The City University of New York
Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American
Underdevelopment
Author(s): J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Jul., 1978), pp. 535-557
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421571 .
Accessed: 07/07/2011 16:53
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York and The City University of New York are
collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
Review Essay
Modernization and Dependency
AlternativePerspectives in the
Study of Latin AmericanUnderdevelopment
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela*
The end of WorldWarII markedthe beginningof fundamentaltransformations
in world affairs. The defeat of the Axis powers and the devastatingtoll which
the war had exacted on Britainand the Europeanallies propelledthe United
States into a position of economic and military preeminence. However, the
United States' power did not go unchallenged.The Soviet Union was able to
influence the accession of power of socialist regimes throughout Eastern
EuropeandChineseCommunistsdefeatedtheirWestern-backedadversariesto
gain control of the most populous nationon earth. These events called for an
urgent strategy to revitalize the economies of the Western nations. With
massive U.S. public and privateeconomic investment, Western Europe and
Japansoon recoveredfrom the ravages of war.
But WorldWarII usheredin anotherimportantchangewhose global implications would not be felt for some yearsto come. The weakeningof the European
powers and the logic of a war effort aimed at preservingself-determination,
markedthe final collapse of the vast colonial empiresof the nineteenthcentury
and the establishmentof a multiplicityof states each claiming sovereign and
independent status. The "new nations" soon drew the attention of U.S.
policymakersconcerned with the claim that Marxismpresentedthe best and
most logical road to full incorporationinto the modem world. They also
capturedthe attentionand imaginationof U.S. scholarswho in the pursuitof
knowledge, as well as the desire to influence governmentpolicy, began to
producea vast literatureon the "developing" nations. For many economists
the solutionwas anotherMarshallplan designedfor the ThirdWorld. But other
social scientists argued that fundamental differences between the developmental experience of Europe and the less-developed countries mitigated
0010-4159/78/0715-0006$05.00/1
? 1978 The City University of New York
535
Comparative Politics
July 1978
againstthe success of such a strategy.It was not simply a matterof reconstruction but one of development and, as such, a fundamentalquestion needed
answeringbefore policy recommendationscould be advanced:Why was there
such a starkcontrastin the developmentalexperience of a few Westerncountries and most of the rest of the world?
The answer to this question led to the developmentof the "modernization
perspective." Elaborated by a few economists and by anthropologists,
sociologists, andpoliticalscientists,this perspectivearguedthatit was essential
to consider the culturalcharacteristicsof "new" nations in determiningtheir
potential for development. These "noneconomic" factors became the cornerstoneof a conceptualframeworkwhich would influence the U.S. response
to the Third World.1 Though "Latin Americanists" did not write the major
theoreticalor conceptualworksof the modernizationliterature,thatperspective
soon became the dominantapproachinfluencingthe methodologyand conclusions of the most importantand trend-settingstudies.
U.S. scholars, however, were not the only ones preoccupied with the
difficulties of applying neoclassical economic assumptions to the developmental problems of Latin America. In internationalagencies, notably the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and university
researchcenters, LatinAmericansocial scientiststriedto come to gripswith the
widespread economic stagnation which affected the region in the postwar
period. Workingseparately,often with little communication,scholarsin various disciplines soon turnedto the broaderand more basic questionof the roots
of LatinAmericanunderdevelopment.Manyintellectualstrandscame together
in the 1960s with the elaborationof a moregeneralandcomprehensiveconceptual framework. The "dependency perspective" became the dominant approachin most Latin Americanintellectualcircles by the mid to late 1960s.
It is revealingthatthe most importantwritingsof the "dependencyperspective" still have not been translatedinto English, over a decade after the first
mimeographeddrafts began to circulate in Santiago. Dependency analysis
becameknownin the UnitedStatesandEuropenotthroughthe writingsof Latin
Americansbut throughinterpreterssuch as AndreGunderFrankwhose work
differs substantiallyfrom that of importantauthorsin the field such as F.H.
Cardoso, O. Sunkel, and T. dos Santos.2
Modernizationand dependencyare two sharplydifferentperspectivesseeking to explainthe samereality.They originatedin differentareas, with different
evaluative judgments, different assumptions, different methodologies, and
differentexplanations."The purposeof this review essay is not to describethe
origins of the two perspectives, their "extra scientific" elements, but to
comparetheirconceptualapproachesto the studyof LatinAmerica. As such, it
will be necessaryto considerthe two perspectivesas "ideal types," accentuating importantcharacteristicsof each frameworkin a mannernot found in any
particularauthor.Thereis a good deal of varietyandseveralpolemics (particu536
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
larly in the dependency literature)stemming from disagreements over the
emphasisgiven to key elementsof the conceptualframework,the operationalization of concepts, and the way in which certainprocesses occur empirically.
Though the essay will mentionsome of the controversieswithineach perspective, its purposeis to drawbroadcomparisonsandto providesomejudgmentas
to the relative utility of these competing frameworks in explaining Latin
Americanunderdevelopment.
The Modernization Perspective
This review will examine the modernization perspective's conceptual
frameworkby drawingon the work of some of its most importantauthors,and
then illustratethe use of that frameworkin the study of Latin America. This
formatis dictatedby the fact, noted earlier, that specialists on Latin America
failed to contributeimportanttheoreticalefforts to the field.4 Thoughthereare
several explanationsfor this failure, one of the most compelling is that Latin
America'sclose (particularlycultural)ties to the West madeit moredifficultby
contrastwith Asia andAfrica, to pointto obvious differenceswith the European
experience. Indeed, the early theorizingmade a distinctionbetween Western
and non-Westernexperiences, and, as J. Martznoted, "the LatinAmericanist
inevitablywonderedif his own regionwas included." Thatfact, however, did
not preventstudentsof LatinAmericafromdrawingextensively on the modernization literatureto interpretLatin Americandevelopment.
Assumptions The basic buildingblocks of the modernizationperspectiveare
parallel tradition-modernityideal types of social organizationand value systems, distinctions borrowed from nineteenth-century sociology.6 Since
societies are understoodto move from traditionto modernity,the ideal typical
dichotomyconstitutesthe polarends of an evolutionarycontinuum,thoughat
some point incrementalchanges give way to the qualitativejump into modernity. The location of this point is unclear;and yet, Third World countries,
including those of Latin America, are perceived to be below the thresholdof
modernity, with a preponderanceof traditionalfeatures.
The specific elements includedin the two polaritiesvary substantiallyin the
literature.The traditionalsociety is variouslyunderstoodas having a predominance of ascriptive,particularistic,diffuse, and affective patternsof action, an
extended kinship structurewith a multiplicityof functions, little spatial and
social mobility, a deferentialstratificationsystem, mostly primaryeconomic
activities, a tendency toward autarchy of social units, an undifferentiated
political structure,with traditionalelitist and hierarchicalsources of authority,
etc. By contrast, the modem society is characterizedby a predominanceof
achievement;universalistic, specific, and neutralorientationsand patternsof
537
ComparativePolitics July 1978
action; a nuclear family structureserving limited functions; a complex and
highly differentiatedoccupational system; high rates of spatial and social
mobility;a predominanceof secondaryeconomic activities and productionfor
exchange; the institutionalizationof change and self-sustainedgrowth;highly
differentiatedpoliticalstructureswith rationallegal sourcesof authority;andso
on.7
The literatureassumesthatthe values, institutions,and patternsof action of
traditionalsociety areboth an expressionand a cause of underdevelopmentand
constitutethe mainobstacles in the way of modernization.To enterthe modern
world, underdevelopedsocieties have to overcometraditionalnormsand structures opening the way for social, economic, and political transformations.For
some authorsmodernizationderives from a greaterdifferentiationof societal
functions, institutions, and roles and the development of new sources of
integration.For others, modernizationis based more on the actualtransformation of individualsthroughtheirassimilationof modernvalues.8But in general,
the primarysource of change is discussed in terms of innovations, that is, the
rejection of proceduresrelated to traditionalinstitutions, together with the
adoptionof new ideas, techniques, values, and organizations.Innovationsare
pursuedby innovatorsand the group that assumes this role inevitablyclashes
with defendersof the old order.The struggleis over two differentways of life.9
In describingthe assumptionsof the modernizationliterature,it is important
to note thatthe modem pole of the parallelideal types is the pivotal conceptual
and analytical point because it best approximates the characteristicsthat
societies mustattainin orderto develop. The traditionalend of the dichotomyis
largelya residualcategory,establishedby logical oppositionto the modem end.
