A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England. by Steven
Shapin; David L. Hull
Review by: William Eamon
The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 134-135
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953445 .
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134
Book Reviews
A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England.
By StevenShapin. Science and Its ConceptualFoundations.Edited by
David L. Hull.
Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1994. Pp. xxxi+483. $29.95.
How do we know what we think we know about the world? Until very recently,the
assumptionthat "facts"are the solid bedrock of empirical knowledge and the foundation of science went pretty much unchallenged. Indeed, ever since the emergence
of the "new science" of the seventeenthcentury,"factuality"has been regardedas the
benchmarkof truthaboutthe naturalworld.
The goal of constructinga body of knowledge groundedon the "plainfacts"was one
of the main objectiVesof the new science. The foundersof the Royal Society of London
chose as their motto Nullius in verba (On no man'sword). Nothing should be taken on
trust,they argued;deferenceto ancientauthorityhad led to centuriesof errorandconfusion. William Harvey advised readers"to strive after personal experience, not to rely
on the experienceof others,"includinghis own. Henceforth,the new philosophersproclaimed, "mattersof fact,"not blind trustin authority,would rule in naturalphilosophy.
This conceptionof knowledge still prevailsin our culture.Indeed,"legitimateknowledge" is usually definedprecisely by its rejectionof trust.Reliableempiricalknowledge
is supposedto be the productof a sovereignindividualconfrontingthe world.Reliance
upon the opinions of others, it is argued,produceserror.
Such a view of knowledge is, of course, an absurdity.In reality, most of what we
know is secondhand.We cannot possibly verify everythingwe know about the world
for ourselves. Even experimentalscientists must accept on trustmost of what they believe aboutthe world. Radical skepticismmay standup in the lecturehall, but it cannot
survivein the everydayworldor in the laboratory.Thus in science as well as in everyday
life, the problem is not whether we should trust, but who and on what grounds we
should trust.
This seemingly self-evident, even tautologicaltruthis the premiseof Steven Shapin's
subtle, learned, and insightful new book. In exploring the ways in which seventeenthcentury English naturalphilosophers worked out a solution to the problem of trust,
Shapin provides a detailed account of knowledge making in the early modem era. In
essence, he argues that the problem of trust could never be solved by individualsbecause testimony from individual witnesses, even if plausible, direct, and consistent,
could turn out to be wrong. Only testimony from witnesses of proven integritycould
be trusted. Hence the problem of knowledge was a social problem, and it turned on
makingjudgments aboutwhat kinds of people to trust.
In the seventeenthcentury,Shapinpoints out, most categoriesof people were considered to be unreliable.Politicians were dissemblers;merchantslied for profit;the common people were prone to "vulgarerrors";women, inherentlyweaker in their powers
of reasoning, were easily deceived. Only one social group was thought to have the
integrity,independence, and moral characterrequiredto make them truth tellers: the
gentry.Of all social classes, gentlemen were uniquely situatedas truthtellers by virtue
of their adherenceto a code of honor and civility.A gentleman'sword was his bond; to
offend it was a mortal affront. In a court of law, his word was taken as sufficient in
itself, requiringno voucher or external support.Truthfulnesswas accepted as central
to gentility.
Trust,a necessary preconditionof social harmony,was instilled in genteel culture
throughrules of polite conversation,which requiredgeneral assent, not argument,genial toleranceratherthan logical exactitude,and was supposed to lead to nondogmatic
conclusions. The conventionsof genteel conversation,Shapinargues,were carriedover
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Book Reviews
135
to scientific discourse.The style of science that was institutionalizedin the Royal Society of Londonwas markedby its rejectionof the quest for absolutecertainty,its suspicion of rigid demonstrativemodels, and its tolerant attitudetoward the characterof
scientific truth.
Of all figures of the period, Robert Boyle (1627-91) was the embodimentof the
genteel qualities that characterizedEnglish naturalphilosophy duringthe Restoration
period.The son of the Earlof Corkand impeccablya gentleman,Boyle was the leading
English naturalphilosopherof the late seventeenthcentury.His wealth enabledhim to
pursuenaturalphilosophydisinterestedlyand withoutregardto profit.His commitment
to the ideal of civility caused him to shun ruthlesslogical discourseand precise knowledge that did not admit of compromise, which is why, according to Shapin, he was
suspicious of mathematics.Modest, upright,and invariablycourteous, Boyle was the
quintessentialChristianvirtuoso.
Shapin'sargumentrepresentsa new and radicallydifferentview of science than the
one thatcurrentlyprevails.Rejectingthe textbookmodel of science as a form of institutionalized skepticism, Shapinconvincingly arguesthat science is a body of knowledge
that gets its warrantfrom persons of trust.
There are, however,problemswith this thesis. First of all, the notion that gentlemen
were uniquely truthtellers was by no means universally shared in the early modem
period. The courtly figure was also, in conventionaldiscourse, a liar, one who would
deceive in orderto gain advantage,which was one reason why Montaignearguedthat
the simplemindedwere less biased witnesses thanthe highbornand the learned.
Moreover,the type of experimentalscience practicedin the Royal Society was by no
means universallycharacteristicof genteel culture.Courtlyculturewas more inclined
to produce theatrical, showy science (e.g., naturalmagic) than the kind of "sober"
modes of discourseadvocatedby Boyle. The quest for esoteric secrets andthe vaunting
of wondersseems muchmore typical of courtlyscience thanthe RoyalSociety'sutilitarian investigationsinto such mundanesubjectsas dyeing and metalworking.
One of the main strengthsof this book is its impressivecommandof details.Unfortunately,the book's denseness will very likely make it inaccessible to the broadrange of
readers whom Shapin hopes to reach. Yet it would be a pity if this importantbook
went unreadby culturalhistorians.For Shapin not only provides a fascinatinglook at
knowledge in the making but he offers a compelling argumentfor the relevance of
gentility as a model of discoursefor today.
WILLIAM EAMON
New Mexico State University
John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility. By JohnMarshall.
CambridgeStudies in Early Modem BritishHistory.Edited by AnthonyFletcher,
John Guy,and JohnMorrill.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994. Pp. xxi+485. $79.95 (cloth); $34.95
(paper).
Despite the enormous amount of scholarshipthat has been done on John Locke, he
remains a puzzling figure. Rememberedmost for his opposition to Stuartabsolutism
and defense of religious toleration,in his earliest writing he showed himself to be a
supporterof absolute,arbitrarygovernmentand a fierce opponentof tolerationand the
rightsof resistance.How do we squarethe Locke of the Second Treatise-who insisted
that men by naturewere free and equal and maintainedthat to be legitimate, govern-
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