Communicating Global
Interdependence
A FrameWorks Message Memo
Copyright © 2001 – The Frameworks Institute
COMMUNICATING GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE
A FrameWorks Message Memo
This memo reports on communications research conducted by a team of scholars and
communications practitioners under the direction of the FrameWorks Institute for the
Global Interdependence Initiative, a project of the Aspen Institute. Originally drafted in
July 2000, it has been updated to include more recent research results.
The purpose of this Message Memo is to demonstrate ways to apply the research results
to the overall task of reframing American attitudes about international engagement.
Written from the perspective of a communication practitioner, its intent is to complement,
not replace, the actual research reports. It is designed to answer the following questions:
•
How can the FrameWorks research help communications and policy staff better
understand what they are up against in attempting to win public support for
policies that recognize global interdependence?
•
How can this research help individual organizations become more strategic as
they attempt to win support for specific positions?
•
How can it help foster collaborations across organizations, recognizing how
cross-issue work enhances each organization?
•
How can this research help direct organizational energies to the most important
issues and audiences?
•
How should this research inform our day-to-day communications about global
issues?
This memo is organized as follows: first, necessary background information; second,
overall findings; third, presentation of a situation analysis; fourth, a review of the
findings in light of original goals and earlier hypotheses; fifth, specific framing
suggestions and activities. Of necessity, this memo moves from a research review and
analysis to very specific and simple applications. Its variations in tone and format result
from this dual purpose.
I. Background
For just over a year, the FrameWorks research team pursued a series of studies designed
to further our understanding of how Americans think about global interdependence and
related issues and what consequences these orientations and opinions have for specific
global policy debates. The goal of this work was determined by the Aspen Institute at the
founding of the Global Interdependence Initiative (GII), when concerned funders and
experts in global issues chose to investigate the role that communications played in
determining the climate for U.S. involvement in international engagement.
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While other opinion research had begun to suggest that the public may not be as
isolationist and self-interested as conventional wisdom would have us believe, the role of
media in confirming or contesting these more cooperative international values had not
been sufficiently examined. At the same time, the role of media in directing
policymakers’ attention and attitudes seemed of paramount importance, given the
suggestion from these earlier surveys that policymakers were quick to dispute the data
that showed a more internationally interested public; the possibility that the media served
to discount the public’s values through the choice and presentation of international news
required investigation. And, finally, while media might prove an important vehicle for
shaping opinions, questions were raised about the potential efficacy of trusted
intermediary interpreters — NGOs, public interest groups, civic and business
organizations — in articulating for the public an alternative worldview that defined
cooperative multilateral engagement as the embodiment of these basic values.
A. The Approach
To address these questions, the FrameWorks Institute applied a method called strategic
frame analysis. This multi-disciplinary approach to communications research and
practice pays attention to the public’s deeply held worldviews and widely held
assumptions. This approach was developed by a group of scholars and practitioners
capable of studying those assumptions and testing them to determine their impact on
social policies. Recognizing that there is more than one way to tell a story, strategic
frame analysis taps into decades of research on how people think and communicate. The
result is an empirically-driven communications process that makes academic research
understandable, interesting, and usable to help people solve social problems.
This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the dominant frames that drive
reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those models most likely to stimulate
public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). Strategic frame
analysis offers policy advocates a way to work systematically through the challenges that
are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies, to anticipate
attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome
public misunderstanding.
This approach is especially well-suited to the Global Interdependence Initiative whose
purpose was described by Colin Campbell as “developing and deploying a way of talking
about international engagement that will make global issues more salient and more
mobilizing in the eyes of the American public....(and enabling) citizens’ groups to argue
on behalf of specific causes within a coherent, consistent, ethical and practical worldview
that promotes cooperative international engagement across a broad range of issues and
appeals to a broad range of audiences” (Remarks to the European Foundation Center
Assembly, Berlin, Germany, November 8, 1999). From its inception, the GII has been
about setting the public agenda, framing the discourse and priming Americans for
cooperative international engagement.
B. The Research Base
This memo is written at the completion of a sizeable body of work, but notably without
several significant elements of the research. The work that informs this memo can be
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thought of as addressing three critical areas: 1) how the American news media covers
international issues; 2) hwo the American public thinks about global issues; and 3) how
policymakers and opinion leaders think about these same issues. The research conducted
to date is as follows:
On Media
•
A content analysis of national and local news programming on global issues
during a five-week period in 1999, reviewing over 10,000 news stories and more
than 200 hours of airtime to determine the quantity, form and substance of
current international reporting, resulting in “The Myopic Neighbor: Local and
National Network Television Coverage of the World” by S. Robert Lichter,
Daniel R. Amundson and Linda S. Lichter, Center for Media and Public Affairs,
June 2000 (1).
•
A behind-the-scenes analysis of how journalists frame and cover foreign policy
issues, based on Susan Moeller’s popular book Compassion Fatigue (Routledge,
1999) and supplemented by three weeks of media sampling and specific
analyses of the presentations of victimized children and of human rights in
stories of international affairs, resulting in “Four Habits of International News
Reporting,” by Susan Moeller, December 1999 (2).
•
A review of the recent literature on the relationship of media and international
issues, resulting in “Veterans of Perception: GII Antecedents in the Literature on
Media and Foreign Policy,” by Susan Nall Bales, FrameWorks Institute, January
2000 and “Communications and Foreign Policy: A Brief Annotated
Bibliography of the Recent Literature” by Susan Nall Bales with Adria
Goodson, FrameWorks Institute, January 2000 (3).
•
a cognitive review of selected representative and unusual news segments derived
from the local and national media content analysis on global issues, published as
“A Window on the Storm: How TV Global News Promotes A Cognitive Refuge
Stance,” from Joseph Grady and Axel Aubrun, Cultural Logic, October 2000
(11).
On Public Attitudes
•
A summary and analysis of recent survey research related to foreign policy and
global issues, resulting in “Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Affairs: An
Overview of the Current State of Public Opinion,” by Margaret Bostrom,
published in October 1999 (4).
•
An analysis of elicitations (in-depth one-on-one interviews) with 15 Americans
from different age groups, ethnicities, socioeconomic backgrounds, and political
persuasions, resulting in “American Understandings of the United States’ Role
in the World: Findings from Cognitive Interviews,” by Axel Aubrun and Joseph
Grady, Cultural Logic, October 14, 1999 (5).
3
•
a national opinion survey of 2,400 adult Americans designed to test the impact
of different priming issues and statements on a core set of international attitudes
and policies, resulting in “Primed and Suspect: How the Public Responds to
Different Frames on Global Issues,” by Margaret Bostrom, 2001 (6).
On Policymaker Attitudes
•
An analysis of elicitations (in-depth one-on-one interviews) with 10
policymakers representing a range of roles in government and private
institutions, and diverse political perspectives, resulting in “Policymakers and
International Engagement: Findings from the Cognitive Elicitations,” by Axel
Aubrun and Joseph Grady, July 10, 2000 (7).
•
A textual analysis of mainstream print media, resulting in “Ten Differences
Between Public and Expert Understandings of International Affairs,” by Joseph
Grady and Axel Aubrun, Cultural Logic, November 1, 1999 (8).
•
An analysis of the major metaphor domains that inform our understanding of
foreign policy issues, their implications for global interdependence, and their
alternatives, resulting in “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why
Strategic Framing Matters,” by George Lakoff, December 1999. (NB: While
this paper is also about public understanding, its focus is on the elite discourse
that serves to drive public attitudes toward certain models and policy
preferences, so I have placed it in this category) (9).
There have been several overviews of the research-in-progress provided by the
FrameWorks Institute as prefaces to the publication of these reports. In addition, these
investigations resulted in two synthesis documents, which inform this Memo and identify
effective reframes:
??
an analysis of the cognitive cultural models that structure perceptions of global
interdependence, the metaphors that express them, and an assessment of
reframing options, resulting in “Promoting American Engagement: A Catalog of
Recommended Frames and Language,” by Axel Aubrun and Joseph Grady,
Cultural Logic, June 5, 2000 (10).
??
a detailed analysis of the way people think about foreign policy, the frames they
use, their implications for policy, and the potential for using and misusing
prospective global reframes, published as “The Mind and the World: Changing
the Very Idea of American Foreign Policy,’ from George Lakoff, 2001 (14).
In addition to this research, now virtually complete, two reports remain outstanding as of
this writing. These include:
??
an analysis of a media effects experiment using selected news footage from the
local and national media content analysis to measure the impact of dominant and
deviant forms of news on global policy attitudes, to be conducted by Franklin D.
Gilliam, Jr., Center for Communications and Community, UCLA (12).
4
??
a supplemental analysis of media effects, using the same footage but available
on the Internet, with a wider cross-section of public viewers including
policymakers, to be conducted by Shanto Iyengar, Professor of Political Science
and Communications, Stanford University (13).
Additionally, we have had the benefit of research conducted by: (A) Celinda Lake
(presentation to the Global Interdependence Working Group, May 26, 1999); (B) Steven
Kull and I. M. Destler (Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism,
Brookings Institution Press, 1999); (C) Ethel Klein (“Becoming Global Citizens: How
Americans View the World at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” Oxfam America, May
2000); and (D) Beldon Russonello & Stewart (“Connecting Women in the U.S. and
Global Issues, A Women’s Lens on Global Issues,” May 2000).
In order to simplify attribution among these various reports, they are referred to
throughout the text by number or letter as set out above.
II. Overall Findings
There are seven key points that emerge from the research to date, as the research relates
directly to understanding the frames that influence and underlie international discourse
and policy. They are:
1.
We have more of a policymaker problem on this set of issues than a public
opinion problem.
2.
