Reform or Referendum – The UK, Ireland and the Future of Europe
I would like to begin by thanking Noelle O’Connell and Maurice Pratt (on behalf of the
European Movement Ireland) for inviting me to speak today. It is an honour to be asked to
speak on the panel and whilst I certainly do not profess to speak for everyone in Northern
Ireland, I am delighted that a Northern Ireland speaker has the opportunity to give a view on
this issue.
It’s also serendipitous that I am, to some degree, picking up the question where Ken left off,
looking at the background to Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU through the lens of
identity, which remains a sensitive and contested issue.
In Northern Ireland, what was a historic conflict between Britain and Ireland and one which
continued to fester post-partition, was resolved at least from a GB and Irish perspective
with the Good Friday Agreement.
Even prior to the Good Friday Agreement, whilst Ireland may have continued to exert a
constitutional claim on Northern Ireland, politics and society here moved on and forged out
a new form of Irish society from which those on the other side of the border were, by and
large, at a remove. Equally, whilst Britain may have stated that Northern Ireland was an
integral part of the UK, its priority in UK terms was largely dictated by the demands it made
on the security and financial resources of the state and the risk that it posed to the wider
security of Great Britain.
As a result of the continuing tensions in Northern Ireland, there has developed a kind of
uber-unionism and a form of frontier nationalism – much more excessively and aggressively
displayed than in the South or in GB. At times, taken to its extremes, it feels almost like a
parody of national identity and I can only imagine would feel quite alien to those who share
that nationality but reside outside Northern Ireland.
The truth is that both Britain and Ireland saw the Good Friday Agreement as the end of their
territorial dispute. They have been able to agree self-determination for the people of
Northern Ireland and, in doing so, have largely freed themselves to move beyond the
territorial struggle which defined their relationship for so long.
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They are now nation states in Europe with a common interest in many things – banking and
the economy, cooperation on organised crime, as island nations with a shared interest in
agriculture and fishing – and, the risk is that the identity crisis in Northern Ireland makes it
increasingly something of an anomaly in that positive relationship.
NI itself is a distinct region within these islands and within Europe. Borders and nationhood
have become less defined and differentiated with the EU as the emphasis has been on
regions and interconnectedness. It is one of the reasons why as a Party, our emphasis is so
strongly on resolving those internal relationships, rather than on the constitutional question
which remains the main cleavage in NI politics despite having been settled in the Good
Friday Agreement.
As an island off an island off a continent that is no longer the centre of the universe, Ireland
has used its membership of the EU to powerful effect in positioning itself as a European
hub, as a nation at the centre of Europe despite its physical peripherality and it was highly
apparent during the recent Scottish independence campaign that the SNP had noted
Ireland’s example and endeavoured to do the same.
With the rise of countries like Brazil, China, India as economic powerhouses, the need to be
part of something bigger to attract that attention is more and more compelling and is being
driven home by global investors, including the US, in their warnings to the UK about the
impact of any split from the EU on future inward investment.
For Northern Ireland, membership of the EU is essential to our future economic growth
because it allows us to access these emerging markets; in addition to this, around 40% of
Northern Ireland’s exports are to the rest of the EU and the free movement of goods and
labour make it massively easier for Northern Ireland businesses to sell their products.
Further, the EU has funded PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland, which have sought to
forge and protect a Shared Future through peace and reconciliation work, developing
shared spaces and promoting integrated education.
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However, we in Northern Ireland also need to think about what we can contribute to the EU
– and to the construction of democratic institutions and good governance particularly in
divided societies elsewhere in the Continent. We should know, from conflicts right on our
boundaries, most obviously recently in Ukraine, that peace-building is far from a luxury
option – it is an absolute necessity for our and our neighbours’ security. The EU can
cooperate better than it currently does on these matters, and we can be at the forefront.
A more enthusiastic membership of the EU also has the potential to alter our “wee country”
attitude and turn Northern Ireland into an outward and open-minded place, ready to play a
bigger role in world affairs. However, our attitude to the EU cannot usually be described as
enthusiastic, and I believe this stems from UK-wide euroscepticism too often fuelled by fearmongering, populist headlines and political discourse.
It is notable that the push to leave the EU is driven largely by a form of English nationalism
which is in many ways a more traditional style of nationalism than we see in the rest of
these islands today. It is interesting that outside of England the main support for that
position comes from NI Unionist politicians, and I suspect that the reasons are similar.
