European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
brill.com/eccl
The Social Life of Illegal Drug Users in Prison:
A Comparative Perspective
Anton Oleinika,b,*
a) Department of Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, P.O. Box 4200,
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1C 5S7
b) Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, the Russian Federation
Abstract
Different degrees of criminalization of illegal drug use influence the overall composition of prison
populations across countries. Individuals convicted of illegal drug-related crimes represent a significant
part of the prison population in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. These convicts are not a part of the
traditional criminal milieu, but a product of the perception of certain acts as crimes in particular contexts
(e.g., an increasing social distance, the state’s control over potentially dangerous groups, etc.). The
experience of incarceration might cause important changes in their life after release. The idea that prison
contributes to the interiorization of criminal norms rather than preventing deviant behavior in the future
seems especially fruitful in regard to illegal drug users. Elements of prison subculture are described on the
basis of an empirical research conducted in 1996-2003 in Russian prisons (N = 769 (49 of these were
convicted in relation to illegal drugs) in 2000-2001; and N = 214 (24) in 2003). The social organization of
everyday life of inmates convicted of drug-related offences in Russia, Kazakhstan (N = 396 (76) in 2001)
and Ukraine (N = 208 (26) in 2003) is compared with that of other convicts to test the hypothesis about the
lack of significant differences between the two groups.
Keywords
Illegal drugs; criminalization; prison social climate; prison subculture; comparative approach; Russia;
Kazakhstan; Ukraine
* E-mail: [email protected]. A first draft of this paper was presented at an international conference
on Reducing the Use of Incarceration in June 2007 (Tehran, Iran). The author thanks an anonymous
reviewer of the European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice for useful suggestions
and comments on its later version. However, all remaining errors and inaccuracies are solely attributable to the author.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013
DOI: 10.1163/15718174-21022026
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1. Introduction: Particularities of Drug-Related Crimes
Drug-related offences differ from other types of crime — terrorism, violent crimes
(homicide, rape and robbery), crimes of passion, white-collar crimes, etc. — by
the fact that they do not necessarily have victims. All parties involved — drug
producers, smugglers, distributors, sellers and users — in general make transactions on a voluntary basis. ‘We are here in the area of free exchanges’.1 The voluntary character of transactions makes the approach of ‘natural law’ hardly applicable
to the case of drugs.2 Both law and intuitive common sense define murder as a
crime, whereas they may diverge as far as different aspects of drug uses and abuses
are concerned.
Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie argues that the power of labeling drug
use a crime derives from the priority given to the task of strengthening control by
the state over potentially dangerous classes, not from the dangerousness of the
activity itself.3 This reasoning suggests that those convicted of drug-related crimes
violated a law but not a social norm (cf. a murderer transgresses both a formal law
and a universal social norm).
The career of a drug user diverges accordingly from that of a typical criminal
personality. Before being apprehended, the former does not necessarily have regular contacts in the criminal milieu, he or she does not know its particular norms
and values. It is in prison that the drug user gains knowledge of the criminal and
prison subculture. It ‘comprises norms, customs, rituals, language and mannerisms which depart from those required by penal laws and prison rules’.4 All countries with significant prison populations have particular prison and criminal
subcultures embedded in the prison milieu. For instance, the list of elements of the
prison subculture in the US comprises songs of Johnny Cash (who toured American
prisons in the 1960s), hip-hop music, baggy-style clothes, slang, and movies about
the experience of prison and incarceration (between 1929 and 1995 Hollywood
produced 101 such dramatic films, which amounts to 1% of its total production5).
1) M. Cusson, Criminologie actuelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), p. 50. This assumption does not apply to crimes committed for pecuniary gain to sustain a drug habit.
2) The doctrine of natural law argues that definitions of crime and delinquency are entailed by the
nature of the world and the nature of human beings. From the perspective of natural law, common
sense and everyday practices turn out to be the best guiding principles for the justice system (A.-J.
Arnaud, ed., Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1999), p.199).
3) N. Christie, Crime Control as Industry: Towards GULAGs, Western Style (London: Routledge, 2000).
4) M. Platek, ‘Prison Subculture in Poland’, 18 International Journal of Sociology of Law (1990),
459-472; see also V. Anisimkov, Rossiya v zerkale ugolovnyh traditsii tyurmy (Russia in the mirror of
prison criminal traditions) (St-Petersburg: Yuridicheskii tsentr Press, 2003), p. 12.
5) D. Cheatwood ‘Prison movies: Films about adult, male, civilian prisons: 1929–1995’, in F. Bailey,
D. Hale (eds), Popular culture, crime, and justice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), pp. 209-231.
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
187
However, the prison subculture in countries using imprisonment in groups
(the barrack system) seems relatively stronger than in countries where prison is
based on confinement in individual cells. The time convicts spend together, day
and night, in the latter case gives them far more occasions for interacting and
elaborating their own codes of conduct.6 Confinement in individual cells allows
some privacy and an escape from the social dimension of everyday life, at least at
night. Three post-Soviet countries, the Russian Federation (RF), Kazakhstan and
Ukraine, which were the primary sites of the proposed analysis, keep most of their
convicts in groups.
