National Security and Egypt’s Regional Role
Panel 2
Kim Ghattas: Good morning, everybody, and thank you very much for joining us for
the second session of the Middle East Institute’s conference on Egypt. As Kate just
mentioned, this discussion will focus on Egypt’s national security and its regional
role. It’s been a very turbulent couple of years for Egypt, and of course for the
region, needless to say, with uprisings and civil wars. But the clock is ticking on
Egypt and the security crisis there. From the Sinai to its western border with Libya,
there have been some rather shocking developments this year alone, from the
beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians at the hands of ISIS in Libya, to the
deadly insurgency in the Sinai, which took another dangerous turn this summer with
the beheading of a Croatian ex-patriot worker who had been kidnapped on the
outskirts of Cairo. Now, a lot of observers and analysts will say that the government
does not have a handle on it yet, despite the fact that the government says that it is,
very much, in control. What happens next door in Libya is not in the hands of Egypt,
even though it is trying to push for a political solution there. The challenges are
staggering, but is there a real threat to the stability of the country? Or, as one of our
panelists here has pointed out in one of his articles, the insurgency is really simply in
a limited area of the Sinai. There is no further threat. We will look at some of the
factors and factions contributing to the security crisis on both fronts. We’ll discuss
the conditions necessary for the Egyptian military and the police to combat and
reduce the support for armed extremists. And we will also look at the external factors
and actors in this crisis. We have lined up an excellent panel of speakers with very
diverse and complementary expertise on Egypt. I’ll introduce them briefly. I’ll start
here to my left with Omar Ashour, I’ll keep the introductions brief because you have
the detailed bios in your programs. Omar Ashour is a senior lecturer in Middle East
Politics and Security Studies at the University of Exeter. He’s also at Chatham
House, and he’s an expert on the issue of ending political violence and the transition
from armed to unarmed activism, an expertise that the Egyptian government can no
doubt benefit from. Candace Putnam has a long career as a senior foreign service
officer and is current the director of the Office of Egyptian State Affairs at the State
Department. Before that, she served in Egypt, in Alexandria. She’s also served in
Peshawar, Islamabad, Rome, Baghdad, Beirut, Tunis, Ankara, Jerusalem, AbuDhabi, and I have to say, Candace, Rome really stands out in this list. I want to hear
that story! Next to her is Abdel-Monem Said Aly. He’s the director and chairman of
the board of the Regional Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, and a senior fellow
at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies. And of course,
last but not least, we have Greg Aftandilian, I hope I’m pronouncing that correctly,
he’s an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and American University. He
was awarded as Middle East analyst at the State Department for his analysis on
Egypt. He received the department’s superior honor award for his analysis on Egypt,
so we are honored to have you with us as well. I want to start with a fairly basic
question, and I’d like each one of you to give me your thoughts on this. I don’t want
to go into the full history of Egypt and how we got here, but I do want to try to get
each one of you to tell us succinctly, what do you think is the key factor for what
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we’re looking at for why we got here? How do we get to a point where, in the same
year, Egypt has to bomb targets in Libya and is battling an insurgency in the Sinai?
And I’d like each one of you to give us your brief take on this crossroads that Egypt
finds itself at. Omar?
Omar Ashour: That’s a very tough one, but very briefly, I don’t think in the region,
and in Egypt, there is a non-violent conflict resolution mechanism at the moment.
You have a political environment that is very much conducive to political violence
one way or another, whether by state or non-state actors. You have a, more or less,
narrative and ideology in the region that promotes political violence one way or
another. I’m talking here not just about ISIS, but I’m talking about hyper-nationalism
and extreme forms of nationalism and stateism and all kinds of political violence
bundled under it. And, at the moment, and this is the significant development since
2011, you actually have resources by non-state actors to pose an actual military
threat. So you have non-state actors at the moment who operate almost like special
forces. Guerilla tactics, hit-and-run attacks, guided missiles, anti-tank guided
missiles and so on. And that environment was not there yet. So when you have
these kind of compositions, plus the series of events that happened in Egypt pretty
much as building up before, generally, 2011, and from 2011 onwards, the actions
and reactions that happened were very much conducive to what we see today. The
troubles, in comparative perspective very briefly, the troubles in Northern Ireland
happened because 14 protesters were killed by military paratroopers. In Egypt you
had a thousand protestors killed in less than 10 hours and in front of TV cameras.
That’s got to have some repercussions.
Kim Ghattas: And so there is a definite link between the domestic situation and what
we’re seeing and the security issue...
Omar Ashour: There is definitely, but is it not a clear cut or very linear correlation.
Each region has its own local components of what’s happening, so we can get into
the details of north Sinai is very different not from Cairo but from south Sinai. Cairo
is very different of course from western desert. But there are correlations, and it’s a
very porous region in terms of the borders and interactions between all of these
factors.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, how do you, how does the State Department, how does the
administration view those events unfolding in Egypt? Is it the result of four years of
instability in the region? Is it particular to Egypt and the domestic political situation?
Is it a combination of both? How worried are you?
Candace Putnam: Well, I think it’s clearly a combination of both. I mean, you’ve had
four years of political upheaval. You have a revolution that probably isn’t finished. So
a lot of churn still in the society. You have deep divisions that were discussed in the
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panel earlier on the political side of things. You have, I think, a generational divide
across all Egyptian communities that is playing into this. You have an economic
situation where there’s a lot of frustration. And you have the outside actors that are
having an impact on Egypt in ways that Egypt has never seen before, and that’s part
of a regional dynamic. So, it’s a combination of things that are coming together. And
I think, understandably, the Egyptian government sees this as their primary concern
that they have to deal with, and we would agree that it is an issue of growing
concern. You have a combination of an insurgency in Sinai, along with ISIS’ threat
across the Libyan border, and domestic terrorism in which ISIS is reportedly
increasingly involved. So there’s a lot of challenges. It’s a complex threat situation
which makes it very difficult to formulate an easy response.
Kim Ghattas: Were these trend lines apparent to you before they started really
taking shape?
Candace Putnam: I think we’ve been watching it for some time. Again, you can’t take
Egypt out separately. This is something we’re seeing across the region.
Kim Ghattas: Abdel-Monem, you wrote a piece where you were a little bit pushing
back against all the headlines about the insurgency, the instability, the security
crisis. Tell us your view about how serious the situation is and why you think Egypt is
where it is, and what is the alternative view that you have?
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Well, first I have to thank the Middle East Institute for inviting
me. That’s a great honor, and to be with my colleagues as well. To know the
situation now, we’ve got to have a little bit just of comparison between what is a
classic theory of Egyptian national security. It was simple. Egypt was under threat
from three fronts: from the north, and that’s from the Greeks until the British, and
northeast, and that is from the (inaudible 08:52) times to the Israelis, and then about
the Nile flow to Egypt. These are the classic theory of Egyptian national security.
Particularly as the bulk of the population is around the Nile valley and the rest of the
country is empty. That is the simple classic theory of Egyptian national security
doctrine. What’s new? What’s new is two variables. One is Arab Spring and its
aftermath, you know, the Muslim Brothers (inaudible 09:24) and so forth, which
really reduced drastically the immunity of the system. The Egyptian system, the
Egyptian polity as a state, as even security forces, as even economics of the
country, the socio-economic cultural bondage among the population. The general
immunity system in the country weakened. The second, is not only Egypt, and I was
surprised by the last panel that Egypt is like a country in the desert. Yeah, it is in the
desert, but we have a region in which we have almost similar patterns of the results
of Arab Spring lead to a fascist moment in the region. And the fascist moment
started a process of using this lack of immunity in the country, and as such, what we
have now is trying to raise this immunity system in the country. To raise the
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immunity system sometimes you need the chemotherapy. Sometimes you need a
surgery. Sometimes it needs painful solutions to do that. And I guess that the first
response to the last point of what to do, is really to reconstruct Egypt geographically.