It is also more marked by a desire for independence from rather than interdependence with
surrounding nations. Whilst some of that can be explained by the psychology of being an
island nation, Ireland has, by contrast, much more readily embraced its European identity. I
suspect that some of that discomfort with having to partner and negotiate a future with
others stems, at least in part, from being for a long time the lynch-pin nation of the largest
Empire and effectively masters of their own destiny, and for that matter the destinies of
many others. Now to have to deal with people and nations from a position not of weakness
but of equality is a difficult transition to make for some.
That largely English-driven isolationism feeds into the push we are seeing now to address
that “West Lothian” question, and address the matter of NI, Welsh and Scottish MPs having
a say on English only matters. However, rather than doing so by creating devolved
institutions for England (or indeed for regions within England as the Cornish and others
would wish to see), the suggestion is to resolve the anomaly by excluding non-English MPs
from votes in Westminster. This poses a real challenge to UK Parliament as, particularly for
the smaller constituent nations, even on issues which are entirely devolved, such as welfare,
health and pensions, decisions taken at Westminster still have impact in NI, for example,
through budgets and systems which we are reliant upon for the delivery of local service.
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Whilst you would assume that influence within the as powerful an institution as the EU
would be an attractive prospect to those who are frustrated by devolution and its impact on
England, the complete converse is true. This view is not only utterly perplexing to people
like me who can see the obvious benefits of the EU, but is also dangerous for the UK’s
overall stability.
Setting aside the economic and philosophical arguments for membership of the EU, at the
most basic level, after the UK’s exit, the EU will still exist. It will still take decisions which will
have political, environmental and social implications for the UK and its citizens. The UK will
still have to engage with the EU as our nearest neighbours and significant trading partners.
However, by giving up its seat at the table where decisions are made, the UK will weaken its
ability to shape the EU and to guide those decisions to the benefit of its people.
An added complication to the UK’s relationship with the EU is the threat or potential of a
referendum on UK membership. At best, a referendum would be costly, would discourage
potential investors and would distract political parties at a time when constructive
engagement with the EU is most essential; at worst, it would be hugely destabilising to the
economy and society and divisive, both in the UK as a whole and specifically in NI, where the
debate will be overlain with the sectarian political weave of local politics.
The so-called ‘rise’ of UKIP has sought to push calls for an ‘in/out’ referendum up the
political agenda, as well as the public consciousness. UKIP have succeeded in marrying the
issue of EU membership with that of immigration: a dangerous mix.
I am deeply concerned at the rise of xenophobia and the deep mistrust of immigrants, which
has been seen in my own constituency of Belfast East only too recently, in the form of
physical assaults, intimidation and damage to the property of immigrants living locally. It is
not merely a local issue, however, as the narrative which underpins it is propagated more
widely and perhaps more easily in the difficult economic times in which we live.
I am often baffled by the willingness of some politicians and commentators to continue to
peddle the contradiction that immigrants are “coming over here, taking our jobs” whilst
simultaneously “scrounging from our benefits system” and their ability to do so without
serious challenge. Immigrants are type-cast only as the consumers of public services, but
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never as the contributor or provider, despite the huge evidence to the contrary. In my own
constituency, when faced with complaints about Polish workers being contracted in Harland
& Wolff as an example of the dangers of immigration, I did point out that Gustav Wolff was
not a particularly local name – so some immigration had driven our economy for a long
time.
If we tie in the added sectarian element in NI – arguably ‘anti-EU’ campaigners will be seen
as ‘pro-British’ and ‘pro-EU’ campaigners as ‘anti-British’ or even ‘pro-Irish – this is a truly
alarming prospect for a still-fragile peace process in Northern Ireland.
In conclusion, to counter this, I believe we should have open and honest public discourse
about the future of the EU. The EU in its current form is not perfect: we do not have to
pretend it is to be pro-European.
Rather, I would prefer to fully explore options for reform, such as strengthening Human
Rights framework, changes to the Common Agricultural Policy, a review of the bureaucracy
associated with the EU and more accessible voting records and expenses claims for MEPs,
ensuring they are held to account. We also need to acknowledge that if we want to be in a
position to influence reform, the best place is at the centre rather than hanging around the
door straining to leave.
We must also seek to emphasise the benefits of EU membership in a way which translates
to the general public, the ‘grass roots’. The potential implications for businesses are wellknown, and the previous speakers have illustrated these very well; however, my own
constituents are unlikely to be moved by arguments around the financial services industry
or the City of London: it simply does not appear relevant to them.
Only when we make clear that it is not just our economy and our trading relationships which
are on the line here, but also our security and our role and influence in the world, can we
have a proper debate about the EU and about the vast, if often unspoken, benefits that it
brings to each and every one of us.
Thank you.
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