The public problem that does exist results from a misperception that America is
doing it all, bearing the burden of the world; but even this misperception does
not translate into an unwillingness to support international efforts.
3.
The other major public problem is an inability to assign responsibility to any
actor – governments, NGOs, business, etc. The public lacks an understanding of
cause and effect or even a strong image of effective international solutions.
They do not know whom to hold accountable for global issues, or what
respective roles government and private groups should play.
4.
These two public problems are reflections of current media frames.
5.
While the news media fails to educate Americans about causes and
consequences, its impact on public values is not as pernicious as one might
expect.
6.
Media is dependent upon a small number of authorized sources for news,
creating opportunities for influence.
7.
Depending upon what you want to accomplish in the global arena, different
issues and arguments work for and against you, and their impact is more
directly related to the reasoning they set up than their literal issue domains.
5
Each of these is examined in greater depth in the following pages.
1. We have more of a policymaker problem on this set of issues than a public opinion
problem.
As Margaret Bostrom concludes from her review of previous survey research, reinforced
by the findings from our own national opinion survey, “Americans care more about
global problems than most polls indicate.”
This concern is, however, more evident at the level of core values and beliefs than it is in
consistent expressions of specific opinions and policy preferences or in a concrete
knowledge base. Thus, we see strong support across many surveys for an active U.S.
role in world affairs. How that role should be implemented, where U.S. energies and
funds should be directed, and what should be the goals of our involvement are all highly
volatile questions, which appear to be extremely sensitive to specific situational dynamics
and to presentational cues.
The important point is that, as Steve Kull asserted in his 1999 summary of public opinion
(B), the new isolationalism is indeed a myth. We found nothing in either our qualitative
or quantitative work to suggest otherwise.
The literature of media and foreign policy are clear on at least one critical point: for
policymakers, the public has little “standing” on international issues (3). Americans are
viewed by policymakers as woefully naive and uninformed, and their participation in
foreign policy debates is often discounted as limiting diplomatic options and threatening
security.
And, when policymakers do look to the public for approval, they tend to look to media as
the proxy for public opinion. Thus, we begin to see the emergence of a kind of selffulfilling policy prophesy in which the global mayhem news frame that dominates
coverage is viewed as the “pictures in the public’s mind” and the only kind of
intervention necessitated is aid to victims of disasters.
The fact that Americans see the world through a different lens than do policymakers
further contributes to this distancing of citizens from the policy discourse. As Aubrun
and Grady admonish (10), “A central challenge facing the GII is to create a discourse that
seems natural to both policy elites and the general public. These groups bring different
assumptions to the table.”
Policymakers, and other elites, tend to view international issues through an entirely
different set of models than those instinctively used by the public. Relations between
countries are “games” and the world is a chess board (7). Two metaphors predominate,
according to Lakoff (9): the Balance of Power Metaphor, in which the “international
system is a physical system in which state-objects are exerting force on one another, war
is collapse of the system, and the danger of war is instability; and the Rational Actor
Metaphor, in which “each nation is a person who acts rationally to maximize his selfinterest (the ‘national interest’), that is to maximize gains and minimize costs and losses.”
While there are numerous other metaphors at play in experts’ rich thinking about
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international affairs, these two are especially prevalent and demonstrate the dramatic
differences between where the public starts on these issues and where policymakers are
coming from.
It is little wonder that, reasoning from these different perspectives, elites and the public
value different issues. For example, Ethel Klein (C) found improving the global
environment to be a top foreign policy priority for 50 percent of the public, compared
with 41 percent of media elites, 26 percent of business and financial leaders, and 22
percent of Hill policy staff.
More media — or at least more of the same kind of media — does not promise much
remedy. As John Zaller has pointed out (3), the more attentive Americans are to media,
the more their opinions begin to reflect those of policymakers: “Elite and media influence
is likely to be limited to those citizens who are sufficiently attentive to politics to be
aware of what elites are saying...and then the most politically aware citizens are most
susceptible to influence because they are most heavily exposed to an elite consensus that
they have no partisan basis for resisting.”
While mass media is thought of as affecting the populace at large, it sometimes plays a
more powerful role in policymaker opinion formation. In a study of the actual impact of
what he termed “icons of outrage,” or those famous photos widely credited with having
had an impact on foreign policy attitudes among the public, David Perlmutter found
instead “a first person effect where discourse elites feel that a picture has an effect on
them (or should have one) and then, often falsely, project this effect on the general
viewing public” (Photojournalism and Foreign Policy: Icons of Outrage in International
Crises, Praeger, 1998). Perlmutter found that pictures such as those associated with Tet
or Tiananmen have a powerful effect on policymakers, as “policy is explained by
pointing at specific images in the press.” The very belief in the image’s power drives a
response; it makes issues more salient to discourse elites themselves (3). Following this
line of reasoning, it is likely that, given the shallow coverage accorded the WTO
nationally, the power of its visual imagery of protest has had more effect on policymakers
than on the public at large. The protest then becomes strategically effective in its use of
media as proxy for public opinion, directed at policymakers – more effective even than
the numerous public opinion polls that, Kull notes, policymakers discount.
Finally, another reason for the public’s lack of standing on these issues is that there
appear to be few electoral consequences for policymakers on these issues. As Kull and
Destler (B) put it, “(A)ccurate readings of public attitudes is not a day-to-day necessity
for U.S. foreign policy practitioners, and because the political market does not punish
those who misread the public, myths about public attitudes can persist.”
There are few reasons for policymakers to connect with the public and many reasons not
to do so. As Aubrun and Grady note (7), “policymakers are, to some extent, constrained
by the discourse of their peers — when speaking privately they are less inclined to
conform to language and opinions accepted among their professional and/or policy
colleagues.”
George Lakoff has suggested that there are two questions that policymakers ask
themselves about any policy they are asked to advocate: “Will people think I’m nuts?”
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“Will people think I’m doing the right thing? In order to engage policymakers, the
FrameWorks research must find new ways to express global issues that pass these tests.
2. The public problem that does exist results from a misperception that America is doing
it all, bearing the burden of the world, but even this misperception does not translate into
an unwillingness to support international efforts.
In fact, as the Women’s Lens survey attests (D), some Americans take pride in the
country’s leadership role. “Pride as an American” ranked second only to “responsibility
for future generations” among the top reasons for international involvement, and
significantly ahead of “protecting our economic interests.”
The problem arises because Americans only see their own efforts, while those of other
countries are virtually invisible (1). As a consequence, they believe the U.S. is
shouldering the majority, if not all of, the responsibility for world peace (5). In
interviews with FrameWorks researchers (8), both experts and ordinary Americans
reflected this view. Grady and Aubrun (8) also call attention to the tendency in print
media to exaggerate U.S. contributions, even when it is involved in multilateral efforts, a
variation on the “domestic news hook”:
U.S., Japan, Other Nations Pledge $7.9 Billion in Food Subsidies
(subheadline of a story explaining that the U.S. pledged $300 million to
Indonesia, while Japan pledged $1.3 billion and unidentified other countries
pledged $6.3 billion. WP, 7/31/98, p. A20)
Again, the conventional wisdom would be to attack the misperception with a “public
education” campaign designed to get the fact in front of Americans that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, U.S. foreign aid spending accounts for only a small percentage of
our total budget. Our research suggests that this tactic is likely to end in failure. When
informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and
then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is
at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame.
There are ways to introduce information that help Americans get over this misperception
— but they are not literal rebuttals (see below). The good news is that the consequences
of the misperception are not so great that they inhibit support for international
involvement. As Bostrom points out (6), while a plurality (43%) believe the United States
is doing more than it should in other parts of the world, two-thirds (63%) still favor
giving economic assistance to other countries, with one-third (33%) strongly favoring.
This fiction does, however, energize the opposition. While only 29% oppose economic
assistance, nearly all are strongly opposed (21%).
While it may ultimately prove beneficial to GII communicators to show other actors on
the global stage, providing assistance and leadership, the fact that Americans perceive the
U.S. as doing more than its share does not prove the stumbling block to international
engagement and aid that we might have thought. It is important not to put
communications energies into solving a problem of fact that may not have profound
consequences for policy.
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3. The other major public problem is an inability to assign responsibility to any actor –
governments, NGOs, business, etc. The public lacks an understanding of cause and effect
or even a strong image of effective international solutions. They do not know whom to
hold accountable for global issues, or what role government and private groups should
play.
This is a problem that is absolutely critical to the success of GII efforts. A number of our
priming experiments (5) worked to pack issues of importance to the GII into the
definition of engagement and to dramatically increase their salience. However, agendasetting alone is insufficient to accomplish GII ends. The public has to connect these
issues to governments and to politics, or accountability disperses among a host of
potential actors, with no one left in charge, just as we saw in the opinions of those
exposed to the dominant media frame.
As Ethel Klein concluded in her review of public opinion for Oxfam (C), “The fact that
Americans acknowledge that they are part of a global community...does not mean that
they have learned how to ‘think globally’ about solutions to these problems. For many
Americans, these are very confusing and potentially disconcerting times. The solutions
they have been offered are often narrowly framed in technical language that goes against
their instincts about how to handle change.”
Thus, it will not be sufficient for the GII to reframe the problem unless accountability is
also packed into the frame. For example, FrameWorks survey respondents primed with
the moral norms model moved away from the U.S. government as the most effective and
useful source of help (-4% over the control) and into the “don’t know” category (+5%).
This despite the fact that the moral norms model was extremely successful in raising the
salience of such issues as combating world poverty and hunger (+10), protecting the
global environment (+9), preventing human rights abuses (+11), and promoting equal
education so girls in developing countries can obtain the same education as boys (+9).
