Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and

Volume 9 | Issue 17 | Number 1 | Apr 25, 2011
The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus
Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity,
1850–Present アジアの主体性・団結の理想としての汎アジア主義−−
1850年から今日まで
Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Sven Saaler
with its accompanying tensions and discontents,
Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian
Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present
has attracted much media and scholarly
Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman
consensus on what Asia actually stands for as a
attention. Yet for all this talk of Asia, there is no
whole. Is the vast Asian landmass a single entity?
This is a revised, updated and abbreviated
There has never been—and perhaps never will
version of the introduction to the two volume
be—universal agreement on this question.
collection by the authors of Pan-Asianism. A
Where is Asia?
Documentary HistoryVol. 1 covers the years
1850-1920; Vol. 2 covers the years 1850-present,
Attempts to define Asia are almost as old as the
link
term itself. The word “Asia” originated in ancient
(http://www.rowman.com/isbn/1442206020).
Greece in the fifth century BC. It originally
denoted the lands of the Persian Empire
The economic and political power of Asia, the
extending east of the Bosphorus Straits but
world’s largest continent, is increasing rapidly.
subsequently developed into a general term used
According to the latest projections, the gross
by Europeans to describe all the lands lying to
domestic products of China and India, the
the east of Europe. (The point where Europe
world’s most populous nations, will each surpass
ended and Asia began was, however, never
that of the United States in the not-too-distant
clearly defined.) Often, this usage connoted a
future. China’s economy, like Japan’s, is already
threat, real or perceived, by Asia to Europe—a
larger than that of any single European country.
region smaller in area, much less populous,
With this new economic might comes growing
poorer, and far less significant than Asia in terms
diplomatic influence. The twenty-first century,
of global history.
many pundits agree, will be an Asian century.
This undisputed Asian success story, together
The term “Asia” arrived in East Asia relatively
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late, being introduced by Jesuit missionaries in
the sixteenth century. The term is found, written
in Chinese characters (亜細亜), on Chinese maps
of the world made around 1600 under the
supervision of Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), one of
the founders of the Jesuit mission in China.
However, it took two more centuries before the
name gained wide currency in the region. For it
was only with the resumption of European
colonialist expansion in the nineteenth century
that “Asia” ceased to be a technical term used by
1808 map of Asia
East Asian cartographers and, in reaction to the
threat of Western colonialism, came to represent
These arguments about the definition and nature
a specific geopolitical space bound together by
of Asia in reaction to the impending Western
such commonalities as a shared history, close
threat marked the beginnings of Pan-Asianism as
cultural links, a long record of diplomatic
an ideology and a movement. Vague sentiments
relations, trade exchanges, and the notion of a
about strengthening Asian solidarity were
“common destiny.” Although the definitions of
gradually developed into concrete policy
Asia were diverse and often contradictory, the
proposals for a united defense of Asia against the
real or perceived Western threat caused an
encroachments of Western imperialism. In many
increasing number of intellectuals, politicians,
cases, such calls for Asian solidarity, integration,
and activists throughout Asia to argue for
and unity were accompanied by endeavors to
strengthening “Asian” solidarity in relation to
create an Asian identity by postulating
“the West.”
commonalities and identifying traditions of
interaction and interrelationship. Some thinkers
took for granted the existence of an Asian
identity. Others argued that such an identity
must be deliberately forged as a necessary
condition for realizing the ultimate objective of
unifying Asia. Although individual writers in
different places and at different times advocated
a wide variety of strategies and views on the
nature of Asian unity, we can nonetheless
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observe a certain degree of uniformity in the
published
three-volume
anthology,
development of pan-Asian rhetoric from the
Ajiashugishatachi no Koe
(Pan-Asianist Voices),
nineteenth century down to the present—a
which merely reproduces snippets of texts
pattern discussed below.
seemingly at random without any critical
contextualization. Pan-Asianism, however,
In this way, then, a pan-Asian worldview or
receives scant attention in widely available
“style of thought” became established and
English-language source collections on Asia such
diffused throughout the region. It can be
as the volumes in the Introduction to Asian
identified in the writings of intellectuals, political
Civilizations series—Sources of Japanese Tradition,
statements, popular slogans, and even in songs
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Sources of Korean
and poems in a number of Asian states and
Tradition and Sources of Indian Tradition
.
nations. A representative selection of such texts,
all of which are of great significance in the
The end of the Cold War in 1989 produced a
history of Pan-Asianism and Asian regionalism,
surge of interest in issues of regionalism and
are included in this collection. They were written
transnational identity in contemporary East Asia.
or collected in various parts of Asia, from Japan,
This new interest in contemporary regionalism
through Korea, China, Indonesia, and India to
was followed only a decade later by the
the Ottoman Empire, over the past 150 years.
recognition of the long-term historical
These texts, most of which have been translated
developments underlying the geopolitical
into English from a number of Asian languages,
formation of the East Asian region and the idea
are brought to the Western reader for the first
of Asian solidarity (i.e., the ideology of Pan-
time in an easily accessible form. Each source is
Asianism) as important research subjects. Few
accompanied by a commentary that provides
works on Pan-Asianism were published before
essential information, such as a biographical
2000 in any language. But since the beginning of
sketch of the author and the historical context of
the twenty-first century there has been an
the document under consideration.
upsurge of interest in the historical development
A number of collections of pan-Asian texts have
of Pan-Asianism, reflected in a stream of book-
been published in Japanese. The most important
length publications on various aspects of Pan-
of these is Takeuchi Yoshimi’s (1910–1977)
Asianism. In addition, a number of important
volume Asianism, which, in addition to providing
articles have been published on the subject over
a selection of sources, examines the significance
the years. Notwithstanding these publications,
of Pan-Asianism and attempts to place it in its
however, knowledge of Pan-Asianism and its
historical context. Much less useful is the recently
role in modern Asia remains fragmented,
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and economic presence of the Western powers,
unsystematic, and unbalanced.
and their territorial expansion in East Asia. The
This collection aims to remedy the situation by
Opium War of 1839–1842 was a watershed in the
providing readers with the seminal documents of
history of Asian–European encounters. The
Pan-Asianism and thus a comprehensive
British victory led to the recognition, throughout
overview of the development of the ideals of
East Asia, of Europe as a common threat, and it
Asian solidarity and regionalism in the hope of
was at that time that intellectuals and politicians
stimulating further research and providing the
throughout the region began to consider the
foundations for a synthesis of earlier work. The
questions of “Asia” and Asian solidarity. With a
major difficulty with researching Pan-Asianism is
view to giving the concept of solidarity
a linguistic one, for it would be very difficult, if
substance, they began exploring Asian cultural
not impossible, for any one scholar to master all
commonalities and the common historical
the languages necessary for a comprehensive
heritage of the continent. It is of course true that,
study of the subject. So, while the community of
as Hamashita Takeshi and other scholars have
scholars interested in issues of Asian regionalism
pointed out, East Asian countries had a long
continues to grow, linguistic difficulties and the
history of interaction before the nineteenth
barriers of specialization have prevented them
century. This took the form of an interstate
from studying Pan-Asianism as an ideology that
system, centered on China. It was this Sinocentric
transcends linguistic boundaries and national
system (sometimes also known as the tributary
narratives and examining the processes of
system) to which the Western powers had to
regional integration in East Asia from the
accommodate when they first came into contact
perspective of the longue dureé
. We hope that this
with East Asian states. But it was the acute sense
collection, with its comprehensive approach, will
of crisis brought about by the Chinese defeat in
help scholars to look beyond the scope of their
the Opium War that forced Asian writers and
narrow specializations and open new
thinkers actively to pursue the agenda of a united
possibilities for transnational cooperation in
Asia, an Asia with a common goal—the struggle
research on Asian regionalism.
The
Origins
of
against Western imperialism.
Pan-Asianism:
Ideas of Asian solidarity came in a large variety
Macronationalism and Transnationalism
of forms, as did the geographical definitions
The term “Asia” came into common use in East
underlying claims for regional solidarity. Some
Asia only in the mid-nineteenth century in
forms of the concept were based on assumptions
response to the increasing diplomatic, military,
of racial unity, following, curiously enough,
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racial notions that had originated in the West
popularity of a transnational Pan-Asianism and
(Hannaford 1996; Dikötter 1997). Others tended
the transnational political activities of
to emphasize commonalities in culture and
revolutionaries show that the nation was not, as
language (more accurately written language).
is often believed, an absolute and unquestioned
This was especially the case in East Asia, often
value in Asia. (The rise of pan-movements in
referred to in the West as the “Orient” (Japanese:
other parts of the world, too, has been seen as an
Tōyō; Korean: Tong’yang; Chinese: Dongyang), a
expression of skepticism over the absolute
region which, for thousands of years, had been
character of the “nation.”) To be sure, in a
under the powerful influence of Chinese
number of Asian countries protonationalism had
civilization. (The term “East Asia” was used from
already developed before the arrival of the
European powers in the region. Within the
the late nineteenth century on [Japanese: Tōa;
Sinocentric international order, the elites of
Korean: Dong-a; Chinese: Dong-ya].) In this
tributary states in East Asia had developed their
context, some thinkers saw the new quest for
own sense of nationhood. However, in the
solidarity as a strengthening of the existing
nineteenth century new forms of nationalism
networks of economic and cultural exchange.
developed in East Asia. In the same way as Pan-
Others were inspired by pan-movements
Asianism, they represented a reaction to Western
emerging almost simultaneously in Europe and
colonialism and over time developed into
America. The various approaches to Pan-
national independence movements. Yet again,
Asianism, however, all shared a common
emphasis on transnationalism and Asian unity.
these nationalist aspirations and the
Pan-Asianism was at times used to legitimize
characterized by strong transnational links,
independence movements they spawned were
Japan’s territorial aggrandizement and colonial
alliances that were apparent in the activities of
expansion. One of the few detailed studies of
Asian revolutionaries described in this volume:
pan-movements in general, Louis Snyder’s
Indians, Vietnamese, Indonesians, Filipinos, and
Macro-Nationalisms
, characterizes
pan-
activists from other Asian countries who went
movements as “Nationalism Writ Large” or
into exile in Japan, where they exchanged ideas,
“extended nationalisms.” However, as the
promoted pan-Asian solidarity, developed
present volume shows, advocacy of Pan-
networks, and worked together to achieve
Asianism also reflected reservations about the
national independence. Benedict Anderson has
concepts of nation and nationalism, which were
brilliantly traced the process by which the elites
also imported in their modern forms to Asia from
of colonized nations developed a sense of
the West in the nineteenth century. The
national identity and a desire for independence
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from their colonial masters during periods of
founded all over Asia and was also reflected in
residence in the metropole. It could be argued
pan-Asian conferences that took place in Japan,
that a similar process was at work in the case of
China, and Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s.
the revolutionary members of Asian elites.
