ICBH / LSE IDEAS
Witness Seminar
Britain and the Grenada Crisis, 1983:
Cold War in the Caribbean
Institute of Contemporary British History
Friday, 29 May 2009
A316 Main Building, LSE
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
Programme:
2.00 p.m. – 3.30 p.m.: Session One
3.30p.m. – 3.45 p.m.: Break for refreshment
3.45 p.m. – 5.00 p.m.: Session Two
Witness Programme Director: Dr Michael D. Kandiah
Institute of Contemporary British History
1
Acknowledgements
This witness seminar and interview programme has made possible with the support of:
The Dean’s Fund, School of Advance Studies, University of London;
Professor Kathleen Burk, University College London; and
The University of Essex.
2
About ICBH and the Witness Seminar Programme:
The Institute of Contemporary British History was founded in 1986 by Professor Peter
Hennessy (now Lord Hennessy of Lymsfield) and Dr Anthony Seldon to promote the
study of recent past.
Since the institution’s foundation, the Witness Seminar Programme has organised
nearly 100 witness seminars and a dozen interview programmes, with the aim of
facilitating scholarly research into different aspects of recent history.
Witness seminars are best described as exercises in oral history. Key participants
meet around the seminar table to discuss and debate the issues surrounding the chosen
topic as they remember them. Witness seminars thus operate as group interviews,
chaired by a senior academic, which are taped and transcribed. Participants are allowed
to redact their contributions and the agreed transcript is published on the worldwide
web and in paper hardcopy.
ICBH witness seminars are widely regarded by contemporary historians and
social scientists as among the most useful and innovative forms of oral history. They
often prove to be of more value than one-on-one interviews because of the interaction
between witnesses stimulated during these discussions. They have been adopted by
other institutions, both in Britain and abroad.
3
About LSE IDEAS:
LSE IDEAS is the centre for the study of international affairs, diplomacy, and grand
strategy. Its mission is to use the LSE’s unique resources for understanding international
events in order to develop research and training programmes that can help us recognise
how today’s world came into being and how it may be changed. It is a unique venture in
that it aims to link the past with the present and the practical with the academic. It draws
on research done by political scientists, scholars of international relations and historians,
as well as sociologists and economists. In addition, it involves the practitioners of
international affairs – politicians, civil servants, journalists and business leaders – as well
as academics and graduate students. The centre thus serves as a genuine meeting place
for professionals from very different backgrounds and perspectives, and for ideas
originating from very different places.
LSE IDEAS incorporates the Cold War Studies Centre, the world’s foremost centre for
the study of the Cold War era in international affairs.
4
Cold War in the Caribbean
Gary Williams
University of Essex
Background
The relationship between Britain and Grenada dates back to 1763 when it was ceded to
Britain after the Seven Years War with France.
The period of Grenadian history that has received the most attention from
scholars has been the period between 1979 and 1983. The period began with a coup by
the Marxist-Leninist New Jewel Movement (NJM) and, after four eventful years, finished
in dramatic fashion with the execution of the Prime Minister and a military intervention
by US and Caribbean forces.
However, the United Kingdom’s relations with Grenada during this period have
received little attention. Britain’s involvement in the region was guaranteed, based on
her position as a former major colonial power although a policy of gradual
disengagement was in progress with most of the Associated States on track to their
independence by the time of the coup.1
The origins of the coup in Grenada lay in the increasingly autocratic, repressive,
violent and eccentric leadership of Eric Gairy, who had been in an out of power since
1951. By the time Grenada became independent in 1974, Gairy faced a new opposition
party that posed a serious threat to him. The NJM, established in March 1973, was
influenced by Black Power ideology, African socialism and Marxist-Leninism. Having
failed to unseat Gairy in the 1976 election (as part of a People’s Alliance) the NJM turned
towards the use of force to remove him. On 13 March 1979 a force of 46 lightly armed
NJM members attacked the main army barracks and police stations, meeting little
resistance. By the end of the day the NJM were in control.
The reaction of Grenada’s Caribbean neighbours was mixed—Jamaica, Trinidad
and Barbados for example condemned the use of force but officially recognised the new
People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG). The smaller islands such as St Lucia and
Antigua were frightened by the coup, and the precedent it could set, and refused to
accept the new government.
The UK and the USA were both initially satisfied to be guided by the Caribbean
reaction. After an initially promising start some worrying signs appeared: the PRG
suspended the constitution, arrested political opponents, imposed press restrictions,
postponed promised elections indefinitely and received arms from Cuba and Guyana.
The UK appeared content to give the PRG the benefit of the doubt, assuming that
the realities of ruling would result in a moderation of some of their more left-wing
tendencies. London was also mindful that its ongoing disengagement from the region
should not be disrupted if possible.
The Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent)
were established in 1967; the islands were responsible for domestic affairs and Britain was
responsible for foreign affairs and defence. Grenada had been the first one to become
independent in 1974 and St Kitts-Nevis the last in 1983.
1
5
Given the PRG’s ideological disposition and the USA’s view of the Caribbean as
its ‘backyard’ it was not surprising that the US reaction was less optimistic. When the
Americans informed Grenada that they would ‘view with displeasure any tendency on
the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba’ the Grenadian Prime Minister
responded defiantly, stating that: ‘we are not in anybody’s backyard and we are
definitely not for sale’.2
The PRG was a classic authoritarian regime that quickly established good
relations with Cuba who provided substantial financial assistance and labour. The PRG
also established links with the Soviet Union, Soviet bloc countries, North Korea as well as
radical third world regimes like Libya.
As the USA placed increasing emphasis on the Cold War significance of the
Caribbean and Central America relations with Grenada steadily deteriorated; the US
adopted a distancing policy and increased aid to the rest of the Eastern Caribbean. A
combination of economic, political and military pressure was also applied: the Cubanbuilt airport under construction was denounced as a military facility, international
financial institutions were pressured to exclude Grenada from their programmes and
regular naval manoeuvres were held in the Caribbean.
UK policy for the most part echoed the US approach, condemning the lack of
elections, lack of press freedom, political prisoners and the PRG’s foreign policy. London
decided that no new aid agreements would be signed with the PRG because ‘greater
weight should be given in the allocation of British [bilateral] aid to political ...
considerations alongside our basic developmental objectives’.3 Nonetheless, the UK
remained an important trade partner for Grenada and honoured existing aid
agreements.4 The UK also established a permanent diplomatic presence in Grenada in
1980, the only Western country to do so.
Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds), Maurice Bishop Speaks – The Grenada Revolution in its Own
Words (Pathfinder Press, 1983), p.31.
3 Neil Marten, Minister for Overseas Development, cited in Anthony Payne, ‘The Grenada Crisis
in British Politics’, Round Table, vol.292 (1984), p.406.
4 A £2.24 million capital aid settlement had been negotiated at independence in 1974. The value of
various technical co-operation programmes remained steady at an average £42,000 per annum.
House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 2 nd Report, Grenada (London, 1984), p.29.
2
6
Downfall
Grenada became the focus of attention in October 1983. A severe internal crisis in the
PRG culminated in the arrest and murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several
cabinet members on 19 October by a rival government faction. During the following
week there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in the Eastern Caribbean, Washington and
London.
In the Caribbean, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)5 met on 21
October and unanimously agreed on a military solution to resolve the situation in
Grenada, where a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) had been established and
placed the island under curfew. Barbados and Jamaica agreed to assist. Although the
OECS stated that they planned to invite the UK, Canada, France and Venezuela it was
clear that the OECS saw the USA as the mostly likely, and most viable, source of
assistance. Indeed, the USA was the only one to receive a formal written invitation.
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)6 met on 22 October but there was no
consensus on action. Instead CARICOM favoured a non-military solution based on
political and economic sanctions. The OECS members in attendance had not expected
much from the meeting and proceeded with their own plans.
In Washington the State Department had been monitoring the situation since
Bishop’s arrest and contemplating the need for an operation to evacuate US nationals
(mostly students at a private medical school). When Bishop was killed the emphasis
shifted towards the possible need for a large-scale operation. Reports from the US
embassy in Barbados made it clear that there was a convergence of thinking in
Washington and the Caribbean. Hence when the OECS request for US assistance to
remove the RMC was received it found a willing ear in Washington.
As the USA continued planning for a full-scale military intervention, the British
decided to wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting. The UK Deputy High
Commissioner in Barbados visited Grenada to assess the situation and meet with the
Governor General. Washington eventually received an invitation for assistance from the
Governor General as well, via Barbados.
The UK embassy in Washington was instructed to find out the Americans likely
response to the OECS request as they concluded that the US reaction would be the key to
how events unfolded. London made their opposition to intervention clear to
Washington; in the House of Commons Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe told MPs that
he had ‘no reason to think that American military intervention is likely’.7
This situation changed that evening (24 October) when telexes and telephone
calls conveyed that the USA was giving serious consideration to intervening. British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher attempted to persuade President Reagan to call off the
The OECS consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts-Nevis, St
Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.
6 CARICOM consisted of all the OECS members as well as the larger independent countries
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
7 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (Macmillan, 1994), p.328. See Document 3.
5
7
operation but her words fell on deaf ears and the intervention commenced the next
morning.8
The Prime Minister did not condemn American actions but she did say that the
UK would have welcomed more opportunity of consultation and that the use of force in
international law was always controversial. On the World Service she stated:
We in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our force to
defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into independent
sovereign territories ... If you are pronouncing a new law that wherever
Communism reigns against the will of the people, even though it’s
happened internally, there the United States shall enter, then we are going
to have some really terrible wars in the world.9
The Prime Minister also stated that the UK had never received a request to participate
from the OECS. Having been told there was no likelihood of American intervention, the
Commons strongly criticised the government’s ‘impotence’ and claimed that the UK had
been deceived and humiliated by its oldest and closest ally.
The lack of consultation and trust shown by the USA towards the UK, and some
deliberate deception, in some quarters raised questions about the state and nature of
current Anglo-American relations, especially with US nuclear weapons about to be
deployed on British soil.
However, tensions soon dissipated as both countries described the matter as a
difference of opinion. Grenada highlighted that differences of opinion and independent
action are a reality even when the relationship between the two leaders were as close as
Reagan and Thatcher.
8
9
See document 6.
Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (Bodley Head, 1990), p.131.
8
Participants
Chair:
Professor Paul Sutton, London Metropolitan University
Senior Professor in Caribbean Studies. Formerly Emeritus Reader in Politics, University
of Hull. He is an international expert on Caribbean affairs and has published many
books and articles on the Caribbean. He is a former Chair of the Society for Caribbean
Studies where he lectured on the Caribbean, United States, and European Union. He has
been a consultant on the Caribbean to various international organisations, including
bodies such as the West Indian Commission. He is also currently a member of the
Caribbean Advisory Group appointed by the UK government to advise on policy in the
Caribbean.
Witnesses:
Their positions around the time of the Grenada Crisis
Field Marshal the Lord Bramall, KG, GCB, KCB, OBE, MC, JP
Chief of the General Staff, 1979—82; Field Marshal, 1982. ADC (Gen.), 1979—82. Colonel
Commandant, 3rd Battalion Royal Green Jackets, 1973—84.
Robert Chase
Head, Caribbean Section, Mexico and Caribbean Department, FCO, 1976-80, Asst Head,
South American Department, FCO, 1982—83.
John Edwards, CMG
Head, West Indian and Atlantic Department, FCO, 1981—84.
Peter Gay
Second Secretary, UK High Commission Trinidad and Tobago, 1978—80.
Sir Sydney Giffard, KCMG
Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1982—84.
John Kelly, CMG, LVO, MBE
UK Permanent Representative, FCO, Grenada, 1982—86.
9
Sir Bernard Ingham
Prime Minister’s Press Secretary.
David Montgomery, CMG, OBE
Deputy High Commissioner, UK High Commission Barbados, FCO, 1980-84.
Mrs Patsy Robertson
Commonwealth Secretariat.
Ambassador Lawrence G. Rossin
US State Department.
Audience Members:
Dr Gill Bennett, Cabinet Office.
Dominic Benoit, University of Liverpool.
Mrs Michele Blagg, CCBH.
Professor Michael Cox, LSE IDEAS.
Ruth Evans, CCBH.
Matthew Glencross, CCBH.
Dr Keith Hamilton, FCO Historians.
David Lane, CMG: High Commissioner in Trinidad and Tobago, 1980–85.
Mrs Lane.
York Membery, CCBH.
Professor Philip Murphy, University of Reading.
Professor Michael Parsons, University of Pau.
Dr Jill Pellew, IHR.
Mark Pellew, CVO: Counsellor: Washington, 1983–89.
Mel Porter, ICBH.
10
Dr Virginia Preston, ICBH.
Professor Patrick Salmon, FCO Historians.
Matthew Skrein, University of Liverpool.
Dr Amanda Sives, University of Liverpool.
Mark Smalley, BBC.
Mrs Gillian Staerck, IHR.
Tony Thorndike, Chambers and partners.
Principal Organisers:
Dr Michael D. Kandiah, Director, Witness Seminar Programme, ICBH.
His publications include Cold War Britain (Macmillan/Palgrave, 2003).
Dr Gary Williams, University of Essex.
His publications include US-Grenada Relations (Macmillan/Palgrave, 2007).
Dr Sue Onslow, LSE IDEAS.
Her Remaking of Europe since 1975: Cold Warriors to Peacemakers is forthcoming.
11
Chronology of Events
1967
MAR
Grenada achieved internal self-government under the Associated
Statehood Act. Britain retained responsibility for defence and foreign
affairs.
AUG 25
Eric Gairy elected for fourth period in office. Gairy first elected in 1951
and re-elected in 1954 and 1957. He had been dismissed from office by
the Colonial Office for financial irregularities in 1962.
1972
FEB 28
Eric Gairy re-elected.
1973
MAR 11
The New Jewel Movement (NJM) established with the merger of
Maurice Bishop’s Movement for the Assemblies of People and Unison
Whiteman’s Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberty.
NOV 18
Six leading members of the NJM arrested and beaten up by Gairy’s
police and Mongoose Gang in what becomes known as ‘Bloody
Sunday’, the day a General Strike had been due to begin.
1974
JAN 1
A three-week national strike started. During protest march Bishop’s
father shot dead by police.
FEB 7
Grenada achieved independence.
APR 8—10
The NJM concluded that the cause of the failure to remove Gairy
during the 1973-74 unrest was backward economic structure, a strong
petit bourgeoisie and ideologically weak working class. They decided to
become a vanguard Marxist-Leninist organisation.
1975
12
DEC
The NJM established a Grenada-Cuba Friendship society.
1976
DEC
Gairy narrowly won a sixth term with 52 per cent of the vote. Bishop
appointed leader of the opposition People’s Alliance in parliament.
1978
SEPT
Guns smuggled from the USA to Grenada in three barrels marked
‘grease’ and delivered to the home of a senior NJM member.
1979
MAR 12
US Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents arrived in Grenada as part of
an ongoing investigation into gunrunning from the USA to Grenada.
Gairy departed Grenada to visit New York.
MAR 13
The NJM seized power in a coup which met with little or no resistance
from Gairy’s army or police force.
MAR 14—15
CARICOM (Caribbean Community) met to discuss the implications of
the coup and how to restore constitutional order. No consensus
reached.
MAR 20
WIAS (West Indies Associated States) met to discuss the coup; WIAS
strongly condemned the coup and refused to accept the People’s
Revolutionary Government (PRG) until a return to constitutional
normalcy occurred.
Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana officially recognised the Bishop regime.
MAR 22
Britain, Canada and the USA officially recognised the Bishop regime.
MAR 23
US Ambassador to Barbados, Frank Ortiz, met Prime Minister Bishop
and discussed aid and elections. Bishop also met with British High
Commissioner to Trinidad, Harry Stanley, and discussed the same
issues.
MAR 25
Bishop suspended the country’s constitution and replaced it with a
series of People’s Laws.
MAR 27
High Commissioner Stanley returned to Grenada and met Deputy
Prime Minister Bernard Coard to discuss the economy and elections.
13
APR 4
The first load of Cuban arms arrived secretly by plane. Further arms
and personnel arrived on 7 and 14 April. Arms from Guyana arrived
on March 16, 22 and April 9.
APR 6
Bishop claimed that Gairy recruited mercenaries to organise a
countercoup.
APR 7
Bishop requested arms from Britain, USA and CARICOM.
APR 8
Bishop announced that he will be asking Cuba and Venezuela as well
and expected material assistance soon after.
APR 10
Ambassador Ortiz met Bishop and informed him that the USA ‘would
view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop
closer ties with Cuba.’
APR 13
Bishop rebuked the USA on Radio Free Grenada, claiming that Ortiz
made ‘veiled threats’ against the tourist industry and was
unresponsive about aid. He said that if Cuba offered aid Grenada
would accept it and warned that ‘we are not in anybody’s backyard,
and we are definitely not for sale.’
APR 14
Grenada established diplomatic relations with Cuba.
MAY 2—3
A tripartite meeting in Washington between the USA, UK and Canada
discussed Grenada, the Eastern Caribbean and the Caribbean region.
JUL 16
Grenada signed the Declaration of St George’s with Dominica and St
Lucia where leftwing governments had just been elected.
SEPT
Grenada established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
OCT 13
The independent Torchlight newspaper was closed by the PRG.
People’s Law 81 was passed to limit ownership in any medium to four
per cent and to ban foreign ownership.
NOV
Bishop announced that Cuba will provide financial aid and labour to
build an international airport at Point Salines.
1980
JAN
Grenada supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the UN
General Assembly vote.
FEB 20
UK Minister for Overseas Development, Neil Marten, announced that
‘greater weight should be given in the allocation of British aid to
14
political, industrial and commercial considerations alongside our basic
developmental objectives.’
MAY
The UK established a one-man post on Grenada, responsible to the
British High Commission in Barbados.
MAY
US Operation Solid Shield military manoeuvres were conducted in the
Caribbean.
JUN 19
A bomb exploded at a rally in Grenada narrowly missing the PRG
Cabinet.
OCT
The PRG signed a secret military agreement with the Soviet Union to
provide substantial levels of arms and ammunition. Further
agreements were signed in February 1981 and July 1982. Military
agreements were also signed with Cuba and North Korea.
1981
FEB
London decided that due to the ‘unsatisfactory political situation’ a
new loan would not be made to Grenada under the banana
development programme. No new aid agreements would be made.
MAR
The USA blocked a US$19 million loan request to the IMF by Grenada.
The USA failed to block three other IMF loans totalling US$20 million
during the PRG’s lifetime.
JUN 18
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was established.
Its members are Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St KittsNevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent.
JUN 19
The independent Grenadian Voice newspaper was closed after first issue
despite conforming to People’s Law 81.
JUN
The Caribbean Development Bank rejected a $4 million US loan
because it excluded Grenada on political grounds.
JUL 6
The UK Treasury’s Export Credit Guarantee Department agreed to
underwrite a £6 million Plessey Electronics contract to supply
equipment to Grenada’s airport project.
AUG 1
US Operation Ocean Venture naval manoeuvres commenced and
lasted until October.