In turn, the basic featuresof the modem pole are derived from characteristics
attributedto those countriesalreadyconsideredmodem. Moreover,since in the
process of modernization all societies will undergo by and large similar
changes, the historyof the presentlymodem nations is taken as the source of
universallyuseful conceptualization.Thus, as historianC. Black notes, "Although the problemsraised by generalizationsfrom a rathernarrowbase (the
now modem countries) must be acknowledged, the definition of modernity
takes the form of a set of characteristicsbelieved to be applicable to all
societies. This conception of modernity,when thoughtof as a model or ideal
type, may be used as a yardstickwith which to measure any society." 10 G.
Almondaddsthatto studymodernizationin the non-Westernareasthe political
scientist needs to "masterthe model of the modem, which in turncan only be
derivedfrom the most carefulempiricalandformalanalysis of the functionsof
the modem Westernpolities." I1
These assumptionsare logically consistentwith the view thatthe impetusto
modernizein the now developedcountrieswas the resultof endogenouscultural
and institutionaltransformations,while change in the late developers results
values and
primarilyfrom exogenous stimuli, thatis, the diffusion of modemrn
538
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
institutionsfrom the early modernizers.ModernizingThird World elites are
understood to be guided by the Western model adopting and adapting its
technology; assimilatingits values and patternsof action; importingits financial, industrial,and educationalinstitutions;and so on. Westerncolonialism,
foreign aid, foreign educationalopportunities,overseas business investments,
the mass media, etc., are all importantchannelsfor the transmissionof modernity. For some writersthis meansthatthe worldis convergingtowarda uniform
and standardizedculture resembling that of the United States and Western
Europe.'12
Though, as will be notedbelow, thereis disagreementon the extentto which
traditionalfeatureswill disappear,thereis broadagreementon the notion that
individualdeveloping countriesmust in some way replicatethe path followed
by the early modernizers.The principaldifference between alreadydeveloped
countries and developing ones is not in the natureof the process, but in the
speedand intensitymakingit possible for the late modernizersto "skip stages"
or "telescope time."'3 Despite the fact that the modernizationperspective
stresses the importance of the worldwide context in its analysis of social
change, the basic historical setting for modernizationis the nation state. As
Black notes, "Societies in the processof modernizationmust .., be considered
both as independent entities, the traditionalinstitutions of which are being
adaptedto modernfunctions, andalso as societies underthe influenceof many
outside forces."14 The world is fragmented, and yet bound by intersocietal
communication. It is, in the words of Dankwart Rustow, a "world of nations."'15
Finally, it is clearthatthe stresson the differencesin values from one context
to anotherhas some importantimplicationsfor the modernizationperspective's
concept of humannature.The characteristicof developed societies which has
received the most attentionin the literatureis the presumed"rationality" of
bothleadersandfollowers. Indeed,W. Moorehas recentlyarguedthatmodernization is best understoodas "the process of rationalizationof social behavior
and social organization." Rationalization,or the "institutionalizationof rationality," is defined as the "normativeexpectationthatobjective information
andrationalcalculusof procedureswill be appliedin pursuitor achievementof
any utilitariangoal .... It is exemplified but not exhausted in the use of
sophisticatedtechnology in constructionandproduction."1 As such, modernization theoristsagree with the assumptionof economic rationalityimplicit in
the economic growth models of traditionaleconomic theory. But as Moore
noted in a 1950s article, where they differ with traditionaleconomics is in the
assumption that rational behavior is a universal human characteristic. By
contrast with the developed countries, attitudes and values in developing
nations are such that individuals "behave in ways that are 'irrational' or
'non-rational'as judged on economic grounds." 17This explains why Bolivian
businessmenwill not take risks with their capital, preferringto put money in
539
Comparative Politics
July 1978
Swiss banks. Or why Ecuadorianswill study law ratherthan enter a more
lucrative career in business or technology.
In concluding this section, it is necessary to note that from the very outset
certain elements of the modernizationperspective came into criticism from
scholars who shared its basic assumptions. It is revealing that much of the
criticism came from researcherswho were experts in many of the featuresof
individual"traditional"societies. They were uncomfortablewith the arbitrary
designation of a wide variety of phenomena as "traditional," with little
concern for the rich, complex, and often strikingly different characteristics
subsumedunderthatvague concept. They arguedthatmanybelief systems and
institutionalarrangementswith no common referent in the United States or
Western Europe could indeed have modernizing functions. J. Gusfield has
summarized many of the relevant arguments adding that even in modern
societies certaintraditionalcharacteristicsmay surviveor gain renewedimportance.18These argumentsdo not, however, constitutea rejectionof the assumptions of the modernizationperspectivebut an illustrationof their use. Despite
the title of his article, Gusfield does not arguethattraditionand modernityare
"misplaced polarities." Gusfield simply points to a confusion in the use of
termsandtheirmisapplicationin concretesituations.He continuesto acceptthe
assumptionsthattraditionandmodernityarevalid theoreticalpolaritiesandthat
traditionin its many ramificationsis the basic obstacle to modernization.If a
particularsociety or regionexperiencessignificanteconomic growth, whatwas
thought to be an other-worldlyreligion underminingrational economic behaviormay in fact be a creed capableof promotinginstrumentalvalues conducive to modernization.There can be a "modernity of tradition."19
Recent amendmentsto the modernizationperspectiveare extensions of the
same internalcritique. Reflecting the soberingreality of the 1970s with many
studies pointing to an ever increasing gap between rich and poor nations,20
several modernizationwritershave questionedthe earlierbelief in an inevitable
and uniform process leading to the convergence of societies on economic as
well as social and political grounds.21 Others, while not questioning the
inevitabilityof the process, point more forcefully than before to its disruptive
and negative effects which affect the "latecomers" much more seriously than
the "survivors." 22 It still remainsthe case thatto modernize,howevergood or
inevitable that process may be, it is by definition necessary to overcome
traditionalvalues and institutionsand substitutethem for more modem ones.
Latin America and the modernization perspective MainstreamU.S. scholarshipon LatinAmericahas implicitlyor explicitly drawnon the modernization
perspective to explain Latin American underdevelopment.Often contrasting
the LatinAmericanexperienceto thatof the UnitedStatesor WesternEurope,it
has arguedthattraditionalattitudesand institutionsstemmingfromthe colonial
past have provento be serious, if not fatal, stumblingblocks to any indigenous
540
J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela
effort to develop economically, socially, or politically. The values of Catholicism, of large Indian populations, or of aristocratic rural elites have contributed
to "irrational" patterns of behavior highly detrimental to modernization.
One of the most influential statements is S.M. Lipset's "Values, Education
and Entrepreneurship," the introductory essay to the best-selling text Elites in
Latin America. Lipset draws directly from T. Parsons and D. McClelland in
arguing that:
The relativefailureof LatinAmericancountriesto develop on a scale comparable
to those of North America or Australasiahas been seen as, in some part, a
consequence of variationsin value systems dominatingthese two areas. The
overseas offspring of Great Britain seemingly had the advantage of values
derivative in part from the ProtestantEthic and from the formationof "New
Societies" in which feudal ascriptive elements were missing. Since Latin
America, on the other hand is Catholic, it has been dominatedfor centuriesby
rulingelites who createda social structurecongruentwithfeudalsocial values.23
In his article Lipset concentrates primarily on explaining economic underdevelopment as a function of the lack of adequate entrepreneurial activity. The
lack of instrumental behavior, weak achievement orientations, and the disdain
for the pragmatic and material have prevented the rise of a risk-taking business
sector oriented toward rational competitive and bureaucratic enterprise. The
educational system has only served to perpetuate the problem by continuing to
socialize the population with inappropriate attitudes. "Even [in Argentina] the
second most developed Latin American country... the traditional landed,
aristocratic disdain for manual work, industry, and trading, continues to affect
the educational orientations of many students." 24 Lipset cites a whole host of
studies, many of which were based on survey research in Latin America, to
conclude that "the comparative evidence from the various nations of the
Americas sustains the generalization that cultural values are among the major
factors which affect the potentiality for economic development." 25 Recent
textbooks on Latin America have clearly been influenced by such observations.