And if you follow my article, I am talking about moving from being a river state into a
sea state. Because in the surrounding vacuum in Egypt, there is only one million
population. If you are talking about Sinai, you are talking about half a million. If you
are talking western desert, it’s 330,000, and the Red Sea 180,000. So that’s a big
vacuum for others to use in a moment of weakness.
Kim Ghattas: Greg, tell us your view, and also in terms of how Egypt fits in the
region, and if you could react a little bit to what Abdel-Monem was saying, right now
as well, is it really mostly about external factors, in your view. Is it disconnected from
the domestic politics, as some Egyptians would like to suggest?
Gregory Aftandilian: Well, I agree with Abdel-Monem about the issue of the Arab
Spring, because that affected a lot of countries and we see very similar patterns in a
breakdown of authority in a number of Arab states. So I agree with him on that.
There are also some peculiarities about the 2011 revolution. Because a number of
terrorists were actually released from prison; during that whole upheaval some of
them broke out of prison and things like that. So, they took advantage of certain
situations in Egypt. And then you have a number of socio-economic problems that
the revolution was supposed to address but that has not been done. And then also
you have some closing of some political space after the euphoria of 2011 and we
know that some young Muslim Brotherhood activists have now resorted to violence.
And then you have the trans-national factors of ISIS and Al-Qaeda seeing
opportunities and trying to exploit those opportunities for their own benefit. So I
agree with the consensus of the panel that it’s a number of factors, but certainly
Egypt is not really divorced from the other troublesome Arab countries that we’re
seeing right now.
Kim Ghattas: And Omar, when Abdel-Monem talks about the fragile immunity of the
system in the wake of the Arab Spring, I guess there are very divergent ways of
addressing that, and that’s where some of the problems are arising and how the
state and armed forces are looking at what is the solution to the security crisis.
Omar Ashour: There is two points here. First, about the Arab Spring, which I like to
call the Arab Majority Uprisings, because this is exactly what it is. Uprisings that lead
to transition processes that may have succeeded or failed. The issue here is that
what happened before the Arab uprisings lead to the Arab uprisings. We cannot
discount the corruption, the depression that lead initially to these uprisings. And then
after that you had the transition periods where really multiple forces were fighting in
it. And there was the, between the forces of status quo, that wanted to keep things
as they are. And then the forces were a bit reformist and so wanted gradual, or, in
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the State Department language, orderly transition. Or, the forces that wanted a real
revolutionary change from the roots but had no powers to make revolutionary
change. And in the end, in most of the countries, status quo forces won. Or, you
descend, because of the balance between pro change and pro status quo, you have
a civil war scenario. In the lack of a non-violent conflict resolution mechanism. In the
lack of institutions that can limit the scope of political conflict to votes and
constitutions and legal matters. So because of that lack, we had the collapse of most
of the transitions. With regards to the idea that national security of Egypt is about
external statist threats, I don’t think that applies at the moment. I think this applied
probably in the 60s, partly in the ’70s, before the peace treaty. I think the perception
from within most of the security and the military institutions, that the threat are
internal, they have to do with non-state actors who challenge the system. Whether
these non-state actors, of course, there are different degrees of threats. So whether
these non-state actors are armed and violent (Sinai situation) or they are
decentralized idealistic youth groups that also challenge the system and challenge
the status quo, they put them in different levels of threats. And now I think the most
important faction that are victorious at the moment within the bureaucracy, is the
faction that sees the main mistake of President Mubarak and the main mistake of
Field Marshal Tantawi was not to crack down on it. And if they crack down hard, they
would not have a generated 2011 to begin with, and we would have avoided all this
headache. This is the perception.
Kim Ghattas: How does the State Department view this analysis? Are you thinking if
only this Arab uprising hadn’t happened, we wouldn’t be dealing with the security
crisis in Egypt, we wouldn’t have the MOF come under attack in the Sinai?
Candace Putnam: No, we don’t look at it that way at all. Tahrir Square fundamentally
changed Egypt forever, so that’s a new dynamism that is, it’s a factor there and it’s a
factor for the president and for the security services on how to address the
challenges that they face. But the challenges are relatively new. I mean, fighting in
Sinai to the degree that it’s going on now is a new phenomenon. You have an army
that was trained and equipped for conventional warfare trying to adjust to
asymmetric warfare. To guerrilla warfare. And we know from our experience how
hard that is to do. So they are in the midst of trying to address how they approach
this. And again, with any big major institution, inertia and the old ways are very
difficult to change. On the domestic side as well. I mean, domestic terrorism like
Egypt is seeing today is completely new, and as Omar said, the initial reaction is just
crack down more and that will take care of the situation. Because the other
solutions, the economic, the social justice are much harder and much more long
term. And so it takes time. It takes a different kind of mindset that does not yet, I
think, exist.
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Kim Ghattas: Abdel-Monem, how many Egyptians, and Omar, feel free to interject as
well, make that distinction between the non-state violent actors and the more, the
part that is civil disobedience or pushing back against the state? I mean, from, when
you listen to Egyptian officials, it’s all part of one group, and they mostly get the label
of terrorists.
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Well, sometimes you have for just purposes of getting your
messages through in a time of media, the media is playing a great part. You talk
about the youth, Egyptians, terrorists, but I think we know very well that there is
degrees of it, and there is kind of typology for those terrorists. But I want to add
something that, facing them is not only a security matter. We were lucky in Egypt. I
know a lot of a people might differ with me, that our armed forces kept themselves
intact during that entire upheaval which created big questions for everybody. So,
nothing in Egypt is happening like what happened in Syria, on Libya, on Yemen, on
other countries. Second is the treatment of the terror is taking also other
approaches. In addition, I agree totally that we still struggling with the idea from
having a regular classic army into being a counter-terrorist army. Which is, I think we
are moving though it with low success into that direction. But it will take more time.
However, we got to look also that Egypt economically is now better. In a sense, we
are growing by about four-point-something to, or five, I don’t remember. And also,
there is, people talked about, you know, that the distribution of money. Salaries in
Egypt which is most government employees are into the categories were taking at
the beginning in 2011, 70 billion Egyptian pounds. Now it’s more than 400. Is it good
or bad? That’s something economists will tell you is bad, but it’s happening. There is
a minimum wage, and that was one of the things that the revolution called for. So
there is an attempt also. Actually, in terms of coefficient, Egypt is distribution of
wealth is much better than the United States. And also the number of people
incarcerated are better, much, much better than the United States. So here we will
get back to the fighting of terror. It is this distinguishing between hard-core kind of
transnational terrorists like what is in Sinai, and the heartland kind of terrorism, in
which the core of it, contrary to the information that’s prevailing in Washington, are
the Muslim Brothers. The Muslim Brothers talk in Arabic completely different than
what we talk in English. And the (inaudible 21:00) and many of the cases in which
explosives were detained were active members of the Muslim Brothers. Also the
current event in which there was an attack that was (inaudible 21:23) made, the
facilities, the money, the transportation of explosives were by Muslim Brothers
members. So facing this is coming through an Egyptian attitude. Egypt is not under
siege. It is living. It is working to grow. Actually wedding parties are increasing in
Egypt by 4.9%, more than the growth rate. So people don’t make weddings a lot
when they are under siege or feeling that terror. We just face the terrorist act, clean
the place, and go on.
