The Eurasian Era
Volume 1 | Number 1 | Summer 2016
In This Issue
Shifting Political Dynamics and Democratic Disillusionment in
Hungary’s Political Youth
Hobbes’s Leviathan: A Critique of the Omnipotent Sovereign
Is Political Islam Compatible with Democracy?
How the Manas Basing Crisis Illustrated Russian Behavior in the
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New World Power?
Eurasian Research and Analysis Institute
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EDITORIAL BOARD
Will Lasky – Editor in Chief
Rejeanne Lacroix – Editor
Rebekah Nowak – Editor
Michael Kameras – Editor
Saye-Chantl Joseph – Editor
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Michael Zeller holds Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Corvinus
University of Budapest. His bachelor’s degree is in Political Science from the
University of Louisville.
Erik Khzmalyan holds a B.A. in Political Science from Southwest Minnesota State
University. His research interests include Middle East Politics, American Foreign
Policy, and Political Philosophy.
Anna Kruglova holds M.Sc. in Security Studies from UCL and is completing M.A.
in International Conflict Studies at King’s College. She worked at MEC
International, The Bow Group and Integrity UK.
Mariya Pak Feuer is an international policy consultant based in Washington, DC.
She holds a PhD in human geography with a focus on international water
management from Oregon State University.
Table of Contents
Shifting Political Dynamics and Democratic Disillusionment in Hungary’s Political Youth 3
By Michael Zeller
Hobbes’s Leviathan: A Critique of the Omnipotent Sovereign ..............................................12
By Erik Khzmalyan
Is Political Islam Compatible with Democracy? .....................................................................20
By Anna Kruglova
Battle for the Base: How the Manas Basing Crisis Illustrated Russian Behavior in the
Conduct of Foreign Affairs ......................................................................................................28
By Michael Zeller
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New World Power? ...........................................37
By Mariya Pak Feuer
2
Shifting Political Dynamics and Democratic
Disillusionment in Hungary’s Political Youth
By Michael Zeller
Politics and governance is increasingly dynamic; development of rapid means of
disseminating information, innovation of new modes of political mobilization, and
diversification of both has destabilized previously durable political infrastructures.
In democratic states, where political parties and the systems in which they operate
have pluralized societies, the effects of these developments are most profound. Party
systems in western democracies are fraying from challenges to longstanding parties,
both endogenously and exogenously. New forms of constituent mobilization and the
further political pluralization of societies facilitated thereby, together, portend at
least more electoral volatility, and more menacingly engender the threat of political
atomization.
The young democracies of the post-Soviet space are meeting these novelties in a
rather different manner, however. Whereas in Western Europe new mobilization
tools and culture has overlain the presiding political system, in the East it has
grown up alongside the new political order and its party constituents. Hungary
exemplifies this dissimilarity. The two foremost Hungarian political parties,Fidesz –
Magyar Polgári Szövetség (or simply Fidesz), along with its alliance
partnerKereszténydemokrata Néppárt (the Christian Democratic People’s Party, or
KDNP)[1], and Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (or simply Jobbik) — both
products of the post-communist era system[2] — are notable for their prevalent and
robust media and mobilization apparatuses. The political socialization that these
tools facilitate, particularly among the youth (see Saltman 2014), has produced
their current primacy in Hungarian politics.
Yet Hungary is not exempted from the phenomenon of party system shift that has
gripped much of Europe. The rise of a far-right party, ideological
shift and weakening of centrist politics, and forces of consolidation for a new
political dynamic — similar to several democracies, these developments have been
visited on Hungary. What factors underlay these vicissitudes, what sustained them?
This article argues that the right-wing political youth — the dominant sector of
Hungary’s politically-involved youth, mobilized under the aegis of Fidesz and of
Jobbik party organizations — is dismissive of opposition parties, largely
disillusioned by the post-Soviet democratic experience and, resultantly,
unsupportive of the liberal democratic system. Furthermore, the illiberal regime
alterations supported by the right-wing youth, insomuch as they coincide with and
buttress realignment in Hungary’s political system, represent a threat to the
3
unconsolidated democracy of Hungary and exemplify a challenge prevalent across
European politics.
In establishing the basis for and advancing this argument, the article excerpts a
significant facet from a more thorough examination of right-wing youth politics in
Hungary (Zeller 2015). The article first presents in brief the research methods and
pertinent literature that informed the original study. Then, an exposition of focus
group testimony provides material for a concise analysis of the attitudinal
phenomenon that jeopardizes the democratic consolidation of Hungary, and indeed
the democratic stability of several European systems.
Literature and Context
My larger study necessarily sought, as have others (Szabó et al. 2013, 2015,
Saltman 2014), to describe the ideological disposition of Hungary’s political youth
before analyzing their role in the political system. A highly serviceable construct for
identifying and describing the ideological characteristics are Arend Lijphart’s
(1990[3]) dimensions of ideology, a series of qualitative frames for detailed
evaluation of a political system’s or subsections ideological makeup.
Lijphart identified seven dimensions observed in democratic systems, including
‘regime support.’ Essentially, this dimension is understood as a percentage scale
wherein complete support for the governing system would represent one-hundred
percent and complete opposition zero percent. Though difficult to quantify and
subject to numerous qualifications, levels of regime support among electorates, and
especially in key sub-populations thereof, form a critical aspect of the life of a liberal
democracy.
Even cursory observation of Hungarian political affairs reveals that that dimension
is a present and significant element, indeed all the more significant given the
adolescence of Hungary’s democracy. Recent elections have created and consolidated
a new political dynamic in the country, namely, the collapse of the political left and
the rise of the new center of political competition, between the right-wing Fidesz
party and the far-right Jobbik party.
This shift corresponds to what Scott Flanagan and Russell Dalton (1990) termed
‘realignment.’ Distinct from the converse phenomenon of ‘dealignment,’ which
depreciates the functionality of political parties, realignment alters party
allegiances and results from the forces of segmental (i.e. religious, ethnic, and
regional divisions) and economic cleavages. Observation of a systematic
realignment, and its ongoing consolidation, informed and shaped the larger study
from which this article is derived, and which held as a premise the contention that
the generation currently coming into political maturity (ages 18 to 30) will play a
critical role in determining Hungary’s political future.
4
Methodology
The study conducted focus groups with youth party groups of Fidesz-KDNP
(Fidelitas) and Jobbik (Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat, or Jobbik IT, meaning ‘Jobbik
Youth Division’), including ones with Miskolc and Budapest Jobbik IT members and
one with Debrecen Fidelitas members. Groups were of the traditional field variety,
that is, conducted in-person, directed by an engaged moderator (myself) and with
the assistance of a translator. (The same translator was employed for each focus
group, thereby eliminating any communicative incongruence from group to group.)
Participants were gathered from targeted populations (members of party youth
groups) on a voluntary, first-come, first-served basis. The focus groups each lasted
an hour and a half to two hours, included six or seven participants aged eighteen to
thirty, and were documented with field notes and audio recording.
The interviews were semi-structured and employed a “funnel-based” method,
beginning with general questions about participants’ introduction to politics and
party affiliation and moving toward more particularized questions (though phrased
in such a way to evoke thorough responses) including, for the purposes of this
article, inquiries regarding respondents’ ideological dispositions toward the current
regime. Participants were asked about their perception of existent corruption, about
the transformation from the socialist to the democratic regime, and about the
quality of Hungary’s democracy. Moreover, as a matter closely linked to the liberal
democratic regime, participants were asked about Hungary’s membership in the
European Union. And more generally, the group members’ descriptions of their own
party and, crucially, of others — whether there was a so-called ‘loyal opposition’
perspective or rather a staunch conviction that others are illegitimate—revealed
much about their assimilation (or lack thereof) of the values of a liberal democratic
electorate.
The Case of Hungary
The party system in Hungary is consolidating a political shift. After a term of
scandal and mismanagement by a left-wing government, the critical election of 2010
inaugurated the predominance of Fidesz and a new pole of political opposition:
Jobbik. While superficially this created bilateral oppositions to the centrally
positioned Fidesz, with Jobbik to the right and the recently unseated Socialists to
the left, successive election cycles have exposed the left-wing opposition as defunct.
Thus the center of political competition lies in the ground between right-wing
Fidesz and far-right Jobbik. (It may be noted that this resembles the situation of
several other political systems, particularly Poland.)
Serving in the dual offices of engines powering their ascent and of tools securing
their long-term viability, Fidesz and Jobbik youth parties play a crucial role in the
5
evolving nature of Hungary’s political system. Their views on the presiding
democratic regime, therefore, carry significant implications for the future.
Interviewed Fidesz youth members, unsurprisingly given Fidesz’s governmental
predominance, were more circumspect and oblique in their critique of Hungary’s
democratic system. The dynamic figure of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his
party are performing well in the wake of adverse conditions (i.e. the economic crisis
and the inheritance of mismanagement by the preceding Socialist government), the
respondents professed. However, viewed holistically, their description of the system,
particularly of the late Socialist government (from 2002 to 2010), indicates a latent
though undeniable democratic disillusionment.
One respondent’s view on corruption, which was echoed by others in the focus
group, reveals a particularly interesting facet of regime support, namely, that
corruption matters, but in respect of degree rather than mere existence. ‘Corruption
is a thing that is unavoidable, but on the Left it was too much. They went over the
line.’[i] More forgiving of scandal, more sympathetic to the means employed to
address speedily exigencies of government — such an outlook typifies unromanticized and somewhat resigned view of democratic governance common
among Fidelitas members. The boundary between tolerable and excessive
corruption is vague, however, and might stand in a different position if other parties
were in power. In other words, they trust their party to exercise governmental
power with restraint and moderation — even allowing for some minimum of
corruption — but not the other parties.
If supporting of any change in the regime, the participants seemed implicitly to
validate the systematic predominance[4] of Fidesz by their regard for the party’s
moral superiority on one hand, and Jobbik and the Socialist party’s philosophical
and political inferiority on the other. Fidesz defends Hungary against attempts,
particularly by the European Union, to control its economy or trespass on its
interests while ‘the left-wing are selling out the country to foreign interests.’[ii]. On
the other side, Jobbik cannot be taken seriously as a party, one respondent claimed,
since they are ‘trying to blame one ethnicity for most of the problems.’[iii]
The other parties, however, are a secondary concern, according to another. The
main challengers of Fidesz are rather the ‘fake civil societies and associations with
left-wing support both from inside and outside the country.’[iv] Indeed, the likelihood
of foreign support for opposition parties and political forces[5] rankled the interview
participants and, they generally asserted, delegitimized Fidesz’s foremost political
adversaries. Such a perspective seems implicitly supportive of the ‘illiberal
democracy’ model, which Prime Minister Orbán has articulated and advocated as a
means of ordering the state for success (chiefly economically). Mr. Orbán cited
China, the Russia under Vladimir Putin, and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan
6
as exemplars of such organization. Youth respondents hewed to this explicitly antiliberal proposal.
