Spécialité : Sociologie du politique et de l’action publique Parcours : Politiques et Développement en Afrique et dans les Pays du Sud 2008 - 2009 Sommaire SOMMAIRE.......................................................................................................2 REMERCIEMENTS ..........................................................................................5 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................7 PART 1: THEORETICAL FRAME OF THE WORK .................................... 16 CHAPTER 1: THE DISCOVERY OF MIDDLE CLASSES IN AFRICA .......................... 17 1.1. The recognition of middle class issues in Africa................................ 17 1.2. The African middle class: Only a matter of definition? ..................... 24 CHAPTER 2: THE C ONCEPT OF MIDDLE CLASS IN S OCIOLOGY .......................... 27 2.1 Some aspects of Class analysis ......................................................... 27 2.2 Class analysis in Africa: An exception? ............................................ 30 2.3 The varying role of middles classes in different societies .................. 34 CONCLUSION PART 1................................................................................... 40 PART 2: FRAMING THE MIDDLE CLASS IN MAPUTO ................ FEHLER! TEXTMARKE NICHT DEFINIERT. CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN M APUTO…………………………………………………………………………... 43 3.1 Social stratification in Lourenço Marques ........................................ 45 3.2 The transition from Lourenço Marques to Maputo ............................ 47 3.3 Maputo during the civil war ............................................................. 52 3.4 Structural adjustments and the reconfiguration of colonial social demography ................................... Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. CHAPTER 4: OUTCOMES OF THE FIELDWORK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS IN MAPUTO ……………………………………………………………………………………..57 4.1 Operationalisation Critérias to frame members of the middle class 59 4.1.1 Income...................................................................................... 59 4.1.2 Education and Job ..................................................................... 60 4.1.3 Standard of Living and Lifestyle ............................................... 61 4.2 Presentation of the outcomes ............................................................ 62 4.2.1 Social origins and social mobility.............................................. 62 4.2.2. Education and Job ..................................................................... 65 4.2.3 Housing and Security ................................................................ 70 4.2.4 Standard of living and Lifestyle ................................................ 75 4.2.4.1 Cars: A basic need or luxury? ............................................... 75 4.2.4.2 Consumption patterns: Making the choice between local and foreign markets…………………………………………………77 4.2.4.3 Traveling and studying abroad as way to accumulate social and cultural capital .............................................................................. 78 4.2.4.4 Running: Preventive healthcare in everyday life..................... 79 4.2.4.5 The domination of Portuguese in everyday life....................... 80 4.2.4.6 Between family solidarity and individualization..................... 81 4.2.4.7 Religious affiliations and new religious movements ............... 85 CONCLUSION PART 2: ................................................................................. 89 PART 3: THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ELITE AND THE URBAN MIDDLE CLASS IN MAPUTO .............................................. 89 CHAPTER 5: THE URBAN MIDDLE CLASS AND ITS CHANGE FROM SUPPORT TO ALIENATION TOWARDS THE RULING ELITE ………………… 5.1 92 The historical relation between the urban middle class and the elite 92 5.1.1 The socio-historical background of the ruling elite .......................... 92 5.1.2The relation between the urban middle class and the elite during socialism…………………………………………………………………… 93 5.2 Liberalization and the increasing and differentiation between the urban middle class and the elite ............................................................................ 95 5.2.1 The adaptation of the elite to the changing circumstances ......... 95 5.2.1.1 The increasing class character of the elite .............................. 99 5.2.1.2 Unity and cohesion despite internal divisions ....................... 100 5.3. The alienation between middle class members and the ruling elite ..... 101 5.3.1 The struggling middle class during liberalization .................... 102 5.3.2 Revealing event: The case of Cardoso ..................................... 103 CHAPTER 6: Political attitudes of urban middle class members in Maputo……107 6.1 Recent political environment in Maputo.......................................... 108 6.1.1 The upcoming general elections .............................................. 108 6.1.2 The creation of MDM (Movimento Democratico Mocambicano)……………………………………………………110 6.2 The urban middle class between apathy and opposition .................. 112 6.2.1 Interest in politics and upcoming election................................ 112 6.2.2 Perceptions about the ruling elite............................................. 115 6.2.3 MDM: An alternative to FRELIMO? ....................................... 118 CONCLUSION PART 3................................................................................. 120 CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 121 BIBLIOGRAPHIE ......................................................................................... 128 TABLE DES ANNEXES ................................................................................ 136 Remerciements Tout d’abord, je voudrais remercier Comi Toulabor, Dominique Darbon et Joan Bardeletti de m’avoir donné non seulement l’opportunité d’effectuer le travail du terrain à Maputo, mais aussi de m’avoir soutenu tout au long de ce travail. Je voudrais aussi remercier Michel Cahen pour ses contacts avec les chercheurs à Maputo. Mes remerciements vont aussi à l’encontre de toutes les personnes à Maputo, qui ont contribué à la réalisation de ce mémoire, notamment aux personnes qui ont accepté de faire des entretiens avec moi, mais aussi l’IESE pour son accueil et notamment, Sérgio Chichava et António Francisco pour m’avoir sensibilisé aux réalités mozambicaines et pour m’avoir donné des pistes de réflexion intéressantes. Un grand merci également à Jennifer Zimmermann, Ndubueze Onyedikachi Nkume-Okorie et Olabisi Shoaga pour avoir corrigé mon anglais. Sans Dan Daniel Lama et Ndubueze Onyedikachi Nkume-Okorie j’aurai probablement dû déposer ce mémoire écrit à la main mais heureusement ils ont géré la mise en forme pour moi. Merci ! Je ne saurai terminer sans remercier mes parents et ma grande sœur pour m’avoir toujours soutenue, financièrement mais également moralement. Résumé – mots clés Résumé: The work aims to find out who the members of the urban middle class in Maputo are, and what position they take up in their society. Starting with a theoretical overview about the relevance of middle class studies in the African context and the complex notion of “middle class” in general, the master thesis explores different possible roles of middle class members in different societies. The work then identifies and characterizes members of the urban middle class in Maputo focusing on those who are civil servants or employed by the donor community. The outcomes of the fieldwork that was conducted in August and September 2009 are presented and standard of living and lifestyle are explored as well as, religious affiliations and political attitudes. Furthermore the dynamic relation between middle class members and the ruling elite of FRELIMO is investigated in order to know if the urban middle class could become a crucial actor to overcome the gap between society and state or if it rather tries to copy the elite. Mots clés: Maputo, Mozambique, Middle class, class theory, social stratification, MDM, FRELIMO Introduction This master thesis is the result of a contribution to the project “middle classes in Africa”. This project aims at understanding and describing the middle classes in Africa. Furthermore the project wants to find out about the role of this population in the development of the continent. One of the six countries where research was/is or will be conducted is Mozambique and the matter in hand ought to give first insights and to stimulate further research. Since the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique is often described as an African success story because of its successful peace building, its political stability and economic growth. Bill Clinton even claimed that Mozambique has “the fastest growing economy in the world”1. Indeed, Mozambique still is one of the countries with the highest economic growth rates in Africa, varying between 6, 5-12, 6% for over ten years now2. For the international community Mozambique is important, because it affords an occasion to present the urgently needed success story in Africa that legitimates the presence and interventions of the donor community3. It must not be forgotten though, that Mozambique remains one of the less developed countries in the world, occupying the 175nd position of a total of 179 countries in the Human Development Index4. During the last 35 years Mozambique has experienced two very far reaching political transformations. After 500 years of Portuguese presence and colonization Mozambique became independent the 25.06.1975, ending the 11e years independence struggle of the FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique). Only Smith, Russell, “Mozambique’s economic hopes washed away”, BBC News, 24.02.2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/655557.stm, consulted 4.10.2009 2 Republic of Mozambique, Report on the Millenium Development goals, Republic of Mozambique, 2009, p.11 3 Joseph Hanlon, Paolo de Renzio, “Contested Sovereignty in Mozambique : The Dilemmas of Aid Dependence”, GEG Working Paper 25, Department of Politics and International Relations Oxford, 2007, p.4 4 UNDP, “Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2008 - HDI rankings”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, consulted 17.09.2009 1 two years after independence the country was plagued by a long and very violent civil war that opposed the Marxist FRELIMO and the from South Africa supported RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance). The FRELIMO always claimed that the civil war was a war of aggression led by Rhodesia and South-Africa, whose aim was to destabilize their socialist, independent neighbor5. It is true that Rhodesia and South Africa have contributed and supported the creation of RENAMO and that the USA supported them financially. Nonetheless RENAMO could only become and maintain its military and political strength because they found many Mozambicans supporters who were disappointed and angry about the radical modernization programs of the FRELIMO and the lack of recognition concerning traditional leaders and elites not belonging to the elites in the extreme south of the country. Once the civil war had ended after nearly 16 years in 1992, the first democratic elections took place in 1994 and the economy made remarkable progress in restoring growth and improving welfare. Mozambique successfully reduced the monetary poverty of 69% of the population in 1997 to 54 percent in 20036. One could state that Mozambique is one of the countries which has benefited from good management on the macro level side and has experienced a global boom in commodity prices. As already mentioned it became of the “donor’s darlings” because it is considered to be a credible partner that quickly implements economic conditions requested by donors7. Nevertheless, much of the growth is linked to the development of highly capital intense mega projects (Aluminum MOZAL) with a very limited absorption of 5 Michel Cahen, « Histoire géopolitique d’un pays sans nation », Lusotopie – Géopolitiques des mondes lusophones, 1994, pp.213-266, 262 6 Louise Foxe and Malcom Ehrenpreis, “Beating the Odds: Sustaining Inclusion in a growing economy-A Mozambique Poverty, Gender and Social Assessment”, Washington D.C.,World Bank, 2007, p.3 7 Manfred Öhm, „Mosambik: Demokratie ohne Mehrwert“, Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, Maputo Mosambik, 2008, p.5 workers8. Apart from these megaprojects, it is very ostensible that there is a “missing middle” which becomes visible by the lack of medium-sized firms in the formal sector and the lack of production of domestic products. The medium-sized firms in the traditional sectors of textiles, clothing and metal working have closed and not been replaced by new ones. Apart of that, huge regional disparities hinder the sustainable development of the country as a whole (Maputo has an IDH of 0,622 while Zambesia has an IDH of only 0,2029.). These regional cleavages can also be observed in politics and show a continuing deep regional division of the country, which becomes especially evident in the electoral behavior of the population. The results of all elections show that FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) dominates the south and the extreme north while RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Mocambicana) has its strongholds in the central and northern parts of the country. The existence of these regional disparities lead us to the assumption that it is more sensible to concentrate on the social stratification in Maputo in detail instead of using the results of the fieldwork to analyze social developments concerning Mozambique as a whole. It seems to be appropriate to focus on the capital, as social change, mobility and reform can best be observed in urbanized areas and Maputo is one of the cities with the highest urban growth rates in the world10. Furthermore the fieldwork includes interviews which were conducted in Maputo ad are not representative for Mozambique as a whole. Nonetheless Maputo is highly influenced by national and regional wide developments which have to be taken into account as well. 8 Fion de Vletter, Migration and Development in Mozambique: Poverty, Inequality and Survival, Cape Town, Idasa Publishers, 2006, p.7 9 Arndt Channing, James Robert, Simler Kenneth, “Has economic growth in Mozambique been pro-poor?”, in: Journal of African Economies 2006 15(4),p.572 10 Iraê Baptista Lundin, Negotiating Transformation: Urban livelihoods in Maputo adapting to thirty years of political and economic changes, Göteborg, School of Business,Economics and Law, 2007,p.92 Regarding the political system, Mozambique is officially considered to be an “electoral democracy” in which elections take place regularly and opposition parties are officially legitimated and accepted 11. Anyhow, Mozambique can at best be considered as a „defective democracy” 12 and FRELIMO becomes the more and more dominant in politics and economics. Gubueza, president since February 2005, introduced an authoritarian style of government and centralized more powers around his office. Thus, FRELIMO has the leading role in developing the country and Guebuza as party president is in a good position to run for a second mandate as state president in 200913. The apathy of the citizens seems to increase. While 1994 only 12% did not participate in the elections, this number increased to 30% in 1999 and even up to 63,6 % in 2004.14 However, the disappointment of the population concerning the politics of the government does not lead to an increase of support for the opposition. Indeed, RENAMO has lost a huge part of its supporters in 2008. The local elections in November 2008 revealed the lack of an effective opposition, as FRELIMO won the local elections in 41 out of 43 cities15. According to experts, there is no doubt about FRELIMO winning the next elections on the 28.10.2009 as well, which means that the party will steadily become a hegemonic force in politics16 as people do not have a real alternative. Consequently, there is no effective opposition existing in Mozambique and the RENAMO finds itself in a deep crisis. Many members have already left the party and the new opposition force MDM (Movimento Democratico de Mocambique) has just been founded. The evolutions indicate the lack and/or the lack of trust in the government and its different institutions. According to the Afrobarometer, 64% of the population 11 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=269&year=2006, consulted 1.10.2009 Kurzgutachten Mosambik 2008, p.1, http://www.bertelsmanntransformationindex.de/fileadmin/pdf/Kurzgutachten_BTI_2008/ESA/BTI_2008_Mosambik.pdf, consulted 1.10.2009 12 13 Mozambique Country Report 2008, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, p.2 Kurzgutachten Mosambik, op.cit., p.3 15 Manfred Öhm,op.cit.p.5 16 Mozambique file Number 373, p.3 14 believes that Mozambique is a democracy with big or small deficits17. Another survey revealed that only 56% of the population states that democracy is the preferable government form (African mean 62%) and only 42% disapproved oneman rule (African mean 76%). Furthermore only 47% believe that the president must obey law and courts (African mean 67%)18 Another sign of the mistrust of society in state institutions are the reactions to the repeatedly revealed corruption scandals, the murder of the journalist Cardoso only being the most spectacular case. Corruption in general is an important issue in everyday life and influences the relationship between society and the state. According to surveys, nearly 60% of the population think that the government and the justice system are corrupt and even 70% do not have any trust in the police because of their corruptness19. This corruption, experienced by society on a regular basis, has a negative impact on the citizens´ trust in already weak political institutions, and it widens the gap between the state and society. This gap is not specific for Mozambique but a recurrent subject of discussion for the vast majority of African countries. Bertrand Badie for instance, argues that the importation of the European “nationstate” by the “importer class” generates several problems. According to him, the imported products like political debates, multi-party systems and the rule of the law are not adapted to local realities. Thus, their importation creates disorder leading to alienation between the society and the state.20 Furthermore a loss of meaning of the imported political institutions occurs and the individuals of the society deject the adaptation to institutions that are not of concern for them.21 The consequences include extra-institutional mobilisations, reinforced community 17 E. Gymiah- Boadi and Daniel Armah Attoh, “Are democratic citizens emerging in Africa?” Afrobarometer Briefing Paper, N°70, 05.2009, p.15 18 “The status of democracy, 2005-2006: Findings from Afrobarometer Round 3 for 18 countries”, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 40, November 2006, p.2+p.6 19 “License to kill: Police Accountability in Mozambique”, Amnesty-International, 04.2008 20 Bertrand Badie, L’Etat importe- L’occidentalisation de l’ordre politique, Paris, Fayard, p.224 21 Ibidem, p.227 solidarity (micro and transnational level) as well as the creation of spaces that the state cannot penetrate (rural, peri-urban areas). 22 Under these circumstances the creation of a positive relation between the state and the society require more than regular elections and economic growth. The bridging between the state and the society must include the change of the state’s nature, a conception of the state that exists for the benefit of the population and thus the overall context of state society relations would have to be re-constituted.23 This master thesis argues that members of the middle class could be beneficial to overcome the mentioned gap. In fact, the positive correlation between the quality of institutions and the size of the middle income groups has already been pointed out by several political economists. According to Nancy Birdsall for example, it is not so much the poverty-trap many Africans states suffer from but rather the weak institutional-trap African countries are caught in.24.Besides the dependence on mineral and oil export, low natural openness, few checks-and balances for the executive and problematic borders combined with ethnic heterogeneity, she sees the missing middle class as another important indicator of a weak-institutions trap. Moreover the American economist William Easterly also stated that the smaller the income share of the three middle quintiles, the worse a country does on various institutional measures like accountability and government effectiveness25. Bearing in mind these statements the question is: How can the correlation between the size of a middle-income group and the quality of the states institutions be explained? Nancy Birdsall states that the share of households in the middle of the income distribution is sufficient to provide a check on the abuse of economic and political 22 Ibidem, p.230,239,249 Wale Are Olaitan, Towards a functional african state- Bridging the gap between the state and the people, Paper Codesria, Maputo, 2005 24 Nancy Birdsall: “Do no harm: Aid, weak institutions and the missing middle in Africa”, Development Policy review, Vol.25 N°5, 2007 25 Williams Easterly “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth”, Working paper 94, Center for global development, 08.2006 23 power. The interest of the middle-income group to create and sustain a political system that undertakes productive investment instead of rent seeking is very likely. While we found in literature frequently the expression of the “missing middle” in Africa, Vijay Mahajan, author of “Africa Rising: How 900 million African Consumers offer more than you think”, has a quite different point of view. He explains that the expansion of middle classes is one of the most stroking African realities, which lead to a rather optimistic view of the future, if supported consequently26. Despite these different assumptions the mentioned approaches have in common that they try to know more about the “middle class” in Africa by focusing on the economic dimension, while neglecting the sociological one. This master thesis aims to frame and characterize the urban middle class of Maputo. Therefore the sociological dimension of middle class studies has to be explored in order to give a more complete impression of middle class members and the role they take up in society. In order to characterise the members of the urban middle class in Maputo we have to find answers to the following questions: 1.) Who are the members of the middle class in Maputo and how do they live? 2.) What is characteristic for their everyday life? 3.) How do they differ from other groups and why? 4.) What relation do they have to the state? In order to find answers to these questions we have to clearly define and carefully use the concept of “middle class” for Mozambique. 26 Vijay Mahajan, African Rising- How 900 Million African Consumers offer more than you think, New Jersey, Wharton School Publishing, 2009 Depending on the definition of middle class, this social category can include many or few persons in Maputo. While we consider the problem of an appropriate definition in the first part of the work, it has already to be mentioned, that this work could only characterise some members of the middle class but not the middle class as a whole. Furthermore we are conscient of the plurality and heterogeneity of the middle class in Maputo but prefer to use the term in singular to underline its differences compared to the poor and the ruling elite. In the African context we have, like in other parts of the world, a multitude of notions to characterize the different layers within a society. We can observe a disparity between anthropologic and sociologic approaches, which makes it difficult to examine the building of social categories and the necessary connections between them. Even though class analysis remains a vital and important tool for the understanding of African politics and society 27, there always has been (and still is) an invisible wall separating ethnicity and class analysis28. However, the literature of Nancy Birdsall and others illustrates that there is a need for nonideological, objective class analysis. Therefore, different theoretical approaches are presented in the first part of the work and their utility in understanding the urban middle class in Maputo is tested. Concepts which were developed and used for societies in the North will be presented and it will be discussed to what extent they can be applied to societies of the South in general and to the society of Maputo in particular. Furthermore the importance but also the ambiguities of studies on southern middle classes are discussed. 27 Peter Schrader, African Politics and Society, a Mosaic in Transformation, New York, Palgrave Mac Millen, 1999 28 Crawford Young, “Nationalism, Ethnicity and Class in Africa: A Retroperspecive” Cahiers d’études africaines, Volume 26, 1986, p.421-495 The second part of the master thesis aim is to frame the middle class of Maputo. In a first chapter the historical development of social stratification in Maputo is retraced which is necessary to understand recent developments. In the second chapter the outcomes of the interviews undertaken during the fieldwork are presented and discussed. This chapter also contains information about the methodology adapted during the fieldwork in Maputo. After having given first insights in the characteristics of urban middle class members in Maputo it is also important to explore its relations to the rest of society. Indeed, the position of middle class members in the society can only be understood with a proper knowledge of what relation the middle class has with other parts of the population. It is true that it would be also interesting to explore what middle class members differentiate from the poor and where similarities can be found. However, this master thesis concentrates only on the relation between urban middle class members and the ruling elite, because otherwise we would go beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore the relation to the ruling elite seemed more important because it can tell us a lot about the political attitudes of middle class members and their relation to the state in general. Therefore, the last part of this work we will concentrate on the evolution of the relation between the ruling elite and the urban middle class in Maputo. In the conclusion a summary of the main findings is presented as well as the limits of the (field) work that has been undertaken. A cautious answer to the question if the urban middle class is a crucial actor in overcoming the gap between state or society or a simple copy of the elite is developed as well. Furthermore some ideas for further research are pronounced. PART 1: Theoretical frame of the work In order to examine the characteristics of the urban middle class in Maputo, we have to use an appropriate definition of the term “middle class” in this very specific context. This master thesis’ aim is not to give an exhaustive overview of the literature existing about middle classes on the globe. However, we believe that a brief discussion of the different concepts existing is necessary to draw the attention to possible difficulties occurring when using the term “middle class” in the African context in general and in the case of social and economic analyses in Maputo specifically. To put it in a nutshell, we have to know what we are looking for before starting to analyze the local findings. Apart from that, the possible disparity between the theoretical part and the analysis of Maputian reality will allow us to find out to what degree the term “middle class” is useful and operational to understand socio-economic cleavages and the development in Maputo. Therefore, we will give a definition of the origins and the development of this term, which was originally used to describe and to analyze the social stratification in countries of the North before it was used to categorize and examine socio-economic developments in African (and southern) societies. Instead of deeply analyzing the term itself, we are going to concentrate on the application of middle class concepts in the African context in order to test its validity and its limits of significance. Besides, conditions of the term´s adaptation will be worked out to apply them carefully to the research study in Maputo. In chapter one, we will therefore concentrate on the development of the term and its possible application in the African context in general. Parameters that are used in the case study will be presented and critically analyzed. In the second chapter of the first part we are going to characterize the urban middle class of Maputo by using literature, interviews and material from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) in Maputo. CHAPTER 1: The discovery of middle classes in Africa 1.1. The recognition of middle class issues in Africa We already referred to the author of “Africa Rising: How 900 million African Consumers offer more than you think”, who explains that the expansion of middle classes is one of the most striking African realities29. He suggests the categorization of companies that divide the African market into five segments (A-E) based on income and consumption patterns. Even though the exact definitions of the segments vary from one country to another as well as the percentage allotted to each segment, Mahajan recognizes a common pattern on the African continent. While the early focus in the market was on the A and B class (Africa one), he claims that the C class (Africa two) is growing rapidly in wealth and influence. Members of “Africa Two” are characterized as people wanting to achieve a better standard of living, being very mobile and very motivated to educate their children as well as being interested in purchasing consumer products. While “Africa One” constitutes only 5-15% of the market “Africa Two” is considered to constitute 35%-50% of the market and is therefore described as “the future of the African market”.30 If we believe Mahajan, companies producing products targeting these consumers will rise with them and they will be able to create major businesses in Africa. Segment Percentage of the Market Estimated Population Across Africa Africa One 5%-15% 50-150 million Africa Two 35%-50% 350-500 million Africa Three 50%-60% 500 – 600 million Source: Vijay Mahajan, African Rising- How 900 Million African Consumers offer more than you think, p.57 Vijay Mahajan, African Rising- How 900 Million African Consumers offer more than you think, New Jersey, Wharton School Publishing, 2009, p.61 30 Ibidem, p.58 29 The table illustrates that “Africa Two” is a very interesting group for investments as it is richer than “Africa Three” and has much more members than “Africa One”. Therefore Mahajan calls “Africa Two” the “greatest opportunity in Africa”31. However, we have to be very careful in taking into account his findings because “Africa Two” is very different from the known definitions of “middle class”. While Mahajan estimates that “Africa Two” consists of at least 350 million people, the World Bank believes that there will only be 43 million people in the official middle class in Africa by 2030. According to the World Bank, this estimation already is very optimistic as it would mean that the number of people belonging to the middle class would be tripling compared to the estimation of 12.8 million in 200032. Unfortunately, Mahajan does not explain the background of his estimations whereas the World Bank generally defines the middle class as individuals with an income from $4000 to $17000 (PPP). This figure lies between the per capita income in Brazil and Italy which creates a much higher threshold for the middle class than Mahajan would like to admit. Similarities between the estimations of the World Bank and Mahajan are, that both of them are convinced of the increase of a middle income group in Africa over the next years. These rather optimistic views of economic opportunities in Africa consequently lead to the question if a possible connection between economic, social and political developments can be found. The existence of a positive correlation between economic and social developments seems to have been already proven by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959 who stated that: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”.33 31 Ibidem., p.66 The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the new Wave of Globalization”, The World Bank, 2007 33 Martin Lipset Seymour, “Some social requisites of democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1., 1959, pp. 69-105 32 Lipset is one of the best known supporters of the theory that the existence of a middle class is a decisive factor for a country´s political transformation from a non-democratic into a democratic country. For him, social mobility is the consequence of sustained growth that contributes to economic diversification, which again leads to societal differentiation. According to the modernization theory, authoritarian regimes cannot face ongoing modernization because they cannot control the political decision-making anymore when it becomes much more complex and needs more technical knowledge. The emerging commercial stratum wants to participate in the growth and therefore demands democratization of the political system. Apart from that, rapid growth often causes social and regional disparities and signs of cultural decay. In this context it is usually the urban, educated middle class (academics, students, independents, NGO-activists) that are engaged in the fight against patronage, corruption and the interwining of politics, justice and the economy. There seems to be a correlation between the pluralization and politization of society, the increasing level of education and the number of those who speak up for more transparency, democracy and decentralization increases steadily34. Indeed, it’s the whole discipline of transitologie, highly influenced by O’Donnell and Schmitter35 that supports the idea of an evolutional change leading from authorian rule to liberalization democratization and finally consolidation. Modernization theories claim in general that economic development leads to social mobility, and to the creation of a middle class. This middle class is considered to be the base for new ways of organizations like labor unions, student groups which can contribute to the creation of democratic regimes. The core of the modernization theory, supported by Lipset, regarding the relation between middle class and democracy, is well described in the following quotation: 34 Dieter Senghaas, Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1998 35 For example: Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, London, Baltimore Publishing, 1986 “To the extent that the development of democracy is attributed to an agent (…), it is the middle class that is seen as the primary promoter of democracy. The upperclass and especially the lower class, are seen as the enemies of democracy (...) The poor are more likely to be a threat to the privileged and the established order. The rich in turn tend to be hostile to democracy, both because they feel threatened and because the often view it even as morally wrong to let the poor and the wretched participate in political decisions - an arrogant attitude which in turn feeds the resentment of the poor. Thus, the middle class emerges as the main pro- democratic force in Lipset’s analysis and this class gains in size with socioeconomic development” 36 However it has become clear quite early that economic development does not necessarily lead to an influential middle class increasing the demand for democratic transformation. Some Asian countries like Singapore have sustained economic growth over a long period, without the middle class demanding the establishment of a democratic system. In return, some Latin-American countries serve as an example that political mobilization, political opening and democratic reforms can also be the consequence of economic crises. In the African context the connection between economic growth and the demand for democracy is not that obvious either as very poor countries like Benin and Mali went through a successful transition and consolation process whereas richer countries like Gabon remain under rather authoritarian rule. Another example which challenges the role of the middle class in democratization processes is the fight against Apartheid in South Africa which was highly supported by the lower classes. On the theoretical level the modernization theory was sharply criticized by Huntington, for whom indicators like economic growth, the increase of education levels and openness of the media landscape are perceived as causes for political instability37. He highlights that order itself in whatever form (democratic, 36 Dietrich Rueshemeyer and Evelyne Huber, Capitalist Development and Democracy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p.5 37 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University, 1968 authoritarian, socialist) has to be an important goal for developing countries. In his point of view the primary lag of developmental politics is the development of political institutions after social and economic changes. In his book “Political Order in changing societies”, he argues that societies that modernize themselves become more complex and disordered and warns that if this disorder is not matched by a process of political and institutional modernization the result may be violence. Consequently, there are good reasons to criticize the modernization theory. Nevertheless, its legitimacy can be seen in the wave of democratization in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly, this changing context turned Huntington from a disputant into a supporter of the so called modernization theory. Huntington claims that states with an income per capita of at least 3.000$ are less likely to be haunted by military coups and authoritarian rule and at the same time he also argues that “In virtual every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class” 38 In his famous but heavily criticized book the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” Huntington describes the main causative factors for the mass phenomena of democratic transitions after the cold war39. Besides the loss of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and external factors, the growth in global economic output is perceived as an important factor of supporting the modernization of less developed countries. The ongoing economic modernization is characterized by structural changes like increased rates of urbanization, education and also a rising middle class. According to Huntington, it is this rising middle class that produces social forces with the capacity of organization and education that are pressing for a democratic government. 