The moral norms model redefines what’s important to foreign policy, but it fails to help
Americans understand whom to hold accountable for setting and enforcing those norms
(see page 21 for a definition of the moral norms model, or see 6 and 9 for more
discussion of the model).
Interestingly, where Americans are clear on whom to hold accountable – in the realm of
domestic issues – they are more likely to feel efficacious. Both domestic primes, for
infectious disease and the environment, increased people’s assessment that they could
have an impact, over their international equivalents.
It is quite possible that American frustration over not being able to identify causes and
solutions is misread as “compassion fatigue”; our research demonstrates, however, that
Americans remain reasonably stalwart in their commitment to relieve international
distress even when they cannot find anyone to hold accountable for causing the problem.
4. These two public problems are reflections of current media frames.
9
In summarizing their detailed analysis of more than 10,000 TV news stories over a six
week period (1), the Center for Media and Public Affairs concluded:
“Little of the material we found on local or national television news could
reasonably be expected to increase either the comprehension ordinary citizens
have of global issues, or their representation in the public debate of America’s
role in the wider world. The sheer volume of global news has gradually
declined on the networks and remains minuscule on most local newscasts. The
coverage that does exist is largely episodic in format, prosaic in presentation,
and shallow in context. Television news typically emphasizes the ‘otherness’ of
the world outside our borders, portraying the international arena as a subsidiary
sphere of little concern to most Americans except as a place where bad things
happen, and the United States occasionally needs to intervene to set them right.”
It is little wonder in this context that, as Ethel Klein notes (C), “foreign aid...is now seen
as charity.” Indeed, the very definition of intervention becomes relief from mayhem.
Of particular concern to the analysts was the fact that “the global news agenda was
skewed heavily...toward topics such as war, natural disasters, industrial accidents, crimes,
and demonstrations.” Moreover, the news was “overwhelmingly episodic, focusing on
discrete events and short-term crises.” As the work of Shanto Iyengar demonstrates,
“exposure to episodic news makes viewers less likely to hold public officials accountable
for the existence of some problem and also less likely to hold them responsible for
alleviating it (Is Anyone Responsible?, University of Chicago Press, 1991:2). Finally, and
perhaps most important in terms of our research:
“Global news rarely conveyed the impression that Americans had a stake in
global issues, beyond a humanitarian interest in assisting disaster victims. Only
a small proportion of stories dealt with the causes of international problems, and
those that did focused mainly on the obvious, such as natural disasters and
accidents attributed to human error, rather than more complicated historical,
ethnic, religious, or socio-political processes. Attention was directed mainly to
what was about to happen, not why a particular event was happening and how it
fit into broader patterns of similar events. As a corollary, there was even less
attention to political solutions for the problems that were reported. The United
States was rarely seen as the cause of international problems, and even more
rarely was it seen as part of the solution, on either local or network newscasts.
Even the WTO protests generated little discussion of ways to resolve the
problems that the protesters thrust into the news agenda.”
It is little wonder from this coverage that, as Grady and Aubrun concluded (5), “In their
day to day lives, Americans are scarcely aware of other countries, their governments and
their actions.”
5. While the news media fails to educate Americans about causes and consequences,
its impact on public values is not as pernicious as one might expect.
It is puzzling to consider how Americans can continue to hold positive international
views and continue to support policies of engagement when their nightly news is so filled
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with mayhem and so little actual information about the world. The answer, as Aubrun
and Grady noted (8), is that “public understandings are not closely based on media
representations, even though those representations are a major source of information for
the public.”
The bad news is that both the quality and the quantity of American TV reporting on
international news is insufficient to provide a knowledge and conceptual base for
furthering American interest in global interdependence. The good news is that, as
superficial and episodic as this coverage is, its toll on core American beliefs is not as
corrosive as one might expect. In fact, the dominant media frame tends to quicken public
concern, to motivate people to want to exert some control on an out-of-control arena and
to provide relief to victims. At the same time, however, it disperses accountability; the
lack of causation in the dominant media narrative ensures that the public does not know
whom to hold responsible for these international situations and, therefore, does not know
in whom to vest authority for fixing these situations in the future.
Further analysis of the dominant media frames directs us to consider what media critics
like George Gerbner have described as the steady “drip drip” of negative news frames on
our understanding of the world. As Aubrun and Grady assert (11), “by presenting most
global events as though they were acts of nature, American TV news...is likely to evoke a
state of mind in which people observe global events from a safe refuge, spectating rather
than participating actively in them.” Indeed, public support for foreign aid is not directly
inconsistent with this “refuge stance”; you can believe the world is a scary place and
choose to stay at home while opting to make it less scary through development
assistance. As organizations look for opportunities to create cognitive dissonance
between the public’s mediated impressions of the world and their actual experience –
whether through travel, study abroad, or sister city exchanges – these opportunities are
likely to be colored and eclipsed by public perceptions of a mean globe, home to
terrorists, earthquakes, and infectious disease.
6. Media is dependent upon a small number of authorized sources for news, creating
opportunities for influence.
U.S. non-government sources account for nearly one-third (32%) of all sources quoted in
news stories (1), and three-quarters of this group came from “the elite sectors of various
foreign policy experts, academics, think tank scholars, etc.” However, as the Center for
Media and Public Affairs is quick to point out, “66 out of the 216 non-government
sources were representatives of activist groups such as environmental organizations and
organized labor, or demonstrators who were shown offering their opinions or shouting
slogans during the protests.”
The tremendous power of the WTO protests to open up news to citizen voices was only
partially successful, however. This is a kind of reverse Jesse Jackson phenomenon — a
major news event occurs and the people who have engineered it abandon responsibility
for interpreting its meaning for the media. This abdication of communications ensures
that the journalists, desperate to fill the news hole and the news template with quotes
from interested parties, will find someone to provide an interview, and that someone
provides an uncontrollable and unpredictable spin on a carefully constructed news event.
11
Additionally, the Center study found that their local news sample included 20 statements
from ordinary citizens who had no affiliation with activist groups or no “expert”
credentials. “These examples of what used to be called ‘man on the street interviews’
were entirely missing from the source mix of network news. This illustrates the adage
that what is not reported can be as significant as what is reported on the news. Ordinary
individuals are represented in global news primarily as the victims of large impersonal
forces such as wars and natural disasters.”
Ironically, the Center’s study shows the media’s collusion in excluding the public from
the policy debate. “Polls of public opinion on international news were cited only twice in
network newscasts and three times on the local news....Even among the average citizens
who did appear as sources in the local news, several were Seattle residents who were
interviewed to illustrate stories on how little ordinary people knew or cared about the
debates surrounding the World Trade Organization.”
There are three important opportunities for GII communicators, which will be explored
below in greater depth. First, the GII membership includes precisely the kind of
academic and policy experts who have access to the news as sources. Second, the
opportunity to insert soundbites into the news from established leaders should never be
squandered. And, third, training ordinary citizens to provide commentary and giving
them a news hook to get into the media may prove easier and more effective than we
think. The literature of media and foreign policy (3) underscores the power of these
interpretive cues in driving public opinion and policy; at the same time, the literature
suggests that only a handful of non-governmental spokespersons are assertive in
cultivating news attention.
7. Depending upon what you want t o accomplish in the global arena, different issues and
arguments work for and against you, and their impact is more directly related to the
reasoning they set up than their literal issue domains.
The FrameWorks research serves to test a number of important hypotheses about
reframing international engagement for public support, as well as to shed light on
previous research findings.
A) Like A Good Neighbor
As Lakoff (14) has pointed out, the world community metaphor is often used by media
and experts to explain how the world works. According to this metaphor:
“a state is a person living in a community of nations, with neighbors, friends,
enemies and competitors. Strength for the state-person is military strength,
while health is economic health. Since it is a person’s interest to be strong and
healthy, it is a nation’s interest to be militarily strong and economically healthy.
The ‘national interest’ is defined as a high level of military strength and
economic health.”
We use this model all the time — Mexico is our ‘neighbor’ to the south, hostilities broke
out in neighboring countries, Israel and Jordan will never be ‘friends,’ – but we are too
often unaware of the consequences of our tactical choice on public reasoning about
global issues. In fact, because it has easy resonance with the public, it is often
recommended as a frame for policy issues. The Women’s Lens survey (D) found that the
12
two main roles Americans would like to see the U.S. take in the world are that of
“neighbor” and “teacher.” But, as Aubrun and Grady point out (5), the policy outcomes
that are likely to arise from use of the neighbor metaphor are not altogether positive:
“...in current American culture, the neighbor model refers mainly to casual and
episodic interactions, or to unwanted ties and intrusions: ‘Good fences make
good neighbors’ (Robert Frost). Most of the time, Americans tend to feel and
act as though they have no neighbors. An important exception is that Americans
like to feel they can trust their neighbors in times of crisis. In effect there are
two understandings at work: The good neighbor is invisible day-to-day but on
the scene when urgently needed.”
Indeed, when the neighbor model was used by people, as documented in Aubrun and
Grady’s interviews (D), “it was typically in the context of either help following a natural
disaster (limited engagement), or wanting to respect the autonomy of other countries
(unwanted intrusions).”
The neighbor metaphor only gets you so far. It may increase support for aid at times of
crises. But it is also likely to dampen American interest in international affairs; no one
likes a “nosy neighbor.” In fact, as the Women’s Lens poll points out (D), 73% of
Americans agree with the statement that “the U.S. should not try to change what goes on
in other countries, because it is inappropriate for us to impose our values on others.” The
nosy neighbor quickly evolves into the neighborhood bully, the least desirable role for the
U.S. to play (D).
