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THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR SOUTH AMERICA
A POLÍTICA EXTERNA DOS EUA PARA A AMÉRICA DO SUL
Bruno Gomes Guimarães1
Abstract
This paper delves into the foreign policy of the United States of America towards the South American continent.
Using the duality between the Monroe Doctrine and the Manifest Destiny as ideas that influence the US foreign
policy, it seeks to analyze the logic behind the US policy towards South America in the 20 th century, identifying
interests and trends for the 21st century. The framework of analysis is based on offensive realism and geopolitics
of South America. After a brief description of the theories, the paper describes the history of US foreign policy
for South America in the early 20th century, during the Cold War and contemporarily. It concludes that the US
has historically fostered the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina to hinder the integration of the region and that
currently it props up integration processes that challenge the already established ones. On the international level,
the US foreign policy has sought to balance off external powers, such as the Soviet Union and the Nazi
Germany. For the 21st century, two alternatives are at hand: maintaining US primacy through buck-passing with
a partnership with Brazil or by trying to politically split South American countries and hamper their integration
process.
Keywords: United States of America. US foreign policy. South America.
Resumo
Este trabalho analisa a política externa dos Estados Unidos da América para o continente sul-americano.
Fazendo uso da dualidade entre a Doutrina Monroe e o Destino Manifesto como ideais que influenciam a
política externa estadunidense, o artigo procura descobrir a lógica por trás da política dos EUA para a América
do Sul no século XX, identificando interesses e tendências para o século XXI. O quadro de análise é baseado no
realismo ofensivo e na geopolítica da América do Sul. Após uma breve descrição dessas teorias, o trabalho
descreve a história da política externa dos Estados Unidos para a América do Sul no início do século XX,
durante a Guerra Fria e contemporaneamente. Conclui-se que os EUA fomentaram historicamente a rivalidade
entre Brasil e Argentina para dificultar a integração regional e atualmente apoiam processos de integração que
desafiam os já existentes. No âmbito internacional, a política externa estadunidense procurou balancear
potências externas, tais como a Alemanha Nazista e a União Soviética. Para o século XXI, as duas alternativas
disponíveis são: manter a primazia dos EUA por meio de buck-passing em parceria com o Brasil ou da tentativa
de dividir politicamente os países sul-americanos e impedir o processo de integração.
Palavras-chave: Estados Unidos da América. Política externa norte-americana. América do Sul.
1
Mestre em Relações Internacionais com foco em Desafios Globais em programa conjunto da Universidade
Humboldt de Berlim, Universidade Livre de Berlim e Universidade de Potsdam. Bacharel em Relações
Internacionais pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Pesquisador associado do Instituto SulAmericano de Política e Estratégia (ISAPE).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Up to the late 19th century and early 20th, the United States was a country which was
deemed isolationist. Once it decided to get itself involved in global affairs, the U.S. had two
contending views on this role to be played. On the one hand, Theodore Roosevelt favored an
engagement based on considerations of national interest. On the other, Woodrow Wilson
leaned strongly towards an international insertion based on values and idealism. Roosevelt's
view was quite unpopular and, therefore, Wilson prevailed. Under the latter's leadership the
United States took part in World War I. This meant that idealism had overcome isolationism,
laying the ground for all future policies of the American superpower (KISSINGER, 1994).
There are two ideas which have marked the formation of the U.S. foreign policy as it
is today. Both of them had already been developed before Roosevelt or Wilson came to
power. They are namely the Monroe Doctrine and the Manifest Destiny. The first represents
values of self-government, civil rights and duties, and leading by example. The latter has
characteristics of civilizing domination and exceptionality, predestined to lead the world.
Pervading U.S. history, these two symbolic notions have influenced the US foreign policy
since their first conception (FRANÇA et al., 2013). As authors have put it: “since they
[Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny] embody opposite polarities of the U.S. soul, they
serve as tools to assess trends in the U.S. foreign and security policy” (FRANÇA et al., 2013,
p. 8).
Both notions emerged to deal with the region surrounding the country, i.e. the
Americas or western hemisphere. The first engagements of the United States with the rest of
the world as an independent country were marked by the necessity to guarantee its
sovereignty and autonomy. That is the logic behind the development of the Monroe Doctrine
in 1823, which sought to avoid the return of European colonialism in the Americas. It
represented the kernel of regionalization under U.S. aegis to uphold sovereignty and
autonomy from foreign powers (FRANÇA et al., 2013). It was the incarnation of the principle
of non-interference in internal affairs (BEST et al., 2008).
Conversely, Manifest Destiny's objective was to justify the conquest of the West.
According to this notion, God had awarded that territory to the people from the U.S.
(FRANÇA et al., 2013). The country was exceptional because God had blessed them.
Consequently, the United States had to spread its values to other parts of the world, especially
its region. It had to civilize them, show (and impose to) the rest of the world how great their
people are (BEST et al., 2008).
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Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine were notions created to deal mainly with
the western hemisphere and later with the rest of the world too. However, they were not
devoid of national interests (guarantee independence and justify expansionism). The
Americas, then, play a major role for the development of U.S. foreign policy as a whole. It
was only after the United States had been consolidated as a continental state – unquestionable
independence with coast-to-coast territory – with no rival land powers that it could be deemed
as a world power and that it could overcome isolationism.