1982
15
FEB 24
President Reagan announced the US$350 million Caribbean Basin
Initiative designed to address the socio-economic causes of unrest in
the region.
APR 8
President Reagan visited Barbados and told regional leaders that
Grenada ‘now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means
that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours.’
APR 28
Operation Ocean Venture 82, US naval manoeuvres, took place in the
Caribbean for one month.
SEPT 21
The Soviet Union opened an embassy in Grenada.
OCT 29
A Regional Security System was established by Antigua, Barbados,
Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent. Grenada was excluded.
OCT
PRG Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard resigned from the Central
Committee and Political Bureau, disappointed over the rate of social
and economic transformation and the difficulties encountered in
establishing a Marxist-Leninist party structure and control system.
NOV 16-18
A CARICOM heads of government meeting produced a Declaration
recognising that ideological pluralism will not be an obstacle to
regional integration.
DEC
UK Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Central
America and the Caribbean noted the ‘considerable degree of success
achieved by the economic and social policies of the PRG.’ The
Committee recommended that the UK promote a dialogue with the
PRG and establish a new bilateral aid programme.
1983
JAN 12
FCO Assistant Under-Secretary Sir John Ure met Bishop during a visit
to the Caribbean. Discussion focused on restoring the country’s
constitution, elections and aid.
MAR 23
President Reagan announced Strategic Defence Initiative and with the
aid of satellite photos drew attention to Grenada, stating that ‘the
Soviet-Cuban militarisation of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as
power projection in to the region.’
MAR
US Operation Universal Trek naval manoeuvres took place.
16
JUN 7
Bishop met National Security Advisor William Clark and Deputy
Secretary of State Kenneth Dam during an 11-day visit to Washington
and New York.
JUL 13-19
PRG Central Committee First Plenary session was held. Organisational
weaknesses were identified and the continued failure of the party to
transform itself ideologically and organisationally and to exercise firm
leadership along a Leninist path.
AUG 26
An emergency meeting of the Central Committee focused on the
membership and function of the CC and beginning of the
disintegration of the party.
SEPT 14-16
An emergency meeting of the Central Committee focused on the
membership and function of the CC. Bishop was targeted for direct
criticism; the quality of his leadership was questioned and his failure to
put the party of a firm Marxist-Leninist footing emphasised. A Joint
Leadership solution was proposed: Bishop would be responsible for
work with the masses, propaganda, organs of popular democracy,
foreign affairs. Coard would be responsible for party organisation and
development, strategy and tactics.
SEPT 25
At an NJM Extraordinary General Meeting Bishop expressed his
doubts about the Joint Leadership proposal but accepted it.
SEPT 27
Bishop and two colleagues departed for an economic mission to
Eastern Europe. During the trip Bishop changed his mind about Joint
Leadership and saw it as an effort to undermine him.
OCT 12
The Political Bureau and Central Committee met. Bishop’s request to
reopen the issue of Joint Leadership was rejected and Bishop identified
as ‘mainly responsible for the crisis in the party.’
Bishop’s bodyguards circulated rumours that the Coards were plotting
to kill Bishop.
OCT 13
A meeting of NJM members called: Bishop denounced as having
‘disgraced the party’ and being ‘without redemption’. He was placed
under house arrest and expelled from the party the next day.
John Kelly (the British representative on Grenada) reported to the
British High Commission in Barbados that ‘Coard is about to throw
Bishop out and declare a Marxist state.’
In Washington the State Department’s Restricted Inter-Agency Group
(RIG) met to discuss the possibility of further unrest in Grenada and
the threat this posed to US citizens.
17
OCT 14
UK Deputy High Commissioner to Barbados, David Montgomery,
reported to London that Coard had been all but successful in removing
Bishop.
PRG Minister Selwyn Strachan tried to announce Bishop’s replacement
by Coard at the Free West Indian newspaper’s premises but was shouted
down and chased off by an angry crowd.
OCT 15
Fidel Castro sent a letter to the Central Committee saying that events
were ‘a surprise, and disagreeable’ and that Cuba would not get
involved in Grenada’s internal affairs.
Negotiations between Coard and pro-Bishop Ministers to find a
solution to the crisis continued for three days but without success
OCT 17
RIG met and considered the possibility of a non-permissive evacuation
operation.
Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams met with US Ambassador Milan
Bish to request US involvement. Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Charles Gillespie to request US involvement.
OCT 18
Several hundred people took to the streets in Grenada to protest,
chanting ‘No Bishop, no revo.’
OCT 19
Prime Minister Adams met Ambassador Bish again and made a strong
pitch for US assistance to rescue Bishop but also raised the idea of a US
and Eastern Caribbean multinational force to take over Grenada and
restore order.
Prime Minister Adams met the British High Commissioner, Giles
Bullard, to discuss the idea of a multinational military intervention.
Bishop freed from house arrest by a crowd of his supporters. Bishop
heads to Fort Rupert. The Central Committee ordered the army to
retake the Fort – in the process 30-40 people were killed. Bishop and
seven colleagues were lined up and shot.
A 16-man Revolutionary Military Council was established, headed by
General Hudson Austin. A four-day shoot-on-sight curfew was
imposed.
OCT 20
The Crisis Pre-Planning Group met in Washington to discuss an
evacuation operation.
St Lucian Prime Minister John Compton called Prime Minister Adams
to express in ‘the strongest possible terms’ the need for a Caribbean
initiative to intervene in Grenada on a multinational basis.
Prime Minister Adams met Ambassador Bish and suggested
intervention under the auspices of the OECS. Bish informed Adams
that ‘unequivocal written requests’ would be required.
Fidel Castro condemned the RMC, saying that political relations would
‘undergo profound and serious analysis.’
18
The Special Situations Group (chaired by Vice President George Bush)
met in Washington. Planning focused on a larger-scale operation rather
than an evacuation. The Sixth Fleet Carrier Battle Group on its way to
the Mediterranean was diverted towards Grenada to provide a military
option.
OCT 21
The OECS met in Barbados and agreed to a military solution. Britain,
the US, France, Canada and Venezuela would be approached for
assistance. Prime Ministers Adams, Charles and Seaga met with US
diplomats afterwards to convey the request to ‘depose the outlaw
regime in Grenada by any means.’
British embassy officials in Washington reported that contact with the
State Department suggested that no action was currently planned.
OCT 22
President Reagan responded positively to the OECS’ request and
approved planning for a military operation. There would be three
objectives: 1) ensure the safety of US nationals, 2) restore democratic
government and 3) the elimination of current, and prevention of
further, Cuban intervention on Grenada.
Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in Washington, Robin
Renwick, visited the State Department to express British concern about
a possible military intervention.
High Commissioner Giles Bullard received an oral request for
assistance from Prime Minister Adams, who indicated that a formal
written request would follow.
The HMS Antrim was diverted towards Grenada in case an evacuation
of UK nationals was required.
US diplomats Linda Flohr and Ken Kurze and British Deputy High
Commissioner David Montgomery flew to Grenada from Barbados.
CARICOM met in Trinidad and focused on a non-military solution,
ruling out the use of force or external involvement in a Caribbean
problem. The OECS members decided to proceed irrespective of
CARICOM. Grenada expelled from CARICOM.
OCT 23
241 marines are killed in a suicide attack in Beirut.
The National Security Planning Group met in the morning and
afternoon in Washington. President Reagan signed the National
Security Decision Directive that authorised the operation.
David Montgomery and John Kelly met with Governor General Paul
Scoon in Grenada.
British and American diplomats met with RMC member Leon
Cornwall. Discussions about the evacuation of nationals were
unproductive and Cornwall insisted that order would be restored
shortly and a new government formed.
Montgomery reported that the situation was ‘calm, tense, and pretty
volatile’,
19
High Commissioner Bullard reported to London that CARICOM
offered the best chance of a peaceful solution but that the OECS would
go along with a military solution if external assistance was
forthcoming.
Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, Derek Thomas,
contacted the State Department to enquire about US intentions and got
the same message as Renwick had the day before.
Ambassador Frank McNeil met with Caribbean leaders in Barbados to
provide an independent assessment of the situation. McNeil explained
that, if the US were to be involved, a formal written invitation would
be required from the OECS.
Radio Free Grenada announced that the OECS had taken a decision to
send military forces to Grenada. The militia and army were mobilised.
Cornwall met US diplomats in the evening to plead for talks to avoid
bloodshed. RMC inflexibility over evacuation plans and their
determination to stay in power made progress impossible.
OCT 24
US Ambassador McNeil reported to Washington that the RMC
believed an intervention was imminent and that they were not keen to
let the students leave and that the situation on the island was
deteriorating rapidly.
The curfew was lifted in Grenada. Four charter flights departed from
Pearls airport. Colonel Pedro Tortola Comas arrived in Grenada from
Cuba to take charge of the Cuban contingent.
The US embassy in Barbados received information that 50 per cent of
the students at St George’s University wanted to leave.
The UK Cabinet met and considered reports on the OECS and
CARICOM meetings, Montgomery’s meeting with Governor General
Scoon and the reports from the British embassy in Washington.
British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Wright, met with US
Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who confirmed that
military action was likely.
UK Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe informed the House of
Commons that London was in close touch with the US and Caribbean
governments; when asked about the possibility of US intervention he
replied that ‘I know of no such intention.’
President Reagan gave the ‘go ahead’ order for Operation Urgent Fury
to begin the next morning.
OECS leaders were informed that the US had acceded to their request.
President Reagan informed the leadership of Congress of his decision
to intervene in Grenada.
President Reagan sent a letter to Downing Street stating that he was
giving ‘serious consideration’ to the OECS’ request and would
welcome the Prime Minister’s thoughts and advice. A second letter
arrived some hours later indicating that President Reagan had decided
to ‘respond positively’ to the OECS request.
20
Prime Minister Thatcher phoned President Reagan and asked him to
call off the operation fearing that it would endanger US and British
citizens and the Governor General and that Britain had not received
any written request from the OECS and most CARICOM members
opposed a military solution. President Reagan thanked her but had
already decided to proceed with the operation.
OCT 25
Operation Urgent Fury commenced at 5:00 a.m. local time. Within
three days 6,000 US troops were on Grenada.
Prime Minister Thatcher informed the House of Commons that the
government had ‘communicated our very considerable doubts’ to the
USA.
OCT 26
Governor General Scoon rescued and flown to the USS Guam and then
on to Point Salines airport where he signed a formal written invitation.
OCT28
US forces secured ‘all significant military objectives’. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey admitted that ‘we got a lot
more resistance than we expected.’
NOV 3
Hostilities officially ended.
NOV 9
Governor General Scoon named a nine member interim government to
be headed by Nicholas Braithwaite.
1984
DEC 3
Coalition New National Party won 14 of the 15 seats in the first election
since 1976.
21
Questions for Discussion
1.
What were relations with Eric Gairy’s Grenada like after independence in 1974?
What was known about the opposition New Jewel Movement?
2.
How and why did British and American responses to the NJM’s coup on 13 March
1979 differ?
3.
What were relations with the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) like
under the Thatcher government? What were the main areas of contact? To what
extent was British policy influence by US concerns? Did the UK share these
concerns?
4.
Was the UK aware of any crisis within the PRG in the lead up to Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop’s arrest in October 1983? What was the reaction to his arrest in
London? What contact was there between British, American and Caribbean
officials in the region?
5.
How and when did news of Bishop’s death emerge? What was the response in
London?
6.
What and when did the UK know about the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
States’ (OECS) intention to request assistance for a military solution?
7.
How did London react to the OECS request and how important was it?
8.
Did London place greater emphasis on the outcome of the CARICOM meeting on
22 October? Did the UK underestimate the strength of OECS feelings?
9.
What role did the British High Commission in Barbados play? What was the
nature of the reports that London was receiving from the High Commission?
10.
What information was London receiving from the British Embassy in Washington?
11.
When and how was Governor General Sir Paul Scoon’s invitation to Barbadian
Prime Minister Tom Adams to restore order in Grenada made?
12.
When FCO officials met on 24 October to consider reports from the Caribbean and
the US what conclusions were drawn about the likelihood of a non-military or
military solution to the crisis? Was there a consensus?
13.
When President Reagan informed Prime Minister Thatcher the night before the
intervention that he was considering responding positively to the OECS request
how did she respond? To what extent was her response shaped by her personal
relationship with Reagan? Was there the expectation that London’s views would
have any impact?
22
14.
Why and how was the UK excluded from the Grenada intervention? Would the
British reaction have been different if they had been informed earlier and received
a written invitation from the OECS? Did the UK need to be involved?
15.
How did Grenada impact upon Anglo-American relations?
16.
How did Grenada impact upon Anglo-Caribbean relations?
17.
How did the FCO react to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
report on Grenada that was published in March 1984?
23
Selected Bibliography
Jorge Heine, A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada (1990)
Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (1994)
Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (1984)
Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion (1984)
Ronald Reagan, An American Life (1990)
Kai Schoenhals and Richard Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New
Jewel Movement, the United States and the Caribbean (1985)
George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (1993)
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (1993)
Margaret Thatcher Foundation: Online Document Collections
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/
Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (1985)
Gary Williams, US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard (2007)
24
Selected Documents
Document 1
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109428
1983 Oct 24 Mo
Archive (Reagan Library)
Grenada: Reagan letter to Thatcher (thinking of intervening) [declassified 2000]
Document type:
thatcher record
Document kind:
Archive
Venue:
Augusta National Golf Club, Georgia
Source:
Reagan Library: Executive Secretariat NSC: Records Country File
(UK vol.V)
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
Despatched 1847 GMT 24 Oct 1983. A copy was sent on 12 Dec
1983 to the new US Ambassador in London, Charles Price.
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
596 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA), Foreign policy (USA),
Monarchy, Law and order, Defence (arms control), Foreign
policy (USSR and successor states)
Declassified S98-002#602
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/21/00
White House Situation Room
Via Cabinet Office Channels WH08192
24 October 1983
Dear Margaret,
I have followed closely the political turmoil in Grenada in recent days. I know
that you share my concern for the impact which the killing of the leadership there has
had on our friends in the Western hemisphere, particularly on the democratic
governments of the English-speaking Caribbean states. The prospect that the bloodstained group who appear to be the only authority on the island could perpetuate their
power also raises questions about the welfare of the people of Grenada themselves, as
well as our own nationals resident there.
The members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) have raised
similar concerns which are, of course, magnified by their proximity to and limited ability
to defend themselves against the threat which Grenada now poses. They have a well
25
founded fear of aggression by or subversion from Grenada, or the possibility that their
own democratically-constituted governments may be challenged by some who might
seek to imitate the example set by General Austin and the [fo 1] People’s Revolutionary
Army if this situation is not rectified. The nations of the OECS have unanimously
decided to pursue a collective security effort to restore peace and order in Grenada and
have formally requested United States support and participation. I understand that a
similar request was to have been presented to Her Majesty’s Government.
I am writing to inform you that I am giving serious consideration to the OECS
request. On Sunday, October 23, 1983, I dispatched a Special Emissary, Ambassador
Francis McNeil , to Bridgetown to confer with Prime Minister Adams and other OECS
and Caribbean leaders regarding their plans. I understand that they have already
assembled forces in Barbados from the various island nations. Ambassador McNeil has
informed Prime Minister Adams that the United States firmly endorses the political
objectives of their proposed operation, namely, to restore order and security so as to
permit the formation of a provisional government which would hold early elections.
We believe that Her Majesty’s Governor General in Grenada [Sir Paul Scoon ]
could be a key figure in this operation, since he is the only remaining voice of legitimacy
on the island and should be the one who designates a new provisional government. Such
a government could be formed shortly after the collective security forces lands in
Grenada. It is also important that free and fair elections be held as early as possible to reestablish a truly democratic system of government.
Ambassador McNeil has also consulted with the Caribbean states on their
intention to request an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organisation
of American States, in which they would take the lead in seeking an endorsement of
their collective security effort.
I welcome your thoughts on these matters. I know that you would want to be
kept informed of any role the United [fo 2] States may decide to play in support of the
island nations of the Caribbean. I will, therefore, undertake to inform you in advance
should our forces take part in the proposed collective security force, or of whatever
political or diplomatic efforts we plan to pursue. It is of some assurance to know that I
can count on your advice and support on this important issue.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Ron
Document 2
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109429
1983 Oct 24 Mo
Archive (Reagan Library)
Grenada: Reagan letter to Thatcher (decided to intervene) [declassified 2000]
Document type:
thatcher record
Document kind:
Archive
26
Venue:
Augusta National Golf Club, Georgia
Source:
Reagan Library: Executive Secretariat NSC: Records Country File
(UK volume V)
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
Despatched 2200 GMT 24 Oct 1983. A copy was sent to the new
US Ambassador in London, Charles Price, on 12 December.
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
247 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA), Foreign policy (USA),
Monarchy, Law and order, Defence (arms control), Foreign
policy (USSR and successor states)
Declassified S98-002#603
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/21/00
White House Situation Room
Via Cabinet Office Channels WH08195
Dear Margaret,
In a message to you earlier today, I expressed my desire to keep you informed of
the United States’ response to a formal request by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) to support and participate in a collective security effort to restore peace,
order, and democracy in Grenada. I have decided to respond positively to this request I
understand that Barbados and Jamaica have also responded favourably.
Our forces will establish themselves in Grenada. The collective Caribbean
security force will disembark on Grenada shortly thereafter. You will appreciate the
sensitivity of this information to the security of these operations and the safety of
military personnel.
We will inform you of further developments as they occur. Other allies will be
apprised of our actions after they are begun.
I expect that a new provisional government will be formed in Grenada shortly
after the collective security force arrives. We [fo 1] hope that Her Majesty’s Government
will join us by extending support to Grenada’s new leaders. The United Kingdom can
play an important role in strengthening the new government’s position by offering
political support and by providing a program of economic assistance.
Ron
Document 3
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1983/oct/24/grenada
27
House of Commons Debates, 24 October 1983, vol.47, cc27-30 27
4 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe)
With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the situation in Grenada. The
House will be aware of the violent events of last week on the independent
Commonwealth island of Grenada. Her Majesty’s Government join with those in the
Caribbean region and elsewhere who have deplored the killings, and we view with
grave concern the existing state of unconstitutional government and insecurity on the
island.
We are particularly conscious that there are some 200 British citizens on Grenada,
including a number of British tourists. The resident representative of the British High
Commission has been active in maintaining contact with this community and reports
that no British citizens appear to be in immediate danger. The Deputy High
Commissioner also visited Grenada from Barbados yesterday to make contact with the
new authorities and to speak with the Governor-General. He found the island calm but
tense and confirmed that neither the Governor-General nor members of the British
community appeared to be in any imminent danger.
None the less, the position remains extremely volatile. It is for this reason that
Her Majesty’s Government have instructed HMS Antrim to be prepared to evacuate our
community should the situation worsen and make this necessary.
Meanwhile, we remain in close touch with the Governments of the other
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, whose leaders have been meeting in Trinidad. We
shall be discussing with them and with other interested states the best prospects of
helping to achieve a restoration of constitutional government, peace and security in
Grenada. I shall keep the House informed of developments.