38 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth century, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.63+p.67 Regarding the development of the modernization theory, it becomes clear that the correlation between economic development, the formation of a middle class and democratic reforms is not only highly dependent on the historical background, international implication and power relations but also determined by local structures and local developments that have to be taken into account. In the case of Mozambique for example large parts of the urban middle class were pro-portugese and rather skeptical towards FRELIMO in the beginning. Interestingly the same argumentation clusters used by modernization theorists can also be found in the argumentations of political economists dealing with middle classes in developing countries in general and in African countries specifically. The American economist William Easterly states for example that the smaller the income share of the three middle quintiles, the worse a country does on various institutional measures like accountability and government effectiveness40. In return, countries with a middle class consensus, which he defines as a high share of income for the three middle quintiles and a low degree of ethnic divisions, are empirically associated with higher income, higher growth, more education, better health care, better infrastructure, less political instability and more democracy. 41 Nancy Birdsall believes weak institutions to be even more hindering to sustained economic growth than the poverty-trap many African countries are caught in. Many African countries are not only highly dependent on foreign aid and have high poverty rates, but they are also often categorized by donors as fragile, meaning that they are perceived to have weak government institutions. These weak institutions lead to the failing of the protection of property which is urgently needed to sustain productive private investment. Birdsall estimates that institutions could be improved by strengthening the middle class, e.g. through a better distribution of national income which needs to be 40 Williams Easterly, “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth”, Working paper 94, Center for global development, 08.2006 41 William Easterly, “The middle class consensus and Economic Development”, Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, 2001 distributed between 60% of the households in the three-middle-income quintiles of the income distribution. However, not only in absolute, but also in relative terms, e.g. relative to the top quintile, the “middle” in most African countries has a relatively limited economic power compared to the middle income group in other parts of the world.42 This small share of a middle income group has serious consequences as it is the middle income group that is most likely to provide a check on the abuse of economic and political power. Besides, the middle-income group is perceived to be interested in creating and sustaining a political system that undertakes productive investment instead of rent seeking and would support public investments in human capital and property rights, which could enable it to compete in a market economy. 43 Even though Birdsall makes allusions to the important role the middle-income group could have, she does not go into detail and tells us nothing about how the middle-income group could exercise this control function over the upper income group. However, we can presume that the poor have to spend a lot of their time and energy to meet their immediate needs while members of the middle income group have plans for the future and are more likely to be educated and to be able to follow political and economic abuse scandals. Furthermore, they are more likely to pay taxes which give them a certain control as well. Nevertheless, these assumptions remain rather superficial and research is needed to specify and verify these assumptions. 42 Nancy Birdsall: “Do no harm: Aid, weak institutions and the missing middle in Africa”, Development Policy review, Vol.25 N°5, 2007, p.585 43 Ibidem 1.2 The African middle class: Only a matter of definition? Even though Easterly and Birdsall, Duflo, the World Bank and Mahajan are using predominantly economic variables, they do not use the same parameters. There are generally two ways of defining middle class (perceiving it as an economic group). We can either define it in relative terms by examining the middle income range of each country or in absolute terms which means that a fixed band is used for all countries. Birdsall defines the middle class by taking into account the incomes lying between 75% and 125% of the median income of the country44. Easterly chooses those who are in the three middle quintiles of the income range (he substrates the poorest 20% and the richest 20%) 45. Definitions in relative terms are problematic because each country has a different median income and the definition regarding the middle class differs from one country to another. An absolute definition avoids this problem, but others appear as one has to choose the level of the fixed band. Official documents from the World Bank use the average incomes of Brazil and Italy to frame the middle class which is an income between $12-50 a day per person (Purchasing-Power-Parities).46The weak point of this definition is that it excludes many people in developing countries that belong to the middle class according to Mahajan an India’s National Council for Applied Economic research. This is why Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee state that everyone using between 2-10 dollars per day for consumption in the developing world belongs to the middle class47. Two dollars a day constitutes the poverty line in developing countries and we can say that people above that line have moved out of poverty and therefore belong to the middle class. Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that the poverty line in industrial countries is much higher. In the USA for example it is 13 dollars a day. Consequently, we cannot speak of a global middle class, but Nancy Birdsall,op.cit., p.589 William Easterly, “The middle class consensus and Economic Development”, op.cit., p.17 46 The World Bank “Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the new Wave of Globalization” Washington,The World Bank, 2007 47 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “What is middle class about the middle classes around the world?” The journal of economic perspectives, Vol.22, number2, 2008, pp.3-28, p.3 44 45 only about the developing world’s middle class when using the Duflo´s parameters. Furthermore, the income as the only indicator does not tell us enough about the changing living standards and its consequences for society. The standing of a person within a society depends also on many other factors. A well-paid qualified worker for example will not take up the same position as a small merchant who has the same income. Duflo is already cautious about this problem and includes living standard, consumption and investment patterns in her research 48. Furthermore, she does not concentrate as much on the question of economic growth as Easterly and Birdsall, but is also interested in the impact on development in general. She comes to the conclusion that there are very strong resemblances between the poor and the middle class which might reflect the importance of relative prices in shaping consumption decisions or the power of norms and fashion in determining consumption. Apart from that, the most important characteristics of the middle class for her seem to be the security of a steady job (not the income itself) and to have fewer, healthier and better educated children 49. The examples above highlight that also economist end up using very different parameters that do not have a lot in common and will lead to conclusions quite different one from another. It is certainly true that the definition of the middle class defined as an income groups constitute a highly discriminative and objective parameter. However, there is no single best definition and we have to keep in mind what the definition we are working with is used for. In the context of the case study in Maputo we are not so much interested to compare the middle class in Maputo to other middle classes in the world, but to find out about its characteristic and its influence in development issues and social and political change. Therefore we will not use absolute definitions of middle class but relative ones that better reflect local realities. Apart from that we will remain aware of the fact that the 48 49 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, op.cit.,p.6 Ibidem, p.3 definition of a middle class by income group or consumption patterns might mean that we will have to work with a highly discriminate parameter, which cannot be sufficient to explain the role of middle classes in society. Although the approaches presented above focus rather on the economic dimension and tend to neglect the sociological point of view, we believe the sociological point of view to be very important to our study, because it offers reflections on the potential influence middle classes could have in the social and political sphere of their country. The sum it up, we can say that the modernization theory and the economic studies presented have to be taken seriously because they give us a first impression of who could belong to the middle class and what it could mean to belong to a middle class. Nevertheless, they do not give us enough information and interpretation clusters to understand the complex relation between economic development, liberalization, democratization, social change, and the influences those factors have on the (re) formation of middle classes. Therefore, we will proceed with the presentation of (middle) class analysis in sociology which should help us to understand social dynamics and class relations as well as to find local phenomena of middle class dynamics. CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE CLASS IN SOCIOLOGY Using the term of middle class inevitably means to be confronted with a multitude of complex definitions and interpretations sometimes contradicting one another, and to face the difficulty to choose an adequate one for the context it is used for. It also includes thinking about class analysis and social stratification in general as we have to know to what kind of “middle” the term middle class refers to. 2.1 Some aspects of Class analysis Social classes or stratus in general can be simply understood as sections of the population that share a similar economic and social situation which engender a similarity of interests and values. The first common approach to this issue probably was Karl Marx’s theory of antagonist classes which comes to one’s mind when thinking about classes as social categories. Admittedly, the reflections of Marx influenced the whole political universe in the 20th century and inspired socialist regimes and many political parties all over the world. For Marx, capitalist systems are characterized by the existence of the capitalist bourgeoisie, controlling the means of production and exchange which gives them the power to exploit the proletariat, which possesses nothing but its labor force. It is true that this understanding of Marx´ theory is very simplified as he names up to seven different classes50 and even detects the existence of a middle class. However, he considers this middle to be the rest in between that will experience proletarisation or ascendance to bourgeoisie51. However, one is easily suspected to be theoretically backward as soon as one uses the concept of classes. In fact, many sociologists are rather dissatisfied with the concept of class as social category and are convinced that 50 The seven different classes are : 4 groups of bourgeoisies : Financial,commercia, industrial and petty, and paysanerie and proletarians and lumpenproletarians 51 Karl Marx, Léon Rémy (Traduction), Les luttes des classes en France, 1848-1850, Paris, Table Ronde, 1850 “…like Victorian architecture, whatever appeal it might once have had has disappeared with the passing of the era which created it”.52 This attitude might be partly due to the fact that class analysis, as practiced by Marx, was closely connected to a certain historical philosophy instead of being used as a basis for empirical studies. One of the weak spots in Marx´ theory is that it tries to explain the existence of classes only by economic factors, neglecting social and political ones. Even though Max Weber adopts the economic dimension from Marx, he adds other important factors in his “three- component theory of stratification”53. This multidimensional approach claims that social stratification is produced by the interplay of wealth, prestige, and power. It is important to note that the interactions of these components vary from one society to another. For Weber, classes are not at all equal communities, but rather possible and frequent bases for social action. In contrast to Marx who believes that class position leads to class action and class consciousness, Weber does not see a necessary logic that economic class categories will result in classes as social groupings because the economic position is only one factor amongst many affecting social consciousness and identity54. Regarding the middle class, Weber claims the existence of at least two different levels that have to be distinguished: Firstly there is the petty bourgeoisie may own shops and may be able to buy labor power of others but usually works together with their employees. 52 Anthony Giddens, The class structure of advanced societies, London, Hutchinson, 1973, p.9 Max Weber (translated by Alexander Morell Henderson and Talcot Parson), The theory of social and economic organization, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947 (Original Version Tübingen 1922) 54 Bert Becker, Mythos Mittelschichten-zur Wiederkehr eines Paradigmas der Demokratieforschung, Bonn, Softcover, 1999, p.23 53 Secondly there is also the educated class that does not own property, which is characterized by its professional qualifications regardless of their leisure of wealth55. As classes are internally differentiated (skills, property) and status and party affiliations cross-cut economic interests and undermine class-consciousness, a common class situation seems to be a very unstable basis of commonality for Weber. Nevertheless, the neo-weberian stance argues that class position can create “potential interest” in being one potential source of identity and action amongst others56. To put it in a nutshell, we can say that in neo-weberian terms class analysis shall be used as a tool helping us to investigate to which degree objective class situation influence subjective consciousness, social identities and political action 57 Bourdieu proposes a slightly different perspective on class analysis because the existing class fractions in his theory are determined by a combination of the varying degrees of social, economic, and cultural capital. In his opinion the social and economic capital that have to be accumulated over time are dependant on the social origin and the cultural capital a person has. In fact, he examines the reproduction of inequalities through the hierarchically differentiated nature of taste and dispositions. For him everyday preferences like music, food, clothing etc. are choices decided on in a specific economic and cultural space that influences children since their early childhood. He concludes that preferences are a sort of internalized class disposition that is influenced by the social and economic conditions people are confronted with in everyday life58. 55 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen,1921, p.177-180 Bert Becker, op.cit. p.31 57 Wendy Bottero, Class Consciousness, in George Ritzer, Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p.2 58 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1984 56 Consequently, class continues to shape people’s social identity and remains important as a social filter for placing oneself in relation to others. However, you do not have to explicitly recognize class issues for class processes to operate. On the contrary, internalized class dispositions are rather a mode of differentiation which is an operation of individualized distinction, rather than of social groupings. Thus, class still shapes people´s lives, but does not have to be translated into consciously lived cultural identies. Even if class identification and/or awareness do not exist within a society, class dispositions become visible through classdifferentiated tastes and practices producing specific forms of identity. As we could see in the previous part of the text, class analysis remains a complex issue and discussions about its capacities and characteristics continue and evolve depending on the context and the location it is used for. 2.2 Class analysis in Africa: An exception? While some theoreticians like Jürgen Habermas and Becker doubt whether class analysis is still appropriate in industrial countries, other authors find it questionable if there has ever been a creation of classes in some developing countries and especially in Africa59. Development researchers often refer to vertical structures and patronage systems that hinder the development of class structure. Ethnic conflicts, religious tensions and regional differences are examples for this vertical segmentation, which is often considered to be more important and influential as the horizontal structuring of classes. 59 Bert Becker, op. cit., p.22 Claude Rivière enumerates three types of hypotheses that are often found in literature dealing with class analysis in Africa60. a) Denial of social class structures in African societies b) Affirmation of social class structures in African societies c) Identification of a class embryo in African societies The first hypothesis is explained by the allusion to the supposed non-existence of classes in traditional African societies and the absence of private property, caused partly due to the abundance of available land. Furthermore, the denial of the existence of social classes in Africa was used to increase an anti-colonial unity and to facilitate the creation of the new independent nations presupposing a national identity. Nevertheless, even Sékou Touré, who wanted to create a socialist Republic without class struggle, had to acknowledge the existence of internal divisions and tensions61. Literature acknowledging the existence of classes generally claims that all human societies are heterogenic; that differences can only be thought of in terms of contradictions and that the concept of class division is a universal one. We agree with Rivière when he argues that these examinations have neglected realities that could not be explained by class analysis 62. The problem with these examinations is that they have created the idea of different classes’ post-factum which does not correspond with local reality. The theory of a class embryo assumes that it is rather the entrance into world economy. The introduction of plantations in agriculture, the diffusion of new know-how, urbanization and industrialization are the factors that triggered the formation of social classes in Africa. This theory is often in line with a Marxist approach of class analysis but differs from it in several points63. The nature and characteristics of the several groups analyzed do not correspond to the traditional approach adopted by Marx. 60 Claude Rivière, Classes et Stratifications Sociales en Afrique: Le cas guinéen, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1978, p.18 61 Ibidem, p. 23 62 Ibidem, p. 22 63 Ibidem, p. 31 This might be partly due to the fact that the new social stratification is considered to be formed at the very moment, as well as to the relations and roles of the different groups in question. Apart from that, it has to be mentioned that class analysis has often been neglected in the African context, because other concepts seemed to be more appropriate or simply easier to use. Even though class analysis remains a vital and important tool to understanding African politics and society, Crawford Young admits that: “An invisible wall has separated ethnicity and class analysis which has only infrequently been scaled” 64. The most analyzed, and probably the most easily identifiable social class in the African context is the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the upper class or elite that is perceived as a class that is using its position to accumulate capital and to exploit the masses. However, we have to mention that the terms of elite and upper class do not necessarily refer to the same concepts. While elites are normally confronted with the masses, the upper class has separated itself from other classes with specific characteristics. The terms of class and strata refer much more to the economic dimensions of social structures while the term elite rather refers to the political dimension. In the context of this work we will us the terms elite and ruling class to highlight their importance for the political decision making process. Using the African context, it becomes even clearer that Marx´ theory suffers from “economism” as Poulantzas has put it. He argues that there can be periods in history when the owners of the means of production do not form the ruling class, but the state could be dominated by a political elite using political strength rather than economic power in order to maintain and reinforce their position of dominance65. 64 65 Crawford Young, op.cit., p.489 Alex Thomson, Introduction to African politics, New York, Routledge, 2000, p.83 In this case it is not the means of production but the means of consumption that acts as the defining feature of the class. Therefore Sklar concludes that class relations in Africa are often determined by relations of power and not production66. Furthermore, the small size of the private sector has made the political and bureaucratic factions of the African bourgeoisie particularly important and leads to the assumption that accumulation of wealth without the help of the state is difficult. This little detour describing the ruling class is necessary to understand that politics and not economy is the defining aspect of class relations, it also being the one influencing a middle class throughout Africa. In contrast to analyses about ruling classes very little literature dealing explicitly with middle classes can be hardly found and the monographs available only provide systematic case studies about emerging middle classes in the Maghreb region67 and the Republic of South Africa68 which are both neither representative for the continent as a whole, nor for the specific case of Maputo. Literature dealing with class analysis in Africa sometimes mentions the very weak and state dependant middle classes of some countries without presenting a real analysis. In some research there are also allusions to the consequences of structural adjustments plans that apparently undermine great parts of urban middle classes69. Apart from the very little attention paid to African middle classes and the role they play in societies it has to be mentioned that the interest in African class analysis in general has diminished significantly since the second half of the 1980s and it had not been rediscovered until this decade when rather liberal economists started to become interested in African middle classes 70. 66 Richard Sklar, “Nature of class domination in Africa”, Journal of Modern African Studies , 1979, pp.531-552 67 Zghal, Abdelkader, Les classes moyennes au Maghreb, Paris, Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique Paris, 1980 68 Alan Gregor Cobley, Class and Consciousness; The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa 1924 to 1950, London, Green Wood Press, 1991 69 Alain Marie, Afrique des Invidius, Paris, Karthala, 1997 70 For example Vijay Mahajan, Esther Duflo, Nancy Birdsall Before looking at the urban middle class of Maputo, it seems appropriate to give a little insight into the origin and development of middle class concepts in industrial countries. The aim is not to give an exhaustive overview about existing literature, but rather to contextualize the subject of research and to raise awareness of methodological problems that might occur when using the same concept in the context of Maputo. 2.3 The varying role of middles classes in different societies As the term itself might already presume, the middle class is generally considered to consist of the socioeconomic group between the workers and the upper group. We have already mentioned that the middle class was mentioned by Karl Marx, even though it does not occupy an important position in his theory. This is understandable as it challenges the theory of class struggle and demands a reorientation of class analysis. However, a theory of middle class is indispensable to explain social changes that occurred in the 20th century when the increase of independent workers, craftsmen and traders, who were neither dependant on wages, nor in the position of capitalists, was very obvious. In the 1970s and 1980s an interesting evolution regarding the acknowledgment of middle class in French sociology became evident. Mallot and Touraine explain that the new categories of employment were connected to the modernization of the industrial production. They still had a very minimalistic view of the middle classes that included only self-employed people, but not the new forms of wage employments that were called “the new working class”71. 71 Catherine Bidou- Zachariasen, « Les classes moyennes: Définitions, travaux, controverses » Education et Société, n14, pp.119-134, 2004, p.126 The approach of Baudelot, Establet and Malemo is already a bit different as they speak about the “new bourgeoisie” to describe new forms of wage employment. However, both approaches agree with each other on the existence of a fluid middle that is quite diversified so that it challenges class analysis. Poulantzas who tries to modernize the Marxist approach uses the term of the “new small intellectual bourgeoisie”, which seems to be that diversified and that fluctuates between the ideology of contestation and domination72. The development of middle class analysis was quite different in the United States where Gouldner and Ehrenreich were the first to be interested in a new part of the population possessing a university diploma. This class was perceived to be influenced by and to influence the cultural contestation movements with regard to the traditional ruling class. This new class hoped to become more influential, being of the opinion that their educational success provided the legitimacy for them to occupy higher positions. In this context the middle class is perceived as a social group with own interests and values 73. This point of view challenged the bipolar vision of societies and also became interesting for French scholars who created a think tank called “new middle classes” in 1985. This think tank argues that the formation of the new middle class is connected to the extension of the education system, as well as to the development of public services and the acceleration of technologic innovation74. In Great Britain middle class analysis is strongly influenced by Renner and Goldthorpe who developed the concept of the “service class”. The characteristic of the “service class” is that it has a dependant but contractual relation with the capital. That is why its members have many privileges in comparison to the workers and do not see why they should 72 Nicos Poulantzas, Les classes sociales dans le capitalisme aujourd’hui, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1974 73 Catherine Bidou- Zachariasen, op.cit., p.130 74 Ibidem., p. 128 defend their cause. Consequently, the “service class” seems to be rather conservative75. By giving these few examples, it becomes quite obvious that the definition and the role middle classes occupy vary from one society and historical context to another. Therefore, it is difficult to find a universal definition of the term “middle class” responding to realities in all historical contexts and locations. However, a definition that seems flexible enough to guide our research in Maputo is the one developed by Francois Smiand and supplemented by Maurice Halbwachs: “Il faut entendre par les classes moyennes une catégorie durable de personnes, considérées avec leur famille, qui ont des revenus et aussi souvent un patrimoine de niveau moyen, intermédiaire entre celui de la classe sociale la plus élevée et celui des travailleurs et des salariés »76 This definition points out that the income is quite vast and Maurice Halbwachs tries to acknowledge the heterogeneity of this class while finding another criterion than income: “ Ce qui caractérise tous ces hommes, c’est que leur activité est avant tout une activité technique, qui suppose la connaissance pratique d’un certain nombre de règles mais qui ne suppose rien d’autres. » 77 These definitions of middle class characteristics take the salary into account without making it the only criterion. The aspect of technical knowledge leads to the presumption that middle class members have access to formal education which distinguishes them from traditional workers who can only sell their manpower. 