Thus, R. Adie and G.E. Poitras note that "there is in Latin America a social
climate in which the very rewards which have spurred on the entrepreneurs in,
for example, North America, are consistently deemphasised.. . socioeconomic change dependent on business activities... cannot necessarily be expected to follow the same path as it has elsewhere." 26
The late K.H. Silvert, one of the leading authorities on Latin America, wrote
extensively on the impact of traditional values not only on Latin America's
economic but also its political performance. He made it very clear that Latin
America's experience had to be judged by the more advanced countries. In a
recently reprinted article he asked, "What else is one to do other than define
development by the selection of certain characteristics of the already developed
states?" On the basis of implicit comparisons with his own society, Silvert goes
541
ComparativePolitics July 1978
on to say that"there is somethingin the qualityof the LatinAmericanman and
his culturewhich has made it difficult for him to be trulymodern... which has
made this part of the Western world so prone to excesses of scoundrels, so
politically irrationalin seeking economic growth, and so ready to reach for
gimmicks." 27 Judgmentssuch as those led him to argue, duringthe heyday of
the Alliance for Progress, that the United States should "tip the domestic
political scales" in the directionof "modernizinggroups." "Moneys spenton
the kind of education, for instance, which will attractpersons of a modem
mentality can be confidently expected to assist the general move toward
development. Moneys spent in betteringor certifyingthe positions of students
of a traditionalcast will only make more robust the anti-developmentsectors.... If help can be extended to the attitudinallydeveloped in such countries, then it should be done. Otherwise assistance merely certifies nondevelopmentor invites unpredictablerevolution."28
Similar sentiments are expressed by R. Scott, another prominent Latin
Americanist.Scott notes thatthe "inabilityof LatinAmerica's political structures to act as efficient integratingmechanisms.., suggests that the only real
solution in the long runis to alterthe value system of the people." 29 A recent
text echoes that theme: "A traditionalpsychoculturalworld does indeed predominatein LatinAmerica.... To depictcollective attitudesandvalue traitsas
basically traditionaldoes help to explain much of political life southof the Rio
Grande . . .
." 30
The assumptionthat the key to Latin Americansociety can be found in its
culturalvalues is not only characteristicof the literatureof the 1960s and of a
rashof new textbooksaimedat the college market,31it has also found renewed
currencyin the writingsof a numberof U.S. historiansandpolitical scientists.
In what has become known as the "new corporatism,"an effort is being made
to explaineconomic, social, andespeciallypoliticalfeaturesof LatinAmerican
countries by stressing the durabilityof Catholic and "Thomistic" values.
Authoritarianpolitical patterns,corporativisteconomic organizations,and the
disdain for democraticand liberal values are the results of a "distinct tradition." H. Wiarda, a prominentrepresentativeof this "new" trend in the
literature, has argued "largely untouched by the great revolutionary
movements-social, economic, religious, political, intellectual-that we associate with the emergenceof the modem order,the Ibericand LatinAmerican
nationsremainedlocked in this traditionalpatternof values andinstitutionsthat
postponed and retardeddevelopment."32
Wiardamaintainsthatthe focus on LatinAmericancorporatismrepresentsa
significantdeparturefrom the modernizationschool. He bases his claim on the
fact that he stresses the importanceof studying Latin America on its "own
terms," without advocating the desirabilityor inevitability of change along
United States or WesternEuropeanlines. He thus questions the convergence
thesis noting that "many traditionalsocieties, and particularlythose of the
542
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
IbericLatinnations,haveprovedremarkablypermeableandflexible, assimilating at variouspointsmore 'modern'and 'rational'elements, but withoutlosing
theircharacteristics."33But this positiondifferslittle fromthe well-established
"modernityof tradition"argumentreferredto earlier.Wiardamerelyprovides
an example of the concreteapplicationof the tradition-modernity
dichotomyto
the Latin Americancase; he does not question the basic assumptionsof the
perspective.The impressiveexamples of economic development, which have
occurredfrom time to time in LatinAmericaare simply due to the adaptability
of some traditionalvalues and institutions to outside influences. And yet,
however remarkablethe "permeability" of traditionin Latin America, it is
implicitin Wiarda'sargumentthatit has been the exceptionratherthanthe rule.
Otherwise,LatinAmericawould not have fallen behindin the roadof development.
The Dependency Perspective
Like the modernizationperspective,the dependencyperspectiveresultedfrom
the workof manydifferentscholarsin differentbranchesof the social sciences.
Much of the work proceededin an inductive fashion. This was the case with
economists working in ECLA who first sought to explain the underdevelopment of Latin America by focusing on the unequal terms of trade between
exportersof raw materialsand exportersof manufacturedgoods. ECLA "doctrine" called for a concerted effort to diversify the export base of Latin
American countries and accelerate industrializationefforts through import
substitution.However, the continueddifficulties with that model of development soon led to a focus on the internalcontraintsto industrialization,with an
emphasison factorssuchas the distortingeffects of unequallandtenurepatterns
and the corrosiveresultsof an inflationbest explainedby structuralratherthan
monetaryvariables. Soon these two trendscame togetherwhen scholars, such
as Osvaldo Sunkel, combinedthe early emphasison externalvariableswith the
internalconstraintsto development.34
But this dependencyperspectivewas anticipatedby Latin Americanhistorianswho had been workingfor years on variousaspects of economic history.
Studiessuch as those of SergioBagfi stressedthe close interrelationof domestic
developmentsin Latin America and developmentsin metropolitancountries.
And in Brazil, sociologists such as FlorestanFernandes,Octaiviolanni, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Theot6nio dos Santos also turned to broad
structuralanalyses of the factors of underdevelopment.The fact that many of
these scholars found themselves in Santiago in the 1960s only contributedto
furtherdevelopmentof the perspective.
In its emphasis on the expansive natureof capitalism and in its structural
analysis of society, the dependencyliteraturedrawson Marxistinsights and is
related to the Marxist theory of imperialism. However, its examination of
543
ComparativePolitics July 1978
processes in Latin America imply importantrevisions in classical Leninist
formulations,both historicallyand in light of recent trends. The focus is on
explaining Latin Americanunderdevelopment,and not on the functioningof
capitalism, though some authorsarguethat their efforts will contributeto an
understandingof capitalism and its contradictions.
Assumptions The dependency perspective rejects the assumption made by
modernizationwritersthatthe unitof analysisin studyingunderdevelopmentis
the national society. The domestic culturaland institutionalfeaturesof Latin
America are in themselves simply not the key variables accounting for the
relative backwardnessof the area, though, as will be seen below, domestic
structuresare certainly critical interveningfactors. The relative presence of
traditionalandmodem featuresmay, or may not, help to differentiatesocieties;
butit does not in itself explainthe originsof modernityin some contextsandthe
lack of modernityin others. As such, the tradition-modernity
polarityis of little
value as a fundamentalworkingconcept. The dependencyperspectiveassumes
that the developmentof a nationalor regional unit can only be understoodin
connection with its historicalinsertioninto the worldwidepolitical-economic
system which emergedwith the wave of Europeancolonizationsof the world.