Mr Denis Healey (Leeds, East)
I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making the statement. The Opposition fully
share his concern at what has happened in Grenada during the last week. Military
dictatorships are all too common in that part of the world. I think that I am correct in
saying that this is the first time that anything like one has been established in a
Commonwealth country in the Caribbean. I welcome the steps that the Government
have taken to ensure the evacuation of any British citizens who wish to leave the island
and his intention to concert policy with other Commonwealth members in the
Caribbean.
Can the Foreign Secretary assure us that there is no question of American
military intervention on the island? It could only make the position worse.
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I know of no such intention.
Mr Peter Tapsell (East Lindsey)
Has my Right Hon. and learned Friend any information about the alleged Cuban
presence on Grenada and the role that it has played or is playing? Is he aware of the
widespread belief in the Caribbean during the past two or three years that Grenada
should be regarded as part of a Soviet game-plan, and the new airports as a jumping-off
28
ground aimed primarily at Trinidad and Venezuela? Should we not, therefore, see the
(col.28) incident as a serious development in the global struggle for power and not just as
an isolated seizure of power by a group of the military?
Sir Geoffrey Howe
One must take account of all those factors in considering such a matter. It must be
remembered that Prime Minister Bishop, who lost his life in the recent coup d’état, was a
close friend and associate of Dr Castro, that there are several hundred Cuban advisers on
the island already, and that the Cuban Government have lamented the death of Prime
Minister Bishop and deplored the recent events. It is difficult to conclude—although my
Hon. Friend is correct to remind us of the facts — that in that respect the matter has
changed significantly.
Mr Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber)
Does the Secretary of State think that, where a group has seized power in a
Commonwealth country with a small population, the British Government have any
responsibility to do anything?.
Sir Geoffrey Howe
The British Government obviously are concerned with such an event in any independent
country, particularly one that has only recently secured that independence and freedom
as a result of decisions of the House, but Grenada is an independent country. Our
concern and what we are prepared to do about it must be determined by recognition of
that fact.
Mr Eldon Griffiths (Bury St Edmunds)
In view of the desirability of avoiding any American intervention to safeguard American
citizens, can the Foreign Secretary say whether HMS Antrim would have the appropriate
authority to assist also in the removal of any Americans who might be at risk? When will
the new airport on Grenada be ready? Is it a fact that the airport would enable Mig27s to
overfly Venezuela if the Cubans were to land them there? Will the Foreign Secretary
raise the matter at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference and ascertain what is
the position when a nasty dictatorship, with no regard for human rights, seeks to retain
its membership of the Commonwealth?
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I am not in a position to tell my Hon. Friend the date of completion of the airfield on the
island. The United States Government have explained that their own naval forces in the
area are in that position solely because of the requirement that may arise to rescue their
own very sizeable community in Grenada. There is no reason to doubt that their forces
would be sufficient to achieve that purpose, but I take account of the point raised by my
Hon. Friend.
With regard to the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, plainly
there, as everywhere else in the Commonwealth, there must be concern at an incident of
this kind, but it is too early to say whether any conclusion would or would not be right
at that stage.
29
Mr John Fraser (Norwood)
As I represent tens of thousands of West Indians, may I tell the Foreign Secretary of their
openly expressed sense of outrage and grief at what has happened in Grenada? Will it be
the aim of the Foreign Secretary’s policy, in conjunction with his Commonwealth
colleagues, to seek not only the restoration of constitutional government but democracy
in Grenada, without undue veto or pressure from the United States, Cuba or any other
country?
Col.29
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I confirm what the hon. Gentleman said about the sense of outrage felt by members of
the Caribbean population in Britain, as in the Caribbean itself, at what has taken place. It
must be remembered that the Government who have been ousted came to power in 1979
as a result of a military coup. I am sure that it would be right for us to take counsel with
the Caribbean Commonwealth Governments to see whether there are any steps which
can be taken to help promote the prospects of the return of democratic government in
the island of Grenada.
Mr Nigel Spearing (Newham, South)
Has the Foreign Secretary been told that last year members of the Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs visited Havana and Grenada and produced a report with
recommendations? Is he aware that among those recommendations in respect of
Grenada was a recommendation that Her Majesty’s Government should strengthen
diplomatic presence there, and that they should initiate talks with a view to starting a
bilateral aid programme? Has he been told that in Cmnd. 8819 those recommendations
were turned down? Does he agree that the Select Committee might have been right?
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I am, of course, aware of the recommendations of that Select Committee. The decisions
taken in respect of them have been explained in the White Paper to which the hon.
Gentleman referred. However, I do not believe that an event of this kind would have
been significantly influenced by acting on those recommendations.
Mr Allan Roberts (Bootle)
Is the Foreign Secretary aware that all those, including myself, who recently visited
Grenada, and met some of the Ministers who have since been murdered, will condemn
the actions of the military in Grenada? But have not the Government some responsibility
for the event, having not only turned down the recommendations of the Select
Committee but, along with United States of America, undermined the economy of
Grenada since the moderate regime, led by Bishop, took over? The Stalinists who are
now in control, having executed moderate Socialists who wanted to keep their links with
Great Britain, are there as a direct result of some of our Government’s policies. Is the
Foreign Secretary aware that the only reason why the Cubans are in Grenada building
30
the airport is that, when Bishop came to Britain and America for help to build a longplanned airport, we turned him down?
Col.30
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I cannot subscribe to the hon. Gentleman’s view. No doubt he is better qualified than I to
make judgments about moderation between Socialists and Communists.
Mr Andrew Faulds (Warley, East)
My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle (Mr Roberts) is better qualified than the Foreign
Secretary to make judgments on anything.
Mr George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and. Doon Valley)
Is the Foreign Secretary aware that his reply to my Right Hon. Friend the Member for
Leeds, East (Mr Healey) about possible American intervention was not at all reassuring?
Will he and the British Government advise the American Government than any
intervention by the United States would be unhelpful? Is he aware that progress towards
democracy such as my Right Hon. and hon. Friends have spoken of will not be achieved
by any form of external military intervention?
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are keeping in the closest possible touch with the
United States Government and the Caribbean Governments to which I have referred. I
have no reason to think that American military intervention is likely. The United States
Government have explained that the movement and presence of their naval vessels in
the area is prompted solely by the same reasoning which Led us to consider the
positioning of HMS Antrim—to rescue a sizeable American community in Grenada if
circumstances deteriorate and evacuation is necessary.
Mr Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North)
Is the Foreign Secretary making representations to the United States Government to
withdraw their fleet, which is anchored off Grenada? Its presence can only exacerbate
the situation and be a prelude to a possible landing on Grenada by American forces?
Sir Geoffrey Howe
I have already explained twice that the presence of the United States naval vessels is not
prompted by the consideration that the hon. Gentleman has in mind. The vessels are
there for the reason that the United States Government and we have given. There are
more than 1,000 United States citizens and several hundred British citizens on Grenada.
It is only prudent that when Governments of democratic countries are faced with such
circumstances they take steps to provide for the rescue of their citizens if necessary. That
is the reason for the presence of the naval vessels.
31
Document 4
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/commentary/displaydocument.asp?docid=109427
1983 Oct 25 Tu
Thatcher memoirs
Grenada: Thatcher letter to Reagan (‘deeply disturbed’ at US plans) [memoirs extract]
Document type:
commentary
Document kind:
Memoirs
Venue:
No.10 Downing Street
Source:
Downing Street Years (HarperCollins, 1993), p331.
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
MT’s original letter remains classified on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
490 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA), Foreign policy (USA),
Monarchy, Law and order, Defence (arms control), Foreign
policy (USSR and successor states)
At 7.15 in the evening of Monday 24th October I received a message from President
Reagan while I was hosting a reception at Downing Street. The President wrote that he
was giving serious consideration to the oeCS request for military action. He asked for my
thoughts and advice. I was strongly against intervention and asked that a draft reply be
prepared at once on lines which I laid down. I then had to go to a farewell dinner given
by Princess Alexandra and her husband, Angus Ogilvy, for the outgoing American
Ambassador, J.J. Louis, Jnr. I said to him: ‘do you know what is happening about
Grenada? Something is going on’. He knew nothing about it.
I received a telephone call during the dinner to return immediately to No.10 and
arrived back at 11.30pm. By then a second message had arrived from the President. In
this he stated that he had decided to respond positively to the request for military action.
I immediately called a meeting with Geoffrey Howe, Michael Heseltine and the military
and we prepared my reply to the President’s two messages, which was sent at 12.30am.
There was no difficulty in agreeing a common line. My message concluded:
This action will be seen as intervention by a Western country in the internal
affairs of a small independent nation, however unattractive its regime. I ask you to
consider this in the context of our wider East/West relations and of the fact that we will
be having in the next few days to present to our Parliament and people the siting of
Cruise missiles in this country. I must ask you to think most carefully about these points.
I cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for
32
my advice. I have set it out and hope that even at this late stage you will take it into
account before events are irrevocable.
I followed this up 20 minutes later by telephoning President Reagan on the
hotline. I told him that I did not wish to speak at any length over the telephone but I did
want him to consider very carefully the reply which I had just sent. He undertook to do
so but said, ‘we are already at zero’.
At 7.45 that morning a further message arrived, in which the President said that
he had weighed very carefully the considerations that I had raised but believed them to
be outweighed by other factors. In fact, the US military operation to invade Grenada
began early that morning. After some fierce fighting the leaders of the regime were taken
prisoner.
33
Document 5
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109430
1983 Oct 25 Tu
Archive (Reagan Library)
Grenada: Reagan letter to Thatcher (intervention goes ahead) [declassified 2000]
Document type:
thatcher record
Document kind:
Archive
Venue:
White House
Source:
Reagan Library: Executive Secretariat NSC: Records Country File
(UK volume V)
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
Despatched 0656 GMT 25 Oct 1983. A copy was sent on 12 Dec
1983 to the new US Ambassador in London, Charles Price.
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
523 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA), Foreign policy (USA),
Monarchy, Law and order, Defence (arms control), Foreign
policy (USSR and successor states)
Declassified S98-002#604
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/21/00
White House Situation Room
Via Cabinet Office Channels WH08211
Dear Margaret,
I appreciate your thoughtful message on Grenada. I have weighed very carefully
the issues you have raised and have reached the following conclusions.
I continue to be greatly concerned about the welfare of our citizens. The violent
events of the last few days have caused a large number of them to seek any possible
means of evacuation. Given the composition of the governing Military Council, and its
proven brutality, we are not sanguine that the situation will hold much longer. I well
appreciate the dangers inherent in a military operation to assure the safety of these
citizens, but, on balance, I see this as the lesser of two risks. In this regard you may be
sure that we will comply fully with your request that we safeguard all British citizens.
Special consideration has gone into our operational planning to protect the Governor
General [Sir Paul Scoon] .
On October 23 I received a formal request in writing from the OECS asking for
our support for their efforts to stabilize the [fo 1] situation in Grenada. Jamaica and
Barbados have given their strong support. Quite frankly, this request has weighed
heavily in my consideration on whether to commit US forces. With so clear an
34
expression of the will of the nations of the region I would find it difficult to explain
either to them or to others who depend upon us why we had not acted.
Finally, I have also weighed US national security interests in my decision. As you
know we have been increasingly concerned by Grenada’s recent drift into the Soviet
bloc. The political developments of the last few days have done nothing to ease our
concerns. To the contrary, it is clear that Grenada has now been taken over by a group of
leftist thugs who would likely align themselves with Cuba and the Soviet Union to an
even greater degree than did the previous government. The arrival Monday in Grenada
of a high level Cuban delegation highlights this concern. The alternative to decisive
action on our part may well be to allow the imposition by the Cubans of the regime
whose actions would be even more inimical to our interests. In our view, relying upon
economic and political sanctions would provide time for Cuba and the Soviet Union to
consolidate the position of the new regime.
Again, I appreciate your comments; I share many of your concerns, but believe
that they are outweighed by the factors outlined above. I would hope that as we proceed,
in cooperation with the OECS countries, we would have the active cooperation of Her
Majesty’s Government and, in particular, that the Governor General will exercise his
constitutional powers to form an interim government which would restore democracy to
Grenada and facilitate the rapid departure of all foreign forces.
Warm regards,
Ron
35
Document 6
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109426
1983 Oct 26 We
Archive (Reagan Library)
Grenada: Reagan phone call to Thatcher (record of conversation) [declassified 2000]
Document type:
thatcher record
Document kind:
Archive
Venue:
White House—House of Commons
Source:
Reagan Library: Executive Secretariat NSC: Records Country File
(UK vol.IV)
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
Declassified 21 July 2000. MT took the call in her room at the
House of Commons during an emergency debate on Grenada.
She recalled later that she was ‘not in the sunniest of moods’ at
the time (Downing Street Years, p332). ‘There was not much I felt
able to say and so I more or less held my peace, but I was glad to
have received the telephone call’ (p333).
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
1,561 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (USA), Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA),
Foreign policy (USSR and successor states), Defence (general),
Security Services
Declassified S98-002#523
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/21/00
The White House Washington
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the
United Kingdom
DATE, TIME: 26 October 1983
AND PLACE: 1:28 – 1:38 pm
Prime Minister Thatcher:
Hello, Margaret Thatcher here.
President Reagan:
If I were there Margaret, I’d throw my hat in the door before I came in.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
There’s no need to do that.
36
President Reagan:
We regret very much the embarrassment caused you, and I would like to tell you what
the story is from our end. I was awakened at 3:00 in the morning, supposedly on a
golfing vacation down in Georgia. The Secretary of State [ George Shultz] was there. We
met in pyjamas out in the living room of our suite because of this urgent appeal from the
Organisation of East Caribbean States pleading with us to support them in Grenada. We
immediately got a group going back here in Washington, which we shortly joined, on
planning and so forth. It was literally a matter of hours. We were greatly concerned,
because of a problem here – and not at your end at all – but here. We have had a nagging
problem of a loose source, a leak here. At the same time we also had immediate
surveillance problem [sic] – without their knowing it – of what was happening on Cuba
to make sure that we could get ahead of them if they were moving and indeed, they
were making some tentative moves. They sent some kind of command personnel into
Grenada.
Incidentally, let me tell you that we were being so careful here that we did not
even give a firm answer to the Caribbean States. We told them we were planning, but we
were so afraid of this source and what it would do; it could almost abort the mission,
with the lives that could have endangered.
When word came of your concerns – by the time I got it – the zero hour had
passed, and our forces were on their way. The time difference made it later in the day
when you learned of it. For us over here it was only 5:30 in the morning when they
finally landed and at last we could talk plainly. But I want you to know it was no feeling
on our part of lack of confidence at your end. It’s at our end. I guess it’s the first thing we
have done since I’ve been President in which the secret was actually kept until [fo 1] it
happened. But our military and the planning only had [sic] – I really have to call it a
matter of hours – to put this together. I think they did a magnificent job. Your Governor
General [Sir Paul Scoon] and his wife are safe. One of our primary goals was to
immediately sequester him for his safety. He is safe in our hands down there.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
I know about sensitivity, because of the Falklands. That’s why I would not speak for
very long even on the secret telephone to you. Because even that can be broken. I’m very
much aware of sensitivities. The action is underway now and we just hope it will be
successful.
President Reagan:
We’re sure it is. It’s going beautifully. The two landings immediately took the two
airfields. Then we managed to secure that medical school, St Georges Medical School
[sic], where we have about 800 students. We’ve moved on, but there is still some combat.
All those several hundred Cuban construction workers down there must have been
military personnel or reserves, because, as I told you, we got word that a little group had
arrived before we could get anything underway. They looked like they were pretty
prominent Cubans because they were being treated with great deference. They turned
out to be a military command and the opposition that still remains, as the last word we
have here – in about three spots on the Island – is led by these Cubans. They are the
leading combat forces, not the Grenadian forces. We have captured 250 of them already.
37
Prime Minister Thatcher:
Well let’s hope it’s soon over Ron, and that you manage to get a democracy restored.
President Reagan:
We’re very hopeful that it is going to be short and then your role is going to be very
critical, as we all try to return Grenada to democracy under that constitution that you left
them. The leader that was murdered [Maurice Bishop] , and of course those that
murdered him, have abandoned that constitution.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
Well the constitution, I’m afraid, was suspended in 1979.
President Reagan:
Yes, that’s when Bishop made his coup and took over. We think he was murdered
because he began to make some noises as if he would like to get better acquainted with
us. He no more got back on the Island – he was here and visited our State Department –
and he was murdered. The people who murdered him are even further over in the
Cuban camp. So things would be worse, not better, for the people on Grenada.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
That is right. Is there any news about Coard, his rival? [fo 2]
President Reagan:
No. The man that seems to be out in front is named Austin. We believe that the same
thing has happened to Coard that happened to Bishop. We won’t be sure of that until we
get the situation controlled, but we have the radio stations, so we can communicate with
the people. They have just these three spots and we’re very optimistic. There have been
very limited casualties, certainly on our side. We don’t want a lot of casualties on the
Grenadian side. The troops that are out in front now seemed [sic] to be those several
hundred Cubans. We know that you and through the Queen’s Governor General there –
all of us together – can help them get back to that constitution and a democracy.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
I just hope Ron, that it will be very soon and that they will manage to put together a
government which can get back to democracy.
President Reagan:
Those people on those other islands are pretty remarkable. I had with me Prime Minister
Charles when I made the announcement to the press here that are our forces are on shore
and D-Day has happened.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
I know her. She’s a wonderful person.
President Reagan:
She certainly is. She’s captured our city by storm. She’s right up on the Hill meeting with
some of our Congress right now. And then, Adams, from Barbados, we are getting him
38
up here. We’ve got both of them on some of our television shows so they can talk to the
people. We are getting him on, we’ve had her on. He’s a remarkable man also.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
He is a very cultured man and very wise. He’s been in politics for a long time.
President Reagan:
Yes. Mrs Charles doesn’t even have an army. She did away with an army completely.
She has a police force. She told me that her constables in her police force were coming in
from out in the country and asking her if they couldn’t go with the forces to Grenada.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
They wanted to help.
President Reagan:
They all feel – and dating from the days when they were under the Crown – she used the
expression: kith and kin. I don’t know if that’s one of our expressions or one of yours.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
It’s one of ours. [fo 3]
President Reagan:
Well, we still use it here. We still have the heritage. She used that several times to
describe their feelings. They have no feeling of the people on the other islands being
foreigners. They still think of themselves as all one group. We want to put them out
ahead in helping with the restoration of a government, so there will be some taint of big
old Uncle Sam trying to impose a government on them.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
There is a lot of work to do yet, Ron.
President Reagan:
Oh yes.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
And it will be very tricky.
President Reagan:
We think that the military part is going to end very shortly.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
That will be very, very good news. And then if we return to democracy that will be
marvellous.
President Reagan:
As I say, I’m sorry for any embarrassment that we caused you, but please understand
that it was just our fear of our own weakness over here with regard to secrecy.