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Kim Ghattas: It comes with a lot of violence at many times, and I know there are very
divergent views on this approach. Omar, do you want to tell us how you see it, this
difference between, as I said, the non-state actors and domestic political groups
which have been branded as a terrorist organization. How is that fueling some of this
internal tension? And then Candace and Greg, I’d like you to give us your views as
well. Because I know that in the state department you see this very differently.
Omar Ashour: It’s complex. Very, very complex. Briefly, the narrative is used by the
state or whoever controls the state, which is more or less the military, is that if you’re
not with us, you’re against us. And if you’re not with us and cheering for us
enthusiastically, if you’re less enthusiastic, then maybe this is also a problem. But if
you’re not with us and cheering for us enthusiastically, then you’re either a supporter
of terrorism or a supporter of the insurgency. Or somehow part of a foreign
conspiracy against the country. So it’s very much about controlling the narrative and
closing the ranks, as opposed to making any sort of change in policy that were
ineffective. That’s one thing. What’s happening in north Sinai does not have to do
necessarily with the crises in 2011 or 2013. What happens in Sinai you can trace it
back to 1982 when the Israelis withdraw and from to 2000 once the second intifada
happened and there was a perception among the military and security bureaucracies
that there is some logistical support coming from northeast Sinai to Gaza. And a
series of crackdowns left a series of urban terrorism that happened between 2004
and 2006 and when 2011 happened, it was an opportunity not to attack military
checkpoints because back then they did not attack military checkpoints, they
attacked police stations and security headquarters, this is in January 2011, way
before, when the uprising was happening in Cairo, more or less in vendetta attacks
to avenge what happened before. And then the insurgency took a different level.
This is Egypt’s strongest insurgency. I’m talking here specifically about northeast
Sinai, north Sinai is one government in Egypt. There are mainly three districts that
the fighting is happening in, (inaudible 24:21). And to have an insurgency that is
capable of using heavy artillery, guided anti-aircraft missiles, (inaudible 24:33)
Russian-made, hornets, guided anti-tank missiles, with this kind of military capacity,
this is all new in the country.
Kim Ghattas: These are unprecedented capabilities.
Omar Ashour: Unprecedented. If you look at the 90s, the more sophisticated
weapon used in upper Egypt was the RPG-7, a weapon from the 60s.
Kim Ghattas: And whose failure is that, that these actors have these capabilities
now?
Omar Ashour: I think it’s a mix of issues. Regional developments, especially what
happened in Libya, partly contributed. Sinai already had quite a significant amount of
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weapons, and there is a significant amount taken from the army. And this is always
discounted in the military, but if you saw the propaganda videos of these groups,
they show you the weapon, show you the serial number from the army, and it’s
mostly taken from attacks on military checkpoints. So you have a different situation.
But when you look at it, this should not have been, back to the asymmetric warfare
and the point tactics, this should not have developed in this way. If you look at the
power ratio, we’re talking at least 500 to one. Five hundred soldiers to one insurgent.
If you look at the geography, this is not a rugged geography. This is mostly
happening in the north coastal areas, which is flat. The rugged geography of Sinai is
in the center and in the south. Sometimes they retreat to that, these areas, but then
they attack again in the flatlands. And if you looked at the population, is it at best
divided. You have the tribe, the Sawarka who is pro-insurgent, and the Sawarka who
is pro-incumbent. The Tiyaha who is pro-insurgent, these are all tribes, Sinai tribes,
pro-insurgent and pro-incumbent. So it’s not a situation where you have this massive
population. We’re talking about an area of less than a quarter million. Sinai’s
population, north Sinai around 120,000. What’s happening is area of around less
than a quarter million. When you have this situation, you should think after two years
of extremely brutal and extremely ineffective tactics, this would end. But other than
that, it’s not ending, it’s escalating. And part of what’s feeding it is really the political
environment that more or less became as a result partly of the security and the
tactics.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, I’d like you to chime in here and tell us how concerned you
are about the fact that two years into this, the military forces, the police, don’t seem
to be able to get a handle on it, and whether you agree with Abdel-Monem, and
Greg, I’d like you to tell us as well, that you know, for the rest, Egypt is living, it is
moving forward. People are getting married and so on, the economy is improving. Is
it really that disconnected, or is there a risk that is could all become much worse, not
just on the fringes but centrally as well?
Candace Putnam: Well, certainly Egypt is returning to normalcy. Long way to go on
the economics side, but yes, their life is returning to normal. But, a lot of Egyptians
tell me it’s a new normal. It’s a new normal where they say they’re not concerned
about bombings and attacks on the subway or the rail lines or drive-by shootings of
policemen, so it’s an acceptance of a different Egypt than anyone would have
envisioned before 2011. Of course we’re concerned about what’s going on in Sinai.
We’re very concerned. We want Egypt to win this battle against terrorism.
Kim Ghattas: What are they doing wrong?
Candace Putnam: Well, as I said before, it’s trying to make the shift between how
they’ve been trained and equipped for decades and facing a new kind of enemy, a
new kind of insurgency and having to need to adopt new tactics and new doctrine.
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And I think we’re seeing signs that is starting to take place. We’re certainly trying to
encourage that shift. But the solution in Sinai is not going to be only military. There
has to be an economic component. These people have very genuine grievances, as
Omar said this goes back a very long time, as sort of being considered people up
there. Everyone on the panel is talking about Sinai versus the rest of Egypt. That’s
not really a helpful framework if you’re trying to be inclusive and improve the lives of
these people. They should be considered as Egyptians, not Sinai Bedouin. So that
needs to change. It’s much easier for any government to assume that the threat is
more coming from outside than from inside. And I think that’s what they are
struggling to come to terms with as well. To get to your other point, we’re concerned
about radicalization across the board. The effect of ISIS on not only evens in Sinai
but in the rest of Egypt. We’re concerned about how the domestic political
repression is increasing radicalization, not just within the Brotherhood members, but
society across the board. So we don’t see that as a positive development. We keep
encouraging an opening of political space, a way to lift the pressure, to let out steam,
to allow people to express themselves, we think that will contribute to the larger
security situation writ large. So you can’t really divorce all these elements.
Kim Ghattas: I want to get into the details of how to better approach the local
population in Sinai and have this more inclusive look at what is going on there, but
first I do want Greg and Omar and Abdel-Monem to tell us a little bit how you see the
two fronts. You’ve got the Sinai, and you’ve got the porous border with Libya. How
connected are they? Do they feed off each other? And what does IS’s local affiliate
eventually want? What is, do you think, their goal? To march onto Cairo? To redraw
the regional map? To undermine the peace treaty with Israel? What is it that they are
looking for, Greg?
Gregory Aftandilian: Well, over the past year or so, we have seen a number of new
groups popping up in Egypt. (inaudible 31:09) at Sinai, they pledged allegiance to
ISIS. But now you have also groups along the Nile Valley who have now said they
represent the Islamic State. And then as I said you have some of these popular
mobilization units, maybe former youth activists now of the Brotherhood engaging in
violence. So, there’s not one terrorist group now in Egypt; there’s a number of these
groups. Certainly they’re not strong enough to undermine the state. The state
remains very, very strong. But, over time, this has a corrosive effect on Egypt’s
image abroad. People say in this capital, Washington, questioning long-term
stability, there’s a lot of issues that get involved when there’s a number of terrorist
attacks. And some of it within the Nile Valley has been low-level stuff, but then we
saw the killing of the public prosecutor, we saw the bombing by the Italian consulate,
so even within the Nile Valley region, we see more sophisticated elements, or more
sophisticated methods by the terrorist groups. So that becomes a problem over time.