B) Teachers and Mentors
Both the Women’s Lens survey (D) and FrameWorks research (5, 1) explore the teacher
metaphor; in the survey, “teacher” was deemed the second best choice for describing the
role the U.S. should play in the world. The problem with positioning the U.S. as a
teacher to other countries, is that one entailment of the metaphor is that other countries
are, by definition, children. As Aubrun and Grady point out (10), “Americans’ tendency
to treat the relationship between the U.S. and smaller and less industrialized countries as
a relationship between a parent and a child is a barrier to the GII’s goal of promoting
equilateral cooperation.” They suggest, instead, reframing this model slightly to that of a
“mentor.”
Using this model, the goal of the relationship is autonomy — obviating one of the chief
concerns of American engagement, that of protracted involvement to no discernible end
— built upon the American model of raising children to be independent. Aubrun and
Grady conclude (5):
“Both the public and policy elites are enthusiastic about the Costa Rica aid
example, because it suggests that providing education leads to self-sufficiency,
and reinforces the American interest in efficacy. The example perfectly
illustrates and reinforces the idea of ‘mentoring for autonomy.’ It suggests that
an important part of working with this general frame is to inform the public (and
elites) about similar successes.”
13
C) The Motivational Power of Democracy
The Path to Democracy model is also often suggested as a motivating principle for
Americans. As Lakoff defines it (E), “certain steps lead inevitably to democracy, e.g.
capitalist markets, elections, civilian control of the military.. Dictatorships can be
tolerated as long as the country has...capitalist markets and elections, which are seen as
leading inevitably to democracy in the long run.”
A version of this model was at play in the recent debate over China trade policy. “When
over 100 million people in China can get on the Net,”asserted President Clinton in a
commencement speech the day before the Congressional vote to grant China permanent
trade status, “ it will be impossible to maintain a closed political and economic society”
(New York Times, May 28, 2000 4:4). Here we see American confidence in the ability
of a free media to transform ideology toward democratic ideals.
This approach tends to equate democracy with access to consumer goods and to view
both the old and the new media as a delivery system for advertising, which is viewed as
inherently democratizing: “A rising middle class first demands a decent apartment, then a
car, and sooner or later a vote” (NYT, May 28, 2000, A4).
While this argument may have persuaded policymakers and other elites, who bring some
different perspectives to global issues (7), it is unlikely that it did much to persuade
ordinary Americans of the issue. The Women’s Lens survey (D) found the democracy
argument ranked dead last among all the arguments offered as a reason for the U.S. to be
active in world affairs; only 18% of Americans ranked it as an important reason,
compared to 62% who felt it was important to leave a better world for future generations.
Grady and Aubrun’s analyses of the differences between expert and public opinion (8)
underscore the weakness of this model for galvanizing public support: “The public is
much more concerned with social and moral values. Experts are much more concerned
with security and national interest....Experts are more interested than the Public in
making other societies more American.” They conclude that “a communications strategy
emphasizing the transformation of other nations and societies would alienate many
average Americans, either because they would see it as presumptuous or because they
would not see that any purpose is served by trying to change countries that play no major
role in their picture of the world anyway.”
Again, the model poses problems for GII goals. If a country is indeed on the path to
democracy, one cannot call attention to human rights violations or sweatshops or poor
environmental practices. The model has certain entailments that tend to conceal facets of
international engagement that the GII has defined as primary (see section IV below).
D. Re-examining Self-Interest
Other scholars of foreign policy opinion (A, C) have suggested that Americans need to
connect their own self-interest to international issues. This has often been interpreted as
a literal need to explain international issues first in the context of their domestic impact,
or even to begin with a domestic problem and then demonstrate its international
implications (for an example of this approach, see Bringing the World Home: Showing
Readers their Global Connections, A Newsroom Handbook, The Freedom Forum and
American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1999).
14
There are strong reasons to question the effectiveness of this approach for GII goals,
arising out of both our qualitative and quantitative research. First, both the FrameWorks
research and the Women’s Lens survey support the assertion that Americans’ assessment
of global issues is rooted in more altruistic values, like responsibility to future
generations and caring, than in narrow self-interest or nationalism.
As Aubrun and Grady put it (5), “When thinking about international relations, ordinary
Americans are not driven by calculations of self-interest of the kind described by
‘rational choice’ theories.”
In fact, the fallacy of the self-interest hypothesis as it applies to international issues
echoes earlier findings on environmental issues presented in Environmental Values in
American Culture (Kempton, Boster, and Hartley, MIT Press, 1999). This study “found
that environmentalism has already become integrated with core American values such as
parental responsibility, obligation to descendants, and traditional religious teachings.
Surprisingly, biocentric values — valuing nature for its own sake – are also important
values.”
From this key finding, the authors suggest that “environmental advocates are missing an
opportunity by basing their arguments primarily on utilitarian grounds (i.e., protect the
rainforest because it has potential medicines)....Environmental advocates who work in the
political arena tell us that utility is still a more convincing argument for politicians – it
may be hard for a representative to argue for the rights of other species when his or her
constituents are threatened by unemployment. However, for advocates working with the
public, appealing to a broader range of values offers the potential for a broader and
perhaps more deeply felt reservoir of support” (Kempton et al: 223-224).
The FrameWorks survey found substantially more support for aid to “the poorest
countries” (47%) than for either of the self-interest alternatives, countries important to
U.S. security (27%) and countries that the U.S. needs as trading partners (19%). The
public overwhelmingly believes in the importance of cooperating with other countries
(63%, 53% strongly) over just concerning ourselves with pursing our national interests
(31%, 25% strongly).
Does approaching international issues (global environment, global infections disease)
through their domestic counterparts (domestic environment, domestic diseases) increase
support for foreign assistance? The FrameWorks survey (6) would suggest otherwise.
Comparing those who were primed by the domestic environmental set-up, compared to
those primed by international environmental issues, we find weaker, not stronger, support
for giving economic assistance to other countries, 56% compared to 67%. Moreover,
opposition grew among those primed domestically, with 37% opposed compared to 27%
among those who heard the international set-up. Similarly, there were large differences
in support for promoting fair labor practices in countries where sweatshops and child
labor exist and combating world poverty and hunger, with those primed globally proving
significantly more supportive.
For most Americans, the equation that works to inspire international involvement is
“think globally, act locally” and not the reverse.
15
(N.B. For more discussion and detail on this issue, see “Self Interest vs. Selfish Interest in
Section IV).
E. It’s Teamwork
Aubrun and Grady have suggested that one way around the weakness of the neighbor
model is to transport it to a different domain: the workplace. Here, they reason,
Americans have more developed models of cooperation and collaboration. To help
advocates articulate this, they have developed an extensive catalogue of related frames
(10).
To test the power of this frame overall, we included it as a set-up in the FrameWorks
priming survey (6), expressed as follows:
“Many people feel the U.S. shoulders more than its share of the burden of
dealing with international problems, such as security issues, infectious diseases,
and environmental threats. It would be more fair, and more effective, to manage
these challenges by working jointly with other countries, than by the U.S.
working alone. By working as a team, the U.S. and other countries can pool
their talents and resources to get the job done in these and other areas. When
countries work together, there are payoffs on all sides.”
How did the prime affect perceptions and policy preferences? First, it is plausible; 79%
agree with it, and 61% strongly. Second, it increases support for an active role in the
world (+5), and slightly decreases the proportion of those who believe that United States
should stay out of world affairs (-3). However, it also increases the perception that the
United States is doing more than it should (+7), and depresses strong support for
economic assistance (-5), while increasing mild opposition to economic assistance (+5).
Finally, it significantly increases the importance of trading partners as targets for U.S.
aid.
There is some discussion among FrameWorks research team members that part of the
effect is due to the statement of the negative frame as opener. All things considered, GII
communicators should be careful how they position this powerful business frame, as it
has significant entailments that may decrease certain altruistic values in favor of selfinterest.
F. Issues as Primes
There were two issues tested as interpretive prisms in our priming survey: infectious
disease and the environment. For both of these, domestic and international frames were
tested as primes to a wider array of global issues. While there are some interesting
results from the domestic versions (see 6), we will confine comment here to the two
international versions.
Both international issues served as powerful primes, putting people in a frame of mind
that helped support many GII objectives. What this means is that the issues themselves,
when vividly conveyed, can help drive reasoning on a host of global issues not
necessarily connected to the prime by most people.
16
Of the two issues, however, only the global environment can be said to work as a prime
for the majority of GII objectives.
As Margaret Bostrom reports (6), “when thinking internationally, the infectious disease
frame increases soft support for being active in the world (+6), and increases the belief
that the United States is doing less than it should (+6).” It has virtually no impact on
opinions for or against assistance to other countries, compared to the global environment
frame which boosts support by 15 points. On accountability, it promotes confusion,
increasing the number (+4) who say they don’t know which entity is the most effective
and useful source of help.
Problematically, the infectious disease frame does not help other issues. Compared to the
control, the global infectious disease prime causes people’s prioritization of human rights
abuses to drop by 4 points, poverty and hunger by 3 points, sweatshops and child labor by
1 point, equal education for girls by 6 points, and global environment by 7 points.
This should not dissuade GII advocates from using infectious disease as an issue focus,
nor even from using it as a prime. We reiterate that it proved extremely powerful. Our
research does suggest, however, that this issue requires additional explanation to
overcome some of the deficits inherent in the frame itself. Paying careful attention to
pack responsibility and efficacy into the frame early in the discussion, for example, may
obviate some of the effects noted above.
By contrast, the global environment frame proved extremely developed and powerful for
people. It worked to prioritize a host of global issues, and to provide an interpretive lens.
Bostrom’s findings conclude:
“A majority of Americans would like to see funding to improve and protect the
environment expanded (56% overall), particularly when they are thinking of the
global environment (63%). A majority also believes it is possible to have a lot
of impact on improving the domestic and global environment (59% and 57%
respectively).