For persons convicted of drug-related crimes, prison becomes a place of
re-socialization. Not in the sense of rehabilitation, one of the three missions
assigned to prison (rehabilitation, retribution and custody), but in the sense of
initiation into norms and patterns of the criminal subculture. ‘The more people
pass through penitentiary institutions, the more bearers of the criminal subculture’.7 The scholarly literature on the criminal subculture and its re-socializing
effects is particularly abundant in the countries that practice imprisonment in
groups.8 Imprisonment in cells prevails in Western Europe and North America
where the academic interest in studying the prison subculture is relatively weaker.
There are several notable exceptions, however, namely a famous study of the
‘society of captives’ in the United States and the literature that it has inspired.9
The proposed analysis aims to answer the research question as to whether the
social behavior of individuals convicted of drug-related crimes in prison differs
from that of other convicts. If the above hypothesis about re-socialization is true,
then the comparison of two groups of prisoners, those convicted of drug-related
crimes and those convicted of other crimes (all crimes combined), will not produce substantially (and statistically) significant differences. In what follows I will
test this hypothesis and simultaneously describe the legal framework related to
uses and abuses of drugs as well as penitentiary systems in the three above mentioned countries.
In Section 2 I will discuss sources of information, both primary and secondary,
used in this study for purposes of description and analysis. Section 3 has a descriptive character: penal policies in regard to drug users are compared, with emphasis
on their impact on crime rates. A short overview of the institutional organization
of penitentiary systems in the three countries follows. In Section 4 I compare the
6) A. Oleinik, Organized Crime, Prison and Post-Soviet Societies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 45-48.
7) V. Anisimkov, loc. cit., p. 176.
8) See, for instance, an account of the situation in post-socialist Poland: M. Platek, loc. cit.
9) G.M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1958); A. Liebling, Prison and their Moral Performance: A Study of Values, Quality,
and Prison Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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group of inmates convicted of drug-related crimes with that of other inmates
using a series of social indicators highlighting the organization of everyday life
and their behavioral patterns. This allows testing the hypothesis about the social
closeness of the two groups as a result of the progressive re-socialization of members of the former group. Some normative implications of the proposed analysis
are put forward in the Conclusion.
2. Sources of Information
This paper is based on primary and secondary sources of information. The list of
secondary sources includes official statistics on the number of registered crimes,
prison population rates (PPR), the number of persons convicted of drug-related
crimes. I also refer to legal documents (Penal Codes and anti-drug laws).
A series of surveys conducted in penitentiaries of the Russian Federation (two
surveys), Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the first half of the 2000s serve as a source of
primary data. In all cases cluster sampling techniques were used. The penitentiary
administration of a particular country gave permission to visit prisons located in a
particular region or a number of regions. No randomization at this stage was possible for administrative and financial reasons (the geographical scope of Russia,
for instance, makes extremely difficult geographical cluster sampling even in the
case of public opinion polls: as of today, this country has 83 regions). However,
the choice of a unit(s), otryad, to be surveyed within the particular prison was
randomized. The otryad is commonly composed of individuals sentenced for
various crimes (i.e., the variable ‘article of Penal Code under which one was convicted’ does not necessarily explain his or her placement in a particular unit).
As for the sentence conditions, usloviya (Article 87 of the Criminal and Correctional
Code (Ugolovno-Ispolnitel’nyi Kodeks) of the Russian Federation, for instance,
defines three types of conditions: regular, strict and facilitated), they do vary
across the detachments. The detachment was randomly chosen among those in
regular sentence conditions (the absolute majority). When visiting individuals
placed in strict conditions was allowed, efforts were made to interview a few of
them too.
All members of this unit available at the time of my visit were requested to take
part in the survey. The participation had a voluntary character, yet the decision to
administer the survey in groups (questionnaires were filled out individually but at
a session where everyone was present) contributed to extremely low levels of
refusals, varying from zero to 15%. As a rule, a minimum of 30-35 inmates per penitentiary filled out the questionnaires. All completed questionnaires were simultaneously submitted to the researcher. This, together with the fact that no
information revealing the identity of the participant was requested, ensured the
protection of anonymity. No staff member was present inside the room where the
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
189
survey took place. In-depth interviews, also conducted by the author, complemented the data collected through the surveys.
The collection of all primary data by the same person helps control the impact
of the researcher’s personality, although this might decrease reliability of the presented findings. The researcher’s personality has an especially important impact
in the context of total institutions where speculations that one is working for the
administration can destroy trust necessary for obtaining valid results. The author
was introduced to inmates as an independent university researcher and, in fact, a
reputation of reliability has been built in the process of the survey as the information freely circulates in the post-Soviet prison world by word of mouth and other
informal yet sometimes highly sophisticated and efficient channels (according to
an informant, a message originating in Moscow can easily reach the region of
Arkhangelsk located 1,500 km North of the capital city in just one or two days10).