75 John Goldthorpe, “On the service class : its formation and future”, in Anthony Giddens, McKenzie G. Social class and the division of labour, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982 76 Citation found in: Maurice Halbwachs, Les classes sociales, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1942 77 Ibidem Bearing these definitions in mind, we still have the problem of finding an appropriate method to identify the middle class and of how to distinguish it from other classes. Considering the fragmentation and the fluent frontiers of the middle class, it is questionable if we can speak about one single middle class because it remains very difficult to define the boundaries of middle class at the bottom and the top Even though we cannot deny the heterogeneity of middle classes, Giddens reminds us that the similarities of the middle class (strata) predominate over the differences.78 The income of the middle class is higher and more stable than the one of the working class and there are often possibilities of promotion and the chances to increase the income. Even when workers and members of the middle class work together there is a hierarchy in prestige and you can observe that members of the middle class live in different neighborhoods than workers. Also the number of family members differs and there is a different attitude towards the education of children79. The question which remains very important for our research in Maputo is if the similarity of the economic and social situation engenders similar interests as claimed by class theory. Unfortunately, literature treating this question does not give us an explicit answer and there seems to be no final consensus among scholars. If we believe Parkin and Olin Wright, the middle class is caught in a very conflicting situation. Its members try to achieve the social and economic status of the bourgeoisie and try to draw a clear dividing line between themselves and members of the working class80. This attitude can lead to a situation where a middle class member identifies himself with the values and interest of the bourgeoisie even though his income is much nearer to the income of workers.81 78 Anthony Giddens, The class structure of advanced societies, London, Hutchinson, 1973, p.20 Ibidem 80 Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, London, New Left Books, 1978 81 Anthony Giddens, Sociology: A brief but critical Introduction, Cambridge, Macmillan, 1982, S.220 79 To sum it up, we can conclude that the common economic and social situation of middle class members is less obvious than the one of workers or members of the bourgeoisie. This leads to the question if the highly fragmented middle class can be considered as a political “actor”. Regarding the democratization literature, we have discovered that there is a debate about whether “actors” or structures are more decisive for democratic transition and state building. It is true that only individuals can introduce or hinder changes in transition processes. However, social classes or other structures have to be considered as influencing factors and it has to be analyzed in which way classes can influence democratization and state building. Classes cannot be considered as “collective actors” who are organized and join forces like political parties, churches or other organizations which are able to speak in the name of its members82. Even the purely theoretical possibility to organize all members of the middle class would not make them act as “the class” but as members of an institutionalized organization. In reality there is a variety of organizations competing with each other in order to try to organize members of a social group/class. Consequently, one has to differentiate between individuals and groups that claim to act in the name of a class and the heterogenic actions of middle class members. Even though the middle class itself cannot be an “actor”, it limits the number of potential actors. The rising of middle-class politicians and activists can only happen if there is a middle class that can be mobilized. However, the fragmentation of the middle class promotes a variety of organizations that are founded by their members. Typical examples are women associations, self-help groups, human rights organizations and environmental protection advocacy groups. The middle class is often considered to be obliged to organize itself in these domains, because members do not have enough resources to face these problems alone. In contrast to the bourgeoisie, middle class members are much more likely 82 Bert Becker, op.cit., p.29 to become a victim of despotic rule, state arbitrariness, corruption and nonpolitical problems, like insufficient health care and pollution83. The typical form of middle class organization is a rather non- politic84. The politization of middle classes rarely happens. If they are mobilized their behavior is quite strategic in order to improve their situation and their relation to the state. Consequently, we argue that the behavior of the middle class is highly dependent on its relation to other classes and social groups and also to the role that the state plays in society. Supporters of the modernization theory state that the creation of a middle class leads to the creation of social groups which are rather independent from the state. They assume that middle class members usually work within the private economy. However, in many parts of the developing world the majority of middle class members are civil servants and bureaucrats volatile to the cooptation of the state85. Therefore we believe that we have to be very careful in transferring the concept of middle class from industrial to developing countries. Depending on the context the role of the middle class in the national development can vary a lot. Last but not least 3 examples are stated to illustrate the different roles middle class can have in different countries 1. The middle class can be a social base for a democracy movement as believed by modernization theory. The middle class is meant to be the most autonomous strata in society, not as dependant as workers and more politisiesed. The bourgeoisie is dependant from states subventions and is afraid of its sanctions. When a middle class is mainly composed by employees and non-state bureaucrats like in South-Corea and Taiwan for example this stratum is very independent from the state. Even though the increasing middle class profits from the economic growth it becomes suspicious against pollution, corruption 83 Ibidem.,p.30 Ibidem., p.30 85 Hartmut Elsenhans “Staatsklassen”, Schulz, Manfred (Ed.), Entwicklung: Die Perspektive der Entwicklungssoziologie, Leverkusen, Opladen, 1997, p.161-185, p.180 84 and has a controlling function in the society. In some cases, like South Korea it comes also to solidarity movements and mobilization of workers to attend a common goal. However this scenario is rather uncommon in African states as middle classes are still highly dependent on the state. 2. The middle class of a country can also be a junior partner of the bourgeoisie and social basis for democratic movement in the same time. This scenario occurs after an economic crisis when the level of development is still low. There are already some big businessmen but middle class and worker class are not already formed. Examples of this scenario are south American countries and the Philippines where democratization processes occurred in a context of economic crisis to rescue the economy. Members of the middle class supported the democratization process without giving strong inputs. 3. Middle class are also often co-opted by the state which means that modernization does not lead necessarily to middle classes seeking for democracy. The middle class of Singapore for example is almost not politisiesed. This situation is due to the capacity of the state enough to integrate the majority of its citizen and to convince them of the advantages of technocratic rule. These few examples show us that the middle class cannot be clearly differentiated from the bourgeoisie and the working class. The upper and the under part of the middle class have tensions have often more similarities with the poor or the upper class than with the middle of the middle class. It’s very hard to mobilize the middle class because of its fragmentation and because of its rather apolitical character. Their behavior is very dependent on the comportment of other classes and of the independence from the state apparatus. Conclusion PART 1 The first conclusion to draw from this theoretic chapter is that there is no “one fits all” definition which could help us to identify and to characterize the urban middle class in Maputo. If there are some characteristics that we find most likely to be useful for our purpose, it is the access to education and the planning of the future which becomes possible because not much time has to be spent on the satisfaction of immediate needs. The existence of rather conservative middle class members in Singapore and much more liberal ones in South America do not say anything about the role of the middle class members in Maputo. However, these examples highlight that the historical and political context, e.g. the relation between the middle class and other members of society, is very decisive for its own position. In the African context we have to take into account that the means of consumption are probably much more important than the means of production. For the case of Maputo this could also mean that the middle class remains highly dependent on the state instead of building a social group which is rather independent. Apart from that we have to bear in mind that class surely counts but remains only one of several components which contributes to social stratification. Following the argumentation of Bourdieu there can be a middle class in Maputo even when members are not necessarily aware of belonging to this group. However, the taste and the preference of certain symbols could give us some hints for identifying this group. Concerning the methodology, we have seen that definitions of middle class concentrating on the economic dimensions are necessary to guide the research, but not sufficient to characterize the urban middle class. To conclude, we can say that class analysis remains an important tool to understand social stratification and social change but has to be used in a dynamic and inclusive way that takes the local and historical context into account. PART 2: Framing the middle class in Maputo This chapter aims to identify and characterize members of the urban middle class in Maputo. The identification and characterization of the urban middle class in Maputo is quite problematic as the literature of social stratification in general but especially about the middle class in Maputo is almost inexistent. Even though the notion of “middle class” appears sometimes in literature concerning Maputo it is hardly analyzed. Therefore we can speak in this context about a notion which is often used but never studied. While the differences between the upper classes and the lower classes are quite eye-catching the middle class is often be considered as none existing or as very small. When speaking with several researchers in Maputo it became soon very clear that the opinions of what the middle classes are and what role they could have vary enormously and there is absolutely no consensus about their role, their size and their characteristics. A great risk in the field work was to choose people coincidentally without knowing if they belong to the middle class or not. This risk could not be avoided but reduced by choosing objective critérias which determine if someone belongs to the middle class or not. These critérias contain the economic situation, the technical knowledge and education of a person as well as the lifestyle. We already mentioned above that social geography can play an important role as it is assumed that middle class members will try to live in different neighborhoods than lower class members. So, the first chapter of this second part of the work gives an overview over the historical development of social stratification in Maputo by focusing on social geography and history. The second chapter will then present the findings of the interviews and looks at the question that these interviews revealed. CHAPTER 3: Historical development of social stratification in Maputo Maputo, formerly called Lourenço Marques 86, is not only the political and economical capital of the country but also has three times as many inhabitants as the next biggest city Beira. Maputo has an official population of 1,244,227 (2006), but the actual population is estimated to be up to 3 million people because of the numerous slums and many unregistered houses and inhabitants87. Today Maputo is an amalgamation of different people occupying a space of urban, peri-urban and mostly poor rural environments. Great Maputo includes five urban districts plus three others with the names Infulene, Machava and Matola that have been connected administratively to the city of Maputo since 1986. Great Maputo receives a continous and regular flow of new people coming to the city and merging in social interaction with the local population, creating an amalgation of individuals and social groups of different backgrounds. While the city is surrounded by the Maputo Province, it is administered as an own province. The majority of state institutions are centrally based in Maputo City and therefore Maputo is the center of all decision-making processes and the place where the majority of international organizations and NGO’s have their headquarters88. Maputo is also the most developed place in Mozambique with an HDI of over 6 while the provinces in the North of the country only have HDI’s around 2 or 389. Nevertheless, it is also a city of tremendous social inequality which is demonstrated by the Gini coefficient of 0.52 90 (only South African cities are more unequal 0.73, Dar Es Salaam is much more equal 0.39). 86 Named after the Portuguese navigator www.unhabitat.org/Maputo, consulted 17.09.2009 88 Iraê Baptista Lundin, Negotiating Transformation: Urban livelihoods in Maputo adapting to thirty years of political and economic changes, Göteborg, School of Business, Economics and Law, 2007, p.125 89 Arndt Channing, James Robert, Simler Kenneth, “Has economic growth in Mozambique been pro-poor?”, in: Journal of African Economies 2006 15(4),p.572 90 The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure to determine the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households deviate from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini coefficient of 0 means perfect equality whereas a Gini coefficient of 1 means perfect inequality (one person has everything). 87 Maputo is quite a young capital and a glance at its history will help to understand how Maputo has become what it is today. Maputo was formerly known as Lourenço Marques and developed as a port. It became a town in 1898 when only 888 inhabitants lived there at that time with only 10% of them being African. The town itself developed around a Portuguese fortress completed in 1787 and almost one hundred years later it was described as a poor place with narrow streets and fairly good flat-roofed houses and grass huts 91. The transfer of the capital from Ilha de Mocambique to Lourenço Marques totally marginalized the traditional Creole elite that was based in the north of the country. The elite that developed in Lourenço Marques had no tradition and no relation to the means of production and was therefore since the beginning very dependant of the exterior92. The urbanization which started in the beginning of the 20th century was mainly due to the development of British capitalism in southern Africa and not to the growth of the Portuguese province itself. It was more the development of the mines economy in the southern African region which influenced and shaped the Mozambican landscape at the end of the 19th century93. The necessity to ensure the access to the ocean to export and import materials led to the accelerated urbanization of Lourenço Marques and Beira which in return led to the inclusion and ancrage of Mozambique in the southern African economy94. Until today Maputo (and even Mozambique as a whole) is highly dependent on South Africa and the infrastructure connecting South Africa and Maputo is much better than the infrastructure that would be needed to connect Maputo to the northern parts of the country. 91 Iraê Baptista Lundin, op.cit., p.81 Michel Cahen, « Une Afrique lusophone libérale ? La fin des premières Républiques », Lusotopie -Transitions libérales en Afrique lusophones, 1995, pp. 85-104, p.87 93 Michel Cahen, « Histoire géopolitique d’un pays sans nation », Lusotopie – Géopolitiques des mondes lusophones, 1994, pp.213-266, p.214 94 Brigitte Lachatre, Enjeux urbains au Mozambique: De Lourenço Marques à Maputo, Paris Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1999, p.27 92 Until 1910 the population of Laurenco Marques was mainly consisted of Europeans and it was not until 1920 that the number of Europeans, Indians and Asiatics began to adjust (8304 Whites and 9445 Blacks) and the African population had to wait until 1930 to become the majority95. In this context it is also important to mention that The city started to acquire its present geographical profile during the 1950s and 1960s due to the development of industrial activities towards Matola and Macheva which transformed the city into Great Laurenco Marques. As mentioned above, these changes were accompanied by the increase of the population in the 20th century. 3.1 Social stratification in Lourenço Marques Laurenco Marques was segregated from the beginning of the settlement in the 16th century until independence; a dividing line existed between Xilunguine (the place of the whites) and Canfumo (the place of the Africans). For much of its history the black population of Lourenço Marques has been perceived as migrants and foreigners and during colonial time it was mainly young men who were recruited as servants, cheap labour and workers in the port 96. This deep polarization was reflected in the spatial organization of the segregated city which even influences life today. While the white elite was concentrated in the southwest axis of the city (Polana/Sommershield), a group of “mulattos”97 and black Africans assimilated to urban habits and values, gradually settled in the peripheral cement city (Nalhangalene, Mafalala). They shared this urban space with the so-called “second-class Portuguese”, a term used by the colonial system to give a name to the Portuguese born outside the Metropolis. Indians usually lived in the Baixa, the 96 97 Ibidem, p.82 This term might have a discriminative connotation but is widely used in Mozambique commercial central city district. This district was a sort of social border between the best areas in terms of social status (Polana, Sommershield) and the areas inhabited by the blacks and the mulattos 98. In the privileged areas you could find large shops, universities, secondary schools, hospitals, paved roads and tree-lined boulevards as well as electricity and regular bus services99. In the north and the northwest of the city was the Canfumo, the periphery of red, zink and wood houses inhabited by the black majority. In 1944 the majority of wage earners still lived outside the city and was classified by the government as domestic servants, state workers, private workers, porters, artisans, strolling buyers and sellers. Even the land at the periphery was the property of a small number of Portuguese people and its inhabitants needed to buy the land or to pay a monthly amount to the proprietor. 100 These barriers between different ethnic groups were the result of the economic growth and diversification but also the effect of a discriminatory municipal reglementation. The barriers became more profound due to the implementation of laws concerning the status of indigenes; work and habitation reglementation which began to become more and more coercive in the 1920s and continued throughout the salazariste period101. Salazar’s project of the “Estado novo” promoted Portuguese settlers in Maputo which led to an increased competition between the different the Portuguese settlers and the African population. Many reglementation and interdictions were developed in order to impede the rise of an urbanized African class and to favor Portuguese settlers in getting access to land, education, and public and private employment.102 98 Brigitte Lachatre, op.cit., p.38 Bridget O’Laughlin, “From Basic-needs to safety nets; Rise and Fall of Food- Rationing in Mozambique”, European journal for development, Volume 8, Issue 1, June 1996, pages 200-223, p.204 100 Ibidem, p.205 101 Brigitte Lachatre, op.cit., p.3 102 Ibidem p.40 99 Africans were not allowed to possess land within the urban areas and their land rights were only recognized by the common law. 103 Unlike in many other colonies, Portuguese settlers were often poor ruralists who were eager to find their luck and to install themselves in Maputo. This is why between 1960 and 1972 the European population expanded to 53.3% (158 000 persons)104. This increase influenced the social structuration of the town much more than that of the countryside. The Portuguese colonialists led their lifestyle in the functionary quarters and influenced small merchants. During the last years of colonialism the increase in the Portuguese settlers led to the accelerated construction of houses in Maputo. This increase had effects on the caniço as well and many inhabitants were expelled from their residential land because of the expansion of the cement city105. 3.2 The transition from Lourenço Marques to Maputo The peace agreements of 1974 were the beginning of another turbulent time for Lourenço Marques, because the town and its inhabitants were confronted with revolutionary projects on the one hand and the persistence of colonial structures on the other hand. Even though the first president of the independent Mozambique, Samora Machel, did not have racist prejudices towards the Portuguese settlers, 90% of them (approximately 250.000) left the country when Mozambique became independent on the 25th of June in 1975 and took with them the skills necessary to run the economy106. In 1976 the name Maputo replaced Lourenço Marques, an administrative symbol indicating the end of the colonial era and indicating also the beginning of a new social structure and the opening of the city´s gates to welcome the Mozambicans to areas that used to house mostly the settler and the colonial bureaucrats. So, after 104 Ibidem, p.42 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.205 106 Rolf Steinbruch, Mosambik- schwarz und arm und ziemlich weit weg, Stuttgart, Schmetterling Verlag, 2007, p.43 105 1976 the population of Maputo quickly became mixed. Those newly arriving from guerilla camps or from other rural areas settled next to inhabitants already socioculturally used to the urban Portuguese way of life, whereas many Africans who had already settled in the outskirts of the city did not move. Frelimo aimed at promoting growth through redistribution and social investment. Therefore land became public property and individual ownership was only accepted when the land was productively used. The farms and shops left by the settlers were managed in trust by workers integrated into state enterprises and cooperation’s. The abandoned houses and flats as well as rental houses in the Caniço were also nationalized by the government 107. The social division between cement and caniço cities broke down as thousands of families moved from the suburbs and other provinces to the central city. Nevertheless, it also has to be mentioned that the majority of the inhabitants stayed in the Caniço. By 1980 48% of the population of Maputo was living in a cimento or a brick house, 38% had running water and 31% had electricity. 108 Another problem was that one could observe a rapid deterioration of available housing stock in the cement city due to too many inhabitants and the lack of maintenance as well as rural and cultural practices which where incompatible with urban living such as the introduction of small livestock into apartments and the indoor use of grinding mortars for food preparation.109 The people moving to the city after the country´s independence desegregated the urban space not only in social but also in ethnic terms and new patterns developed: The most fashionable parts of the inner belt of Maputo maintained their status after independence and were occupied by high-level politicians and qualified civil servants as well as government personnel, embassies and foreign agency’s 107 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.206 Ibidem., p. 207 109 Jeremy Grest, “Urban Management, local government reform and the democratization process in Mozambique: Maputo City 1975-1990”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 21, N°1, 1995, pp.147-164, p.152 108 delegations. But the areas outside the inner belt, especially the neighbourhood Alto Maé, were nearly completely abandoned due to the withdrawal of the colonial administrative personnel. The re-occupation of this part of the city by African families took place unsystematically. The houses were almost taken by storm, often on a compulsory basis by African families moved from the rural areas or from the suburbs of reed, zinc and wood houses to fill the space were the colonial civilians and military personnel used to live. According to a report of FRELIMO in 1983, more than 150,000 residents in Maputo benefited from the nationalization of rented property and consequently the face of the city changed dramatically. Unfortunately, state institutions and the inability of many new tenants to make proper use of the facilities caused the gradual destruction of the houses and the solid waste in the cement city became and has remained a big problem110. Furthermore, for the new socialist government the urban heritage was perceived as an obstacle to the new political and economical order that was supposed to be erected. In the socialist era, Maputo was often considered to be a symbol of social inequality and social antagonism that needed to be destroyed. The heritage of Maputo appears to be the result of domination and oppression. It was indeed regarded as a privileged place which facilitated the exploitation of the rural areas and it was seen as a service center for the colonial economy111. The creation of a new identity of the town which was supposed to be compatible with the national identity was therefore very difficult to create. 110 111 Iraê Baptista Lundin, op.cit.,p.87 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.205 « Lourenço Marques, ville de ciment, construite en hauteur pour marquer la différence entre nous et le colonisateur…Lourenço Marques, ville de roseaux, reléguée dans les vallées inondables, entrepôt de labeur humain et de souffrance employé pour le luxe du colonisateur…D’un côté, le ciment, l’opulence, les rues brillante de propreté ; de l’autre, l’insécurité née de l’injustice sociale, la discrimination, la pauvreté et les ténèbres de la misère «112 Samora Machel often referred to Maputo and cities in general as something negative and one could even say that for him the class struggle was as important as the national combat. In his speeches he refers to the inhabitants of Maputo for example when he says: « vivant en ville, quartier général de la bourgeoisie- faisaient partie de la petite couche de Mozambicains à qui était concédé le droit de manger les miettes du grand banquet colonial. Dans la ligne de mire, le group des assimilés embryon d’une bourgeoisie noire, prête à prendre la place et les privilèges des colons portugais. »113 Despite this official rhetoric the whole FRELIMO policy was directed in favor of the urban population. In fact FRELIMO opted for the continuation of urban life and adopted policies which were aimed at the destruction of dualism in Maputo. While dependence on wage-labor increased very much until 1980 (90% of active men and 54% of active women), there was a reduction in self-employment which was considered as a capitalistic exploitation of the workers114. One of the measures to destroy social inequalities in Maputo was FRELIMO´s attempt to limit the range of wage differentiation by defining wage bounds. Top wage levels applied at ministerial level for example were only about ten times 112 Speech of S.Machel in march 1980: „Desalojamos o inimigo interno do nosso aparelho de estado“ found in: Brigitte Lachatre, p.72 113 Ibidem 114 Rolf Steinbruch, op.cit., p.44 higher than the minimum urban wage (except housing, travel and entertainment allowances)115. Furthermore, there was an opening up of jobs held by settlers and a general expansion of public sector employment. From then on many Mozambicans worked in supervisory or administration positions. Despite these new opportunities for Mozambicans, the official unemployment rate was higher than it had been in the colonial period for several reasons. First of all, better access to Maputo for rural migrants led to a high increase in people looking for work. Apart from that, the settlers having left Maputo could not employ domestic servants anymore, but also the end of the construction boom and the closing down of many small factories were important factors for this development. Furthermore, South Africa Mozambican workers for political reasons 116 suspended the recruitment of . Even though poverty and food shortages affected Maputo, urban residents were still better off than the peasantry. Many people who lived in this period are still a little bit melancholic when they are looking back at it. While they appreciate the changes that liberalization and democracy has brought, they also approved of the free health care and education as well as the lack of violence and theft. Furthermore, it seems that during the first years of independence there was an atmosphere of mutual support and cooperation which went beyond kinship and regional networks117. At that time people were poorer in numerical terms but as social inequalities were not that evident, you could neither find the great wealth nor the sharp visible differences in levels of consumption that are characteristic for Maputo today. 115 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.208 Ibidem. 117 Rolf Steinbruch, op.cit., p.42 116 3.3 Maputo during the civil war When the civil war started in 1978 battles were mostly concentrated in rural zones but the role and the economic and administrative function of Maputo changed fundamentally. The provision with food from the surrounding rural zones and the communication between the city and the country often totally collapsed. Maputo received alimentation aid from abroad however. Another consequence of the civil war was that functionaries moved to Maputo from the country because they were one of the preferred targets of the RENAMO. Many civilians fled from the country to the city where, despite all the existing problems, nobody died of hunger and almost no fighting occurred between the opposing parties. Maputo was perceived to be a privileged and protected enclave that was isolated from the ravaged countryside, fed mainly on aid distribution through the urban rationing system at prices based on subsidies.118 Not surprisingly, from 1981 onwards, the amount of migrants who came to Maputo for reasons of security, work, food, school and health care, rose abruptly. The majority of internally displaced persons came from the southern provinces of the country (Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo province) and the majority of them were very poor. Many of these internal refugees stayed in Maputo which has influenced the current social stratification of the town. The biggest problem in this context was and remains the uncontrolled occupation of living space as the new migrants mainly live in the Caniço which contributes to one of the main challenges in Maputo (and many other cities in the country). The rents within the colonial city were subsidized but public housing stock did not increase accordingly. The migration flows at the end of the eighties caused a significant population increase in Maputo which is one of the reasons for the explosion of urban poverty. New migrants mainly found housing in the Caniço at that time119. 118 119 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.215 Iraê Baptista Lundin, op.cit., p.87 3.4 Structural adjustments and the reconfiguration of colonial social demography In August 1984 Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank in the hope of obtaining better access to international lines of credit and in fact the country started to receive increased amounts of western support. January 1987 was an important turning point in the history of Mozambique as the IMF introduced the Structural Adjustment Program which has left a deep impact on Mozambique’s economic and social life. Indeed FRELIMO was the first socialist single political party that abandoned the Marxism.120 Even though the PRE was developed and imposed by the IMF, it was presented as a government program rather than a package forced onto the country from the outside. The Mozambican Prime Minister at that time, Mario Machungo, defended the measures by stating that it would be very important to change attitudes in order for the economy to recover. According to Machungo, attempts to force economic agents to change their mentality and to impose discipline on the workplace were necessary as there had been too much job security before121. However it is not clear to what extent the PRE reflects official Mozambican thinking rather than IMF pressures and modifications. It increased the countries dependence on foreign aid and correspondingly limited its ability to pursue an independent domestic economic policy122. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the fact that the liberalization process in Mozambique was not introduced because of an ideological conviction and neither because of the will of Mozambicans, but because it seemed the only way to end the war, and for FRELIMO it was the only way to remain in power123. 