39
Prime Minister Thatcher:
It was very kind of you to have rung, Ron.
President Reagan:
Well, my pleasure.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
I appreciate it. How is Nancy?
President Reagan:
Just fine.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
Good. Give her my love.
President Reagan:
I shall.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
I must return to this debate in the House. It is a bit tricky.
President Reagan:
All right. Go get ‘em. Eat ‘em alive.
Prime Minister Thatcher:
Good-bye.
40
Document 7
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109339
1983 Dec 23 Fr
Archive (Reagan Library)
Cold War: Reagan letter to Thatcher (Commonwealth & Grenada) [declassified 2000]
Document type:
thatcher record
Document kind:
Archive
Venue:
White House
Source:
Reagan Library: NSA Head of State File (Box 35)
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
Declassified 28 March 2000. The President’s reply followed the
State Department draft almost word for word.
Importance ranking:
Major
Word count:
275 words
Themes:
Foreign policy (USA), Commonwealth (general), Foreign policy
(development, aid, etc), Foreign policy (Americas excluding
USA)
Declassified F96-107#243
By SMF, NARA, Date 3/28/00
The White House
Washington
Dear Margaret:
Thank you for your letter on the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting
in New Delhi and its Communiqué.
Given the predominate [sic] ‘non-aligned’ orientation of most Commonwealth
member countries, I understand the difficulties you faced. This highlights the need to
continue close consultations on Third World matters and to promote constructive
dialogue with these developing nations on a bilateral and regional basis, as well as in
international fora. In this regard, I agree that we must avoid an economic conference
which could weaken international monetary institutions. I also have reservations with
[sic] some of the specifics of [Canadian] Prime Minister Trudeau’s recent proposals.
While we are uncomfortable with several passages in the Communiqué, I
personally appreciate your efforts to moderate and improve the language of the original
drafts. Your remarks at the Conference and later in the House of Commons were also
helpful and reassuring.
In particular, I was pleased to note the strong and effective response by OECS
countries to the hostile challenges of their position on the Grenada matter. You rightly
41
emphasised that we should focus our attention on Grenada’s future. Your [fo 1] efforts in
pointing the Communiqué towards an emphasis on ‘reconstruction’, as well as your
government’s contributions towards economic assistance to Grenada and the rebuilding
of the island’s police force, are most welcome.
Thank you for taking the time to share your thoughts with me.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Ron
42
ICBH Guidelines for Former Officials
at Scholarly Interviews and Witness Seminars
AIM: to help retired or former Whitehall officials and others in a comparable
position to participate more readily in scholarly interviews and witness seminar
programmes by setting out guidelines.
GENERAL: The Public Records legislation and related rules and practices (e.g.
the thirty-year rule for most disclosures) as well as FOI exemplify the public interest in
the accuracy and preservation of the historical record of the conduct of government
business at national level in the United Kingdom. It is increasingly recognised that oral
testimony by living witnesses, as well as contemporary written records, are essential to
preserving a full account. It is also recognised that witness seminars, with a number of
contemporary witnesses of a series of events acting in a structured process are an
enhancement of separate individual accounts elicited in one to one interviews, and can
provide a cross-check on blurred, partial or competing recollections. Unlike the written
record, witness recollection is impermanent, and cannot always wait for a fixed period to
elapse.
The case for former officials to participate, as well as politicians and others, is
reinforced in the case of witness seminars by the need for the input to be as balanced,
comprehensive and well-informed as possible.
Since the Open Government White Paper of 1993, a much freer and more open
climate has set in regarding the propriety and usefulness of more disclosure than used to
prevail, and the vast body of official records disclosed since then includes a large mass of
material which originally bore very high security classifications, and which while highly
sensitive at the time is now assessed as disclosable.
PRINCIPLES:
1. Compliance with the law – both OSA and related obligations; and FOI/HR
(including privacy) and defamation considerations.
2. Compliance with the duty of confidentiality, including any employment
contract terms.
3. Respect for the loyalty owed by officials in close working relationships with
Ministers.
4. Primacy of the truth.
GUIDELINES:
1. Do not turn down an invitation to participate simply on the mistaken basis that
it would necessarily be a breach of duty. It may very well not be, and while there can be
no obligation whatsoever to take part; there is a balance to be struck between discretion
and the need for accuracy and balance.
43
2. All contemporary history carries some remaining potential for political
controversy. This should not be regarded as an automatic bar on taking part but it does
require careful judgement both of the auspices of the interview or seminar, any track
record by the institution concerned, and the standing of the interview or witness seminar
process/organisation and, possibly, of the other participants.
3. Closeness in time to particular events is clearly an important, but nevertheless
variable factor in deciding whether to take part. Once the bulk of the written public
record has been disclosed after thirty years, there can be little difficulty; equally, events
that still concern the government of the day will for the most part make it difficult for
former officials to participate.
4. In the case of a witness seminar where the subject matter has attracted
generally high security classifications, or is of lasting live political controversy, it may
still be possible for former officials to participate to some extent, though exercising
discretion. Where former Ministers especially across the political divide are to take part,
a constructive contribution by former officials may very well be possible even in these
circumstances.
5. Anything said at a witness seminar is likely to be ‘on record’. Unlike
interviews, conferences and similar events that take place under ‘Ditchley’ or ‘Chatham
House’ rules of confidentiality and non-attributability, witness seminars by their very
nature and purpose are not usually confidential. That is not in itself a reason to refuse,
but it is something that needs to be held constantly in mind. It is sensible to check the
rules under which the seminar is to be run before accepting. In the event of seminars
being conducted under rules of confidentiality until some set future date, and under
reliable auspices, the threshold for participation is evidently lowered substantially.
6. The best guide may be this: would you if still a serving official today in this
field of responsibility have found it acceptable for a former colleague to take part in the
particular interview or witness seminar concerned?
7. If in any doubt, do consult the Permanent Head or Head of Personnel of the
Department concerned, or in the ultimate the Cabinet Secretary or Head of the
Diplomatic Service.
9 December 2002
44
Map of Grenada
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas.html
45
BRITAIN AND THE GRENADA CRISIS, 1983:
Cold War in the Caribbean
PROFESSOR MICK COX: I am one of the directors of the hosting organisation,
IDEAS. Please do not ask me what it means. We just thought that it was a good title. I
have met one or two of you before on round tables that we have held here, and I wish to
welcome you formally on behalf of the LSE and IDEAS. I shall not say too much about
what IDEAS is or does, but I have left out some propaganda for you to peruse. All I can
say is that, this week, we have held a round table on Solidarność and the Chilean coup of
1973. Last night, we held a very successful round table on ‘Tiananmen Square
remembered’ and, today—given that it is Friday, it must be Grenada.
We have tried through IDEAS to do what universities often do not do, which is to
clamber out of their ivory tower, think about the real world and bring together
policymakers and those in the academic world. That is part of what we have been trying
to do through these various witness seminars, which have been so successful over the
past year. Dr Sue Onslow is the moving force behind much of this, and we thank her
greatly for all her hard work. She said that there is one thing that I need to say right at
the beginning but not be too long-winded about it: I must remind people that Maurice
Bishop was at the LSE. I am not sure why I am reminding people of that fact, but he was
here. I am not sure what impact that had on members of the audience, Sue, other than to
stun them into silence, but then Thabo Mbecki was at Sussex—I had to be sectarian; it
goes with the turf.
I welcome all the distinguished guests and I shall hand over to Paul Sutton, who
will be hosting the discussion.
PROFESSOR PAUL SUTTON: I welcome everyone on behalf of the Institute of
Contemporary British History and IDEAS, LSE. I thank them for hosting the event. The
seminar will be recorded and transcribed by the ICBH, which means that the speakers
will be on record. As such, we want everyone when participating for the first time from
the floor to identify themselves and, in particular, sign a consent form so that, when the
record is lodged, we can use their contribution. Without that, their contribution will be
wiped. Please make sure that the form is signed.
We also believe in monopolies, so we are asking no one else to record the session.
Before the seminar is published, a draft manuscript will be sent to each contributor—
both those around the table and to the speakers from the floor. Everyone will then have
the opportunity to make amendments, corrections or deletions to the manuscript. The
full edited manuscript will then be published. Because of that and because we want to
establish the truth and make it available to everyone, there are no Chatham House Rules.
Speakers will be attributed. What they say will go down on record. There is a
refreshment break for 15 minutes at 3.30 pm. We shall start again at 3.45 pm and finish at
5 o’clock. Will everyone turn off their mobile phones, an important consideration in such
events?
In bringing people together for the event, we are trying to arrive collectively at a
46
situation in which everyone has a better understanding of what went on. Often, as I have
done over my years as an academic, the one-to-one interviews attract part of the story,
but when you have lots of one-to-one interviews, you do not quite get all of it.
Hopefully, given all the distinguished people here today, we can bring those in. The
witness seminars have done a lot of things. They have covered similar areas in the past,
such as American perceptions of the Falklands War, given that that was another
situation when there was a slight entanglement—although not dramatic—between
Britain and the United States; decolonisation in Africa; Rhodesian UDI—again, a vexed
question; the role of Her Majesty’s embassy in Washington and the like. A lot of material
has been covered. In fact, more than 100 witness seminars have so far been collected. We
are now moving into the second 100 of them.
I am currently Research Professor at London Metropolitan University. Before
that, I was at Hull University for many years. I published a book on Grenada at the time
with Tony Payne and Tony Thorndike who is sitting in the front row. I knew some of the
protagonists, Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, and indeed made several visits to
Grenada in the years of the revolution. I have always followed events since then. Will
those round the table introduce themselves briefly before we start the main proceedings?
DR GARY WILLIAMS: I am based at the University of Essex in the Research and
Enterprise Office. I was one of Paul’s former PhD students. I have published several
articles on Grenada and, most recently, a book.
SIR BERNARD INGHAM: I am the former press secretary to Margaret Thatcher
for all bar the first four months of her Prime Ministership.
SIR SYDNEY GIFFARD: I was at the Foreign Office at the time of Grenada and
the Falklands.
FIELD MARSHAL THE LORD BRAMALL: I was Chief of the Defence Staff
between 1982 and 1985.
JOHN EDWARDS: I was head of the West Indian and Atlantic Department at
the FCO between 1981 and 1984. Immediately before that, I was Head of the British
Development Division in the Caribbean based in Barbados. My career was spent
between the Overseas Development Administration and the FCO.
MRS PATSY ROBERTSON: I am from the Caribbean. I worked for several years
at the Commonwealth Secretariat as Director of Information and spokesperson during
the time of Sir Shridath Ramphal.
JOHN KELLY: I was the British Resident Representative in Grenada from 1982 to
1986, so I was there during the period when the revolution collapsed.
PETER GAY: I was in Grenada from late 1978 to early 1980 during the period
when the first revolution took place.
47
AMBASSADOR LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN: I am a retired State Department
Officer. At the time, I was in the US Embassy in Barbados, which covered Grenada for all
of 1981 and part of 1982. I returned to Grenada at the time of the US military
intervention in October 1983 and was there for about the first four months.
ROBERT CHASE: I divided my time between being a diplomat and being in
industry. I was Head of the Caribbean section during 1979 and 1980, during the coup
and was subsequently Acting Head of the South American Department between 1981
and 1984.
SUTTON: Thank you for introducing yourselves. Gary and I have worked out a
series of questions. We would like to cover as many of them as we can because we think
that that can provide the in-depth story. However, we may be sidetracked at certain
times, but I shall try to keep things in a clear order.
I should particularly like Robert Chase to give attention to the first question.
What were relations with Eric Gairy’s Grenada like after independence in 1974 and what
was known in the Foreign Office about the opposition New Jewel Movement (New Joint
Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation Movement) at the time?
CHASE: Eric Gairy was already becoming somewhat of an embarrassment. We
had a situation in the Caribbean at the time when Cuba was a major power. It was a time
when Jamaica was very close to Cuba, Guyana, and the rest of the Caribbean when
Grenada was regarded to some extent, despite the vagaries of Mr Gairy, as not a major
problem. The interesting thing is that, at that stage, we were in a period of disengaging
from the Caribbean. It was the foreseen as the politically correct thing to be doing. It was
not an area of major interest, except in terms of the West Indian population in the United
Kingdom. Once the coup took place, we had an extraordinary change in that there was
realisation of just how important the area was for America and Canada. For the vast
majority of tourists, it is the great getaway place for the Americas and Canadians. In
Grenada, the key point of sensitivity was the well-off families’ kids who were there in
medical schools. There were about 1,500 of them in Grenada.
We had an extraordinary situation when the crisis occurred because all of a
sudden the pressure from the United States changed totally the other way. The
interesting thing was that they themselves had a major inhibition in terms of actually
doing much about the situation in the Caribbean and the instability, because they and
South America had become involved in helping the police forces. Allegations of torture
had got back to Congress, which passed legislation on the police forces. From a practical
point of view, the US was looking to us. The Governments in Dominica and St Lucia
were also looking in the Cuba direction.
An event that is not recorded in this splendid calendar of events was a small,
nevertheless significant, attempt by a group of Grenadians to invade the Grenadine
islands belonging to St Vincent. That was seen off by a splendid St Vincent Chief of
Police with his shotgun and colleagues. Nothing came of it, but at the time it caused
considerable consternation about the effect it could have. As a result of the coup, I was
sent with a Chief Inspector of Overseas Police on a security inspection, which was a trip
round five islands in five days, which included a visit to Grenada. As a result of that, we
provided assistance to the police forces. We set up a training academy. We established a
48
situation in which many activities became centred round Barbados and, finally, there
was a setting up of coastguards.
That was how I became involved, but the interesting thing about the subsequent
invasion was the fact that when we did a very quick inventory of interest, the US North
American interest in that part of the world was very great. Politically, there was pressure
on any US Government if something of that sort occurred, given that the Grenadian
Government were close to Cuba and the real hard nuts in that Government could
murder the Prime Minister and take over. From the point of view of American citizens, it
posed a very real threat.
SUTTON: I suppose that we knew a great deal about Gairy, but what did we
know about the opposition New Jewel Movement, which had decided to become a
Marxist-Leninist movement and to keep that decision below the limelight. Can I bring in
Tony Thorndike who was certainly around at the time? What did you know of the New
Jewel Movement? Did the British Government know anything about it?
TONY THORNDIKE: I first met Bernard Coard when I was doing work at the
University of the West Indies in Trinidad. I found myself next door to him. In fact, I
accompanied him to Grenada, which was my first visit, when he was campaigning for
the September 1976 General Election on that island. It certainly was clear to me that a
strong sense of socialism was running through the party. Through Bernard, I met party
members such as Bishop and Hudson Austin. Equally, it was imbued with Black Power
ideas, but it was not very coherent.
I had a meeting at the British High Commission in Trinidad, although not about
Grenada, but the development programmes in the area that I was working on. I got the
strong impression that it knew very little indeed about the NJM other than the fact that it
had joined up in a grand alliance to seek a wider base for tactical reasons. Few people
had an idea that it harboured quite strong socialist ideas. There was virtually no
knowledge of it having decided in 1975 that it would be a Leninist party, espousing
broadly written Marxist ideas. In other words, it was not a Social Democratic party.
GAY: It is a shame that my predecessor, Mike Dibben, is not here. He visited
Grenada regularly from about 1976 onwards and was certainly aware of the Marxist
leanings of the New Jewel Movement. He reported towards the end of his period of
visits the arrival of guns in oil barrels and, although he did not make contact himself
with Bishop and Coard, he had excellent contacts with Alister Hughes and others who
were aware of the New Jewel Movement’s thinking.
When I arrived, I wanted to meet Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop and, within
a week or two, I took them out to lunch on the other side of the island. I was told that
Eric Gairy would not particularly like that, but a week or so later I received a phone call
saying that the Prime Minister would like to invite me to his nightclub ‘The Red Palace‘
for dinner. I said that I would be delighted to attend, and the lady said that that would
be $13.50. I met Eric Gairy there and, as well described in the paper, he was very much a
ladies man. He was very smart and polite. He said that he was glad I had met the
Opposition. That was all he said. He then went on his usual round of the nightclub with
an eye for the ladies.
I then decided that I ought to meet Herbert Blaize, the previous Prime Minister.
49
He called on me a couple of times in St George’s. We had a little house halfway up the
hill. In those days, his health was not very good. He did not say very much beyond the
fact that he, too, realised that something was afoot. And so it turned out. A few weeks
later, I had arranged to fly out to Carriacou on 13 March to have coffee with him because
he was unwell and it was a good opportunity to have a chat. I arrived at Pearls Airport.
There was some shooting. I wandered around and asked what was going on. They said,
‘Oh, somebody was just doing a robbery‘. My little plane arrived. I landed in Carriacou,
and was then told that a coup had taken place. There I was, sitting in the middle of
Carriacou. I had coffee with Herbert Blaize who thought that he might be invited to join
the Government. As you know, he did not receive such an invitation, but he seemed
relatively calm about the matter. I remained on Caricoo for, I think, two days and then
Maurice Bishop, urged by Harry Stanley, sent off a plane and I flew back to St George’s.
By that time, the NJM were firmly in control as it had, in effect, been from the
first day. I simply sat there and wondered what to do next. Harry Stanley came over and
we then arranged a meeting, which is reported here with both Maurice Bishop and
Coard. I was always slightly aware of a little tension between them. Bishop was an
extremely attractive personality to most people. Coard was very much a thinker. They
were both very worried because they were aware that Eric Gairy, for all his faults, was
extremely popular with the old groups around the west of the island. ‘Uncle Eric‘
mattered to those groups. After all, he was the man who had basically broken the power
of the plantocracy. He had marched into a hotel, leading a group of servants and
released the West Indian servants who were doing 15-hour days. There was a great deal
of residual popularity among a group of Grenadians, which was probably reflected in
the nervousness and inevitable cautiousness of Coard and Bishop.
It was rather curious when Harry Stanley came over when I first met Maurice
Bishop, it was assumed that Bernard Coard would be there as well. There is probably
some significance in the fact that he was not, in that he wished to be seen separately and
alone, as he was four days later.
SUTTON: Let us move on to the coup itself and the responses to it of Britain and
the United States. Records show that, by and large, Britain accepted the situation in
Grenada. The American response is generally interpreted as being a bit tougher. Will
Ambassador Rossin state what he understood to be the American response and why he
thought that it might be a bit more vigorous than the British response?
ROSSIN: I was not there at the time of the coup, so my knowledge is based on a
study of the diplomatic records at the time and from talking to Frank Ortiz and others
who were there at the time. As for the US response, obviously there was a lot of
unhappiness about the fact that there was a coup in an area of the world where coups
were not expected. It was not Africa, but the British Caribbean with its parliamentary
traditions and so on. It was not particularly viewed initially as a danger to Americans,
for example, who were there nor was it necessarily viewed as something that had to
have a bad outcome.
