27
27.1
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS
It is alleged that
1.
a)
The senior officers violated their obligation to protect the right
to life of the marchers and others and failed to take all feasible
measures to vindicate the right to life and to minimise to the
maximum possible extent the risk to innocent lives.
b)
By their acts and omissions in the planning, organisation,
approval and conduct of the military operation on Bloody
Sunday the senior officers violated domestic and international
law standards protecting the right to life including Article 2 of
the European Convention.
2.
The legal context in which the acts and omissions of the senior
officers fall to be judged has been set out in Section 25.
General Carver
3.
General Carver was aware of the number of deaths that had been
caused by the military in controversial circumstances in Northern
Ireland and failed to take any or adequate steps to ensure there were
no others.
4.
General Carver knew of and approved the unlawful usurpation by the
army of the role of the police.
5.
General Carver approved the plans for Operation Forecast and the
use of 1 Para in spite of the specific warning communicated to him
via Lieutenant Colonel Ramsbotham.
6.
General Carver knew within hours of Bloody Sunday that unarmed
civilians had been deliberately shot by 1Para. He appraised Sir
Edward Heath, Lord Carrington and the members of GEN47 on the
morning of 31st January 1972 that “only shooting into crowds was
directed at hooligans” (as opposed to gunmen).
General Tuzo
7.
General Tuzo was behind the Internal Instructions which illegally
supplanted the role of the police with the military and illegally took
control of all security operations.
8.
General Tuzo illegally entered into an agreement with the Chief
Constable to remove soldiers from the criminal justice system and
the normal functioning of the criminal law.
9.
General Tuzo was aware of the number of deaths that had been
caused by the military in controversial circumstances in Northern
Ireland and failed to take any or adequate steps to ensure there were
no others.
10.
General Tuzo was aware of Major General Ford’s memo entitled
“The Situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972” (G48.299 to
G48.301). There is no evidence that he dissented from its contents,
and in fact he brought them to attention of the JSC.
11.
General Tuzo approved the plan for Operation Forecast.
12.
General Tuzo was aware of all the decisions being made about the
arrest operation and the thinking which underlay it.
13.
General Tuzo was the source of Major General Ford’s hostility to
and dismissal of Chief Superintendent Lagan.
General Ford
14.
General Ford wanted to break the “no-go” areas and to teach 8
Brigade and the Bogsiders a lesson.
15.
General Ford regarded the use of lethal force as legitimate as a
method of law enforcement above and beyond circumstances where
there was a threat to life
16.
Operation Forecast was not planned so as to minimise to the greatest
extent possible the risk to civilian life.
17.
General Ford made the decision to stop the march in circumstances
where he knew that decision carried with it an increased risk of
violence. This decision ought to have been made by the local police.
18.
General Ford made the decision that the army would police the
march in circumstances where he knew:
a)
The army were inadequately trained in a policing role.
b)
He knew that the army were more likely to have recourse to
maximal force, including lethal force.
c)
That the army had killed 37 nationalists since internment in
controversial circumstances
d)
Significantly 10 of the 14 people killed on Internment night by
the army, in disputed circumstances, were killed by members of
the Parachute Regiment
19.
General Ford made the decision to use 1 Para.
20.
General Ford lied about the reason for using 1 Para. 1 Para were
used because of their reputation as tough and because he would exert
more control over the operation if it was mounted by 1 Para than if it
was mounted by local security forces.
21.
General Ford wanted to launch a major arrest operation in Derry
whether necessary or appropriate in the circumstances on the ground
on the Day.
22.
General Ford failed to impose restrictions on the use of lethal force
(in fact he was of the view that a restrictive use of the Yellow Card
was in operation and considered that more extensive use of force
than was in fact the practice was justified).
23.
General Ford failed to take any steps in the Operational Order
G95.572 Paragraph 4 to consider a disciplined withdrawal in the
client that any Soldier formed a belief that there was a threat that
justified the response the use of lethal force.
General MacLellan
24.
The plan for the arrest operation
a)
did not contain sufficient information as to the circumstances in
which an arrest operation could be legitimately launched
b)
did not provide for “separation”
25.
The “scoop-up” operation planned was unlawful
26.
Separation was developed subsequent to the march to justify the
launch of the arrest operation.
27.
General MacLellan abdicated control of arrest op to 1 Para.
28.
General MacLellan failed to exercise command & control.
29.
General MacLellan failed to adequately brief 1 Para on the special
characteristics of Derry, the specifics of the march and the locality of
the arrest operation.
30.
General MacLellan failed to acquaint himself with their plan.
31.
General MacLellan failed to respond to Jackson & Welsh re use of 1
Para.
32.
General MacLellan failed to address issues raised by Ferguson at CoOrdinary Conference re use of lethal force and liaison.
33.
General MacLellan committed perjury in relation to the importance
attached to separation and the order to go in.
34.
General MacLellan failed to establish and maintain proper
communication with 1 Para.
35.
General MacLellan failed to obtain accurate information from 1 Para.
36.
General MacLellan launched the arrest operation when he should not
have.
General Steele
37.
The plan for the arrest operation
a)
did not contain sufficient information as to the circumstances in
which an arrest operation could be legitimately launched
b)
did not provide for “separation”
38.
The “scoop-up” operation planned was unlawful
39.
Separation was developed subsequent to the march to justify the
launch of the arrest operation.
40.
General Steele committed perjury in relation to separation, the order
to go in and the order to withdraw.
Colonel Wilford and Colonel Loden
41.
The personal responsibility of Colonel Wilford and Colonel Loden is
direct and significant. Their determination to achieve the launch of
an arrest operation was at the expense of:
a)
Proper planning;
b)
The provision of current and accurate information to Brigade;
c)
The provision of current and accurate information of the Gin
Palace. ;
d)
The exercise of command and control;
e)
The specific orders issued by Brigade;
f)
A controlled arrest operation;
g)
Exercising any measure of restraint upon the soldiers on the
ground;
h)
42.
Having any regard to the risk of life of innocent civilians.
This comprehensive disregard for their general and specific
responsibilities was the immediate cause of the tragedy of the day.
43.
Both committed perjury in relation to the order to go in and the
events subsequent to the entry of 1 Para into the Bogside.
44.
Both assisted the soldiers in their cover up of their criminal
responsibility, and in so doing perverted the course of justice.