120 Michel Cahen, « Une Afrique lusophone libérale ? La fin des premières Républiques », op.cit., p.92 121 Otto Roesch, “Economic Reform in Mozambique: Notes on Stabilization, war and class formation”, Department of Anthropology Trent University, 1996, p.9 122 Ibidem p.6 123 Jason Sumich and Joao Honwana,“Strong party, weak state? Frelimo and state survival through the mozambican civil war- An analytical narrative on state-making” The structural adjustment program which is known under PRE in Mozambique was expected to get the production moving again by improving the terms of trade for agricultural producers and efficient enterprises. The measures included price increases, increased taxation, reductions in public spending, privatization of many state enterprises and the increase of the importation of consumer goods. One of the consequences of the PRE was a sharp increase in the quantity and diversity of food and consumer goods available, especially in urban areas. These products were often imported but there also was a significant increase in agricultural and industrial production by state, capital and petty commodity producers. However, the prices increased together with the supply and especially the supplies of tools and raw material became very expensive124. The PRE enabled the private commercial sector to increasingly push out the state from both retail and wholesale commerce and the wholesale activity became mostly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of large (mostly Asian) trading houses. It is indeed this merchant stratum that constitutes one of the few sectors of Mozambique´s society that is successful in maintaining or improving its standard of living. With cutbacks in the public and industrial sector, a large number of urban workers turned to agriculture, construction and transport, communication and trade. The increasing polarization created a range of new jobs in the security service varying from the uniformed well-armed guard to children offering to watch cars. The industrial sector has undergone some limited differentiation since the independence (clothes, bicycles, soap, tires) but it has retained its basic colonial features of low capitalization, centralization, limited sectorial integration and strong orientation towards urban and export markets. In literature there seems to be 124 Pascoal Muibo, Privatisierung in Mocambique- Aufbau einer kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft, Magdeburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac Fakultät für Geistes, Sozial- und Erziehungswissenschaften der Otto-von Guericke-Universität, 1999, p.153 a consensus about the absence of any significant domestic industrial bourgeoisie and the reluctance of domestic merchant capital to invent in manufacturing.125 This gap tends to be an obstacle for the development and the creation of a strong middle class because there cannot be an increase in the industrial production with price liberalization and elimination of state subsidies. It is true that the PRE could correct financial imbalances of the state´s industrial sector which led to fewer and more efficient industries. Nevertheless, the industrial production could not be increased quickly which had impacts on the employment structures and the social standing of workers. Another measure which had deep impacts on the social stratification in Maputo was the dramatic cut of the operating budget, the reduction of the state bureaucracy and of the labor forces of state enterprises. While the Health and Education Budget made up 17% and 7% of the total expenditures of the state in 1986, it dropped down to 10% and 4% in 1988126. These cuts affected the poorest people the most because as a result of these measures education and basic health care were no longer for free. It is assumed that in the second year after the PRE implementation about half of the urban population was living in absolute poverty127. Furthermore, the salaries and options of state employees were cut and so a significant shift of labor from the state sector to the private sector started. Indeed the employment in the private sector and in the development sector was much more financially rewarding than employment in the state sector. Persons who remained in the state sector were less motivated and absenteeism, indiscipline and low productivity rose around this time128. As the bad salaries could not guarantee the subsistence of its employees, the pursuit of parallel economic activities during working hours and the growth of cynical and opportunistic attitudes towards state employment became very common. As the PRE formally legitimized the idea of 125 Otto Roesch, op.cit., p.14 Ibidem p.18 127 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.229 128 Otto Roesch, op.cit.,p18 126 private enterprises, many public officials were increasingly involved in entrepreneurship, an activity which was an obvious conflict of interest. So, the introduction of PRE has made the Mozambican state the focus of an increasing class struggle. The state remains the instrument of popular power and becomes the vehicle for personal profit by a ruling elite129 Due to the increase of corruption, PRE (Economic Rehabilitation Program) became also known as Individual Rehabilitation Program. Furthermore, students and artists started to criticize the government policies and popular jokes about the government became quite popular130. Until today corruption remains a major public issue in Maputo and Mozambique and we will focus on this point in the third chapter of this work. 129 130 Ibidem,p.20 Ibidem,p.19 CHAPTER 4: Outcomes of the fieldwork on the middle class in Maputo This chapter is going to present the outcomes of the fieldwork which was conducted in August and September 2009. It contains 13 interviews as well as many rather informal conversations with professors and persons living and working in Maputo. The initial plan was to interview persons from every sector, which means from the public, private and especially the informal sector. In the beginning it was quite hard to convince persons to speak about their origins, their family and their work and to even give us information about their salary. Often it was only possible to speak to persons after we had met them several times and a trusting relationship had been established. Furthermore, the majority of persons interviewed were very busy and it was complicated for them to put an interview on their agenda. Especially people working for private enterprises and self-employed people were almost impossible to speak to. Another problem was to find a place where we could speak without being overheard by other persons. Sometimes it was quite obvious that people were far more open when talking to me alone, which was particularly true when it came to politics. At the same time some people preferred to be interviewed while colleagues or friends were around. This sometimes was interesting because some interviews turned into group discussions, but these were less valuable considering the aim of semi-directive interviews. The majority of persons interviewed were employed by the state (7) or by organizations of the cooperation sector (5), and only one person worked in the formal private sector. The interviews aimed at understanding the everyday life of the persons which includes their work, their housing, their families and their free time occupation. Apart from that, the interviews are meant to give a first insight of the relation between middle class members, the state and politics in general. How do they live? What do they consume? What are their main preoccupations in everyday life? What are their hopes and dreams? What kind of relation do they have to the state and politics in general? Are they rather optimistic or pessimistic about the future and how do their perceptions influence their actions? In order to find answers to these questions a questionnaire was developed that contained questions about five different areas 1) Family and Social Origin 2) Education and Job 3) Housing, Lifestyle and Consumption Patterns 4) Religion 5) Political Opinion Even though very specific questions had been prepared (how much do you earn?)131, interviews usually started with very general questions (Could you tell me what you are doing in life?) which were supposed to make the persons feel comfortable and to give them the opportunity to speak freely about what seems important to them. In many cases the persons would answer the specific question on the questionnaire without being asked explicitly. In some cases however, it was necessary to ask specific question or to direct the conversation in the desired direction but the attempt to create a relaxing atmosphere, in which the interviewed and the interviewer have a simple conversation, proved to be very useful to get the needed information. During the first interviews a recorder was used because the persons interviewed accepted this technical device right away and recording the interviews seemed to be the most efficient way of recording what has been said. However, it was quite noticeable that persons quite often stared at the recorder, particularly when asked about their political opinion and other sensitive information. Apart from that people tend to speak more slowly when they know that the interviewer is taking notes. For these reasons the recorder was replaced by the traditional pen and paper. Thus, answers about political opinions and corruption became much more interesting as people started to open up much more and this change of instrument turned out to be a good decision. 131 A summary of each interview can be found in the annex. As already mentioned above, one big issue was to define criteria to choose people for the interviews who belong to what we call “middle class”. With regard to the findings from the first, theoretical part of this work, three criteria were developed to identify a person belonging to the middle class. 1. Income and Living Standard 2. Education and Job 3. Lifestyle 4.1.1 Income The income of the middle class is somewhere in between the lowest and the highest income in their country. As rents are very high, people owning their own houses are often better off because they can save the money other people have to spend for the rent. Interestingly, people living in the cement city are often tenants. In Sommershield 1, the richest part of the town for example the majority of the houses belong to members of the FRELIMO who often rent them out to expatriates, Mozambicans with Indian racines and other Mozambicans who very often have close ties to FRELIMO as well. In contrast, the majority of the people in the periphery are the owners of their small houses or barracks. Persons who were interviewed earned between 7.500 Mt (280 $) and 95.000 Mt (3.500 $) which means that all of them earn much more than the minimum salary which is 2150 MT ($56) at the moment132. Many people and especially those who are working in the informal sector, even work for much less than the minimum salary. Women who clean or cook in private households for example are often only paid 1500 MT per month, sometimes even less. As Maputo is a very expensive town, people having a total 132 “Government ratifies minimum wage increases”,28.04.09, http://allafrica.com/stories/200904280769.html, consulted 17.09.2009 income of 2150 MT have to be considered as poor. Nonetheless, many people have different income sources which vary from one month to the next. Depending on the question if somebody owns or rents the place he lives in, different amounts of money are necessary for every-day life. The size of the family also plays an important role for the money someone earns often has to be shared with many persons. More important than the actual amount of the income is the ability of persons to satisfy their basic needs, which means the income must be high enough to provide sufficient nutrition, decent and safe housing as well as health care. The regularity of the income was another criterion to choose people for the interview because it is the stability of their income which allows people to make middle- and long term plans, to open bank accounts, to have access to credits and to invest. All the interviewed persons claimed to have formal contracts that allow them to be sure to hold their jobs for at least another two years if they do not find a better job. 4.1.2 Education and Job In the first chapter we referred to Maurice Halbwachs who claims that people from the middle classes hold jobs which demand more than the use of simple manpower. In order to carry out these jobs, they need the practical knowledge of some rules. In practical terms this means that middle class members differ from the poor in terms of access to education and also in terms of the jobs they hold to earn their living. At the time of independence the illiteracy rate among adults in Mozambique was estimated to be 97%. Only a tiny minority was privileged enough to have access to higher education. The first institution of higher education was founded in 1962 in Lourenço Marques and was upgraded to university status (University of Lourenço Marquez) in 1968. The great majority of students where white and at the time of independence only 40 African students studied at the university133. 133 Andrea Quelroz de Souza, „Schwerpunkt Bildung“, Mosambik Rundbrief Nr. 74, Berlin, 05/2008, p.11 It is true that in the last decades a lot of progress has been made, but the literacy rate in 2003 was still 48%. The majority of the persons interviewed went to a secondary school, six of them finished university, three of them study at night after work and only two of them did neither finish secondary school nor did they study. Hence, we can say that the persons interviewed are privileged in terms of access to education. Although the jobs of the interviewed persons are quite different, from secretary to economy specialist for example, they all have one thing in common: the need for technical knowledge like writing, reading and using the computer. 4.1.3 Standard of Living and Lifestyle While the standard of living rather refers to material goods, the lifestyle of a person can be understood as a specific way of living that influences social relations, consumption patterns and entertainment. These decisions make sense for the person and are often the expression of attitudes and values. Middle class members often have the aspiration to reach the social and economic situation of the upper classes and they usually want to show that they are different from the members of the working class. As they succeed to meet their basic needs they develop other needs that they try to fulfill. Because of their income which is higher than that of the poor, they can insist on a good quality of the products they buy and are often willing to pay more for food and wear more expensive clothes. These consumption patterns are what Bourdieu refers to when he speaks about the hierarchically differentiated nature of every day tastes like music, food and clothing. Before undertaking the interviews, it was not possible to know what kind of lifestyles the persons had. Nevertheless, it was assumed that middle class members would go shopping in certain places. Furthermore, it was assumed that middle class members would frequent particular places like bars and restaurants that are not posh enough for the upper class, but already too expensive for the poorer parts of the population. 4.2.1 Social origins and social mobility Social mobility can be understood as a sociological concept that describes the option for individuals or families to change their status within a system of social hierarchy and stratification. The social origin of members of today’s urban middle class in Maputo can tell us a lot about social mobility, its different ways and its limits. It has already been mentioned that the socialist FRELIMO government were suspicious about cities in general because they did not participate in the liberation struggle and were accused to defend the colonial bourgeois culture.134 However, in a context in which the illiteracy rate among Mozambicans was between 90% and 97%, FRELIMO desperately needed persons with the skills necessary to make the state function.135 Thus, every person who had access to formal education was accepted and even invited into the expanding bureaucracy, which led to a movement of outstanding social mobility. Students were promoted to teachers, and workers found themselves in managerial positions136. During the interviews several persons confirmed that they and/or their families have profited from the changes in the period right after the independence. Elena for example was directly recruited from secondary school to the Ministry of Communication because there was a lack of main d’oeuvre. This situation allowed her to have a regular income and to travel to Germany in order to continue her education. When she came back she could stay in the ministry but changed jobs to work for a development agency because salaries were cut at the ministry and she could earn more in the private sector. Jeanne Penvenne assumes that members of today’s urban middle class primarily come from the colonial petty bourgeoisie which means that they come from families who worked in the lower levels of the state bureaucracy during the colonial time, the 134 Margaret Hall and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence ,London, Hust & Company, 1997 135 Jason Sumich,“Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique: A critique of Neopatrimonial interpretation of African Elites”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 34, N° 1, 03/2008, p.111-p.125, p.113 136 Ibidem., p.114 professions, or the urban working class137. What unified all these groups was that they all had at least some access to education. This is true for one of the interviewed persons. The family of Ruth for example already worked in the private sector during the colonial time. Once independence had arrived, her parents got jobs in the ministries because they were part of the few persons who had access to formal education. Like many other civil servants, her parents bought a house in Sommershield, the best part of the town. As her parents never joined FRELIMO and her father wanted to start a stationary business without letting the party own part of it, the family started to get into trouble and her father was arrested for one year. When he came free in 1984 the socialist regime was already very weak and he was allowed to run his business. Today, Ruth can take advantage of her social origins as she lives at her father’s place with her family. However, the interviews showed that there must be other ways of social mobility because some of the persons interviewed come from very modest, poor and rural families. One example is Fernando who is working for an UN Agency at the moment. He comes from a very modest rural family from the North of the country and is the only one in his family who went to university. His parents are farmers and cannot write. When he went to primary school the teachers already realized his potential and supported him. He got a scholarship for the university in Beira and then he even got a scholarship from Great Britain to study there. Once he had come back, he got the well paid job (3500$) at the UN Agency through an advert in the newspaper without knowing anybody at his new workplace and without having any social networks that could have helped him. His story reminded us a lot of the American Dream and its possibility to rise from rags to riches, which normally seems very unlikely, but, as this example shows, is not impossible. His case is interesting for two more reasons. 137 Jeanne Penvenne, “Attitudes Towards Work and Race in Mozambique: Lourenço Marques, 1900-1974”, Unpublished Paper, Boston, 1979 First of all, it is quite obvious that Fernando could only succeed with the help from scholarships which came from outside the country and secondly he has a good job in the international sector. As he did not have any existing social networks, it was easier for him to succeed in an international organization than in a national one where social networks and the class standing tend to play an important role. A very different example is the case of Augostinho, who is a secondary school teacher (and a teacher at the police school in the evening), was born in Maputo and, like his parents, he is a FRELIMO promoter. During the interview he confirmed his support for the party several times and claimed to have been an active member of the party for a long time. During his education as a French language teacher, he was interested in traveling to France. He obtained two scholarships: one in 1998 and another one in 2006 which were sponsored by the French cooperation. However, the fact that he is from Maputo City and is a strong138 supporter of FRELIMO helped him to get the scholarship. The case of Pedro, a civil servant at the Ministry of Defense also shows the importance of social origin and the access to social networks. Unlike the majority of his colleagues who come from Maputo or the surrounding provinces, he was born and has grown up in Cabo Delgado. His parents were simple farmers, but he got the chance to go to a secondary school and university in Maputo. He has never been a supporter of FRELIMO and feels that he is often neglected when people are getting extra payments or promotions. When asked for the reasons why he is often “forgotten”, he answered that he believes that the fact that he is not a member of FRELIMO might be the reason. He added however that being from another region might also play a certain role as well. 138 Andrea Quelroz de Souza, op.cit., p.3 4.2.2 Education and Job It has already been mentioned that only a tiny part of the Mozambican populations had access to education before independence in 1975. The long civil war was a further obstacle to build an effective educational infrastructure and it was only in the mid-1990s that the education system rapidly expanded in order to accommodate the increasing number of children requiring admission and it took another ten years until in 2005 school fees for primary education were abolished139. It is estimated that 88% of the children today are enrolled in primary school. Nevertheless, huge challenges remain as the illiteracy rate at 61% (Literacy rate 66% men and 33% woman) and the drop-out rates in both primary and secondary school remain very high. Most interview partners (except Diogo) finished secondary school and therefore already belong to a minority in Mozambique. The younger persons interviewed (25-32) claimed to have been through the classical way of education, which means after completing secondary school, they went to university and then they found a job. In contrast to them, the older persons interviewed (35-45) had gone through a different form of education. Elena and Diana for example only started to go to university when they started to work in development agencies. This means that they are working at the development agency in the day and go to university at night until 10 pm. Both of them go to private universities where the timetables are adjusted to people working in the day time. As they do not know how long the development agency will stay in Mozambique, they study to get a diploma at a university. The level of education is rising, competition in general is getting harder and diplomas are becoming more and more important in order to find work as a civil servant. Pedro, who is 45 years old and has already finished his studies to become a French language teacher, has realized that he cannot use his competences in many areas. 139 http://www.unicef.org/mozambique/education.html, consulted 17.09.2009 Therefore, he attends university at night when he has finished his job at the Ministry. Furthermore he gives private French lessons and he owns a duck farm which could be serving as another income source one day. This multitude of income sources does not seem to be uncommon as two other civil servants interviewed are in a similar situation. Elena and Augostinho, both teachers at secondary schools, told me that their basic salary was not sufficient for a living. While Elena gives private lessons at night, Augostinho also works as a teacher at the academy of police studies. The multitude of income has become widespread since the imposition of the FMI that demanded massive cuts in government spending and civil service wages in 1991. One consequence was that the salaries of nurses and teachers fell below the poverty line in early 1992. Any civil servant able to leave the public sector did so and started working for an aid agency or NGO so that the most educated people left the government. An example for this development is the case of Elena who worked for the Ministry of Commerce as an official in charge. When she got the offer to work as a secretary in a development agency she did not hesitate for one minute as she now earns twice as much money as she did before. Civil servants who stayed in the public sector had to take bribes (“privatized user fees”) or to steal time, goods or money to survive. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that the pauperization of the civil servants has contributed to their frustration and their lack of motivation which has led to a degradation of the functioning of the state.140 Today salaries of civil servants have improved and are called “reasonable”141 in secondary literature. However, the interviewed persons who are working for the civil service at the moment were complaining about their insufficient salary stating that they could not survive without other income sources. Also the climate of petty corruption continues to the present day. All the persons interviewed (except Diogo) worked as 140 Dominique Darbon, « Administration et société », in : Christian Coulon and Denis-Constant Martin, Les Afriques politiques, Paris, Editions de la découverte, 1991, pp.172 ff. 141 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, Do Bicycles equal development in Mozambique? , New York, Boydel and Brewer, 2008 civil servants or were employed by development agencies. During the fieldwork it soon became very clear that it is much harder to get into contact with persons working for private companies or independents like shop owners. First of all many shops and companies are owned by Indians, Pakistanis or other foreigners. The Mozambicans in Maputo working in the private formal sector seem to be very busy and also a little bit suspicious towards strangers. Once meetings had been arranged, persons would call the last minute to say they could not make it. This happened unusually often with persons working for private companies. On the other hand, people working for private companies represent 53% of the employees who are officially registered and should be taken into account in further fieldwork. In the following table the percentage of the economically active population in Maputo City in 2002-2003 is divided into different sectors of occupation. Sector of occupation Percentage Public sector 15.9 Private sector 19.7 Self-employed 24.3 Household 10.8 Patron or entrepreneur 29.5 Total 100% Source: Iraê Baptista Lundin, Negotiating Transformation, op.cit, p.134 Even though the weight of the public sector remains fairly high, the private and self-employment sector together are already overwhelmingly dominant in the way occupations are distributed in Maputo. The labor profile of Maputo indicates that compared to the rest of the country high percentage of the adult workforce is employed in waged work in the private and the public sectors. The administrative institutions for the management of the state in Maputo explain this fact. As a consequence of the process of privatization of productive units totally or partly controlled by the state before, self-employment is increasing in Maputo. According to the Ministry of Labor, this process is one reason for the increasing unemployment rate in the whole country. The formal workforce in Maputo is mainly active in the industrial sector, transport and communication and public administration. The informal sector consists mainly of petty trading in the markets and on street corners. However, Maputo’s informal sector is very dynamic and people can get decent monthly earnings. It also has to be considered that informal activities are not the same as illegal activities, because informal vendors usually pay a daily or weekly fee to the municipality and micro enterprises classified as class vendors are required to pay taxes. When doing fieldwork in Maputo one also has to be aware of the fact that the informal sector absorbs a lot of people and is characteristic for the economy as it is assumed that 52% of the persons who are between 15-64 years old work in the informal sector. Many of them are poor but some of them have succeeded to establish their business in the informal sector or to find a way to accumulate capital in order to escape poverty. However, we did not have time to focus on this type of group but suggest that further fieldwork should be done to find out about the opportunities the informal sector provides to escape poverty and to become part of what we call middle class. Like civil servants, people working in private companies often have several income sources in order to make a living. This seems to be particularly true for men working as security men in private households. One of the interviewed, Diogo (42 years old), works as the director of human resources in a small security company that sends security men to shops and private homes. He earns about 8000 Mt a month and says he can only live from that money because he only has one daughter and does not have to support other family members. He does not have a car and lives in a modest house in the periphery of the town. Even though his employees earn only the minimum salary of just above 2000Mt (just below 60$) some of them drive cars and live in better houses than he does. Thus, they have other income sources and are often part of the informal business sector, which permits them to have a different lifestyle than Diogo has. Because of this ambiguity between the visible employment and the real income on the one hand and the threat of poverty which persists despite of having a regular job on the other hand, Diogo stated: “Someone can have shoes without having work but another person can have work but no shoes.” To sum up, we can say that employment in a development agency seems to be an attractive alternative to the worse paid jobs as civil servants. In terms of income, people working as civil servant have to be better educated and to fulfill more complex tasks in order to earn the money people can get more easily in development agencies. One example was Stefan who holds an IT diploma and earns 18.000 MT for his work in the administration of the university. Diana and Elena are both working as secretaries who fulfill accountant´s tasks too. They finished secondary school but do not hold a university diploma at the moment. Even though they are less educated, they earn the same amount as Stefan and can take advantage of the health care system many development agencies provide. Nevertheless employment as a civil servant remains attractive in an environment in which the competition to get a job increases and employment in development agencies is often limited to some years. After all, the occupation as a civil servant remains one of the rare opportunities to get a steady job as there is an absence of possibilities to accumulate capital outside the state sector142. In fact, one of the main causes for poverty in Mozambique and Maputo is the lack of formal employment opportunities and the lack of social security. 143 142 Dominique Darbon, op.cit., p.178 Franz Kaufmann, “Pequenas e médias empresas em Mocambique: Situacao, Perspectives e Desafios”, Ministério da Indústria e comércio direccao nacional da Indústria, 2007 143 Further research should have a closer look at the obstacles and opportunities for the creation of small and media enterprises which could contribute efficiently to the economic, social and political development of the country. In the first chapter of this part we have already pointed out that in the past the place a person lives at already tells a lot about his or her socio-economic standing. This pattern has not changed and is still valid in the actual structuration of Maputo even though the city is characterized by an ongoing restructuration of its different districts. Before concentrating on the results on the interviews, a glance at the impact of the transition on the social geography will help to better understand the specific situation of middle class members in Maputo. In fact, the transition to a market economy changed the social geography of Maputo in terms of the use of space and of the individual occupation of its inhabitants. Rents and the supply of electricity and tapped water increased dramatically, but this increase caused troubles because households had difficulties in paying for those commodities and to guarantee their basic needs in terms of livelihood. With the increasing income differentiation and the reduction of subsidies, Maputo once again had the problem of clearly defined class segregation inherent in the colonial segregation of the colonial city. While the market economy is increasing in size and function, there are also patterns of ruralisation that can be observed in Maputo. While about 2/3 of the population in Maputo live in houses that can be considered formal, only 1/3 of the population has access to what is normally associated with formal housing like access to electricity and tapped water144. Apart from that, a lack of development of the urban infrastructure concerning street lights, public transport and paved roads is common. While walking through Maputo, it becomes quite obvious that the policy of privatization has led to a 144 Iraê Baptista Lundin, op.cit., p.89 reappearance of structures which existed during colonial times. It is true that the major difference is that the population is no more separated by the color of their skin itself, but by economic factors of classes, indicating social stratification. Thus, it has to be mentioned that the effect is the same as it was in colonial times. The result is the juxtaposition of values, needs and interests in the same space, anticipating and creating conflicts. For this reason Forjaz and also Carlos Serra speak about two cities within Maputo’s structures and boundaries: One in the cement city and another one in the suburbs 145. Regarding this polarized structure of the city, the question is where to find the members of the middle class. Where do they live? And how did they cope with the transformations? The majority of the people interviewed lived in what was called “Cidade de cimento” and owned the house they lived in. From the 13 persons interviewed, eight persons own their house and only five persons rent the place they live in. A house is perceived as a very important long term investment and a sign of stability in life by many people. The possession of a house is also a way to economize as you will not have to pay a monthly rent anymore. The people interviewed who rent their living place do so because they have just arrived in Maputo some months ago like Fernando or want to economize to construct a house one day. Persons who own a house can be divided into a group that have owned the houses for a long time, often since independence, and those who had rented their living place before, and then bought, but more often constructed, their own home. Ruth for example lives in the house that already belonged to her father who bought it shortly after independence in 1978 from a Portuguese person who was leaving the country. As a result, she lives in Sommershield, the richest part of the town, where all the embassies and many international organizations have their headquarters. She states that she can only live there because the house already belonged to the family. When all property, apart from land was privatized the 145 Carlos Serra, Sur le carreau: Une étude sur la précarité sociale dans trois villes du Mozambique, Dakar, Saint Paul, 2005, p.17 houses went on sale in 1993 and even though prices were relatively low, they were too expensive for the majority of the tenants. As the rents and utility rates rose, working class families living in the cement city sold their keys to expatriates, technicians, NGO workers, wealthy traders etc. In exchange they received building material and/or a large sum of money to pay for the rights of a building plot in the Caniço and one can imagine that congestion in the Caniço increased with the inflow of new residents146. In rather poor districts like Polana Caniço and Xipamanine you will find many person living in very small and modest houses with zinc roofs who are renting out their property to richer Mozambicans or very often also to expatriates. One the one hand the rent permits them to have a regular income, but on the other hand the rent is often the only income they have and because they do nothing the whole day, many people start to drink and become very frustrated. Even though these persons often have an income of 500$ or even more, we cannot consider them to be typical members of the middle class, as they often do not have any education or any plans where to invest their income in the future. Returning to the case of Ruth it also has to be mentioned that it is quite interesting that, unlike the majority of persons living in Sommershield, she and her family do not have Guardas (Security men) or electric fences. Instead, they have a dog that watches the house. This is quite astonishing because you can observe a correlation between the belonging to a social group and the way people protect themselves and their property. While most members of the elite and upper middle class have electric fences, emergency buttons, and a 24 hour security service, members of the middle middle class prefer to defend their property with dogs and high but not electric fences. One the one hand these differences in looking for security can be explained by the lower costs for a dog. On the other hand it is also the expression of a different need for security and a different attitude towards crime. 