These developments showed the diversity and
Particularly those who found themselves in
interconnectedness of anti-Western movements
Japan, whether as students or exiles, interacted
throughout Asia. A few examples will suffice to
with other Asians and in this way developed a
illustrate this phenomenon. In 1907, socialists and
common Asian consciousness.
anarchists from China, Japan, and India joined
forces to found the Asiatic Humanitarian
In Japan they came also into contact with
Brotherhood in Tokyo. In 1909 Japanese and
Japanese pan-Asianists, many of whom
Muslim pan-Asianists in Japan established the
supported independence movements throughout
Ajia Gikai (Asian Congress) with the goal of
Asia. The Japanese triumph in the war with
promoting the cause of Asian solidarity and
Russia in 1904–1905 was an important turning
liberation. It was almost certainly this Ajia Gikai
point, an event that accelerated the spread of
that a British intelligence report referred to when
pan-Asian ideas throughout the continent. Many
it mentioned “an Oriental Association in Tokyo
Asians now believed that Japan would soon
attended by Japanese, Filipinos, Siamese, Indians,
assume leadership in the struggle against the
Koreans, and Chinese, where Count Okuma
tyranny of the Western imperialist powers. Even
[Shigenobu, 1838–1922] once delivered an anti-
in distant Egypt, a delighted Arab announced the
American lecture”. In 1921, the Pan-Turanian
news of the Russian defeat to the Chinese
Association was founded in Tokyo to rally
revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925),
Japanese support for the unification of the Turks
who was traveling by boat through the Suez
of Central Asia and their liberation from Russian
Canal. “The joy of this Arab, as a member of the
rule. The association cooperated closely with the
great Asiatic race,” Sun recalled many years later,
Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyōkai) and
“seemed to know no bounds”. However,
other Japanese pan-Asian organizations.
disillusionment with Japan soon set in when it
embarked on a program of carving out its own
The transnational character of Pan-Asianism was
colonial empire at the expense of other Asian
also apparent in its publishing activities. Indian
nations and justified these expansionist policies
pan-Asianists published material in Japan, China,
with pan-Asian rhetoric.
the United States, and Germany; Japanese pan-
Pan-Asian cooperation was institutionalized in
Asianists published in China, India, and the
the form of numerous pan-Asian associations
United States. Koreans, too, such as the court
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noble An Kyongsu (1853–1900), published their
the pan-European movement and the publisher
works in Japan. Journals with a clear pan-Asian
of the journal Pan-Europa, also praised the pan-
message—the source of many of the documents
Asian movement; a Japanese translation of an
in this collection—were published in Japan,
enthusiastic article by him appeared in the
China, and Southeast Asia.
journal Dai Ajiashugi(Greater Asianism).
Although such writings might be dismissed as
As a final striking example of the appeal of Pan-
mere “propaganda”, there is no doubt that a
Asianism to Westerners, in 1934 an anonymous
significant number of Westerners were
Greek wrote a letter addressed “to the Eastern
sympathetic to the ideals of Asian solidarity and
Asiatic people of the Mongolian race and
Pan-Asianism. At the center of pan-Asian
colour,” which he sent to the Japanese consulate
activities in Japan at the end of World War I
at Surabaya in the Dutch East Indies (present-day
stood the now obscure French mystic, Paul
Indonesia). The letter called on Asians to
Richard (1874–1967), whose works were
published in Japan, India, and the United States
cultivate
and certainly widely read, at least in Japan. In the
consciousness, in feeling, in thought
1920s and 1930s, the famous editor of the
and above all in action; harmonize,
Zeitschrift für Geopolitik
, Karl Haushofer
cultivate and facilitate in every
(1869–1946), paid tribute to the pan-Asian
possible way the Inter-Mongolian
movement, seeing it as proof of his theory that
race intercourse and understanding
international relations would come to be
by adopting an official and
dominated by regional blocs. Haushofer
compulsory taught and used Inter-
introduced to his readers the writings and
Mongolian language composed of
activities of pan-Asianists such as Sun Yat-sen,
Words of Chinese, Japanese and
Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), and Benoy
Siamese languages; Eliminate from
Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949). These Asian activists
your mind and from your
and revolutionaries, Haushofer was convinced,
dictionaries the word FOREIGNER,
reflected a trend toward a future world order
and cultivate the Inter-Mongolian
that would be dominated by large, regional blocs,
fellowship and community of
replacing the existing order characterized by the
interest; Harmonize your national,
sovereign nation-state. Another proponent of
political, social, economic and
pan-ideas, Richard Nikolaus Count von
religious life. . . . [F]orm and
Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972), the founder of
organize
7
the
Pan-Mongolian
THE
INTER-
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MONGOLIAN
AND
INTER-
and Kada Tetsuji (1895–1964).
CONTINENTAL HARMONIZED
While the West was important as a reference
AWAKENING, in every city, town,
point, Pan-Asianism as an ideology also posed a
village and hamlet.
significant challenge to the earlier Sinocentric
order—an order not limited to China proper but
This bizarre letter was apparently inspired by the
also appropriated by the nomadic conquerors of
Japanese Foreign Ministry’s so-called Amau
Statement,
which
declared
China and by states on the periphery such as
“special
Korea and Japan. In this context, the seemingly
responsibilities for Japan in East Asia” and which
“more modern” ideology of Pan-Asianism served
was often interpreted as a declaration by Japan of
as an integrating force, helping to fulfill the
an “Asian Monroe Doctrine,” that is, a call for
requirement for the “de-centering of China.”
noninterference by Western powers in China. As
far as one can tell, this appeal to an inter-Asian
Arguably, in many cases the Sinocentric
consciousness elicited no reaction either in Japan
hierarchical view of the world influenced the
or elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless, Pan-Asianism
thinking of some Japanese pan-Asianists who
was stimulated, both positively and negatively,
appropriated it faithfully with one significant
by Western influences. For example, the Japanese
change. For them it was Japan, not China, that
politician Kodera Kenkichi (1877–1949), who had
was to be the new “Middle Kingdom” and the
studied international relations in Europe and the
leader of Asia. Although, as we show, early
United States for almost a decade, justified his
forms of Pan-Asianism often envisioned
advocacy of Pan-Asianism by constantly
cooperation on equal terms, insistence on
referring to the positive role of pan-movements
Japanese leadership (meishu) in Asia increased in
in the West. In contrast to Kodera, Prince Konoe
proportion to the growth and expansion of
Fumimaro (1891–1945) chose to stress the
Japan’s power in East Asia.
negative aspects of the West by rejecting the
universalist pretensions of the League of Nations
For advocates of this “Meishuron” Asianism,
(founded 1919) when he proclaimed the need for
Japan’s leadership was justified on moral
Asian solidarity under Japanese leadership. Both
grounds as well as by the realities of
Kanokogi Kazunobu (1884–1949) and Hirano
international relations. Japan qualified as the
Yoshitarō (1897–1980) were strongly influenced
leader of Asia because it was morally superior to
by German ideas, as were the 1930s proponents
China, which was in political turmoil, and had
of a regional bloc in East Asia such as the
always been as a result of its frequent dynastic
political scientist Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1980)
changes. In contrast, Japan, many Japanese elites
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believed, was qualified to lead Asia because of its
some commentators insist that Japan never
divine imperial dynasty that was “unbroken
officially pursued a pan-Asian foreign policy
through ages immemorial.” Japan, in this view,
before or even during the Asia-Pacific War
was a “chosen” country, the “Land of the
(1931–1945), it is undeniable that the Japanese
Gods”—qualities that uniquely fitted it for a
government frequently utilized pan-Asian
special “mission” to liberate Asia from Western
rhetoric in the 1930s and 1940s in order to bolster
oppression, become the leader of the region, and,
claims to Japanese leadership in East Asia and
as its more imaginative supporters asserted,
legitimize its colonial rule over parts of Asia.
unite the whole world under the benevolent rule
In The Origins of Totalitarianism
, Hannah Arendt
of the Japanese emperor, following the ancient
suggested a close link between nineteenth-
slogan hakkō ichiu
, or “The Eight Corners of the
century Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism and
World [United] under One Roof.” Rather than
twentieth-century
drawing on the foundational myths, other pan-
totalitarianism
and
expansionism. “Nazism and Bolshevism,” she
Asian writers justified Japan’s leadership of Asia
contended, “owe more to Pan-Germanism and
on the grounds of Japan’s successful
Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other
modernization program, an effort they contrasted
ideology or political movement. This is most
with the failure of the rest of Asia in this regard.
evident in foreign policies, where the strategies
From this perspective, Japan’s technological
of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have
advances served as evidence of Japanese
followed so closely the well-known programs of
superiority. But whatever the grounds for such
conquest outlined by the pan-movements before
claims, the fact remains that many Japanese pan-
and during the First World War . . .”. Although it
Asianists, in various ways, consciously or
would be an exaggeration to claim that Pan-
unconsciously, provided justification for Japan’s
Asianism formed an important component of any
colonial rule and territorial expansion in Asia.
totalitarian developments in modern Asia, one
Pan-Asianism and Empire
cannot overlook the connection between PanAsianism and Japanese ultranationalism
One of the reasons why, for a long time after
(discussed below) and also the contribution of
1945, Pan-Asianism was largely ignored by
this ideology to the legitimization of Japanese
researchers—not to mention politicians and
colonial rule and empire building in Asia in the
diplomats—was its fateful connection to Japanese
first half of the twentieth century.
imperialism and the role it played as an ideology
that legitimized Japan’s empire-building project
As early as 1910, pan-Asian rhetoric was used by
in the first half of the twentieth century. While
the Japanese government to legitimize the
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annexation of Korea. The Annexation Treaty
countries to their ancient status of
referred specifically to commonalities between
being one homogeneous whole.
Japanese and Koreans, such as racial origins, a
common history and culture, and a shared
The assertion of racial and cultural
destiny. This remained the orthodox way of
commonalities presented here went hand in hand
justifying and legitimizing Japanese rule in Korea
with the legitimization of Japanese superiority on
throughout the colonial period and was
the grounds that Japan was a country chosen by
reiterated time and again in both public and
the gods. As early as the late 1910s, a number of
private statements. The same pan-Asian rhetoric
writers, such as Kanokogi Kazunobu, Kita Ikki,
was continuously reaffirmed and applied to
and Ōkawa Shūmei, spoke of a divine Japanese
other colonial territories. For example, in 1939, in
“mission” to liberate Asia. This high-sounding
the semi-official journal Contemporary Japan
, a
objective was often difficult to distinguish from
writer insisted that
the substitution of one form of colonial
oppression (by Europeans) for another (by fellow
contrary to the general assumption
Asian Japanese). And a belief in Japan’s divine
held abroad, and even entertained
mission was by no means limited to radical
by some Japanese, Chosen [Korea],
reformists. Even mainstream writers who
Taiwan, and even Manchukuo are
eschewed ideologically driven rhetoric and
not Japanese colonies according to
sought to explain international relations in terms
the Western way of thinking. . . . “To
of Realpolitik, such as Tokutomi Sohō
make the world one household” is
(1863-1957), urged Japan to establish an “Asian
an expression used by the Japanese
Monroe Doctrine.” In doing so, Tokutomi may
to indicate their moral principle of
have been applying an idea of Western
co-existence and co-prosperity. . . .
provenance to international relations in East
Although their languages and
Asia, but he still believed, like Kita and
customs are now different, Japan
Kanokogi, that Japan had a special “mission” to
and Korea were especially close to
accomplish in East Asia.
each other until about thirteen
centuries ago, there having been a
large intermixture of both blood and
culture before that time. . . . Japan’s
annexation of the peninsula might
be taken as a reversion of the two
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with earlier concepts of an “Asian Monroe
Doctrine.” The notion of an “East Asian bloc”
was also popular with Marxists and socialists, as
can be seen in the writings of Takahashi
Kamekichi (1894–1977) and some members of the
Shōwa Kenkyūkai, the brain trust founded by
Prince Konoe Fumimaro, prime minister in
1937–1939 and 1940–1941.