A perception of excessive corruption and, they argue, an indefensible regime
continuity (from the late socialist regime to the current democratic one) induce a
similarly subdued though undeniably sharper degree of regime opposition from the
Jobbik youth. “Still, after 25 years in the [post-Soviet] system, Jobbik is the only
party, or almost the only party that was not involved in this changing process…or
connected with high corruption in the new leader caste, which is not so new since
they were leaders already in the 1980s, so Jobbik is the only big party that is clean
from this period.”[v] Jobbik respondents almost uniformly referred to Fidesz and the
Socialists as the ‘status quo parties,’ as equally culpable for the failings of
Hungarian government over the past two and a half decades and approximately
equally corrupt.
Fidesz corruption is so commonplace, said one, that it acquired the faces and names
of Mr. 10 or 20 or 30 percent. My translator explained,
“When there are public contracts, the state or the city is buying services, building
infrastructure—there’s a competition and one company wins, and they get paid.
These processes are corrupted. The deciding politicians are called ‘Mr. 30 percent’
because the company that wins has to pay that exact value [of the contract] to the
politicians… One of the biggest of these was Lajos Kósa, who was the first person
who got publically labeled with this.”
Though corruption is abundant enough to condemn on that basis alone, Jobbik
youth members insist that Fidesz is similarly delegitimized by their artificiality.
‘The fake Christian identity of Fidesz with the Christian Democrats [KDNP] is
inauthentic because, in the 1990s when Fidesz was more liberal, they were antireligious, they were criticizing Christians, they were more secular.’[vi],[6] This
imitation serves to highlight Jobbik’s sincere Christian identity. Essentially, Jobbik
respondents contended that their genuineness legitimized them and that
disingenuousness delegitimized the mainstream parties, which they also termed
‘political whores’ (“politikai kurvák”).
Ultimately, the ‘status quo parties’ are beset by corruption and characterized by
purposeful or negligent inaction. ‘There are cultural, ethnic, and social problems
combined,’ insisted one, not least among them the ‘great and growing extent of
deprivation and impoverishment among the society. The political leadership is not
interested in solving these problems, since they help the political class stay in
power.’[vii] The perception of besieging, multi-faceted crises, which have been ignored
by the ‘status quo parties,’ defines and shapes the Jobbik youth’s policy positions.
Only drastic, only ‘radical’ strategies, they say, can provide effective solutions to
Hungary’s problems.
7
Yet still ‘status quo’ Fidesz stands in the way, according to Jobbik youth. They have
impeded Jobbik’s ascension by media smear campaigns and by legal revisions to
ensure their political dominance. ‘If [Fidesz-KDNP] hadn’t rewritten the election
laws, they would not have a two-thirds majority now!’[7],[viii]. The resultant regime
disillusionment is distinguished by its resigned tone — “Jobbik IT functions as a
political organization that accepts the democratic system we live in, and strives to
achieve change within the constraints provided by democracy. Democracy is not the
best system, but currently there is no better alternative” (Szabó et al.: 2013: 12).
This attitude buttresses Jobbik members’ explicitly radical approach to politics. The
conviction of necessary radicalism pervades the answers of respondents and accords
with a desire for a systematic overhaul, if not outright transformation.
The disposition of regime support among Hungary’s political youth, particularly as
it is exemplary of a much wider phenomenon and set of developments, impresses
itself directly on numerous facets of society and indirectly on innumerable others;
direct inputs to the political system reverberate in spheres of economy, culture, and
ostensibly minor quotidian affairs. Notwithstanding the vast scope of repercussions,
a few immediately significant conclusions emerge.
First, as in other ideological dimensions, the distance between Fidesz and Jobbik
youths is slight in their views of regime support. Perception and toleration of
existent corruption explains much of the separation, though that should not obscure
the more deeply seated and actuating and shared democratic disillusionment that
generates support for regime alteration or transformation from both groups. The
youth constituents of Hungary’s two chief political parties are dissatisfied with the
workings of post-Soviet democracy; they support their party, but on support for the
system in which that party operates they demur.
Second, the political socialization of Hungary’s youth (see Saltman 2014, Zeller
2015) shapes their ideologies, including attitudes toward the presiding regime, and,
in concurrence with numerous other illiberal and perhaps anti-democratic forces, is
consolidating a political shift in Hungary: the contraction of left-wing support
correspondent with a new and principal center of political competition between the
right and far-right. This political realignment resembles the development of other
party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, and contrasts with
the dealignment (or at least greater variability) occurring in much of Western
Europe. But it is not yet clear whether this realignment is durable; the ideological
similarity of Fidesz and Jobbik and indeed the lack of regime support suggest
fragility.
Worryingly, the tenuousness of Hungary’s political system extends along several
fault lines. Party system — is it now and will it remain a predominant, two-party,
or multi-party system? Political regime — will ‘illiberal democracy’ or a paradigm of
‘radicalism’ come to characterize Hungary’s government? Regional affiliation — will
8
it remain in the European Union and the sphere created by other Western
supranational organizations or drift into a re-expanded Russian sphere of influence?
As ever, today’s political youth will exert an outsized influence on these
developments as their generation ages into political maturity.
Finally, the phenomenon, of which regime support is only one facet, of attitudinal
and ideological challenges to liberal democracy in contemporary European politics is
arresting in the way it has disturbed even longstanding systems. In young
democratic regimes like Hungary and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, twentyfive years has proven insufficient to establish resilient democracies. Political youth
has not been socialized into a healthy democratic system, and without having
experienced much or any of the preceding socialist system, thus lacking that
comparative frame, it significantly expresses dissatisfaction with the current
regime. The engine of youth electorate adherence along with the capacity of new
political actors to present plausible viable alternatives to presiding elites and
governing systems will continue to nourish the evolving novelties and coincident
challenges to liberal democracies. Youth regime support, or lack thereof as seems
increasingly common, along with their broader ideological character will have
determinative effects on the condition of liberal democracy in Hungary, Europe, and
beyond, for better or worse.
Endnotes
[1] Although a formal division still exists between Fidesz and KDNP, the Christian
Democrats are unquestionably the junior partner and subservient to and to some
extent subsumed under Fidesz. This paper, therefore, deals with the Fidesz-KDNP
alliance as one party.
[2] While it was originally founded in 1988, Fidesz, as presently constituted in
alliance with KDNP, came into being in 2005. Jobbik was founded in 2003.
[3] Originally described in a 1981 volume entitled Democracy at the Polls: A
Comparative Study of Competitive Elections.
[4] In several moves since the Fidesz government’s inauguration in 2010, they have
gone some way toward systematically bolstering their position of power, including a
new constitution, revised media regulations, a rewritten electoral code, and
alterations to the Constitutional Court and judiciary.
[5] Respondents referenced accusations of foreign (western) financing of Socialist
party, the allegations that Gordon Bajnai’s Együtt party received support from the
Soros Foundation and the Washington-based think-tank Center for American
Progress (MNO.hu, ‘Az Együtt és Bajnai kusza pénzügyei’, 2015), and the ongoing
scandal concerning Jobbik MEP Béla Kovács’s Russian connections and alleged
espionage and service as an intermediary between Jobbik and Putin’s regime.
[6] The respondent here cited the a phrase “térdre csuhások,” said by Viktor Orbán
in the early 1990s to clerics, telling them to kneel and pray in a derogatory manner.
9
[7] At the time of the focus group, Fidesz had not yet lost the Veszprém by-election,
and thus their two-thirds parliamentary majority.
[i] Original response: “…nincs olyan, hogy nincs korrupció, csak azt szoktam
mondani, hogy arányokat másképp találják el. Tehát nem mondom, hogy a másik
fél feltétlenül rossz, csak az arányok nincsenek eltalálva.”
[ii] Original response: “Én még azt tenném hozzá, hogy nagyon kontrasztos és jól
észrevehető, hogy a jobboldal, mondjuk a Fidesz, ellentétben a baloldallal a nemzeti
érdekeket, értékeket, illetve a nemzet gazdaságát erősíti és védelmezi, míg a
baloldal nyolcéves két ciklusa alatt azt láthattuk, hogy nem is azt mondom, hogy
kiárusítják, az lehet, hogy erős szó, de abszolút nem kompetensen védik ezeket az
értékeket és érdekeket, és inkább a külföldi érdekeknek próbálnak megfelelni.”
[iii] Original response: “Erkölcsi okok tekintetében ugye én elég nagy javulást látok
a Fideszben is, mióta a KDNP-vel összeolvadt, úgymond. Ennek nagyon örülök, a
másik pedig, hogy igazából erkölcsileg ez a legmagasabb szinten álló párt, mert
hogy ha megnézzük a többit, a Jobbik is most… nem akarok ebbe nagyon
belemenni, de ott is inkább egy-egy adott népcsoportra próbálják ráterelni a
problémát, mikor hogy itt szerintem más okok vannak…”
[iv] Original response: “Jelenleg szerintem a kormánynak a legnagyobb ellenfele
nem a politikai ellenfelek, hanem az olyan álcivil szervezetek, akiket baloldaliak
támogatnak Magyarországról illetve külföldről is sajnos, illetve az olyan média…
orgánumok, amelyek ugye támadják a kormányt, szerintem most jelenleg ez a
legnagyobb politikai ellenfél sajnos…”
[v] Answer given in English.
[vi] Original response: “Az, hogy mennyire keresztény vagy nem keresztény a
Fidesz… ugye most a Kereszténydemokrata Néppárttal van együtt, ami mondjuk
azt, hogy egy zombi párt… nagyon érdekes, hogy most mekkora keresztények, míg a
kilencvenes évek elején a ‘térdre csuhások’…”
[vii] Original response: “Amúgy szerintem a legfontosabb mindenképpen a
társadalmi problémáknak a megoldása, amik nagyon sok esetben etnikai és
kulturális vonatkozásúak is. Szerintem annak a belátásán sok múlhat, illetve az,
hogy mikor tudunk elkezdeni azzal egyáltalán kezdeni valamit, hogy egy etnikai
bombán ülünk…önmagában az a tény a legfontosabb ebben, hogy az eltartottak és
az eltartók aránya kezd eltolódni, és hogy ezzel a mindenkori hatalom nem kezd
semmit, mert minél több az eltartott, minél több a „mélyigénytelen”, annál olcsóbb a
szavazatvásárlás.”
[viii] Original response: “És nagyon fontos még annyit hozzátenni ehhez az
egészhez, hogy ha nem módosították volna ennyire a választási rendszert is, akkor
nem lenne kétharmada most a Fidesznek.”
10
Works Cited
Bornschier, Simon. (2009). “Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies.” Living
Reviews in Democracy, 1, 1-13.
Flanigan, Scott, and Russell Dalton. (1990). “Models of Change.” In The Western
European Party System (pp. 232-246). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. (1990). “Dimensions of Ideology in European Party Systems.”
In The Western European Party System (pp. 253 – 265). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan (1990). “Cleavage Structures, Party
Systems, and Voter Alignments.” In The Western European Party System (pp. 91 –
138). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saltman, Erin. (2014). Turning Right: A Case Study on Contemporary Socialization
of the Hungarian Youth (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). School of Slavonic and
East European Studies, University College London (UCL), London.