146 Bridget O’Laughlin, op.cit., p.217 As already mentioned above, income inequality became an important topic in Maputo after the fall of socialism because Maputo is the “entrance door” for all international cooperation organizations. Foreign investment takes place at a big scale and Maputo alone contributes to the GDP with 40%. Therefore, it is not surprising that 42% of crimes in Mozambique are committed in Maputo147. Even though it has to be admitted that this statistic only takes into account the registered cases and that police presence is much lighter in rural areas and small towns, the crime rate of Maputo is significantly higher than in all other provinces and is the expression of the high inequalities in living standard and income. The fact that 72.9 % of the crimes registered were crimes against people´s property like thefts and incursions confirms this assumption 148. Another person interviewed who prefers to have a dog to protect himself against incursions is Arsenio. As a civil servant he has been living in a rented apartment in Bairro central for many years. Even though he lives in a secure and central district he often has problems with the water supply and the elevator in his apartment because it is not well maintained. Therefore he saved money to move to Triumfo with his family, a new district were many new houses are to be constructed. The creation of new districts and the revalorization of some originally run down districts is one of the developments that tend to be a result of an increasing middle class in Maputo. In most cases only upper middle class members can afford to buy territory and to construct houses in new districts like Triumfo, Sommershield 2 and Costa do Sol. Members of the middle middle class and even some of the lower middle class will rather try to build their houses in the periphery in districts like Laulane, Hulene and even Zimpeto. Furthermore, the nearby industrial town Matola becomes more and more attractive as infrastructure is improving, universities and shopping opportunities are built and new working opportunities are emerging. For these reasons prices are going up in Matola and people are even moving further to buy territory and construct houses in the periphery of Matola. 147 Fabrice Folio, « La criminalité à Maputo, Mozambique: Origine, distribution et répercussions spatiales », Cybergeo : European Journal of Geography, 02.2007, p.17 148 Ibidem Zimpeto is an example of a district which has been quite isolated and poor but now starts to attract people who want to construct houses there. Augostinho, a driver for a development agency has owned a house there for 12 years now. With an income of about 300$ and 6 persons dependent on his income, he can only be counted to the lower middle class because he does not have to pay a rent and he economized money from a job in the administration of a big company he had before he got licensed due to a restructuration. However, people who move to Zimpeto now tend to revalorize the district and the same pattern can be observed in Laulane and Hulene. Ronaldino, teacher at the Laulane secondary school is about to consciously build a house with 3 rooms in Laulane. Instead of renting an apartment in downtown Maputo, he and his family prefer to live in a house that he owns and where the working place is nearby. As already mentioned, the separation between the richer inner belt of the city and the poorer periphery persists and is constantly reproduced because of poorer people from the rural parts of the country coming to the periphery and the rise of rental prices in the center. In fact, only two persons interviewed lived in the periphery, one in a new district and one in Matola. The majority of persons remain in the central district where the infrastructure is better and prices are higher. Nevertheless, the construction of stable houses in run down district tends to mitigate this juxtaposition of rich and poor districts. Concerning the new districts, it has to be said that they are geographically very close to poor districts and tend to push the poorer population into the periphery of Maputo even more. The migration from Maputo to Matola tends to lead to an increasing traffic volume between the towns but also within Maputo. Therefore, cars are another very important tool for many middle class members and will be referred to when dealing with the lifestyle of middle class members in Maputo. 4.2.4 Standard of living and Lifestyle In the introduction of this chapter, we had already referred to the standard of living and lifestyle as expressions of attitudes and values. Understanding the lifestyle of middle classes is important in order to understand, the particular characteristics of middle classes, the mode of consumption and other lifestyle patterns. Those elements are represented in what Bourdieu calls “distinction”. This summary of his thoughts seem to be useful for our study: …social status involves practices which emphasize and exhibit cultural distinctions and differences which are a crucial feature of all social stratification…Status may be conceptualised therefore as lifestyle; that is, as the totality of cultural practices such as dress, speech, outlook and bodily dispositions…While status is about political entitlement and legal location within civil society, status also involves, and to a certain extent is, style149 In the next sections, we will focus on the most relevant findings we came up with while doing our field work in Maputo. Those findings are rather superficial and not representative at all. However, they give first impressions, insights and ideas for further research. 4.2.4.1 Cars: A basic need or luxury? When walking through Maputo the quantity of vehicles of all sizes, types and conditions, and the traffic jams they are causing is impressing. Like in other countries cars seem to be a very important status symbol people like to show off. In conversations with several persons it became quite clear that for many middle class members having a car was not perceived as luxury but as a necessity to cope with everyday life. Indeed Chapas (mini buses that serve as public transport) are known for transforming passengers into human drove because “Comprador” (cashiers in the minibuses) will should “Baixa emptyyy !!!!” even though the bus is already totally overloaded. It is probably because of these conditions of traveling that members of the middle middle class and upper middle class are rarely seen in the Chapas.150 This assumption is reinforced by the interviews 149 150 Richard Jenkins, Key sociologists : Pierre Bourdieu, New York, Routledge, 1992, p.83 Carlos Serra, op.cit., p.37 undertaken as 9 out of 13 persons stated to have a personal car and to make use of it in everyday life. Two others interviewed (Augostinho and Diogo) just cannot afford a car and belong rather to the under middle class struggling not to reenter in poverty. The third person Fernando is new in the town and as member of the upper middle class he is the only one of the interviewed who revealed to stick strongly to post-materialist values as he could afford a car but prefers to walk. When talking with Augostinho about social mobility in general he promptly referred to cars and the opportunity to take a credit at a bank to buy one. For him someone escaped from poverty when he or she had work and can eat three times a day. However someone who is in the middle of the hierarchy for him is someone who can afford to take a credit to buy a car, which does not have to be big but has to work. As he lives in a stone house, has a regular income, sends his children to (secondary) school and eats three times a day he doesn’t consider himself as poor. Never the less he cannot consider himself as one between the poor and the rich as he cannot afford to take a credit for a car. It is not the question to know if Augostinho is right with his classification or not but rather to understand the social significance of possessing or not a car. Apparently it is much more than a way to get comfortable from place to another. Taxi drivers for example (taxis are not always apparent as such) stated often that women would respect them more since they owned a car but were often disappointed when they had to say that they only work with the car but don’t possess it. Even though this observation might not be true it shows that the car is a status symbol that can grade up a person and make him feel respected by others. 4.2.4.2 Consumption patterns: Making the choice between local and foreign markets In the introduction, the assumption was made that members of the middle class would probably spend more on food as quality of nutrition can be important to them. The field work can only confirm this to some extent. It is true that some people prefer to buy food from clean places where hygiene and keeping conditions are guaranteed. Nonetheless, the majority of the interviewed persons claimed to buy most of their products in local market because they do not see the difference in quality between products purchased in markets and those bought from supermarkets or shopping malls. However, while members of the low middle class claim to rarely shop at Maputo Shopping Center, Polana Shopping Center, ShopRite and so for, members of the middle middle class and upper middle class do buy some products from those places. More than a total change of consumption patterns, the middle class in Maputo seem to combine consumption patterns from both the poorer and richer parts of the population. For example, Stefan explained while he buys (meaning that his “empregada” buys for him) non-labeled products from low-price markets like Xipamanine and Xilangalene, he goes to ShopRite when he needs packaged products or when he considers important to know the origin of the goods such as beer, milk, etc. Wearing and consuming fancy products (clothes, drinks…) seem to be important to him as it reflects a certain status in the society. In general, owning a car seems to be much more important than wearing trendy clothes. Although all the interviewed persons were dressed in a modern way and paid lot of attention to the way they dress, they admit not spending lots of money on clothes and accessories. Many of them said that they do not buy clothes from official shops but rather from informal markets (from hawkers and street stalls) or on their weekend trips to South Africa. Apart from shopping, Mozambican middle class activities during the week-ends include running, going to the beach, going to bars by the seafront or even going to the Feira (Funfair) with their children. 4.2.4.3 Traveling and studying abroad as way to accumulate social and cultural capital When the interviewees were asked, what they would like to do if they had more money, the most frequent answer was “traveling” and/or “studying abroad”. While members of the middle middle class and upper middle class had already been to different European countries and would like to travel more, members of the under middle would rather travel to family members living in other provinces of Mozambique. During the interview, they often expressed the importance of knowing different places from the ones they know. This motivation to travel can partly be explained as follows: 1. Its closeness to neighboring South Africa which is easily accessible and yet very different and varied. 2. The curiosity to know new places reinforced by the influence of television and tourists met in Maputo Some of the interviewees (Ruth, Diogo, Ronaldino, Fernando and Paula) were motivated to leave Maputo permanently or at least for a long period as they would like to know other places and would prefer to continue their studies abroad. These answers are not surprising knowing that Mozambique is one of the countries which is highly affected by brain drain. In fact, 45% of the people holding a university degree lived in another country. Usually, the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon is high in countries where the population is less than 5 millions. If the latter condition is not taking into account, Mozambique ranks among the last third on the list after Haiti (83.6 %) and Ghana (46.9%).151 4.2.4.4 Running: Preventive healthcare in everyday life There is another sign that shows a change in habits and leisure activities which can be easily observed at late afternoon and early evening. One just needs to wander through Sommershield area and its streets by the sea to see many people jogging. Most of them are members of the upper and middle middle class. It is believed that not many Mozambican upper classes belong to the “runners” as they prefer to join expensive fitness centers with view on the sea, fearing security risks if they run in the street. At the same time, when middle class people go for a run, maids, gardeners and nannies are on their way back home in the suburbs of Maputo. When passing by the runners, workers often make fun of them and jokes can be heard such as: “Look how fat they are! They won’t lose weight by running because they are doing nothing but eating the whole day!” “When a white man runs he does sports, a black man only runs if he has stolen something. So what did they steal that makes them run like that?” The content of these jokes lead to several assumptions. 1. Perceptions about the correlation between color of skin and the behavior persons remain in many people’s mind. 2. The leisure to run is reserved to specific social groups and is seen as strange by other social groups. 3. The habit of running is perceived to be in correlation with a certain lifestyle including eating too much. 151 Rolf Steinbruch, op.cit., p. 135 We will only focus on the second and third points, which are interesting for the characterization of middle class members. None of the interviewees said to be registered in a fitness centre and four of them claimed to go for a run regularly. They explained that running was a way for them to release their stress after work and exercise a bit after having worked all day in the office. They care about their health and want to prevent heart problems and to keep fit. Moreover, it is an opportunity to show off in expensive sport clothes and to meet people with common interests and same background. Thus, we can speak in this case of a certain transformation of habits coming from and leading to a further occidental lifestyle. 4.2.4.5 The domination of Portuguese in everyday life Another characteristic of the urban middle class of Maputo is that they speak more Portuguese than regional languages at home. Some younger interviewed persons cannot even speak Shangaan, or another regional language. Alina and Ruth explained that their parents forbid their housemaids to speak with them in Shangaan as they did not want their children to learn it. Even though they think it is a pity, neither have they learned it, nor do they make the effort to change this situation. For them, they communicate in their everyday life in Portuguese and they only have friends who speak Portuguese. Other interviewees like Stefan, Paula, and Diogo do not teach Shangaan to their children because they think Portuguese is more important. Adding to that, they have partners whose regional language is different from theirs. For this reason, they want to teach their children only the common language they speak with their partners. However, there were also persons like Arsenio and Diana who try to speak in Shangaan with their children but the latter are not very interested as they speak Portuguese at school and with their friends. As a result, we observe that a crucial aspect related to urban middle class lifestyle is the generalized use of the Portuguese which can also be observed in other big cities like Luanda. 152 4.2.4.6 Between family solidarity and individualization In the previous chapter, we concentrated on new consumption patterns and emerging lifestyles of the middle class in Maputo. It had also been mentioned that the introduction of the PRE put lots of pressure on the middle class and the “traditional” solidarity patterns within families. It is true that the family remains one of the most important networks, which was used to mitigate the risks associated with radical economic transformation, social resettlement and to cope with the effects of the civil war. In the context of high insecurity, people recomposed and reactivated traditional solidarity patterns and their networks still play an important role in Maputo. However, with the economic liberalization and the democratization process, new forms of consumption emerged and other forms of solidarity appeared as more important than the family solidarity. Both, the increasing social inequality and the decrease in the capacity to sustain reciprocity of traditional solidarity networks, seem to lead to the creation of clearer socio strata and new criteria. Although neighborhood relations, religious identities or economic networking have emerged on a more individual form of solidarity and social security, they did not succeed to replace family support. To sum up, we can say that the material and financial constraints seemed to put pressure on family solidarity but make them more necessary than ever. In this context, it was interesting to find out what kind of family relationship middle class people in Maputo have and how do they maintain them. 152 Cristina Rodrigues, “From family solidarity to social classes: Urban stratification in Angola (Luanda and Ondjiva)”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 33, N°2 06.2007, pp.235250 The majority of the interviewees had already created their own family and was living with them (except Alina). While the average Mozambican household is 4.8 persons, and a woman has on average 5.2 children, an average household has 6.3 persons in Maputo. The high number of household members is due to extended family members living together because of the scarcity of available housing.153 The household size of the interviewees varied between one person (Alina) and 7 persons (Ronaldino) but the majority was living in households with a size of 3 or 4 members which is clearly under the average. As the choice of the interviewees was not a representative one, we cannot conclude that their situation reflect the average situation on middle class members. Nevertheless, Duflo already found out that members of the middle class seem to have fewer, healthier and more educated children than the poorer parts of the population. This assumption seems to be true as well for Maputo. The women interviewed were aware that having children does not only mean a lot of work but also that investing in their education is very important and pricey. For example, Paula has one daughter of two years old and does not want to have more children because she wants to offer her daughter the best education. In her opinion, this would not be possible with more children as she would have to share the money available between the children. Stefan, whose wife is pregnant with the first child, does not want to have more than two children for the same reason. Two other conflicting patterns become visible when speaking about the relation between the interviewees and their family. One the one hand, some of them felt responsible for poorer relatives and many supported them financially. On the other hand, other interview partners deplored that poorer family members slowdown or even hinder their own development. 153 INE, “Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre orcamento familiar”, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica Minsiterio da Industria e comércio direccao nacional da Industria, 2002/2003, p.7 Indeed, the majority of interviewees declared that they support family members whom do not belong to their nuclear family and do not live with them. In Arsenio’s case, he earns about $1000 a month but has to share this income with poorer family members. He financially supports his parents and pays for the school uniform, books and school fees for eight cousins living there. Even though he seemed convinced of what he was doing, he feels melancholic when he thinks of what he could do with the money he spends on his relatives. When he was asked about the reason he was doing that, he responded that it is bad to have uneducated relatives. Moreover he mentioned the following arguments: 1. He does not want his relatives to become jealous of him 2. If he does not share what he has, they might show some disrespect 3. He would rather pay for the cousin’s education now so his own children will not have to pay for them. The last point shows that he hope his children will earn good money. Arsenio’s story is not an exception and we can clearly reach the conclusion that interviewees are convinced their solidarity is needed and could have good impacts in the future. However, we could notice strong social control from the less privileged relatives. This social control can take different forms, from simple accusations, curse to the threat of poisoning. Even though none of the interviewees explicitly shared these fears, it is possible that they influence them so they support those family members despite wanting to accumulate capital to their own nuclear family. The probability to see family members jealous and suspicious is enough to convince the person who has money to share it with those who do not. For instance, Arsenio admitted that he gives money to his nephews because he does not want them to be jealous of his children which could lead to an uncomfortable atmosphere within the family. Interestingly enough, the only two persons who were not supporting poorer family members, were very active members of the new protestant movement. While Jerry is member of “Jehovas witnesses”, Stefan is member of the “Assembly of God”. Religion plays a vital role in their life and they participate in meeting several times a week. Both justified themselves saying they do not feel responsible for poorer family members. They think they have to care about themselves and their nuclear family first. Stefan even said that: “Everyone has family members who need help, this is not the question. But to help my family I have to help myself first and have to attain a certain standard of living. Only then I can help others as well.” It might be a coincidence that those two persons clearly outlined their individualistic point of view and that they were the only one able to distance themselves from the obligation to support other family members. It is true that Alina did not support other family members as well. She simply claimed not to have family members in need which tells us already something about her class standing as well. As a result, family solidarity remains an important reality that involves many middle class families and slows down or hinders their accumulation of capital. In the meantime, it is vital to help poorer family members who often depend entirely on those financial contributions. However, it can be observed that younger persons in particularly try to free themselves from these obligations by finding different arguments to legitimate their decision. One of their justifications can be found in certain religious movements on which we will concentrate in the next paragraph. 4.2.4.7 Religious affiliations and new religious movements In literature, churches are often described as a refuge from family’s curse and as an alternative community where individuals feel protected from spells. One of the advantages of paying church’s fee is that it is a fixed amount unlike the amount one would have to pay to satisfy his family. 154 Although our focus is not on whether Stefan’s and Jerry’s religious activity directly contribute to their individualization, it is interesting to note their “capitalistic” values. They are much more into capitalism in the sense of accumulation of capital than the other interviewees. Their values seem to match what Weber called the “protestant ethic”. Weber was convinced that capitalism evolved when protestant ethic encourages large numbers of people to get involved in work in the secular world. This would stimulate initiatives to set up their own businesses and start trading, accumulating wealth in order to invest. Unlike other religions that praise the rejection of material things, Protestantism encourages the spirit of capitalism which means a spirit that favors the rational pursuit of economic gain. New protestant movements in Maputo seem to be very successful. Church services are given in Portuguese, in English but also in Shangaan. As Murore Munyaradzi Felix points out, the rise of the new religious spirit seems to accompany the rise of global capitalism and massive prosperity-gospels are being spread throughout Africa155. In contrast to the Zion movement in Maputo which mostly attracts the poorest, new protestant churches like the Assembly of God often tend to attract better educated people with a stable economic situation, like middle class members. The membership in the community enables you to have new contacts and social relationships that go beyond your own country. Stefan explained that a sick friend of him could only get a Visa to Europe to get a therapy against cancer 154 For example: Alain Marie, op.cit., p.317-320 Felix Murore Munyaradzi, “The incarnation of M.W. protestant ethic spirit of capitalism in post-colonial sub-saharian African economic discourse: The quest for an African economic ethic”, Mankind quarterly, Vol.45 n°4, 1998, pp. 389-407 155 because he and his family were members of the Assembly of God and had contacts with members in European countries. The example of Jerry and Stefan showed us that religion can play an important role in the everyday life of middle class members. In fact, the majority of the persons interviewed claimed to participate regularly in religious ceremonies. With the exception of Stefan and Jerry, all other interviewees were going to catholic churches. Frelimo’s discourse says that protestant churches (the official ones not the new ones) supported the national independence struggle while the catholic churches had a much closer relationship to the colonial state. Based on that, we could have made a parallel with interviewees attending Catholic Church and their class position within the society. On the one hand, it is true that protestant churches created protestant national elite (i.e. Suisse mission and Methodist mission) who were fighting for national independence. However, it has to be mentioned that there were already 15 different protestant churches before the independence which have collaborated with the colonial state since 1960.156One the other hand, there were catholic churches against the colonial state too.157 Having said that, the opposition between protestant churches as supporters of independence and catholic ones as more conservative is too simplified. Therefore, it is quite hard to draw a clear correlation between the belonging of middle class members to catholic churches and elite members to protestant churches. The fact that most of the interviewees are Catholics could simply be explained for historical reasons and to the fact that the interview partners were not choose by representative critérias. 156 Eric Morier-Genoud, « Y a-t-il une spécificité protestante au Mozambique ? Discours du pouvoir postcolonial et histoire des églises chrétiennes », Lusotopie-Des protestantismes en «lusophonie catholique », 1998, pp.407-420 157 Ibidem Some of the interviewees were quite active in their community. One of them, Ronaldino was member of the “youth association B” of his church which gather people sharing same concerns such as sharing similar responsibilities and families’ duties. The association consists of 34 couples who are visiting and supporting each other. As they are all in the same situation, they can speak about common problems they meet in everyday life and try to solve them together. Recently, they started to create a sort of savings club where every couple has to pay a small amount per week. The money can be used either to help a family with financial problem or to organize social events. This sort of mutual help can remind us of what Alain Marie calls “renegotiation of the debt”. Instead of totally renouncing the communitarian solidarity patterns, individuals renegotiate the conditions of solidarity and try to develop more contractual and definite terms according to the motto: « I help those who helped me and not anybody who claims to have the same belonging”. (Interview with Jerry) Finally, within the context of an ex-socialist country, we would like to mention that out of fourteen interviewees, four of them declared religion not to be important in their life or even not having a role at all. While Fernando, Ruth and Alina admitted they would only go to church for special occasions like Christmas and Easter to please their elder family members, their partner or friends, Paula, however, is more categorical. She explained that the churches’ aim in Maputo was only to take money from people and that she preferred to spend her time and money in other things more relevant to her everyday life. This kind of comment is quite surprising knowing that African countries including Mozambique are often described as places were religious movements could mobilize the masses much more than political movements and were atheism is hard to be found158. One should always analyze religion in its historical context and should also see it as a factor that not only influences but also is influenced by both political and social dynamics. Generally speaking, it is common to think that Africa’s permanent crisis and African cultures closely tied to spiritual beliefs are two good reasons to make it easier for religion to appear as the last resort and the solution to all the problems159. However, in the particular case of Mozambique and especially in Maputo, this might not apply as we should remember that the dominant party, FRELIMO, was officially an atheist party and fiercely supported socialist paradigm. Finally, in our case study, atheism or the lack of interest in religion are closely connected to the urban way of living. This was mostly observed among educated people in big cities, influenced by occidental culture.160 158 Christian Coulon, « Religion et politique », in : Christian Coulon and Denis-Constant Martin, Les Afriques politiques, Paris, 1991, pp.87 ff. 159 Ibidem 160 Rolf Steinbruch, op.cit., p.114 Conclusion PART 2: To conclude it can be said that the framing of the urban middle class was a very interesting but also a very challenging task. Unfortunately it was not possible to interview persons who were working in the informal sector, migrant workers or entrepreneurs so that the image remains rather limited. Nonetheless the heterogeneity of the middle class was taken into account by interviewing people from the upper middle class like Fernando, the middle middle class like Diana and the under middle class like Diego. Despite their heterogeneity they have some things in common: They tend to have an occidental lifestyle that is expressed by the use of the portugese language, their way to dress and consumption patterns. Furthermore most of them are divided between the obligation of family solidarity and the wish to stay with own money. All interviewees seemed not to be interested in public life as no one was member of associations or labour unions. Nevertheless most of them inform themselfes very regularly about the political and social developments. As the general elections are coming up in 28.10.2009 most of them are following the recent development quite regularly and politics is quite present in their everyday life. We used these circumstances to explore the relation between these middle class members and the ruling elite which is represented by the FRELIMO. The outcomes of this part of the fieldwork are presented in the next part of the work. PART 3: The dynamic relationship between the elite and the urban middle class in Maputo In the first part of the work we underlined how crucial middle classes can be for successful and sustainable democratic transitions and consolidations as well as for a sustainable and redistributive economic growth. It was also argued that a large middle class can be very efficient in controlling the government in power. However, it was also referred to the fact that the role of the middle class is highly dependent on the social and historical context of a country. After having given first insights in the characteristics of urban middle class members in Maputo it is now important to explore its relations to the rest of society. Indeed, the role of the middle class in national development can only be explored with a proper knowledge of what relation the middle class has with other parts of the population and especially to the ruling elite. Therefore, the last part of this work we will concentrate on the evolution of the relation between the ruling elite and the urban middle classes in Maputo. The term of elite can be used for local chiefs, high ranking members of the major opposition party, influential religious leaders, foreigners working for the powerful international development agencies and the richest members of the Indian merchant class. In this work however, we will concentrate on the interlinked group which coalesces around the ruling FRELIMO party, because its dominant place is widely recognized. Furthermore FRELIMO is often used as term for elite in Maputo in general.161 161 Jason Sumich Elites and Modernity in Mozambique, London, School of Economics, Department of Anthropology, 2006, p.14 In the first chapter we concentrate on the origins, structure and characteristics of the ruling elite. In order to stay in power the elite managed to invest in different coalition partners which have changed over time. In that context, Jason Sumich argues that the urban middle classes were originally strong FRELIMO supporters but have become more critical towards FRELIMO recently. Middle class members would criticize the government but due to the lack of an alternative, FRELIMO could still count on their indirect support162. The reasons for the alienation will be explored and possible consequences will be looked at. In the second chapter we will focus on political attitudes of members of the urban middle classes and explore their points of views. The part of the interviews concerning politics will be analyzed and interpreted. 162 Jason Sumich “Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique: A critique of Neopatrimonial interpretation of African Elites”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 34, N° 1, 03/2008, p.111-p.125, p.113 CHAPTER 5: The urban middle class and its change from support to alienation towards the ruling elite The urban middle class of Maputo became a supporter of FRELIMO and its elite even though they were very suspicious in the beginning of independence. However nowadays middle class member seem to have become more critical towards the elite. The aim of this chapter is to understand and to explain this change of attitude. Therefore we are going to concentrate on the historical relation between those groups in a first place. Then the focus is put to the adaption of the elite to the liberalization and the changes it has undergone. In order to explain the reasons of the alienation we highlight then some changes the liberalization had on middle class’s life. 5.1 The historical relation between the urban middle class and the elite In this part of the section we will focus on the evolution of the relation between middle class members and the ruling elite. In a first sub-section the background of the ruling elite is explored before focusing on the relation with the urban middle class during socialism. 