The intimate connection of Pan-Asianism with
Japan’s empire-building ambitions leads to
The Asian Monroe Doctrine
another central problem of Pan-Asianism—the
inherent ambiguity of the concepts involved. It is
In the 1930s, claims that Japan’s empire was an
clear that, from the outset, pan-Asian thought
embodiment of pan-Asian ideals were voiced
was riddled with ambiguity and contradictions
more frequently and openly than before. This
that made this ideology capable of being used to
was due to the impact of “regional bloc thinking”
legitimize both the anticolonial struggle against
that was highly influential at the time. For
the West and the domination of one Asian nation
example, Rōyama Masamichi insisted in 1934
by another. This ambiguity is also inherent in the
that “the Pan-Asiatic movement” was a “decisive
terminology used to describe the ideology.
influence responsible for the establishment of the
Empire.” Though he lamented that this
Problems of Terminology
movement lacked “any coherent programme
under any prominent leader,” he nevertheless
As stated at the start of this introduction, Pan-
regarded it as full of promise for the future. As
Asianism poses a problem as a topic of scholarly
evidence, he noted with satisfaction that “many
inquiry even at the level of terminology. The
small groups of so-called Pan-Asianists loosely
object of inquiry is hard to define and is almost
affiliated through study organizations . . . have
as elusive as a continuously shifting target. There
sprung up like mushrooms during the past two
is no scholarly consensus on the definition of
years in both Japan and Manchuria”. Rōyama’s
“Asia,” on pan-movements, or on ideologies with
notion of an “East Asian bloc” gained wide
a transnational focus that have evolved over
prominence in Japan in the late 1930s, amplified
time. Likewise, the question of how Pan-
by a fusion with the geopolitical ideas of Karl
Asianism is related to other pan-movements is
Haushofer and Carl Schmidt (1888–1985) and
far from settled.
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As we have seen, the emergence of Pan-Asianism
were dispatched to Europe and the United States
was inseparable from the rise of Japan as a major
expressly to dispel any Western suspicions as to
power and Japan’s struggle with China for
Japan’s pan-Asian ambitions. For example, in the
leadership in Asia. But Pan-Asianism also
United States, Harvard-educated Baron Kaneko
reflected attempts by East Asian elites to forge
Kentarō (1853–1942) dismissed rumors voiced in
Asian unity by bringing Japan and China
the “yellow” press that Japan was aiming to form
together. Thus, early manifestations of the
an Asian federation, as did diplomat Suematsu
movement were characterized by the close
Kenchō (1855–1920) in Europe. As late as 1919,
cooperation of ideologues, activists, and
Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865–1950) ridiculed the
politicians from Japan, China, and Korea. But the
idea of a Japanese-led Asian alliance against the
need for cooperation and, thus, compromise
West in a publication funded by the Japanese
resulted in pan-Asian ideas being characterized
government:
by a marked lack of specific content. Although
the concept of Pan-Asianism can be traced from
Among our own people, there are
the mid-nineteenth century on, the term “Pan-
some who do not rightly interpret
Asianism” (or Asianism, Greater Asianism) was
the history of their own country,
not in use in China, Korea, and Japan before the
and who do not take their national
1890s and occurs only infrequently prior to the
strength into proper consideration
1910s.
and who, being prompted by certain
fanatical ideas, advocate the alliance
Around the turn of the century, Western writers
of the yellow races against the
who were clamoring about the threat of the
white, an alliance of which Japan
Yellow Peril occasionally used the terms “Pan-
should be the leader, and with that
Asianism” or “pan-Asiatic league” in warning of
object in view, they favour the
the dangers a united Asia would pose for
partition of China. Those who argue
Western supremacy. The Japanese government
in this strain have evidently lost
was quick to lay any Western suspicions on this
their mental balance.
score to rest, particularly after the start of the war
with Russia, a Western power, in 1904. It took
Just as the government went to great lengths to
this popular Western agitation so seriously that
deny any association with Pan-Asianism, the
on many occasions it officially disclaimed any
opposition placed a strong emphasis on Pan-
interest in promoting closer relations with its
Asianism, calling for the unification of the
(weak) Asian neighbors. Japanese diplomats
“yellow race,” that is, the Asian peoples. As early
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as 1874, Ueki Emori (1857–1892), a prominent
and slogans when propagating their ideals. In the
member of the opposition freedom and peoples’
1880s, the term Kōa, or “Raising (or Developing)
rights movement (jiyū minken undō
), had attacked
Asia,” was the most widely used slogan,
what he considered the pro-Western policy of the
implying the need for Asia to modernize in order
government and, insisting that the West was
to catch up with the technologically advanced
Japan’s enemy, called for the formation of an
West. The term was not without problems,
Asian League (Ajia rengō). Ueki held a version of
however. For example, an organization called the
Pan-Asianism that assumed equality among
Kōakai (Raising Asia Society) was founded in
Asian nations. He even advocated independence
Tokyo in 1880. Its membership was
for the Ryukyu archipelago (present-day
predominantly Japanese—they had chosen the
Okinawa Prefecture), a previously independent
group’s name—but it included some Koreans
kingdom that was annexed by Japan in the 1870s.
and Chinese who objected to the name on the
An anonymous writer in the journal Ajia (Asia)
grounds that it implied—in contrast to
and the antigovernment activist and politician
successful, modern Japan—that Asia was
Tarui Tōkichi (1850–1922) made similar
backward, oppressed, and downtrodden, and
proposals in the 1880s. It was not until 1903 that
could be saved only by “raising” it through
the first acknowledgment of the potential of Pan-
Japanese leadership and advice. Following such
Asianism as a significant factor in international
criticism, the Kōakai was renamed Ajia Kyōkai
relations was made, when the art critic Okakura
(Asia Association) in 1883. But it was not only
Tenshin (1862–1913), famous for coining the
Japanese pan-Asianists who believed in Japanese
phrase “Asia is one,” stated in his book The
superiority; many Asians also acknowledged
Awakening of the Eastthat a “Pan-Asiatic
their political and economic backwardness in
Alliance” would “in itself constitute an immense
relation to Japan. Many Chinese recognized the
force.” However, the impact of this statement
failure of modernization, at least implicitly, in
may have been somewhat reduced in Japan by
their nation, accounting for the formation of
the fact that Okakura had written his book in
political associations with names such as the
English for an Indian and not a Japanese
Raise China Society (Xingzhonghui), founded by
audience.
Sun Yat-sen in 1894, and the China Revival
Society (Huaxinghui), founded in Hunan 1904.
While the term “Pan-Asianism” entered the
mainstream political vocabulary only in the
Another early term used to describe pan-Asian
1910s, in the nineteenth century advocates of
solidarity was the classical Chinese phrase fuche
Asian unity could draw on a number of terms
chunchi (Japanese: hosha shinshi
; Korean: poch’a
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sonch’i), which means “mutual dependence” or,
fear in Japan of a future “clash of races,” that is, a
literally, “a relationship as close as that between
war fought along racial lines in which Japan
the lips and the teeth or between the chassis and
would have no choice but to side with the Asian,
the wheels of a cart.” This image implied a high
or “colored,” peoples against the white powers of
degree of interdependence, but, in contrast to the
the West. Parallel with the development of this
potentially hierarchical Kōa, it presumed equal
kind of racial thinking in Asia, the idea of the
relations among Asian nations. Its origin also
“White Peril” also gained ground. It was an
indicates the influence of Chinese classical
inversion of the “Yellow Peril” hysteria that
scholarship on early Pan-Asianism. This phrase
affected Europe at the time. The proponents of
was used by early pan-Asianists particularly in
the “White Peril,” including some Europeans
the 1870s and 1880s, but it can be found in many
(e.g., Gulick 1905), believed that the threat to
of the texts presented in this collection well into
civilization came not from the “yellow” peoples
the twentieth century.
of Asia but from the predatory European powers.
A third influential slogan used to express pan-
It was only in the 1910s that the term “Pan-
Asian sentiment and activism that was very
Asianism” made its debut in intellectual
popular at the turn of the century was “Same
discourse. Japanese political scientist Ōyama
Culture, Same Race” (Japanese: dōbun dōshu;
Ikuo (1880–1955) used the term for the first time
Chinese: tongwen tongzhong; Korean: tongmun
to describe Chinese political associations which
tongjong), which likewise did not imply
were promoting “Greater Asianism” (Da
hierarchical relations between Asian nations or
Yazhouzhuyi) “in secretly published pamphlets”
make claim to the superiority of any one country.
with the intention of spreading anti-Western
In Japan, the term was used particularly often by
sentiment in China”. Ōyama himself rejected
Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), who,
Asianism because he saw the emergence of this
uncharacteristically for an early pan-Asianist,
ideology as a sign of increasing nationalistic and
was a member of Japan’s ruling elite, and by the
xenophobic tendencies in Japan. While Ōyama
Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture
criticized Asianism from his position as a liberal
Society). The term also appears frequently in
intellectual, the Japanese government remained
Japanese journals of the day and seems to have
wary of pan-Asian proposals because it feared
received some acceptance in other Asian
that such tendencies might undermine Japan’s
countries. Closely related to the rise of racial
good relations with the Western powers.
thinking in Japan and East Asia, this slogan also
Between its signing in 1902 and 1921–1922, when
has to be seen as an expression of the growing
it was superseded by the Washington treaty
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system, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was always
would not be able to “digest and assimilate the
at the heart of Japan’s foreign policy. The
strong national and racial characteristics which
alliance, however, would be in jeopardy if it
distinguish the Japanese.” Mahan seemed
transpired that Japan was supporting an
moreover to believe that in excluding the
independence movement in India as part of a
Japanese, Californians were acting in the interests
pan-Asian foreign policy. On several occasions,
not only of the United States but also of “the
Britain showed suspicion over Indian–Japanese
whole community of European civilization”. In
relations, particularly during World War I when
the debate Chirol, who had retired from his
members of the Indian independence movement
position at The Timestwo years before and joined
were cooperating with Germany. For example,
the Foreign Office, criticized the Land Bill.