In fact, Spykman and Nicholl (1944) argues that the security of the United States can
only be assured by a unified western hemisphere. A point which is corroborated by Samuel
Pinheiro Guimarães, who stated that Latin America “in fact is the most important strategic
zone for the U.S.” (GUIMARÃES, 1999, p. 99). In North America, its dominance is
unquestionable. However, in South America this authority had to be forcefully guaranteed
several times. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the logic behind the U.S.
foreign policy towards South America in the 20th century, trying to unveil interests and
identify trends for the 21st century.
The framework of analysis is based on offensive realism as developed by John
Mearsheimer and geopolitics of South America as described by Therezinha de Castro. These
theoretical approaches shall be presented in the first section of this paper. Then, there will be
a description of the U.S. foreign policy towards South America divided in three parts: early
20th century, the Cold War, and contemporary policies. Analysis and conclusion follow the
description.
2 THEORETICAL APPROACH
2.1 Great power strategies
On his seminal work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John Mearsheimer laid
down a framework for analysis about the ways great powers behave when conducting their
international affairs. For him, all great powers seek opportunities to gain power over their
rivals and their final objective is hegemony (MEARSHEIMER, 2001, p. 29). This
competition for power is based on five assumptions: 1) the international system is anarchic,
which drives states towards a security competition; 2) great powers have enough military
capabilities to destroy one another; 3) it is impossible for a state to be certain of the real
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intentions of the others; 4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and 5) states are
rational actors (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).
These assumptions are the bedrock of Mearsheimer's theory, which he calls“offensive
realism”. Its core question is the security dilemma, i.e. states seek their survival and are wary
of all others. The result of the five assumptions put together is that great powers always have
an offensive behavior. It can only be checked by others through the balance of power.
Notwithstanding that, Mearsheimer (2001) accepts that great powers seek goals other than
security as long as they do not go up against the logic of the balance of power.
In relation to cooperation, Mearsheimer (2001) ascertains that great powers do not
seek it voluntarily. Because they are always trying to maximize their power, diminishing the
other great powers' share of world power is a goal. Cooperation between states falls within the
logic of the balance of power and it is guided purely by selfish reasons, mostly to maintain the
status quo and bearing in mind relative gains. Then, cooperation is highly unlikely in this
scenario. However, great power rivalry may create order in the international system. The Cold
War would be an example of that. Still, since great powers are permanently looking for
opportunities to increase their share of world power, they will move to undermine a stable
order if a favorable situation arises (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). Therefore, the fear of getting
cheated gets in the way of cooperation between great powers. Mearsheimer (2001, p. 52)
notes that “this concern is especially acute in the military realm, causing a 'special peril of
defection', because the natures of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balance of
power”.
Mearsheimer includes in his work the concept of regional balance of power.
According to him, to be a hegemon means being the only great power in the system. Even if a
state is considerably more powerful than the others, it does not have hegemony, because there
are still other great powers in the system. “A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it
dominates all the other states in the system” (MEARSHEIMER, 2001, p. 40). Rezende (2005)
states that, for Mearsheimer, being a global hegemon is the same as being “the owner of the
world”. However, Mearsheimer (2001) states the there has never been such a powerful state in
the system and probably never will. The main problem behind it are the immense costs and
the enormous difficulty for states to project power overseas (Mearsheimer, 2001)2
2
See Chapter 4, “The Primacy of Land Power”, of Mearsheimer's (2001) book for an in depth analysis of the
superiority of land power over sea and air powers for effective domination.
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However, Mearsheimer argues that the concept of hegemony may be applied to
regions. In the sub-system regional hegemony is a valid concept that describes a situation in
which a single state can dominate its region without significant challenge from others
(MEARSHEIMER, 2001). Accordingly, for him the United States has been a regional
hegemon in the western hemisphere for the past century and the only one of modern history
(MEARSHEIMER, 2001). Other states have tried to achieve regional hegemony without
success. Within this logic, states strive for becoming regional hegemons, because it is the
most they can get to maximize their power (REZENDE, 2005).
Once a state has become regional hegemon, it will do everything to prevent the rise of
other regional hegemons elsewhere (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). This happens because “a rival
great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is
essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power's backyard” (MEARSHEIMER,
2001, p. 41-42). In modern history, the U.S. as the only regional hegemon acted to prevent the
rise of Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan as hegemons of their regions. To contain this
rise, the already existing regional hegemon wishes that at least two powers exist in a single
region so that they will concentrate their efforts against each other and not against itself
(MEARSHEIMER, 2001). This is the most desirable situation: to be the only regional
hegemon in the system with other powers containing each other (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).
To prevent the rise of other regional hegemons, states may adopt several strategies
which depend on the distribution of power in the region of the rising hegemon. Mearsheimer
(2001) identifies to types of strategy: for gaining power and for checking aggressors (rising
powers). From the first group of strategies, war is the most classical one, which is still a valid
means for maximizing power albeit (justly) criticized (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). Blackmail is
another option, trying to change the balance of power in favor of the state that is
blackmailing. However, Mearsheimer (2001) notes that blackmail does not produce big
changes in the balance of power when it comes to great powers: It is a strategy for rather
smaller less powerful states. Bait and bleed is a third strategy of this group, in which a state
provokes a protracted war between two rival states, while it remains on the sidelines and
maintains its power intact (thereby increasing its relative power whilst the other two are
“bleeding”) (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). The inherent difficulty of this strategy is for a state to
create a conflict without having to join the engagement, according to Rezende (2005).