This global system is thoughtto be characterizedby the unequalbut combined
developmentof its different components. As Sunkel and Paz put it:
Bothunderdevelopment
anddevelopment
areaspectsof thesamephenomenon,
botharehistoricallysimultaneous,
botharelinkedfunctionallyand,therefore,
interactandconditioneachothermutually.Thisresults... in thedivisionof the
worldbetweenindustrial,
advanced
or"central"countries,andunderdeveloped,
backwardor "peripheral"
countries....35
The centeris viewed as capableof dynamicdevelopmentresponsiveto internal
needs, and as the main beneficiaryof the global links. On the other hand, the
peripheryis seen as having a reflex type of development;one which is both
constrainedby its incorporationinto the global system and which resultsfrom
its adaptationto the requirementsof the expansionof the center. As Theotinio
dos Santos indicates:
Dependencyis a situationin whicha certainnumberof countrieshave their
andexpansionof another... placing
economyconditioned
by thedevelopment
thedependent
countriesin a backward
counpositionexploitedby thedominant
tries.36
It is importantto stressthatthe process can be understoodonly by referenceto
its historicaldimensionandby focusing on the total networkof social relations
as they evolve in differentcontexts over time. For this reason dependenceis
characterizedas "structural,historicalandtotalizing" or an "integralanalysis
544
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
of development."37 It is meaningless to develop, as some social scientists
have, a series of synchronicstatisticalindicatorsto establishrelative levels of
dependenceor independenceamong differentnationalunits to test the "validity" of the model.38The unequaldevelopmentof the world goes back to the
sixteenth century with the formationof a capitalist world economy in which
some countriesin the centerwere able to specialize in industrialproductionof
manufacturedgoods because the peripheralareas of the world which they
colonized providedthe necessaryprimarygoods, agriculturaland mineral,for
consumptionin the center. Contraryto some assumptionsin economic theory
the internationaldivision of labordid not lead to paralleldevelopmentthrough
comparative advantage. The center states gained at the expense of the
periphery. But, just as significantly, the different functions of center and
peripheralsocieties hada profoundeffect on the evolutionof internalsocial and
political structures. Those which evolved in the periphery reinforced
economies with a narrowrangeof primaryexports. The interdependentnature
of the worldcapitalistsystem andthe qualitativetransformationsin thatsystem
over time makeit inconceivableto thinkthatindividualnationson theperiphery
could somehow replicate the evolutionaryexperience of the now developed
nations.39
It follows from an emphasison global structuralprocesses and variationsin
internalstructuralarrangementsthat contextualvariables, at least in the long
run, shape and guide the behaviorof groupsand individuals.It is not inapprobehavioror to
priateattitudeswhich contributeto the absenceof entrepreneurial
institutional arrangementsreinforcing underdevelopment.Dependent, peripheraldevelopmentproducesan opportunitystructuresuch that personalgain
for dominant groups and entrepreneurialelements is not conducive to the
collective gain of balanceddevelopment.This is a fundamentaldifferencewith
much of the modernizationliterature.It implies that dependence analysts,
thoughthey do not articulatethe point explicitly, sharethe classical economic
theorists' view of human nature. They assume that individuals in widely
differentsocieties arecapableof pursuingrationalpatternsof behavior;able to
assess informationobjectively in the pursuitof utilitariangoals. Whatvaries is
not the degree of rationality,but the structuralfoundationsof the incentive
systems which, in turn, produce differentforms of behavior given the same
processof rationalcalculus. It was not attitudinaltransformationswhich generatedthe rapidindustrializationwhich developedafterthe GreatDepression,but
the need to replaceimportswith domesticproducts.Or, as Cardosopointsout in
his studies of entrepreneurs,it is not values which conditiontheir behavioras
muchas technologicaldependence,stateinterventionin the economy, andtheir
political weakness vis-a-vis domestic and foreign actors.40What appear as
anomalies in the modernizationliteraturecan be accountedfor by a focus on
contextual processes in the dependence literature.
545
ComparativePolitics July 1978
It is necessary to underscorethe fact that dependency writers stress the
importanceof the "way internaland externalstructuralcomponents are connected" in elaboratingthe structuralcontext of underdevelopment.As such,
underdevelopmentis not simply the result of "external constraints"on peripheralsocieties, norcan dependencybe operationalizedsolely with referenceto
clustersof externalvariables.41Dependencyin any given society is a complex
set of associations in which the external dimensions are determinativein
varying degrees and, indeed, internalvariables may very well reinforce the
patternof externallinkages. Historicallyit has been rarefor local intereststo
develop on the peripherywhich are capable of chartinga successful policy of
self-sustaineddevelopment.Dominantlocal interests,given the natureof class
arrangementsemergingfrom the characteristicsof peripheraleconomies, have
tendedto favor the preservationof rearticulationof patternsof dependencyin
their interests.
It is also importantto note that while relations of dependency viewed
historicallyhelp to explain underdevelopment,it does not follow that dependentrelationstoday necessarilyperpetuateacrossthe boardunderdevelopment.
With the evolution of the world system, the impactof dependentrelationscan
change in particularcontexts. This is why Cardoso, in studyingcontemporary
Brazil, stresses the possibility of "associated-dependentdevelopment," and
Sunkel and Fuenzalida are able to envision sharp economic growth among
countries most tied into the contemporarytransnationalsystem.42 Because
external-internalrelations are complex, and because changes in the world
system over time introducenew realities, it is indispensableto study comparatively concretenationalandhistoricalsituations.As AnibalQuijanosays, "The
relationshipsof dependency... take on many forms. The nationalsocieties in
Latin America are dependent, as is the case with the majorityof the Asian,
African and some Europeancountries. However, each case does not present
identicaldependencyrelations."43 The dependencyperspectivehas thus concentratedon a carefulhistoricalevaluationof the similaritiesanddifferencesin
the "situationsof dependency" of the variousLatin Americancountriesover
time implying careful attentionto "preexisting conditions" in differentcontexts.44
The descriptionof various phases in the world system and differingconfigurationsof external-internallinkages, follow fromthis insistenceon diachronic
analysis and its applicationto concrete cases. The dependencyperspectiveis
primarilya historicalmodel with no claim to "universalvalidity." This is why
it has paid less attentionto the formulationof precise theoreticalconstructs,
such as those found in the modernizationliterature,and more attentionto the
specificationof historicalphases which are an integralpartof the framework.
The dependencyliteraturedistinguishesbetween the "mercantilistic"colonial period (1500-1750), the period of "outwardgrowth" dependenton pri-
546
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
mary exports (1750-1914), the period of the crisis of the "liberal model"
(1914-1950), and the currentperiod of "transnationalcapitalism."
As alreadynoted, becauseof the need for rawmaterialsandfoodstuffsforthe
growing industrializationof England,Germany,the UnitedStates, andFrance,
Latin Americanproductivestructureswere aimedfrom the outset at the export
market.Duringthe colonial period, the economic specializationwas imposed
by the Iberian monarchies. As Bagutnotes in his classic study, "Colonial
productionwas not directedby the needs of nationalconsumers, and not even
by the interestsof local producers.The lines of productionwere structuredand
transformedto conformto an orderdeterminedby the imperialmetropolis.The
colonial economy was consequently shaped by its complementarycharacter.
The products that did not compete with those of Spain or Portugal in the
metropolitan, international or colonial markets, found tolerance or
stimulus.... ."45 Duringthe nineteenthcentury,exportswere actively pursued
by the politically dominant groups. The independence movement did not
attemptto transforminternalproductivestructures;it was aimedat eliminating
Iberianinterferencein the commercializationof productsto and from England
and northernEurope. The logic of the productive system in this period of
"outwardlydirecteddevelopment," in ECLA's terms, was not conducive to
the creation of a large industrialsector. Economic rationality, not only of
individual entrepreneursbut also of the system, dictated payments in kind
and/orextremely low wages and/orthe use of slavery, thus markedlylimiting
the internalmarket. At the same time, the accumulationof foreign exchange
made relatively easy the acquisition of imported industrial products. Any
expansion of exports was due more to political than economic factors and
dependedon a saleableexportcommodity, andplenty of land and labor, for its
success.
Therewere, however, importantdifferencesbetween regions and countries.
During the colonial period these are attributableto differences in colonial
administrations, natural resources, and types of production. During the
nineteenthcentury a key difference was the degree of local elite control over
productiveactivitiesfor export. Thoughin all countrieselites controlledexport
production initially (external commercializationwas mainly under foreign
control), towardsthe end of the centuryin some countriescontrolwas largely
relinquishedto foreignexploitation.Wherethis occurred,the economic role of
local elites was reducedconsiderably,thoughthe importanceof this reduction
varieddependingbothon the degreeto which the foreign enclave displacedthe
local elite from the exportsectorandthe extent to which its economic activities
were diversified. Concurrently,the state bureaucracyexpandedand acquired
increasingimportancethroughregulationsand taxationof the enclave sector.
The state thus became the principalintermediarybetween the local economy
and the enclave, which generally had little direct internalsecondaryimpact.
547
ComparativePolitics July 1978
Otherdifferences, especially at the turnof the century, are the varyingimportance of incipient industrialization,the size and importanceof middle- and
working-classgroups, variationsin exportproducts,naturalresources, and so
on.46
The world wars and the depressionproduceda crisis in the export-oriented
economies through the collapse of external demand, and therefore of the
capacity to import. The adoption of fiscal and monetary policies aimed at
supportingthe internalmarketand avoidingthe negativeeffects of the external
disequilibriumproduced a favorable climate for the growth of an industrial
sector undernationalauspices. The availableforeign exchange was employed
to acquirecapitalgoods to substituteimportsof consumerarticles.47 The early
successes of the transitionto what ECLA calls "inwardly directed development" depended to a large extent on the different political alliances which
emergedin the variousnationalsettings, andon the characteristicsof the social
and political structuresinheritedfrom the precrisis period.