Szabó, A., Oross, D., Róna, D., & Keil, A. (2013). Political Orientations, Values and
Activities of Hungarian University and College Students. Prague: Heinrich-BöllStiftung.
Szabó, A., Oross, D., Róna, D., & Keil, A. (forthcoming, 2015). Political Orientations,
Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students. Prague:
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
Zeller, Michael. (2015). Engines of the Right: A comparative examination of
Hungarian right-wing party youth groups (self-published master’s dissertation).
Central and Eastern European Studies, College of Social Sciences, University of
Glasgow, Glasgow.
https://www.academia.edu/19759820/Engines_of_the_Right_A_comparative_examin
ation_of_Hungarian_Right-Wing_Party_Youth_Groups.
11
Hobbes’s Leviathan: A Critique of the
Omnipotent Sovereign
By Erik Khzmalyan
For centuries, Thomas Hobbes’s pessimistic outlook on the state of nature has been
one of the dominant theories in political philosophy. Hobbes vehemently argued
that the state of nature is so violent and brutal that humans should do everything
possible to avoid it — even if it requires giving up all of one’s individual freedoms
and letting the sovereign take full control of everything. In the state of nature,
Hobbes believed, humans have a natural desire to fight one another. Hobbes wrote,
“During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
are in that condition which is called warre; and such a warre as is of every man
against every man.” Hence, Hobbes introduced the Leviathan, a biblical monster
metaphorically represented as the state, ready to subdue the inherent pride and
selfishness of its rebellious citizens in order to evade the possibility of the state of
nature.
Hobbes articulated that humans are inherently selfish, power seeking, and have an
intrinsic appetite for material possessions. Depicting human beings as
fundamentally malevolent, Hobbes claimed that there would always be conflicts and
clashes of interests resulting in violent deaths. Therefore, his primary solution was
the idea of Commonwealth — a complex society formed by the citizenry led by a
supreme ruler to repress violence.
While it is true to some extent that humans have an insatiable appetite for power, I
shall argue that the assumption that sovereign with an absolute power is a
safeguard against the Hobbesian state of nature is absolutely erroneous. Moreover,
there are good reasons to believe that Hobbes’s sovereign might pose more threats
to citizens than the state of nature he described. Consequently, Hobbes put too
much faith in his sovereign and did not provide a proper solution to containing the
violence that he believed existed in the state of nature.
Hobbes constructed his argument on a hypothetical state of nature which is in a
condition of a perpetual anarchy. To overcome the misery of the state of nature, as
mentioned above, Hobbes proposed a rather radical alternative — a central
authority with unchallenged power that dictates the moral and legal laws of the
society. In short, Hobbes’s sovereign, whether a man or an assembly, is the head of
the state with an unlimited power.
The main error in Hobbes’s reasoning, as Bertrand Russel observes, is that he is too
impatient to cut the Gordian knot. This is where Hobbes’s main shortcoming
becomes evident — he tries to solve the problem of the state of nature in a forceful
12
and radical way and fails to consider other solutions that might be better
alternatives to the despot in total charge of the state.
Before identifying the problems with Hobbes’s sovereign it is essential to
understand what his hypothetical Commonwealth looked like. In Leviathan, Hobbes
provides a detailed description of his Commonwealth and recognizes the eminent
role of the sovereign in inhibiting the citizens from falling back into the state of
nature.
Being a rigid materialist, Hobbes believed that life is simply a motion of the limbs,
therefore, automata have an artificial life. It follows from the latter point that
Hobbes’s Commonwealth is an artificial entity — Leviathan is a creation of art. The
creation of the state, according to Hobbes, happens as humans escape the evils of
the state of nature to become subjects to a central authority. The formation of the
state is artificial and citizens get together through a social contract. Hobbes argued
that ultimately citizens agree to choose a sovereign body to end the universal war.
With the creation of the state, individuals get deprived of their freedoms for the
sake of their self-preservation. The final goal, Hobbes articulates, is to end the
chaos that can be caused by our love of liberty and endless desire to dominate
others.
Hobbes explains the reasons that make the state and the sovereign artificial. He
claims that the human cooperation is not natural like the cooperation that exists
between ants and bees. The latter, according to Hobbes, lack the reason to criticize
the government and do not have a natural inclination toward competition and
honor. Hence, their agreement is natural unlike the one achieved between humans
through covenant.
Hobbes’s artificial creation of the sovereign is known as a nominalist theory of the
state. Hobbes’s nominalism concludes that without a proper political organization,
humans that are in the same territory do not naturally make up the human
community. This nominalist theory of the authority suggests that citizens give the
sovereign the power to act in their names by transferring to him or her something
intangible such as their power, will, rights, or even persons.
As Hobbes vehemently argued, humans alarmed by anarchy choose to form a
despotic government. After the formation of the Commonwealth, the sovereign is in
charge of the property laws and more importantly the moral laws. Hobbes’s
Leviathan would embody justice and his or her decisions couldn’t be challenged or
questioned by anyone. Hobbes gave his sovereign an enormous amount of power —
upon the sovereign there can be no constitutional checks.
It is important to recognize that Hobbes’s sovereign is permanent. This means that
citizens cannot disobey or rebel by changing their allegiance. The only way that this
13
would be possible is if the sovereign himself gives permission to breach the
covenant. Moreover, the sovereign has the right to determine his successor without
the permission of the citizenry. However, there are two rights that citizens cannot
be deprived of. First, the citizens have the right to self-defense, as it is an
indivisible part of the self-preservation. Secondly, the covenant cannot require the
citizens to give up their rights to protect themselves — it cannot be abandoned by
transferring it to the sovereign.
The sovereign, the supreme legislator, has an absolute monopoly over lawmaking.
Citizens cannot blame the Leviathan for injustice because, Hobbes writes, that’s
part of the covenant authorized by the citizens. Consequently, the sovereign is
immune to punishment.
There are many problems regarding Hobbes’s radical alternative to anarchy. First
and foremost, the state described by Hobbes can become so horrific as to make the
state of anarchy more desirable for the citizens. Based on historic events, it’s fair to
claim that Hobbes’s Commonwealth with its all-powerful sovereign is doomed to
failure. The conditions under the Hobbesian sovereign can become so miserable that
citizens will choose to rebel without even caring about the alternative — even if the
alternative turns out to be disastrous too. For instance, there are several examples
in history that put this point into perspective — such as the Russian Revolution of
1917. Life in Russia was so brutish under the “Russian Leviathan” Nicholas II that
people chose to live in temporary anarchy. He and his entire family were
assassinated by Communists. Nicholas II was a perfect epitome of Hobbes’s
sovereign.
I argue that the world would be beyond miserable if it applied the Hobbesian
submissive attitude universally. It has historically been true that governments
without checks and balances shift towards unprecedented totalitarianism, which
can be worse than Hobbesian state of anarchy. Since in Hobbes’s Commonwealth
the sovereign does not have a fear of rebellion he or she will make himself or herself
personally even more superior. The sovereign will enrich himself at the expense of
his citizens. He will oppress any economic or intellectual ideas that might slightly
challenge his authority. Again, conditions can become so unbearable under Hobbes’s
sovereign that citizens will end up preferring temporary anarchy.
Another obvious shortcoming in Hobbes’s Commonwealth led by a supreme ruler is
the assumption that, for some reason, all citizens have the same interests. Let’s
assume after forming the Commonwealth the sovereign takes control and leads the
state. Hobbes is so concerned with the danger of anarchy that he missed some of the
nuances than can lead to chaos right after the formation of the state. It is unclear
what made Hobbes believe that the interests of his sovereign would necessarily be
identical with those of his citizens. Especially in times of war, citizens tend to have
extremely varying opinions and interests and, as Bertrand Russell writes, during
14
crises advocating for a submission to the absolute power is not the best way to avoid
the anarchy. Moreover, Russell argues that it should have been obvious to Hobbes
that the English Civil War could have been prevented if power had been shared in
England.
To shed light on the evident flaw in Hobbes’s radical solution and to argue that his
remedy can lead to counterproductive results, I will elaborate on a hypothetical
example. Assume I’m the most prominent economist in the United States. I spend
days thinking of the growing economic inequality and try coming up with a solution.
By applying Hobbesian logic, I would abolish the capitalist system, establish a
communist state, deprive the rich of their possessions and distribute it among the
people. With this radical approach I would not only ruin America’s economy but also
cause an international disorder. This example is not an over exaggeration since it
perfectly illustrates Hobbes’s overly radical solution to anarchy, which is
totalitarianism.
As mentioned above, the chances that the sovereign would lead to a situation akin
to one it replaced are very high. After all, Hobbes’s sovereigns are “men from their
very birth…” as he writes. Like all other men the sovereign would be primarily
concerned with his survival and be worried about his security. In order to guarantee
his own safety and make sure that his subjects are loyal and obedient, he would do
anything necessary to eliminate potential rivals by destroying the organized
opposition. Through these methods the sovereign would not be able to avoid the
inevitable: he would create an atmosphere of fear and violence. Not the best
alternative to the state of nature. If, according to Hobbes, human beings are
inherently ferocious, they consequently are prone to making dubious moral
judgments. Given Hobbes’s pessimistic account of men, one can argue that the
sovereign chosen by the populace would reflect its citizenry. Hence, if Hobbes is
right, the sovereign too, would more likely be violent, morally unjust, and selfish.
Hobbes’s Leviathan, as I pointed out, has a self-perpetuating power. Hobbes was
adamant that no state can function adequately without this attribute. The
sovereign in Hobbes’s Commonwealth is destined to appoint his successors. Again,
to show the evident exaggeration and radicalism in Hobbes’s vision of the selfperpetual power, it is essential to consider several historic events.
England, for instance, was governed effectively from 1689 on by a sovereign without
the power of self-perpetuation. King William III did not have the right to choose his
successor. Moreover, the members of parliament were forbidden to appoint their
successors as well. This example proves that the Hobbesian notion of a sovereign
with a self-perpetuating power is not an essential element in maintaining a stable
society.
There are several factors that can lead to the downfall of Hobbes’s Commonwealth
due to the unchecked power and political hubris of his sovereign. And this especially
15
would become possible during military confrontations and other international
disputes. Perhaps one of the best examples that illustrates how greedy and
overconfident “Leviathans” can become is Napoleon, whose inflated ego led to
disastrous outcomes.
Having conquered much of Europe, Napoleon targeted Russia. Due to the poor
calculation and his extreme presumptuousness, Napoleon began losing 5000 men
per day of his Grande Armee consisting of 400,000. The brutal Russian winter,
desertion, starvation, and suicides were to cost Napoleon dearly. Eventually he had
to abandon his own army in Poland and return to Paris. His retreat from Moscow
became known as one of the greatest military disasters in history and, of course,
enabled Napoleon’s gradual fall. France entered a new era of a political chaos.
Another important factor that is worth considering is that it is extremely
speculative to claim that humans would be willing to exit the state of nature and
immediately become subjects of some authoritarian despot. Since Hobbes argues
that the sovereign has to be omnipotent and should control man’s personality and
fate entirely, he will impose artificial regulations conflicting with man’s personal
essence. A Hobbesian Commonwealth led by the sovereign does not seem to be a
reliable alternative for citizens to immediately prioritize it over anarchy.