the visit of the celebrated poet and first Asian
However, it appears that he was a voice in the
Nobel laureate, Rabindranath Tagore, to Japan in
wilderness. Even the editors of The Timesseemed
1916 caused “considerable uneasiness in
to support Mahan when they criticized Japan for
London” over “a Japanese–Indian understanding
what they regarded as contradictions in its
that could eventually take a political and anti-
foreign policy:
British form”. The British intelligence service
kept close tabs on Indian independence activists
On the one hand, she [Japan]
in Japan (and China) and their Japanese
demands recognition because her
sympathizers.
people are not as other Asiatics. On
the other hand, . . . her publicists are
If only to avoid alienating its British ally and
now asserting that “to Japan is
other Western powers, both the Japanese
assigned the leadership in the claim
government and the press tended to be highly
of the ‘coloured’ races against the
critical of pan-Asian schemes. The hostile tone
‘non-coloured.’” These two sets are
adopted by Japanese newspapers during a public
mutually destructive. Japan cannot
debate on Pan-Asianism in 1913 well illustrates
have it both ways. . . . She must
this point. In a debate with the British journalist
make up her mind whether she
and diplomat Sir Valentine Chirol (1852–1929),
wishes to present herself as aloof
the celebrated American naval strategist Admiral
from other Asiatic races, or as the
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) defended the
avowed champion of Pan-Asiatic
1913 California “Alien Land Bill”, which would
ideals.
prevent Asian immigrants from owning land or
property in the state on the grounds that America
Such criticisms clearly struck a sensitive chord in
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Japan. Throughout June and July 1913, these
confidence resulted in an outpouring of pan-
statements were discussed at great length by
Asian writings during the last two years of the
Japan’s leading newspapers, including the Osaka
war. These writings should be seen as a Japanese
Asahi Shinbun, the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun
, and
contribution to the debate on how a new
the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun
. The Asahi
international order could guarantee peace. But
unequivocally declared that it considered “Pan-
Japanese writers were not alone in arguing for
Asianism an illusion (kūsō),” while the Nichinichi the necessity of regional integration. There were
ridiculed the notion that Japan would “lead the
also notably some Chinese commentators who,
Asian peoples to fight against the Euro-American
while critical of Japanese Pan-Asianism,
white powers” as “useless and reckless.” It was
nonetheless advocated regional integration on
in these articles dismissing the accusations made
the grounds that only a regional, pan-Asian order
by Mahan and the Times that the terms Han-
would result in the achievement of a permanent
Ajiashugi (“Pan-Asianism,” Mainichi and
peace. When the idea of a League of Nations
Nichinichi) and Zen-Ajiashugi (“All-Asianism,”
surfaced during World War I, pan-Asian writers
Asahi) made their first appearance in the Japanese
in Japan reacted by proposing an East Asian
language. They were coined specifically to
League (Tōa renmei) that would guarantee peace
express the English term “Pan-Asianism,” which
on a regional basis.
previously had had no exact Japanese equivalent.
By the war’s end, pan-Asianist visions of regional
At this stage, as indicated by the critical, derisory
integration had thus come to be accepted, at least
tone of the newspaper articles, these neologisms
by public opinion and some politicians, as a
were used in a derogatory sense.
realistic scenario for future international relations
Yet, little by little, the negative connotations of
in East Asia. Certainly, in contrast to the vague
the term “Asianism” were lost in the aftermath of
professions of pan-Asian unity that had been the
World War I. The bloodbath in Europe made
norm up until the beginning of the twentieth
Japan the dominant power in East Asia and
century, the ideology of Pan-Asianism had by
brought about an upsurge in Japan’s self-
1918 become concrete and well defined. It had
confidence. At the same time, it stimulated
gained recognition in public discourse and was
international attempts to establish a new world
no longer confined to the political fringes. Terms
order after the war, an order that would
such as Pan-Asianism (Han Ajiashugi), Greater
guarantee peace—if not permanent peace, then at
Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi) , All-Asianism (Zen
least peace for the foreseeable future. Within
Ajiashugi) , and the “Asian Monroe Doctrine”
these developments, Japan’s newly found self-
(Ajia Monrōshugi), largely absent from public
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discourse until then, now began to appear
exclusionist policies was also attested to by a
frequently in newspapers and journals. This
slew of articles on the subject in the Japanese
proliferation of neologisms reflected a growth of
press. For example, the influential journal Nihon
diverse and sophisticated approaches to the issue
oyobi Nihonjin(Japan and the Japanese) brought
of Asian solidarity in all its ramifications. The
out a special issue on “Greater Asianism” (Dai
wide range of responses can be gleaned from the
Ajiashugi) in October 1924, and the Asian
flood of articles on Pan-Asianism that appeared
Newspaper Company published a call for the
during and after the war. While these works
“Foundation of a Greater East Asian
indicated the spread and acceptance of the term
Federation”.
“Pan-Asianism” in Japanese discourse, perhaps
Not all pan-Asian slogans and catchphrases—like
more important they also defined Asianism in
some of the new associations—survived. Many
concrete terms and demanded that Japan act in
enjoyed a brief popularity and then quickly
accordance with pan-Asian principles in
disappeared from public discourse. Some terms,
international relations.
however, resurfaced in later years, often in
The new popularity of Pan-Asianism in Japanese
different contexts. The notion of an “East Asian
intellectual discourse and politics received a
League,” for example, exemplified the
boost when news of a new immigration law that
entrenchment of the term “East Asia” in Japanese
would bar Japanese from immigration to the
public discourse around the turn of the century.
United States (part of the 1924 Immigration or
However, after the wave of anti-American
Johnson-Reed Act) reached Japan. Protests
protests subsided in 1924, “East Asia” receded
against the act were held through the length and
from public discourse, only to return to the
breadth of Japan, events that in many cases
mainstream discussion in the late 1930s, in
turned into demonstrations of pan-Asian
somewhat modified form, as the “East Asian
solidarity.
Cooperative Community” (tōa kyōdōtai or tōyō
kyōdōtai) . The formation of a “Greater Asian
In this climate of anti-American agitation a
League” (Dai Ajia rengō) was also proposed in the
number of new associations sprang up whose
founding manifesto of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai
names—such as the Federation of East Asian
(Greater Asia Association) in 1933. This
Races (Ajia Minzoku Gikai, founded in 1923) or
manifesto, drafted a year after Japan had left the
the Oriental Co-Existence Society (Tōyō
Kyōzonkai)—proclaimed
their
League of Nations, insisted that such a league
pan-Asian
was necessary given the global trend toward the
orientation. The invigoration of popular interest
formation of regional blocs.
in Pan-Asianism as a result of America’s
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“All-Asianism” (Zen Ajiashugi), another term for
the Agency for the Development of Asia
Asianism or Pan-Asianism, was launched by
(sometimes also known in English as the East
Ōkawa Shūmei in the wake of the 1913
Asia Development Board). The Kōa-in was a
Chirol–Mahan debate in articles he contributed to
cabinet-level agency with the primary task of
Tairiku (The Continent). However, the term did
coordinating political, economic, and cultural
not catch on and vanished from public discourse
activities in regard to China. While it engaged in
in the early 1920s. In any event, all these terms
research on Chinese affairs and published its
were used largely interchangeably. Even Ōkawa
findings in the Kōa-in Chōsa Geppō(Kōa-in
on occasion used Han Ajiashugiin the same
Monthly Research Bulletin), some scholars argue
context as Zen Ajiashugi, and he appears to have
that it was also involved in the recruitment and
made no distinction between the two.
management of forced labor and even in the
opium trade in China. Such were the powers of
The term “Kōa” perhaps enjoyed the most
this agency that only formal diplomatic relations
remarkable career of any pan-Asian term. Kōa
with China remained within the jurisdiction of
first appeared in the 1880s, when it was used as
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kōa-in was
the main slogan to express pan-Asian solidarity.
integrated into the Ministry of Greater East Asia
However, it was quickly discarded because it
(Daitōa-shō) in 1942, which from that time on
implied Japanese leadership of the pan-Asian
directed Japan’s political and diplomatic
movement. But the term was not forgotten
relations with the members of the newly declared
completely, as it reappeared in the 1930s at a time
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
when Japan was adopting a form of PanAsianism in its foreign policy. By then, Japan had
This official endorsement of what is probably the
begun to abandon its policy of cooperation with
oldest pan-Asian term caused a veritable boom in
the Anglo-American powers and was openly
the use of Kōa. Newspapers used the term
pursuing a strategy of destroying the political
frequently; journals incorporating it in their
status quo in East Asia. The unity of Asia and, at
title—such as Kōa Kyōiku (Education to Raise
the same time, the establishment of Japanese
Asia) or simply Kōa—were founded, while
hegemony in East Asia had become Japan’s
politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals discussed
ultimate objective. Although no government
the new Kōa policy. These figures included a
decrees contained the terms “Asianism” or “Pan-
foreign minister, and a prime minister who
Asianism” even in the 1930s, the Japanese
proclaimed the “Raising of Asia” a “holy task”.
government demonstrated its commitment to the
Under the circumstances it is no surprise to learn
pan-Asian cause in 1938 by creating the Kōa-in,
that, in Japanese schools, children were taught
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from a “Colonial Kōa Textbook”. Newly founded
Association), in addition to think tanks engaged
political organizations and a number of political
in research on East Asia, such as the Dōmei Tōa
conferences held in the late 1930s and early 1940s
Kenkyūkai (Alliance East Asia Research
also were characterized as contributing to the
Association), the Tōa Chōsakai (East Asia
policy of “Raising Asia.” In 1941, the Dai Nihon
Investigation Association), the Tōa Kenkyūjo
Kōa Dōmei (Greater Japanese League for Raising
(East Asia Research Institute), and the Tōa
Asia) was founded. Its members and advisers
Chitsujo Kenkyūkai (East Asian Order Research
included venerable pan-Asianists such as
Association).
Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944) and Kuzuu
These wartime efforts to “raise Asia” had also an
Yoshihisa (1874–1958), party politicians well
international dimension. A year before the
known for their pan-Asian sympathies such as
founding of the League, a “Raising Asia Welfare
Nagai Ryūtarō (1881–1944), as well as a large
Congress” (Kōa kōsei taikai) was held in Osaka
number of senior military figures, such as Araki
in October 1940 that was attended by
Sadao (1877–1966), Yanagawa Heisuke
representatives of eleven countries, including
(1879–1945), Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950), Ōi
Japan’s Asian and also its two European allies,
Shigemoto (1863–1951), Hayashi Senjūrō
Germany and Italy. Even today, the name of a
(1876–1943), Honjō Shigeru (1876–1945), Matsui
Japanese insurance company, Nippon Kōa
Iwane (1878–1948), and Abe Nobuyuki
Sonpo, which was founded in 1944, reminds us
(1875–1943). This impressive lineup, which
of the former popularity of this pan-Asian term.
included two former (Hayashi and Abe) and one
future prime minister (Koiso), reflected a
Another term pan-Asianists began to use in the
growing interest in the potential of Pan-Asianism
late 1920s was “Kingly Way” (Chinese: wangdao
;
in military circles. In the atmosphere of social
Japanese: ōdō). In the 1930s it was used with
mobilization that thickened as the war escalated,
increasing frequency as a way of emphasizing
the League became a central organization,
the region’s legacy of Confucian values and the
incorporating fifty-three associations and
significance of Confucianism as a potential basis
institutions of pan-Asian character under its
for the unification of Asians. The “Kingly Way”
umbrella. These included the Tōa Dōbunkai, the
implied benevolent rule and was used as a
Dōjinkai (Comrades’ Society), the Tōa Renmei
fundamental concept to help legitimize Japan’s
Kyōkai (East Asian League Association), the Tōa
construction of the new state of Manchukuo after
Kensetsu Kyōkai (Association for Constructing
1932. Japanese “guidance” of this new, ostensibly
East Asia), the Tōa Kyōkai (East Asia
independent state—in reality it was a puppet
Association), and the Tōyō Kyōkai (Oriental
state—was seen in paternalistic, Confucian terms
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as the kindly direction and advice offered to a
penned by a Korean, An Chung-gŭn (Ahn
younger brother (Manchukuo) by his elder
Choong Kun, 1879–1910), a member of the anti-
brother (Japan). In fact, as is well known, under
Japanese movement in Korea. In 1910, while
Japan’s “benevolent” guidance Manchukuo
imprisoned on death row for assassinating Prince
became a cornerstone of the Japanese Empire. It
Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), Japan’s minister-
was ruthlessly exploited to provide materiel for
resident in Korea, he wrote a visionary essay in
the Japanese war effort, and this economic
which he talked of a united Asia facing the
exploitation, carried out under the cloak of
reality of a coming war between the yellow and
paternalistic
contributed
white races. In order to prepare for this conflict,
significantly to the discrediting of pan-Asian
An advocated a transnational military force and
ideology—the subject to which we turn next.
even a single currency for an East Asian political
benevolence,
union. However unrealistic in the climate of the
Pan-Asianism and the Asians
time, An’s vision testified to the increasing
importance of Pan-Asianism in international
As we have argued, Pan-Asianism was
relations in East Asia.
particularly important in the framework of
intellectual debate and policy formulation in
Japan, but other Asians also made an important
contribution to the discussion—comment that
was sometimes supportive, sometimes critical.
While in China the term apparently made its
debut in the 1910s, in Korea similar terms were
used to express similar sets of ideas a decade or
so earlier. At the turn of the century, the term
“Easternism” (Tong’yangjuyi) was first found in
Korean writings on the subject to describe the
idea of close cooperation between Korea, China,
and Japan. Although Koreans were on the whole
An Chung-gŭn
suspicious of Pan-Asianism as a concept that
served to cloak Japanese attempts to establish
As official and public support for Pan-Asianism
their leadership of East Asia, anxiety over a
as a tool for establishing Japanese hegemony in
future “race war” with the West was just as
East Asia grew stronger in Japan, the likelihood
widespread in Korea as in Japan. In fact, one of
of the acceptance of pan-Asian ideals waned in
the first concrete pan-Asian policy proposals was
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other Asian countries. This distrust of Pan-
greatly limited. But it was not extinguished
Asianism was particularly pronounced in East
completely. Some Korean pan-Asianists
Asia, where the Japanese threat was most
continued to advocate a more or less equal
palpable. In Korea, for example, Pan-Asianism
“union of the Korean and Japanese cultures
was marginalized. Korea was a special case
within the context of a broader Asian alliance,”
because of its geographical proximity to Japan.
or within “a pan-Asian community,” until the
Most Korean intellectuals and political activists
end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Some
had been fairly skeptical about the idea of Asian
Koreans who continued to adhere to the ideal of
solidarity even in the nineteenth century, even if
pan-Asian solidarity even interpreted the
some pro-Japanese modernizers, such as Kim
outbreak of war with the United States in 1941
Ok-kyun (1851–1894), had promoted Pan-
(or the “Greater East Asian War,” as it was
Asianism as a useful tool for cooperation with
officially called in the Japanese Empire) as the
Japan against the threat posed by imperial
beginning of “a real war of races—the Yellow
Russia. In spite of Korean suspicions over
against the White”. For these Koreans it was clear
Japanese ambitions for the Korean peninsula,
that Korea, as an Asian nation, had to side
many Korean intellectuals, strongly influenced
(temporarily at least) with Japan in this war of
by social Darwinism during the final years of the
the races, even though Koreans were unhappy
nineteenth century, were convinced that for
with Japanese colonial rule.
historical reasons the Koreans—“a backward and
Some Chinese intellectuals and activists also
thus inferior race”—had no choice but to form an
continued to adhere to Pan-Asianism in the first
alliance with China and Japan as a result of
decades of the twentieth century, as is evident
Korea’s proximity to its two neighbors. Others,
from the quotation by Sun Yat-sen discussed
who feared the much-trumpeted Western peril
above. However, open criticism of Japanese Pan-
much more than any alleged racial inferiority,
Asianism as a tool of Japanese expansionism was
reached the same conclusions.
voiced as early as 1907, when the scholar and
After Korea became a Japanese protectorate in
revolutionary Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936)
1905 and a Japanese colony in 1910, Korean
described Japan as the “public enemy” (kōteki) of
writers naturally became highly suspicious of
Asia. Zhang gave vent to his conviction that
their powerful neighbor and advocated
Japan was an imperialist predator rather than a
resistance and “self-strengthening” as a way of
victim of imperialist oppression to which calls for
regaining their independence. Under Japanese
Asian solidarity could properly be directed.
rule, the appeal of Pan-Asianism to Koreans was
Zhang also questioned the validity of pan-Asian
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discourse in general. Rejecting the simplistic
death in 1925) and his confidant Wang Ching-wei
scheme of “oppressed yellow Asians” and “white
(1883–1944), remained hopeful that Pan-
oppressors,” he stressed the “double
Asianism might yet play a constructive role in
enslavement of the Chinese”—bondage by
Asia’s fight against Anglo-Saxon imperialism,
Western imperialism and by “foreign,” that is,
and a group of Chinese pan-Asianists published
Manchu, rule. His argument led him to
a journal, Asiatic Asia, in Shanghai from 1941.
emphasize the urgent need to establish Chinese
However, in the end Japanese efforts to
nationalism as a counterforce to Manchu rule.
legitimize its various forms of aggression,
However, these views did not prevent him from
including the war against China (1937–1945), as a
forming the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood
pan-Asian “holy war” completely discredited the
to promote cooperation with other Asian
idea of Asian solidarity in China for many years
peoples.
to come.
Another revolutionary leader of modern China,
In India, by contrast, Pan-Asianism left few
Li Dazhao (1888–1927), also rejected Pan-
negative legacies, probably because, unlike Korea
Asianism as advocated by its Japanese
and China, that country had never come under
exponents. In 1919, he harshly criticized Japanese
Japanese rule. In India, attempts to secure
pan-Asian writings as an expression of Japanese
Japanese support for the national independence
expansionism. However, while rejecting Japanese
movement had a long tradition and resulted in
forms of Asianism, Li nevertheless conceded that
close connections with Japan. A number of
some kind of regional cooperation was necessary
Indian revolutionaries found asylum there, and
to counter the threat of Western imperialism and
some even used Japan as a base for their pan-
called for the formulation of a “New Asianism”
Asian activities. Among them was Taraknath Das
that presumably would be untainted by Japanese
(1884–1958), who frequently published in Japan
distortions. The tense atmosphere of pan-Asian
under the pseudonym “An Asian.” In works
conferences organized by Japanese and Chinese
published in Japan and China, Das called on
groups in Nagasaki in 1926 and Shanghai in 1927,
“Asian Youth” to resist the West: “Every Asian
however, clearly demonstrated that Chinese
youth . . . who possesses even a tiny bit of the
hostility to Japanese versions of Pan-Asianism
feeling of self-respect should strive to achieve the
had undermined any realistic expectation of close
goal of assertion of Asia to the fullest sense of its
Sino–Japanese cooperation in an atmosphere of
meaning.” Clearly Japan’s invasion of China did
true solidarity.
nothing to dampen Das’s hopes for Japan as the
liberator of Asia, for as late as 1941 he insisted
Some Chinese, such as Sun Yat-sen (until his
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that Japan was “the only Eastern Power which
imitation of Western practices. However, in 1924,
can challenge the mighty forces of the West. . . .
when demonstrations against the United States
People of the East . . . have set their eyes on
Asian Exclusion Act erupted in Japan, Tagore
[Japan] as their possible saviour.” Rash Behari
spoke out on a number of occasions in favor of
Bose (1886–1945), who was naturalized as a
pan-Asian unity to audiences of several
Japanese subject in 1923, also used his Japanese
thousand. Announced at these rallies as “The
contacts to campaign on behalf of Pan-Asianism
Pride of the Orient,” Tagore called on his fellow
and Indian independence. He was an influential
Asians to “awake, arise, agitate, agitate and
advocate of a Japan-centered Pan-Asianism and
agitate against this monstrous and inhuman
remained so until his death in 1944. His
insult which America has heaped upon us.” He
compatriot Subhas Chandra Bose (no relation,
hoped that the discriminatory U.S. immigration
1897–1945), who met Hitler in his attempt to
law would “unite the Asiatic races who will
marshal support for Indian independence, also
awake from their long sleep and . . . prove
entertained great hopes for Japan as Asia’s
invulnerable against the attacks of the White
savior. He held meetings with Japanese leaders
Races” and motivate them to erect an “Empire of
to encourage their support for his nationalist
Asia . . . [that would] spring roaring into the
cause and participated in the Assembly of the
arena of the world’s politics.”
Greater East Asiatic Nations in 1943.
Greater East Asia Conference, 1943. Tojo
Hideki (center), Subhas Chandra Bose
(right), Wang Ching-wei (third left), José
Laurel (third right)
Rabindranath Tagore in Japan, 1916
South East Asians became suspicious of Japanese
The celebrated writer and cultural nationalist
Pan-Asianism only in the late 1930s—much later
Rabindranath Tagore was a longtime friend of
than the Koreans and Chinese. The main reason
Okakura Tenshin and visited Japan several times
for this was, unlike in Korea and China, the
in the 1910s and 1920s. During his first visit,
Japanese were not perceived as a threat to a
Tagore condemned Japanese nationalism as an
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region dominated by the Western powers.
Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob (1911–1979) founded,
Consequently, Japanese-directed Pan-Asianism
with Japanese support, the pro-Japanese and
enjoyed great appeal throughout Southeast Asia.
pan-Malay (if not pan-Asian) Kesatuan Melayu
In the Philippines, Japanese pan-Asianists had
Muda (League of Malay Youth). Its members
already supported the independence movement
cooperated with the Japanese forces during the
under Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) as early as
invasion of the Malay Peninsula against the
1898. In 1915, a Pan-Oriental Society was formed
British and continued to do so throughout the
in Manila. The society was headed by General
Japanese occupation.