5.1.1 The socio-historical background of the ruling elite Many members of the recent ruling elite, or their parents, belonged to the assimilados in the colonial era and many of them have Indian or biculturel and Portuguese backgrounds. Most of them have their origins in southern Mozambique, in the capital and in Gaza Province and belong to the Shangaan, Ronga and Chopi. This group of persons is very small in numbers, lives mainly in Maputo for a long time and has only weak ties to indigenous African power structures163. Indeed many members of the elite have a petty-bourgeois background in the colonial period which means that they were among the most privileged sector of 163 Jason Sumich, Elites and Modernity in Mozambique , op.cit., p.15 non-white elite164. Many belonged to the legal category of Assimilados who had formally the same rights like whites. This tiny minority played often the role of intérmediare between the population and the colonialists and they had at least some access to education. The assimilados became soon a group apart. One the one hand they had African roots but on the other hand they began to master the middleclass bourgeois manners of the Portuguese elite. Assimilados often held low-level petty-bourgeois positions in the colonial administration wore European clothes and communicated in Portuguese . Many members of the “assimilados” became embittered because of the colonial rule of the Portuguese and the discrimination they had to face in everyday life. They mobilized sections of the peasantry and their successful guerrilla fight led Mozambique to Independence. The leadership of FRELIMO saw itself as the more “developed” section of Mozambique’s population and they promised to transform Mozambique from an unjust, arbitrary state to a strong, modern and “rational” socialist state. Once the liberation struggle was won the elite became politically dominant and controlled the stated and the economic sector as well. 5.1.2 The relation between the urban middle class and the elite during socialism Once independence was achieved the socialist Frelimo government was rather suspicious of many established urbanites because the great majority did not participate in the liberation struggle. Apart from that they were also perceived as defending the colonial bourgeois culture165. Nonetheless the urban middle class as well as a small urban working force soon became a strong base of support for the regime because they benefited from the changes FRELIMO introduced. 164 PENVENNE Jeanne, “The unmaking of an African petite bourgeoisie in Lourenço Marques”, African Studies Center Boston, 1982, p.12 165 Jason Sumich, “Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique, op.cit., p.113 According to J. Penvenne, the middle class and the elite came both often from the so called petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie during colonial time was constituted of families that worked in lower levels of the state bureaucracy, professions or the urban working class. What all these groups had in common was that they belonged to the few who had at least some access to formal education166. In fact, the social difference between elites and the urban middle classes stems from service in the liberation war but not from social backgrounds. Besides the shared social origins, there was also a very pragmatic reason for the alliance between Frelimo and the urban middle class in Maputo. It has already been mentioned that nearly the whole technical and managerial class of Mozambique disappeared with the exodus of the majority of the Portuguese settlers. In a context were illiteracy among Mozambicans was about 97% FRELIMO needed desperately persons with the necessary skills to make the state function. Thus, every person who had access to formal education was accepted, and even invited into the expanding bureaucracy167. A movement of outstanding social mobility was created as students were promoted to teachers and workers could find themselves elevated to managerial positions from one day to another. Diana said that she did not even have finished secondary school when people from the commerce ministry were visiting her school because they were looking for students to recruit. These circumstances led to a creation of a highly State/FRELIMO dependant middle class who shared not only the social origins with the elite but also social ideals like the aspiration to develop towards modernity. 166 Jeanne Penvenne, “The unmaking of an African petite bourgeoisie in Lourenço Marques”, op.cit., p.12 167 Grest, Jeremy, “Urban Management, local government reform and the democratization process in Mozambique: Maputo City 1975-1990”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 21, N°1, 1995, pp.147-164, p.159 Despite this close relation between the elite and the urban middle class Jason Sumich is of the opinion that democratization and economic liberalization have hardened barriers between these two groups. According to him, these barriers are due to the fact that elite members can benefit more and also more directly from the changes introduced by democratization and economic liberalization. Therefore, in the next section, we will concentrate on the elite’s adaption to economic liberalization and democratization. 5.2 Liberalization and the increasing and differentiation between the urban middle class and the elite As already mentioned above, Mozambique has known extreme and brutal changes in a very short time as it has experienced a colonial capitalist economy of plantation before undergoing a socialist revolution to return suddenly to an economic liberalization, and all this within less than 40 years168. These different stages left their marks on the political, economic and social level and influence the Mozambican society until today. Like many other African countries Mozambique was oriented to a political and constitutional evolution towards a democratic system. In the meantime, there was a completely reconversion from socialism to liberalism. 5.2.1 The adaptation of the elite to the changing circumstances In the early 1980 as the civil war intensified, exports were falling, oil prices were rising, coupled with the high interest rates, thus leading to the collapse of economy in Mozambique. Therefore the ruling elite asked the international community for help. The aid came but donors and the US demanded a turn towards the West and linked some other conditions to the promised help. The conditions included to let organizations like CARE and World Vision work in the country, to move towards capitalism and to adopt the IMF structural adjustment policies169. The leadership of FRELIMO has already proved to be able to maintain power throughout the years of economic collapse and civil 168 Jacques Marchand, « Economie et Société dans la transition libérale au Mozambique », Lusotopie -Transitions libérales en Afrique lusophones, 1995, pp.105-137, p.117 169 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, Do Bicycles equal development in Mozambique?, New York, Boydel and Brewer, 2008, p.10 conflict. Even though the state nearly collapsed in the years of the civil war, the Frelimo elite managed to remain in power. Mozambique is therefore also referred to as a weak state with a strong party170. It is true that many members of the FRELIMO elite were suspicious of several elements of the transformation but they also felt that the cooperation with the international community was the only way to remain in power. Thus, they made use of the imposed liberal project in order to remain and extend their power. In fact, the elite was successful in using their political power base to create coalitions with influential international aid agencies which provided about 60% of the government’s budget in 2004 and to use these networks to infiltrate the opening economy171. In that context Castel Branco points out that the privatizations were not at all a neutral and technical measure that was introduced by the World Bank and the IMF. The privatization process was rather a highly politicized process and the ruling elite directed the events as much as possible172. Large-scale privatizations were implemented and current and former state officials were often among the chief beneficiaries as they were often some of the few who had the skills and the experiences, resources and political connections necessary to operate these industries173. Thus, the state continued to play a major role by directing the privatization process and deciding often who will become the owner of the privatized companies. The elite remains and becomes even more a key player in economy, because they own now many big enterprises and many of the “new” private economic actors are members of the Frelimo party who have strong links with the government. Instead of owning the means of production as the traditional Marxist theory would understand the ruling class, the elite uses its political dominance and its access to social and political networks to 170 Jason Sumich and João Honwana “Strong party, weak state? Frelimo and state survival through the mozambican civil war- An analytical narrative on state-making”, Crisis states research center LSE, Working paper N°23, 12/2007,p.23 171 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, op.cit., p.12 172 Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, “Aid and Development, A question of ownership? A critical view”, Maputo, IESE Working PAPER, 2008, p.27 173 Anne Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique: The politics of Privatization 1975-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 remain in power. The adaptation of the elite to the newly created market economy led to a change of its behavior and its structure as well as to a change of its relationship to other social groups. The sharp expansion of the elite in the new created market economy was accompanied by a sharp increase in corruption, including corruption of the elite as well as petty corruption. The corruption of the elite included the use of political connections to facilitate money laundering, drug smuggling and land appropriation174. The international donor community with its liberalization policy actually created the conditions that allowed the elite to become that corrupt. This does not mean that donors consciently tried to bribe the elite (even though this could have been appeared in some cases too). It is rather believed that they had higher priorities like reducing the role of the government and increasing the role of the private sector175. . By diffusing the “trickle down paradigm” which suggests that economic development takes place when people are enriching themselves some elites members started to believe they deserved a little bit extra. Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart state that one consequence of the economic liberalization was the division of the elite in a “predatory group” and in a “developmental” group While the small predatory group is quite small powerful and willing to steal and to killing order to enrich itself, larger groups of the elite are “singing the donors song because they want to get money for their project or their agency”176 The development group inside the elite tries sometimes to block the predation of other members and fights for a softer and more democratic capitalism with a higher degree on state intervention. It is true that even the development group wants to live well and often possesses big houses and cars. However the difference is that they see themselves as actors participating in a joint project to develop the country whereas the predatory only works only for itself. 174 Joeseph Hanlon, “Do donors promote corruption? The case of Mozambique”, Third World quarterly, Vol. 25 No.4, pp.747-763, 2004, p.750 175 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart 2008, op.cit., p.104 176 Ibidem, p.107 This predatory group succeeded to create three interdependent pillars that are known in Mozambique as the CCCC: 1. CUNHA (social networks between politicians and their alienated) 2. CANDONGA (Commercial extortion without any respect to costs, taxes and investment) 3. CHAPA-CEM (Persons who control the transport) Yusuf Adam puts this group even at the top of the pyramid of social stratification177: Source : see foot note 174 He argues that the development strategy adopted by the government and supported by the donors enabled these groups to buy land, to get access to more capital and to develop some technical and literal skills and/or political power. Indeed, it is very difficult to set up a business without a member of this group having a share and licences, permits and land require bribe or another form of 177 Yussuf Adam, Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo e Cair na Boca do Leopardo: Trajectória de Moçambique Pós-Colonial (1975-1990), Maputo, PROMÉDIA, 2006, p.272 participation.178The Mozambican term for this practice is “cabritismo” coming from “cabrito” (goat) and referring to a Xichangana saying claiming that “the goat eats where it is tethered”.179 The more honed developmental group raised questions about the obvious failures and elevated social costs of neo-liberal policies. The donor community did not take these manifestations as honest and constructive criticism but considered this group to be resistant to change. As their priority was/is to create their “african success story” great parts of the international donor community started to back the predatory elite because “they were seen to be doing and saying the right things.” Thus, the developmental group was marginalized and the small predatory group was beeing rewarded for their cooperation by giving non-repayable loans and privatized companies and it was even accepted that they kill and steal.180 The ability of the elite to adapt that well to the changing conditions and circumstances was once more demonstrated in the overwhelming victory of the 2004 elections. This development can only be fully understood by referring to two of its characteristics which are firstly its commitment of unity and secondly its reproductive class character. 5.2.1.1 The increasing class character of the elite The behavior of the ruling elite in Mozambique does not correspond to the predominant “neo-patrimonial school” which is often used to explain social stratification and alliances in African countries. The developing world is said to be characterized by a patrimonial logic that creates highly personalized and corrupt political systems. In the African contexts some authors like Chaban and Daloz refer even to the African culture to be responsible for the neo-patrimonial character of the state181. As already mentioned 178 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, op.cit., p.108 Eric Morier-Genoud, Guerre et transformation sociale, op.cit., p.23 180 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, op.cit.,p.128-129 181 Patrick Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, Oxford and Indianapolis, James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999 179 in the theoretical part of the work they argue that class relations do not exist and that rulers are much more connected through ties of patronage and clientelism that link the poorest parts of the population to the elite. In the case of Mozambique these concepts does not seem to match when we take into consideration that the members of the highest class possible in the racialized colonial system are again forming a ruling class (themselves or their children). This ruling class is based on the control of, and the access to the state and political networks as well as the privatization processes. 5.2.1.2 Unity and cohesion despite internal divisions We already referred to the division of the elite in a predatory and in a development group. Despite this internal disagreement and internal social cleavages, members of the elite are known for their tendency to take a common stand and defend their interest’s vis-à-vis other social are protected.182 In contrast to many other African parties there have been no splits and few people were ever expelled even though tensions between different sections exist183. Tensions are often ended by recruiting potential opponents into the party. The election campaign of 1999 constitutes a good example of the will of unity within the elite. The election campaign was marked by the increasing alienation of traditional FRELIMO voters who were shocked by the degree of corruption. The majority of the party leadership was afraid that their image could be deeply damaged and they decided to outset Chissano (the former president) as party leader and presidential candidate. Yet, Chissano remains in the party, on the political commission and remains therefore powerful184. Even corrupt allies of Chissano are allowed to stay and the justice system is manipulated to hinder their prosecution. It seems that unity and cohesion of the party leadership are so important to the ruling elite that they are willing to let unsavory people stay in their party. 182 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, o. cit., p.110 Joseph Hanlon and Marcelo Mosse, “Is Mozambique’s elite moving from corruption to development?”, Presentation UNU-Wider Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, Helsinki 12-13 June 2009, p.3 184 Joseph Hanlon andTeresaSmart2008, op.cit., p.96 183 The strength to remain united can be explained by the history of FRELIMO as ex single party. It is these parties that are often quite institutionalized and take benefits from stable resources and the good relation to the state and a long and strong support in the population.185In the case of Mozambique many people put FRELIMO on one level with the state and don’t see the difference between the two. In the previous sections we argued, that the adaption of the elite to democratization and neo-liberalism, originally imposed from outside, created new opportunities that were used to remain in power and consolidate its position. The elite is highly aid dependant and follows partly the Marxist imagery of a comprador bourgeoisie” that cannot function on their own but becomes wealthy by serving the interest of foreign compagnies and the donors against the interest of their own people. Quite contrary to a neo-patrimonial acting “Big Men” the elite does not tend to redistribute its wealth through vertical links so that many middle class members seem to sense a flow of wealth in the opposite direction. The change of the relation between the middle class and the FRELIMO elite is thus object of investigation in the next section 5.3. The alienation between middle class members and the ruling elite In this sub-section we are going to explore the link between the impact economic liberalization had on the life of middle class members and their alienation from the elite. In order to illustrate this alienation we refer to the assassination of Cardoso who was an independent journalist. The fact that the two social groups had very different opinions concerning this case can be interpreted as a sign of hardening class barriers. 185 Nicolas Van de Walle and Kimberly Smiddy “Partis politiques et systèmes de partis dans les démocraties « non libérales » africaines », L’Afrique politique 2000, p.3 5.3.1 The struggling middle class during liberalization While the ruling elite could take advantage of the system change, the case of the urban middle class is much more complicated. The urban middle class was further hidden by the PRE which had particular severe effects on civil servants. While the civil wage range was from $31 to over $500 in January 1991 five years later it had already fallen to a range that was from 20$ -150$ so that nurses and teachers fell even below the poverty line in early 1992.186 This situation that was experienced by a lot of African countries that had to implement the structural adjustment program led to a high increase in corruption. Anyone with access to State resources used it in order to upgrade his income. In Maputo, State cars were used as taxis and medicines were stolen and sold in the markets. Thus the low wages corrupted the entire system and the motivation of civil servants decreased sharply187. In general less work was done and everything had to be paid for. Despite the fact that the IMF backed off and civil servants wages increased constantly from 1996 up to now188 petty corruption remains a very big problem among civil servants. A survey in 2005 showed that petty corruption in Mozambique was twice as serious as the average in Africa as a whole with more than 1/5 of people saying that they had to pay bribes within the previous year in order to get a child into school, to get through a police check point or to obtain a document from the government. The health sector seemed to be the worst with 29% of the persons in the survey claiming that they had to pay at least one time a year a bribe to obtain healthcare189 186 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, op.cit., p.102 Jacques Marchand, « Economie et Société dans la transition libérale au Mozambique », Lusotopie -Transitions libérales en Afrique lusophones, 1995, pp.105-137, p.114 188 Minimum was rose from $20 in 1995 to 30$ in 1998 and then $37 in 1999. In 2006 the minimum wage for civil servants was 56$ 189 Carolyn Logan, Fujiwara Tetsuya and Virginia Parish,” Citizens and the State in Africa”, Afrobarometer Round 3 Working Paper 61, 2006, p.20 187 Hanlon and Smart state that this petty corruption is partly due to the fact that civil servants see themselves as members of the middle class and are demanding a higher standard of living, while their wages remain relatively low.190 In spite of this worsening condition of civil servants, many middle class members found also ways to benefit from the system change. A very classic way to improve one’s income was to find work in the multitude of NGO’s and development agencies that were coming to Mozambique having their headquarters usually in Maputo. However the best jobs were often taken by elite members because they had a better education or had the chance to study abroad at prestigious universities. This fact created the inequality of opportunities to have access to powerful social networks191. Furthermore, middle class members often felt that high positions were denied them because they or their parents did not participate in the liberation struggle and/or did not have access to the social networks of the elite. While the elite was dependant on the urban middle class during socialism, the legitimization in front of the international community seem to make them more independent vis-à-vis their traditional supporters. The historical closeness and the blurred boundaries between elite members and the (upper) urban middle class seem to lose its significance192. To put it in a nutshell we can say that middle class members remain privileged in comparison to the population in a whole. They are socially close enough to the elite to be aware of what they have but due to their class standing they cannot obtain these things. Therefore they feel discriminated and at disadvantage when compared with the elite. In order to illustrate the hardening of class barrier we are going to present an example where the different perceptions and opinions become evident. 190 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart 2008, op.cit., p.109 Jason Sumich, “The illegitimacy of Democracy? Democratization and Alienation in Maputo, Mozambique”, Crisis states research center LSE, Working paper N°16, 09/2007, p.6 192 Ibidem, p.16 191 5.3.2 Revealing event: The case of Cardoso An incident that proved to be very decisive to understand the different opinions and values of middle class members and the elite was the process that followed assassination of Carlos Cardoso. Carlos Cardoso was one of the senior managers of the Mozambican State News Agency during the socialist period. Even though he came from a white, wealthy Mozambican family with Portuguese background and had studied abroad he was a committed socialist and returned to Mozambique once it became independent. When Samora Machel was murdered he left the FRELIMO and five years later he founded two independent news papers, Mediafax and the Metical. Cardoso criticized the government policy heavily and began to aggressively report cases of corruption and was especially focusing on scandals arising from the privatization of banks193. Apparently he was heavily displeasing to some persons and was assassinated while driving back home from work on the 22.11.2002. The government pursued the case only very slowly until internal and international pressure arose194. The prominent and powerful Indian family “Satars” was suspected to be concerned with this case and 6 men were arrested. During the trial, one of the accused claimed that he was acting on behalf of Nyimpine Chissano, the son of the former president. Nyimpine had been employed as a consultant by one of the banks accused by Cardoso and finally had to testify to the court but was never judged. The trial was the second televised trial in Mozambique and was followed by almost everyone who had access to a TV. By doing so the ruling elite could save its reputation and demonstrated “good governance” and “transparency” but in Mozambique the trial revealed even more speculations about a high- ranking conspiracy195. Jason Sumich explains that elite members were mostly of the opinion that the son of the president was not guilty. They affirmed that he was 193 Jordane Betrand, « Le cas Cardoso au Mozambique- la violence et la corruption en procès », Lusotopie -Violence et contrôle de la violence au Brésil, en Afrique et a Goa, 2003, pp.453-463, p.454 194 Steinbruch, Rolf, Mosambik- schwarz und arm und ziemlich weit weg, Stuttgart, Schmetterling Verlag, 2007, p.71 195 Jordane Betrand, op.cit., p.558 corrupt and not a very nice person but insisted at the same time that he would never kill a person. This perception was quite different from that of the middle class members who were overwhelmingly convinced of his guilty, were satisfied to see him on trial and wanted to see him punished. They interpreted the assassination of Cardoso as an example that democracy and press freedom did not exist. Furthermore the case seemed to be a further indication that the state was corrupt and had to hide its criminal activities196. During fieldwork some interviewees also referred to the case of Cardoso without being asked. Arsenio for instance took the case of Cardoso as an example of the strength of the ruling elite to do whatever they want to do without being punished. Alina stated the case of Cardoso as an example that demonstrated that one should better not get involved in politics and that it would be the best to withdraw from politics as much as possible. To sum up we can conclude that Cardoso was used by middle class member to refer to any negative characteristics of the elite that in their eyes were becoming more and more illegitimate. In this chapter we demonstrated that despite the similar social origins, class barriers between middle class members and members of the elite seem to harden. Middle class member feel that they cannot take the same advantages from the liberalization process as the ruling elite. Furthermore, the elite is more interesting in beeing perceived by international donors as legitimate and a good partner than maintaining its support from the middle class members. Apparently, the elite is of the opinion that they do not need the active support of the middle class members anymore. Even though many middle class members feel that the elite is becoming increasingly corrupt, Jason Sumich argues that the urban middle class will not turn its back on FRELIMO due to the lack of an alternative.197 For him this situation leads to the paradox that those that are the best able to understand the meaning of democratization and the most likely to support it, are also the least likely 196 197 Jason Sumich, Elites and Modernity in Mozambique, op.cit., p.175 Jason Sumich, “Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique”, op.cit., p.125 to vote for the opposition and actually change the regime. This phenomenon can be partly understood by the link between modernity and FRELIMO. Whereas others parties like RENAMO seem to be backward FRELIMO has long time been the only party able to promise progress and the development towards what they believe is modernity. In order to better understand this paradox the next chapter examines political attitudes of middle class members in Maputo. CHAPTER 6: Political attitudes of urban middle class members in Maputo The aim of this part is to concentrate on the political attitudes of the interviewed middle class members. But once more, one has to be reminded of the fact that these members do not necessarily reflect a representative image of the urban middle class of Maputo as a whole. Nevertheless, the interviews undertaken revealed some interesting patterns that will be discussed and that could give incentives for further research. The same 13 interviewees, who were questioned about their everyday life, were also questioned about their political affiliation, their estimation about the next elections, the state of democracy and their perception of recent economic and political problems. While some persons were very eager to give very useful insights and statements others were rather cautious and reluctant. In general it could be said that people working for developing agencies were more open to talk and to criticize the government than civil servants. This is not very surprising as civil servants are much more dependent on the State and felt sometimes obliged to defend it. The suspicion of some interview partners was not expressed in the refusal to answer question but rather in giving very short or evasive answers. Furthermore it is assumed that more than three persons, especially among the civil servants were members of FRELIMO but probably did not want to share this information with me. This could be because they did not want to be in a situation where they would have to defend the party against delicate questions as they knew that many strangers are very critical towards FRELIMO. Furthermore, the feeling persisted that some interviewees tried to present their country in the best way they could. The research organization Afrobarometer made similar observation when they conducted a research on a poll in 2006 and stated that: “the answers to the political questions are so out of line with reality that we must assume that the respondents are saying, not what they believe or how they voted, but what they think the questioners want to hear”.198 Therefore the outcomes of the interviews have to be used with caution as not all answers can be considered to be true. 6.1 Recent political environment in Maputo Before presenting the outcome of the fieldwork, it seems useful to give an insight on some key issues in the current political environment of Maputo as these issues influenced the interviews a lot. In order to stick to the most important points, we will only present the two events that seemed to be the most important to us for this study. 6.1.1 The upcoming general elections At the moment the political debates concentrate a lot on the upcoming elections which will take place on the 28.10.2009 and will be at the same time presidential, parliamentary and regional elections. The official start of the election campaign with the “dança do voto” was on the 13.09.2009 199. Catholic Church has already announced being afraid that it could come to violent confrontation between supporters of different parties in the electoral period200. In the streets demonstrations, the dominance of FRELIMO is very eye-catching. But for a stranger the atmosphere seems calm and relaxed. It will be the fourth time that the president is elected since the end of the civil war in 1992. The first democratic elections took place in 1994 and Joaquim Chissano was elected president with 53% of the vote. Also the other two elections in 1999 and 2004 were won by FRELIMO. The present president Guebueza came to power in 2004 with 64% of the votes after an internal party power struggle with Chissano. 198 “Mozambicans look on the bright side”, Mozambiquefile 2006, July 2006, No.360, p.10 “Danca do vota”, Domongo-Noticia,14.09.2009 200 “Igreja católica teme period eleitoral sangrento”, SAVANA, 7.08.2009, p.32 199 The municipal elections in November 2008 confirmed once more that FRELIMO is almost a hegemonic force in Mozambican politics as it won every municipality except Beira.201 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart point out, that many democratic countries like Sweden, Mexico and India are ruled by “a natural party of government”202and therefore it would not be legitimate to criticize the state of democracy in Mozambique only because FRELIMO has won every election so far. This is certainly true but it has to be mentioned as well that there is an obvious lack of check and balances and an insufficient accountability as well as a culture of impunity which leads to the conclusion that corruption in Mozambique is endemic203. Nevertheless, Mozambique remains one the “donors darlings” receiving 65$ per inhabitant per year (Malawi which is poorer and less corrupt received 42$ per inhabitant)204. It is in this context that Sumich repeatedly argues that the state concentrates on being legitimate in the eyes of foreign donors but neglect the wider population in its projects.205 On the 14th of August, the names of the three official candidates Armando Guebeza (FRELIMO), Afonso Dhlakama (RENAMO) and Daviz Simango (MDM) were published. While FRELIMO and RENAMO have been belligerents and dominate the political landscape since the introduction of the multi party system, the MDM is a political party which has just been created 206. 201 “RENAMO in its death throes?” Mozambique file Number 373, 2008, p.3 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, Do Bicycles equal development in Mozambique?, New York, Boydel and Brewer, 2008, p.89 203 Marcelo Mosse and Augustinho Manjate and Edson Cortez, “Country Study Report Mozambique”, Transparency International, 2006/2007, p.5+6 204 Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart, op.cit., p.123 205 Jason Sumich, “The illegitimacy of Democracy? Democratization and Alienation in Maputo, Mozambique”, Crisis states research center LSE, Working paper N°16, 09/2007, p.7 206 “Quem sera o próximo president da Repúplica?” Scorpiao, 17.08.2009 202 6.1.2 The creation of MDM (Movimento Democratico Mocambicano) The MDM was founded on a congress in Beira on the 6 th of March and its president, Daviz Simongo, was the most successful of RENAMO’s five mayors, in Beira, the second largest town of Mozambique207. In fact, the creation of the party is a direct consequence of the political turbulences during the council elections in November 2008. Daviz Simango had successfully completed his first mandate as mayor and wanted to run again for RENAMO but the president of the party, Afonso Dhlakama, refused him to do so, because “he was too popular and competent, and there had been visible improvements in Beira under his rule”208 he was probably afraid that Simango could one day become a concurrent for him. Instead of accepting this refusal Simango and his supporters succeeded in enrolling him as an independent candidate on the list. While he was elected with 62 % Renamo picked up a derisory 2.7% of the vote209. The election of Beira showed that political success was possible to achieve outside of the FRELIMO and RENAMO and encouraged Simango and his supporters to create their own party. The symbol of the party is a cock and the slogan is “Kikeriki” and shall convey the message of a necessary wake up of the Mozambican people. The aim of the party is to make people believe that change is possible in Mozambique210. Even though it is widely believed that MDM has no chances to win the next elections the party could break the two party systems, which would already be a very big change and could become a real opposition party in the long term. In the short term MDM might weaken RENAMOS in the sense that MDM could end up with more deputies than RENAMO in the next parliament. In contrast to the majority of recent politicians, Daviz Simango belongs to the post-war generation and holds a university degree in engineering. His father, Uria Simango, was co- 207 “RENAMO in its death throes?” op.cit., p.3 Ibidem, p.5 209 Ibidem, p.6 210 Annette Schwarzbauer, „Weckruf mit Hahn-die neue Partei MDM in Mosambik“, KAS Länderbericht Mosambik, 03.2009, p.2 208 founder and vice-president of FRELIMO and it is assumed that he and his wife were murdered because of internal party quarrelling.211 As Simango has connection to both parties he seems to provide an alternative for those discontents with both FRELIMO and RENAMO members. However Guebuza is not intimidated and claimed that the current electoral environment is clearly favorable for a convincing FRELIMO Victory. 