Mearsheimer (2001) also points out that the bait is easily perceived by the target states, which
do not want to wage war. Moreover there is also the possibility that one of the states wins a
rapid victory and ends up gaining more power instead of depleting its resources (“bleeding”)
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(MEARSHEIMER, 2001). The last strategy of this group as presented by Mearsheimer (2001)
is the bloodletting, the objective of which is to support the prolongation of a war between its
rivals, who independently have gone to war (there is no bait for that, in opposition to the
former strategy presented). The state is concerned with causing as much exhaustion of
resources of both sides of the war as possible, while it stays out of the conflict
(MEARSHEIMER, 2001).
There are four strategies in the second group as in the first one. They are namely
balancing, buck-passing, appeasement, and bandwagoning. The first of these strategies
consists of actions aimed at avoiding changes in the balance of power with the least possible
costs (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). At first the state will try to deter the rising power through
peaceful means (strong diplomatic efforts) to show commitment to the prevailing status quo.
If it fails, it will try to create a defensive alliance, which Mearsheimer (2001) names “external
balancing”. If this also fails, the state will engage in “internal balancing”, which is the
mobilization of its own resources to contain the aggressor (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). The last
resort would be direct war. To counter and avoid the emergence of regional hegemons, a great
power may act in regions other than its own as an offshore balancer (MEARSHEIMER,
2001).
Alternatively, a state may engage in buck-passing, which is when a great power
attempts to get another state to bear the costs of deterring (or possibly fighting) the aggressor,
while it remains in the sidelines (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). The buck-passer will try to
maintain good relations with the aggressor in the hopes that it will use its resources only
against the buck-catcher. Besides that, the state will keep some distance from the buckcatcher, because it does not want to be drawn into a conflict in case of a war with the
aggressor (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the buck-passer “to
allow or even facilitate the growth in power of the intended buck-catcher. That burden-bearer
would then have a better chance of containing the aggressor state, which would increase the
buck-passer's prospects of remaining on the sidelines” (MEARSHEIMER, 2001: 159). Yet,
this presents a danger for the buck-passer, because the buck-catcher can have its power
augmented too much so that it becomes the aggressor (Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer
(2001) notices that, in spite of this, states prefer buck-passing over balancing due to the
smaller costs of such course of action.
As for appeasement and bandwagoning, Mearsheimer (2001) affirms that they should
be avoided by great powers as a way to cope with changes in the balance of power. The
reason behind it is that they are in opposition to the logic of the balance of power, since they
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concede power to the aggressor. Bandwagoning is a strategy only for weak states, when they
follow a more powerful partner hoping that the spoils will be shared disproportionately in its
favor (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). On its turn, appeasement tends to increase the will of the
aggressor – although the objective is to change the behavior of the aggressor through
concessions –, because it will perceive it as a weakness on the side of the appeaser
(MEARSHEIMER, 2001).
2.2. Geopolitical characterization of South America
Spykman and Nicholl (1944) argues that the security of the United States can only be
assured by a unified western hemisphere. In this case, the only threats to the U.S. would come
from Eurasia and Africa. However, Rezende (2005) correctly notices that the Americas are
not a single geopolitical entity. The Panama Isthmus was the only land connection between
North and South America (now interrupted by the Panama Canal), making extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the projection of land power. Because the United States would
need sea power to project itself in the South — having to overcome the stopping power of
water —, South and North America are in fact geopolitically distinct regions (REZENDE,
2005)3.
In view of that, the Brazilian geopolitical scientist Therezinha de Castro (1997)
borrows some concepts developed by Mackinder and Spykman to describe the geopolitical
characteristics of the South American continent. She identifies South America's heartland4 as
somewhere between the Bolivian altipiano (highlands) and the western part of the Brazilian
cerrado (tropical savanna). The Andes mountain range represent a sort of rimland5 of the
continent, isolated from the most part of it. East of this mountain range lie the largest part of
the territory, facing the Atlantic. In this region, there are three hydrographic basins – i.e. the
Orenoco, Amazon and La Plata basins – with corresponding lowlands which lead the
continent to its “manifest destiny”, namely the Atlantic Ocean. According to Castro (1997),
this geopolitical vocation towards the ocean is a product of the connection of the rivers with
the predominantly coastal settlements (and also it benefits from the lowlands, especially in
3
Even though the western hemisphere is composed of two distinct regions, the logic behind Spykman’s idea of
needing it united to have greater security is not invalidated. This objective, however, is more difficult to attain
(and probably would be at the core of any US global security strategy).
4
The concept of heartland is used to describe a resource-rich territory which does not allow for easy access by
the sea and is, therefore, pivotal for the control of the larger landmass (MACKINDER, 1904). Mackinder
developed this idea referring to the Eurasian continent.
5
According to Spykman and Nicholl (1944), the rimland is an intermediate region between the heartland and the
sea which functions as a buffer zone of conflict between land and sea powers.
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comparison to the Andes). Although these characteristics do not lean towards continental
unification, Castro (1997) notes that they also do not impose disaggregation.