Thus, in the enclave situationsthe earliest developments were attainedin
Mexico and Chile, where middle- and lower-class groupsallied in supporting
state development policies, ultimately strengtheningthe urban bourgeoisie.
The alliance was successful in Chile because of the importanceof middle-class
partieswhich emergedduringthe final periodof export-orienteddevelopment,
and the early consolidationof a tradeunion movement. The antecedentsof the
Mexican situationareto be found in the destructionof agriculturalelites during
the revolution. Such structuralconditions were absent in other enclave situations (Bolivia, Perui, Venezuela, and Central America) where the internal
developmentphasebegan laterundernew conditionsof dependence,thoughin
some cases with similar political alliances (Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala,
Costa Rica). Throughoutthe crisis period agrarian-basedand largely nonexporting groups were able to remain in power, appealing in some cases to
military governments, and preservingthe political scheme that characterized
the export-orientedperiod.
In the nonenclavesituations,considerableindustrialgrowthwas attainedin
ArgentinaandBrazil. In the former,export-orientedagrarianentrepreneurshad
invested considerablyin productionfor the internalmarketandthe contraction
of the export sector only accentuatedthis trend. In Brazil the export-oriented
agrariangroupscollapsed with the crisis andthe state, as in Chile and Mexico,
assumeda majordevelopmentalrole with the supportof a complex alliance of
urbanentrepreneurs,nonexportagrarianelites, popularsectors, and middleclass groups.In Colombiathe export-orientedagrarianelites remainedin power
and did not foster significant internalindustrializationuntil the fifties.48
The importsubstitutingindustrializationattainedgreatestgrowthin Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. It soon, however, reached its limits, given the
parametersunderwhich it was realized. Since capital goods for the establishment of industrialparkswere acquiredin the centralnations, the success of the
548
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
policy ultimately depended on adequate foreign exchange supplies. After
reaching maximum growth through the accumulation of foreign exchange
during the Second World War, the industrializationprograms could only
continue-given the available political options-on the basis of an increased
externaldebt andfurtherrelianceon foreigninvestments.This accumulationof
foreign reserves permittedthe success of the national-populistalliances in
ArgentinaandBrazilwhich gave the workersgreaterwelfarewhile maintaining
investments. The downfall of Peronand the suicide of Vargas symbolized the
end of this easy period of import substitution.
But the final blow to "import substitution"industrializationcame not from
difficultiesin the peripherybutfurthertransformationsin the centerwhich have
led, in Sunkel's term, to the creationof a new "transnational"system. With
rapid economic recovery the growing multinationalcorporationssought new
marketsand cheaperproductionsites for theirincreasinglytechnologicalmanufacturingprocess. Dependencyconsequentlyacquireda "new character"as
Dos Santos noted, which would have a profound effect on Latin America.
Several processes were involved resulting in (1) the investment of centrally
based corporationsin manufactureswithinthe peripheryfor sales in its internal
marketor, as CardosoandFalettonote, the "internationalisationof the internal
market"; (2) a new internationaldivision of labor in which the periphery
acquirescapitalgoods, technology, andraw materialsfrom the centralnations,
and exportprofits, along with its traditionalraw materialsand a few manufactureditems producedby multinationalsubsidiaries;and (3) a denationalization
of the older import substitutingindustriesestablished originally.49Although
the "new dependence" is in evidence throughoutthe continent,the process has
asserteditself more clearly in the largestinternalmarketssuch as Brazil, where
the weakness of the trade-unionmovement(the comparisonwith Argentinain
this respect is instructive)coupled with authoritarianpolitical structureshas
created a singularlyfavorable investmentclimate.
In subsequentand more recent works writersin the dependencyframework
have pursued different strategies of research. Generally speaking, the early
phases of the historicalprocess have received less attention, though the contributionof I. Wallersteinto an understandingof the originsof the worldsystem
is a majoradditionto the literature.50Most writershave preferredto focus on
the current"new situation"of dependence.Some have devoted moreattention
to an effort at elaboratingthe place of dependentcapitalismas a contributionto
the Marxist analysis of capitalist society. Scholars in this vein tend to argue
more forcefully than others that dependentcapitalism is impossible and that
socialism provides the only historically viable alternative.51Othershave focused more on the analysis of concrete cases of dependence, elaboratingin
some detail the variousinterconnectionsbetweendomestic and foreign forces,
and noting the possibility of differentkinds of dependentdevelopment.52Still
others have turned their attention to characterizingthe nature of the new
549
ComparativePolitics July 1978
capitalist system, with particularemphasis on the emergence of a "transnational system" which is rendering more complex and problematic the old
distinctionsof center and periphery.53Particularlyfor the last two tendencies,
the emphasis is on the design of new empirical studies while attemptingto
systematize further some of the propositions implicit in the conceptual
framework.
Summary and Conclusions
Modernizationanddependencyaretwo differentperspectiveseach claiming to
provide conceptual and analytical tools capable of explaining the relative
underdevelopmentof Latin America. The object of inquiry is practicallythe
only thing thatthese two competing "visions" have in common, as they differ
substantiallynot only on fundamentalassumptions,but also on methodological
implications and strategiesfor research.
Though there are variations in the literature, the level of analysis of a
substantial tradition in the modernizationperspective, and the one which
informsmost reflectionson LatinAmerica, is behavioralor microsociological.
The primaryfocus is on individualsor aggregatesof individuals,their values,
attitudes,and beliefs. The dependencyperspective,by contrast,is structuralor
macrosociological. Its focus is on the mode of production,patternsof international trade, political and economic linkages between elites in peripheraland
central countries, group and class alliances and conflicts, and so on. Both
perspectives are concerned with the process of development in national
societies. However, for the modernizationwriter the national society is the
basic unitofanalysis, while the writerin a dependenceframeworkconsidersthe
global system and its variousforms of interactionwith nationalsocieties as the
primaryobject of inquiry.
For the dependency perspective, the time dimension is a crucial aspect of
what is fundamentallya historical model. Individualsocieties cannot be presumed to be able to replicatethe evolution of other societies because the very
transformationof an interrelatedworld system may preclude such an option.
The modernizationpotential of individual societies must be seen in light of
changes over time in the interactionsbetween externaland internalvariables.
The modernizationperspective is obviously concerned about the origins of
traditionalandmodernvalues;but, thetime dimensionis not fundamentalto the
explanatorypretensionsof a model which claims "universal validity." Without knowing the source of modernityinhibitingcharacteristics,it is still possible to identifythem by referenceto theircounterpartsin developing contexts.
At the rootof the differencesbetweenthe two perspectivesis a fundamentally
differentperception of human nature. Dependency assumes that human behaviorin economic mattersis a "constant." Individualswill behavedifferently
in differentcontexts not because they aredifferentbut becausethe contexts are
550
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
different.The insistenceon structuresand, in the final analysis, on the broadest
structuralcategoryof all, the worldsystem, follows logically fromthe view that
opportunitystructurescondition human behavior. Modernizationists,on the
other hand, attributethe lack of certainbehavioralpatternsto the "relativity"
of human behavior;to the fact that culturalvalues and beliefs, regardlessof
opportunitystructures,underlie the patternsof economic action. Thus, the
conceptionof change in the modernizationperspectiveis a productof innovations which result from the adoptionof modern attitudes among elites, and
eventually followers. Though some modernizationtheorists are now more
pessimistic about the development potential of such changes, modernizing
beliefs area prerequisitefor development.Fordependencyanalyststheconception of change is different.Changeresultsfrom the realignmentof dependency
relationsover time. Whetheror not developmentoccurs and how it occurs is
subjectto controversy.Given the rapidevolution of the world system, dependent development is possible in certain contexts, not in others. Autonomy,
througha breakin relationsof dependency,may not lead to developmentof the
kind already arrivedat in the developed countries because of the inability to
recreatethe same historicalconditions, but it might lead to a differentkind of
development stressing different values. Thus, the prescription for change
varies substantiallyin the dependencyperspectivedependingon the ideological
outlook of particularauthors. It is not a logical consequence of the historical
model. In the modernizationperspectivethe prescriptionfor change follows
more automatically from the assumptions of the model, implying greater
consensus.