And it’s worrisome, but as I said, I don’t think the state is in danger of falling. Now, in
terms of ISIS’s grand strategy, obviously I think they want to do in the regime and
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they want to get the public on their side, and that’s I think not just confined to Egypt,
but confined to many other places where they’re active. If you just look to the west,
to Libya, we see basically a failed state where there’s no one central government.
And that’s where ISIS will thrive. And we see that now in Yemen, too. So I think
that’s their ultimate goal. Now if you compare this to the 1990s, Egypt did have a
very serious internal terrorism problem. In fact, one of my jobs at the State
Department at the time was actually to follow this in detail and say, is Egypt headed
towards a revolution or not based on those incidences by Islamic groups and
Egyptian Islamic jihad. But there again, you had a situation where they cause a lot of
turmoil, but the state was never really in danger of falling.
Kim Ghattas: But they also used very heavy-handed tactics at the time.
Gregory Aftandilian: Right, but to gain back to your follow-up question, I think a
certain point in the campaign in the 1990s, the government realized they couldn’t
rely just on draconian policies along. So you did see a shift in the government policy
to say the Imbabah neighborhood of Cairo was really a hotbed of Islamic groups.
The government then poured more development assistance into that neighborhood.
They also concentrated on some areas in Upper Egypt where a lot of the young
gunmen of the Islamic group came from. And then the government I think got more
sophisticated in its own propaganda against these terrorist groups. So right now, as
has been alluded to, I think in the Sinai, the problem is the government is just using
kind of brute force, and it really needs to think more creatively about how to help the
disaffected young Bedouin in those areas to get some alternative than to join groups
like (inaudible 34:36).
Kim Ghattas: And that’s something that you’ve written about, Omar, as well, and I’d
like you to tell us some more as well. It does require economic development. It does
require opportunities. It does require jobs and a sense of inclusivity, that they are
part of the state, that they are welcome by the state. Because they’re not necessarily
running to join ISIS at all.
Omar Ashour: No, I think this is on the long-term, or mid-to-long term, to really alter
the social security-led policies that alienated major parts of the Sinai, and this idea
that either the Sinai is a potential informant, a potential terrorist, a potential
smuggler, or a potential spy. But not an Egyptian citizen. So these security-led
policies need to be altered. This is on the long term. On the short term, I think the
coin policies, the counter-insurgency policies, need to be fundamentally altered.
Because the motto that the US Marine Corps field manual on counter-insurgency is
about winning hearts and minds. What they are doing is more bodies and less
hearts, basically. So I think the idea of narrowing the targets to become just the
insurgent, this is the real challenge. And they’re not equipped to do that. It is
interesting, some operations, which was exactly that. I’m not here supporting
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targeted assassinations, but they went after particular insurgents, and then later on,
the organization itself issued an obituary for these insurgents. Either killed by special
operations by the Israelis, or joint strikes by the Israelis. Of course, the reaction is
sometimes you find massive funerals for the dead insurgents because he was killed
by the Israelis. Now there is an interesting term, which is accidental guerilla. That’s
the guy who had no a priori animosity towards the state, and then the state comes
and bombs his house or kills his brother or arrests his relatives, and therefore force
him to join the insurgency. Part of that is happening. But the other part of course is
the military capacity as I mentioned earlier. So as I mentioned on the short term, the
coin tactics, and the narrative that supports them in the media and by the state
needs to be fundamentally changed. I think part of it also is there is this perception
that we can control the whole narrative about what’s going on in Sinai or in the
western desert like the 1960s. This is social media and local journalists and the dead
Mexicans and all of this exposes this narrative cannot be controlled. And therefore,
the coin policy again needs to be updated for the 21st century counter-insurgency
pose.
Kim Ghattas: But how much is the narrative out of control for the Egyptian state? I
mean, anecdotally, most Egyptians I speak to, although I’m not a pollster, seem to
be very supportive of how the state is approaching it. There are only few dissenting
voices. They are quite vocal, but they are only few dissenting voices. It seems to me
but, I would like you to give me your impression that there is some extent success in
trying to sell that narrative to the wider Egyptian population.
Omar Ashour: Absolutely. The military is trusted by major segments of the
population. And this is a country of 90 million people. The eligible voters are 54
million. Half of them do not even vote, so you are ending with 25 million. If you have,
I don’t know, 1% of the, 10% of the 25, that’s two and half million people. A lot of
them will be cheering for the military. Because it’s a big country and because we’re
surveying in areas that are Cairo or urban upper middle class Cairo that has a very,
very specific perception of what’s going on in Sinai. Surveying, which is impossible,
but surveying north Sinai is a different story. Before things started to escalate to a
different level, this is in 2012, in north Sinai you would see people who were
recalling back the good days of the Israeli occupation and how they built roads and
provided employment. You have this, and I heard it myself, so I believe now it would
be a different story after the escalation and the around 27,000 forced evacuees.
Human Rights Watch talks about 3,000 destroyed buildings and so on and so forth.
So it’s a different level of perception now of these operations.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, does Egypt have what it takes to actually do this long-term
approach to dealing with an insurgency in Sinai? And is the US turning a blind eye to
some of the human rights abuses for the sake of supporting Egypt’s role in
countering ISIS?
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Candace Putnam: Yes, of course Egypt has the capacity to do that. It’s just going to
take some time, and some changes in the way they are doing their operations, and
we want to assist that process. That doesn’t mean we ignore the human rights
violations. I think we have been extremely vocal about our concerns, as I said. When
the secretary was in Cairo for the strategic dialogue in August, he made a point of
saying publically and privately, that we are concerned about the human rights
situation. We are concerned about the radicalization effect, and the link that has to
our shared security concerns. So, all of these elements are clearly tied in together.
But there are competing priorities and interests. For years, we’ve been pushing
Egypt to close the tunnels along the Gaza border to stop the flow of weapons and
fighters to Hamas. So, they close the tunnels and the perhaps unintended
consequence was they also devastated the economy of north Sinai. So now, a lot of
Bedouin are out there without employment and without any alternative means, and
that makes them ripe targets for radicalization and recruitment by ISIS. You try to fix
one problem and you get another problem.
Kim Ghattas: No one is ever happy with whatever policy the US decides to adopt.
There are always critics, and I understand that. But when the US restored military
aid in March to Egypt, it did send a very clear signal that certifying that Egypt was
abiding by, supporting democratic rule, etc., was not a requirement anymore to get
this military aid. And that sends a certain signal as well to the Egyptians.
Candace Putnam: I think what the President’s decision made very clear, was that
our security priorities were to help Egypt with fighting terrorism and better controlling
their border to contain terrorism particularly from Libya. That does not exclude our
other priorities of continuing to press on the human rights agenda and on the
economic development that also has a significant impact on security.
Kim Ghattas: But how do you press on those issues? How do you make the
Egyptians change their approach to dealing with a population in Sinai when your
foremost concern is the stability of Egypt, territorial control, and the peace treaty with
Israel and Israel’s security?
Candace Putnam: Well, we do it the way we do it in every country. We continue
steady, quiet engagement, combined with public criticism as well. It’s a slow, steady
process, but we’re not going to be able to dictate as a lot of people assume we can.
It’s just going to take slow and steady continued pressure, I think.
Kim Ghattas: Abdel-Monem, how does Egypt view the support that it’s getting from
the US at the moment for its fight against the insurgents? We just heard President
Sisi say yesterday that the US had been by Egypt’s side 100%. That’s not always
what is said in Egypt by the president himself and by officials around him.
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Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Might be officials around him, but they can’t find one quote
from the president that say that in Egypt. And I want just to make a, since you
passed me twice, I will have a few minutes. I will start by saying that we say a lot
that security forces are paranoid. I mean, actually, they are paid to be paranoid. That
is their job to be paranoid. Second, there is nothing called nice war. If the
Americans, we give the Vietnam experience, and I’m willing to make a serious
comparison between the Egyptian forces in Sinai and the American use of force with
Iraq and we can compare, so we can have something to measure how war...