Castro (1997) also distinguishes four different regions: the Caribbean, the Pacific, the
Atlantic, and the Interior. The first stretches from Colombia to the French Guyana and is
somewhat isolated from the rest of the continent due to the Andes and the Plateau of Guyana.
The second, from Colombia to Chile, is also somewhat detached from the rest of the continent
due to the Andes, but more integrated to it since there are some passes through the mountains.
The Interior region would be Bolivia and some parts of Brazil and Paraguay, i.e. the
heartland, where the hydrographic system is closed to the rest of the continent. Climatically
and geographically, it is a transition zone to/from the Amazon basin and the La Plata as well
as to/from the Pacific and the Atlantic regions. Lastly, as already stated, the Atlantic region is
characterized by the two river basins which facilitate the penetration in the hinterlands of the
main countries (Argentina and Brazil). These features can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Map of the Atlantic South America.
Fonte: Castro (2002).
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Consequently, Castro (1997) emphasizes that there is a South American geopolitical
vocation towards the Atlantic, especially towards its southern part. The lowlands to the East
form a semi-circle with its points at the mouths of the Amazon and La Plata rivers. The Andes
are the western rearguard of these lowlands together with the Plateau of Guyana to the North
and Patagonia to the South. Brazil, then, is the only country which can connect the two basins,
and articulate all of the regions of South America (CASTRO, 1997, 2002). Accordingly, she
notes that this Atlantic vocation is marked by the integration process of Mercosul (CASTRO,
2002), which has been put forward by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and now
with the addition of Venezuela.
3 US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AMERICA
3.1 The first half of the 20th century
3.1.1 The Roosevelt Corollary
If during the 19th century the United States focused efforts on consolidating its
independence and expanding the state, at the outset of the 20th century the country could
afford to focus on regions other than North America. The Spanish-American War in 1898
represented the idea of regional defense as conceived by the Monroe Doctrine. It effectively
expanded the scope to encompass places outside of the western hemisphere, for instance the
Philippines (CUMINGS, 2009).
Yet, towards the Americas themselves, the United States adopted a different stance.
Under Theodore Roosevelt, an addendum to the Monroe Doctrine was developed as a way to
further protect the hemisphere from European powers. Known as Roosevelt Corollary or
simply the “big stick policy”, it conferred to the United States the right to intervene in any
American country which somehow disrespected internationally established precepts of
behavior. Simply put, the U.S. could invade any country that displeased U.S. interests. In the
words of Roosevelt himself:
[The U.S.] would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it
became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad
had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the
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detriment of the entire body of American nations (ROOSEVELT apud KAPLAN,
2014, p. 1).
More than that, the Corollary introduced a doctrine of preventive intervention that
would permit the United States to intrude in Latin American countries threatened by
European powers (O’BRIEN, 2007). If, on the one hand it further limited the presence of
European colonialists in the region, on the other it gave justification for carrying out a
civilizing mission (O’BRIEN, 2007).
Nonetheless, the United States applied the Roosevelt Corollary mainly in Central
America and the Caribbean and rarely in South America. It came into play especially in
Colombia, the borderland between South America and the Caribbean. The United States
negotiated a treaty with Colombia to build a canal in the province of Panama, but in the end it
was rejected by the Colombian government. The rebuff was countered by military invasion of
Panama when a rebellion started in the province. American gunboats prevented the
Colombian military from quelling it (SMITH, 2005).
Shortly afterwards the U.S. government recognized Panama’s independence and
signed a treaty with the new country to build the canal (O’BRIEN, 2007). In addition to
Colombia, the U.S. also sent warships to Venezuela and Chile during disputes – although
troops never landed as in Panama – where investments by U.S. companies in mining and oil
exploration industries had thrived (LIVINGSTONE, 2009; O’BRIEN, 2007).
Notwithstanding Colombia, at the same time that the U.S. promoted interventions in
its neighborhood, it adopted a discourse of Pan-Americanism towards South America.
O’Brien (2007, p. 105) states that “U.S. officials never seriously considered using
interventionist tactics to extend their civilizing mission to South America”. In stark contrast to
the imperial policies in the Caribbean and Central America, the Pan-Americanism promoted
by the U.S. diplomacy was quite benign in the sense that the country tried to achieve
consensus with South American countries on key economic issues (O’BRIEN, 2007).
However, the South American nations started to criticize U.S. interventionism in the western
hemisphere and showed concern that the country could try to extend its power to the region
(O’BRIEN, 2007). Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Argentinean diplomats and intellectuals denied
the Roosevelt Corollary and defended the old interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine (BURNS,
2003; O’BRIEN, 2007).
Smith (2005) points out that the United States tried to developed better relations with
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, known as “ABC”. Out of the three, Brazil was the favored one. It
became the first South American country to host a U.S. ambassador and to be visited by the
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Secretary of State in 1906 (SMITH, 2005). However, the United States tried not to show any
preferential relations with Brazil in order to avoid upsetting Argentina and getting entangled
in the rivalry between the two (SMITH, 2005). Eventually, the ABC countries even mediated
a conflict between the U.S. and Mexico successfully preventing a full-scale war (e.g. SMITH,
2005).