Froma methodologicalpointof view the modernizationperspectiveis much
moreparsimoniousthanits counterpart.And the focus of muchof the literature
on the microsociologicallevel makes it amenableto the elaborationof precise
explanatorypropositionssuch as those of D. McClellandor E. Hagen. Dependency, by contrast,is more descriptiveand its macrosociologicalformulations
are much less subject to translationinto a simple set of explanatorypropositions. Many aspects of dependency, and particularlythe linkages between
externalphenomenaandinternalclass andpower relationsareunclearandneed
to be studied with more precision and care. For this reason the dependency
perspective is an "approach" to the study of underdevelopmentratherthan a
"theory." And yet, precisely because modernizationtheoryrelies on a simple
conceptualframeworkand a reductionistapproach,it is far less useful for the
study of a complex phenomenonsuch as developmentor underdevelopment.
But the strengthsof the dependencyperspectivelie not only in its consideration of a richerbody of evidence and a broaderrangeof phenomena,it is also
more promising from a methodological point of view. The modernization
perspectivehas fundamentalflaws which make it difficult to provide for a fair
test of its own assumptions.It will be recalledthatthe modernizationperspective drawson a model with "universalvalidity" which assumesthattraditional
551
Comparative Politics
July 1978
values are not conducive to modernbehavioralpatternsof action. Given that
underdevelopment,on the basis of variouseconomic andsocial indicators,is an
objective datum, the researchtask becomes one of identifying modernizing
values and searchingfor their opposites in underdevelopedcontexts.
In actual researchefforts, the modernityinhibitingcharacteristicsare often
"deduced" fromimpressionisticobservation.This is the case with muchof the
political science literatureon Latin America. However, more "rigorous"
methods, such as survey research, have also been employed, particularlyin
studies of entrepreneurialactivity. Invariably,whether throughdeduction or
surveyresearch,less appropriatevalues for modernizationsuch as "arielismo"
(a concern for transcendentalas opposed to material values) or "lowachievement" (lack of risk-takingattitudes)have been identified thus "confirming" the hypothesis that traditionalvalues contributeto underdevelopment. If by chance the use of control groups should establish little or no
differencein attitudesin a developedandunderdevelopedcontext, the research
instrumentcan be consideredto be eitherfaultyor the characteristicstappednot
the appropriateones for identifyingtraditionalattitudes.The latteralternative
might lead to the "discovery" of a new "modernityof tradition"literatureor
of greater flexibility than anticipated in traditionalnorms or of traditional
residuals in the developed country.
The problem with the model and its behaviorallevel of analysis is that the
explanation for underdevelopmentis part of the preestablishedconceptual
framework. It is already "known" that in backward areas the modernity
inhibitingcharacteristicsplay the dominantrole, otherwisethe areaswould not
be backward.As such, the test of the hypothesisinvolves a prioriacceptanceof
the very hypothesisup for verification,with empiricalevidence gatheredsolely
in an illustrative manner. The focus on individuals simply does not permit
considerationof a broaderrange of contextual variableswhich might lead to
invalidating the assumptions. Indeed, the modernity of tradition literature,
which has pointed to anomalies in the use of the tradition modernity
"polarities," is evidence of how such a perspectivecan fall victim to the "and
so" fallacy. Discrepancies are accounted for not by a reformulation,but by
adding a new definition or a new corollary to the preexisting conceptual
framework.
Much work needs to be done within a dependencyperspectiveto clarify its
concepts and causal interrelationships,as well as to assess its capacity to
explain social processes in various parts of peripheralsocieties. And yet the
dependencyapproachappearsto have a fundamentaladvantageover the modernizationperspective:It is open to historicallygroundedconceptualizationin
underdevelopedcontexts, while modernizationis locked into an illustrative
methodological style by virtue of its very assumptions.
552
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
NOTES
*ArturoValenzuelawishes to acknowledgethe supportof the FordFoundationandof the Institute
of Development Studies at the University of Sussex which made the completion of this paper
possible during his tenure as a Visiting Fellow at IDS.
1. See Manning Nash's foreword to the anniversaryissue of Economic Development and
CulturalChange, XXV (1977, supplement)in honorof BertHoselitz, one of the firsteconomiststo
stress "non-economic" factorsin development.See his Sociological Aspectsof EconomicGrowth
(New York, 1960) which was translatedinto twenty-five languages by the U.S. Departmentof
State. Myron Weiner's Modernization:The Dynamics of Growth (New York, 1966) is a good
collection of essays by prominentmodernizationwriterswhich were first preparedfor the " Voice
of America."
2. The principalworksin the dependencyperspectiveareFernandoHenriqueCardosoandEnzo
Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina (Mexico, 1969) and Osvaldo Sunkel and
PedroPaz, El subdesarrollolatinoamericanoy la teoriadel desarrollo (Mexico, 1970). The former
soon will be publishedin English, while the latteris not scheduledfor translationdespite the fact
thatthe Spanishversion is in its ninthprinting.Because of the language"barrier"AndreGunder
Frank is often thought to be the founder of the dependency school. See for example Adrian
Foster-Carter"FromRostow to GunderFrank:ConflictingParadigmsin the Analysis of Underdevelopment," WorldDevelopment, IV (March1976), 1975, whereFrankis referredto as "Copernicus" of a new paradigm.In fact, Frankdrawsextensively on LatinAmericanscholarsin studies
such as his Capitalismand Underdevelopmentin Latin America (New York, 1967). He and other
"interpreters" such as Susanne Bodenheimer ("Dependency and Imperialism," Politics and
Society, I [May 1970]), present oversimplified and often distortedviews of much of the Latin
Americancontribution.On this point see Cardoso, "The Consumptionof DependencyTheory in
the United States," Latin AmericanResearch Review, XII, No. 3. Frank's work was, however,
extensively read and discussed in Latin Americanuniversities.
3. Thoughmodernizationanddependencecan be thoughtof as alternativeparadigms,we prefer
the term "perspective" because in Thomas Kuhn's terms the social sciences are "preparadigmatic,"only approximatinga "normal science." See Kuhn, The Structureof Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago, 1970).
4. This is less true for developmentaleconomics and anthropology, than for sociology and
political science. Economists like Hoselitz and EverettHagen (On the Theoryof Social Change
[Homewood, (Ill.), 1962]) drew in parton LatinAmericanfield research.RobertRedfield's The
Folk Culturesof Yucatan(Chicago, 1941), is consideredone of the classics. The most important
sociological work was done by Gino Germani, although his most importantstudies were never
translated.See his Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transici6n (Buenos Aires, 1968). For an
intelligentoverview of his work, as well as thatof Cardoso, see Joseph A. Kahl, Modernization,
Exploitationand Dependency in Latin America (New Brunswick, [N.J.], 1976).
5. John Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a
Region," Latin AmericanResearch Review, VI (Spring 1971), 78.
6. For antecedentsof the modernizationliterature,see the work of scholars such as Maine,
Tonnies, Durkheim, Weber and Redfield.
7. For surveysof the literature,see FrankSutton,"Social TheoryandComparativePolitics," in
HarryEcksteinandDavid Apter,eds. ComparativePolitics (New York, 1963), andDaniel Lerner,
"Modernization:Social Aspects," InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968).
8. See the excellent distinction made by Alejandro Portes between "development as social
differentiation"and "development as the enactmentof values" in Portes, "On the Sociology of
National Development: Theories and Issues," American Journal of Sociology, LXXXII (July
1976). Examplesof the formerare Neil J. Smelser, "The Modernizationof Social Relations," in
Weiner,Modernizationand "Mechanismsof ChangeandAdjustmentto Change," in JasonFinkle
and RobertGable, eds. Political Developmentand Social Change (New York, 1971); and Talcott
Parsons' companion volumes, Societies: Evolutionaryand ComparativePerspectives and The
553
ComparativePolitics July 1978
Systemof ModernSocieties (EnglewoodCliffs, [N.J.], 1966 and 1971, respectively). Examplesof
the latter are Hagen, On The Theory of Social Change; and David McClelland, The Achieving
Society (Princeton,1961) and"The PsychologicalCauses andConsequencesof Modernization:An
EthiopianCase Study," EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange, XXV (1977 supplement).