212 There have been no serious researches that would challenge the estimation that FRELIMO will win the next election. What is less clear however is if FRELIMO can hold its 2/3 majority and if they can mobilize the middle class in the long term. Furthermore, it is not clear yet, if all Mozambicans will have the possibility to vote for the MDM in all provinces of the country. On 6 September, the CNE declared that the MDM had only produced enough valid candidates for four (Maputo City, Inhambane, Sofala, Niassa) of the 13 parliamentary constituencies. In the other nine constituencies, the candidates did not produce adequate documentation213. On Wednesday the 30.09.2009 the MDM in return accused the National Elections Commission (CNE) of stealing its election candidates' supporting documents, in order to give the impression that the documents had never been submitted in the first place. The senior MDM representative Ismael Mussa said that the MDM will appeal against the CNE to the Constitutional Council, the body which has the final word in electoral disputes. He added that Simango and the MDM election agent, Jose Manuel de Sousa, are traveling from Beira to Maputo on and plan to meet with CNE chairperson Joao Leopoldo da Costa the 05 October 2009214. This confusion underlines the hegemonic force of FRELIMO who probably knows that the MDM could become a more serious opposition than the RENAMO. 211 Annette Schwarzbauer, „Drei Präsidentschaftskandidaten,26 Parteien, 340.000 neue Wähler – Wahlvorbereitungen in Mosambik“, KAS Länderbericht Mosambik 09. 2009, p.4 212 „Mozambique: Political Environment favorable to Frelimo’s Victory“ , http://allafrica.com/stories/200908250445.html, consulted on 13.09.09 213 MDM excluded from most constituencies, 7.09.2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200909081129.html, consulted 2.10.2009 214 MDM accuses CNE of stealing its documents, 30.09.2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200910010741.html, consulted 2.10.2009 After having mentioned two events that influence the political atmosphere at the moment, we will now concentrate on the political attitudes of the persons interviewed. 6.2 The urban middle class between apathy and opposition In this section the outcomes of the interviews with 13 middle class members about their political attitude are presented. In the first place their interest in politics in general and their opinion about the next elections are analyzed. Their relationship and opinion about FRELIMO and its leadership are discussed in a second sub-section before focusing on their attitudes towards the new party MDM. Their behavior can be best described as apathetic. According to Bajoit, the notion of apathy describes the opposite behavior of protest because an apathetic person does not create a conflict and contribute to the reproduction of the status quo and provoke the deterioration of cooperation215. The alienation of middle class members could lead to concrete actions like voting for the opposition in the short and medium term. Sumich argued that the alienation does not lead to opposition because many middle class members feel that they do not have an alternative to FRELIMO. However the creation of MDM could constitute one of these alternatives even though it seems preemptive to judge about the consistency and maturity of this new party. 6.2.1 Interest in politics and upcoming election The usual answer to the question if the interviewees were interested in politics was a simple and plain “NO”. The majority of the interviewees claimed not to be interested in politics and to prefer focusing on their daily life. Everyone except Ronaldino stated that the government in place does not represent the interests of the population and therefore they do not like politicians in general. Only 3 persons claimed to be member of FRELIMO and nobody claimed to be a member of another party. Furthermore, none of them was active in a labour union or in other associations or organization except church. 215 Guy Bajoit, « Les réactions individuelles au mécontentement », Revue de sociologie française, Vol. 29 Numéro 2,1988, p.325-345, p.334 Nevertheless only Paula claimed that she never watches TV and does not want to read the newspaper because she believes that they do not always tell the truth. While it is true that the biggest newspaper NOTÍCIAS has close ties with the government other newspaper and especially the monthly SAVANA are publishing above party-lines and criticize the government as well as the opposition parties216. In fact, the majority of the interviewees stated to follow the press regularly and watching news at TV because even though they are not interested in politics they want to follow the recent developments. The hesitation to affirm interest in politics is therefore rather interpreted in not wanting to affirm a particular opinion about politics and in not wanting to speak with the interviewer about delicate issues where they would reveal their opinion. The fact that most of the interviewees stated to follow the electoral campaign and were rather well informed about the different candidates and circumstances was another indication that interest in politics existed or that politics was simply a part of every – day life. The interviewees were also questioned about the upcoming election and the impact the elections could have. Interestingly many interviewees gave very”technical” answers like Fernando who stated that: “Yes, for sure the elections will have an impact. Some minister’s posts will change, perhaps new ones will be created and a range of political posts will be occupied with new staff.” All interviewees were convinced that FRELIMO will win and that the electoral campaign would proceed in a relative calm without serious violent incidents in Maputo. Some however claimed that it will be more difficult for FRELIMO to win this time because they were losing support in the population. Augostinho, for instance believes that FRELIMO will manage to win this time with much effort and if necessary also with electoral fraud but that they will not win the next elections in 5 years. 216 Rolf Steinbruch, op.cit., p.122 The majority of interviewees claimed to participate in the election, though it seems that some were undecided if they would participate or not. Diana for instance voted last years but was always annoyed by the fact that people had to wait in lines for hours and she hesitates to participate this year. However she claimed that probably neighbors, friends and even family members would find it strange if she stayed at home. Fausia said, that people and even police men would sometimes ask to see the painted finger, which indicates that one has already voted. Thus, the social pressure and control seems so strong that people will participate in elections even though they are not convinced of its sense. This participation despite the lack of conviction can be explained with the notion of apathy. Guy Bajoit defines the notion apathy as the opposite of protest because actors are not opening the conflict but contribute to the reproduction of the status quo217. In the mean time apathy provokes the deterioration of the cooperation in this case between middle class members and the government in place. Thus, persons who are participating in the elections, even though they are not convinced of their meaning, contribute to the status quo. Instead of showing their dissatisfaction, which could lead to an improved cooperation, the relationship between them and the government remains the same but the elections itself are deprived of their meaning. This state of apathy seems to influence the relationship between middle class members and the ruling elite in general. In order to understand this phenomenon we are going to look more closely on the recent relationship between middle class members and FRELIMO in the next section. 217 Guy Bajoit, « Les réactions individuelles au mécontentement », op.cit., p.334 6.2.2 Perceptions about the ruling elite Even though Maputo has always been a stronghold of FRELIMO only 3 persons, (Ronaldino, Diogo and Alina) claimed openly to be members of the political party and only Ronaldino was a convinced member who defended FRELIMO’s positions. Diogo stated that he was only FRELIMO member because he was convinced about their politic 23 years ago when he joined the party. Even though he is not convinced anymore he remains in the party and attends sometimes events that are organized in his districts. Alina admitted right away that she was only member of the FRELIMO because she was told to join the party when she applied for her post. Her position was quite interesting as she openly stated that she would vote for the new party MDM even though she was member of FRELIMO. In his research Jason Sumich already pointed out how astonished he was to speak to persons who would vote for FRELIMO even though they sharply critzise penchant for corruption and their overall uselessness. 218 This observation was also very present in the recent fieldwork were people could blame FRELIMO for many things without entering in open opposition to it. The reasons for the persistence of support for FRELIMO despite all criticism were quite clearly expressed by Elena: “Yes, it is true that FRELIMO is corrupt and not very interested in developing the country, but at least they are already rich. Therefore they can take some money for developmental issues…If a new party would come to power, they would have to start from the bottom…Let’s say I would come to power (looks down to her shoes)…it’s sure that I would have to buy some new pairs of shoes….. a nice television, a big house and cars for me and my family…once I would have all these things, not before that. I could start to care about all the others.” To sum it up, most of the interviewees found it rather normal that politicians are enriching themselves before caring about others. This does not mean that they welcomed this behavior as they sharply criticized it. Nonetheless the opinion was widespread that these characteristics are not specific to FRELIMO but would occur 218 Jason Sumich, “Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique”, op.cit. , p.112 in any other party as well. Therefore it seemed for many persons better to stay with the evil they knew than to change to something new that could be even worse. As already mentioned the only openly supporting member of FRELIMO was Ronaldino and his statement that… “Politics is like football, you cannot avoid it because it is just everywhere.” …was quite illuminating concerning the nature of his support. During the whole interview confusion between the notions of politics and FRELIMO was eyecatching. In fact, for Ronaldino it seemed not to be possible to disconnect politics from FRELIMO. Thus when he was saying “Politics is like football” he was probably also saying “FRELIMO is like football”. Ronaldino is a secondary school teacher and as it is usual for civil servants he is member of the FRELIMO. He was obviously embarrassed when he was confronted with delicate questions about the omnipresence of FRELIMO. The fact that he was defending “his” party was probably also due to the fact that we were sitting just next to the office of the school director. Football should be an activity he should not want to avoid because he plays once per week with his colleques and watches matches at the TV. Nonetheless it is a part of everyday life he cannot avoid because it is omnipresent. It appears nearly automatically on the TV screen and if he does not come to a match with colleagues he would have to justify himself. His relationship to politics and FRELIMO is about the same. It appears in everyday life in conversations, in the newspaper on TV and so on. As a civil servant he would have to justify himself not to be member of FRELIMO and in literature it is even stated that persons were excluded from their jobs when refusing to join the party. 219 Another interesting pattern that occurred during the interviews was that person divided the FRELIMO leadership along generational lines. Augostinho for instance hoped that FRELIMO would be changing if the younger ones obtain more power and FRELIMO would finally stop to take its legitimacy from the independence struggle which made them to heroes that would be allowed to do anything. During the period, the interviews were realized an event demonstrated how important the independence struggle remains in order to legitimize the rule of Frelimo. Chipande (born 1939) was the first Defence minister of Mozambique from 1975 to 1986 and was credited with firing the first shots of the war of independence on 25 September 1964. He caused much agitation but also support when he defended the excessive Lifestyle of FRELIMO members with their independence struggle.220 When he was asked by a journalist how the high-ranking FRELIMO members could have the lifestyle of “ricos” while the majority of the population remains very poor he answered: “At the end of the day wasn’t it the leaders of FRELIMO who have given you the independence that you are profiting from now 221?” Augostinho’s estimation that the behavior of FRELIMO might change once the power is more in the hands of younger elite members, the ones Sumich calls “independence elite” could be true. The younger members did not participate in the liberation struggle and have only childhood souvenirs of socialism. Therefore they have to find other legitimation clusters than the older high-ranking members of FRELIMO. To conclude it can be said, that the persistence of the support of FRELIMO was in many cases not due to the conviction that FRELIMO is a good party that is interested in developing the country. All interviewees believe that at least parts of the ruling elite become more and more corrupt and self-interested. They complain about FRELIMO but will still vote for them. Many middle class members seem to be apathic which means that they do not believe anymore in the legitimacy of FRELIMO but they prefer to opt for the lesser evil instead of trying to change the situation. The symbolic meaning of democratic elections and the representation of the population by political parties risks therefore losing their sense (apart from pleasing the donor community). Nonetheless the creation of 221 Original: « Afinal de contas nao foram eles (os dirigentes do FRELIMO) que trouxeram indepêndica que vovês estao a usufruir ? » Savana, 07.08.2009, p.4 MDM could be one possible alternative to FRELIMO in the future and we are going to explore it in the next sub section. 6.2.3 MDM: An alternative to FRELIMO? In all the interviews, the conversation came more or less automatically to a point where people were talking about MDM and their influence on the next elections (in most cases without being directly asked). The interview partners had different opinions concerning the creation of MDM and it was quite ostensible that older persons interviewed were much more reluctant towards MDM than younger persons who in general welcomed its creation. Ruth and Alina and in a less euphoric way Fernando as well, stated right away that they will vote for MDM because it is time to change and to try new things. Ruth explained that she is of the opinion that the recent government is not interested in the problems of young people who are looking for a job. Alina compared Simongo even to Obama saying that he was giving them the hope to believe in change. It was not difficult to oberserve that the program of MDM was not that important but that it was simply the wish to try something new. Alina said: “Some friends of mine are a little reluctant towards MDM because they are new and have not much experience. But over 30 years of FRELIMO is more than enough, so we just have to start something new. Just give them a try.” Generally even the older person welcomed the creation of MDM but this would not mean that people actually would vote for them in the next elections. Ronaldino for instance, stated that it is good to create parties that do not have a direct link to the liberation war and admitted that MDM could be useful to control FRELIMO one day. Nevertheless, he is of the opinion that FRELIMO develops the country very well and that Gubueza “works well and hard” and therefore he should continue his presidency. Older interview partners like Diogo and Diana stated that MDM is still too small and too inexperienced to be voted for. They argued that: “How can I know that members of MDM are less corrupt than the recent government in power? They have to prove their good intention first and then I can vote for them” Diogo, a traditional but not very active FRELIMO member argued that he would at least prefer MDM in comparison to RENAMO but that the fact that many ancient RENAMO members are part of MDM but be a reason for him not to vote for them. To sum it up we can say that it seems out of question that important parts of the middle class will suddenly turn their back to FRELIMO in order to support the just new created MDM. It is very eye catching though that MDM already succeeded to mobilize many younger people and students 222 who are desperately waiting for a change of the political leadership even though they do not know the direction. 222 No interviews were conducted with students but in informal conversations many spoke about the hope they had put in MDM. Students cannot automatically be considered to be part of the middle class as they have normally no or very low income. In terms of education they belong to the privileged part of the population though. Many of them have also middle class aspirations and will often be part of the middle class of tomorrow. Conclusion Part 3 In this last part of the work the development of the relationship between the urban middle class and the ruling elite was traced. It was shown that the ruling elite has succeeded to adapt to the changing political context and has even achieved to complete their power by influencing manifestly the economy. Due to the aid dependency, the ruling elite is much more interested to please the donor community by serving its interest instead of maintaining their historical relationship with the urban middle class. In contrast to the elite the urban middle class had much more difficulties to adapt to the economic liberalization and its constraints like the wage cuts. We argued that many members start to critzise the lifestyle of the ruling elite because they cannot take the same benefit from the new circumstances. Nevertheless the social control and the dependency of Frelimo remains strong enough to hinder people to exit totally from the political scene by not voting at all or to protest by voting for the opposition. Furthermore middle class members seem to perceive FRELIMO as the lesser evil they know and prefer to vote to them than to the opposition. The new created party is too young and small to convince important parts of middle class members to vote for them. Yet, it has to be mentioned that they already mobilized many younger parts of the middle class. If MDM will manage to institutionalize and to become a regular and stable on the political scene they could be an alternative to FRELIMO one day. Other parts of the middle class are not willing to vote for MDM yet but appreciate their creation because MDM is believed to become a serious opposition in the middle future. To sum it up it can be concluded that the impact of MDM as a new party should not be overestimated. Only if the party achieves to institutionalize and to become a regular part of national politics it could constitute a serious opposition party to FRELIMO. This however would be an important step that could constitute an alternative for parts of the urban middle classes. In this case FRELIMO would have to find new ways to remobilize their historical relationship when they do not want to lose the support of the urban middle class. These developments could help the urban middle class to exercise a certain control on the government. Conclusion The initial aim of this work was to explore the urban middle class in Maputo, to understand who they are, how they life and what relationship they maintain with the state. In order to draw a conclusion to this work we will proceed in three steps. Firstly, the main outcomes of each chapter well be presented and secondly we are going to formulate a first cautious answer to the question posed by the subtitle of this work: “Is the middle class a copy of the elite, or a crucial actor in overcoming the gap between society and the state?” In the third and last part of the conclusion we draw attention to observations that could not be included in this work but could procure some ideas for further research. 1. Outcomes of the work In the first part of the work the relevance of class studies in the developing world in general and in Africa in particular were worked out. The main ideas of literature focusing on middle class in Africa were presented and critically analyzed. It was argued that researchers like Dufloo, Easton and Nany Birdsall follow the same argumentation patterns as the representants of the modernization theory like Martin Lipset. The middle class for them is considered to be the basis for new way of organizations like labour unions or students groups and contribute to the consolidation of democratic regimes. By giving examples of the situation of different countries we argued that the role of the middle class can differ from one country to another and does not have characteristics that can be generalized. After having presented the existent literature about middle class in the developing world and in Africa we realized that there is no consens about how to define the middle class. Indeed we worked out that even economist who claim to work with highly discriminating parameters are using quite different concepts which leads to confusion. In order to find utile parameters for the field work we looked at the state of class analysis in sociology. The pro and contras of using the class concept in Africa were discussed and we concluded that it is possible to use the concept in the African context when beeing conscient that is only an objective utile among others, which is dynamic and should be analyzed in an inclusive way. Aiming to characterise middle class members in Maputo we came up with different conclusions from the first chapter that we took into consideration during the field work in Maputo: 1. It has to be taken into account that classes in the African case are usually not based on the means of production but to a larger extent on that the means of consumption. 2. Many African middle classes are highly state-dependant and it is therefore more difficult for them to have a controlling function towards the government. 3. After having realized that it would be difficult to find what we could call a “middle class consciousness” we based us on the assumption that even the taste and the preferences of persons could give us hints concerning their (more or less inconsciently) class standing. 4. Beeing aware that the characteristics and relations of middle class member to other social groups are highly dependent on the historical context, power relations and can therefore change over the time. Therefore they have to be analyzed in a dynamic and inclusive way. Taking these findings into consideration we tended to identify and characterise middle class members in Maputo. Having taken into consideration the specificities of the historical development of social stratification in Maputo, helped us to understand the recent situation and characteristics of the urban middle class members in Maputo. As we only interviewed 13 persons who were predominantly working as civil servants or as employees of development agencies we cannot pretend to be able to give a representative picture of the urban middle class in Maputo. Nevertheless the outcomes have given us forst insights and can serve as incentives for further research. The main trends among the middle class members that we were able to reveal led to the following characterization of an “ideal middle class member”223: The ideal middle class members in Maputo (the interviewed ones at least) can be distinguished by the poorer parts of the population by their occidental life style. He or she usually speaks Portuguese with their friends, their parents and their children. Hence, her/his children cannot speak regional languages and also the typical middle class member cannot speak regional languages very often. The occidental way of life is also revealed by their clothes and free time occupations like jogging. In contrast to members of the upper class, the ideal middle class member consumes many local products from cheaper informal markets and claims not to spend much money on clothes. He or she cannot afford to send their children to the best private schools and might even send them to public school. However, education seems to be very important as even the he or she is often looking for additional education opportunities even though her or his education level is already over average. Furthermore the ideal middle class member is divided between her/his obligation to help poorer family members and the wish to invest in their own life and to accumulate capital. The typical middle class member does not like to take public transport or to walk a lot. He prefers to have a car even though he or she has to 223 It is indeniable that the ideal middle class member does not exist but the compilation of characteristics is meant to summarize the finding and to illustrate certain evolutions. take a loan for it. Besides that, the most important investment seems to be a self constructed house. In order to construct this house the ideal middle class member in Maputo is willing to wait several years to find a space and another couple of years to be able to finish the construction. The transformation of gender relations seems to be another characteristic of the middle class member. Women tend to have less children and to handle work and education of the children. Nevertheless many men seem to hesitate to accept this new role of the woman. While the typical middle class member is not very active in public life concerning the participation in associations for example, he or she tends to attend church rather regularly. In the third part of this work we were interested to find out about the relation between middle class members and other social groups. As we were also interested to explore the relation to politics we decided to examine the relation between middle class members and the ruling elite of the FRELIMO. We worked out that the historical close relation between middle class members and the ruling elite has changed a lot since the externally imposed liberalization. We argued that there are two different but interdependent evolutions that lead to the alienation of urban middle class members. 1. FRELIMO seems to be less dependent on the urban middle class and can allow itself to become much more self- interested 2. Middle class members cannot take the same advantages of the liberalization and feel that they are denied to high posts because they do not have access to powerful social networks. The conducted fieldwork confirmed the assumption of Sumich that despite the alienation the majority of middle class members will still support FRELIMO even if it is only passively. Nevertheless the fieldwork showed that the alienation seems to have advanced because some middle class members seem to be very enthusiastic towards the newly created MDM. 2. The urban middle class: A copy of the elite or a crucial actor to overcome the gap between state and society? As we have already mentioned in the first part of this work the middle class is often be considered to be a crucial actor in the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of sustainable economic growth. However this assumption was already nuanced by stating that the role of a nation’s middle class depends on many factors, like the historical background and the relation the middle class maintains with other social groups and the dependence or independence towards the state. In the case of Maputo we underlined several times that the relation to the elite was rather a close and good one. During “socialism” the urban middle class and the elite were interdependent. While the elite needed the middle class in Maputo for their extending state apparatus because middle class members had some access to formal education during colonialism. In return the urban middle class experienced a high social mobility. During “socialism” we could therefore conclude that members of the middle class (at least those who were dependant on the state) would rather be a copy of the elite than a crucial actor in overcoming the gap between state and society. Even today many characteristics of the middle class seem very similar to the one of the elite (like in many other parts of the world).The two groups have an occidental lifestyle, are urban based, believe in modernity and education as was to development and have no strong ties to indigenous African structures and power relations. Therefore the difference of the lifestyle of these two groups could be rather a different of degrees depending on economical capital than of different values or believes. Nevertheless the gap between the middle class and the ruling class is becoming wider and the middle class could become something else than the “elites copy”. It has several times been underlines that the persistence of the support of FRELIMO by middle class members was much more due to the lack of an alternative and the believe that the devil you know is better than the devil you do not know. However the creation of MDM showed that some middle class members are perceptible to messages that promise change. Even though many middle class members will still vote for FRELIMO they might change their point of view once MDM has succeeded to establish itself as serious party in the political landscape. If this happens FRELIMO could not anymore neglect its former supporter base and could not stay self-interested like now. Once middle class members would realize how much power and influence they could accomplish their role as crucial actor to overcome the gap between state and society. However it has to be reminded to the fact that the urban middle class remains very dependent on the state and that normally an independent middle class is needed to create state-society linkages224 3. Remaining questions and further research It has already been mentioned that this study could not include all parts of the urban middle class in Maputo. Therefore the work as only a heuristic character and has the aim to stimulate further research on middle class issues in Maputo. Important and influential groups, like the Indian merchants had to be neglected due to the lack of time. Mozambican Entrepreneurs and independents were neglected as well because it was very difficult to get in contact with them and they did not seem to be numerous. In fact, in Maputo it is quite eye catching that large parts of the formal petty trade are in Indian hands. Big companies are usually owned by foreigners and there are very few manufactured Mozambican products on the market which means that almost everything is imported from South Africa or elsewhere. Entrepreneurs are created; they do not fall from the sky. These circumstances lead to the assumption that Mozambique does not have a capitalist class and thus not an independent middle class as well. In a study about small business in Mozambique, Kaufmann refers to the complicated and costly processes which are necessary to open a formal business in Mozambique.225 Indeed the costs to open a formal business are that big that most petty entrepreneur prefers to stay in the informal markets avoiding the contact with the state as much as possible.226Voices which claim to bring the state back in order to promote economic growth and a stronger institutionalization are getting louder. They argue that only the 225 Friedrich Kaufmann and Wilhelm Parlmeyer, “Mozambique: the reason to be is the reason not to prosper”, Lisboa, Centro de Estudos Africanos, 2000 226 Friedrich Kaufmann, “Pequenas e médias empresas em Mocambique (2007): Situaçao, Perspectives e Desafios”, Ministério da Indústria e comércio direccao nacional da Indústria, 2007 state can promote sustainable economic growth that leads to the creation of labour and the creation of a Mozambican entrepreneurial class227. It is also argued that all successful developing countries have had extensive state involvement in the economy, and it is the state which promotes and creates successful capitalism. One example of this increasing demand is the Publication of Agenda 2025 which was published in 2003 by a broad but very establishment group of 14 Mozambicans who attacked BWI (Breton Wood Institutions) structural adjustment policy and the bias towards foreign investment, while calling for a development bank and a more interventionist economic policy by the state. The report notes that: “The macroeconomic policies of a neo-liberal nature introduced in the 90’s (…) were leading to an increase of the commercial sector to the detriment of industrialization…the main factories and SME (small and medium enterprises) closed down…” The report further critzise that “Mozambique provides incentives for attracting direct foreign investment, but there is no plan for empowering national entrepreneurs coming from traditionally disadvantaged sectors. The result is “economic activity” dominated by foreigners while economic dependency on South Africa increases”228. 