The American analysis of the New Jewel Movement and of Gairy is something
along the lines of what Mr Thorndike said. Some social restrain was known, after all
Bernard Coard had come from Jamaica, there were influences of the Workers Party and
Trevor Munroe, and that sort of thing. The analysis was also that Bishop was more a
50
socialist, coming from his LSE days—if I can put it that way—here in the UK in the
1970s. He was more authentic in a certain way. There was a mix of Black Power and
some British socialism of the 1960s and 1970s coming back. There was also habitation in
a certain way with those in the New Jewel Movement who were perhaps under a more
clearly Marxist-Leninist influence, which was after all the Workers Party. Not only was
Coard himself, but Phyllis Coard and Richard Jacobs were also associated with it. A
group of Jamaicans and a couple of Guyanese who were much clearer Marxists were
involved.
From talking to Ortiz about the matter as I did a number of years ago when I
wrote a paper on the subject and from reading all the diplomatic traffic, which I did at a
certain point, I learned that there was unhappiness that there was a coup. There was
concern about the predilections of the people and what that might imply. The concern
grew quickly when there were cagey answers about elections, but there was not
necessarily an inclination right off the bat to be hostile to the event, but to see what could
be made of it. The fact that Gairy was such an unattractive character was brought on
himself in a certain sense. It manifested itself from the start with expressed
preoccupations of Bishop, Coard and the others were whether Gairy would come back
and do something. The US was quite content not only to assure but to take the minimal
steps that would be required to ensure that Gairy did not come back and do anything. It
was actually an open-minded approach at the first moment. It was cautious, not happy,
but one that was certainly willing to have a look and see how the situation would evolve.
SUTTON: I would be careful about the LSE! It is always providing decent
people. Phyllis Coard was also a student at the LSE, and that was on the opposite side.
Will Patsy say something about how the Caribbean saw the coup?
ROBERTSON: I should step back a bit from Grenada. By the time it blew up, the
US had already been very active in Jamaica against Michael Manley. Huge efforts had
been made to destabilise him. Jamaica was flooded with guns during the 1970s—from
which we are still suffering. That has been documented and, in fact, I read an article—it
might have been in the New Yorker—that a freedom of information inquiry had shown a
decision that was taken at the time of the coup against Allende not to bother with
Jamaica. That was because Michael [Manley] had decided there was no reason why
Jamaica should not have relations with Cuba, 90 miles away. Hundreds of Jamaicans still
live in Cuba, a fellow Caribbean country that provides us with doctors, but we had the
power of American destabilisation.
When the coup occurred in Grenada, it was not true that America was relaxed.
They cut off bilateral aid immediately and refused to allow their contributions to the
Caribbean to go to Grenada. The scene was set. It was not going to be tolerated. The new
Grenada-Cuba axis was not going to be allowed. The plotting and the planning had
already begun because, by 1979, Edward Seaga was elected Prime Minister of Jamaica
and he was very close to the United States. I will not say anything now as we are being
taped, but there was a feeling that he was one of those people who were very much
involved in keeping American interests alive. He was the big architect of the invasion,
but that is another story.
The British Government were reasonably relaxed. They felt that there was no
51
need to take any great action against Maurice Bishop at the time. The Americans were
quite emphatic and that is recorded.
SUTTON: John Edwards, how did Mrs Thatcher and the Government respond
not only to the coup, but to the developing relations in Grenada, the Movement at the
time and to the increasing American concern with it? Did you counsel moderation? Did
you try to provide other sources of information?
EDWARDS: I did not have any political responsibility for relations with Grenada
until I became Head of WIAD in 1981. However, I had an aid responsibility with the
British Development Division that covered Grenada as it did the Associated States and
the Dependent Territories in the Eastern Caribbean.
I echo what others have said about Gairy. I had some dealings with him. He was
not always a very rational man. He had an obsession with unidentified flying objects,
which he would raise at the UN. That was one of his oddities. A reasonably fair
comment is that it was not a very clean and decent regime. On the aid side, we had
signed an agreement with Grenada at the time of independence. In 1980, we
announced—as your summary points out—that that agreement would be honoured and
that there would be no attempt to cut it off. Our aid involvement was of a lesser degree
than it was with the Associated States. We were particularly involved with the
Windward Islands banana development programme, which was an over-arching activity
that covered all the islands that grew bananas. However, bananas were not nearly as
important to Grenada as they were, say, to St Lucia because it grew nutmeg and other
spices.
However, come 1981, we said that there would be no new agreement for aid to
Grenada once the independent agreement had been wholly dispersed. I visited the other
islands regularly, but went to Grenada only irregularly. It was much more detached
from our relationships on the aid side and the Associated States.
SUTTON: Can I bring in Sir Sydney Giffard to say how Grenada might have
fitted into the wider US-UK relationship at the time?
GIFFARD: I came rather too late on the scene to comment on matters before the
actual emergency period. We had no feeling in the office that another Cuban missile
crisis was at hand.
SUTTON: Sir Bernard Ingham, do you have anything to say about the wider
relationship between the United States and the UK under Mrs Thatcher? Obviously, a lot
of people said that it was quite close at the time. We shall be discussing the actual events
of the invasion later on.
INGHAM: In general, Margaret Thatcher found her mission in life in 1981 when
President Reagan came to office. After Jimmy Carter, she had sort of been all over the
show. She saw it as her job to support the leader of the free world as best she could, but
her concept of friendship and her support was altogether Spartan. She did not believe
that a person was a friend unless that friend gave their honest, candid advice. Therefore,
while at times some might have said that the relationship between Reagan and Thatcher
52
looked to be fairly servile at times, it was anything but. It was really quite lively and,
sometimes, thoroughly enjoyable.
Margaret Thatcher had the great ability to tell people off in the bluntest possible
way without giving terminal offence. It would have been very difficult to give terminal
offence to President Reagan, who was the sunniest man alive at the time. She did not
mince words with her colleagues, but in a curious way they tolerated that because they
reckoned that she was pretty straight with it, quite apart from Mr Gorbachev who just
liked arguing! Let us not kid ourselves that the tremendous ructions over Grenada
caused any damage to her relations with President Reagan, as such. It was something
that she recognised that relationships had to go through, but they survived. They
probably survived all the more because she was so frank about matters.
SUTTON: I am still not getting a sense of similarity or differences in British
policy. No one has yet said that Britain was doing one thing, the United States was doing
another. Gary, did you think that there were two different policies? Were they
convergent or divergent?
WILLIAMS: At the beginning around about the coup time, as Larry [Rossin]
said, the Americans were certainly cautious. They were willing to help, however, and
waiting to see how things unfolded. The British were a bit more relaxed and less
concerned about that. Looking at the documents, I saw the phrase ‘heavy-handed’ in
regard to the American approach to the People’s Revolutionary Government, and they
became concerned about that. Perhaps a month or so after the coup, the Americans
adopted a regional strategy. They increased aid to Grenada’s neighbours and let the likes
of Barbados and Jamaica and the other islands pressure Grenada on the key issue of
elections.
For the Americans, Cuba was a big factor. It played out, especially on the PRG
side. They set out to steer towards Cuba and were not pushed. The thesis that the US
policy pushed Grenada towards Cuba is quite wrong. The UK policy was more relaxed.
It was willing to remain engaged with Grenada. As John said, the aid commitments were
honoured. Other aid programmes continued. The UK also established a permanent post
for John Kelly and his predecessors in Grenada, which none of the other Western
countries did. It seemed a much more relaxed policy. The interesting thing was what sort
of pressure did America put on the UK in terms of their policy approach and what sort
of influence that had. I do not know whether any gentleman round the table can shed
more light on that.
SUTTON: Yes, I shall ask people particularly from the Foreign Office if they felt
that there was a real distinction or not much of one between UK policy leading up to the
revolution in 1979 to 1982-83. Was it discussed very much? Since we were so familiar
with the area, were things in black and white?
CHASE: Essentially, it was hoped that Bishop would be kept in dialogue. There
was a possibility of the thing coming out right. When I was first sent out on the security
round, I even had authority to discuss with those in the Bishop Administration the
possibilities of assistance on that front. As time went on, as it says in the background
papers, there was in some Caribbean countries—particularly Barbados—a real concern
53
about what might happen. As I said, there was the incident at St Vincent. We ended up
with a dual policy when we were still hoping that we could keep the Bishop regime on
an even keel not in a position when it became totally dependent on Cuba.
At the same time, there was a sudden realisation that, on average, few islands
had any military force. Jamaica and Trinidad. Trinidad had most of the islands. It was a
small police force. If you went there on a Sunday with 15 armed men, you could just take
over the islands. You were dealing with a police force of 60 or so. There was a sudden
realisation that, if people were not going to play the democratic political voting game,
there was very little to stop the rot spreading.
To start with, there was, ‘Let’s not rock the boat‘ and, ‘This was a one-off‘ and,
‘Really, they are quite nice lads from the LSE and so on, we can talk with them.‘ Then
came the realisation that actually, if there were similar ambitions elsewhere and given
how the islands were resourced in terms of security forces, there was nothing to stop a
whole series of such events. That was when the pressure came for setting up the police
academy and some minor reinforcing of the police forces with training and other
assistance—and the setting up of the coastguard, which was a reaction to the rowing
boats that went out to St Vincent. We did see a gradual change, nevertheless the
intention on the British side was absolutely minimalist.
When I went on my security visit, I first ended up with a session in Miami with
the drug administration after which time I went to Washington. I realised that the
Americans took matters quite seriously because there was me, a police adviser and a
third secretary from our embassy, but there were 40 on the American side, including full
admirals, generals and everything else. Clearly, from their point of view, they were
taking matters enormously seriously. By the time I got back from the visit I had to go
straight to the Minister of State. There was a feeling of certain pressure that, obviously
the Americans were taking the matter and others situations in the Caribbean seriously
because they could see that, if it became a precedent, they would have a real worry with
the small islands of St Vincent, Dominica and so on.
EDWARDS: We must remember that, at the time of coup, all the other islands
were Associated States and we were responsible for their foreign affairs and defence. In
terms of our relationship with the US, we were anxious to get away from the anomalous
position where we had responsibility without the power. There was a feeling in the US
Administration that it could be a dangerous disengagement because, while we were
responsible for foreign affairs and defence, something like the coup of March 1979
perhaps could not happen. The process started and Dominica went on until 1983. I am
searching my memory, but there was a concern in Washington that we were pulling
back and that created a power vacuum that could be filled by others. To some extent, the
coup in Grenada highlighted the difference of approach between the two Governments.
ROSSIN: I would like to pick on that theme because it is relevant to the
discussion. Mr Chase talked about the sudden realisation that took place, which was
really the coup and the incident on St Vincent that he described. Prior to those incidents,
there was a difference of perception about Cuba and Jamaica, as Mrs Robertson
described, where there was a lot of concern about where Manley was heading and the
relationship with Cuba. I recall a book that was written about that time. It was a
colourful, fictional book about world war three. I remember that it pictured future
54
Jamaican and Cuban troops fighting together in Africa against American troops. That
was the mentality that was going on.
However, the Eastern Caribbean was not really part of that. Up until the coup in
Grenada, one of the things that I found interesting when I worked in the embassy, for
example, was that for almost all the US agencies, such as the drug enforcement
administration and the FBI and those that covered even matters like social security
administration, the Eastern Caribbean was run out of some domestic office of the United
States. So many people from the Caribbean islands are living in the United States and
going back and forth that what was happening was almost like a domestic extension. It
is also so close to the United States. That does not mean that we were trying to run the
place, but the perception was that the interests always flowed that way.
Until the incidents that Mr Chase described, notably the coup in Grenada, I do
not think that the Eastern Caribbean was very high on the agenda. We did not have
representations in any of the islands. The ambassadors who were sent there were
political people. We did not send the top diplomats there. It just did not have that
priority. Both the written and oral records of the time indicate that, in the first period
after the coup, there was an open attitude. It is important to look at the history of both
American and British reactions to the events in Grenada almost day by day from the day
of the coup until the first six-week period. Things were happening rapidly and people
were filling out the big picture they had of what Bishop and Coard were like and what
they might do when they were in power. We then did see a divergence between the
British and the American viewpoint, with the Americans having concerns about Cuba
and Cold War things, as well as Nicaragua. What was happening in the area round them
were preoccupations for the United States, while there was the British distancing policy.
I agree with some of the preoccupation for Washington. When I was in the area,
we were always concerned about what we considered to be a working muddle, such as it
was just going to push independence off on to the first guy on the island who says that
he wants it, and move on, and leave things to its own devices. Such an approach was
creating a vacuum and there was worry about that, which of course the Grenada coup
brought into focus as well as the reactions described by Mr Chase.
KELLY: I wish to make a point about the consequence of the coup and the
independence of the Bahamas in 1973. What happened in Grenada resulted in the British
Government changing their policy on the granting of independence. Until then, it had
been a political party with a manifesto and an election where independence was the
main plank, but after Bahamas and the coup in Grenada the year before and
independence, the policy changed to a referendum to ensure that the majority of people
on the island wanted independence. That was a significant consequence of what went on
in Grenada and the Bahamas.
ROBERTSON: The Commonwealth took the coup very seriously. Ramphal, who
was Secretary-General, went immediately to Grenada to see Bishop to persuade him to
hold an election because he thought that it would legitimise the Government. Well,
Bernard Coard was very much against that, although he set up a Caribbean Advisory
Group of distinguished Caribbean people. The Commonwealth took it very seriously
and was actively trying to bring representative government back to Grenada as quickly
as possible.
55
We also knew that the Eastern Caribbean Governments were really shaken
because they did not want anything like that to happen. Those who had High
Commissioners in London asked the British Government either to intervene or to sever
diplomatic links with Grenada. They wanted Grenada to be forced back to legitimacy.
The High Commissioners told us that the British Government’s response was that Britain
recognised states not governments and since Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General, had
been retained and was representative of the Queen, diplomatic links would continue.
That summed up the British Government’s approach at the time.
THORNDIKE: By 1981, in my discussions with both British and American
diplomats, you could see two quite different priorities. The British were much more
concerned about the human rights situation in Grenada, starting with the lack of
elections but, in particular, the detainees, and the lack of fair trials and due process. The
Americans were becoming obsessed—although perhaps that is too strong a word—with
Cuba. We must not forget that, by 1981, the Caribbean Basin is in the forefront of
American thinking. There was Nicaragua. Jamaica had been sorted out, but there was
Cuba, which was very active. There was Grenada. There was Guyana and the
development of the idea of a Cuban-Soviet nexus operating at the heart of the Caribbean
Basin certainly seemed—to me anyway—to be taking root with the American diplomats
to whom I spoke. It did not seem to have cut much ice with the Brits though.
SUTTON: I remember giving evidence to a Foreign Affairs Committee on
Central America and the Caribbean in 1982. It might seem a bit odd for the FAC to be
addressing Central America and the Caribbean, after all Central America was not an
established British concern. Nevertheless, it was being talked about simply because of its
importance to the United States. I had recently been in Grenada and I was questioned by
the Committee. Perhaps it was an ideological distinction, but the Labour Party people
were very pro what was going on in Grenada and the Conservative members of the
Committee were very anti.
The recommendations of the Committee were that Britain should stop looking at
the issue of Grenada both as a north-south and an east-west issue, but largely as an issue
of under-development and that we should establish a distinctive policy different from
that of the United States to the area. When the report was published and the Foreign
Office responded, none of those issues were mentioned. The Foreign Office ducked the
issue on that one, but that is just my own biased interpretation and remembrance of the
event at the time.
Can we now move on to the events closer to the death of Maurice Bishop and the
subsequent US action in Grenada? John Kelly was the only person resident fin Grenada
at the time—for the UK. I do not know whether any other diplomats were stationed
there.
KELLY: I had lots of or chary colleagues. The Russian Embassy was growing.
There were representatives from a number of other Eastern European countries, and
there were lots of frequent visits by senior people from left-wing, socialist countries,
such as Mozambique. The Korean [Ambassador] was scheduled to come. In some of his
trips overseas, Maurice Bishop would frequently visit all those countries. He struck a
deal with North Korea for a $1 million loan. He had a big loan from Libya. At one time
56
after he came back from his visit to the US, Bernard Coard was writing to Libya asking
for the balance amount. They had lots of aid from Algeria at the time. It was all coming
in, and that was their orientation.
I went there in December 1982 and the atmosphere in Grenada at that time was
changing. The verbal support for the revolution that had taken off in 1979 was much
diminished throughout all levels of society. There were people who, when they visited
my office and could speak securely, would condemn what was going on. They were very
concerned about the increasing number of Russians, for example. The embassy had
opened in early 1982, while in September 1983, 12 Russian teachers came on the island,
which was of concern to us. They dislodged some of the other Commonwealth teachers
who had been working there. The reason for that was that the Grenadian Government
were under some pressure to identify good material for scholarships in the Soviet Union.
They had about 250 to 300 students in Cuba at the time, but the number of students who
had been sent to the Soviet Union over the period of the revolution had not been given
high regard by the Soviets or by East Germany, where there were some as well.
The East Germans were active in putting in a new telephone system. There was a
range of such things going on. Lots of people from Britain, from left-wing organisations,
visited and took parties out to Grenada to see the new participatory democracy that was
supposed to be taking place in action. Jeremy Corbyn MP was a frequent visitor. When I
was there, he brought out a group from Sheffield. Nigel Spearing MP were all interested
in Grenada and visited it during my time. George Galloway was involved through his
War on Want charity. There was worry about how left wing it was all going.
In January and February 1983, the business community and ordinary mortals on
the island began to realise that the supreme authority in Grenada was not Maurice
Bishop, the hero of the people, but the Bureau. People had not realised until that stage
that the party system in place was actually stronger than the Cabinet. In about June 1983,
I received a list of the NJM members. There were only 17 members of the New Jewel
Movement, while there were about 300 associate members. They were running the
country and had a say in it.
Another LSE luminary, Robert Grant, was a great friend of Maurice Bishop when
he was at college here. He was also a lawyer and brought back by Maurice Bishop to
take over as Attorney General, but when he got to Grenada he could not align himself
with some of the things that he was asked to sign into law. We must bear in mind that no
Parliament was sitting. The laws were done through a Public Laws Decree, signed by
Maurice Bishop. Once it was published, that was the law. Robert Grant could not take
that on. He fell out within a month of his arriving, and he went into private practice and
stayed on the island. He subsequently stood for election, but did not get it.
Other British people had gone out to help the revolution. People in the UK were
sending money to support it. All of that began to stop. The economy was shot to pieces
in 1983. All of the available funds were going into building the airport. Cuba funded a
great deal of that, but whatever spare cash the Government could find, it went into
completing the airport, which was the big project and was to come on stream in 1984.
The Government curtailed a lot of travel by many of the Ministers and officials. For
example, instead of sending a big delegation to the International Labour Organisation
annual event, the trade commissioner went. Maurice Bishop visited the United States for
11 days in June and that gave people great optimism that something good would come
out of it. However, nothing much did. He came back in the middle of June. He said that
57
his visit was a great success. However, he had not really seen anyone, but it was a
notable departure from the way in which they had been treating America to that point.