Jose Alejandrino (1870–1951), who had gained his
The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in the
rank in the struggle against the United States
wake of Pearl Harbor and the economic
and, after surrendering in 1901, went on to enjoy
exploitation of the region that followed called
a career as a senator. British intelligence reported
into question the sincerity of pan-Asian rhetoric.
that “he speaks and writes Japanese and speaks
However, even under the Japanese occupation,
with the authority of the Japanese Foreign
Pan-Asianism remained an important factor in
Office.” To the British, the anti-Western position
Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. The
of the Pan-Oriental Society was clear. At its
Japanese certainly milked pan-Asian sentiment to
meetings “speeches are made favoring an
help mobilize the region’s resources for the war
‘Oriental Monroeism’ headed by Japan.” But it
effort. At the same time some Southeast Asians,
would be wrong to dismiss the society as nothing
such as the contributors to the Greater Asia
more than a front for Japanese propaganda.
newspaper in Indonesia embraced the anti-
Alejandrino took a wider interest in Asian affairs
Western component of pan-Asian rhetoric.
and wrote newspaper articles in which he
mentioned the Indian Independence Party and
However, relations between Japan and the
even discussed the possibility of a free India.
leaders of independence movements in Southeast
And there was some evidence of contacts with
Asia remain a controversial subject in Asian
other Asian pro-independence movements.
historiography. The position of those Southeast
According to the British intelligence report, “an
Asians who supported the Japanese war effort
intercepted letter, written by a Filipino student
was much more ambivalent than is generally
returned from Tokyo, shows that there might be
believed. The Indonesian independence activist
a danger of a connection between these Filipino
Mohammed Hatta (1902–1980) is a case in point.
students and disaffected Indians in Japan.” In
Hatta is known for his collaboration with the
Malaya, too, some looked to Japan as a liberating
Japanese occupation authorities during the war,
force. For example, the nationalist journalist
but even at that time he was no Japanese puppet.
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And even before the war, in the 1930s, he was
Arab world; they were fueled by the founding of
capable of a sober critique of the problems
the Greater Japan Islamic League (Dai Nippon
inherent in the Japanese version of Pan-Asianism.
Kaikyō Kyōkai) in Japan in 1938. However,
This is made clear by an article that he published
although a number of influential individuals,
in 1934, shortly after returning from a visit to
including Ōkawa Shūmei and General Hayashi
Japan, where he was wined and dined by
Senjūrō, were sympathetic to the Arab cause, the
members of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai. In the article,
failure of the Japanese to advance west of India
pointedly titled “Does Japan Desire to Return to
during the course of the war precluded any
Asia?,” Hatta predicted the failure of Japanese
effective cooperation.
Pan-Asianism because, in his view, the two
The “Greater East Asian War” and Pan-
conditions necessary to ensure its success—a
Asianism
permanent peace between Japan and China and
the achievement of perfect equality between the
Asian nations—could not be realized in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, notwithstanding his
enthusiastic reception in Japan, Hatta regarded
Asianism as tainted by fascist tendencies, among
which he included Japan’s ambition to become
the leader of Asia.
In western Asia, hopes for Japanese leadership in
Pan-Asian gathering in Tokyo in the late
1930s (participants include Tōyama Mitsuru,
a central figure in the Japanese nationalist
movement, General Hayashi Senjūrō and
Tatar pan-Islamist Abdurreşid Ibrahim)
the struggle against Western imperialism were
growing, but in the end no significant
cooperation between Japan and any western
Asian nation materialized. Japanese contacts with
The use of pan-Asian ideology to legitimize war
the Ottoman Empire, official and unofficial, went
and Japanese colonial rule discredited the
back to the late nineteenth century. In the first
movement. As a result, Pan-Asianism came to be
decades of the twentieth century, pan-Islamic
widely identified as an ideology of colonial
activists came to Japan, where (among other
rule—specifically, Japan’s colonial rule over
things) they cooperated with Japanese pan-
Asian countries and peoples, which, the Japanese
Asianists in founding the Ajia Gikai discussed
rulers insisted, was more “benevolent” than
here. During World War II, hopes for Japanese
Western colonial rule because Japanese were
support were strongly expressed throughout the
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fellow Asians. Yet, as much recent research has
While the Japanese term “Greater East Asian
shown, Japanese colonial rule was as oppressive
War,” used for the war against the United States
as that of any European power. Like the
and Britain from December 1941, implied some
European imperialists, the Japanese ruthlessly
pan-Asian notion of liberation of the whole
exploited the territories they ruled. They
region, the Chinese term rejected the notion that
mobilized their subject populations for the
this was a racial war and had anything to do with
Japanese war effort, and, unlike most Western
pan-Asian ideals. It was—and still is—simply the
powers, they made efforts to assimilate the
“War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression”
populations of at least some of the colonial
(kangri zhanzheng
).
territories they controlled. For the populations of
The Japanese government made concerted efforts
Japanese-controlled territories, Japanese colonial
to stress the pan-Asian character of the war.
rule was not substantially different from Western
Numerous government statements during the
colonial rule, even if the Japanese proclaimed
war emphasized the pan-Asian character of the
pan-Asian “brotherhood” and professed to save
conflict. However, it should be noted that it was
them from the evils of colonial rule by non-
only several months after the outbreak of
Asians.
hostilities that the Japanese government officially
Many prominent Asians, however—politicians,
included the “liberation of Asia from Western
diplomats, intellectuals, and writers alike—were
imperialism” in its list of war objectives. Pan-
forced to choose sides, particularly after the
Asian propaganda intensified as the war
outbreak of the “Greater East Asian War.” China,
continued. In 1942, the Ministry of Greater East
where people were also forced to choose sides,
Asia was founded in order to coordinate and
was a special case. For the overwhelming
strengthen intra-Asian cooperation. This move
number of Chinese “the war” meant not an
was intended primarily to underline the rhetoric
“Asian” war of liberation against “the West” but
of pan-Asian liberation—but, at this point in the
a war against Japanese aggression in which
war, “strengthened cooperation” meant, above
Western countries including the United States
all, the mobilization of resources for Japan’s war
and Britain were allies. The war in China had
effort. The worse the military situation became
started much earlier than in the rest of Asia: it
for Japan, the more the Japanese government
had broken out in 1931 in northeastern China
tended to draw on pan-Asian rhetoric. In this
(Manchuria), spreading to the rest of China by
context, the declaration of the “Assembly of the
1937. The different terms to name the conflict that
Greater East Asiatic Nations” issued in 1943
were used by the opposing sides are instructive.
sounds like a last, desperate appeal for pan-Asian
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unity.
Europe. . . . Japan’s victory will save
Asia and will offer a new hope for
mankind.
So, even though schemes for pan-Asian unity
became more and more unrealistic as the
fortunes of war turned against Japan, the official
The Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic
Nations, 1943, with Japanese Prime Minister
General Tōjō Hideki in the center and
representatives from China, Manchukuo,
Thailand, India, the Philippines and Burma.
espousal of Pan-Asianism by the Japanese
government and military resulted in a further
wave of publications on Asian solidarity and
brotherhood.
At that time even a liberal intellectual like
Pan-Asian Solidarity and the Legacies of Pan-
Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969), seemingly
Asianism in the Postwar Period
oblivious to the looming disaster ahead, was still
insisting that the “Greater East Asian War” must
Japan’s surrender and the advent of the Cold
be the starting point for the establishment of “a
War resulted in the disappearance of pan-Asian
united cultural sphere [by] the races of East
ideals from the international relations arena.
Asia.” In similar vein, Nishida Kitarō
Japanese proponents of Pan-Asianism were
(1870–1945), one of Japan’s leading philosophers,
purged from office, and pan-Asian associations
in 1943 characterized the war as a holy, pan-
were disbanded by the occupation authorities.
Asian struggle to liberate and unify Asia:
Pan-Asianism no longer figured in debates on
foreign relations, in Japan or elsewhere. Clearly,
The Great East Asian War is a
there was no room for pan-Asian schemes in the
sacred war, because it is the
new bipolar world order. This situation did not
culmination of the historical
change even after the estrangement between
progress of Asia. . . . The task of the
China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s because
liberated peoples is now to win the
Japan, once again an important Asian nation, was
war and establish the Great East
now closely allied to the United States and thus
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, in co-
in effect part of “the West.” In the 1960s,
operation with the Germans,
however, the emergence of the nonaligned
Italians, and other peoples in
movement (NAM) led to the resurgence of pan-
Europe, who are engaged in a heroic
Asian ideals. The NAM was founded in 1961
struggle to create a new order in
under the leadership of India’s Prime Minister
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Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), President Gamal
Hayashi Fusao (1903–75).
Abdul Nasser (1918–1970) of Egypt, and
However, postwar Pan-Asianism was tainted by
Yugoslav President Josip Tito (1892–1980).
its association with Japanese imperialism and
However, Asian and African countries played the
aggression. Indeed it became synonymous with
central role in the activities of the movement,
it. For the most prominent political scientist of
which had its roots in the 1955 Bandung
the postwar period, Maruyama Masao
Conference. The Bandung Conference and the
(1914–1996), Pan-Asianism, together with
NAM assumed a firmly anti-imperialist stance
“familism” (kazokushugi
) and “agrarianism”
and objected strongly to the domination of
(nōhonshugi), was one of the three fundamental
international relations by the United States, just
components of Japanese ultranationalism.
as the pan-Asian movement before 1945 had
Perhaps because of this association, there was no
opposed (and even fought) Anglo-American
serious scholarly attempt to deal with Pan-
world hegemony.
Asianism as a subject of historical inquiry in the
Although Japan did not play a leading role in
1950s and the 1960s. One scarcely need mention
these developments, in Japan the sense of a pan-
that in Korea and China Pan-Asianism was
Asian “mission” was preserved in other forms.
completely discredited as an ideology of
After the devastation wrought by the war had
collaboration with the enemy and the colonizers.
nullified the achievements of the prewar era and,
This was the direct consequence of the use of
as some suggested, turned Japan into an
pan-Asian rhetoric to justify Japanese colonial
agricultural economy, intellectuals like Shimizu
rule in Korea, and (in wartime China) to justify
Ikutarō (1907–1988) felt impelled to proclaim that
Japanese aggression and legitimize the Nanjing
“now, once again, the Japanese are Asians”. Pan-
puppet government. There are signs, however,
Asian themes also survived in leftist critiques of
that this situation is changing, as indicated by
Western modernity and in the related claims that
recent efforts by high-level Chinese diplomats to
Japan must side with the oppressed nations of
present Pan-Asianism in a more positive light.
Asia in their resistance to the continuing Western
In Japan, the first serious attempt to grapple with
imperialist domination of the non-European
the thorny question of the legacy of Asianism
world. Variations on the pan-Asian theme have
was made by the Sinologist and literary critic
continued to inform ideas of solidarity, both in
Takeuchi Yoshimi. Takeuchi, who in his youth
left-wing circles and among those who became
had enthusiastically embraced pan-Asian ideals,
ultranationalists after giving up hope in the
had his beliefs shaken by Japan’s defeat. Yet
possibilities of socialism, such as the writer
although some aspects of Takeuchi’s faith were
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undermined, he had no doubt that there were
solidarity, brotherhood, or cooperation, which
positive features that were worth preserving.
often overlapped with socialist or communist
Pan-Asianism, he never ceased to believe, was
forms of international solidarity, or the solidarity
much more than mere window dressing for
of the nonaligned movement. For the Japanese
Japan’s Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In
left, the term “Pan-Asianism” was (and perhaps
Takeuchi’s view, there was a core of pan-Asian
still is) practically synonymous with Japanese
ideals that retained validity and therefore needed
colonialism and aggression.
to be remembered and even cherished.