As a citizen I would think twice before accepting Hobbes’s conditions under the
omnipotent ruler. I’m going to go as far as to argue that I would probably consider
remaining in the state of nature. One of the main problems that would make me
rather hesitant in joining the Hobbesian Commonwealth is the fact that Hobbes
identified the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice with the sovereign.
To point out the obvious, what one man considers good another man finds evil. I
believe some of the components of morality cannot be applied universally. Hobbes’s
sovereign, as the ultimate source of “justice” and “goodness,” would eventually cause
havoc by imposing his own perception of morality upon his citizenry.
Under this absolutism put forward by Hobbes, justice and freedom not only would
be extremely limited but also abolished. In a totalitarian system, the regime, in this
case the sovereign, objectifies its citizens by stripping off their individual
characters. Hobbes demands that citizens give up some of their inalienable rights
which they possess simply because of being humans. Some of the natural rights that
humans are granted from their birth are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. The
latter rights cannot be earned or distributed according to our abilities. The
fundamental problem with Hobbes’s sovereign is that the he refuses to acknowledge
those rights by demanding a complete subordination.
As I argued throughout this paper, Hobbes, by offering a solution to the state of
nature, increases the likelihood of opening Pandora’s Box — that is, through his
16
radical remedy of the omnipotent sovereign, Hobbes gave mankind a lot of new
problems that perhaps he did not expect to occur.
After humans come together to create the Hobbesian Commonwealth and give the
sovereign unlimited disposal over his subjects, it can be assumed that they are also
expected to change their nature. The sovereign wants a new man who is obedient
and refrains from rebelling. Hobbes, I believe, did not take into account the
resistance that humans would eventually develop against the total control. Soon a
conflict would arise between citizens having a disdain for the existing
totalitarianism and the despot trying to enforce the new reality. And since the
sovereign would not be able to control each citizen individually, he would have to
rely on functionaries. The immediate result, I claim, would be the repression of the
citizenry.
If Leviathan decides to torment and maltreat people in order to enforce his own
moral and legal principles, a good portion of the population discontented by the
devastating circumstances, would undoubtedly resort to violence in hopes of
toppling him. The Hobbesian Commonwealth would soon find itself trapped in a
civil war. History has set numerous examples when radicalized populations did
indeed embrace temporary anarchy in order to overthrow their all-powerful
sovereigns, and there are no good reasons to believe that Hobbes’s Commonwealth
would be an exception.
To advance this point further, it is important to examine Machiavelli’s political
views on the sovereign. Like Hobbes, he advocated for a strong ruler who would
effectively maintain the state’s strength. The ruler, Machiavelli argued, is better off
when feared than loved, since love is something fickle that cannot be relied on.
However, Machiavelli warned that the sovereigns should be rather cautious not to
be hated by the populace. Sovereigns, according to Machiavelli, can avoid the
possibility of being hated by the citizenry, for instance, by not meddling in people’s
properties, and as he puts it, citizens will likely to forget their father’s death more
quickly than the loss of their patrimony. A sovereign not in charge of people’s
properties is the exact antithesis of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Even Machiavelli
recognized the importance of limiting the sovereign’s rule.
Hobbes did not provide an adequate solution to the state of nature. He created a
false choice between anarchy and despotism. The state he describes is similar to
George Orwell’s dystopian society where the “Big Brother” — in Hobbes’s case the
sovereign — has eradicated the elementary attributes of a free society. In his
fictional society Orwell describes how the citizens transferred their individual
loyalty, personal beliefs, and basic freedoms to the government. I highly doubt that
most citizens would find the latter conditions more appealing than the ones in the
state of nature.
17
Another argument that can be held against Hobbes’s idea of an all-powerful
sovereign and the claim that the sovereign is a safeguard against universal war is
the fact that Hobbes does not mention a single word about the relations between
various Leviathans except war! If each society forms its own Commonwealth and
chooses an omnipotent leader but still remains in the state of nature on an
international level then it is right to conclude that wars would still be unavoidable.
How should Leviathans behave in international anarchy? Based on Hobbesian
reasoning, Leviathans would distrust each other and each of them would try to
make his moral compass universal. This is a perfect recipe for perpetual wars
ultimately paving a road to universal destruction.
To finalize my thoughts on a Hobbesian sovereign not being a proper solution to the
state of nature I’ll point out one of the prime examples of the recent history—the
rise of Hitler. After WWI Germany was paralyzed both economically and politically.
The state was on the brink of social disaster as chaos and disorder became
inseparable parts of the German society. Even the most moderate citizens embraced
the idea of having a strong ruler who would end the turmoil in Germany. Out of
chaos rose Hitler — the new democratically elected leader of Germany who would
soon become one of the notorious figures in human history. In a nutshell, he ended
the anarchy temporarily but eventually caused an unprecedented havoc. And this
was mainly because his power was absolute, he was regarded as infallible, and
eliminated the state’s opposition by harshly oppressing those who dared to disagree
with him.
As I provided in my argument, Hobbes offers a radical alternative to the state of
nature. His omnipotent sovereign is prone to creating a situation similar to one it
endeavored to replace. By giving enormous power to his sovereign, Hobbes argued
that it is the only option that citizens have in order to evade the war of the state of
nature. As I articulated in this paper, that is not necessarily true. All-powerful
rulers, if unchecked, are incredibly likely to create conditions that would make
citizens prefer temporary anarchy. Hobbes put too much faith in his sovereign
believing that he would have the necessary moral and intellectual capacity to
contain the endless violence of his subjects. He did not, however, consider the
likelihood of citizens developing an aversion towards totalitarianism and resorting
to violence to overthrow the abusive sovereign. Finally, even if the supreme ruler
turned out to be someone impeccable, he would not be able to apply the same
methods internationally, since all “Leviathans” would vigorously try making their
moral and legal principles universal. And if that’s the case, the world would be in
perpetual war and chaos.
18
Works Cited
Buchheim, Hans. “Life Under Totalitarian Rule.” Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and
Characteristics. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1968. 38-55. Print.
David, Saul. “Napoleon’s Failure: For the Want of a Winter Horseshoe.” BBC.com.
N.p., 9 Feb. 2012. Web. 9 Dec. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine16929522>.
Hobbes, Thomas. “Leviathan.” Leviathan. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. The Online
Literature Library. Web. 09 Dec. 2015. <http://literature.org/authors/hobbesthomas/leviathan/chapter-13.html>.
John, Watkins W. N. “How the Sovereign Is Made.” Hobbes’s System of Ideas; a
Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories. London: Hutchinson,
1965. 157-62. Print.
Macpherson, C. B. “The Self-perpetuating Sovereign.” The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon, 1964. 90-95. Print.
McNeilly, F. S. “The Absolute Sovereign.” The Anatomy of Leviathan. New York:
Macmillan, 1968. 231-40. Print.
Nicolo, Machiiavelli. “Concerning Cruelty And Clemency, And Whether It Is Better
To Be Loved Than Feared.” Machiavelli: The Prince: Chapter XVII. N.p., n.d. Web.
11 Dec. 2015. <http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince17.htm>.
Russell, Bertrand. “Hobbes’s Leviathan.” A History of Western Philosophy. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1972. 546-57. Print.
19
Is Political Islam Compatible with Democracy?
By Anna Kruglova
The past 10 to 15 years have been characterized by the rise of Islamic radicalism
and extremism. An abundance of information about terrifying terrorist attacks
committed by Muslims can be found across the media. Another popular narrative is
the spread of dictatorships around the world. Most authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes are reported as being frequent in countries where the majority of the
population is Muslim. Libya (until 2011), Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran are
particularly convincing examples of this statement. In his famous article ‘The Clash
of Civilizations’, Samuel Huntington writes about a conflict between Western and
Islamic civilizations that has existed for some 1,300 years. [1] He notes that along
with direct clashes, such as terrorist attacks or hostile rhetoric, attempts by
Western countries to strengthen democracy in the Arab world brought about ‘some
openings’ [2] in Arab political systems that explicitly let anti-Western movements
become powerful and influential. Therefore, Huntington concludes that Western
and Islamic systems are completely different, even hostile, and those they will only
become more so in the future. [3]
Huntington presents relations between Western democracy and Islam in a purely
antagonistic way. We can confidently say that this perception of Islam as being
violent and inherently undemocratic has caused fear among Europeans and
Americans after the so-called ‘Arab spring’, when groups advocating the
incorporation of Muslim values into politics (adherents of ‘political Islam’) gained
power in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. These election results were labeled the ‘Islamist
winter’ and if not completely damaging, were dangerous for democracy. [4] Those
who voted for the Muslim Brotherhood were characterized as not yet ready for a
democratic regime. [5]
But were these worries justifiable? Or were they simply prompted by existing bias?
Is Islam really incompatible with democratic norms and traditions? Is it doomed to
produce dictatorships under which human rights are violated and dignity is
humiliated? This article attempts to answer these questions. First, the notion of
‘political Islam’ is introduced, its meaning explained and a brief history of its
development provided. It is then argued that Islam and democracy are not as
contradictory as they seem through an in-depth exploration of the norms of Islam,
as well as an analysis of bias about the religion and Arab countries in general,
which provokes negative opinions. A successful example of a combination of religion
and democracy will be discussed, namely Indonesia. The arguments that
corroborate the opposing point of view will then be addressed, before an overall
conclusion is drawn.
20
According to Mohammed Ayoob, ‘adherents of political Islam (or Islamism) believe
that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and
society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in
some fashion.’ [6] John Esposito adds that political Islam has emerged as an
‘alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism,
capitalism and socialism.’ [7] This seems to be particularly true with Egypt. The
years following the 1967 war with Israel were characterized by the decline of
Nasser’s ‘pan-Arab’ and socialist ideology. Following this, the number of religious
ideas and movements that presented Egypt’s loss as a result of society’s existing
sins increased dramatically. [8] This failure of secular ideology is considered by
Robin Wright to be the first phase of the development of political Islam. [9] The
second stage started in 1980 with the rise of religious extremism and suicide
bombers; a phase during which it seemed that a lot of important political goals
could be achieved with violence. [10] In the 1990s, fully fledged political Islamist
parties started forming. [11] But the agenda of most was still closely associated
with the ideas of jihad and martyrdom. This was the third phase in the
development of political Islamism. Finally, the fourth stage started after 9/11. [12]
As Wright notes, this event was a real shock, not only for the Western world but
also for Muslims. [13] The reaction was a kind of ‘counter jihad’, [14] that is to say,
a rejection of extremist tactics for the achievement of political goals. Accordingly, in
opposition to the common view in the Western world, political Islam is a ‘very
dynamic phenomenon, not a static ideology’ [15] stuck with the same ideas of
several centuries ago.
The above perception of Islamist ideas might be one of the biases that prevents the
general public and some scholars from seeing Islam and democracy as being
compatible. Yet the perception it is not entirely correct.
The second bias comprises a vision of the Arab world as unified and homogeneous.