It is noticeable that the European trade, especially the British, dominated South
American markets. This scenario began to change during World War I when the share of the
United States rose pointedly, especially with Brazil and Argentina for raw materials
(Livingstone, 2009)6. On the political front, South American countries favored a neutral
stance towards the conflict. Despite this being initially also the position of the
US, it declared war on Germany in 1917. Argentina was displeased by the attitude and
raised the idea of convening a peace conference excluding belligerent countries, i.e. the U.S.
However, the U.S. managed to get Brazil to declare war on Germany too with promises of
lifting trade barriers (SMITH, 2005). In practice this put an end to the Argentinean proposal.
Not only that, this maneuver dealt a harsh stroke on South American unity altogether, and
particularly on the ABC. It effectively rekindled the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina,
although the U.S. ended up not fulfilling its promises towards the former (SMITH, 2005).
3.1.2 The “Good Neighbor Policy”
The U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America as a whole underwent a stark change
of direction in the 1930s. The aggressive “Big Stick” policy was substituted by the “Good
Neighbor Policy” when Franklin D. Roosevelt (henceforth, FDR) came to power in the
country. Under this policy the United States recognized that no state had the right to intervene
in the internal affairs of the other, i.e. military interventionism was off the table 7. FDR
himself said that “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to
armed intervention” (ROOSEVELT apud SMITH, 2005, p. 96).
This policy was closely connected to the economic situation of the U.S. Right after the
crisis in 1929, it faced a severe depression and needed to cut off expenditures and to increase
its exports. Therefore, FDR sought to boost commercial ties with the rest of the hemisphere. It
6
From then on, the share of the United States in South American trade rose steadily and would eventually
overcome that of the European powers at the outset of World War II (LIVINGSTONE, 2009; SMITH, 2005).
7
This guideline was made clear when the United States signed the final document of the 7th Pan-American
Conference in Montevideo, which stated the rights and duties of all states (SMITH, 2005).
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successfully did so, in particular with Brazil. The Brazilian were the first in South America to
sign a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in 1935. Yet, the U.S. faced a serious
competition by Germany, that had begun an impressive trade offensive towards South
America with remarkable results: total trade volume rose pointedly until World War II.
Notably, German interests in Brazil grew in a faster pace than that of the U.S. in the 1930s
(SMITH, 2005).
During this decade, Brazil played Germany and the United States against each other
for better trade conditions (e.g. VISENTINI, 2013). However, after the war broke out,
Washington gave better conditions by funding the Brazilian industrialization, markedly the
steel plant of Volta Redonda (VISENTINI, 2013; O’BRIEN, 2007). From then on, Brazil
tilted towards the U.S. and even joined military operations after war had been declared.
Still, before the war the United States favored hemispherical neutrality with regards to
the conflict in Europe and in Asia in accordance to the Good Neighbor Policy. Washington
agreed to a 300 miles safety zone around the coastline of the Americas where belligerent
navies could not enter and war activities should not happen (SMITH, 2005). The U.S. also
defended that dominion over European colonies in the Americas could not be transferred, if
the original country was conquered (in the case, by Germany). This friendliness towards its
American neighbors rendered fruits when most South American countries joined U.S. war
efforts after it had broken out (SMITH, 2005).
The exception to this phase of good relations between South America and the U.S.
was Argentina. In Pan-American conventions convened by the U.S. to cope with the war,
Buenos Aires opposed Washington and refused to consent to a resolution calling for
immediate severance of relations with Axis powers (SMITH, 2005). Smith (2005, p. 104)
explains that:
While the action of the Argentine government reflected a proud desire not to be seen
as subservient to the United States, its attitude was also influenced by pressure from
its own politicians and army officers with pro-fascist sympathies and also from the
sizable German ethnic community in Argentina. In addition, Argentine public
opinion was very different to that in the United States in expressing doubt over the
likelihood of an Allied victory over the Axis and apprehension that abandoning the
policy of strict neutrality might provoke German military retaliation.
The Argentinean position was only followed by Chile. Santiago feared an attack
from Japan along its coastline (SMITH, 2005). However, after initial reluctance Chile also
accepted breaking off relations with the Axis powers in 1943 and it effectively declared war
on them in 1945. On the other hand, Argentina was still seen as the “bad neighbor” in the
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hemisphere due to its insistence to maintain relations with Germany until 1944 after the U.S.
waged a publicity campaign condemning Argentinean attitudes (SMITH, 2005).
As a whole, during the war the United States was able to use several ports and
airbases in South America, especially in Brazil. Washington sought to strengthen South
American military forces so that they could also defend the hemisphere against German
aggression (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). Particularly in the case of Brazil, the U.S. feared that
Germany would launch an attack from Western Africa to invade the “bulge” of Brazil’s
northeast (SMITH, 2005). To avoid that, the United States had no problem to support the
Brazilian dictatorship: Brazil received 70% of all aid given by the U.S. to Latin American
countries (SMITH, 2005).
3.2 The Cold War
With the end of World War II, the strategic imperatives of the United States were
circumscribed solely to one purpose: the containment of the Soviet Union and communist
ideology as a whole. For that purpose, the U.S. once again tried to amass all countries of the
western hemisphere in the frontline of the battle against the Soviets. Hemispherical security
dominated the policies of Washington until the late 1980s.