Kim Ghattas: Except the different is that the US is fighting a war that is not on its
territory with its people and the Egyptians are doing that...
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: I recognize the difference, but they were running Iraq for a
longer period of time and there was, you know. The US, the State Department report
about terrorism in Egypt does not mention anything related to the enhanced
interrogation techniques that was part of the US dealing with terror. And I am not
supporting that. I think it was utterly wrong, immoral, and any kind of torture is
immoral, and just political science, war is war. There is no nice war. Another point is
the number of people killed in Egypt since January 2011 are five thousand people.
One quarter of these are police officers and recruits and also army people. And we
have to count that is to measure all the degree of success, the aborted terrorist
operation that’s taking place. This year, and this year I mean 2014-2015, we have
about 31% compared to 23% the year before. So there is a relative kind of success
in dealing with operations of terrorists before they do happen. The point after that is
a term of information. I support my colleagues here when he said that there are new
things happening in the terrorist scene in Egypt. We found by analysis of the Italian
consulate operation and also the north of Cairo security explosion, that both claimed
by ISIS. However, how it was written, the statement coming out is different from the
kind of statement that came out of Sinai operations. They talk about not (inaudible
46:03), they talk about Egypt. Second, in both occasions, it happened with certain
kind of leniency, in a sense, it was six o’clock in the morning. It was Saturday, so
there was at least a little attempt would give us a different kind of a pattern of not a
mass kind of killing on the dash is style. So there is a kind of fragmentation that’s
taking place on the style of terror. And finally, I will say about the United States. I
think there is a lot of help the United States can make. Particularly in Sinai. Sinai is
an open area, desert area, it has only topographical complications in certain areas,
but it has a clear sky. And people forget that south of Sinai is (inaudible 47:06) and
stuff like this. It’s not a subject of terror. About 150 of the people in Sinai are living in
the south not in the north. So the United States can help on that. We need drones.
We need drones on our border with Libya. I know it’s expensive. I don’t know how
that can be, but I think it’s part of upgrading the ability to monitor. Because it’s a
matter of intelligence, I would say, it’s not when you take the parlance of power the
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way here Omar talked about it, how many soldiers versus how many terrorists and
the balance of power. That is the same also in the Levant. However, I will say it’s a
matter of dealing with asymmetrical warfare, whether it’s insurgency or terrorism or
that type of, you deal with lesser numbers but more lethal numbers. So we need
more monitoring for that. And I think the United States also can provide sensors.
There are a lot of advancements that took place on the way of fighting that for my
information Egypt doesn’t get. We don’t get much of satellite pictures although I am
sure that most of the globe is really under American surveillance. So, these kinds of
information in terms of fighting terrorism in Sinai in particular which is an open space
I think can be extremely helpful. I will finalize by saying defeating ISIS in one theater
is really to start the collapsing of ISIS. And Sinai is a most suitable military theater of
operation that allies who are fighting terrorists can really succeed.
Kim Ghattas: Greg, I want to come to you in a second, but I want Candace to react a
little bit to this request for drones. I know that’s not State Department’s purview,
but...
Candace Putnam: Actually, it is.
Kim Ghattas: Yes, of course it is. But you’re not actually going to be delivering it
yourself. But I want to ask you whether you think that you’ve been behind in terms of
how you help the Egyptians address that threat. They’ve always gone for the big
shiny toys. It’s one of their preferences. I know that there has been concern within
the administration about changing that attitude. How do you square this, and when
you hear this request for better intelligence, for drones, how does the administration
react to something like this?
Candace Putnam: Well, we are working with the Egyptians in response to their
request for additional equipment –
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: I didn’t ask officially. [laughter]
Candace Putnam: It’s already been done. They beat you to it. We’ve already notified
to Congress the sale of some equipment for the border to increase their ability to
control the border through mobile sensing systems. We are working on a response
on providing them additional armored vehicles for Sinai, on countermeasures for
their Apache helicopters, and we are offering training on a variety of levels to help
change the picture of what they’re done. You’re absolutely right: intelligence is a
crucial element of combating both terrorism and an insurgency. That’s not something
that you can only do from the sky. You have to have people on the ground, and I
think that’s one of the critical elements that have been missing in Sinai because of
the distrust that’s been built up over decades against either the police or the army.
So, again, we’re looking at a variety of ways to work. And honestly, we have asked
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repeated for access to Sinai to work with the military and they don’t really want us
there.
Kim Ghattas: So there you have a request for the Egyptians that you can take home.
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: The question I would refuse as well to impede American
forces with Egyptian forces, the answer is definitely no. The Egyptian people cannot
take the existence of foreign troops...
Candace Putnam: And I’m not suggesting that. I’m not suggesting that, but…
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Okay.
Kim Ghattas: Greg, do you want to react to any of this or tell us a little bit more on
your views on how to make this approach to counter-insurgency more inclusive?
Because I know you’ve written a lot about the Bedouin population and how to bring
them on board. They’re kind of stuck between the armed forces and the militants.
Gregory Aftandilian: Right, and Omar has also written on this as well, but part of the
problem is, and I hope my Egyptian friends don’t take this the wrong way, but a lot of
mainland Egyptians don’t view the Sinai Bedouin as full citizens. Because they were
under Israeli occupation from basically ’67 to the early 80s, there was a lot of
suspicion. They may have collaborated with the Israelis, the Bedouin deny this, and
then there’s just a lot of socio-economic problems particularly in the Sinai. People
have talked about the tourism jobs in the south Sinai were basic but those are really
reserved for mainland Egyptians who relocated to Sharm el-Sheikh and other places
in the south Sinai. So, in my view, I think the Egyptian government has to do a lot
more in terms of economic development in the north Sinai and I think also the United
States and, I don’t want to speak out of term because Candace is here, but maybe
we’ve already made these pitches but we have to also perhaps gear some of our
economic assistance to Egypt toward the north Sinai. Because that is a crucial area
right now in the whole counter-terrorism issue.
Kim Ghattas: Can counter-terrorism work without better outreach to the local
population?
Gregory Aftandilian: Every counter-insurgency expert in the world will tell you that
unless you get the local population on your side, you’re not going to be able to
defeat an insurgency. I know the Egyptians are very, very sensitive about
Westerners telling them what to do. This goes back to Egyptian history under British
colonialism and things like that. But still, I think there has to be more openness
under the Egyptian military establishment to advice from the US military. We don’t
always get it right. We’ve had problems in Iraq and elsewhere around the world. But
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still, the United States military has devoted a lot of time and resources to the whole
idea of counter-insurgency. And I think it would behoove the Egyptian military to at
least follow some of this advice, and the US has to be very respectful and all that,
but still, I think there’s a lot to be learned on that score.
Kim Ghattas: I want to move on a little bit to the regional situation and Egypt’s
regional role. To what extent, Abdel-Monem, are the internal security concerns
hampering Egypt’s ability to play a real regional role. I know that they took their jets
and bombed targets in Libya. They’re part of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. But
you also hear a lot of people say that the Egypt of the years of Mubarak and before
is no longer. That Egypt doesn’t really have this leading role to play in the region
anymore. Whether it’s diplomatically or whether it’s more forcefully. What is your
view?
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: My view, Egypt, I use the, in one of my articles, sorry to use
my, about our communitary historical kind of isolationist. That’s my, what I think
strategically Egypt can do to recover first. And in order to play a regional role, and
we have to define that regional role. It takes a lot of kind of societal kind of thinking.