[16] But this is not so due to the absence of one prevailing political system or level
of economic development. [17] It is therefore very important to look at the context of
political Islam, its variations and its rules, which are absent of one universal and
‘correct’ Islam. This bias helps groups such as ISIS to create an image of Islam as a
very aggressive religion.
This statement can be supported by the following concrete example, namely that of
Islamic rules concerning a woman’s dress or appearance. Islam is believed to
regulate this issue very strictly and impose the obligation to wear the hijab.
However, if we look at what the Qur’an says about this aspect of a woman’s life, no
direct order to wear the hijab can be found. The Qur’an presents two tenets
regarding this aspect:

‘O Prophet, tell your wives and daughters and the believing women to draw
their outer garments around them (when they go out or are among men).’ [18]
21

‘Say to the believing man that they should lower their gaze and guard their
modesty; that will make for greater purity for them; and Allah is well
acquainted with all that they do. And say to the believing women that they
should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; and that they should not
display their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily appear
thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display
their beauty except to their husbands.’ [19]
As we can see, these two rules do not contain strict and precise regulations about a
woman’s dress. What does it mean ‘not to display beauty’? Or what does it mean to
‘guard modesty’? These formulations could be understood quite broadly. Moreover,
the term ‘hijab’ is not used in the Qur’an at all. The only additional source that is
believed to regulate the way a woman dresses is a hadith, one of the prophetic
traditions, which states: ‘Aisha said, “Asma, daughter of Abu Bakr (that is, Aisha’s
sister), entered upon the Apostle of God (pbuh) wearing thin clothes. The Apostle of
God turned his attention from her and said, “O Asma, when a woman reaches the
age of menstruation, it does not suit her except that she displays parts of her body
except this and this”, and he pointed to her face and hands.’
Again, it is not clear what exactly is meant by thus. The hadith points out that a
woman should not wear thin clothes, but does not explicitly say that she should
cover her head or wear the hijab. Some Muslim researchers claim that the question
of a woman’s appearance rests more in the field of the personal interpretation of
holy texts by clergy than in traditions existing during Mohammed’s lifetime. [20]
Bayat writes that ‘Muslim societies are never monolithic and never religious by
definition,’ [21] before going further to say that, ‘Sacred injunctions are matters of a
struggle of competing readings.’ [22]
The third problem derives from the aforementioned second bias and is that of the
generalization of the term ‘Islam’. In day-to-day use it usually comprises
everything, from IS to the Muslim Brotherhood, without any distinction being
made; yet these two groups are almost on opposite ends of the radicalism scale.
Islam as a religion and as a political ideology is diverse and comprises various
branches.
For example, Ali R. Abootalebi places particular emphasis on the need to
differentiate between Islam and what he refers to as fundamentalism. [23] While
fundamentalists (or ‘traditionalists’) argue for the necessity to maintain Shari’a
traditions and claim a ‘historical monopoly over the right to interpret Islam,’ [24]
they are usually more focused on prompting change within a family or an
individual, rather than within a society. Participation in day-to-day political life is
often perceived as sinful. Moreover, among fundamentalists there is still further
division. Some are adherents to old Islamic traditions, while others are accused of
interpreting Sharia law and the Qur’an in the most strict and severe of ways. [25]
22
These violent sectarianists (Iraqi militias), classic and global jihadists (Al Qaeda),
[26] and the new jihadi-salaffism, all emerged after the ‘Arab spring’ (al Qaeda in
Islamic Maghreb) and combined ‘social activism and proselytism with a new
enthusiasm for violence worldwide.’ [27] In contrast, Islamists are generally aimed
at participation in politics. Among them there is also a division between violent
forms, such as Islamic socio-revolutionary activism (GIA) and non-violent forms.
[28] The latter do believe in the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and argue
that values such as human rights and freedoms are as peculiar to Islam as they are
to Christianity. [29] The ‘Muslim democrats’, as Peter Mandaville points out, view
politics ‘with a pragmatic eye’ and do not seek to change life according to religious
principles; [30] rather, they use Islam as an ideological and uniting basis for
themselves and their electorate.
According to ‘Muslim democrats’, some Islamic principles are considered key to
‘Islamic democracy’. [31] John Esposito names and explores two. The first is shura
or mutual consultation. This means that it is obligatory for Muslims to engage in
consultations with each other and between ulema (the intelligentsia) and the
community regarding the issues of political and public affairs. [32] The second
concept is that of the ‘caliph’. Esposito notes that this term has been changed
artificially and is usually used to mean a ‘ruler’ whose power is not limited by
anything. In reality and according to the Qur’an, this concept has an absolutely
different meaning of ‘steward’ or ‘trustee’. As the first human, Adam is considered
to be God’s steward on earth and the first ‘caliph’. [33] Mohammed, as a prophet,
should have reminded the people that they are all ‘caliphs’, that is, the stewards of
God. [34] In relation to democracy, this concept is considered to be equal to the
principle of the equality of all people.
Fethullah Gulen continues this debate by exploring the question of Islamic tenets
and their compatibility with democracy. In one of his papers, he conducts a
comparative analysis of both concepts. He first enumerates the principles that
democracy is based on: freedom, respect for human rights, dignity, a private life,
tolerance, and the rule of law. [35] Democracy is a system in which people ‘govern
by themselves’ and are not governed by someone. [36] Gulen then names the core
principles of Islam as follows:
1. Power lies in truth, a repudiation of the common idea that truth relies upon
power.
2. Justice and the rule of law are essential.
3. Freedom of belief and the rights to life, personal property, reproduction, and
health (both mental and physical) cannot be violated.
4. The privacy and immunity of individual life must be maintained.
5. No one can be convicted of a crime without evidence, or accused of and
punished for someone else’s crime.
6. An advisory system of administration is essential. [37]
23
Gulen concludes that Western democracies could even borrow some ideas from the
Qur’an, such as the concept of a ‘virtuous society’, which emerges as an ideal society
when all Islamic rules are obeyed. [38] Mohammad Ayoob argues that Islamist
parties actually ‘contributed substantially to the development of a democratic ethos
in recent years.’ [39]
Finally, we can argue that the world contains quite successful examples of a
combination of Islam and democracy. One of them is Indonesia. An Islamic country,
it is in the process of developing into a perfect democracy, having successfully
overcome its authoritarian past. [42] Here Islamist parties comprise approximately
30% of the parliament and peacefully coexist with each other and with other
parties. [43] The majority is shared between the secular-nationalist Democratic
Party and the Golkar and Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle groups. [44] Paul
Carnagy, who has studied this case, concludes that the main issue for establishing a
democracy in an Islamic country is not religion but simply the people’s choice, just
as in any other country in the world. [45]
There are many more examples of the hallmarks of democracy, even in Islamic
countries that are seen as totally authoritarian. For example, in Iran the institution
of presidential elections does exist, as does a legislative assembly; in Iraq the Great
Ayatollah Sistani is recorded as having called upon Iraqi citizens to hold ‘free and
democratic elections based on the principle of “one person – one vote”.’ [46] Even
Osama bin Laden did not oppose democracy as a concept and in his letter to the
American people he characterized the elections in Algeria that were won by an
Islamist party as ‘free and just’. [47] Therefore, he did not deny the compatibility of
this Western concept with Islamic norms.
Mariana Malinova points out that one of the main problems for the development of
Islam-Democracy tandem is the fact that widespread prejudice that these two
concepts contradict one anther still exists in the Arab world itself. [52] This
prejudice is believed to have been created by two Islamic theologists, Sayyid Qutb
and Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, who succeeded in presenting democracy as evil and
placing this idea in heads of many of Muslims. [53] It will thus be extremely
difficult to make people in Muslim countries forget or at least change these biases.
It seems, however, that the events of the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 disproved the idea
that Muslims have an established prejudice against democratic rule. Katerina
Dalacoura notes that the main demands of the protesters were political and social,
such as overthrowing dictators and giving the people adequate conditions for living.
[54] People in the streets used democratic discourse, for example, saying that they
wanted freedom, respect and observance of their rights, respect for human dignity,
and so on. Is this not proof that democratic ideas are not alien to Muslims?
24
Furthermore, the fact that at first, in the post-revolution elections, Islamist parties
came to power in Egypt or Tunisia could actually be perceived as a sign that this is
how a lot of Muslims imagine democracy: a freely and openly elected political party
based on Islamic values.
Generally, most scholars agree that there is no such notion as the compatibility of a
certain religion with democracy. Professor Schirrmacher states that, quite similarly,
centuries ago Christianity was not considered compatible with democracy. [55] Here
we might recall the inquisition, for example, when people were killed because they
contradicted the Church’s point of view. It took time for Christianity and democracy
to form a link that we now consider to be natural. The same is needed for Islam. It
will take time to get rid of stereotypes about the religion and learn to distinguish
between its different forms and interpretations. But when it happens, nothing else
will prevent it from a harmonic coexistence with a democratic political system, even
if it might look or sound different from the Western model.
Endnotes
[1] S. P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?,’ Foreign Affairs 72(3): 31.
[2] Ibid., 32.
[3] Ibid.
[4] T. C. Wittes, ‘Learning to Live with the Islamist Winter,’ Foreign Policy, 19 July
2012, accessed 23 January 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/19/learning-tolive-with-the-islamist-winter/?wp_login_redirect=0.
[5] L. Del Pino, ‘L’islam est-il compatible avec la démocratie ?’ Contrepoints, 6
September 2013, accessed 23 January 2015,
http://www.contrepoints.org/2013/09/06/137876-lislam-il-compatible-democratie.
[6] M. Ayoob, ‘The Future of Political Islam, the Importance of External
Variables,’ International Affairs81(5): 952.
[7] J. L. Esposito, ‘Political Islam and the West,’ Joint Force Quarterly Spring 2000:
51.
[8] F. A. Gerges, ‘The Transformation of Arab Politics: Disentangling Myth from
Reality,’ in: The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, Wm. R. L. Louis
and A. Shlaim (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 303.
[9] R. Wright (ed.), Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are (Washington: The
Wilson Center and the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2012), 6.
[10] Ibid., 7.
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Sh. Akbarzadeh, ‘The Paradox of Political Islam,’ in: The Routledge Handbook
of Political Islam(London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 3.
25
[16] A. Ehteshami, ‘Islam as a Political Force in International Relations,’ in: N.
Lahoud and A. Johns (eds.), Islam in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2005), 45.
[17] Ibid., 46-50.
[18]Noble Qur’an, 33:59, accessed 23 January 2015, http://quran.com/. d.
[19] Ibid., 24:30-31.
[20] Muslim Women’s League, ‘An Islamic Perspective on Women’s Dress,’
December 1997, accessed 27 January 2015,
http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/dress/hijab.html.
[21] A. Bayat, ‘Islam and Democracy: The Perverse Charm of an Irrelevant
Question,’ in: Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements in the Post-Islamist
Turn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007),3.
[22] Ibid., 4.
[23]A. R. Abootalebi, ‘Islamists and Democracy,’ MERIA 3(1): 14.
[24] Abootalebi, ‘Islamists and Democracy,’ 15.
[25] N. Provencher, ‘Is Islam Compatible with Democracy:
A Critical
Reexamination of Existing Theory to Establish Renewed Potential,’ Georgia
Political Science Association Annual Conference (Savannah: 11 November 2011), 18.