See also Alex Inkeles and David Smith,BecomingModern (Cambridge,[Mass.], 1974). Inkeles
andSmithtakeparticularcareto pointout thattheirstudydoes not demonstratea causalrelationship
between the emergenceof modem attitudesand modernizingtransformations,for which McClellandtakesthemto taskin the above cited article. But if all they establishis thatpeople who work in
modem settings have modernvalues, then theirlaboriousresearcheffort is circularand pointless.
9. See Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization(New York, 1966), pp. 68-75.
10. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
11. Gabriel Almond, "Introduction:A Functional Approach to ComparativePolitics," in
Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960) p. 64.
Statementssuch as these have led to the criticismthat modernizationis an ethnocentricapproach.
But ratherthanpointingout theirethnocentricity,it is more importantto indicatethatthey reflectan
assumptionwhich becomes a key methodologicaloption, ethnocentricor otherwise.
12. Forthe view thatmodernizationis an exogenous processleadingto convergence see Lerner,
The Passing of TraditionalSociety (New York, 1958) and Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialismand
IndustrialMan (Cambridge,[Mass.], 1960).
13. See Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America
(New York, 1966), p. 261.
14. Black, p. 50 (emphasis added).
15. DankwartA. Rustow, A Worldof Nations (Washington, 1967).
16. WilbertMoore "ModernizationandRationalization:Processes and Restraints,"Economic
Developmentand Cultural Change, XXV (1977, supplement), 34-35.
17. Moore, "MotivationalAspects of Development," in Amitai and Eva Etzioni, eds. Social
Change (New York, 1964), p. 292. See also his "Social Change" in the InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968).
18. J. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social
Change,"'AmericanJournal of Sociology, LXXII (January1967).
19. Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernityof TraditionalDevelopment in India
(Chicago, 1967). Anotherworkin this vein is RobertWardandRustow, eds. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey(Princeton, 1964).
20. For example see IrmaAdelmanandCynthiaMorris,EconomicGrowthand Social Equityin
Developing Countries (Stanford, 1973).
21. S.N. Eisenstadt,Tradition,Change and Modernity(New York, 1973) and Moore, "Modernizationand Rationalization."
22. Marion Levy, Jr., Modernization:Latecomers and Survivors (New York, 1972).
23. Seymour MartinLipset, "Values, Educationand Entrepreneurship,"in Lipset and Aldo
Solari, eds. Elites in LatinAmerica (New York, 1963). Foranotherstudyin which Lipsetexpresses
similarviews aboutLatinAmerica, while extolling the opposite values in the United States, see his
The First New Nation (New York, 1963).
24. Lipset, "Values, Educationand Entrepreneurship,"p. 19.
25. Ibid., p. 30. Some of the studiescited includeT.C. Cohran,"CulturalFactorsin Economic
Growth," Journal of Economic History, XX (1974); T.R. Fillol, Social Factors in Economic
Development:TheArgentineCase (Cambridge,[Mass.], 1961);B.J. Siegel, "Social Structureand
Economic Change in Brazil," in Simon Kuznets, et al., Economic Growth:Brazil, India, Japan
(Durham, [N.C.], 1955); and W.P. Strassman, "The Industrialist," in John J. Johnson, ed.
Continuityand Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1964).
26. R. Adie and G.E. Potitras,LatinAmerica: The Politics of Immobility(Englewood Cliffs,
[N.J.], 1974), pp. 73, 75. For similar views see pp. 252-53 and W.R. Duncan, Latin American
Politics: A DevelopmentalApproach (New York, 1976), p. 240.
27. Silvert, "The Politics of Social and Economic Change in Latin America," in HowardJ.
Wiarda, ed. Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst,
[Mass.], 1974), pp. 160-62.
28. Silvert, The ConflictSociety, p. 271. For a definitionof "modem man" see p. 265. In the
prefaceArthurWhitacker,a well known historian,noted thatthe book should be made "required
readingfor anyone who wishes to express an opinion" on the Alliance.
554
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
29. R. Scott, "Political Elites," in Lipset and Solari, pp. 133-34.
30. Duncan, p. 240. Scott emphasizes culturaldeterminantsin later writings. See his edited
volume, Latin AmericanModernizationProblems (Urbana,[Ill.], 1973). The role of traditional
features in explaining economic and political patternsin Latin Americawas stressed by the best
known studies of the 1960s. For a samplingsee the articles in the collections edited by Johnson,
Continuity and Change, and by D.B. Heath and R.N. Adams, ContemporaryCultures and
Societies in Latin America (New York, 1965). See also Stanislav Andreski, Parasitism and
Subversion:The Case in Latin America (New York, 1966); George Blanksten, "The Politics of
Latin America," in Almond and Coleman, ThePolitics of the Developing Areas; J. Mander,The
UnrevolutionarySociety (New York, 1969); Luis MercierVega, Roads to Power in LatinAmerica
(New York, 1969); and MartinNeedler,LatinAmericanPolitics in Perspective (Princeton, 1967).
Crude applications of modernizationconcepts to particularcases include Frank Jay Moreno,
Legitimacyand Stabilityin LatinAmerica:A Studyof ChileanPolitical Culture (New York, 1969)
and James Payne, Patterns of Conflictin Colombia (New Haven, 1968). Some importantauthors,
however, took differentapproaches,muchcloserto those of the dependencyperspective.See Merle
Kling, "Towarda Theoryof Power and PoliticalInstabilityin LatinAmerica," WesternPolitical
Quarterly, IX (1956); CharlesAnderson,Politics and EconomicChange in LatinAmerica (Princeton, 1967); Richard Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Developmentin Latin
America (San Francisco, 1967); and Douglas Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery:External
Factorsin LatinAmericanPolitics," in James Rosenau, ed. LinkagePolitics (New York, 1969).
The readerby JamesPetrasand MauriceZeitlin, eds. LatinAmerica:Reformor Revolution?(New
York, 1968), also provideda differingperspectiveincorporatingmany writingsof LatinAmerican
scholars.
31. Besides the Adie and Poitrasand the Duncanworks cited above, see also C.F. Denton and
L.L. Preston, Latin American Politics: A Developmental Approach (New York, 1975); and
Needler,An Introductionto LatinAmericanPolitics: TheStructureof Conflict (EnglewoodCliffs,
[N.J.], 1977). For one of the few alternativetexts see Petras,Politics and Social Structurein Latin
America (New York, 1970).
32. Wiarda,Politics and Social Change in LatinAmerica, p. 269. Anotherimportantcontribution to this literatureis FredrickPike and T. Stritch, eds. TheNew Corporatism:Social-Political
Structuresin theIberian World(SouthBend, [Ind.], 1974). Not all writersinterestedin corporatism
drawprimarilyon culturalvariables.PhilippeC. Schmitterexplicitly rejectswhathe considersto be
the circularityof thatapproach.See his essay, "The Centuryof Corporatism?,"in Pike andStritch.
33. Wiarda, "Toward a Frameworkfor the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin
Tradition:The CorporativeModel," WorldPolitics, XXV (January1973).
34. See Sunkel, "Politica nacional de desarrollo y dependencia externa," Estudios Internacionales, I (April 1967). For reviews of the dependency literaturesee NormanGirvan, "The
Developmentof Dependency Economics in the Caribbeanand LatinAmerica:Review and Comparison," Social and Economic Studies, XXII (March 1973); Ronald H. Chilcote, "A Critical
Synthesis of the Dependency Literature,"Latin American Perspectives, I (Spring 1974); and
PhillipO'Brien, "A Critiqueof LatinAmericanTheoriesof Dependence," in I. Oxaal, et al., eds.
Beyond the Sociology of Development (London, 1975).
35. Sunkel and Paz, El subdesarrollo latinoamericano, p. 6.
36. Theot6niodos Santos, "La crisis del desarrolloy las relacionesde dependenciaen America
Latina," in H. Jaguaribe, et al., eds. La dependencia politico-econ6mica de America Latina
(Mexico, 1970), p. 180. See also hisDependenciay cambiosocial (Santiago, 1970) andSocialismo
o Fascismo: El nuevo caracter de la dependenciay el dilema latinoamericano (Buenos Aires,
1972).