So, part of it is to be successful in Sinai. I mean, provide an example to the rest of
the world and the rest of the region. And if we talk about the future, we will find a
number of things that people don’t know. Number one, the per capital cultivated
land, fidden, per population of Sinai, is one fidden for every person in Sinai. In the
valley, it is ten persons for every fidden. So, sometimes, and there is already the
whole Suez Canal project, is partially to extend the big cities of the Suez Canal into
Sinai to integrate the Bedouins who are in the middle. I disagree with my colleague
here on the left by about saying what Egyptians think of people of Sinai. I mean,
there is that you can get like some Americans might to the blacks or any kind of
different. Egyptians not forget for people in Sinai the role they played while they are
under Israeli occupation. I mean, the celebration of Sinai movement is real. Actually
people in Sinai rejected an offer to have something of a satellite kind of a state there.
So, it is really to the contrary. We see their patriotism. However, over the years,
there is certain things happen. The tunnel things. But this land was not our under
control. We forget sometimes that only through an understanding with Israelis lately
the Egyptians forces and the Apache helicopter can get into area C. So in many
ways, a good part, chunk, of Sinai was not under Egyptian sovereign control. But
since that happened, there are now a new law for ownership in Sinai, which is will
allow people, Bedouins, to own land and make investments and things like that. Plus
the Suez canal project. There is also high commission is formulated on to the
development of Sinai. The United States can help on that. The West can help on
that. The Arabs can help on that. But most importantly, the Egyptians can help on
that.
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Kim Ghattas: You’ve said that Egypt is sort of retreating a little bit while refiguring out
its regional role and focusing on its internal security crisis, but the president has also
said that Egypt sees its security and the GCC’s security as one, clearly there is a
close relationship there. The Gulf countries have put in a lot of money into Egypt, so
that also plays a role.
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Gulf became part of the Egyptian national security doctrine
since the late 1970s. After the Iranian revolution. And the connection is known in
terms of population about three million Egyptians, after that time there was about
two million in Iraq, and so the Gulf is important for economic reasons. However, the
word I use, minimalist approach. I was in Saudi Arabia and I was saying Egypt was
not doing enough on the Yemeni war, and my answer was, which was based on
information, we would never ask to do more than what we did. And I guess that’s the
nature of alliances. You look at your ally and find what he can offer. Egypt can offer
navy operation and incorporation of the American fleet to participate in that war. But
it will be minimalist. And it should be minimalist. Because maximalist approach,
(inaudible 59:29) really would be dangerous and risky to Egypt as it was risky in the
past. But if Egypt really got its own potential, I guess it can really be credible in
playing a regional role.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, how does the US view Egypt’s regional role at the moment?
Do you approve of the minimalist approach? Do you think Egypt should be playing
more of a role in the region? There’s been a lot written about what happens if Egypt
is no longer a pillar for the US in the region? I don’t think that’s what we’re looking at.
But how do you see Egypt’s role today?
Candace Putnam: Well, I don’t think it’s for us to approve whether Egypt is or isn’t
taking a more active...
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: You are a real diplomat. [laughter]
Candace Putnam: Thank you. And when people ask this question, I suspect what
they have in mind is Egypt sort of resuming the role as kind of a moderating force –
Kim Ghattas: A stabilizing force in the region.
Candace Putnam: A stabilizing force in the region. So from that perspective of
course we would like any words. Given the state of the region, the more stabilization
the better. Obviously, they’ve gone through four years of economic turmoil and
political turmoil. They’re facing a major security challenge, both internally and on
their border with Libya, so they’ve got a lot of things on the plate right now before
they could expand. But, it’s almost not a question because Egypt has the largest
Arab population, the largest Arab market, it controls the Suez Canal, which 8% of
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global shipping still travels. They’re centrally located between multiple conflicts. They
have Al-Azhar and many strong religious institutions that can influence the rest of
the Arab region. Virtually every movement, political trend of the last four or five
decades have been connected to Egypt in one way or another. From recognition of
Israel through support of the coalition against Saddam, to the Arab Spring, and the
aftermath of the Arab Spring, you just can’t envision the Middle East without Egypt.
Kim Ghattas: Is there a silver lining in the eyes of the US to the current security crisis
in Egypt which is a dramatically better, dramatically improved relationship with
Israel? I was just reading some quotes from Egyptian officials saying relations with
Israel are great. We have (inaudible 1:02:11) saying that the improvement of
relations with Egypt is nothing less than a miracle. There is obviously a convergence
of interests there. How do you view this?
Candace Putnam: Obviously, we support that. What we don’t talk about anymore is
the fact that the treaty of peace has been an enormous success, and we want that to
continue. But, it’s just going to take Egypt some time, I think, to address this, and if
and how they want to engage with their allies. As you mentioned, the Gulf clearly
thinks Egypt is a force for stabilization in the region. They’ve just poured about 30
billion dollars into the current government. But there’s so much chaos in the region. I
agree. Suggesting that it’s sort of a Nasser presumption of influence is probably not
in the cards right now.
Kim Ghattas: Not the right time. Greg, you wanted to weigh in?
Gregory Aftandilian: I just want to weigh in too because after Egypt was accepted
back in the Arab world after its peace treaty with Israel, one of Egypt’s leadership
keys was to say to the other Arab countries, we’ve dealt with the Israelis on the
peace process, come to us for advice. We know the score. We’ll help you. And now
with the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, that has really diminished
Egypt’s potential role. Now if that gets going again, down the road, who knows,
Egypt could one day again play a certain role. But right now, that’s a key element
that’s out of the picture. One other point, certainly there’s Egyptian-Gulf cooperation
on a number of issues including Yemen and elsewhere, but there are also
differences. How Egypt sees Syria is very different from how the Saudis see Syria at
this point. So even though we see a very close Egyptian-GCC relationship, there are
tensions on certain issues that are very much there.
Kim Ghattas: Candace.
Candace Putnam: Well, I would just say that Egypt is very much engaged in the
conflict in Libya. They have organized several conferences for the Syrian opposition,
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they’ve participated in the Yemen campaign, as you mentioned, so it’s not as if they
have absented themselves from the regional scene in any way.
Kim Ghattas: Omar, would you like to weigh in on how you see Egypt’s regional role
as opposed to when you want to compare Egypt’s regional role in the past and what
it’s doing today? And whether it should leave the region aside and focus on its
internal problems.
Omar Ashour: I think it can play a bigger role despite the...
Kim Ghattas: A bigger role?
Omar Ashour: Yeah, a bigger role. Despite its, Egypt has limited resources
compared to the population it has, the 90 million people. It has a lot of internal
problems, whether Sinai or Cairo’s endemic economic problems, or the western
desert. But I think it could play more of a role if there’s a political will to do that. I
think it can play more...
Kim Ghattas: What kind of role? In which areas?
Omar Ashour: De-escalation in the region. Egypt is not a main partner in the
(inaudible 01:05:31) meetings, for example, between the protagonists of the Libyan
civil war. It shows a side within the civil war, which, within its own coalition, it’s
hawkish. It’s extreme. And elements of it were accused by some of the U.N.
diplomats of trying to spoil the negotiations. So rather, it can alter this role. It can
play a better role. This is its neighbor. It should have a say on what’s going on in
Libya which is going through a very ugly civil war. It does not choose that. It
perceives what’s happening in Libya as what’s happening in Sinai. The state,
whatever that means in Libya, against the terrorists, again, whatever that means.
Kim Ghattas: It’s very reductive.
Omar Ashour: Very reductive role. When it comes to Yemen, from what I know, they
were asked to do more in Yemen. Much more. And I think part of the rejection to do
much more has to do with the political and power dynamics within the military elite.