In accordance to that, during the Cold War, the United States had in place for the
Americas the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, more commonly known as the
“Rio Pact”. It origins date between 1936 and 1947 under the spectrum of World War II and
the beginning of the Cold War. This treaty was crafted with the fear of rising German and
Soviet influence in Latin America. Its first and foremost characteristic is the self-defense
against interventions in the American continent from external powers, especially against
changes in sovereignty (e.g. a return of colonialism). Therefore, the Rio Pact was regarded as
the embodiment of the Monroe Doctrine. It was based on continental solidarity and reciprocal
assistance against external and internal aggression – a legacy of the Good Neighbor Policy.
In addition to this treaty, the Organization of American States (OAS) was created in
1948 to crystallize Washington's domination in the continent. Under OAS' auspices of
multilateral interventions, the U.S. led several militarily incursions in Latin American
countries that were supposedly on the brink of adopting communist dictatorial regimes
(O’BRIEN, 2007). In this context, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 served as a basis for longterm military assistance programs of the U.S. with Latin and South American countries: The
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U.S. was charged with supplying weapons and equipment as well as with cementing ties
between military officers (O’BRIEN, 2007).
However, the ideological battle between western capitalist liberal democracies and
Soviet communism blurred the perception of Washington. In the early 1950s, South American
nationalism was equated with communism and, in fact, was deemed more challenging to U.S.
interests than the latter (O’BRIEN, 2007). Washington favored inter-American partnerships
based on capitalist principles of free trade and open markets (SMITH, 2005). Therefore:
American policymakers [...] in general had a difficult time distinguishing
nationalists from Communists and were more likely than not to simply lump the two
together and condemn them both. They saw revolutionary nationalism as
synonymous with anti-Americanism (HAINES, 1989, p.31).
Because of that, the United States became a harsh critic of democratic openings in
South America that allowed greater participation of leftist political movements and popular
nationalists (O’BRIEN, 2007). This perception was shared by South American elites as well
and together with the United States they perceived communism and nationalism
indistinguishable since both threatened their interests (O’BRIEN, 2007). Especially after the
Cuban Revolution and the missile crisis between the late 1950s and early 1960s Washington
became ready to support any regime whose policies were defined as anticommunist
(O’BRIEN, 2007).
This policy was embodied in the Alliance for Progress initiative and later the Johnson
Doctrine in the 1960s. The former was an ambitious plan to promote socioeconomic
development in the Americas through reforms dictated from the top (LIVINGSTONE, 2009)8.
However, while enormous amounts of credit were directed towards that goal, Washington was
also providing military training and manuals to suppress guerillas and other subversive
movements in the hemisphere (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). The economic side of the Alliance for
Progress was not very successful, but the military aspect persisted (O’BRIEN, 2007;
LIVINGSTONE, 2009). As a consequence, the military officers which had been trained in the
U.S. staged coups d'état in almost all South American countries, which had been pursuing
more nationalistic policies: Argentina (1962 and 1966), Peru (1962), Ecuador (1963), Brazil
(1964), Bolivia (1964)9.8 In most cases, the United States had developed plans of unilateral
military intervention to be carried out if those coups were to meet resistance, and in some
8
For instance, land redistribution, part of the agenda of many left-wing movements, was among the proposed
reforms so as to placate the demands of the populace (e.g. LIVINGSTONE, 2009).
9
In Paraguay the military coup happened in 1954 and the dictatorship lasted until 1989.
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Latin American countries the U.S. indeed intervened unilaterally without the support of OAS
or any other kind of hemispherical consultation (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). In Guyana, the U.S.
also fostered political destabilization so as to curb the influence of nationalistic leaders. These
policies were later known as the Johnson Doctrine, which Smith (2005) describes as a return
to the Roosevelt Corollary.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Nixon (and his advisor Henry Kissinger)
developed a new global strategy for the United States which became known as the “Nixon
Doctrine”. According to it, the U.S. would assist in the defense and development of its allies
and friends, but would not take on the main responsibility of defense of all allied countries
(FRANÇA et al., 2013; Rodrigues, 2004). This meant that each country was the main
responsible for its own security and that the U.S. would only act when requested (LITWAK,
1986; RODRIGUES, 2004). The Doctrine stated that peace would be pursued in partnership
with its allies in the Americas (LITWAK, 1986), especially with Brazil. Nixon himself stated
the U.S. had to work in close relations with Brazil “because we [the U.S.] know that as Brazil
goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American Continent” (NIXON, 1971).
This pursuit of closer partnerships actually led the United States to openly support
more military coups in South America, namely in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay. O’Brien (2007)
asserts that for Kissinger and Nixon Latin America was an exclusive sphere of influence of
the U.S. and that to protect it they would ally themselves with repressive military regimes
without a second thought. It is no coincidence that the most repressive of the military dictators
of Brazil had personally been supported by Nixon (e.g. NIXON, 1971). Regarding the
Chilean case, whose coup was plainly supported by the U.S., Kissinger argued: “I don't see
why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its
own people” (KISSINGER apud HERSH, 1983, p 265). In the context of a military
dictatorship, Chile coordinated regional efforts for the persecution (i.e. tracking down and
executing) of leftists and members of movements against South American dictatorships under
Operation Condor, which was conducted with the support of the U.S. (O’BRIEN, 2007;
LIVINGSTONE, 2009)10.9
However, this overt support for military regimes in South America would come to an
end under President Carter. From 1978 and 1981, his foreign policy was one of human rights
promotion and, because of that, the U.S. halted its support to South American dictatorships.