In addition to being an issue of public concern, the environment is a very strong
frame for increasing a sense of interdependence. The environmental frame
increases willingness to have an active role in the world (+6), particularly when
discussed as the global environment (+9 in strong support for active role). It
also increases the perception that the United States is doing less than it should
(+6), again, particularly when discussed as the global environment (+9). The
domestic frame has no impact on support for economic assistance, but under the
global frame strong support for economic assistance increases (+15). Those
hearing the global environmental frame shift to strong cooperation (+4), while
those hearing the domestic frame shift toward strong national interest (+4).
The public is more likely to see private companies and the United States
government as effective sources of help (+5 and +3 respectively), particularly
among those who were initially thinking of the environment domestically (+8
and +4 respectively). Among those hearing the global environment frame, the
17
role of religious organizations is dramatically decreased (-9), but no other actor
increases in responsibility.”
The global environmental frame increases the importance of most other issues: it raises
prioritization of human rights abuses by 6 points, sweatshops and child labor by 7 points,
poverty and hunger by 7 points, global infectious disease by 6 points, and equal education
for girls by 5 points.
The implications for communicating global issues are simple: using the global
environment as a “warm up” issue to a discussion of global interdependence is likely to
enhance positive attitudes to cooperation and assistance, to strengthen the identification
of poverty, hunger, and women’s education as important foreign policy investments, and
to further Americans’ willingness to engage internationally. Global environmental issues
provides an effective frame for bolstering other global issues which have not yet evolved
and for strengthening issues which have inherent problems.
G. Moral Norms
George Lakoff’s research (14) for the GII strongly suggests that we not overlook an
important extension of the world community metaphor: international moral norms. In
this metaphor:
“members of the World Community are expected to obey certain norms of
behavior, just as people living in a community are expected to do. As foreign
policy, the idea is to stabilize and regulate the behavior of nations by the
imposition of moral norms – behaviors expected of moral nations. These
behaviors are maintained by peer pressure, by international civil society, by the
threat of sanctions and of being treated as an outcast and, if absolutely
necessary, by force – military action – as a last resort.”
The moral norms model is extremely useful, as it lays out a coherent, systematic code for
countries to follow. As Lakoff illustrates, “just as a responsible community of people
must intervene when an individual gets unacceptably violent, so a responsible world
commu nity must intervene when an individual state gets unacceptably violent.” And this
code conveys to other forms of unacceptable behavior, from the oppression of people to
the hoarding of food and resources. And this code “ requires that the U.S. set an
example, that it act according to the moral norms that it advocates, that it uphold its end
of treaties, pay its dues, contribute to peacekeeping forces, and so on.”
When tested as a prime in the national opinion survey, the moral norms frame elevated
the imp ortance of every issue tested, but failed to make the connection to government
action. . Subsequently, Lakoff went back to the drawing board and worked to pack into
the frame more cues about who is responsible. The result is the following:
“The U.S. is wealthier and more powerful than any nation in the history of the
world. With that position come responsibilities of various kinds. Yes we do
have to set an example for the world by addressing our problems at home. But
we also have to offer world leadership. And right now we’re not doing our
share.”
18
Moreover, Lakoff identifies a series of roles the U.S. can play that incorporate
responsibility for others into the model. These include:
??
??
??
??
The Partner: shares responsibility and risk
The Example Setter: lives by moral norms and promotes them by setting an
example.
The Community Builder: brings diverse parties together to get things done.
The Caretaker: responsible for th children, committed to their future.
“These archetypes, taken together,” says Lakoff, “define what the role of the U.S. should
ideally be in a world governed by moral norms.”
III. Situation Analysis
The first question that arises from the research is: if the public’s opinions matter so little
to policymakers, and our goal is to influence policy, why are we focusing on public
opinion?
First, it’s important to note that the problems surrounding public support for international
engagement are almost always framed as: How do we bring the public along? Why
doesn’t the public get it? So, the very fact that we have arrived at a different
understanding of the problem suggests substantial learning as a result of the research.
The answer to the original question is, quite simply, that we must investigate every aspect
of the opinion/policy continuum in order to discern how we can affect it. The
conventional wisdom from political science is that the media sets the public agenda
which, in turn, sets the policy agenda. What we’ve learned from the FrameWorks
research is that this is at best an imprecise equation as it applies to global issues. So let’s
examine each of these three critical arenas and determine exactly what we now know, or
think we know, about its impact on global issues.
A. Media
Situation:
??
less foreign news
??
highly formulaic
??
strong tendency toward episodic coverage
??
no information about cause, effect, solutions
??
serves as Americans’ primary lens on world
??
dependent on public officials, elite spokespersons
??
reinforces expert model
??
politically polarized
??
highly charged visuals break through to policymakers
??
serves as proxy for public to policymakers
19
Problems:
??
extremely difficult to change quality and quantity of news
??
may do little to move public opinion, but may influence policymakers
??
status quo disperses responsibility away from government accountability
??
reinforces refuge stance and isolationism
Opportunities:
??
GII can supply the kinds of recognized sources routinely quoted in news.
??
Internet can serve as a bypass mechanism, reaching Americans with new stories
about the world that better connect to, and reinforce, their values.
??
Strategic communicators can play to journalism formulas (WTO) while cue-ing
different values through their control of soundbites.
??
Journalism education, through funder intervention, could build new formulas
responsive to this research.
B. Public
Situation:
??
already sympathetic to GII goals and principles
??
international support often downplayed in favor of domestic issues
??
easily dismissed by media and policymakers as uninformed, emotional,
manipulable
??
easily drowned out (squeaky wheel syndrome resulting from organized
opposition)
??
media is viewed as its proxy (resulting in compassion fatigue assessment)
??
inarticulate, inarticulated by others (no standing, no organized intermediaries)
??
easily manipulated in specific situations by primes and other cues
Problems:
??
finding/giving a public voice to these issues
??
weakness of intermediaries to engage in constituency building (funding, focus,
expertise)
??
myths and misperceptions of public communications (self-interest, etc)
Opportunities:
??
Intermediaries can be strengthened to undertake constituency building.
??
Intermediaries can be created to connect citizens to policymakers on these
issues.
??
Open up vehicles for public expression.
??
Train citizen voices.
??
Go direct to citizens via community media and the Internet.
20
C. Policymakers
Situation:
??
disbelieve polls on these issues
??
distrust public on these issues
??
more likely to believe what they see and read in media and to confuse this with
public values
??
entrenched mental models, reinforced by partisan debate
??
secrecy and complexity further the reliance on experts, increase isolation from
public input
??
no counter-pressure to spur policy reconsideration
Problems:
??
potential advocates lack access and standing to this population
??
campaign finance system ensures ready access for counter-perspectives
??
squeaky wheel problem through highly orchestrated, organized opposition
??
fear of embarrassment for articulating opinion outside the recognized elite
models
Opportunities:
??
Both Aspen and GII memb ers have historic access to and track record with
policymakers.
??
Find new models and language to over-ride embarrassment.
??
Deploy intermediaries with clout, including civic leaders and business who are
seen as unlikely messengers on these issues.
??
Use media strategically as the pipeline to policymakers.
A more extensive narrative version of this problem statement is presented in an
introduction to the research reports entitled “Framing Studies and Global
Interdependence.”
It is important to note that the plan that emerges from this situation analysis must address
both communications and program. The ability to reframe, to talk back effectively to
dominant models of discourse, will only take us so far. Even the most brilliant
communications plan will be dependent upon the ability of organizations to inherit this
work, to create programs that incorporate and advance it, and to develop new
mechanisms for solving the disconnection between the public and its policymakers.
What follows is an exploration of these two challenges: (1) how to talk differently about
global issues, and (2) how to think differently about what it is we need to do to change
the policy debate. Both these sections incorporate the situation analysis that is provided
above into practical applications.
21
IV. Goals and Hypotheses
How can this new understanding that emerges from the research help shape our
understanding of the task at hand, in supporting cooperative multilateral responses to
global challenges?
The real test of the value of the research comes in our ability to translate it into the daily
work of our member organizations, informing news releases, speeches, brochures, and
tactics with these new findings. The goal of the research, after all, was not to help us
understand the world the way scholars do, but rather to help inform our practical
application of communications to global issues. The work that follows is an example of
one communicator’s learning and application of the research to a specific set of
messages. It is the opinion of the author alone, and has not yet had the benefit of
discussion among FrameWorks research team members.
Let’s begin by re-examining the six principles that inform the GII’s work, attempting to
restate them for a public audience, based on the research. While these principles were
crafted for a highly educated, expert audience, let’s view them as drafts of a speech to a
citizens group, and critique them on that basis. We can assume that they reflect the goals
of the GII and the ideas the GII members hope to infuse in the public discourse.
Strategic frame analysis provides three useful questions for deconstructing frames. They
are: (1) what is this really about? (2) who made the problem? (3) what should be done to
fix it, and who should fix it? These three questions are implicit in our analysis of these
principles.
PRINCIPLE ONE: “The world is changing. We can change it for the better. Economic
globalization can create winners and losers, both within the United States and among
nations. We can and should soften its negative impacts while sharing as broadly as
possible the benefits of global interdependence. It is possible to imagine a future that
provides a greater measure of prosperity and participation for many more of the world’s
poor and excluded. It is essential that the United States help shape such a future.”
COMMENTS: Change will arouse fear, and is likely to be connected to issues like
technology and global warming. Most Americans think the world is changing too fast,
and this tends to make them want to cocoon, so you may have set up a fear frame in your
first sentence that does not put people in a mindset to consider global issues expansively.
The statement that “we can change it for the better,” brings up the issue of efficacy. With
few solutions or results clearly in mind, Americans have a hard time believing this
argument. The benefits of global interdependence raises a self-interest model, as does
prosperity. Finally, the public is likely to support a leadership role for the U.S. but to ask
why we have to do it all ourselves.