The big thing that struck me when I arrived in Grenada was how vitriolic the
anti-Western imperialist vitriol was. I was invited to many party and fellowship
meetings. I had asked Maurice Bishop whether I could attend such meetings and he said,
‘By all means.‘ There were times when I felt like walking out on behalf of America, not
Britain, because of the terrible things that were being said. Victor Husbands had been a
friend of Gairy. I think that I described him as the Vicar of Bray at the time. He had
moved in support of the revolution.
Other optimistic things were happening. In June 1983, Maurice Bishop signed
into law a constitutional commission. Victor Husbands was the secretary of that
organisation. It had mainly party people on it. Merle Collins was to be the representative
of the National Women’s Organisation. A chap called Ashley Taylor was to be the
chairman. It was not due to report for 24 months, but the idea was that the commission
would make recommendations that would be put to the NJM about the future
parliamentary elections in Grenada. It was a movement in the right direction, albeit a
very controlled movement. There were lots of incidents of that type of event. I attended
budget discussions in March of that year. We broke up into workshops and people
discussed different aspects of what Bernard Coard had presented in the budget. I
participated in it and gave my ideas as well. We were able to be involved to that extent.
The mood was changing. The revolution had lost a lot of its impetus. The
economy was shattered and the NJM began to look for the fall guy in it all. The navel
gazing that continued throughout the months from February to September in 1983
pinpointed Maurice Bishop and led to the need for joint leadership. He went on his last
overseas trip at the end of September to East Germany. I do not know whether he went
to the USSR, but he came back via Cuba to the island on about 10 October and said that
he had changed his mind about the joint leadership. That is how I understand it
happened. The party was not happy with that. There were rumours supposedly from
Maurice Bishop that Bernard Coard and Phyllis were arranging for his demise. He was
taken to task about that.
At about 10 or 11 October when Maurice Bishop returned, I began to hear that he
was in trouble and that he was under house arrest. One incident was brought to my
attention on 12 October. It was broadcast at 15 minutes past midnight, when the radio
stations had only been shut for an hour, to members of the party. It was made by the
Comrade Leader to show that he was still okay. He spoke to them about the discussions
on joint leadership. That was the day when someone put a note through my door saying
that London needs to help and that Maurice Bishop was under house arrest. The
Minister for Tourism resigned on the same day and, at that stage, I advised Bridgetown
and contacted David Montgomery. Things were beginning to hot up, but no one until
that time could have expected the turn of events that happened over the next few weeks.
It was completely out of the blue.
SUTTON: We still got the impression up until 1982 that there was still
possibilities of engagement with the Government, but I get from what you are saying
that, from 1983, that had really passed by.
58
KELLY: With the UK, yes. There were ongoing matters. They had run down our
aid programme. When I got there in December 1982, there was just one outstanding aid
programme. It was a school that had been built to the north of St George’s. We were
discussing with them technical co-operation officers. We had offered them a civil
aviation adviser and for many weeks I was pressing the same Minister of Tourism Lyden
Ramdhanny responsible for aviation to accept the civil aviation adviser. After some
weeks, he told me that he could not accept the offer because they wanted someone to
manage the new airport and we were not prepared to take that on. The offer of the
adviser was still there, and we were also discussing other technical co-operation officers
and the return of VSOs to the island. Optimistic things were happening in the
relationship with Britain.
If things had carried on without the collapse of the Government, I am sure that in
the next year or so we would have begun to see some other positive changes. They
desperately needed something to happen. Tourism was down. Agriculture was down.
Unemployment was up, so they would have had to turn to the West eventually to bail
themselves out. They would not continue accepting the sort of aid that they were getting,
particularly from Eastern Europe. I mentioned the East German telephone system that
was being put in. That was state of the art 1950s whereas, after the collapse of the
revolution, the Canadians came in and Motorola put in state of the art 1983 equipment. I
think that the East Germans sent 65 trucks and some tractors. The Russians sent huge
tractors to the island. They could hardly be used because the terrain on the island did not
lend itself to big tractors. A lot of the aid from Eastern Europe was wasted.
SUTTON: I remember the time that Bernard Coard had gone to the IMF. I had a
PhD student who studied the economy of Grenada and, until early 1983, things were
happening.
KELLY: He had $1 million loan from OPEC and a facility from the IMF in May or
June 1983. It was done falsely. The IMF team came down. It did its study and presented
draft figures to the Ministry of Finance. Bernard Coard did not like the draft figures and
the team was asked to stay on for another week, after which new figures were produced.
There was a British adviser at the Ministry of Finance at the time, and he told me the
truth: the figures showed what the economy was really like and what the population
was. The Revolutionary Government always presented the population as being 110,000.
That was critical with the IMF. If there were more than 100,000 people in the country, it
is eligible for a different tranche of aid.
However, the business people on the island told me that the population was not
110,000, but that it was no more than 89,000. When I asked him how he knows, I recall
Fred Toppin, one of the managers of one of the big supermarkets on the island, saying
that he could tell from the sale of ice creams. He put the number at 89,000. The IMF did
give a big facility that year, but it was under a false premise.
SUTTON: David Montgomery, do you have something to say about Grenada
just prior to Maurice Bishop’s imprisonment and subsequent death?
DAVID MONTGOMERY: As a matter of historical record, it must be checked
whether the usual movement existed as an Opposition party to Gairy. The New Jewel
59
Movement did not come into being until about 1977 when Bishop and his humanitarian
colleagues ousted a nice man, Teddy Victor , the leading light in an organisation called
the Jewel… Bishop and Coard were part of a thing called the Movement for the
Assemblies of the People. That movement did not exist in Gairy’s time.
It is not every day that we hear a senior American diplomat introducing a note of
realism into the debate, but Ambassador Rossin who had the benefit, like myself, of
being on the island when the shooting was in progress seems to know what he is talking
about. He hinted—it accords with my view—that the United States was not particularly
fussy about a mosquito-infested pimple in the Caribbean called Grenada. They had other
things to think about in Central and Southern America, which were much more
important (71:28). They were not worried about what was happening in Grenada until
the North Koreans, the Soviet Union and the East Germans established embassies there.
They cost very little, but they caused mild consternation in Washington. Communist
embassies on their doorstep! They had to have another look at what was happening. I
entirely agree with Ambassador Rossin.
As for the lack of reliable information about what was happening within the
Politburo and the Central Committee, and why very little emerged until it was almost
too late, that was largely due to the astonishing feat achieved by the PRG, rather like
what happened in recent times with British MPs in the House of Commons. They did not
know that there was anything wrong until recently. The secret had been kept. The PRG
succeeded in keeping its very serious internal troubles secret. Hardly anyone in Grenada
could say anything that sounded reliable. I am sure that that does not include John
Kelly?
SUTTON: I was about to ask him.
MONTGOMERY: That was my opinion about why very little was known.
As for what Britain could do and whether we were concerned about it, of course
not. Why in the name of god would we be interested in Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis
and nuisances in the Caribbean? In any case, you cannot have a policy in any part of the
world unless you are in a position to do something about it, and we were not. It took
weeks and months for the operation in the Falklands to be mounted, so how could we
have done anything in Grenada within a few days, and the few days that were being
demanded by the other Caribbean Governments—particularly those members of the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States? We could not do anything. Any hint that we
were taking an interest or that it mattered to Britain was just hypocrisy.
GAY: I attended an Anglo-American meeting at the Foreign Office on my return
to London. Sir Nicholas Ridley was present and said quite clearly to the American
delegation, ‘Grenada is in your backyard’, to which the reply was, ‘Well, we could say
that Eastern Europe is in yours‘. That was the attitude.
KELLY: I wish to answer David Montgomery’s question about the New Jewel
Movement. The Jewel Movement was set up by Unison Whiteman in the 1960s when he
came back to the island. The Movement of the Assemblies of People was set up by
Maurice Bishop in 1972. On 11 March 1973, they had a joint meeting in St David’s Parish
and formed the New Jewel Movement.
60
MONTGOMERY: Well before the coup.
KELLY: Six years before the coup. They had the meeting in St David’s and they
had a mock trial of Lord Brownlow10 whose estate was on La Sagesse. He had put a
barrier across the road down to his beach where people had been used to going
regularly. They found him guilty. They all marched down and tore down the barrier
across the road. That was the first action of the New Jewel Movement.
SUTTON: Let us come to the time when Bishop is held under house arrest. I
presume that the situation is being reported back to London. John Edwards, I think that
you were in charge at that time. How were you responding to the news of Bishop’s
arrest and the beginning of difficult events?
EDWARDS: We were obviously in very close touch with our High Commission
in Barbados for an assessment of what was going on. Immediately and over the
significant weekend of the 22nd and 23rd, one of the things that concerned Ministers
most of all was the safety of British citizens on Grenada and what threats they might
face. It was very much in the Prime Minister’s mind, too. Our prime responsibility was
to ensure the safety of British citizens. There was fairly early discussion about the
possibilities of moving the Belize guard ship, HMS Antrim, to a suitable position. That
occurred over the weekend, but we were concerned particularly about the safety of
British citizens. That was before the meetings of the OECS and subsequently of
CARICOM, which formulated the request. Lord Bramall may be able to comment on
that, but our only resource in the area was HMS Antrim.
BRAMALL: We did divert the Antrim and we flew out a company of Gurkhas to
Trinidad to join Antrim, purely if necessary to evacuate British or possibly even
American citizens if trouble impinged on their safety. That was done on 22 October.
EDWARDS: Yes, the Saturday.
BRAMALL: There was no question in the military mind. I shall have more to say
when you come on to the American invasion. There was no question of the British
having a military operation to restore democracy, for instance. That was not considered.
The Antrim and the Gurkhas were there to take off people if they were in danger.
SUTTON: We have now reached the point where Bishop was killed. It was quite
a remarkable set of events. John Edwards, what was the response in London as soon as
we received the news that he had been killed?
EDWARDS: Concern, and the need to find out more about what was going on
through our High Commission in Barbados. Our embassy in Washington was doing its
best to get alongside our colleagues at the State Department about the likely American
reaction. One of the problems facing our embassy in Washington was that its natural
10
Edward John Peregrine Cust, 7th Baron Brownlow.
61
contacts were with colleagues in the State Department and the decisions that were taken
over the weekend of the 22nd and 23rd were taken primarily by the National Security
Council and the Special Situations Group.
As an aside, I subsequently talked to my opposite number at the State
Department about what was going on over that crucial weekend. He said, ‘Not a lot‘.
Getting a clear perception in London of what the US reaction would be was always one
of the problems. Policies were being made within the White House system. That was my
understanding. We really did not know what was happening. We were in great doubt
about what the US would do over that period. That remained the case until the letter and
the famous telephone call between Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan. Hence, the
Secretary of State’s statement that said rightly we had no reason to believe that the
Americans would intervene.
SUTTON: A Mr Mark Pellew is in the audience. He was at the embassy at the
time.
MARK PELLEW: Yes. I was the Congressional Counsellor at the embassy. My
particular role was to talk to the Congress on Government Hill. It is absolutely true what
John Edwards said. The State Department—perhaps Ambassador Rossin can confirm
it—were sometimes not in the loop. I shall give an interesting example of that: on Friday
21 October, I was asked by a member of staff what I would think if the United States
were to invade Grenada in a few days’ time. I said, ‘You are not really going to do that,
are you?‘ He said, ‘Well, actually the White House told the Congressional leadership this
afternoon that plans were being developed to do just that.‘
I asked about the reaction was from the leadership, and my informant, Peter
Galbraith, said, ‘Speaker Tip O’Neill asked what Mrs Thatcher thought about it?‘ Reagan
looked sideways, no one said anything. Reagan said, ‘Well, I don’t think we have told
her.’ That was how the position looked on that Friday afternoon. I went straight back to
the embassy and reported it to Derek Thomas, my boss. He sent a report to London that
evening. So London had that information in addition to that mentioned in Michael’s
excellent summary of all the contacts with the State Department. The State Department
was just telling Robin Renwick and Derek Thomas, ‘Well, we don’t think anything is
being done‘.
SUTTON: I wonder if I can come to Lord Bramall. There were lots of officers in
America.
BRAMALL: I have a lot to say on your question 12! I was the only person here
who was at the meeting in the afternoon of 24 October. Do you want me to describe that?
I have a lot to say about that because I know what happened word for word. I hope to
introduce some jocularity into it also, but it will wrap up all the various things that have
been mentioned about a certain amount of American secrecy and our feeling that the
situation was not as bad as some people made it out to be.
SUTTON: What I was really trying to tease out was the links of the US and the
UK in America. There are British officers in Norfolk, Virginia. They must have known
62
what the Americans were doing. I wondered where the information was going—or not
going—at the time, and whether there was an official channel. I take it not.
ROSSIN: I have a small American perspective. I was in the State Department at
the time in the Assistant Secretary’s office, following events in Grenada. I had visibility,
although I would not claim that I was part of the policy planning process. What Mr
Edwards said also applied to the United States. John was the only actual Western
diplomat on the island. The American embassy was a non-resident embassy and detailed
factual knowledge you have when you have an embassy on the ground was not always
available. In fact, John was one of the people whom the US embassy would call to find
out what was going on. It is important, when considering how the British Government
were interacting with the American Government at the time, to bear in mind that the
American Government themselves were trying to figure out what was going on there,
too, from the moment of the coup. The State Department did the usual thing of setting
up a task force, but it was mostly to find out what was going on and to follow the
situation of the American citizens.
While at working level, the State Department was preparing talking points and
briefing papers, it was probably not in the actual policy discussion. George Schultz and
Larry Eagleburger were involved in the policy discussion process. That was visible to
me. It was not only the NSC and the White House. Because plans were being made to
invade, that did not mean that a decision had been made to carry out an invasion. I
travelled with Ambassador McNeil to Barbados in the chain of events when there were
consultations with the Eastern Caribbean countries and sensed that there was a
preliminary decision to move forward with military action, but that the final decision
was not taken. When I was in Barbados, there could have been a discussion with the
Caribbean leaders to see if they were serious about it.
One of the complicating factors, although it did not change the President’s mind,
was the bombing in the barracks at Lebanon. That was not a happy event and the
Americans already had 200 people killed. Did they want potentially more? It was a
dynamic process and, as we look at what the British Government knew about American
plans, intentions and knowledge, we must realise that those things themselves were
dynamic. It was very much a human endeavour on the American side as well, and one
that was peculiar. The United States has always had the policy of universal
representation. We have embassies in almost every country that we recognise—more so
than any other country in the world. These were a couple of places where the universal
representation was not the case. We covered all of those islands from the embassy in
Barbados. It is important to walk back from any sense of American vision of where they
would end up at the end or anything of that nature. It was a dynamic process.
SUTTON: What was your response, John, to news that Bishop had been killed?
Did you think that the revolution was imploding at that time? Did you think that the
well-set plan by Coard and others was rolling forward?
KELLY: My sense was that it was a pure accident. It should not have happened
the way it did. I was in the market square in the morning having an innocent smoke, and
he [Unison Whiteman] roused the crowd to release Maurice Bishop. Had he not done
that, things would have panned out differently. When Maurice Bishop was brought
63
down, he went to the fort instead of the market place. Negotiations with Bernard Coard
and the others at Fort Frederick might have happened differently too. There was no
knowing what would happen.
My feeling was that the incident was a dreadful calamity, and it was. We did not
know until the middle of the afternoon that Maurice Bishop had actually been killed. I
was witnessing a lot of the killing that went on in the fort at 1 o’clock. There was a
second lot of shooting at about two o’clock, but we did not know what that was about
until we learnt about it later. On the Saturday, I saw the doctor who had signed the
death certificate and he told me what had happened. Who could have foretold that that
would happen?
SUTTON: You feel that it was all action taken by people without much foresight?
KELLY: Without good planning or consideration of the outcome of their actions
at any given time.
SUTTON: Tony Thorndike, you interviewed a lot of people about the issue.
THORNDIKE: The cock-up theory of history. There was a lot of talk about a
well-laid conspiracy by the Coards—Bernard being egged on by his wife. I never
believed that. I found no evidence of it. Events moved so fast. The mistake was, as John
has said, that if Maurice had gone to the market square and turned right down the hill,
as opposed to left up the hill, things would undoubtedly have been completely different.
There was no plan. Matters just simply got out of hand. Bishop was insisting on
broadcasting to the people and was trying to get a telephone line to the radio mast.
Wires were being welded together because everything was broken. It was when he
refused to negotiate when certain elements of the army decided that they had to take
over control.
I am perhaps in a minority, but I believe that, although Coard was the intellectual
brains behind the party and had wanted far greater Leninist edge and leadership and
was Mr Efficiency, as was his wife, Mrs Efficiency, there was no order by them at all.
They were stuck on the other hill about one and a half miles away. This important event
took a momentum of its own.
SUTTON: I remember being with a Latin American student at the time it was
being relayed, and he said, ‘How different it would have been if it had taken place in
South America. What we would have done with the armoured personnel carriers as they
came down the street was to have thrown some sugar, flour and then petrol at them.
That would have been the end of it.‘ The nice thing about the Caribbean is that it is not
that sort of society.
Anyway, we have had enough discussion for the moment. Let us break for tea
and come back promptly in 15 minutes.
Session 2
SUTTON: We have now reached the point at which Maurice Bishop was
murdered, and things are beginning to put Grenada well up on the agenda. Gary, will
64
you summarise what the various options were at the time? We can then explore them as
we come to the invasion itself.
WILLIAMS: Three options were on the table: one was the US, the second was the
Organisation of East Caribbean States and the third was the Caribbean Community,
CARICOM.
I shall start with the US. Until Bishop’s death, the US had started preliminary
planning for an evacuation operation of US nationals primarily at the medical school.
But when news of Bishop’s death was received, matters changed to a full-scale military
intervention as the US realised that an evacuation was no longer feasible. They had one
huge piece of luck: a fleet was about to leave from Norfolk on its way to relieve the
troops in the Mediterranean. On the 20th, the day after, it was diverted towards
Grenada, which was one the major things that made the operation doable.
Even before Bishop’s death, the OECS leader, Tom Adams, had met US officials.
Once news of Bishop’s death had been received, the OECS began to float the idea of a
military operation to remove the Revolutionary Military Council. Indeed, on the 21st, the
OECS approached the Americans with a request to remove the ‘outlaw government in
Grenada by any means‘. The US received a written invitation to participate in a military
operation. Barbados and Jamaica were invited, and the proposal was also sent to France,
the UK, Canada and Venezuela. In the outcome, only the US received a written
request—so draw your conclusions from that. The UK received an oral request via the
High Commission the day after, but nothing else.
The final option on the table was the CARICOM option. Essentially, it ruled out
the idea of a military operation and favoured the political, economic sanction route.
SUTTON: Thank you, Gary. Let me start in reverse order and look at the
CARICOM option. A lot of people have said that the British Government sought to
develop that option and saw it as one that they favoured. Is that right? Sir Sydney, was
that something that the British Foreign Office was considering or advising on at the
time? The British Government were said to be favouring out of the three options that
Gary set out an option involving CARICOM. Was that the case?
GIFFARD: Yes, I would say so.
SUTTON: John Edwards, will you comment on that?