[26] T. Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in
the Study of Militant Islamism,’ in: Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New
Religious Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 245.
[27] H. Malka and W. Lawrence, Jihadi-Salafism’s Next Generation, CSIS, October
2013.
[28] Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries?’ 245.
[29] Ibid.
[30] P. Mandaville, ‘Islam in the System: The Evolution of Islamism as Political
Strategy,’ in Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007), 105.
[31] J. L. Esposito and J. O.Voll, ‘Islam and Democracy,’ Humanities, Nov/Dec 2001,
accessed 23 January 2015,
http://www.neh.gov/humanities/2001/novemberdecember/feature/islam-anddemocracy.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] F. Gulen, ‘A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy,’ SAIS
Review 21(2): 134.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 135.
[38] Ibid., 137.
[39] M. Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the
Muslim World (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2008), 99.
[40] P. J. Carnegie, ‘Can an Indonesian Model Work in the Middle East?’ Middle
East Quarterly,Summer 2013, accessed 27 January 2015,
http://www.meforum.org/3570/indonesian-model.
[41] Ibid.
26
[42] Ibid.
[43] Carnegie, ‘Can an Indonesian Model Work in the Middle East?’
[44] Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, ‘L’islam et la
démocratie,’ The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa:
Carleton University (2006), 5.
[45] Ibid.
[46] G. E. Fuller, ‘The Future of Political Islam,’ Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002,
accessed 27 January 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57806/graham-efuller/the-future-of-political-islam
[47] Ibid.
[48] K. Dalacoura, ‘The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change
and Geopolitical Implications,’ International Affairs 88(1): 2.
[49] C. Schirrmacher, ‘Islam und Demokratie – ein Gegensatz?’ kath.net, accessed
27 January 2015, http://kath.net/news/42377
27
Battle for the Base: How the Manas Basing
Crisis Illustrated Russian Behavior in the
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
By Michael Zeller
A number of Russia’s interests were confronted with a drastic change of
circumstances in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States in
September 2001. Among these, the introduction of an American military
presence in Central Asia was perhaps foremost. An event far-removed from
the control of or even expectation of the Kremlin prompted U.S. military
deployment and operation in Russia’s hinterland. The Russian government
withheld any objections in the early years of the war in Afghanistan, but
acted with increasing aggression to dislodge or at least to destabilize the
U.S./NATO toehold in Central Asia, viewing their presence “as a challenge to
Russian dominance in the region.”[1] The eviction in 2005 of forces from
Uzbekistan’s Karshi-Khanabad (also known as “K2”), for example, resulted in
part from lobbying by Russia (as well as by China and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization).[2]
The highest stakes surrounded the U.S. base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, the key
staging ground for transit and operations into Afghanistan. In 2009, amid
the early throes of the U.S.-led ‘surge’ of military operations, Manas was
threatened with eviction. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced
on February 3rd the decision to close Manas to the U.S. and NATO. ThenPresident Dmitri Medvedev sat at his side and shortly afterward signed a two
billion USD aid agreement, ostensibly as quid pro quo for Bakiyev’s decision.
The U.S., however, salvaged the base with a deal announced in June of 2009,
to the dismay of the Kremlin. Now, nearly seven years later, the U.S. has
vacated its military installations in Manas as part of its overall cessation of
operations in Afghanistan. What were Russia’s interests in Central Asia, as
exhibited in the case of Kyrgyzstan, during the Afghanistan war; how were
they manifest before, during, and after the 2009 base closure situation; and
were the resultant actions effective in advancing Russia’s short- and longterm interests? In confronting these questions, this paper will outline U.S.
and Russian interests in Central Asia (and their expressions in Kyrgyzstan),
detail the base closure crisis including its context and consequences, and pose
a critical analysis of the Russian government’s actions, ultimately concluding
that the case of Manas reveals Russia’s actual objectives (as opposed to
28
rhetorical), their prioritization, and, most importantly, its archetypal mode of
pursuing them. Understanding this episode of Russia foreign policy may
thereby provide broader understanding of the ongoing conduct of foreign
affairs by the Putin regime.
A survey of Russian and American interests — especially as they pertain to
each other — in Central Asia and in Kyrgyzstan is necessary before unfolding
the specifics of the 2009 base closure crisis and undertaking analysis thereof.
Even at the most fundamental levels a stark contrast appears between the
interests of the two; whereas U.S. interests were temporary and limited (at
least in the main), Russia’s were and remain long-term and comprehensive.
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and throughout the prosecution of the
war in Afghanistan the United States government’s overriding interest in
Central Asia was the preservation of a stable basing configuration for
operations. Low rents and high degrees of operational autonomy were
sought. And while the U.S. may have preferred to negotiate directly and
solely with the governments of Central Asian states and to repudiate the
notion of Russia’s sphere of influence, this principal was evidently not
paramount; for the sake of higher priorities, the administration of President
George W. Bush likely sighed in collective relief after President Vladimir
Putin’s early encouragement of Central Asian amenability to hosting
American deployments.[3] All other matters were of tertiary importance,
typically arising only as a concomitant facet of America’s foremost objective.
Russia’s interests, on the other hand, are glaringly distinct in their
comparative breadth. As with most of the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan is
connected to Russia by the remnants of overlapping history: linguistically,
ethnically (12.5 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population are ethnic Russians[4]),
economically, and politically. Several of its interests are rooted in these
origins, including a status of regional hegemony underpinned by pro-Russian
governments. Moreover, the Russian government seeks at least tacit
recognition of this predominance from other foreign powers present in
Central Asia. The more recent evolution of its interests include the
suppression of ethnic violence, Islamic extremism, and separatist movements,
each of which directly threatens the stability of the region that is crucial to
Russia’s dominance thereof.
The U.S. Air Force installation at Manas officially opened on 18 December
2001, as agreed upon by the government of the United States and of Kyrgyz
President Askar Akayev, and publicly supported by President Putin. Over
the next four years annual rent payments of two million USD and
29
government fuel contracts of untold amounts personally enriched President
Akayev and his associates. Kurmanbek Bakiyev heralded Akayev’s ouster in
March 2005 and his own ascendancy to the presidency as a restoration of
staunch protection of Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty.
Early in his presidential tenure Bakiyev criticized the low rental rates of the
air base, as well as decrying silent American acquiescence to the
embezzlement of funds by Akayev’s government. Alexander Cooley
summarized the strategic opportunity open to Kyrgyzstan: “In July 2005 in
Astana, Bakiyev signed the [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] declaration
about removing foreign military bases from the region. The U.S. eviction from
K2 [military base in Uzbekistan] just a few days later gave the Kyrgyz
president the confidence that, having the only remaining official U.S. base in
the region, he could demand a much greater quid pro quo for continuing to
provide basing rights to the United States.”[5] Early in 2006, Bakiyev
announced that he would seek new basing terms that included annual rent of
200 million USD and compensation for environmental damage caused by the
base. The demanded terms compelled the U.S. Department of Defense to
explore alternative basing configurations, particularly in Tajikistan.[6]
Bakiyev eventually agreed to renew the base lease for an overall package of
150 million USD. However, Bakiyev and his administration quickly grew
embittered by the deal, which increased rent payments only to 17 million
USD and dispersed much of the other funds through development aid and
humanitarian programs like the Peace Corps. Several incidents* at the base
“received large-scale media attention, especially in the Russian-language
press,” and intensified Bishkek’s frustration.[7]
The crisis resurfaced in 2009. In the middle of a chill in U.S.-Russia relations
(driven by the 2008 war with Georgia and related disputes), “Central Asian
diplomats themselves informed U.S. officials that Russia was plotting to evict
the United States from Manas to punish it for its support of Georgia.”[8]
Bakiyev too had reasons to seek a new arrangement—or ideally to initiate a
bidding war—since Kyrgyzstan was beginning to feel the effects of the global
economic recession. To gain victory in the forthcoming election, Bakiyev
needed a fresh infusion of financial assets to appease key sections of his
constituency.
The crisis began at a Moscow summit between Bakiyev and Medvedev.
At a joint press conference in Moscow in early February 2009, President
Bakiyev first announced in public that the small Central Asian state had
taken the decision to close down the U.S. air base, citing its domestic
30
unpopularity. At the same event, Medvedev announced that Russia would be
granting a special emergency assistance package to the Central Asian state,
comprised of a $150 million grant, a $300 million soft loan, and $1.7 billion in
credits to invest in the Kambarata-2 hydroelectric plant project. As part of
the deal, Russia also assumed control of a number of Kyrgyz defense
industries, including a 48 percent controlling stake in the Dastan torpedo
manufacturing plant near Lake Issyk-Kul.[9]
Shortly after the announcement, the U.S. government expressed its
recognition of Kyrgyzstan’s sovereign right to allow or refuse tenancy on its
soil — just as Medvedev had at that summit, with a proverbial wink and nod
— but quickly dispatched negotiators to try and salvage the situation.
Publicly, U.S. officials criticized Russia’s role in the decision. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated that Russia was “trying to have it both ways
with respect to Afghanistan, in terms of Manas…on one hand, [they’re]
making positive noises about working with us in Afghanistan, and on the
other hand [they’re] working against us in terms of that airfield, which is
clearly important to us.”[10]
Despite the understanding apparently established by Medvedev and Bakiyev,
American negotiators successfully rescued the basing agreement. The U.S.
concluded a new deal with the notable assistance of Maxim Bakiyev (the
President’s son) in early April—the reversal came shortly after Russia
transferred its first development credit of 300 million USD to Kyrgyzstan.
The new agreement with the U.S. amounted to 180 million USD per annum,
including 60 million in rent payments alone.[11],[12]Despite the cosmetic
change of the facility’s name to the ‘Manas Transit Center,’ the U.S. would
continue to operate the base with full autonomy. In explaining the
government’s reversal, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev said, “it
is no secret that there is currently no alternative to the U.S. and NATO
presence in Afghanistan.”[13]
Shortly after the announcement, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov—both key figures in the Kremlin —
traveled to Bishkek. They won permission for Russia to open another base in
southern Kyrgyzstan, providing the Kremlin with a small consolation prize,
but confirming the loss of its larger geopolitical victory. The comments of
Russian Foreign Ministry personnel revealed the extent of Moscow’s ire.
Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said, ‘the Kyrgyz authorities repeatedly
declared that its decision to close the airbase was final and not subject to
revision. We should proceed from that.’[14] An anonymous Foreign Ministry
31
source went further, saying: ‘the news about the continuation of the base was
a very unpleasant surprise for us — we did not expect such a betrayal…the
base’s name change is superficial — the real nature of the U.S. military
presence in Central Asia has not changed, and that is contrary to the
interests of Russia, and to our agreements with the Kyrgyz authorities.’[15]
The source also promised that there would be an ‘adequate response.’[16]
Bolstered by the spoils of the bidding war, Bakiyev won a second presidential
term in an election of dubious legitimacy. “Tellingly, U.S. officials remained
quiet, issuing a tepid statement a few days after the poll, much to the dismay
of the Kyrgyz political opposition.”[17] Early in 2010, however, Bakiyev was
forced to abandon the Presidency and eventually to flee for refuge in Belarus
due to ethnic violence and internal opposition in Kyrgyzstan. It is widely
thought that Russia spurred Bakiyev’s ouster through media pressure and
other soft power means.