There is already problems within Egypt, and if you see body bags coming from
Yemen, then things may inspire an internal problem, intra-elite problem.
Kim Ghattas: I want to move to questions if you can get your questions ready, but I
want to end with one last question for all of you. If you could give me a brief answer,
I’m not asking you to predict the future, but to what extent and how long do you think
Egypt will need to get this under control, and is it possible to really address the issue
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of an insurgency within your country if there is no political reconciliation of some
form with the Muslim Brotherhood. Very briefly.
Omar Ashour: I think it’s, again, we need to devise a non-conflict resolution
mechanism. I think we know something about transitions; you mentioned the
transitions that I worked on from armed to unarmed activism. None of these
transitions worked and were sustained without a national reconciliation process
going parallel with them, and a structure that promotes dissent or limits the political
violence in an certain way which is parliament elections, judiciary. And, a thorough
security sector reform process. And these three elements are lacking at the moment
in Egypt. One last thing about the US aid, military aid, there is a positive dimension
and it was elaborated upon by my colleagues, but there is also a negative
dimension. When Human Rights Watch shows you a video of an M-60 tank bombing
a residential building in Sinai to demolish it, I think that has repercussions. That
image strikes you. One positive element is that actually many of the residents of the
north Sinai seek refuge at the MFO, at the Multi-National Observers force, because
if they go there, they won’t be bombed by the artillery.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, long-term trend lines and political reconciliation?
Candace Putnam: Well, I learned very quickly that looking into the Egyptian crystal
ball more than two days in advance became a risky proposition. I think there’s an
enormous amount of shifting. So it’s very hard to predict with any certainty how long
this struggle will take. Reconciliation with the Brotherhood is, if you look at Egyptian
history, probably going to happen at some point, but when is unclear. I think more
broadly reconciliation allowing additional voices to be heard is going to be a
requirement for Egypt’s long-term political stability. I think economic development
has a huge impact on political stability as well. But at the same time, there are real
terrorists out there. There are real threats. And there’s going to have to be a military
response, so it’s going to have to be a combination, and getting that formula right is
going to take some time.
Kim Ghattas: Abdel-Monem.
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Well, reconciliation is a nice word, and it really has good
connotations, but we have to know what does it mean? I am for reconciliation, but
(inaudible 01:09:51). Number one, are the Muslim Brothers ready to be an open
organization, not a secret organization that we don’t know anything about its
finances, its organization, its membership? And they did that while they are in power.
Kim Ghattas: That’s part of the conversation.
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Abdel-Monem Said Aly: We got to have, we cannot talk with a secret organization in
the society. It’s got to be an open one. Number two, are they accept the new
constitution of 2014? If we accept these two things and really denounce violence,
but in Arabic and in English and in French and in all languages, I think it will be
possible.
Kim Ghattas: Greg, briefly.
Gregory Aftandilian: I’m very pessimistic about any reconciliation between the
regime and the brotherhood. If you look back to the Nasser period from 1954 until
after Nasser died, the Brotherhood was just either in jail or on the outs or getting
refuge in other countries. So this is a very similar pattern that I see right now,
historically. In terms of the Sinai campaign, I think that’s going to continue to go on
for a few more years, but my hope is that with a change to better counter-insurgency
tactics and perhaps more economic development, hopefully you’ll see maybe the
death rate going down.
Kim Ghattas: Okay. So we’re ready for questions. If you could raise your hand, we’ll
group a few. If you could introduce yourself, keep the question short so that we can
get several in one go. We’re here at the front, these tables here, if you could raise
your hand for the questions.
Female: Hello, Sally Toma. My question would be, it’s not really a question, but I
would like Omar to comment on some of the things I’d like to say, just quickly. There
is an incident referred to as the Mexican Incident now in Egypt. So, I recall because I
was in Siwa at that time and I was coming back like at the same time the Mexicans
were actually hit by the Egyptian army. What happened is that the Egyptian forces
and the media first said that we successfully targeted some terrorists and we
managed to kill them. And then soon when they discovered it was actually Mexicans
around, they withdrew the statement and they said actually it was a mistake and so
forth. Our foreign minister when he was having the press conference, didn’t even
mention the Egyptians at all, although the Egyptians were killed as well. So, my
question would be about narrative in general, first of all, and incompetence. So if we
are talking about security, I think it’s very important to discuss who mandates the
narrative and incompetence, so I’d like you to comment on that, and just finally,
some words that moved me, “war is war, no war is good, war on terror, the terrorist
scene in Egypt, different degrees of terrorism,” I heard all these things and I think
they lie within the narrative.
Kim Ghattas: Thank you very much. If we could have the question over here, and
then we’ll, at the table right there. If you could keep it to a short question, that would
be great.
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Male: Yeah, it actually has to do with Dr. Abdel-Monem’s proposition of this kind of
isolationism as a way for Egypt to recover its regional role. Can Egypt actually afford
this, given our utter financial dependence on the Gulf? And given actually that, part
of the legitimation of the order that we are having in Egypt has to do with the
dynamics of the war in Syria and the war against terror. And of course, given that we
have ISIS in the Sinai, so can we afford isolationism? Thank you.
Kim Ghattas: And a question at the table over there in the corner, and then we’ll
distribute.
Male: My question is two parts, if I may...
Kim Ghattas: Could you introduce yourself, please?
Male: My name is (inaudible 01:13:58) and I am with the American Egyptians for
Democracy and Human rights. Dr. Abdel-Monem pointed to certain statistics and I
would like him to also share with us the number of people living in cemeteries, the
number of people living in the slums, and the growth of slums under the military
regime, the political prisoners in Egypt and the numbers of political prisoners, those
who are dying daily in the prison because of torture, and mistreatment, and lack of
medication. And to us some statistics on those issues. But there is something, if I
may, just a very quick question...
Kim Ghattas: Sure, briefly please.
Male: We briefly heard Mr. Sisi in a private meeting in one of those leaks when he
was talking to top military brass and saying you are an officer, you know it’s easy to
surround and cordon Raffa and get people out and bomb it and get rid of it. But then
he says a remark. He say, “But then you know as an officer, you are actually
creating enemies of your own people.” So does this mean that he knows what he’s
doing by destroying a whole community in Raffa, or is this a regime that really wants
to serve its people but doesn’t know how because of inefficiency?
Kim Ghattas: So all of these questions are actually kind of connected. It’s about
competence and it about narrative, so I just want to start first with you, Omar, and
we can group those two. You know, when there is this incident on the western
border with the Mexican tourists, there is a narrative and then there is the reality and
then there is the question of competence. What happened?
Omar Ashour: I thought I addressed the competence part with the 500 to one ration
and the rugged and this should have been over a long time ago. So, I was trying to
be settled, but apparently, it… There is of course a problem with incompetence. But
there is a problem also with again the idea that they can control the narrative, and
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they can provide, and that narrative legally now you cannot challenge it because of
the anti-terror law which is, you can be put in jail if you challenge the number of
fatalities that the military statements tell you it was. So there’s a problem with this
kind of narrative. And I think it’s self-defeating, in a sense that if you want to look at
the security policy currently in Egypt, it’s built on three pillars. The repression, wide
scale, intelligence mainly from the locals, and propaganda. The repression, we
talked about it. The intelligence of course because of the propaganda, because of
the repression, the intelligence gets undermined and the informants don’t want to
collaborate, and there is mistrust between them, but most importantly the
propaganda dimension is very mediocre. And not just mediocre compared to
realities like we knew about the Mexicans only because they were Mexicans. This
happens for Bedouins in Sinai, we don’t know about it. When it happens for
Egyptians in the western desert, we don’t know about it. But the propaganda part,
compared even to the insurgents’ propaganda, it’s mediocre. And this adds to the
idea of mistrusts with the authorities. So when the authorities talk about the
Mexicans, obviously it’s an international scandal. But also in Sinai when it tells you
that they bombed a house and killed ten insurgents, and destroyed a warehouse of
the arms, and a local journalist, who is a pro-military journalist, tells you no, they
actually demolished five houses, one of them owned by a widow, and there were no
dead insurgents, there were four injured. One widow, and three of her kids. And that,
because he said that, his name is (inaudible 01:17:39) a local Sinaian, because he
said that, he was subjected to a military tribunal. So it tells you something about one,
incompetence, and two, how much lies are there in that narrative.