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A critical view”, Maputo, IESE Working PAPER, 2008 Easterly, Williams, “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth”, Working paper 94, Center for global development, 08.2006 Easterly, Williams, “The middle class consensus and Economic Development”, Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank group, 2001 Gymiah-Boadi, E. and Armah Attoh, Daniel, “Are democratic citizens emerging in Africa?” Afrobarometer Briefing Paper, N°70, 05.2009 Hanlon, Joseph and Mosse, Marcelo, “Is Mozambique’s elite moving from corruption to development?”, Presentation UNU-Wider Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, Helsinki 12-13 June 2009 Kaufmann, Franz, “Pequenas e médias empresas em Mocambique Situaçao, Perspectives e Desafios”, Ministério da Indústria e comércio direccao nacional da Indústria, 2007 Kaufmann, Friedrich and Parlmeyer Wilhelm, Mozambique, “The reason to be is the reason not to prosper”, Documentos de Trabalho nº 59, Centro de Estudos Africanos , Lisboa, 2006 Hanlon, Joseph and De Renzio, Paolo de, “Contested Sovereignty in Mozambique: The Dilemmas of Aid Dependence”, GEG Working Paper 25, Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations, 2007 INE, “Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre orcamento familiar”, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica Minsiterio da Industria e comércio direccao nacional da Industria, 2002/2003 Luckham, Robin, “The middle class and their role in national development”, Policy Brief 11, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2005 Lavallee, Emmanuelle, Razafindrakolo, Mireille and Rouboud, Francois, “Corruption and Trust in political institutions in Sub Saharan Africa” Afrobarometer N°102, 2008 Logan, Carolyn, Tetsuya, Fujiwara and Parish, Virginia,” Citizens and the State in Africa”, Afrobarometer Round 3 Working Paper 61, 2006 Mattes, Robert and Shenga, Carlos, “Citizenship in a low information Society Mozambicans in comparative Perspective”, Afrobarometer Working Paper N°9, 2007 Ministerio de Plano e Finances, “Pobreza e bem estar em Mozambique: Segunda evaliacao nacional”, Direcao Nacional do Plano e Orcamento Ministerio de Plano e Finances, 2004 Mosse, Marcelo and Manjate, Augostinho and Cortez Edson, “Country Study Report Mozambique”, Transparency International, 2006/2007 Morier-Genoud, Eric, « Guerre et transformation sociale »-Notes sur le cas mozambicain, séminaire conflits armés en ASS, 09.02.2006 CEAN Bordeaux Öhm, Manfred, „Mosambik: Demokratie ohne Mehrwert“, Friedrich-EbertStiftung, Maputo, 2008 Olaitan Wale, “Towards a functional african state- Bridging the gap between the state and the people”, Paper Codesria, Maputo, 2005 Quelroz de Souza, Andrea, „Schwerpunkt Bildung“, Mosambik Rundbrief Nr. 74, Berlin 05/2008 Schwarzbauer, Annette, „Weckruf mit Hahn-die neue Partei MDM in Mosambik“, KAS Länderbericht Mosambik, 03.2009 Schwarzbauer, Annette, „Drei Präsidentschaftskandidaten,26 Parteien, 340.000 neue Wähler –Wahlvorbereitungen in Mosambik“, KAS Länderbericht Mosambik, 09. 2009 Sumich, Jason and Honwana, João, “Strong party, weak state? 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WEB Sources: Amnesty International “License to kill: Police Accountability in Mozambique”, Amnesty-International, 04.2008 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR41/001/2008/en Bertelsmann Transformationsindex, „Kurzgutachten Mosambik 2008“ http://www.bertelsmann-transformationindex.de/fileadmin/pdf/Kurzgutachten_BTI_2008/ESA/BTI_2008_Mosambik.pdf Bertelsmann Transformations index, “Mosambique Country Report 2008” http://www.bertelsmann-transformationindex.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI_2008/ESA/Mozambique.pdf Freedomhouse, “Electoral Democracies 2006”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=269&year=2006 Grimmard, Alain, “Maputo, Mozambique: Cities in climate change initiative“ http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/6007_26351_Maputo_Mozambique Smith, Russell, “Mozambique’s economic hopes washed away”, 24.02.2000, BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/655557.html UNDP, “Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2008 - HDI rankings”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ UNICEF, “Mozambique, Education: Progress and challenges” http://www.unicef.org/mozambique/education.html www.allafrica.com: “Government ratifies minimum wage increases”, 28.04.09, http://allafrica.com/stories/200904280769.html „Mozambique: Political Environment favorable to Frelimo’s Victory“, 24.08.09 http://allafrica.com/stories/200908250445.html “MDM excluded from most constituencies”, 7.09.2009 http://allafrica.com/stories/200909081129.html “MDM accuses CNE of stealing its documents”, 30.09.2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200910010741.html Table des annexes SUMMARIES OF THE INTERVIEWS......................................................... 138 SUMMARY INTERVIEW AUGUSTIHNO ................................................... 139 SUMMARY INTERVIEW DIANA ................................................................ 141 SUMMARY INTERVIEW FAUSIA .............................................................. 143 SUMMARY INTERVIEW PAULA ............................................................... 144 SUMMARY INTERVIEW RONALDINO ..................................................... 146 SUMMARY INTERVIEW DIOGO ............................................................... 148 SUMMARY INTERVIEW ARSENIO ........................................................... 149 SUMMARY INTERVIEW JERRY................................................................ 150 SUMMARY INTERVIEW STEFAN…………………………………………...151 SUMMARY INTERVIEW FERNANDO……………………………………….152 SUMMARY INTERVIEW ELENA ........................................................... 15455 SUMMARY INTERVIEW ALINA ................................................................ 157 Summaries of the interviews The summaries do not contain all information about the persons but are only meant to present the persons and the characteristics which seemed to be important for the field work. If needed, handwritten notes and the recorded interviews can be handed in. The names of the persons had been changed in order to protect their privacy. SUMMARY INTERVIEW AUGOSTIHNO (m, 38, Shangaan, Ronga, and Portuguese, Interview in Portuguese, recorded) Work and Education: He works as driver at the GTZ (German development agency) since 02.2008. Besides driving his boss he helps with the accountability of some projects. He earns 7500 Mt (280 $) and sometimes some bonus. In January 2010 he would like to return to university to study accountability as he has already studies accountability for two years but could not finish because of the lack of money. The job as driver is a sort of degradation for him as he worked in Tete at MOGAS at the administration before where he earned 10.000 MT (370$) and had free housing. When he was fired because of structural adjustments within the enterprise he stayed two years without working before starting to work as driver. Family and Housing AUGOSTINHO is married and is responsible for 6 persons. His children (15, 10, 6) go to public school, and he is also in charge of a child from the wife’s family (5). He lives in Zimpeto (periphery) in an area of small but modern arranged stone houses and he owns one of them for 12 years now. While he has electricity, tap water, television, laptop and a fridge he cannot afford to buy a car. Therefore he has to spent much money for himself and for his children for public transport (about 250 Mt per week). Consumption patterns and Lifestyle In his free time he likes to play football, to be on his computer, listening to music and to be with his family. He cannot afford to go to restaurants, theater etc. Nevertheless he manages to travel to other provinces or South Africa once in a while. At home he speaks Shangaan and Portuguese but has the tendency to speak more Portuguese with the children because they speak it the whole day at school. Religion He goes to Catholic Church once a week. Political opinion He reads the newspaper “Noticias” wherever he finds it but cannot afford to buy it regularly (costs 20Mt). However, he follows the news every night at the television. He states that he does not like politicians in general and thinks that power corrupts everyone and that limits have to be set. Even though he claims that he was never member of FRELIMO he is suspicious towards other political parties as well. MDM for him is too small yet to constitute an alternative to FRELIMO but in his opinion this party could become a real opposition in the future. The next generation seems much more decisive for him, because its members were not involved in the liberation struggle and elite members cannot anymore legitimate their positions from their participation in the liberalization war. In his opinion FRELIMO will again win the elections but will have to fraught much more than before because people are frustrated and will not vote for them. When asked about the biggest problems in the country and in Maputo AUGOSTINHO claimed that corruption was one of the biggest issues and obstacles to development, and accuses especially police and justice. (Self) Perception of socio economic position: AUGOSTINHO does not consider himself as poor because he can offer three meals to his family members and himself in everyday life. For him people are poor when they can only eat once or twice a day. When asked to put himself on a scale from 1 (rich) to 5 (poor) he was not sure if he could put himself between 3 and 4. For him people on 3 (middle middle class) are a little bit better of than he is because they can afford to get a credit to buy a car. Referring to our criteres, AUGOSTINHO is a member of the so called lower middle class because he combines characteristics of poor and middle class people. He owns a small but stable house and has some comfort and a regular income and his children will go to secondary school (you have to pay for it). Nevertheless he remains vulnerable cannot have a car and cannot afford to participate in social/ cultural activities like cinema, theater etc. SUMMARY INTERVIEW DIANA (f, 40 years old, Portuguese, Shangaan, and German.Interview was in Portuguese and German, not recorded, notes available) Work and Education: She is Secretary at the DED Head Quarter since 2002 and earns 17.000 Mt ($650) Besides her full time job she is a student and goes to university (from 17.15-22.00) at night to study pedagogy. She is aware of the fact that the DED will not stay in the country forever and therefore she would like to have the ability to become teacher one day to assure her income. Before she came to the DED she had several jobs in the informal sector like repairing televisions, playing in the theatre and working in a bar. She could only get the job at the DED because she learned German during her time as student/guest worker in East Germany from 1982-1988. Family and Housing She is married and has two children who are 14 years old and 8 years old She lives in an apartment in Alto Maé (center of Maputo) which has 4 rooms and that belongs to her family since the state sold it in 1985. The building she lives in is protected by a garde and she feels quite save in her neigbourhood. She lives there with her children, her husband (who is engineer for the army), a sister, two nices and an empregada. She has a car together with her husband and has Internet at home. She supports her parents financially and visits them often in Matola. Consumption patterns and Lifestyle The food DIANA consumes is bought in Malanga, a local very cheap market For serious health problems she prefers to go to private clinics even if it is quite expensive. She speaks more Portuguese than Shangaan with her children and therefore the children cannot speak Shangaan very well. She would likes them to speak better Shangaan but thinks that Portuguese is more important and useful, as it is also spoken at school with friends etc. In her free time DIANA likes to travel to South Africa. Religion She goes to Church once a week, participates in different church activities and visits members of the church at home. Political opinion DIANA believes that the state of democracy improved and feels that the freedom of expression has increased. Corruption remains for her a very big problem, as well as the high unemployment rate. It seems as if she would have interiorized the discourse of some donors when saying that the mentality of people would have to change it real development is to occur. According to her many Mozambicans are not working hard enough for the development of the country. She is of the opinion that MDM could become an opposition force one day but not at the upcoming elections. Therefore she will note vote for them until they have not proved to have the will to change things. When they have proved to be right she is willing to “participate” in the elections but not before. She doesn’t know yet if she is going to participate in the elections as the lines are so long and people would have to wait for hours to vote. SUMMARY INTERVIEW FAUSIA (36, Portuguese, Shangaan, Interview in Portuguese, notes available) Work: FAUSIA is geography teacher in the Josias Machel secondary school (public) in the center of Maputo. She claims to earn 12.000 Mt (430$) per month. She gave private lessons to complete her income until her husband found a better job in the private sector. Now that her husband earns ”enough” she “only” gives 20 lessons per week. Family and Housing: She is married and lives with her husband and her two children (8, 12) close to Matola and has to travel one hour to come to work. Living in a small suburb of Matola is much more cheaper so that her family could build a small house with three rooms, water, electricity etc. there. Political opinion: She is very frustrated and does not believe in any party. She has been member of the labour union for teachers but is not there anymore because she has the feeling the leaders are not taking them seriously. She does not seem to have a real opinion does not read a lot of newspaper but watches the news every evening at home. (Self) Perception of the socio-economic position: FAUSIA put herself exactly in the middle (3) saying that she is vulnerable but better of as many people she knows. She also stated that she has enough to eat and that the family possesses a house. Nevertheless the rice of prices, cost of transportation and the increasing work troubled her life and she was feeling that the situation of teachers was worsening as the sizes of class rises but the number of teachers remains the same. SUMMARY INTERVIEW PAULA (f, 35, Portuguese, English, interview in Portuguese and English, recorded) Work and Education: She is giving classes at the institute of anthropology at the University of Eduardo Mondlane twice a week and does research. She made her master at Cape Town, South Africa and her Lecencitura in Brazil. In the future she would like to go to Norway to make her PHD. The journeys to Brazil and South Africa were only possible because she managed to get good scholarships due to her outstanding results in secondary school. Family, Social Background and Housing: Her family comes from a village not very far from Nampula and she is the only one from her family to be in Maputo. She lives with her husband (who comes from Maputo and works as social worker in the prison) in a house (3 rooms) on the campus. This house is provided by the state for people working at the university. She has a daughter who is almost 3 years old and employs an empregada. She does not want to have further kids, because she wants to provide the best education she can to her daughter. Lifestyle Consumption patterns PAULA and her husband speak only Portuguese with each other and with their daughter. She tries to go to South Africa as often as possible because they believe the quality and the price of products are better. In Maputo they us market places and Shoprite, Wal-Mart depending on the products and the money they can spend. PAULA pays the school fees of a younger brother because she has the feeling to have to help her family in Nampula who is quite poor. PAULA says she likes to sleep and to play with her daughter in the free time she has. (Self) Perception of socio economic position: She considers herself to be in the middle (3) because she can buy enough food, has a decent housing and has a regularly income. Religion Political opinion PAULA did not go to church because she feels that “they only want your money”. Furthermore she claimed not to be interested into politics. She would neither read journals nor watch TV. She estimates that many things written are not true and that much propaganda is distributed. She said if she wants to know what is going on she takes the Chapa and starts to talk with the people in there. Even though she claims not to be member of FRELIMO we had the feeling that she was defending their position. When asked about corruption she answered that “Corruption exists in every country…in Mozambique it is not a bigger issue that in other countries.” When asked about the biggest challenges to develop the country she argued that international development agencies needed better coordination but did not criticize the government at all. A certain loyalty or apathy became clear once more when she was asked about MDM as she stated, “MDM cannot win, because they are in the opposition.” SUMMARY INTERVIEW RONALDINO (30, Shangaan Portuguese, French, Interview in French, recorded) Work and Education: RONALDINO teaches Portuguese and French at a secondary school in Laulane (district in the periphery of Maputo). To complement his salary he works in the evening as teacher at a police school and gives some private lessons too. He said that he would earn about 27.000 Mt (1000 $) a month. While he was studying he received two scholar ships (sponsored by the french cooperation) that allowed him to travel to France for some months. Even though he already finished his formation as teacher he would like to participate in a master program in France. Family and Housing RONALDINO is married (wife does not work) and has already three children (12, 3, 9 mois). They live all together at the house of his parents near Praca das Combattantes (periphery but not far from the center). At the moment he is construction his own house with three rooms in Laulane. He prefers to construct an own house, even in the periphery so that he does not need to pay a rent every month. Lifestyle, Consumption patterns RONALDINO owns a Toyata Corola which he uses to get to work every morning. In his free time he likes to play football and to go to the beach. The food his family consumes is bought in market places like Xipamanine and Xelene (very popular, not hygienic but very cheap). Sometimes he also goes to Shoprite and Hypermarket but as it is much more expensive only special offers are used. RONALDINO is the only one in the house who has an income so that 6 other persons are depending on his incomes as well as some members of the family of his wife. Even though his salary does not seem to be very low, especially in the maputian context, he claims to have often problems at the end of the month. Religion RONALDINO is member of a Catholic Church and member of its youth organization B (for those who already have a family and who are responsible) which consists of 27 families. Together with this group he and his wife have already traveled to Inhambane and have participated in exchanges with other churches. Every couple in the group pays a certain amount for social activities. Political opinion “Politics is like football you cannot avoid to speak about it, it is everywhere” (The interview was conducted next to the school director’s office). RONALDINO was one of the few persons who claimed to be a convinced member of FRELIMO. He claimed to be a supporter of Gubueza and pronounced a very optimistic vision concerning the future of Mozambique. He argued that corruption might be a problem but exists also elsewhere. (Self) Perception of the socio- economic situation RONALDINO claims that he does not belong to the very poor because he (and his family members) can eat three times a day, meets his basic needs and has a stable and regular income. Nevertheless he puts himself between 3 and 4 and cannot really consider himself as beeing part of the middle. According to him, someone who is in the middle has always 500Mt (9$) in the pocket on every single day of the month. For him this is getter difficult in the end of the month. Another criterion which seems to be very important to him is the ability to get a credit from the bank. He gave the example, that only persons who can proof that they have always at least 5.0000 Mt (90$) on their account can get a loan of 200.000 Mt (7200$). SUMMARY INTERVIEW DIOGO (m, 45, Shangaan, Portuguese, English, Interview in Portuguese, recorded) Work and Education: DIOGO is the director of human resources at a small security firm in Coop (central district of Maputo) and earns about 8000 Mt per month ($320). He is responsible to prepare the payments of ca. 60 security men every month. He claims that it is very difficult to know the socioeconomic position of a person. “You can have shoes but no work or work but no shoes” People who work under him and touch officially the minimum wage (2150Mt) and have a car. While he is their superior his everyday life is more modest. He went to Germany from 1986 - 1989 to become a skilled worker and he started a formation in human resources. Family and Housing DIOGO lives in a small stone house next to Praca dos Combattantes in the periphery where he pays 3000 Mt (100$) per month. He lives there with his daughter (7) and wife who does not work. At the moment he has a lot of conflicts with his wife because he would like to educate his daughter “the European way” Lifestyle and Consumption patterns and Religion He has similar consumption patterns as AUGUSTINHO. What was very visible is that he spoke a lot about Germany and would like to show his daughter the country where he stayed 4 years. At the moment he has a lot of conflicts with his wife because he would like to educate his daughter “the European way” and prefers to speak Portuguese with her. He said that the migration experience changed his values and that he often comes in conflict with local beliefs and customs. DIOGO goes to a catholic church on Fridays because he prefers them in Portuguese. Political opinion He is FRELIMO member for 23 years but is not active. He welcomes the creation of the MDM but does not trust them. He claims as well that nobody can get rich without being corrupt. Therefore corruption is necessary and sometimes useful. SUMMARY INTERVIEW ARSENIO (m, 42, Portuguese, Makua, French, Interview conducted in French, recorded) Work and Education ARSENIO works as a civil servant in the defense ministry and teaches also french in a secondary school in Maputo. He claims to earn about 27.000 Mt per month ($1000). Family He is married and has two children (12,17) and two nephews living at his place. ARSENIO supports many of his poorer family members in Capo Delgado. Housing Lives in a house in the district of triumph next to the beach and costa do sol. Before he constructed this house he was renting an apartment in Bairro Central B. He claims to be very happy to own his house as he feels much more independent even though the house is smaller than the apartment. Lifestyle and Consumption patterns Likes to shop at the Maputo shopping center (very Indian),loves the beach and likes to travel to South Africa. He wants his children to be engineers. Political opinion ARSENIO is not member of FRELIMO and is of the opinion that this might be a reason why he does not get bonus at the defense ministry. He likes MDM but states they are too small perhaps it will change within the year. Corruption is a big issue for him that will not change in the nearer future (Self) Perception of the socioeconomic situation Believes to belong to the better off (3) but is also aware of the fact that he could have much more if he would not have to support poorer family members. SUMMARY INTERVIEW JERRY (m, 25, Portuguese, Shangaan, English, Interview in English, notes available) Work and Education: JERRY works as IT specialist at the Administration section of the Eduardo Mondlane University for 6 month. He earns 17.000 Meticais per month ($610). He got the job because he had already worked in the same section during his holidays when he was a student. Housing and Family JERRY lives still with his family in Bairro central. His family lives in Maputo since several generations. His father worked in the military and is still very loyal to FRELIMO. Jerry has a girlfriend and would like to marry her soon to found an own family with her, but she has to finish her studies first. Religion JERRY is member of the testimony of Jehova for 3 years. His family does not go to church but he attends several meetings a week and takes religion very seriously. Lifestyle As JERRY only has to take care of himself he can afford to own a Mazda. He has already traveled to South Africa, Kenya and Holland (always for professional reasons). Besides attending meeting of his church he likes to go running with his girlfriend. Even though he can speak Shangaan he speaks Portuguese with the majority of his friends and even with the family. He uses Shangaan only to speak to very old family members who cannot speak very well Portuguese. Political opinion JERRY claimed that he was not at all interested in politics and that he would probably not vote. Indeed it was not possible to get into a conversation about politics with him and he stayed very neutral the whole time. SUMMARY INTERVIEW STEFAN (m, 30, Portuguese, Shangaan, English, Interview in English) Work and Education STEFAN is civil servant at the Administration of EDM and earns 18.000 Mt. Housing and Family He owns a house with three rooms in Bairro Central and lives with his pregnant wife. He was one of the persons who clearly stated that he tries to cut the ties with his extended family in order to care about his nuclear family. He underlines that he has only one wife and is proud that his wife holds a university degree as well and has worked before she got pregnant. Consumption patterns and Lifestyle STEFAN does not support any poor family members. He can use his income for his nuclear family and even though his income is not very high he was able to buy a Toyota without beeing on the loan. He wears formal, good clothes and we had the expression that he likes to show what he has. His food and the products he consumes come from Maputo Shopping Center but also from market places. Religion He belongs to the new protestant church “Assembly of Good” and participates in various activities during the week and the weekend. He is responsible of the secretary and the coordination of the mission department. His wife organizes meetings were members are visiting each other. Political opinion STEFAN seems not to be very interested in politics. However he has a rather optimistic view but claims that changes only come with the time. He believes that especially young people will vote for MDM which could make them a serious opposition in 5 years. SUMMARY INTERVIEW FERNANDO (m, 31, Portuguese, Ndau, English, Interview was in English, notes available) Work and Education FERNANDO works as an Economic Specialist at an UN agency and earns $3500 (96.000 Mt) a month. According to him he got the job through the newspaper without knowing anyone before. He worked as lecturer at the University of Beira before and remains interested in research and becoming lecturer again one day for ideological reasons even though he would earn less. He likes to work with young people and would like to go to Japan to participate in a PHD program. Family, Social Background and Housing He comes from a small village near Beira and his parents are simple farmers and can both not read and not write. However, they made much effort to send him to elementary and secondary school where teachers supported him because of his potential. He got a scholarship for his lecentura at Beira University and then one to do his master in Great Britain. At the moment he is living with his Japanese girlfriend (knew each other in Great Britain) in Mahangalene (central district) in an apartment with 4 rooms, that he rents Consumption patterns and Lifestyle The interview was conducted at his home at interestingly no signs of wealth (prestige symbols like big TV, expensive furniture) could be seen. Also his clothes does not let know that he has a very high salary, especially in the Mozambican context. Unlike others who earn much less he does not employ an empregada and prefers to walk to work. Nevertheless he claims to buy the food only at supermarkets in Maputo Shopping Center, Shoprite etc. At the moment he is supporting 7 persons financially (6 which are not living with him). In his freetime he likes to go to the beach, to restaurants and to travel. Religion He is catholic but attends also the Buddhist meetings of his girlfriend Political opinion FERNANDO claims that he has never been member of any political party and sharply critizised the corruption. He said that he would not accept corruption in his everyday life, because he knows his rights. He believes that the majority of the people does not really know what the notion democracy stands for, or could stand for but is also of the opinion that things are getting better. Even though there seems to be a big confusion between the party and the government he claims that the freedom of speech is much more respected now. One of the key problems for him is that “the country tends to please the donors first and not the citizens”. (Self) perception of socio economic position FERNANDO is aware of the fact that he has a very high income. Never the less he does not count himself to what we could call upper class or elite but to the upper middle (2) due to the fact that he comes from a poor rural background and has not access to political and social networks of the upper classes in Maputo. SUMMARY INTERVIEW ELENA (w, 39, Shangaan, Portuguese, German, Interview in German) Work and Education ELENA works in the administration, accountability section of the DED Headquarter and earns 30.000Mt ($1100) a month. When she finished secondary school she worked for the ministry and was send to Germany to study from 1985 to 1989.She continues her studies to get a Master because she knows that her contract with DED could finish one day and then she would like to work as civil servant. Family and Housing Her husband became ill and died several years ago and she lives now with her two sons (14, 17) in an apartment in the central district. Even though jewelry and the cell phone have been robed, she feels secure. Consumption patterns and Lifestyle and Religion ELENA uses both, formal supermarkets like Shoprite and market places like the Mercardo Central in the Baixa. In the freetime she likes to go to the beach or to have a drink in a restaurant/café near the sea when she has time. She speaks only Portuguese with her children as they don’t understand Shangaan very well.The belief in good seems to be important to her and ELENA goes to Catholic Church once a week. Political opinion ELENA is not interested in politics and has never been member of FRELIMO or another political party. She condemns the corruption BUT thinks that it is better that FRELIMO stays in power. She argues that its members are already rich and don’t need to enrich themselves no more. So they might have some money left to develop the country. If a poorer party would get the power they would fill up their pockets first before thinking about the population. She does not know yet if she is going to anticipate in the elections as she does not like the long lines.SUMMARY INTERVIEW RUTH (w, 35, Portuguese, English, Interview in English, notes available) Work and Education RUTH Maia works as secretary at GTZ HIV Unit since April 2008 and earns 22.000 Mt ($800) a month. She claims that she found the job through a newspaper and did not know anyone there before. She has worked in many different companies before (travel agency, book store etc.) and had difficulties to find a job. She started university (Accountability, Editory) but interrupted when she got pregnant. When she got the job at the GTZ she started university (private) again in order to make her Lecencitura. Family and Housing Her family lives in Maputo for several generations bur she moved to Tete for 4 years with the parents-in-law (husband got a job) and came back to Maputo in 2006. Her husband (works at Britcol Company as IT specialist) and she have two children (7, 4). They live together with her father in his house in Sommershield (richest area of town). The family has two empregadas (cooking, cleaning) but no security men which is quite unusual for the area. The father who was an assimilado bought the house 1978 from a Portuguese who was leaving the country. This is not a very common situation as the majority of the houses in the area of Sommershield are owned by high ranking Frelimo members who live in there or rent them to rich strangers. RUTH sends her daughter to a catholic private school (150$ a month) because the quality of the public school are not good enough for her daughter. Consumption patterns and Lifestyle RUTH likes to take her children to the fun fair next to the Maputo Shopping Center. She also likes to visit friends in Matola who have bigger houses so that the children can move a lot around. She has been to Portugal several times but claims that it has become very expensive and difficult for her to travel. Clothes are not to important to her and she claims to buy them only about twice a year (has very stylish clothes though). She would like to travel to Europe to study and would not mind to stay even longer. RUTH cannot not speak any regional language and her husband and herself are only talking in Portuguese with their children. Religion She goes to church only on special occasion like Easter and Christmas and Religion does not seem to play an important role in her life. Political opinion RUTH (and her family) has (have) never been member of FRELIMO and she open claims to vote for MDM on the next elections. She argued that the government is not concerned about the problems of the youth, unemployment and the problem of adequate houses etc. and that the obstacles to get a loan a very high. However she is very comprehensive when it comes to corruption because she sees is as a result from the low salaries. According to her bribes are also very useful “to get things done” and as a way “to accelerate things and to get a better treatment”. SUMMARY INTERVIEW ALINA (f, 34, Portuguese, English, Interview was conducted in Portuguese, notes available) Work and Education At the moment ALINA works as IT specialist for the Finance ministry and earns about 30.000 Mt ($1000) a month. After her Lecencitura in informatics she started to work at a bank. She is of the opinion that the work and the colleagues in the bank were better but applied in the Finance ministry because the salary is better. She openly admitted that she got the job because she had friends who helped her and also told that she had to become member of Frelimo for her job. In the future she would like to find a good paid job in the private economy but stated that it could become very difficult because many young people were coming from university. Family and Housing The grandfather of ALINA was a male nurse and had the status of an assimilado which brought certain advantages to her and her family. Today she lives in Polana in an apartment with three rooms and employs an empregada for the cleaning and the cooking at five days the week. She is not married and has no children. She would like to have children but claims not to have met the right man. Consumption patterns and Lifestyle and Religion ALINA seems to have a very Occidental lifestyle; she likes to go jogging, to spend the evening in bars and does not speak any regional language because her parents forbid the empregadas to teach her. She is catholic but goes never to church, said Religion is not important in her life. Political opinion ALINA is officially member of Frelimo but openly claimed that she will vote for MDM. Her argumentation is about the same than RUTH’s. She wants something change and something new because she is disillusioned by Frelimo.
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