Russia has good relations with Kyrgyzstan’s current President, Almazbek
Atambayev, who early in his term assured Moscow that the Manas base
would close at the expiration of the presiding contract.[18]
The great tripartite game in Central Asia ended with the withdrawal of U.S.
armed forces from Afghanistan (though some American companies remain in
the region). The Manas closure crisis presents a revealing illustration of how
Russia played this game, and thus a means of judging the efficacy of Russia’s
behavior in foreign affairs.
The Kremlin successfully leveraged its position to disadvantage the United
States. The key American military installation in the region was threatened,
casting doubt on the immediate and long-term operational presence of the
United States; the Department of Defense was compelled to pay higher rents
and associated costs; and Russia’s actions obliged the U.S. to negotiate with
Moscow to forestall any further pressure to close the base, thereby
acknowledging Russia’s predominance in the region.
Yet the Russian government’s failures and departures from considered
pragmatism are more striking than its victories in the case of Manas. The
threat to the U.S. base endangered the war against extremism and terrorism
in Afghanistan and the wider region which, were it to fail, would pose a
vastly greater security risk to Russia than the United States. This, it would
seem, indicates a prioritization of regional control over defense, the broader
implication being that Russia is comfortable with responding to instability
and terrorism around its borders, and contrastingly uncomfortable with a
32
stable American presence thereabouts. (This conclusion is consistent with
Russian policy and action toward American encroachment in Eastern Europe
and the Baltic.)
Complicating the questionable strategic objective of destabilizing the Manas
basing arrangement, the Kremlin was drawn into a bidding war by President
Bakiyev. And, angered by this deception, Russia sacrificed regional stability
by contributing to the ferment that ultimately caused Bakiyev’s ouster in
2010. While the ensuing chaos eventually brought Atambayev to the
presidency, thus installing a regime favorably inclined to Russia (the
evidently overriding priority for the Kremlin), it might have caused the
elevation of a pro-Western figure like Roza Otunbayeva. This somewhat risky
action displays simultaneously several features of contemporary Russian
foreign policy: willingness to use varied diplomatic, political, and extrapolitical methods to achieve objectives, rhetorical posturing toward stability
and regime continuity fronting a more fundamental allegiance to attaining
and retaining control in its sphere of influence, inclination to risk producing
chaos in order to seek a more advantageous political configuration.
While the Kremlin’s forsaking of stability in the aftermath of Bakiyev’s
actions is illuminating, the approach to the U.S. is even more telling,
specifically Russia’s lack of appreciation for the internal political dynamics in
America. Russia’s drive to expel the U.S. from Kyrgyzstan in 2009 was likely
motivated by the chill in Russo-American relations following the August 2008
war with Georgia. Moving against the Manas base could be a strong act of
retribution against an American administration that was calling for
increased international pressure on Russia. Here again is behavior consistent
in Russia’s conduct of foreign affairs: viewing relations with the U.S.
holistically, all facets of connection and cooperation subject to changing
conditions of each other at all times. That is, conflict over Georgia may
provoke reaction against basing in Manas; missile shield development in
Eastern Europe often corresponds to increased Kremlin cooperation with
Tehran; a largely superficial punitive act against officials connected to the
death of Sergei Magnitsky coincides with the expulsion of USAID; and so on.
Yet often there appears a failure by Russia to appreciate dynamics of
domestic American politics. (And of course, U.S. policy has been habitually
short-sighted in terms of regard for or even anticipation of Russia’s reaction.)
In the case of Manas, the Bush administration had crafted the response to
Russia’s invasion of Georgia. By targeting Manas in February 2009 the
Kremlin weakened the newly-elected Democratic President, Barack Obama,
who, along with his party, had been more open to dialogue with Russia and
33
more amenable to the nuances of Russia’s interests in Georgia, and
strengthened the Republican Party whose defeated presidential nominee,
John McCain, had called for a much stronger response to Russia’s invasion
than President Bush had given. Through the course of action pursued with
Manas (and with several other international crises), the Putin regime has
prompted greater public support in America for politicians that criticize
Russia and characterize it as ‘America’s number one geopolitical foe,’ as did
2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney. The effects and
implications of this trend — which continues to this day* — are difficult to
identify, but are almost undoubtedly to Russia’s detriment as they fortify
antagonistic sentiment and forces in America. While American enmity may
bolster Putin’s domestic popularity (needlessly, it would seem, given his
popularity and lack of serious political opposition) and insulate him from
criticism by Russian or pan-Slavic nationalists, it limits Russia’s capability to
influence events outside of its existing sphere of influence.
Russia revealed the priority of its interests in the case of Manas: dominance
of its sphere of influence above all else. Stability, which was sacrificed at
several points in the basing conflict, regional security, which was undermined
by imperiling military assets necessary to prosecute the war in Afghanistan,
and all other considerations are subordinate to the supreme priority of
regional control. This is thefountainhead of Russian foreign policy behavior.
With its actions on Manas the Kremlin imperiled tenuous security
architecture around the war in Afghanistan and the wider region.
In defending this chief interest, Russia revealed that it would destabilize a
situation for the chance to elevate a more consistently pro-Russian (and thus,
according to the Kremlin’s operative paradigm, anti-American) regime, and
that it is disposed to exact retribution and upset regional stability. With its
actions on Manas the Kremlin imperiled tenuous security architecture
around the war in Afghanistan and the wider region. Perversely, unchecked
volatility in western Asia presents a far more immediate danger to Russia
than the United States. Yet the adamant strategic posture toward ensuring
control over its sphere of influence virtually necessitates discouraging any
type of incursion (military, political, economic, or cultural) by other great
powers. Medvedev’s summit and economic aid agreement with Bakiyev in
February 2009, increased Russian military industrial presence in Kyrgyzstan
(ownership of the Dastan torpedo manufacturing plant and support for the
Kambarata-2 hydroelectric station), pressure exerted by Russian media
outlets and socio-political entities to support Bakiyev’s ouster and the ascent
of Atambayev—the Kremlin exercised its supreme influence on Kyrgyzstan
34
across seemingly all sectors and segments of society. And the timing of all
those exertions links the Manas crisis with American responses to Russia’s
intervention in Georgia, marking the whole affair as partially retributive.
Russian prioritization of regional control, and in some instances
of unopposed control, as well as an often combative posture undoubtedly
diminishes its potential for cooperation and activity outside of that sphere.
Essentially, Russia confines itself to regional dominance rather than accept
the alternative of closer great power presence and a wider reach of foreign
affairs.
The behavior in the case of Manas is consistent with Russian actions in
subsequent crises, including Ukraine and Syria. Obstinate and overriding
protection of spheres of influence (prominently including the post-Soviet
space, Syria, and Iran), a rhetorical posture toward stability and regime
continuity, and a style of geopolitical gamesmanship that employs diverse
tactics and that are characterized by strategic flexibility in a chaotic
situation. The Kremlin’s strategic behavior is consistent, perhaps
characterized chiefly, paradoxically by its comfort with instability
(temporary, as in Kyrgyzstan during the 2010 regime change, or enduring, as
in Syria) or tenuous stability (as in the simmering proxy conflict in eastern
Ukraine, or in the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ elsewhere in the post-Soviet
space).
Quite evidently the Putin regime conducts its foreign affairs in the cast of a
‘zero-sum game,’ wherein the interests and presence of one foreign power
cannot coexist with another (or at least not with the U.S.). Russia presents
unambiguous and holistic resistance to any perceived encroachment in its
‘near abroad’ and established areas of influence—in Manas and Kyrgyzstan,
Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine this fact is resoundingly confirmed. This outlook
hinders the capacity of Russia to cooperate effectively with the United States
and others, and consequently represents a great instability in the present
international order, increasingly so as Russia decidedly, doggedly, and
sometimes recklessly pursues aggressively defensive interests.
Endotes
[1] Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia:
Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2009),
196.
[2] See Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 79
– 92.
35
[3] Associate Press, The. “In Putin’s Words: ‘Ready to Contribute’.” The New
York Times, September 25, 2001.
[4] “Kyrgyzstan.” Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html
[5] Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power
Contest in Central Asia, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2012),
120.
[6] Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler, “Is Russia Succeeding in
Central Asia?,” Orbis 54, no. 4 (2010): 619.
* Most notably: the September 2006 disappearance of U.S. Air Force Major
Jill Metzger, who was abducted and escaped captors three days later (as
Pentagon sources confirmed only in February of 2012); and, in December
2006 Zachary Hatfield, a U.S. serviceman on guard duty shot—purportedly in
self-defense—Alexander Ivanov, a Kyrgyz citizen (and an ethnic Russian).
[7] Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 122.
[8] Ibid, 123 – 124.
[9] Ibid, 124.
[10] Levy, Clifford J.. “Poker-Faced, Russia Flaunts Its Afghan Card.” The
New York Times, February 21, 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/weekinreview/22levy.html?_r=0.
[11] “Kyrgyz parliament approves U.S. base deal.” Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/25/us-usa-kyrgyzstan-baseidUSTRE55O1DP20090625.
[12] Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 125.
[13] “Kyrgyz parliament approves U.S. base deal.” Reuters.
[14] Габуев, Александр. “Американской авиабазе объявили невылет.”
Коммерсантъ. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1192106?isSearch=True.
(Translated by author).
[15] Ibid. (Translated by author).
[16] Ibid. (Translated by author).
[17] Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 127.
[18] Dzyubenko, Olga. “Mission accomplished for U.S. air base in pro-Moscow
Kyrgyzstan.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/uskyrgyzstan-usa-base-idUSBREA251SA20140306.
* Numerous articles written and polls conducted in response to the crisis in
Ukraine and the Syrian civil war indicate significant support for a harder,
more combative approach to relations with Russia.
36
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New
World Power?
By Mariya Pak Feuer
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) intends to promote India and
Pakistan to member state status during its annual summit this June, joining
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This
will transform the SCO into a huge regional organization that will cover more
than 60 percent of the Eurasian continent, represent over 3 billion people,
and include four nuclear power states. While such a development may seem
like a threat to the U.S. and NATO, they need not worry just yet.
The SCO was established in 2001, when Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five
(China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), an SCO precursor
organization formed in 1996. The organization has become more inclusive
over the years and there are now twelve additional Eurasian states
associated with the SCO (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Cambodia, India, Iran, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Turkey).
Each country participating in the SCO faces a mix of religious, ethnic, social,
and territorial conflicts. The organization targets these issues by focusing on:



Strengthening mutual confidence and good relations among its member
countries.
Promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science
and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation,
tourism, environmental protection and other fields.
Making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability
in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic,
just and rational political and economic international order.[1]
What the SCO promises is political and economic stability through increased
cooperation. This is something that the region has not seen in a long time.