EDWARDS: Since we were not in a position to intervene militarily and not
anxious to do so—a fair statement—we were naturally keen that any other opportunity
should be explored. The fact that the OECS had developed our view and went to
CARICOM to get it on board, but did not succeed, was part of the dynamic situation that
was occurring over the weekend. I was at home, and in contact with the Governor of
Montserrat by telephone, who was a friend as well as a colleague. The first news that I
heard of the outcome of the OECS meeting was from John Osborne, the Chief Minister.
He told the Governor who had to remind him that Montserrat was still an Overseas
Dependent Territory and, although he was a member of OECS, he did not have
responsibility for foreign affairs and could not commit Montserrat to military
intervention. We were aware of what OECS wanted over the weekend, but were hopeful
65
that wiser counsels might prevail when they all went to Trinidad and met within
CARICOM states that had been dependent longer and had a more developed mature
view of such matters.
SUTTON: David Montgomery, what was the view from Barbados about the
relative merits of an OECS action and a CARICOM action?
MONTGOMERY: I do not think that anyone who knew anything about the
Eastern Caribbean would have believed that any useful decision could come out of
CARICOM, particularly because of the political gangster in Georgetown, Guyana, Forbes
Burnham, and a useless Prime Minister in Trinidad and Tobago—Chambers. He had
never taken a decision in his life.
ROBERTSON: That is not true.
MONTGOMERY: It is true.
ROBERTSON: Rubbish!
MONTGOMERY: As long as Forbes Burnham and Chambers were attending the
meeting—they were quite bit hitters in CARICOM—there was never any hope of
reaching a consensus. There were indeed some fairly incredible rumours about Burnham
having informed the Revolutionary Military Council of the outcome of the meeting in
Trinidad and, hence, that heightened the PRG’s apprehension about an armed
intervention.
As for the others in the Eastern Caribbean, Tom Adams in Barbados, Edward
Seaga in Jamaica, John Compton in St Lucia and the formidable Miss Charles in
Dominica simply dismissed the CARICOM meeting. Tom Adams did not even go. They
knew what would happen. CARICOM continues to this day to be something of a façade
and not of any real importance.
SUTTON: Do I take it from you that the view coming from the High Commission
in Barbados was that CARICOM would not get anywhere, but the view that I have from
the FCO in London is that CARICOM was the best option? We do have a difference of
opinion.
MONTGOMERY: You have two different opinions.
EDWARDS: I do not think that I said it was the best option that we were looking
for other than a military intervention and the fact that the Eastern Caribbean States were
going down to Trinidad—my friend from Montserrat said that a military intervention
would be proposed at the CARICOM meeting. It was all part of the process of trying to
avoid an inevitable military intervention.
GIFFARD: The idea that a longer term attempt to make CARICOM more useful
was partly influenced by the fact that we were getting definite replies from Washington
to the effect that it was not going to happen. That went on right up to the last minute.
66
SUTTON: Patsy, I am interested in your response to CARICOM. I know that the
Commonwealth would have taken that action.
ROBERTSON: The Commonwealth made a great effort to get CARICOM to be
more firm on the whole question of bringing about a situation where elections could be
held. This is something that must be brought out: in Jamaica, Edward Seaga, who had
benefited from the destabilisation of Jamaica and won the election in 1980, was
absolutely plotting with the United States by then. He was the first visitor to Reagan in
January 1981. Just think of it: a Caribbean leader, the first visitor to the President of the
United States. Reagan was making a whole lot of very strong speeches about the
situation.
Seaga and Tom Adams, who was another plotter, knew that plans were being
laid to have an invasion. I think that they would have probably invaded even if Maurice
had not been killed. They were planning because the Caribbean Government really did
not want to have the idea of coups taking hold in the Caribbean. They believed in
elections. They were poor and unimportant. They were dismissed comprehensively by
that gentleman over there, but they were people with a long history. They lived on their
islands. They still had a great fondness for Britain. Many still had the Queen as their
head of state. The OECS was certainly still hoping that some kind of peaceful means
would be found to get Grenada back to a normal constitutional government. In fact, the
Commonwealth allowed Maurice Bishop to come to the Lusaka meeting at which I think
he met Mrs Thatcher and the Queen. He made a very good impression. The pressure was
on Maurice to call an election and sort the thing out—and, of course, he didn’t do it.
Plans were being laid by Edward Seaga with the United States.
MONTGOMERY: At which time?
ROBERTSON: From 1981.
MONTGOMERY: That is rubbish.
ROSSIN: That is not true.
ROBERTSON: He had pledged to end relations with Cuba. He was fully
supported by the United States. There was a feeling about what had happened in
Grenada—the students and so on. It was being planned. I do not care what you say.
ROSSIN: I base myself only on my experience working on the issue for the US
Government on the documentary record. I reviewed every single diplomatic cable sent
between the United States and our embassies in the region at the time. Given my
knowledge and the conversations that I have had with any number of actors in the
region, it was not being planned in 1981.
Furthermore, with regard to the OECS leaders—I witnessed this—I travelled
with Ambassador Frank McNeil when he was sent by President Reagan to talk to the
OECS leaders because they had received a request for a military intervention, which was
not on the cards at that moment. They wanted to know whether the people were serious.
67
The United States did not wish to carry out a unilateral military intervention in Grenada.
On the other hand, there were a lot of preoccupations not only with students, but in the
case of the United States, there were political considerations.
When Ambassador McNeil met those leaders, it was evident later on when
Burnham and Charles showed up in Washington, they were quite adamant that they
wanted the United States to do it. It was something that had been carried through from
the time of the coup and the OECS attitudes in 1979. They were always uncomfortable
with the situation. They always wanted it reversed. They saw a breakdown into
generalised disorder in an island just like theirs, which by the way was blamed on the
students. The worry in Washington about the students was not that they were being
threatened. They were not. It was just that it was so totally chaotic there. They were in a
dangerous environment and that was a responsibility.
SUTTON: Do I take it from you then that the major option for Washington was
with the OECS rather than CARICOM?
ROSSIN: The UK would have shared the analysis that David Montgomery gave
you. You would never get any kind of consensus on an issue if you had Forbes Burnham
and George Chambers at a meeting.
BOWEN WELLS: I was a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee who
heard evidence on the Grenada affair at the time and afterwards. Both Patsy and Mr
Montgomery are right in their own ways. Miss Charles, John Compton and Tom Adams
certainly told me that, from the beginning, they knew that they needed to find some way
of intervening militarily. They knew that the British did not want to help them and they
were determined to get the Americans to help. That went on from 1980. When Miss
Charles came to power in Dominica, having had, of course, a communist-type revolution
in Dominica itself. The fact that the British and the Americans were not considering a
military intervention is also true, but eventually there was pressure from the democratic
countries of the OECS, Dominica and St Lucia. I accept that Tom Adams and Barbados
was not OECS, but it was wanting an intervention. Both views were right.
DAVID LANE: I was High Commissioner in the Port of Spain from 1980 to 1985.
It was not our high commission at the time that was responsible for relations with
Grenada. We became involved when we heard from John Kelly of the house arrest of
Maurice Bishop. We immediately told the Trinidad Government about it, and that
seemed the first that they knew about the troubles in Grenada. Their attitude then and
throughout the crisis was pretty consistent with what it had been in the preceding years,
which as David Montgomery said, they had not approved of Eric Gairy and were uneasy
about Maurice Bishop.
Eventually, they were shocked by the murder of Maurice Bishop, but they
viewed Grenada’s affairs as a matter for Grenadians. Although the Port of Spain is not
the most highly populated town in the world, they stayed firm about it and differed
markedly from the OECS Governments and the Governments of Barbados and of
Jamaica. That was why they were often sidelined. I did not get the impression that
Trinidad knew about the military plan. Perhaps I was wrong, but when the invasion
took place, George Chambers complained both in Parliament and on a radio broadcast to
68
the people of Trinidad that it came as a complete surprise to the Trinidadian
Government. Their attitude was not really different from that of HMG. They expressed
opposition to the invasion, although we had the feeling from the population of the Port
of Spain that it was popular. They were kept very out of the loop.
ROSSIN: There is a distinction between what the OECS and those countries were
pressing for. They would not have been informed of the US military intervention. You
would not inform many people.
SUTTON: Can we move back to Grenada? John Kelly, you had a meeting with
Sir Paul Scoon at the time with David Montgomery. What was his reaction to events?
KELLY: I saw Paul Scoon each day. On the day of the killings, I telephoned him
to discuss it with him. The next day he asked me if I would get Vaughan Lewis to phone
him. The meeting to which you referred was attended by David Montgomery, Kenneth
Kurze, No. 2 at the embassy, Linda Flohr, a CIA representative. The consul came across
to talk to the Revolutionary Military Council that had been set up. The meeting took
place on the Sunday morning at which they discussed mainly the protection of the
foreigners on the evacuation. I immediately had to take account of that.
My role changed as soon as we had the big problem with the shoot-on-sight
curfew. I had to put on my consular hat and concern myself with the British residents on
the island. The curfew was lifted on Saturday morning for four hours. My office was
then invaded by lots of Brits who we did not know were on the island, including a lot of
Commonwealth and European people who wanted to find out about evacuation flights.
We were given assurances by the military that, if evacuation flights were arranged,
people would be able to leave. But they were never arranged, except there were four
flights left on the Sunday, but there was nothing that we or the Canadians could do.
There was a Canadian Aid Officer on the island at the time. His High Commissioner had
asked him to stay on. He got a permit to travel during the shoot on sight curfew. I got a
permit, as did the OAS representative and a few others. We were a network of people
who could travel around the island. I did not travel much, but they used my office as a
centre to collect information. The British wardens in the various parishes contacted the
citizens who had registered with them. My wife and I called at all the hotels in the St
George’s areas to identify who was British and who would want to be evacuated. We
were building up lists of people and we were inundated with calls from overseas. The
telephone system was functioning strongly, which was how information was getting in
and out of the island. As for links with Britain, the Foreign Office had set up an
emergency unit, which was in contact with me. I should explain that my office was one
man and his wife. We did not even have an official car. It was that bare.
WELLS: Did you have a flag?
KELLY: When I went there, Sir Paul Scoon told me to lift the profile a little and
fly the flag. When I got to St George’s, I started flying the flag. The Governor-General
rang me about three days later to say that he was delighted to see the Union flag flying
in St George’s once again. My predecessor had been told to keep a low profile and not fly
the flag.
69
SUTTON: Did Sir Paul have a view at the time about what action he wanted?
KELLY: His view was that it would not be solved internally. He was a bit
concerned about where it might go to if something did not happen to resolve the matter,
but I am not privy to what he said to Vaughan Lewis or David Montgomery, except
what David told me, when they had their meeting. We had an informal meeting with the
Revolutionary Military Council representative and some of his officers at a hotel in St
George’s. David and I then saw the Governor-General and went back to the meeting.
You had a walk with him in the garden, David. It was critical to whatever Tom Adams
was waiting to hear when you got back on that Sunday afternoon to Barbados.
SUTTON: Can you now enlighten us, David?
MONTGOMERY: It is unfortunate that Sir Paul Scoon’s memoirs had not been
included in the bibliography. He explains everything. I could read you the relevant
extract.
SUTTON: Can you summarise his essential point?
MONTGOMERY: He was in an extremely isolated, difficult and even dangerous
position. A shoot-to-kill curfew was in force on that Sunday morning. Neither he nor any
of his staff had not been allowed to move from Government House. Understandably,
they were really frightened. He had had little or no contact with the so-called
Revolutionary Military Council. Hudson Austin appeared at one stage on the Friday or
Saturday shivering like a leaf and confused and frightened about what would happen to
him. He had nothing to offer in the way of what the Revolutionary Military Council
were going to do. He just hoped that neither the United States nor the anyone else in the
Caribbean would be unsympathetic enough to invade Grenada. We were in no way to
disagree with him one way or the other; he was completely isolated. He had had no
reliable information from any source for weeks. It is not easy to summarise. Anyone who
knows Sir Paul Scoon knows that he is a very careful man. He does not make statements
that might subsequently be disproved. He is a bit like members of the British diplomatic
service.
KELLY: Some of us!
MONTGOMERY: Some of them! He first asked me if I was aware of any
imminent military action to restore Grenada to normality. He said that he was unaware
of any imminent military action to the situation in Grenada, but it could not be ruled out
that the outcome of the high-level discussions currently taking place between Prime
Ministers Adams and Seaga and the OECS Heads of Government on the one hand and
the United States Government on the other might result in an agreement to take joint
military action.‘ ‘He‘—Montgomery—‘went on to say that, in the context of these
discussions, I was now widely acknowledged in the Eastern Caribbean and elsewhere as
the sole representative of constitutional authority in Grenada. Montgomery suggested
that, in these circumstances, I should perhaps give urgent consideration to the role I
70
would be expected to assume if a military operation were to be mounted against the
RMC, adding that clearly my views on military action as an option to restore my country
to normality would be crucial to any decision on that score.’
Sir Paul then went on to talk about the awesome significance of being faced with
such a question and said, ‘While military intervention into one’s territory was not the
sort of thing I would normally advocate, the current potentially explosive situation in
Grenada was such that it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that only the presence of
friendly foreign troops could rescue Grenadians from the abyss into which they had
fallen and bring back law and order into their daily lives. Therefore‘—this is the punch
line—‘if a military operation to achieve that were to be undertaken by our sister states, if
necessary with the assistance from the United States, I would give such an initiative my
fullest support.’
SUTTON: Thank you very much. Ambassador Rossin, I remember an article by
Gary on the OECS’ involvement called ‘The tail that wagged the dog‘. I suppose that he
was trying to get at the fact that the OECS had quite an important role in stimulating the
United States into action. Will you comment on that or say what stage the United States
decided to take action?
ROSSIN: I do not think that Frank McNeil would have told the OECS countries
that a formal written invitation would be required to generate American military action
if the policy of the United States Government at the moment was not to have any interest
in military action. Others going there would not have said so either. You do not want to
get the wrong answer to something like that. Clearly, the possibility was out there. Frank
McNeil was sent down there as well as a military representative, General George Crist
who was a senior military officer. It was useful and may have been essential—I do not
know whether it was a diss-positive factor in the ultimate decision of the President or
not. But having that invitation obviously from a political point of view, was extremely
important.
In a way, it is the same logic that Sir Paul Scoon laid out to David, which is that it
was not an American intervention. It was an intervention by Caribbean states supported
by the United States. Obviously, most of them were Americans, but when I was in
Grenada after the intervention the Caribbean states were not idle standers-by. The
Jamaican and Barbadian troops as well as the police played out their roles. I cannot say
whether or not President Reagan would have decided not to intervene had there not
been such an invitation. Many factors were at work in the calculation, including the
American citizens issue.
As for what Sir Paul Scoon said to David Montgomery, he said to me in a
communication through technical means during the night before he was brought off the
island to the … He specifically said to be that there should be the intervention and then,
of course, the letter appeared, which I assume we shall come to later.
SUTTON: Can I move on a little now towards the American intervention? What
information was London receiving not from the Caribbean, but from Washington about
what action the United States was taking?
71
GIFFARD: Constant denial that action was forthcoming. We were told
repeatedly from Washington and London that it would not happen, both by the State
Department and by Colonel North, whose reputation as a special operations officer at
the time was high.
SUTTON: And you were inclined to accept that?
GIFFARD: Yes, I was told by a Minister afterwards that I must not believe what I
was told, but I did believe it at the time.
SUTTON: Was any information from the Caribbean coming through at the time
about the possibilities of American action?
GIFFARD: Not quite in time.
EDWARDS: Not as I recall of American action. There were indications that the
OECS member states were beginning to deploy forces or get forces organised in the
expectation or hope, but nothing about American intervention came from the Caribbean,
except that it might happen.
SUTTON: Presumably, your assessment would be—given that there were 800
revolutionary army people on Grenada and not even that number of troops in the rest of
the Caribbean apart from Jamaica—that there would certainly not be enough to sustain a
landing that could be resisted.
EDWARDS: Yes, it was quite clear that only American forces were available in
sufficient quantity and in the appropriate time scale to counter the forces that were
supporting the Revolutionary Military Council in Grenada. That was certainly so.
Among the exchanges of telegrams, there was a view that, if the Americans did decide to
intervene—there was always that conceivable possibility—we would ask them to look
after our citizens as well as their own, and that we would not be involved, but that we
would not disagree or counter the operation in any way, and that we would support
them, if necessary.
SUTTON: Lord Bramall—
BRAMALL: Talk about getting down to the nitty-gritty! I want to let you into the
two key meetings that happened in the Cabinet Room, one on the morning of the 24th
and one later that night. The first meeting was a meeting of the Defence Committee and
the Cabinet, and we were not even really discussing much about Grenada. The decision
had been taken to get Antrim and the Ghurkas to Trinidad and in position, but as the
meeting was finishing I said to the Prime Minister—although this was 25 years ago, I
remember it as if it were yesterday; it is more or less verbatim—‘Prime Minister, I have
no collateral for this at all‘—you have heard how there was no collateral—‘but I feel in
my water that the Americans are going to go into Grenada.’
The Prime Minister turned to me and said, ‘What on earth would make them do
a stupid thing like that?‘ I said that I would tell her why I thought that they would go in.
‘They have just lost 241 men in the Lebanon. Their reinforcing convoy going out to
72
replace these people is 80 miles north of Grenada. They have a situation of erratic
Marxist demonstrations. You might say that they have Cuban undertones; there are a
couple of Cuban officers there, some Black Power element, something that they could
believe or make themselves believe was destabilising in the West Indies and I think that
President Reagan will want an easy, quick victory, which he can put against this ghastly
tragedy in the Lebanon to restore morale.’
That was my feeling. I was not an expert on Barbados, but that was my absolute
feeling. The Prime Minister turned to the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, and said,
‘What do you think about that?‘ He said, ‘No, no. I have been in close contact with
Secretary of State Schultz and he has assured me that the Americans are going to do it in
slow time and they are not going to do anything about an invasion.‘ Margaret Thatcher
turned to me, with her steely eyes, and said, ‘There you are’—and, with that, the meeting
broke up.
This is actually as it happens. That evening, my wife and I had been out to dinner
and were back in our flat. We had just fallen asleep and well after midnight—about 12.30
or perhaps 12.45—my really excellent naval assistant burst into our bedroom and said
that the Prime Minister wanted to see me in Downing Street at once. I asked if there was
a car, because we could not use mine as it was in the underground car park, which is
locked at midnight. As the Americans would say, I pulled on my pants and sprinted
with him into Hyde Park looking for a taxi. It took us quite some time, but eventually we
found one. We jumped into the taxi and said, ‘No. 10, Downing Street’ and the man
thought that we were a couple of drunks!
We got to Downing Street. All hell had broken loose. Everyone was there: the
Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office, the Foreign Secretary, Michael Heseltine and
so on. Everyone was shouting. Margaret Thatcher was in a absolutely furious mood. Of
course, she never made a reference to what I had said earlier. I did not expect her to;
there was no reason why she should have done. But signals started to fly backwards and
forwards between her and President Reagan. The first one that came from the Americans
said that they were mindful of taking up the request from the Eastern Caribbean States.