The statement is “about” change. It was intended, we suspect, to be “about” caring and
alleviating the distress of those negatively affected by globalization. The opening frame
is too strong. Moreover, it assumes that bad things just happen (no one made the
problem, it’s an act of nature). And it poses the U.S. as responsible for resolution. It’s a
kind of non sequitur and precisely the kind of logic that drives Americans to ask: why us?
In some respects, it repeats the dominant form of news coverage, which is unlikely to
accord responsibility or to strengthen efficacy.
22
SUGGESTIONS: Begin with the values you know Americans hold and provide them a
lens through which to evaluate the rest of your statement, or an issue prime that helps
follow the reasoning of your proposal.
For example:
We all want to leave the world a better place for future generations. To do that,
we must protect the global environment, working with other countries to set out
rules we can all live by. It also means sharing our expertise with countries that
are trying hard to rise to the next level. We’ve made big strides in this country
on important issues, but no country goes it alone in this new global environment.
As Americans, we care about working toward a world where all people have
opportunities to raise their families, go to school, and earn decent wages.
From this point on, it is important that the statement include a specific problem that has a
solution that sets up American know-how and cooperation as the logical response. An
example would help vivify the statement for the public.
For more information on how to reframe this principle, see section on “mentoring for
autonomy” in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10).
PRINCIPLE TWO: “Values matter. The United States should stand for cooperation,
individual liberty, transparency, sustainability, and justice, and for principles like the
Golden Rule. Advances in global communications allow increasingly for norms to be
genuinely global, and for people to hold government, business and other institutions
accountable to those norms. Holding our institutions and ourselves accountable to these
norms is part of our work as citizens.”
COMMENTS: Aside from the reliance on experts’ code words (transparency, norms), this
is a good statement of the moral norms model. It begins by connecting to a widespread
concern among Americans: the decline of values. It is likely to conjure those values.
The second line would be clearer and more powerful if it restated the Golden Rule; it
serves as the prime for everything that follows. Use simpler words like fairness for
justice, citizen input or government accountability for transparency, freedom not
individual liberty, and problem-solving or results not sustainability. Good incorporation
of responsibility and line of authority from citizens to their government; needs more
detail on how we do that. Global communications seems somewhat weak as the
motivator for a new model.
This statement is “about” doing unto others as we would have them to unto us. The
problem is, by default, that until global communications came along we couldn’t hold
other countries accountable to these same norms (weak). And responsibility is on U.S.
citizens to create and enforce global norms.
SUGGESTIONS: Refer to the section on America as a decent person in Aubrun and
Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10). And, while it did less to
23
incorporate responsibility than the statement above, consider the moral norms statement
tested in the FrameWorks survey (6):
Countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent upon each
other because they realize that most problems don’t stop at borders. Through
international laws and treaties, countries get together to agree upon a basic set of
shared values and a code of behavior that all countries should respect and
respond to. We stand together against those countries that violate basic
standards of behavior through torture, terrorism and pollution. We encourage
and support countries that are trying hard to do better. We share the vision of a
better world for all people and we support its development by cooperating with
countries throughout the world in setting standards we can all live up to, and in
upholding those standards.
PRINCIPLE THREE: “We’re at our best when we are doing our share. A cooperative
approach to global problem-solving — doing our share to build a better world — is
consistent with values that Americans have long cherished. The United States currently
spends less than one percent of its federal budget on international affairs, far less than
other prosperous nations. We can afford to carry our fair share of international
responsibilities while doing what we need to do for ourselves here at home; in fact, if we
don’t do our share internationally, caring for each other here will end up being more
costly.”
COMMENTS: This is “about” doing our share, a social norm. We are living up to our
image as Americans when we exercise American know-how and take pride in our
leadership. All good so far. The U.S. is currently not doing its share, the statement
asserts. That’s likely to be discounted, either as fiction, liberal propaganda or to be
dismissed (1). See section on “just 1%” in Aubrun and Grady (10). If you are going to
state it, and we are not suggesting against this, you will need to explain it: how other
countries are investing, how we stopped paying our UN dues, etc., and the impact this has
on the world. Causes and consequences. Finally, the linked investment idea (our fate
depends on their fate) is undeveloped.
SUGGESTIONS: Develop other examples of effective investments by other developed
countries in developing countries that yielded results. This strongly held belief that the
U.S. is carrying the whole load may be best addressed through a series of examples that
inspire, rather than trying to negate the numbers.
PRINCIPLE FOUR: “Military and economic power are not enough. The security of the
United States cannot be defended by military force, nor purchased through our economic
prowess. Sometimes military force is the appropriate tool. American products,
investments and entrepreneurism can help generate global prosperity. Genuine, longterm security, however, requires that the United States be a reliable partner in pursuing
social stewardship as well.”
COMMENTS: This statement appears to be “about” military might. The negative
opening statement only serves to put us in the military frame. It is also likely to incite
opposition among those who think military might is important, even though they may
hold some useful conflicting values. The statement even goes so far as cede ground to
the opposition by stating that sometimes military force is the right tool. That’s likely to
24
be the take-away from this passage. Indeed, there is no reason offered for reconsidering
the old model, no impetus for re-examination. It also downplays the role of the U.S.
economy, not likely to be readily accepted. The term social stewardship will not mean
much to ordinary Americans and, as Lakoff points out (9) tends to reinforce hierarchical
and utilitarian reasoning.
Implicit in this passage is the notion that other countries are making problems to which
the U.S. is responding inappropriately by using military force. The likely response is to
place responsibility on other countries to fix their own problems, while we stay at home
and concentrate on our economy. Again, the notion of why America is responsible for
generating global prosperity is likely to be a problem in this positioning.
SUGGESTIONS: Don’t lead with the negative. Decide that the statement is about
redefining national security. For example:
National security encompasses many aspects of a country’s internal and external
health: its economic, political and social health, its relationships and reputation
among other countries, as well as its military might. OR, provide a reason for
re-examining the old frame. New opportunities and challenges arise for many
countries in light of the end of the Cold War. National security now
encompasses....
Or provide more vivid reasons for this shift. For example: The child that grows up
hungry and homeless is more likely to resort to force than the child that got early
education and health care. Assistance is an investment in America’s future security.
Emphasize the partner frame; refer to the section on Workplace Cooperation - Partnership
and New Management in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and
Language (10).
PRINCIPLE FIVE: “We can’t do it alone. American leadership is often welcome in the
world, especially when it takes cooperative forms. We can play on a team; we don’t
always need to be captain. Our security, health, and prosperity are intimately tied to the
security, health and prosperity of people throughout the world. We can’t achieve real
security for ourselves or our children by going it alone. The United States and other
international organizations have contributed to some remarkable successes in meeting
global challenges. It’s in our self-interest to help these institutions do better; dropping
out isn’t the answer.”
COMMENTS: The opening negative reinforces Americans’ sense that they are doing it
alone; where’s everybody else? Why don’t we see them doing their share on TV? How
come it’s always us? Second, the idea that American leadership is often welcome may
inflame the opposition; since we’re always bailing countries out and footing the bill, why
shouldn’t we be welcome? OR, it may conjure its opposite, as people assess its truth —
terrorism against our embassies, American flags burning. The assertion that we have
been successful needs back-up; Americans cannot imagine success, having seen few
examples of it in the news. And finally, while the idea of dropping out is an interesting
one, it is a non sequitur. The rest of the passage does not support this education-based
conclusion.
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SUGGESTIONS: Refer to the section on Workplace Cooperation - Partnership in Aubrun
and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10). Here’s an alternative
re-statement:
America’s success in the world depends on our ability to collaborate effectively
with other countries. We have to build teamwork into our foreign policy,
because no country is powerful enough to protect the global environment or
prevent global diseases all by itself. When other societies are in good shape
economically and socially, they make good partners; so we provide disabled. To
manage these new partnerships, we need to listen to the best ideas of other
countries, take advice and coach the talents of all the players.
PRINCIPLE SIX: “Individual actions matter. In our communities, in our work, as
citizens and even as consumers, we can help shape a global future that works for all of
us.”
COMMENTS: Convincing a public raised on American television news that their actions
matter is a very tough challenge. While it is absolutely true that we must increase
Americans’ sense of efficacy, this must be a long-term goal. Beginning with this weak
frame is unlikely to establish the reasoning you desire on the remaining assertions.
Begin, instead, with a statement of principle. For example: It’s important to do the right
thing, to demonstrate to our children and people of the world our commitment to make
the world a better place to our children and to other peoples. The actions we take today
add up to the future direction of the world. It is ineffective and inefficient to attack
problems like global pollution and infectious diseases one country at a time. In a world
where borders matter less and less, we must act on the fact that all parts must be in good
shape for the world to run smoothly.
Refer to the section on Global Systems in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended
Frames and Language (10).
This exercise of deconstructing a passage, anticipating its impact on the public, and
reframing for greater consistency and effectiveness is meant as a model only. Certainly,
any of these passages could be developed t o suit specific policy goals of individual
organizations. But our point here is to demonstrate how the research can inform this
process, and help create an overarching set of messages that, repeated over time, begin to
provide the necessary counterpoint to the dominant frames of current global discourse.
VI. Additional Applications of the Framing Research
Here’s the way one might frame a simple statement about the UN, using moral norms,
partner and community-builder frames:
The United Nations is our international problem solver. The UN brings
scientific and medical research teams together to address the problems facing
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our world, from the outbreak of new viruses to the eradication of old diseases.
It’s the world’s most effective partnership, harnessing the expertise of dozens of
countries. And we have a big stake in its success. Without the World Health
Organization, the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta can’t help Americans
prepare for the flu season, developing resistant vaccines based on international
experience.