Even former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that a “new Silk Road”
centered around Afghanistan and consisting of “a web of economic and transit
connections [would] bind together a region too long torn apart by conflict and
division.”[2]
37
The organization has achieved a lot over the course of its existence. Since its
establishment in 2001, the SCO has been involved in a wide range of
activities. The organization has held “Anti-terror” and “Peace Mission” joint
military exercises since 2002. In 2004, it established the Regional Anti-Terror
Structure (RATS) to address regional terrorism. In 2005, the SCO established
an Afghanistan Contact Group to cooperate on issues of mutual concern,
particularly drug trafficking from Afghanistan.[3] The organization works on
illegal drug control efforts between Russia, the Central Asian states, and the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In 2007, it launched a “health
train” project to jointly deliver high quality medical assistance to remote
areas of the region. At present, the SCO is negotiating plans to build a
network of railroad and gas pipeline systems across the Eurasian continent.
Consequently, many of the SCO objectives and projects have drawn the other
regional states into the organization.
According to the SCO Charter, membership is open for other states in the
region that are willing to commit to the principles and objectives of the
organization.[4] States may choose to have limited participation as observers
or dialog partners. The status of an observer state grants the rights to attend
meetings, bring up issues of their concern, and gain access to certain
documents,[5] but it does not provide a right to vote or participate in decision
making processes.[6] The rights of a dialogue partner are similar those of
observer status, but are more limited on a case by case basis.[7]Prior to 2015,
Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka were the only dialog partners. With the
adoption of the Ufa Declaration in 2015, several new dialogue partners were
admitted including Cambodia (Memorandum signed on September 24, 2015),
Azerbaijan (March 14, 2016), Nepal (March 22, 2016), and Armenia (April 16,
2016[8]). The Declaration also allowed Belarus to become an observer state,
joining Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Iran.[9]
The SCO and the West
Many see the SCO as a China and Russia-led counterweight organization to
NATO.[10] The reasoning is that China wants to deepen its economic ties and
gain political influence with the other SCO member states to further its own
global interests.[11] China is actively promoting its New Economic Silk Road
high-speed rail infrastructure network across the Eurasian continent. The
new railway will begin in Urumqi of China and, on its way to the Iranian
capital Tehran, will stop in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan),
Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Samarkand (Uzbekistan), and Ashgabat
(Turkmenistan).[12] In fact, the first Chinese train just pulled into Tehran
38
station in January of 2016. Russia wants to diversify its market for gas, it
also wants to preserve its influence on the Eurasian continent, and is
suspicious of NATO’s expansion to the East.[13]
Recently, there has been a strong divergence of the political interests and
beliefs between Russia and the West. The events in Ukraine and Syria
showed that despite the common belief that the Cold War era was over, the
Cold War mindset still exists.[14] SCO’s official website does not comment on
Russia’s participation in the Syrian Civil War. Despite the fact that some
SCO member states have voiced their discontent and concerns over Russia’s
annexation of Crimea,[15] the 2014 SCO Dushanbe and 2015 Ufa
Declarations do not contain any criticizing statements about Russia’s
actions.[16] Instead, the 2015 Ufa Declaration states that the member states
support resolution of international and regional conflicts only by the means of
political tools and diplomacy.[17]
For the U.S., the growth and advancement of the SCO means that there is
another major political alliance growing strong on the Eurasian continent.
Led by China and Russia, the organization has already formalized its
relations with the United Nations (2004 and 2010), the Commonwealth of
Independent States (2005), the Association of South East Asian Nations
(2005), the Eurasian Economic Community (2006), and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (2007).[18] It seems that United States’ SCO
policy is one of benign neglect. Despite some claims that in 2005 U.S. had
applied to and was rejected by the SCO,[19] the Assistant Secretary of State
for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, stated in 2006 that the
U.S. had not sought membership.[20] In fact the U.S., reluctant to endorse
repressive regimes, consciously chose to watch from the sidelines. In order to
better monitor the latest developments in the SCO, in 2009 the U.S. State
Department established an Office of Policy, Regional, and Functional
Organizations to allow better coordination between agencies, as SCO
participants fell under the jurisdictions of three different regional
bureaus.[21]
Impediments to the SCO’s goals
The SCO claims to qualify as a new world power and has been taking steps in
that direction. The SCO Development Strategy towards 2025 stated that the
member nations pledge to consistently take common positions on a wide
range of issues of mutual interest in the U.N. and other international
39
organizations.[22] This means that the SCO intends to shape the world’s
political agendas. Despite these plans, the SCO is not yet quite there.
First of all, the SCO has trouble developing its own political agenda. For
example, in 2012, the Deputy Director of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism
Structure’s (RATS) Executive Committee noted that each SCO country
defines terrorism somewhat differently.[23] Consequently, this hampers
strategy defining processes and anti-terrorist activities.[24] On top of the
political issues, there are ones of institutional origin; some SCO member
states have one agency that deals with terrorist and narcotics threats, while
others have two separate entities which makes coordination difficult and
ineffective, reducing RATS’ ability to conduct counter-narcotics efforts.
Second, the SCO struggles financially. The member states are still
negotiating the financial mechanism appropriate for the organization. The
2013 Bishkek Declaration, 2014 Dushanbe Declaration, and 2015 Ufa
Declaration all discussed the avenues to establish the SCO Development
Fund and the SCO Development Bank.[25] Overall, the discussion has been
going on for more than ten years and has not yielded any practical results.
Having a financial mechanism in place is crucial for the SCO, as it would
stimulate trade and development throughout the region. The 2015 Ufa
summit did yield a ten-year SCO Development Strategy that pledges
continued cooperation in efforts to establish joint financial institutions.[26]
Third, the geographic region covered by the SCO is complex. Zbigniew
Brzezinski calls it a ‘troubled area’ full of ethnic, religious, territorial, and
social conflicts.[27] On top of their internal issues, the SCO members have
major bilateral tensions. China has numerous border disputes with its
neighbors, including Russia.[28] Then there is the almost 70-year long
territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir
regions. Similar border disputes exist between the Central Asian states of
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Fergana valley.
Lastly, it is apparent that the SCO faces problems of distrust between its
members. There should be no illusions that one can build a major
international political institution with no trust between its partners. The
presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan expressed their concerns about
Russia’s ambitions to restore its influence over the Former Soviet
States.[29] After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Central Asian states
were uncomfortable supporting Russia’s actions, as they were worried about
becoming the next Ukraine.[30] Kazakhstan expressed its concerns about its
40
northern territories, adjacent to Russia and densely populated with ethnic
Russians.[31] Most importantly, both China and Russia aspire to be the top
world power, therefore they do not share a common vision of a new world
order.
Conclusion
In 2016, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will celebrate its
15th anniversary. Despite the political and financial challenges, the
organization has grown over the past fifteen years, developing its
institutional capacity, deepening socio-economic ties with associated states,
and expanding geographically. India and Pakistan’s new roles in the SCO
might at first glance seem like a major international policy event, possibly
changing the current global politics. However the real challenge lies within
the core of the SCO itself; there is still much conflict among its members and
disagreements on crucial financial decisions. Until the SCO improves trust
between its members, formalizes its financial institutions, and starts to
implement large scale collaborative development projects, the SCO will
remain on the sidelines of driving global politics.
Endnotes
[1] Available at: http://en.sco-russia.ru/about_sco/20140905/1013180761.html
[2] Cited in Boland, Julie. “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.” (2011): 29-31, available
at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghaicooperation-organizationboland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland.pdf
[3] Protocol on Establishment of the SCO–Afghanistan Contact
Group between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, available (in Russian) at:http://infoshos.ru/ru/?id=95
[4] Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Art.
13,http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69
[5]Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Art. 7,http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=65
[6] Ibid.
[7] Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, Art. 2.1.5; once the applicant state receives a
status of a Partner, SCO and the concerned state sign a Memorandum. The
Memorandum outlines areas in which a state or organization will interact
with the SCO, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=64
41
[8] “Nepal receives SCO dialogue partner status,” 22 March 2016, available
at:https://in.rbth.com/world/2016/03/22/nepal-receives-sco-dialogue-partnerstatus_577789
[9] Ufa Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, available
at: http://sco-russia.ru/documents/
[10] “Pax Sinica,” 20 September, 2014, available
at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21618866-china-trying-build-newworld-order-starting-asia-pax-sinica; “Shanghai Co-operation Council
emerges as rival to West,” 11 September, 2014, available
at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29169248; “China- and Russia-led
Shanghai bloc eyes Afghan role,” 7 June, 2012, available
at:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-18349607
[11] “Suppression, China, Oil,” 7 July, 2005, available
at: http://www.economist.com/node/4158711
[12] “China seeking to link Iran to its New Silk Road,” 15 December 2015,
available at:http://www.dw.com/en/china-seeking-to-link-iran-to-its-new-silkroad/a-18917586
[13] “From cold war to hot war,” 14 February 2015, available
at:http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggressionukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation;
[14] “From cold war to hot war,” 14 February 2015, available
at:http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggressionukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation; “The new cold war:
are we going back to the bad old days?” 19 November, 2014, available
at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-badold-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine
[15] “Uzbekistan: Rattled by Russian Expansionism, Tashkent Looks East” 8
September 2014, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69881
[16] Dushanbe Declaration, available (in Russian)
at: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4750
[17] Ufa Declaration, available (in Russian) at: http://scorussia.ru/documents/
[18] Boland, Julie. “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”
(2011): 29-31, available
at:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghaicooperation-organizationboland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland.pdf
[19] See “Pax Sinica,” 20 September, 2014, available
at:http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21618866-china-trying-build-newworld-order-starting-asia-pax-sinica
42
[20] Boucher, R. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the U.S. Helsinki
Commission, 26 Sep 2006, available
at:http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&C
ontentRecord_id=381&Region_id=0&Issue_id=0&ContentType=H,B&Conten
tRecordType=H&CFID=23548910&CFTOKEN=95881001;
Boland, Julie. “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” (2011):
29-31, available
at:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghaicooperation-organizationboland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland.pdf
[22] SCO Development Strategy towards 2025, available
at: http://www.sectsco.org
[23] “Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center,” 25
September 2015, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65960
[24] Ibid.
[25] See SCO Declarations from 2005, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Available
at: http://www.sectsco.org
[26] SCO Development Strategy towards 2025, available
at: http://www.sectsco.org
[27] Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft, and David Ignatius. “America
and the World.” NYC: Basic Books (2008).
[28] ‘China’s territorial disputes,’ 27 August 2014, available
at:http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/daily-chart-15
[29] “Putin: West wants to prevent the reconstruction of the Soviet Union, but
the Russian Federation does not have such objectives,” 20 December 2015,
available (in Russian) at:http://ria.ru/world/20151220/1345642539.html
[30] “Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan supported Ukraine on Crimea,” 6 April
2015, available (in Russian) at: http://www.chronotm.org/2015/04/uzbekistan-i-turkmenistan-podderzhali-ukrainu-po-voprosukryima/
[31] “Annexation of Crimea has magnified divisions inside Kazakhstan,” 3
May 2015, available
at:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/03/annexation-of-crimeamagnified-divisions-inside-kazkhstan
43