Yet, whether or not they eschewed the term itself,
Interestingly, Takeuchi regarded Japan’s
in postwar Japan the left incorporated pan-Asian
aggression in China not as a consequence of Pan-
elements into its own views. And the continuity
Asianism but rather as Japan’s “shedding” of
between prewar pan-Asian rightists and postwar
Asia (datsu-A), a concept that emerged in the
left-wing circles should not be overlooked in this
1880s and became highly influential as the
context. This (at first sight) surprising continuity
antithesis to Pan-Asianism throughout the course
has only rarely been discussed in previous
of modern Japanese history. From this
research. The prewar flirtation with national
perspective, Japan’s aggression was in effect an
socialism and Japanism by socialists like
application of inauthentic (and therefore
Asanuma Inejirō (1898–1960) is well known. It is
culpable) Western methods to Asia and thus had
less widely known, however, that Marquis
nothing to do with the “Eastern spirit” or Eastern
Tokugawa Yoshichika (1886–1976), one of the
cultural practices or political norms. It was a
major sponsors of the rightist movement in the
natural, if deplorable, consequence of the
prewar period and a close friend of pan-Asianists
westernization of Japan. This misguided attempt
such as Ōkawa Shūmei, became a benefactor of
by Japan to depart from pan-Asian principles
the newly founded Socialist Party of Japan after
was corrected, to some extent at least, by the war
the war. It appears that Tokugawa’s support for
Japan waged from December 1941 on the colonial
the Socialist Party was motivated to some extent,
powers of the United States, Britain, and the
at least, by pan-Asian motives. These motives
Netherlands. It was little wonder that Takeuchi
were also apparent in an extraordinary statement
welcomed this war enthusiastically. Takeuchi is
by Tokugawa’s erstwhile comrade in the rightist
difficult to locate on the ideological spectrum.
movement, Ōkawa, who in 1949 detected a “close
Although he would not classify himself as a
resemblance between today’s communists and
rightist, his attempts to restore legitimacy to the
the early Muslims” and wished for “a second
discredited term Pan-Asianism were unusual.
battle of Tours-Poitiers” to be fought between the
Those on the left preferred to talk of Asian
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communists and the West, which this time would
China, Tsuji considers the ties that bind Asians
result in victory for the communists (i.e., Asia).
together stronger than those between Communist
China and the USSR”. A Japanese biographer of
Another right-wing Pan-Asianist, Tsukui Tatsuo
Tsuji agreed that he was “harsh on the Soviet
(1901–1989), well known in the postwar period as
Union and soft on communist China.” For
an “ultranationalist historian,” is known to have
members of the Japanese left, Tsuji, as an army
lavished praise on communist China. In the
colonel blamed for a number of wartime
mid-1950s, a U.S. counterintelligence report
atrocities, was beyond the pale. However, they
accused Tsukui of bringing a large sum of money
would no doubt agree with his support for the
from mainland China, funds that were eventually
downtrodden peoples of Asia.
given to the National Diet member and former
army colonel, Tsuji Masanobu (1902–1961?), “for
Leftists might find the case of the politician and
safe keeping.”
parliamentarian
Utsunomiya
Tokuma
(1906–2000) even more ambiguous. The son of
It should be noted that, like Tsukui, the recipient
General Utsunomiya Tarō (1861–1922),
of this unspecified largesse, Colonel Tsuji, who
commander of the Japanese army in colonial
had achieved notoriety during the war, made no
Korea, Utsunomiya was one of the founding
secret of his pan-Asian sympathies in the
members of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955
postwar period. According to Tsuji, on matters of
but cannot be categorized simply as a
regional solidarity ideological differences were
conservative politician. In the 1980s Utsunomiya
less important than blood ties. At a gathering of
emerged as a stern critic of the party he had
former generals on 20 November 1954, Tsuji is
helped to found but no longer supported, and, on
reported as arguing that Japan should work with
a number of occasions, he appeared to be closely
India to achieve neutrality and with communist
allied with the Socialist Party. He was a fervent
China to maintain peace. Noting his friendship
proponent of disarmament and ran successfully
with Chinese Communist Party officials such as
in elections against the retired Self-Defense
Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), he explained that,
Forces general, Kurisu Hiroomi (1920–2004), an
communist or not, “[a]fter all, they’re Asians.”
advocate of rearmament. In the 1960s
An American intelligence analyst concluded,
Utsunomiya had been a prominent supporter of
“Tsuji, head of the neutralist Self-Defense League
Algeria’s struggle for independence. He went out
(Jiei Dōmei), has long been a vigorous exponent
of his way to support all expressions of “Asian
of ‘the Asia for Asiatics,’ doctrine of the late
and African nationalism” and never hid his pan-
Ishihara Kanji. Like right wing critic Tsukui
Asianist sympathies. It could be argued that
Tatsuo, who also returned from Communist
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Utsunomiya’s pro-Asian attitudes were
Afghanistan; and in lawsuits challenging
inseparable from his anti-Western and, more
Japanese logistical assistance to U.S. military
specifically, anti-American, sentiments.
activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
Most recently, in a remarkable example of this
This same set of attitudes has characterized many
tendency to pan-Asian solidarity, in late 2009 the
on the left, one of whose major criticisms of the
Japanese cabinet, led by Hatoyama Yukio
Japanese government is its pro-American, pro-
(1947–), the leader of the Democratic Party of
Western stance. Most left-wing commentators
Japan in coalition with the Social Democratic
would never admit to entertaining pan-Asian
Party, halted Japanese military support for
sentiments, for, as we have seen, in their view
American-led operations in Afghanistan and
Pan-Asianism was irredeemably besmirched by
recalled the Maritime Self-Defense Forces from
Japan’s wartime aggression. But whether they
the Indian Ocean.
recognize it or not, the political left in Japan is
heir to the pan-Asian tradition. This is
Recent Developments
abundantly clear both from the activities of the
As stated at the outset, issues of regionalism and
Japanese pacifist movement in general and the
regional integration in East Asia have received
movement against the Vietnam War (organized
considerable attention since the 1990s. In Korea,
by the Citizens’ League for Peace in Vietnam;
for example, pan-Asian unity is identified as a
Japanese: Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengō,
promising path to avoid domination not only by
Beheiren) in particular. Numerous statements by
Japan but also by China. In 2002, for example,
members of these movements condemning
former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun
American imperialism and American aggression
(1946–2009) declared that “the age of Northeast
have been issued over the years and continue
Asia is arriving.” At the same time, regional
today.
approaches in East Asia, especially since the
The pan-Asian undertones of these criticisms are
beginning of the present century, have been an
generally revealed in their appeals to Asian
expression of increasing discontent with
brotherhood and Asian solidarity. This tendency
American-led globalization and a developing
is also seen in gestures made by prominent left-
unilateral world system. In South Korea, pan-
wing politicians such as Doi Takako (1928–), the
Asianist regionalism is thus “seen as an attractive
one-time leader of the Japan Socialist Party; in
alternative to Korea’s dependence on America.”
statements by activists such as Dr. Nakamura
South Korean and Japanese interests seem to
Tetsu (1946–), who has devoted his life to the
have converged in these respects. In Japan, from
cause of helping the needy and sick in
as early as the 1980s, a “New Asianism” has
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begun to resurface, partly as an offshoot of the
discredited ideology of Pan-Asianism, in
so-called Asian values debate of the 1980s, a
combination with statements by high-ranking
discussion initiated by Malaysia’s Prime Minister
diplomats acknowledging the potential of the
Mahathir Mohamad (1925–) and the prime
region’s pan-Asian legacy, arguably reflects a
minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew (1923–),
change in attitudes in China.
supported by the xenophobic populist politician,
In Japan, the rise of a “New Asianism” has
writer and governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō
reflected diplomatic and economic efforts to
(1932–). Despite his frequent “Asian-bashing”
stimulate regionalist approaches. These efforts
outbursts, Ishihara is also known for his
advocacy
of
pan-Asian
were, however, always placed under strain by
views—which,
the strong priority given by the Japanese
essentially, are an expression of his strong anti-
government to the US-Japan Security Treaty.
Americanism.
Nonetheless, Japan, as a recent study notes, “has
In the 1980s these politicians—and others like
been a driving force of Asian regionalism
them—advocated a set of common “Asian
throughout the post-war period,” particularly in
values” (always vaguely defined), based on
the economic sphere. Notable in this regard was
Confucian virtues, as a counter to the universalist
Japan’s involvement in the founding of the Asian
claims of liberalism, democracy, and human
Development Fund in 1957 and the proposal for
rights, values that were dismissed as alien to the
an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997. In addition,
region and inauthentic for Asians on account of
Japan has also been relatively active in the
their allegedly Western provenance. However,
ASEAN+3 cooperative network, involving the
many Asian politicians and writers, such as the
ASEAN nations plus China, Japan, and South
future president of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung
Korea. But as the acronym indicates, the driving
(1925–2009), strongly rejected the idea of a
force of this new body is ASEAN—the only
common set of “Asian” values, and the debate
effective organization working for regional
has made little headway since. Recent work by
integration in Asia, which has brought a
Chinese scholars suggests an attempt to find
considerable degree of stability and economic
some kernel of truth in the legacy of Pan-
growth to Southeast Asia. Japan also has been
Asianism with the objective of criticizing
rather passive and reactive with regard to the
“Western” (i.e., United States) policies or the
development of a Free Trade Agreement network
West’s claim to the universality of democratic
in East Asia, and, given its continuing
values. The recent trend in Chinese academia to
dependence on the security treaty with the
deal more openly with the once completely
United States, it remains questionable whether
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Japan can play a leading role in the integration of
integration in the past will play an increasingly
the
significant role in the years to come.
region
in
the
future—notwithstanding
immediate
the
outspoken
Recurrent Pan-Asian Themes
advocacy of Pan-Asianism by some leading
politicians.