10
Permanent and occasional members of the Operation Condor were: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay,
Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela (besides the U.S.).
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The relations between South American countries and the U.S. was, then, deeply strained, for
instance, Brazil denounced several military agreements.
The relations further worsened in the 1980s with the Malvinas/Falklands War. When
Argentina militarily invaded the South Atlantic archipelago controlled by the United
Kingdom, it expected that the United States would support its claims when it invoked the Rio
Pact for its defense. However, the failure of the United States to support Argentina during the
war effectively proved that the hemispheric security architecture had failed. The Rio Pact was
then deemed an outdated instrument which had no geopolitical and geostrategic value. It had
shown that the region could not count on the U.S. to protect them from external attacks. As
Smith (2005, p. 157) puts it:
While Latin American governments were opposed in principle to Argentina's use of
force to resolve a territorial dispute, they were alarmed by America's [the U.S.]
evident pleasure at the British military triumph and support for what was essentially
a reassertion of Brisith colonialism.
In addition to that, South American discontent with the United States rose further
with their debt crisis. The government of President Reagan adopted policies that pushed up
the international exchange value of the U.S. dollar through larger interest rates (SMITH,
2005). Consequently, South American states were spending almost 50% of their annual
income to service debts, the prices of which were raised by the policies of Reagan (SMITH,
2005). This discontent brought South American countries together and gave rise to the
emergence of regional integration processes, such as Mercosul, which in fact put an end to the
regional rivalry between Brazil and Argentina.
3.3 Contemporary policies
After the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as a victor. This meant that
it could try to rally countries behind its banner of capitalist market freedom. Generally, the
Americas were no longer Washington's priority (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). Therefore, the U.S.
foreign policy for the western hemisphere underwent changes towards a greater role of the
economy in its formulation (MEDICK-KRAKAU, BRAND; ROBEL, 2012).
The main banner defended by the U.S. during the 1990s was market liberalization. As
a consequence, the precepts of the Washington Consensus (economic austerity and market
liberalization) were followed by most South American countries in the 1990s. Furthermore,
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U.S. President Bill Clinton started the negotiations for the establishment of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), an economic zone which would encompass all liberal market
teachings.
The FTAA proposal, however, did not have a warm reception among South American
countries, which in fact underwent severe economic crises due to neoliberal policies
(VIZENTINI, 2004). Most socioeconomic problems of the continent have worsened with the
policies propagated by the U.S. (VIZENTINI, 2004; LIVINGSTONE, 2009). In response to
that, socialist presidents were elected in most South American countries in the 2000s with
very cautious attitudes towards the U.S11. Notably in Venezuela, in 2002 the United States
once again supported a military coup (against Hugo Chávez) (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). In
2012 the United States also recognized the coup in Paraguay against leftist President
Fernando Lugo with the subsequent creation of a military basis in the country (ISAPE, 2014).
In addition to that, the United States also started to focus on drug trafficking in the
continent. Now that the threat of communism was no longer valid as a pretext for military
presence in South America, drug cartels were the alleged reasons for the U.S. to stage
interventions in Colombia and Peru (LIVINGSTONE, 2009). The “War on Drugs” saw the
emergence of a crescent militarization of social problems, leading to Plan Colombia in
199812. According to it, the U.S. would give huge amounts of aid to Bogota, especially
military; moreover, U.S. military bases would be established in the country (LIVINGSTONE,
2009).
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States, Washington tried to harness all
Latin American countries in its War on Terror, but with no success. The Untied States, then,
started to focus even less on South America, which enabled the region to deepen its regional
integration without Washington's participation (e.g. UNASUR). However, there was a
militarization of the relation between the U.S. and the continent, with an increased interest of
the U.S. in the fight against drug trafficking in Colombia.
After Obama came to power in the U.S., he pursued a foreign policy for South
America very similar to the one conducted by Clinton. Economy is the main goal for the
revitalization of the relations after the strains left by George W. Bush. Because the FTAA was
11
Some governments more vocal against U.S. imperialism have even left the Rio Pact, such as Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Bolivia.
12
According to Livingstone (2009), Plan Colombia was first drafted by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana
and it comprised a comprehensive peace plan with social reforms, but it was later rewritten by the U.S.
effectively becoming a plan for war.
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given up after facing strong opposition from left-wing governments in the 2000s, the U.S.
started to promote the Pacific Alliance and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP). Even though Washington is not a member of the former, it fosters
the initiative carried out by Mexico, Peru, Chile and Colombia. It is seen by many analysts as
a challenge to the South American continental integration process represented by the
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and led by Argentina and Brazil (e.g. SILVA,
2013). It can also be seen as a preparatory step towards the TPP, a free trade agreement of the
Pacific Ocean (which has excluded China up to this date) that revamps the proposals of the
FTAA in a larger scope (e.g. LAFER, 2014).
3.4 Analysis
Throughout the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the United States has
alternated its foreign policy towards South America from the Monroe Doctrine to the
Manifest Destiny. At times, it would favor respecting the sovereignty and autonomy of all
countries and at others a urge to civilize its neighbors would pervade the policies.