Here’s a simple answer to the question ‘why do we need to support foreign aid,’ that
draws from what Lakoff calls ‘Pragmatist Who Cares’ and the Moral Norms model:
Foreign aid is effective and practical. It yields benefits for everyone, including
the U.S. If follows naturally from the priorities most Americans hold about the
way the U.S. should act in the world community. And it’s the right thing to do.
In an early draft of a white paper on foreign policy, InterAction set out the idea that, in
order to help others, the U.S. must be strong itself – an idea that Lakoff advances:
“...Preserving a vibrant and growing U.S. economy is vital. Clearly, U.S.
assistance in the developing world when properly implemented positively
impacts the U.S. economy. Eighty percent of the foreign aid budget boosts the
U.S. economy by expanding markets for American good and services...By
addressing problems in the developing world, the U.S. helps build and sustain a
strong consumer base for U.S. goods and services and thereby increases the
number of U.S. trading partners and subsequently promotes American jobs.”
But that first draft failed to complete Lakoff’s equation: the country that is strong then
uses its strength to bring others along, to advance larger goals in the world. On the
second draft, a promising paragraph got even better by balancing wealth with moral
health, and inserting the idea that “to those to whom much is given much is required.”
Many of the profiles in the Institute for Sustainable Communities’ 2001 Report use the
Mentoring for Autonomy model, showcasing the role U.S. organizations can play in
lending expertise to others so that they can solve problems:
“A worker at the Amurbio-farm Tea Company dries sea-buckthorn berries,
which are sustainably harvested from the nearby taiga. ISC’s project gives
Russians good examples like this of how to create jobs and invest in their
economy in ways that enhance rather than threaten natural resources.”
Finally, there is this quote from President Clinton that combines moral norms and
teamwork into an especially effective soundbite:
“I believe that one of the fundamental facts of the modern world is that we are
growing more and more interdependent within our communities, our nation and
beyond our borders. I believe that, therefore, successful social work, including
economics, is becoming more and more like winning the national basketball
championship. It’s a team sport.”
President Clinton, Chicago, January 9, 2001, as reported in
The Washington Post, Wednesday, January 10, A9
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VII. A Framing Strategy for Promoting Interdependence
Combining frames from the research can give your message the best possible chance of
connecting to the public’s innate understanding of global interdependence. In this
section, we provide a general recommendation for structuring each sequential section of a
communication, and then demonstrate how it might be realized with reference to the
specific topical issue of global infectious disease. The “Framing Checklist” that follows
this “Message Memo” can be used to ensure that you incorporate the GII research and its
framing lessons into any communication your organization is drafting on a specific issue.
TEN TIPS FOR FRAMING ISSUES
1. Start with a global environment prime.
2. Don’t reinforce global mayhem.
3. Showcase shared leadership and
teamwork.
4. Stress efficacy.
5. Establish responsibility with a clear
call to action.
6. Choose trusted messengers.
7. Downplay “foreignness” in visuals and
messages; foreground similarities that
reinforce empathy.
8. Appeal to moral values, establish the
role for the U.S. as a decent person
in the world community.
9. Leverage public opinion to hold
policymakers accountable.
10. Choose your metaphors carefully to
reinforce interdependence.
1. Try to get your audience in a global environment mindset. Here’s an example of how
to do this:
We live in a global environment. No one can stop the air quality in one country
from influencing another. The health of the oceans is affected by the actions of
many countries. And today diseases that begin in one country are carried
halfway around the globe by mosquitos, by tourists and business travelers, and
food exports. Infectious diseases know no boundaries. So, instead of trying to
erect useless barriers, we need to engage in the world and prevent problems
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before they spread. The world of tomorrow will take even more international
teamwork.
2. Don’t try to acknowledge where you think most people begin; see “Don’t Think
About Elephants” in Section VI for an explanation of why this is a bad tactic. Don’t start
off with a frame that reinforces the dominant news frame of global mayhem by stating
that the world is a scary place. While the following example may sound good on the face
of it, it cues up the refuge stance that Cultural Logic documented, and therefore
advantages more isolationist, defensive and containment-oriented policies, rather than
global engagement and cooperation. Here’s an example of what NOT to do:
America has an opportunity to make the world safer than ever for our children
and for ourselves. The Cold War has ended, lifting the spectre of nuclear
war.....The new threat on the horizon is not military but microbial, but it is just
as deadly.
3. Tell stories of shared leadership – for example, the role that the UN system plays or
other multilateral efforts – while showcasing group problem-solving involving expertise
from many countries, including the active participation of poorer countries helped. Try
to foreground the expertise of other groups and countries, and the theme of working side
by side for mutual benefit. See “Telling Stories” in Section VI for more detailed
suggestions. Use these suggestions strategically to counter the belief that the US is doing
it all or at least more than its share. Overall, the story you tell should be about teamwork,
as in the following statement:
America’s success in the world depends on our ability to collaborate effectively
with other countries. We have to build teamwork into our foreign policy,
because no country is powerful enough to protect the global environment or
prevent global diseases all by itself. When other societies are in good shape
economically and socially, they make good partners; so we give them a hand
and some coaching. To manage these new partnerships, we need to listen to the
best ideas of other countries, take advice and coach the talents of all the players.
4. Stress efficacy. Remember that the dominant media frame for international issues is
“global mayhem” in which preventable events – from famines and poverty to wars and
diseases – are equated with acts of nature, and no cause or solution presented to the
American public. To overcome this mindset, you will need to demonstrate that problems
can be prevented, that we actually can have an impact on the world. Quite simply, you
want to make the point that there are causes that we have an opportunity to address long
before these crises develop:
Every country we successfully help (with development aid) is a war we won’t
have to fight, a crisis we won’t have to intervene in.
In earlier GII research, an example like the following met with great interest and support
from informants:
We gave Costa Rica foreign aid for some years, which helped to provide basic
health care, safe drinking water, and free primary and secondary education to all
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of its citizens. That country worked alongside us to improve the lives of its
people. Today, adult literacy rates in Costa Rica are 94%, and infant mortality
is now at a level that is comparable to that of most developed countries. Costa
Rica's per capita income is now among the highest in Latin America, and Costa
Rica no longer requires foreign aid.
5. Hold policymakers accountable. Since the “call to action” for most social issues is
not as simple as “buckle up,” you will need to make a direct statement about what
Americans can and should do to support your organization, the US, the UN or other
vehicle in its problem-solving role. You must both raise and answer the question: so
what’s the problem here?
The US hasn’t given the UN a pay raise in more than four decades, even though
our investment in eradicating smallpox saved this country $17 billion in
domestic health care costs.
OR
When your team is doing well, you don’t back out. The UN has proven itself an
effective disease-fighting organization, enlisting the expertise of many nations.
Why, then, isn’t Congress backing this preventive force?
DON’T try to state directly that the US isn’t paying its fare share, as this will be resis ted.
6. If you quote experts or use messengers, choose those who are seen as being both
knowledgeable and unlikely to lie to the public on this issue; “unlikely allies” might
include business leaders who are expected to be concerned about the bottom line, not the
humanitarian impact of policies, or doctors/scientists attesting to the contribution of
another country’s scientific expertise when they might be expected to favor US expertise.
Use domestic policy activists to make the connection to global issues; for example, a US
pediatrician might say:
“Protecting children today means thinking locally and acting globally to keep
our water, air, and food supply pollution-free and disease-free. No child lives in
a gated community in today’s world.”
7. Talk about international or global issues, not foreign issues. Avoid less effective
analogies like neighbor, parent, social worker, nanny, or policeman; scrutinize the
country-as-people metaphors and don’t let the US become “Uncle Sam,” for example.
DO use the litmus test of the US as a decent person in the world. DO substitute “mentor”
for “teacher.” Resist the tendency to use metaphors and motivators that don’t energize
people, such as the “path to democracy” and self-interest.
DON’T allow infectious disease to be equated with foreign-ness, or weakness or certain
people. That is the downside of this particular disease: its easy migration from physical
to moral disease. The global environment prime is an insurance policy against this
tendency, but review your copy carefully to make sure that you have not inadvertently
given out cues that connect the infectious disease to country conditions or population
characteristics that undercut the idea that “this could happen to anyone.”
DON’T spend a lot of time thinking you have to make the connection to local impact and
local self-interest; the public is already there, it’s the policymakers that need to be able to
30
convince themselves of these connections and to incorporate them into their own
positions and discourse.
8. Appeal to moral values, to the desire to make the world a better place, to the value of
nature for its own sake, the right thing to do, and to the Golden Rule, as in the following
examples:
We all want to leave the world a better place for future generations. To do that,
we must protect the global environment, working with other countries to set out
rules we can all live by. It also means sharing our expertise with countries that
are trying hard to rise to the next level. We’ve made big strides in this country
on important issues, but no country goes it alone in this new global environment.
As Americans, we care about working toward a world where all people have
opportunities to raise their families, go to school, earn decent wages, and live
and work in environments that are disease-free.
OR
Countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent upon each
other because they realize that most problems don’t stop at borders. Through
international laws and treaties, countries get together to agree upon a basic set of
shared values and a code of behavior that all countries should respect and
respond to. We stand together against those countries that violate basic
standards of behavior through torture, terrorism and pollution. We encourage
and support countries that are trying hard to do better, to get their citizens off to
a healthy, productive start in life, to raise new leaders. We share the vision of a
better world for all people and we support its development by cooperating with
countries throughout the world in setting standards we can all live up to, and in
upholding those standards. The UN is our problem-solving organization: how
we set standards, how we help countries and kids get off to a good start.