Kim Ghattas: And the question about whether officers know that their tactics are
counterproductive and don’t care or whether they don’t realize that this approach is
counterproductive?
Omar Ashour: Okay, to put it politely, there is a very high toleration for collateral
damage within the culture of the security institutions. So therefore, if this collateral
damage does not cost you...
Kim Ghattas: In the short term.
Omar Ashour: Does not cost you at the moment, then it’s fine. That’s number one.
And it has to do with another problem, which is the structural deficiency in civilmilitary relations, and the lack of the security sector reform. There is no review of the
policies except by the military themselves. There’s no national security committee in
an independent, freely elected parliament that overviews the policies. There is no
independent judiciary that can, if you committed something like that, you can be held
accountable in front of a civilian court. Nothing like that. So it has to do with this
structural deficiency as well.
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Kim Ghattas: Abdel-Monem, do you want to answer the question about the regional
role? Considering everything that Egypt has to deal with internally and its economic
problems, even though things are somewhat on the mend, can it afford to be fighting
in Yemen? Can it afford to have this wider regional role? And I would also like you to
address the question about human rights issues within the country. There is, of
course, a lot of improvement, but there are documented human rights abuses in
Egypt as well.
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: Oh, there is. But I want to emphasize to be again for the
media here, I am talking not about isolationism or meaning that Egypt close its
doors. I am talking about the minimalist approach, that we do only what’s necessary
to our security and also the security of our allies. We don’t have to play a role, and I
mentioned the Nasser era in which we have much expanded foreign policy. So I
want that to be clear. The second point here in my response is some of us talk as if
we can export all the Egyptian people out and bring probably another people to
Egypt. And I would prefer a Swiss people. We don’t have terrorism in Switzerland.
So we get the Swiss police and the Swiss army, it would be very nice. And Swiss
knives as well. [laughter] So that’s not the case. We cannot do that. Egypt is an
under-developed country with a per capital income of $6,000 if we make (inaudible
01:20:26). So it is. It goes with the territory in terms of education, in terms of skills.
Competence. Narratives. And other things. Could it be avoided? Yes, it can be
avoided. But I will say, we need also security-sector reform. And we need a lot of
reforms regarding civic society organizations. And a lot of things. But I like here to
differentiate between two things here in the United States. There is something I call
it “friendly reform” and there is hostile reform. Hostile reform’s aim is to create from
Egypt and the like states a stage in which everybody in demonstration all the time. I
didn’t as Madam Gamila said attended the January revolution, attend the June
revolution, I am a reformer, and I think badly of revolutions. That’s my own biases. I
like to confess of it. So the issue, we cannot have countries that can develop and all
the slums and things without certain level of stability and certain level of working
very hard to do that. I will finalize that depending on Egyptians, Egyptians in the last
three years of turmoil in Egypt, transferred sixty billion dollars to Egypt. That’s more
than three times as much Arab aid to Egypt and you count American aid, sixty billion
dollars. And this year, it will approach twenty billion dollars. When we met a project
we have 8.2 billion dollars in less than a week. Egyptians are capable. If they are
motivated, if the reform is taking shape, if the target is clear, and there is, this
conference is about Egypt’s potential. You ask Egyptians to invest in the potential of
the country, the money will be there.
Kim Ghattas: Thank you. We’ll get another cluster of questions if you’d like to raise
your hand. Right here in the middle? Two in front of each other?
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Male: Hi, my name is (inaudible 01:22:48). I’m a student at the American University;
I study foreign policy. I’d like to thank the panel for giving interesting news to
important issue. My question goes to Mr. Aly. You said that Egypt needs to define its
regional role. How would you define Egypt’s regional role in the current political
situation?
Kim Ghattas: And the question just in front. I think we sort of answered that, but we’ll
try to get some more details.
Male: Hamid Mansour. I want to direct my question to Ms. Putnam. And I hope she
will not be diplomatic when she answers. You said that that the US is offering
training to the military for counter-terrorism operations. Can you speak more detailed
about that, and Dr. Abdel-Monem said that he’s calling for sensors and drones. Is
there any consultation between the Egyptian government and the US concerning
that? Thank you.
Kim Ghattas: All right. Abdel-Monem, do you want to go into more details about what
you see as Egypt’s regional role?
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: I said it’s minimalist in the sense that everything that can
help Egypt to win the war against terror, then that Egypt should do in terms of our
foreign policy. And in terms of what we ask the Americans to give to Egypt, that is, if
we are allies and we have the same target of fighting, we should deal with the
theater of operations. We have six theaters of operations in the Middle East against
terror. And I won’t count them. But we have to deal with them as one theater...
Kim Ghattas: You see it mostly then as a counter-terror regional role and not so
much diplomacy. You’re not going to call a peace conference on Syria...
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: I won’t call for a peace conference with Dash...
Kim Ghattas: But would you want to be a leader in finding political solutions to
problems like Yemen or Syria, or are you just focused on the military approach?
Abdel-Monem Said Aly: No. When you have a military approach, you have a political
approach to build allies. To deal with allies, that’s a political move and diplomatic
move as well. So it is complementary here. But if there is an opportunity that does
not take from the attention of our leaders who got all these problems inside the
country, then let it be it. And actually President Sisi called for a conference in Cairo
for all Syrian political forces. I have to wait and see who will say “I’m coming” and we
get Bashar Al-Assad into the process and our Saudi allies are against it and our
American allies are against it. Our Russian allies are for it. So, that’s something you
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need more information. But, the work of strategy is about priorities. And I think the
major priority is to deal with terror.
Kim Ghattas: Candace, how much more can you tell us about consultations on
counter-terrorism, cooperation and training, and weapons delivery?
Candace Putnam: This is a process that’s interactive with the Egyptian government
and military. The President has made clear that our foreign military financing dollars
are going to be devoted to counter-terrorism and border security. Within those
categories, we had a discussion with the Egyptians about what systems they’re
looking for, what kind of training we can provide on those particular systems, and
training encompasses a wide variety of things from doctrine to tactics to improving
competency in precision use of weapons so that there isn’t collateral damage. So
those are just some examples.
Kim Ghattas: We’re running out of time. Greg, I know you haven’t had the
opportunity to answer a question. If there’s a last point you would like to make, this is
your chance.
[laughter]
Gregory Aftandilian: Well, I think Egypt is going through a very, very tough time right
now. But I mean the state of Egypt still remains very strong. But the question is,
what type of society does Egypt want to become? And as I said, I’m pessimistic
about any reconciliation between the regime and the Brotherhood, but hopefully
there could be more open political space down the road. And I think that would be
for the well and good of Egypt. Right now, it’s a very restrictive environment and
people have talked about that, but I think if the government opens up the political
space, then I think there’s hope for the future.
Kim Ghattas: That’s a great way to wrap us up. Thank you all: Greg, Abdel-Monem,
Candace, and Omar. Thank you very much for joining us for this session. Thank you
all.
[applause]
Discussion ends
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