37. Sunkel and Paz, p. 39; Cardoso and Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo, chap. 2.
38. This is the problemwith the studies by RobertKaufman,et al., "A PreliminaryTest of the
Theory of Dependency," ComparativePolitics, VII (April 1975), 303-30, and C. Chase-Dunn,
"The Effects of InternationalEconomic Dependence on Development and Inequality:A Cross
NationalStudy,,"AmericanSociological Review, XL (December 1975). It is interestingto notethat
Marxistscholarsmakethe same mistake.They pointto featuresin the dependencyliteraturesuch as
unemployment,marginalizationetc., noting thatthey are not peculiarto peripheralcountriesbut
characterizecapitalist countries in general. Thus "dependence" is said to have no explanatory
value beyond a Marxisttheory of capitalistsociety. See Sanyaya Lall, "Is Dependence a Useful
Concept in Analyzing Underdevelopment?," World Development, III (November 1975) and
555
ComparativePolitics July 1978
TheodoreWeisscopf, "Dependenceas an Explanationof Underdevelopment:A Critique," (paper
presented at the Sixth Annual Latin American Studies Association Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia,
1976). The point of dependency analysis is not the relative mix at one point in time of certain
identifyablefactors but the evolution over time of structuralrelations which help to explain the
differentialdevelopmentof capitalismin differentpartsof the world. As a historicalmodel it cannot
be tested with cross national data. For an attempt to differentiateconceptually contemporary
capitalismof the core andperipheralcountries,andthusmoreamenableto such criticism,see Samir
Amin, Accumulationon a WorldScale (New York, 1974).
39. Some authors have criticized the focus of the literatureon the evolution of the world
capitalist system. David Ray, for example, has argued that "soviet satellites" are also in a
dependentandunequalrelationshipvis-a-vis the Soviet Union and thatthe key variableshould not
be capitalismbut "political power." RobertPackenhamhas also arguedthat the most important
critiqueof the dependencyliteratureis that it does not consider the implicationsof "power." See
Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin AmericanUnderdevelopment:Three Basic Fallacies,"
Journal of InteramericanStudiesand WorldAffairs, XV (February1973) and Packenham,"Latin
American Dependency Theories:Strengthsand Weaknesses," (paperpresentedto the HarvardMIT Joint Seminaron Political Development, February, 1974), especially pp. 16-17, 54. This
criticism misses the point completely. It is not power relationstoday which cause underdevelopment, butthe historicalevolutionof a worldeconomic system which led to economic specialization
more favorable to some than others. It is precisely this concern with the evolution of world
capitalismwhich has led to the preoccupationin the dependencyliteraturewith rejectinginterpretations stressing the "feudal" ratherthan "capitalist" natureof colonial and post colonial Latin
Americanagriculture.On this point see Sergio Bagui,Economiade la Sociedad Colonial (Buenos
Aires, 1949);Luis Vitale, "AmericaLatina:Feudalo Capitalista?,"Revista Estrategia, III (1966)
andInterpretacionMarxistade la historia de Chile (Santiago, 1967); and E. Laclau, "Feudalism
and Capitalismin Latin America," New LeftReview, LXVII (May-July 1971). A brilliantrecent
exposition of the importanceof studying the evolution of the capitalist world system in orderto
understandunderdevelopmentwhich focuses more on the center states than on the peripheryis
ImmanuelWallerstein,The Modern WorldSystem: CapitalistAgricultureand the Origins of the
European WorldEconomy in the SixteenthCentury (New York, 1974).
40. Cardoso,Empresarioindustriale desenvolvimentoecondmicono Brazil (Sao Paulo, 1964)
and Ideologias de la burguesia industrialen sociedades dependientes (Mexico, 1971).
41. Cardoso and Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo, p. 20. Indeed Cardoso argues that the
distinctionbetween externaland internalis "metaphysical." See his "Teoria de la dependenciao
anilisis de situacionesconcretasde dependencia?,"RevistaLatinoamericanade Ciencia Politica,
I (December 1970), 404. The ontology implicit in such an analysis is the one of "internal
relations." See Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society
(London, 1971). This point is importantbecause both Frankand the early ECLA literaturewas
criticized for their almost mechanisticrelationshipbetween externaland internalvariables.Frank
acknowledges this problem and tries to answer his critics in Lumpenbourgeoisieand Lumpendevelopment (New York, 1967). "Tests" of dependency theory also attributean excessively
mechanicaldimensionto the relationship.See Kaufman,et al., "A PreliminaryTest of the Theory
of Dependency."
42. Cardoso, "Associated DependentDevelopment:TheoreticalImplications," in Alfred Stepan, ed. AuthoritarianBrazil (New Haven, 1973), and Sunkel andEdmundoFuenzalida,"TransnationalCapitalismandNationalDevelopment," in Jose J. Villamil, ed. TransnationalCapitalism
and National Development (London, forthcoming).It is thus incorrectto argue that dependency
analysts ignorethe evidence of certainkinds of economic growth. For fallacies in the dependency
literaturesee Cardoso"Las contradiccionesdel desarrolloasociado," Desarrollo Economico, IV
(April-June 1974).
43. Anibal Quijano, "Dependencia, Cambio Social y Urbanizaci6nen America Latina," in
Cardoso and F. Weffort, eds. America Latina: Ensayos de interpretacionsociolrgico politico
(Santiago, 1970).
44. Cardosoand Faletto, Dependenciay desarrollo, pp. 19-20; Sunkel and Paz, El subdesarrollo latinoamericano, pp. 5, 9.
45.
Economia de la sociedad colonial, pp. 122-23.
Bagti,
46. On
industrializationsee A. Dorfman,La industrialisaci6nen AmericaLatinay las politicas
de fomento (Mexico, 1967).
556
J. Samuel Valenzuelaand Arturo Valenzuela
47. See M. de C. Tavares, "El proceso de sustituci6n de importacionescomo modelo de
desarrollo reciente en America Latina," in Andres Bianchi, ed. America Latina: Ensayos de
interpretaci6necon6mica (Santiago, 1969).
48. For detailed discussions of nonenclave versus enclave situationssee Cardosoand Faletto,
and Sunkel and Paz.
49. Sunkel"Capitalismotransnacionaly desintegraci6nnacionalen AmericaLatina,' Estudios
Internacionales, IV (January-March1971) and "Big Business and Dependencia:A Latin American View," Foreign Affairs, L (April 1972); Cardosoand Faletto;Dos Santos, El nuevo cardcter
de la dependencia (Santiago, 1966).
50. Wallerstein,The Modern WorldSystem.
51. V. Bambirra,Capitalismodependientelatinoamericano(Santiago, 1973); R.M. Marini,
Subdesarrolloy revolucion (Mexico, 1969); F. Hinkelammert,El subdesarrollolatinoamericano:
un caso de desarrollo capitalista (Santiago, 1970).
52. Cardoso, "Teoria de la dependencia." A recenttrendin dependencywritings attemptsto
explain the currentwave of authoritarianismin LatinAmerica as a resultof economic difficulties
createdby the exhaustionof the easy importsubstitutingindustrialization.The new situationleads
to a processof developmentled by the stateandthe multinationalcorporations,which concentrates
incometowardthe top, increasesthe levels of capitalaccumulationandexpandsheavy industry;the
old populist alliances can therefore no longer be maintained. See Dos Santos, Socialismo o
de la dependenciay el dilema latinoamericano(Buenos Aires, 1972);
fascismo: el nuevo caradcter
GuillermoO'Donnell, Modernizationand BureaucraticAuthoritarianism:Studiesin LatinAmerican Politics (Berkeley, 1973); Atilio Bor6n, "El fascismo como categoria hist6rica:en torno al
problema de las dictadurasen America Latina," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, XXXIV
(April-June1977); the effects of this situationon labor are explored in KennethP. Ericksonand
PatrickPeppe, "Dependent CapitalistDevelopment, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Repressionof the
WorkingClass in Chile andBrazil," LatinAmericanPerspectives, III (Winter1976). However, in
the postscriptto their 1968 book, Cardoso and Faletto caution against adopting an excessively
mechanisticview on this point, against letting "economism kill history"; Cardosoand Faletto,
"Estado y proceso politico en America Latina," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, XXXIV
(April-June 1977), 383. Articles with dependency perspective appearfrequentlyin the Revista
Mexicana de Sociologia as well as in Latin AmericanPerspectives.
53. Sunkel, "Capitalismo transnacionaly desintegraci6nnacional en America Latina," and
Sunkel and Fuenzalida, "TransnationalCapitalismand National Development."
557