Under both guidelines, the United States seemed more prone to intervene in
geopolitical regions of South America identified as the continent's rimland, i.e. Venezuela,
Colombia, Chile, Peru. These countries suffered more interventions than any other.
Conversely, the U.S. seemed to adopt a more cautious strategy towards Brazil and Argentina,
always somehow trying to take advantage of their rivalry or even inciting it. Except during
the Cold War, the U.S. refrained from intervening in those two countries, which are
geopolitically favored by their river basins and easy access to the continent's heartland in
Bolivia (and Brazil).
The Roosevelt Corollary was a clear reincarnation of the Manifest Destiny. Imperial
policies were pursued by the U.S. in South America, especially in the northern part of the
continent. During World War I, the United States perceived that its security was closely
related to hemispheric unity. Yet, while trying to gain support from South American states, it
managed to explore the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, closely resembling the strategy
of bait and bleed (even if softer) as described by Mearsheimer: the U.S. increased in relative
power while Brazil and Argentina were busy dealing with each other.
The Good Neighbor Policy was a return of the Monroe Doctrine in its original features
of respecting sovereignty and autonomy. It positively affected the relations of the United
States with the region, since it provided much help for the development and industrialization
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of the countries, especially Brazil. In spite of that, the U.S. once again managed to worsen the
rivalry between Brazil and Argentina by giving more advantages to the former.
During the Cold War, the United States had a more general strategy of containing the
Soviet Union, which in South America presents more traces of the Manifest Destiny13. The
U.S. supported military coups throughout the region to counter the rise of communism
regardless of geographical positions. The geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War subdued
more regionally-designed approaches. This policy resembles Mearsheimer's strategy of
balancing. In the case, the balancing is occurring against the Soviets (and regionally against
Cuba). The U.S. tried peaceful measures to contain subversive movements (nationalists
included) and when it did not work, force was used as the last resort, just like Mearsheimer
described.
Having won the Cold War, the security of the U.S. was deemed as guaranteed.
Therefore, South America was no longer a priority of the country's foreign policy. This fact
coupled with the end of the Brazilian-Argentinean rivalry after the Malvinas/Falklands War
gave rise to regional integration processes (pointedly Mercosul). Both countries became the
geopolitical center of South American integration. Meanwhile, the United States had stopped
interfering in their internal affairs, coming closer to the Monroe Doctrine ideal type, even if
still advocating for neoliberal reforms in those countries.
However, after regional integration in South America became a challenge to U.S.
interests, it started to target countries in the rimland as it had already done during the
Roosevelt Corollary era. The United States maintained military presence in Colombia and
started to support integration processes (TPP, Pacific Alliance) which challenge the existing
ones that do not have it as a member (UNASUR, for instance). Moreover, it propped up coups
in Venezuela, also in the rimland, and quite alarmingly in Paraguay, a lot closer to the South
American heartland.
In accordance to Mearsheimer's theorization, these actions by the United States can be
interpreted as balancing against the rise of Brazil and Argentina. The U.S. is trying to divide
the continent in order to thwart the undergoing integration processes which challenge its
dominion over the region.
4 CONCLUSION
13
Globally, the Nixon Doctrine is closer to the ideal type of the Monroe Doctrine as França et al. (2013) have
argued. However, its implementation in South America is unquestionably more related to the Manifest Destiny
even if including some aspects of buck-passing as presented by Mearsheimer.
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In this paper we have seen that the United States has taken advantage of the rivalry
between Brazil and Argentina to hinder the integration of the region. Nowadays, it has been
propping up integration processes that challenge the already existing ones which are deem to
be contrary to U.S. interests.
The U.S. foreign policy towards South America has had a strategy of balancing off
external powers, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. For many, the unity of the
western hemisphere is tantamount to the security of the U.S. and this has proved to be the
case in the world wars and the Cold War. However, the most beneficial policies where those
under the ideal type of the Monroe Doctrine. Development was achieved, even if geopolitical
consideration and U.S. interests were at stake too.
Bearing that in mind, there seems to be two alternatives for the future of U.S. foreign
policy towards South America. The United States can maintain its primacy by forging a
strong partnership with Brazil. This way, Brazil could be the guarantor of stability in South
America through UNASUR. It would be a buck-passing by the U.S., where the costs of
maintaining stability would be shared (KHANNA, 2008; BRZEZINSKI, 2012). This option is
closer to the Monroe Doctrine.
Conversely, the second strategy, closer to Manifest Destiny, would consist of trying to
worsen the division of South American countries and exploring regional rivalries (between
Chile and Bolivia or Venezuela and Colombia, for instance) to maintain its dominion. The
instability created would hamper the integration of the continent, as well as the rise of Brazil.
This strategy has already been defended by geopolitical analysts such as Friedman (2011),
who further states that the U.S. should try to shatter the alliance between Brazil and Argentina
so that neither can rise and, thus, impede continental integration. However, the costs for
guaranteeing stability would be solely the burden of the United States, whose economy is still
frail.
The question of how the United States will act towards South America is a globally
relevant question for it may determine or at least influence the posture adopted by the country
to deal with other rising states. The stability of the current multipolar system depends on how
the U.S. will cope with emerging powers, not least with South America as a pole.
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