OR
It’s important to do the right thing, to demonstrate to our children and people of
the world our commitment to make the world a better place. The actions we
take today add up to the future direction of the world. It is ineffective and
inefficient to attack problems like global pollution and infectious diseases one
country at a time. In a world where borders matter less and less, we must act on
the fact that all parts of the globe must be in good shape for the world to run
smoothly.
DO link preventing infectious disease around the world to being active in the world and
providing foreign assistance. DO draw upon the language of the workplace and team
sports for analogies like win-win assistance or engagement, joint decision-making, joint
ventures, and coaching other players. DO use metaphors of teamwork and partnership, as
in the following example:
By working as a team, the US and other countries can pool their talents and
resources to get the job done. When countries work together, there are payoffs
on all sides. Foreign assistance is a win-win proposition for disease prevention
at home and abroad.
9. Use public opinion research to good effect in pushing policymakers to justify their
positions. Point out the difference between the public and policymakers on these issues,
and point out the difference to reporters. For example, the GII survey data, Steve Kull’s
31
work, Ethel Klein’s survey review for Oxfam and Beldon Russonello & Stewart’s report
for the Women’s Lens on Global Issues can all be used powerfully in op/eds to point out
that the public is leading on global issues and the policymakers are still stuck in “old
think” about national security and fighting the next war:
For the public, the next war is happening now in New Jersey, New York,
Maryland and other states where the West Nile Virus promises to take its toll on
Americans because we didn’t use our scientific and humanitarian resources early
on to stop the disease before it crossed our borders.
DO quote ordinary citizens, especially those with high civic visibility, who are willing to
say, “we need a new approach to international policies and programs that recognizes we
live in a global environment.”
The child that grows up hungry and homeless is more likely to resort to force
than the child that got early education and health care. Assistance is an
investment in America’s future security.
10. Use the GII research as a shopping list for effective metaphors. You don’t have to
make up your language anew with each brochure or speech; try to write from these
metaphors again and again, so that your communications add up to a consistent
worldview. The “Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language” that follows this
“Message Memo” in rich in illustrations of ways to help direct NGO communications on
specific issues.
For example, here’s a collection of suggestions specific to frame infectious disease:
Foreign health problems are U.S. health problems.
The public health endeavor is a source of optimism.
Public health is a matter of education.
Public health is a matter of prevention.
Public health spending is less subject to criticism than other forms of spending.
Would you rather let other countries worry about global issues like infectious
disease, or make sure that American expertise is being applied?
Beating infectious disease requires a sustained effort.
The public’s model of public health largely agrees with the Expert (medical)
model.
They are further developed by the researchers, and we repeat these below:
Foreign health problems are U.S. health problems.
Americans readily understand that many diseases today “know no
borders.” They also find it both unrealistic and un-American to try to
seal the borders against foreign disease. It is easy for both the public
and policy elites to think of infectious disease in t erms of a “global
system” perspective. People understand that where the world goes, so
too goes America.
32
The public health endeavor is a source of optimism.
Americans have a positive attitude towards public health agencies,
such as the CDC, the WHO, or the NIH. The public health endeavor
elicits ideas of efficacy and knowledge; people trust medical
practitioners.
Public health is a matter of education.
The public believes that most public health issues are “90%
education.” As a result, the public health endeavor lends itself to the
model of “mentoring for autonomy.”
Public health is a matter of prevention.
A related American understanding is that an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure.
Would you rather let other countries worry about global issues like infectious
disease, or make sure that American expertise is being applied?
The American beliefs that the U.S. knows best, and that most public
health problems have solutions, combine in this framing to promote
engagement.
Beating infectious disease requires a sustained effort.
This general frame provides a way of working around the public’s
avoidance of long-term engagement with others. In the American folk
understanding, infectious diseases can constitute emergencies, but also
require long-term efforts at control. Related terms are hygiene and
prevention.
VIII. A Programmatic Strategy for Promoting Interdependence
As stated above, the second challenge the research suggests is programmatic. Not only
do GII members need to create a new discourse, but they must find ways to embed this
new language in ongoing activities that reach media, the public and policymakers
consistently over time. The broad outline of such a plan is presented above in the
“opportunities” sections of the situation analysis.
What follow are three very specific, concrete directives and related activities that further
these broader goals.
A. Get out in front of media, and come behind it.
One way to harness the power of media to reach policymakers is to get out in front of a
news event and to be the first to define its significance and meaning. There are several
ways to do this.
First, op/eds can be submitted using the authority of GII members, board members,
academics and other experts to interpret the meaning of news about to break. For
example, next week, President Clinton will meet with the Group of Eight leaders; here’s
what’s at stake. OR, the political nominating conventions are likely to see protests that
echo the Battle for Seattle; the issues they want on the political agenda are the same ones
33
many Americans favor. Even if the op/ed editor declines to go out ahead of the news,
you are likely to find the article runs after the fact, once the hard news story leads.
Second, pursue commentary opportunities aggressively. This means positioning the
heads of GII organizations, board members, etc. as willing and able to comment on
breaking news. Perfecting soundbites, and filling out the rolodexes of key reporters with
others who can do so as well, will allow GII members to provide the interpretive spin on
the news that Americans need to make sense of international issues and events. We’ll be
providing more information in the forthcoming toolkit on how to bridge from hostile and
ill-informed questions to the frames you wish to put forward. But it takes a commitment
from both the communications director and the executive to prioritize this activity.
Never yield your soundbite to chance, as was done in the WTO and IMF/World Bank
protests. The journalists must be taken to your leader. Even if your leadership is shared,
provide 3 or 4 trained communicators who can and will speak for the group and interpret
what it is doing and why.
Third, connect media with both experts and citizens in ways that overcome the media’s
myth that Americans are not interested in global issues. Take a reporter to lunch with
three business leaders whom you’ve helped train and inform about GII goals and
messages. Editorial board visits, backgrounders on issues and public opinion, press
briefings, story suggestions that are fundamentally new — all of these begin to create
more space in the news media for the new global discourse.
You can exert some control over news interpretation even after the fact through the letters
to the editor. Help concerned citizens write and place short well-framed comments that
demonstrate public interest in an international issue as well as interpret its meaning for
readers. Since editorial usually follows news, edit boards can also be accessed after a
story breaks.
What is the goal of this intensified use of media? It is three-fold: (1) to convince
policymakers that Americans care about these issues, by letting the media serve as proxy
for public opinion; (2) to provide new interpretive lenses and language that seed into
public discourse ways for ordinary Americans to articulate their core beliefs; and (3) to
provide the missing elements of the frame — responsibility, solutions, cause and effect,
etc. — that would connect American values to political views and actions.
B. Control your own communications.
The websites, annual reports, newsletters, and other routine communications vehicles of
GII members and friends reach many, many Americans. The FrameWorks research
should be used to prompt a re-examination of how well these vehicles are serving to
reframe global issues for public understanding and support. An audit of the main
vehicles is a good way to start.
Second, GII members influence and inspire many communicators: at the national, state
and local levels. Helping them understand how to talk about global issues is an important
part of building an articulate constituency. You can do this by building communications
training into chapter capacity-building and creating new mechanisms for training and
deploying “unlikely allies,” especially those who can reach policymakers.
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PROGRAM TIPS TO SUPPORT FRAMING
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Get out in front of the news.
Piggyback on, and ride, breaking news.
Control your own communications.
Stress interpretation.
Enlist trusted intermediaries to address
citizens and policymakers.
6. Create new forums for interaction and
discussion.
7. Help citizens acquire standing on global
issues.
8. Make calls to action specific, and help
people practice and fulfill them.
9. Move your metaphors into common
speech and regular forums.
10. See your communications and program
activities as organically connected.
C. Organize new infrastructures to connect citizens and policymakers.
The media is an important but unreliable link, and a distorted one at that. Campaign
contributions and big money drown out all but very consistent and powerful citizen
voices. On other important national issues, policymakers complain that they never hear
any citizen voices except activist ones, whom they discount.
Policymakers need to hear from “trusted intermediaries,” often defined as ordinary
constituents, or at least those constituents most likely to matter to their re-election:
business and civic leaders, the heads of major endorsing organizations like teacher’s
unions, leaders of important swing constituencies like soccer moms and Hispanics, and
the core voting groups like seniors.
GII members need to work to put in place not sporadic meetings between an elected
official and an interest group, but sustained forums for powerful citizen voices to find
expression to policymakers. These citizens, trained in the lessons of communicating
global issues, will, over time, create a policy environment that allows officials to break
with the status quo, to find new language and policy options to overcome their timidity
on global issues.
This does not require a complete act of invention. Some of the “old” infrastructures
remain vital places for framing opinions. In an article entitled “Upon This Rock: The
Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement,” Allison Calhoun-Brown
demonstrates how “the culture of the black church helped leaders to frame the meaning of
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the nonviolent message and encouraged churchgoers to respond to it positively (PS:
Political Science and Politics, June 2000:173). She quotes Andrew Young:
“Nobody could have ever argued segregation and integration and gotten people
to do anything about that. But when Martin would talk about leaving the slavery
of Egypt and wandering into the promised land; somehow that made sense to
folks. And they may not have understood it; it was nobody else’s political
theory, but it was their grassroots ideology. It was their faith...And when they
saw in their faith also a liberation struggle that they could identify with, then
you kind of had ‘em boxed. They all wanted to be religious. And when you
finally helped them see that religion meant involvement in action, you kinda had
‘em hooked then.”
The programmatic challenge for the Global Interdependence Initiative is to find those
places where Americans gather to understand the world and to explore meaning —
whether in church or synagogue, civic or business club, party or political interest group
— and to use these places to discuss global interdependence in ways that connect identity
to action.
Susan Nall Bales
FrameWorks Institute
revised March 2001
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