The second one said that they were going in at 5 o’clock in the morning. At one time, the
signal went back and my opposite number said to a friend of Reagan, ‘There is a
telegram from the Prime Minister of Britain.‘ He looked at it, let out an absolute
expletive when he read it. She was saying that even at this late hour not to do it. It was a
Commonwealth country and he had no right to invade it. That showed how strongly she
felt.
I said to the Prime Minister that there was only one question that I wanted to ask
her, which was whether she wanted to be seen as being associated with this operation or
not because I had to get some orders out to HMS Antrim, which otherwise will be in the
middle of the American invasion. ‘Certainly not‘, she said. Perhaps I should have said—
although it was for me to say, given that the Foreign Secretary was there—that, as they
were going to do it, perhaps we ought to be showing them some support. However, I
did not feel that that was for the Chief of Defence Staff and said, ‘Well, in that case, I
shall now get orders on to HMS Antrim to get well clear of the area, together with the
company of Ghurkas on board. Incidentally, after the Foreign Secretary had made that
remark of Schultz, he gave a statement to the House of Commons actually saying the
same thing: ‘I have no knowledge of any invasion’.
The interesting follow-up was that the Foreign Secretary had to make a statement
73
in the Commons the next morning. As you know, the excellent Geoffrey Howe is quite a
mild-mannered fellow. Had it been Michael Heseltine, he would have gone in, guns
blazing. Geoffrey Howe gave quite a bland statement and he was always on a hiding to
nothing. When the question came back, ‘Did the Americans tell you about this?‘, if he
had said that he did know, without being too specific about when, they would have said,
‘Why the hell did you allow them to do it? It was a British Commonwealth country.‘ If
he had said that he did not know until about three hours before it happened—and
remember we had all those cruise missiles at Greenham Common—the great question
would be, whose hand would it be on the trigger? So he had not better tell these things.‘
He was on a hiding to nothing.
There were some telephone conversations. I thought that Margaret Thatcher was
very balanced. She talked about hoping that democracy would be restored. The
interesting thing was that, at that level, it made no difference to the wonderful
relationship between Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan, although they disagreed
fundamentally on that point. Later on, we saw another relationship between Prime
Minister Blair and President Bush, when one single objection might be taken to be a bad
thing. Eventually, the American invasion was more painful than they expected; they had
19 casualties. The opposition was not very great. They got the American students away.
It helped to stabilise the West Indies, to some extent. That is exactly as it happened and,
of course, it shows up all the various things that have been said: the Americans were
keen to keep it absolutely quiet until the last minute. We hoped that there would be
another solution. Margaret Thatcher had no intention of intervening nor did she think
that other countries should do so. She saw no parallel between the Falklands and that.
They were utterly different.
When I went to America soon after, I got terrible statements not from top people,
but from any ladies whom I met at parties. They said, ‘Look at you, we backed you to the
hilt over the Falklands, and what did you do about us in Grenada? Absolutely nothing!’ I
said that President Reagan took about a fortnight to three weeks to make up his mind
whether he was supporting us in the Falklands, and Margaret Thatcher had about three
or four hours!
SUTTON: Thank you very much for that. Sir Bernard Ingham, can you tell us
when Margaret Thatcher first became engaged with Grenada, it being a serious issue for
her, and follow on from what Lord Bramall has just said?
INGHAM: To put it in context, I must explain what a Press Secretary does. You
are there to manage relations with the media and keep them on as even a keel as is
possible in this awful world. If anybody needed a manager, it was Margaret Thatcher
because she did not have the slightest interest in them. The reality of No. 10 is that you
see the political correspondents lobby twice a day, the Foreign Press Association on
Monday, the European Group on Tuesday, the American group on Wednesday, British
provincial group on Thursday and the fishing fleet on Friday. The Sunday lobby got
absolutely nothing. Everything had been written. They are desperate. When you see all
those people, it is a voyage of instant discovery. As a consequence, you do not go around
poking hornets’ nests where you know they exist.
Therefore, it is fair to say that Grenada blew up out of thin air, really from my
point of view, to the morning after the night that the Field Marshal had spent his lively
74
time with Margaret Thatcher being rather like the Queen in ‘Alice in Wonderland‘. I had
to brief all those people and the only question was whether it was perfectly clear that we
did not know until the last minute, so that dealt with that issue.
What about the special relationship? Oh my god, that was awful. How would we
stop the Soviets walking into wherever they want and would we deploy cruise missiles?
Those were the essential points that I had to deal with. Fortunately—or, unfortunately,
as the case may be—we were in the habit of arranging interviews with journalists well in
advance so that there could be no argument in our regime that we played it for kicks. On
this occasion, the Daily Mail played it totally for kicks with the able assistance of
Margaret Thatcher. She went completely ballistic in an exclusive interview with Sir
David English. She went over the top. The two essential points were how dare he invade
the Queen’s territory without telling them and, secondly, how would we stop the
Soviets. I did not really have to say anything. The Prime Minister was answering all
those questions.
The process did not take too long. It got Mrs Thatcher off the idea that President
Reagan had behaved appalling by not telling her, because we said that, if she had
thought that a military operation depended on secrecy, she would not have told
anybody. How we would stop the Soviets took a little longer. You will see that the
Americans left Grenada fairly rapidly. She then said, ‘See, they are different from the
Soviets. Once they have achieved the operation, they are off.’ What rose out of it was the
doctrine of the backyard. From thereon, she was ever mindful that the United States
would, whether we liked it or not, have a legitimate interest in its own backyard, which
was certainly the Caribbean. That begged a lot of questions about the Soviet Union and
why they were in Afghanistan—but we shall leave that on one side.
The Field Marshal and I have said that we really did not interfere. We had
tremendous upsets over the Falklands, Grenada, Tripoli, Reykjavik—when President
Reagan decided to get rid of nuclear weapons—and—
PELLEW: SDI.
INGHAM: You are quite right. And, of course, President Reagan’s runaway
budget deficit because of defence spending, which Margaret Thatcher thought was all
together out of this world. Reagan was always immensely courteous. He is reputed to
have said when she got really brisk in one telephone call, ‘Gee, honey, don’t take on so!’.
On the 26th, she recorded that he rang and she admits that she was not in her sunniest
disposition. President Reagan is reputed to have started his telephone call by saying,
‘Well, I thought I might throw my hat through the door first!’ They got over it and I
suppose that we all got over it. The lasting effects of Grenada was that we have to
recognise that the great powers have a legitimate interest in their own backyard.
SUTTON: I might come back to that before the end. Before I call Ambassador
Rossin, I would like to go back to something that you suggested, Mark, earlier when you
said that you some inkling that America was planning military action on 19 or 20
October.
PELLEW: Yes, that was on the preceding Friday, the 21st—it was merely an
advanced consultation with the Congressional leadership. There was great sensitivity at
75
the time between the President and the Congress about the whole situation, which was
being argued in respect of the Americans in the Lebanon. They were being ultra cautious
in making sure that Speaker Tip O’Neill was told enough in advance, but then they had
the great worry about breaching security. It was extremely difficult. They told the
Congressional leadership considerably in advance. We did, to that extent, have some
inkling, but only informally. The State Department, I am sure, was exactly as reported in
the list that we have before us and was saying that it knows of no plans.
SUTTON: How does that square with something when I was writing the book
and talking to people to the effect that, with the invading forces, a UK officer of fairly
senior rank was sent to Grenada without markings to observe what was going on? I do
not know how true that was, but people said it to me. I would not have thought that an
officer would have done that without higher authority, whatever his rank. Was that
true?
BRAMALL: Someone else might know. I ought to have known if one was sent
officially. I would be taking a bit of a chance in view of what Margaret Thatcher had just
said to me. I certainly did not know of one being sent. Whether one from Antrim had
somehow got himself there, I do not know. Does anybody know?
EDWARDS: No. Bernard said something about what we knew about the
intentions in Washington. I have a summary note of the telegram that arrived in
Washington about 5 o’clock on the Sunday. The phrases included, ‘National Security
Council proceeding cautiously. The fleet that had reached area 23 was being kept east of
Dominica‘. That gave the US the option to intervene, although no decision had been
taken, but they had been receiving requests from the OECS.
BRAMALL: Did they say that they were mindful?
EDWARDS: The telegram says that the students were okay, but they were
considering very carefully and that Cuba was acutely nervous. They gave a categorical
assurance that they would evacuate British citizens and that there would be consultation
with us before future steps. On the basis of that telegram, the meeting with the Secretary
of State took place on the following morning at 9 o’clock. We were advising about what
the statement should be in the House of Commons when the phrase ‘I know of no such
intention‘ was used. Some of us there, not only Lord Bramall, thought that they might do
it, but we thought that they would consult us before further steps were taken.
BRAMALL: About the officer, it is possible. The task force did not leave America
intending to go to Grenada. It left America to go to the Lebanon, to reinforce what they
had lost and perhaps to do other actions, which they did not yet know about. There
could well have been some British liaison officer on the force that was going to the
Mediterranean when the thing got diverted.
SUTTON: I want to explore why the Americans felt it necessary to keep us out of
the loop.
76
MONTGOMERY: I do not think that it is surprising that the United States
decided to keep their intentions secret from No. 10. When one thinks of the interminable
leaks of information that come out of there, they were very wise.
INGHAM: Not then! It is an absolute libel on No. 10 pre-1997 to say that leaks
were always coming out of there. They were not!
MONTGOMERY: They must have come from somewhere.
INGHAM: Probably the Foreign Office.
MONTGOMERY: That useful whipping boy of all Prime Ministers.
As for whether anyone knew, any casual observer from the moment that Maurice
Bishop was executed on the 19th, Barbados airport became the scene of a second D-day.
United States forces were pouring in by the minute. There were thousands of combat
troops, support troops and other personnel. It was clear that the Americans were
preparing for an armed intervention, provided that they could get the necessary written
specific invitation from people such as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States or
the useless CARICOM—although that was never an option.
ROBERTSON: They got a backdated invitation from Paul Scoon, after the
invasion.
BRAMALL: If there were such things, matters had certainly not reached the
Prime Minister. When I put the idea into her head, she might have said that she had been
wondering about it, too. But she did not. Her first reaction was, ‘What on earth would
make them do a stupid thing like that?’ Her mind was completely set against the idea.
Nothing ever reached anywhere near the Prime Minister.
SUTTON: Can you explain why the Americans decided to keep us out of the
loop?
ROSSIN: As for the timing of the decision, making plans to carry out an
intervention and preparing for the mobilisation of troops is different from deciding to
carry out such plans. If you decide to, you do it on the spot, but if you have the option,
you want to make sure that you ready. I was in Barbados with Ambassador McNeil and,
at a certain point, I was told that I was going to Grenada with the Special Forces. My
sense is that the final decision was taken to do it about two hours after the OECS
meeting with Frank McNeil. I think that David’s analysis is essentially correct. That said,
there was a strong inclination to do it. It is not that they did not think of it until the
OECS. They might have done it anyway. The timing to do it was finalised by the OECS. I
do not think that the Lebanon thing had much of a roll anyway because it did not change
anything in the process. I was on the Guam during the first day of the military operations
with Admiral Metcalfe and I did not see a British military officer, which is where he
would have been.
I do not know why Ronald Reagan decided not to inform Margaret Thatcher, but
I throw out a theory: she thought that it was stupid. Denis Healey said in Parliament that
77
it would only make the position worse to have a military intervention. At the time,
George Foulkes said, ‘Is he aware that progress towards democracy such as what my
right hon. and honourable Friends have spoken of will not be achieved by any form of
external military intervention?‘ There was the great assumption on this side of the water
that it was self-evidently a stupid thing and something that would be damaging.
Hindsight has 20:20 vision. We see what happened only after, and after clearly proved
that it was neither stupid nor a blow to democracy—given that democracy was restored
fairly quickly.
Under those circumstances, did the operational security considerations that the
Chief of Defence Staff and others have mentioned play into this? There was not a
sympathetic audience on this side of the water, so given that troops were to be put in
harm’s way as would the students and Grenadian people, and that the point of
minimalising casualties generally argues for telling as few people as possible, there was
no operational necessity to tell. The theory that it was a Commonwealth country so the
United States had no right to take such action was dismissed by Paul Scoon himself
immediately after the intervention. He said, ‘She is the Prime Minister of Britain. This is
Grenada‘. There may be some reasoning why the transparency that we would expect
between London and Washington did not pertain in this case. I am speculating, but the
generalised assumption that it was stupid and bound to be a failure was remarkable.
There was no such thought on our side of the water
INGHAM: I want to support our American friend. It seems that when you read
this record, the Americans could say quite reasonably that they consulted us. Indeed, I
think that they went a long way to consult us—and they got the answer. Perhaps they
got the answer that they were expecting, but they got it. No. We cannot argue on the
basis of all that I have read in the document that they did not consult us. They did. They
did not get the answer that they liked, and then they took their own decision. We may
not have expected them to take the decision.
EDWARDS: I was at the meeting in No. 10. We had the letter about being
minded to take action. There was then a telephone call to the Prime Minister. She was
very reluctant to say too much on the telephone. She was very conscious of the security
situation and doing any damage to the operation. Robin Butler told her that it was a
secure line. She said, ‘No. I remember the Falklands. I shall not say anything that might
damage in any way the operation of going in at 5 o’clock the following morning.’ We
were actually told in a sense what was happening. She was very careful and understood
very much the operational need for secrecy.
Heseltine and the Minister for the Armed Forces, John Stanley, were present as
well and the thing that was uppermost in their mind when they knew it was going to
happen and when the Secretary of State said that he had no knowledge of such an
intention was the matter of the cruise missiles. That was raised several times at the
meeting. There had been a lot of discussion in the press about whose finger was on the
trigger and were we going to be consulted? In political terms, that was almost the most
worrying aspect of the whole thing. I think that Bernard Ingham will confirm that.
INGHAM: And the legality of it.
78
SUTTON: Mr Montgomery, I want to explore two more questions.
MONTGOMERY: No. 10 simply failed to understand the strength of feeling of
the people who actually matter, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, whose
future security was possibly at risk. If they had, we would not have had any silly
exchanges between the Prime Minister and President Reagan. Until the very last minute
on the Monday, the United States in the form of the White House was very wary about
agreeing to the armed intervention. That morning, they were faced with the piece of
paper which Sir Paul Scoon referred to in his memoirs. Faced with the information, yes
in principle because of the situation and because he know the people who were
advocating it—Tom Adams, Seaga, Miss Charles and Compton—he was prepared to
give tacit approval to an armed intervention with the promise of what was practicable,
as he states in his book, for a written request On the Monday morning, Tom Adams was
still struggling to persuade the United States officials in Barbados to go. However,
Barbados Airport looked like the preparation for D-day, but that was only a precaution
in my view. Larry Rossin can perhaps say something.
ROSSIN: I do not think that I can add anything.
PELLEW: The impact of the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon was
enormous. It was ghastly. It would have been unthinkable after that for President
Reagan to show weakness to foreign policy in his own backyard, which was relatively
simple and something that should have been quick and easy. It was unthinkable that
they would not interfere with the thing that was already set well in train. I do not
remember being involved in writing the telegram that John Edwards quoted from, and
which must have been sent on the Sunday, but I am sure that it would have referred to
Beirut.
SUTTON: I have two questions: one involving Grenada and one involving the
United States. My impression is that it did not really do too much to disturb what is
sometimes referred to as a ‘special relationship‘. Is that right, Sir Sydney?
GIFFARD: Yes. My impression at the time was that the Beirut thing was crucial
in the timing of the American decision. No, I do not think that it affected matters longer
term.
SUTTON: So, within days, we were back to the normal relationship.
INGHAM: Bearing in mind the catalogue of arguments, it strengthened the
relationship in a sense. They could actually have a row and come out of it with mutual
respect. We make far too much of such noises.
SUTTON: What was the response of the people of Grenada when the Americans
came in, and you were sitting watching it all happen?
KELLY: I did not dare call it an invasion any longer. It was a rescue mission, as
they saw it. They saw President Reagan as the saviour. Most Grenadians were not
79
concerned. They were glad that it happened when it happened. They said that, if Britain
had been involved, it would have taken another few days and those days could have
been critical. I do not think that we came out of it badly. We did not come out of it in the
Commonwealth badly. Mrs Thatcher was able to go there with her head high about the
Grenadian issue. We had not muddied waters. The Grenadians welcomed it. They spent
the next year or so persuading Americans not to apologise for what had happened.
When my friends in Grenada visited the States, they were often apologised to for what
America had done to them. They said, ‘Don’t dare apologise‘. About 95 per cent of the
people welcomed it.
THORNDIKE: I agree. A great majority of Grenadians went along with it.
However, they were very sceptical of the idea that Cubans were hiding in the hills.
Helicopters were flying around saying in English and Spanish, ‘Okay, Cubanos, we
know you are there. Come on out.‘ Posters were put up in the town offering so many
dollars for an AK47, pistols and so on. They were very sceptical about the ex post facto
claims still going on that the airport was planned primarily to be a Soviet air base in the
Caribbean.
In the December 1984 elections, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, which
billed itself as the successor to the New Jewel Movement only received 5 per cent of the
vote, and it was a completely free and open election. What was remarkable was how
quickly the revolutionary rhetoric that had washed over people and which the party
believed had been taken on board by the people disappeared. On the first anniversary of
the revolution following the intervention—rescue mission—on 13 March 1984, a national
holiday, no one said anything. It was as if there were a collective decision to wipe it off
the historic map. It was quite extraordinary.
KELLY: It has now been agreed to call the new airport the Maurice Bishop
International Airport! That was agreed in April.
SUTTON: Everyone can add one line and then we must finish.
EDWARDS: In terms of Anglo-American relations in respect of the Caribbean,
one positive consequence of what happened in Grenada we then put into a more formal
way our exchange of views with the Americans. A meeting was organised at Chevening,
and a subsequent meeting in Washington. There was a real attempt for us to get
alongside the Americans and talk about the Caribbean thoughtfully and its longer term
future.
GAY: On a Trinidad and Tobago website in January 2008, there was a long
statement from Maurice Bishop’s daughter, Nadia Bishop, giving everyone involved—
including Bernard Coard, who she visited while he was in jail. It is very long. It is very
religious, but well worth reading.
ROSSIN: She is Maurice Bishop’s surviving daughter. With regard to the
weapons, naturally the place was awash with weapons. At one point there was a scandal
because every American going there was bringing back as a souvenir an AK47 or
something. A Congressman actually tried to smuggle one back into the United States. A
80
significant stockpile of weapons and uniforms were also found there. We never did
understand what they were for, and we probably never really will understand the
ultimate relationship between Grenada, Cuba, the Soviet Union and Nicaragua.
SUTTON: I thank all the participants for their contribution. Everyone who has
contributed will be receiving a statement of the proceedings to check, which we want
them to return. Thank you very much for enlightening us about such events.
81