Pan-Asian styles of thought have always come
most to the fore in debates on foreign policy and
Nor should one forget the historical legacies of
on Asian identity. If the many varieties of Pan-
World War II and of Pan-Asianism as an
Asianism had anything in common, it was their
ideology. As late as the 1990s, partly because of
opposition to the West: opposition to the West’s
the difficulties Japan experienced in coming to
presence in Asia (i.e., Western imperialism),
terms with its past, writers in Asia as well as in
opposition to Western culture and values, and,
the West warned that Japanese regionalist
conversely, an emphasis on the importance (and
initiatives could be interpreted as a resurgence of
in many cases, the superiority) of Asian culture
claims for Japan’s leadership in East Asia, with
and Asian values. In fact, it could be argued that
the objective of creating “a new version of the
anti-Westernism was central to Pan-Asianism. In
Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of World
opposition to the “West”—which was, to a large
War II.” In recent years, the issue of historical
degree, an invented concept—pan-Asian writers
memory has become less contentious in Japan,
constructed their own “Asia.” Images of this
but persistent elements of “retrospective Pan-
constructed Asia varied greatly. They changed
Asianism”—the rehabilitation of wartime pan-
over time and took particular forms in different
Asian rhetoric to whitewash Japan’s wars of
places and in the works of different authors. But
aggression and colonial rule in Asia—continue to
all pan-Asianists assumed the existence of “one
hinder attempts to promote regional integration.
Asia” and based this assumption on one or more
On the academic level, however, considerable
of the following categories:
progress has been made over the past two
decades, as witnessed by drafts for an “Asian
• Geography (Asia, East Asia, the
Constitution,” proposals for an East Asian
Orient)
Common House and a myriad of academic
• Cultural unity (influence of Indian
conferences dealing with (and not infrequently
and Chinese civilization, religions)
advocating) regional integration. This suggests
that attention to the historical legacies of Pan-
• Historical interconnectedness
Asianism and the identification of positive
(Sinocentric
examples of pan-Asian solidarity and regional
33
system,
tribute
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relations, trade networks)
particularized insistence on the existence of
commonalities has played an important role in
• Racial kinship (the yellow race,
the construction of Pan-Asianism, as the texts
races of color)
reproduced in this collection show.
• The unity of Asian civilization in
Recent research has stressed the importance of
terms of its values and spiritual
historical interconnectedness as an authentic
character (Confucianism, justice and
benevolence
vs.
foundation for forces encouraging the
Western
development of regional integration. The notion
materialism and rationalism)
of a world system that connected the various
states of East and Southeast Asia for centuries,
• A common destiny (the fight
before the imposition of Western-based
against Western imperialism and
international law, had sufficient cogency to bind
colonial rule)
indigenous forces against the threat of external
domination. In recent years, these approaches
Nevertheless, there was never a consensus on the
have once again been attracting attention as a
geographical definition of Asia and that pan-
reaction to the emergence of a unipolar world
Asian writers constantly revised their definitions
order.
of “Asia,” blurring geographical exactitude with
interpretations that allowed them to extend their
Enough has already been said about the
definition of Asia even to some European and
incorporation of the Western ideas of race into
African nations.
pan-Asianist rhetoric. References to “racial
kinship” were frequent, as the documents in this
The perception and creation of cultural unity,
collection make clear. However, the Western
brought to an extreme of simplification in the
provenance of the concept of race made it highly
slogan “Asia is one,” also remains an important
questionable that such an ideology could serve as
theme of pan-Asian writers over the past one and
the basis for a regional identity—not least since a
a half centuries—and down to the present day. In
Pan-Asianism based on racial motives limited
2010, an Internet search (google.com) of the term
“Asia” to East Asia and tended to exclude India,
generates a large number of hits. Although it is
western Asia, and other areas. Further, the ideal
clear that any particular assertion of what
constitutes
cultural
commonalities
of racial equality and the reality of racial
(or
discrimination
differences) is highly arbitrary and subjective, it
within
Asia
eventually
thoroughly discredited the racial component
is important to acknowledge that such a
within Pan-Asianism, particularly in Korea (after
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1910) and other territories under Japanese
shared by all Asians, are superior to Western
colonial rule.
values. This idea is often linked to an emphasis
on the antiquity of Asian culture, which is often
The complex notion of Asian values—Asian
presented by pan-Asianists as the cradle of
“spirituality” versus the “materialism” of
civilization, including European civilization. In
Western civilization—is also highly contested
this connection, much has been made of the fact
and riddled with contradictions. As we have
that all major religions of the world, including
already noted in the discussion of geographical
Christianity, originated in what is geographically
definitions, the “Asia” of the pan-Asianists
considered Asia. On these grounds, it is often
sometimes included territories that are generally
argued that only “Asian” civilization has the
classified as “Western” countries, such as
potential to ultimately save mankind, including
Germany, Italy, or even Ireland. The 1920s saw a
the West. In the words of Tagore, “If Asian
wave of sympathy for the cause of Irish
civilization constituted a great reservoir of
independence in Asian publications, and in the
spiritual power, and if modern civilization was
1930s, Japan allied itself with Germany and
about to destroy humanity itself, then it must be
Italy—ostensibly since Germany and Italy had
from a regenerated Asia that man’s salvation
chosen to join the fight against “Western”
would come.” Tagore was an outspoken critic of
materialism, now limited to Anglo-Saxon
nationalism in at least some of his writings. There
civilization.
is no doubt that the kind of Pan-Asianism to
which he subscribed was “a vision of community
Notwithstanding the various contradictions
that sought to transcend the territorial nation-
generated by any definition of Asia or the West,
state and redeem and regenerate the world
pan-Asianists have generally regarded “the
through Eastern spiritual morality.”
West” as the alien Other. Time and again, as this
collection shows, for pan-Asianists Asia
Yet, for all this cultural tension, the material
represents the antithesis of the West. Indeed,
advantages of the West and of modernity in
these writers regularly define Asia in terms of the
general became obvious to most Asians, except
West. This is true of such diverse figures as
for a very small number of reactionary
Okakura Tenshin, Ōkawa Shūmei and, in the
obscurantists. Western-style modernity was an
postwar period, Takeuchi Yoshimi, Ishihara
indispensible condition for success in the
Shintarō, and Nakamura Tetsu. The corollary to
nineteenth-century world. For that reason, along
this vision of the West as the Other is the
with the majority of Asians, most pan-Asianists
assumption that there exists a coherent set of
Asian values and that these values, ex definitione
35
never rejected modernity as such. Many ancient
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Asian customs and practices were patently
community) or declarations by transnational
useless or anachronistic in the modern world,
organizations such as ASEAN, are anything to go
and, under the circumstances, the chief problem
by. It is impossible to gauge whether such
that had to be overcome was the antiquated
sentiments will contribute to the realization of
structure of state and society. But was everything
closer transnational cooperation or even regional
distinctive about the East to be denied? Initially
integration in the future. To be sure, obstacles to
there was a tendency to discard the whole
regional cooperation in East Asia remain
culture, lock, stock, and barrel. In an excess of
numerous. They include not only strong
modernizing enthusiasm, some Japanese even
expressions of nationalism and the negative
wanted to give up their native tongue in favor of
legacies of World War II but also the geography
English. Needless to say, such proposals were at
and demographics of Asia. Unlike in the case of
best impractical. But were there aspects of
European countries, the “Other,” or the “enemy,”
Eastern tradition still of relevance in this
for many smaller Asian nations is to be found
Western-dominated world? Above all in the
within Asia, not somewhere outside. While Asia
realms of ethics, morals, and philosophical and
will certainly never be “one,” we may anticipate
religious thought, convincing arguments could
continued progress in the areas of regional
be made for the relevance, if not the superiority,
cooperation and integration, developments that
of Eastern traditions—arguments that the reader
can contribute to the stability and the prosperity
will encounter time and again throughout this
of the region.
collection.
While the meaning—and even the existence—of
About the book: The sources collected are arranged in
“Asian values” remains debatable, the notion of
chronological order. This allows the reader to trace the
commonly held Asian values and a common
development of Pan-Asianism and Asian regionalism
culture and racial identity, which together
from the mid-nineteenth century down to the present
constitute the basis of Pan-Asianism, is closely
day and provides an insider’s view of intra-Asian
related to the sentiment of a “common destiny”
debates. The material discussed in each chapter falls
for Asian peoples. This latter notion represents
roughly into three often overlapping and never
another recurrent theme in Pan-Asianism—one
mutually exclusive categories: 1) attempts to define
that perhaps retains much of its appeal even
Asia and assess the region’s contribution to world
today, if recent statements by Asian governments
civilization; 2) calls for Asian solidarity, integration,
(e.g., the initiative of former Japanese Prime
and unity; and 3) debates about Asia’s role in world
Minister Hatoyama Yukio to prioritize East Asian
politics and, above all, about Asia’s relations with
36
9 | 17 | 1
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Europe.
Articles on related themes:
Sven Saaler is Associate Professor of Modern Japanese
•
Mark
Selden
History at Sophia University. He was formerly Head
(http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/3422), Nation,
of the Humanities Section of the German Institute for
Region and the Global in East Asia: Conflict and
Japanese Studies (DIJ) and Associate Professor at The
Cooperation
University of Tokyo. His book
Politics, Memory and
Isabel
Hilton
Public Opinion examines recent history debates in•
(http://apjjf.org/-Andreas-Schild/3224),
Japan. Together with J. Victor Koschmann, he edited
Andreas Schild, Mohan Munasinghe, and Dipak
Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History
Gyawali, Regional Cooperation at the Third Pole:
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/041537216X/?ta
g=theasipacjo0b-20), with Wolfgang Schwentker The Himalayan-Tibetan Plateau and Climate
The Power of Memory in Modern Japan Change
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1905246382/?tag
=theasipacjo0b-20) and with Christopher W. A.
SzpilmanPan-Asianism: A Documentary History
•
Mark
Selden
(http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/3061),
East
Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205962/?tag
Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16th
=theasipacjo0b-20) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).
to 21st Centuries
Christopher W. A. Szpilman is professor of modern
• H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang
Japanese history and international relations at
(http://apjjf.org/-Michael-Hsiao/3054), Soft
Kyushu Sangyo University. He is co-editor of Kita
Power Politics in the Asia Pacific: Chinese and
Ikki’s Kokutairon oyobi junseishakaishugi (On
Japanese Quests for Regional Leadership
National Polity and Pure Socialism),
Mitsukawa
Kametarô nikki (Mitsukawa Kametaro Diaries, •
Mark
Beeson
Ronsôsha 2011) andPan-Asianism: a Documentary
(http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Beeson/3008),
History
Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205962/?tag
Pacific: After American Hegemony
=theasipacjo0b-20).
•
Hamish
East
McDonald
Recommended citation: Sven Saaler and Christopher
(http://apjjf.org/-Hamish-McDonald/2793),
W. A. Szpilman, Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of AsianBeyond the Hub-and-Spoke Security System in
Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present, The Asia-East Asia: Australian and American Perspectives
Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 17 No 1, April 25, 2011.
on East Asian Regionalism
37
9 | 17 | 1
APJ | JF
• Guillaume Gaulier, Francoise Lemoine and
Deniz
Regional and World Economy
Ünal-Kesenci
• Wang Hui (http://apjjf.org/-Wang-Hui/2407),
(http://apjjf.org/-Guillaume-Gaulier/2441),
The Politics of Imagining Asia: Empires, Nations,
China’s Rise and the Reorganization of the Asian
Regional and Global Orders
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/041537216X/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)
Click on the cover to order.
(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1905246382/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)
Click on the cover to order.
38
9 | 17 | 1
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(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205962/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)
Click on the cover to order.
39