The survey in Russia was organized in two waves, in 2000-2001 and in 2003.11 In
2000-2001 29 penitentiaries (N = 769) — all regimes, minimum, medium and maximum security, combined — located in five regions (Ivanovo, Moscow, Murmansk,
Perm and Sverdlovsk) were visited. In 2003, the survey was conducted a second
time in six penitentiaries in the Moscow region (N = 214). The sample in Kazakhstan
is composed of 12 penitentiaries located in two regions (Kazakhstan includes in
total 14 regions), Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk) and Akmola (N = 396). Finally, the
Ukrainian sample included five prisons located in the region of Kharkiv. A caveat
concerning the limited representativeness of the sample in this country has to be
put forward. First, the data collected in one region can hardly be generalized to
the country as a whole (Ukraine has 24 regions). Second, I did not manage to randomize the choice of respondents within a particular penitentiary as a sample
of inmates who took part in a cultural event (a theatre show) filled out
questionnaires.12
The data used in the reported study have an important limitation which the
reader has to bear in mind when considering its outcomes. The available data do
not differentiate between drug-users and drug-traffickers: both of these categories
are included in the category ‘persons convicted for illegal drug-related offenses’.
On the one hand, the existing literature suggests that in the West drug-users are
often involved in drug dealing. This involvement — regular or occasional —
allows them to generate personal income and to cover the cost of their own drug
use. A study conducted in Canada reports that every fifth active drug user engaged
10) A. Oleinik, loc. cit., pp. 60-61.
11) Results of the 1996-1999 wave were discussed in detail in A. Oleinik, loc. cit.
12) The show was attended by inmates placed in different detachments, representatives of one of
them were invited to stay after its end and assist in the research — in this case a number of questions
dealt with the show and its perception by convicts.
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in drug dealing during the six months prior to their interview.13 An American
study produced similar figures: twenty-nine percent of participants reported dealing an illegal drug that they consume in the past two months.14 The empirical
evidence in this regard in the post-Soviet countries is scarcer, but it also suggests
that drug dealers turn often out to be current or past drug users. Namely, drug
users can commonly be found at the lowest and most exposed to law enforcement
levels of the distribution system.15
On the other hand, the law both in the West and the post-Soviet countries treats
drug users differently from drug dealers. Those who fall in the latter category are
expected to receive heavier sanctions. In reality, however, the situation is clear-cut
neither in the West nor in the post-Soviet countries. For instance, an analysis of
trends in drug user and drug dealer arrest rates in Australia produces a rather
unexpected result: provider-type offences lead to fewer arrests (20-30% of all
drug-related arrests) than consumer-type offenses (70-80%).16 A case study of the
relevant law enforcement practices in a Russian region suggests an opposite picture: the number of drug dealers receiving prison sentences is almost twice as
high as the number of prosecuted drug users.17 Nevertheless, it remains unclear
whether these findings could be generalized to other Russian regions.
In these circumstances, I considered the fact that most respondents failed to
clearly indicate the particular drug-related offense for which they had been sentenced18 as a factor that does not undermine the overall validity of the findings
reported in this paper. The principal objective, it should be recalled, consists in
demonstrating the re-socializing effects of prison incarceration as a result of
which people, who committed victimless crimes, interiorize criminal norms and
values. The existing contradictions in the law and in law enforcement practices
13) T. Kerr, W. Small, C. Johnston, K. Li, J.S.G. Montaner and E. Wood, ‘Characteristics of Injection
Drug Users Who Participate in Drug Dealing: Implications for Drug Policy’, 40 Journal of Psychoactive
Drugs (2008), 147-152, at p. 150.
14) S.J. Semple, S.A. Strathdee, T. Volkmann, J. Zians and T.L. Patterson, ‘“High on My Own Supply”:
Correlates of Drug Dealing among Heterosexually Identified Methamphetamine Users’, 20 The
American Journal on Addictions (2011), 516-524, at p. 518.
15) L. Paoli, ‘Drug trafficking in Russia: A form of organized crime?’, 31 Journal of Drug Issues (2001),
1005-1034, at pp.1016-1019; R.E. Booth , J. Kennedy, T. Brewster and O. Semerik, ‘Drug Injectors and
Dealers in Odessa, Ukraine’, 35 Journal of Psychoactive Drugs (2003), 419-426, at p. 422.
16) D.A. Bright and A. Ritter, ‘Australian Trends in Drug User and Drug Dealer Arrest Rates: 1993 to
2006–07’, 18 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (2011), 190-201.
17) V.I. Kuznetsov, ‘Primenenie sudami Irkutskoi oblasti “antinarkoticheskikh” statei Ugolovnogo
Kodeksa RF’ (The application of ‘anti-drug’ articles of the Penal Code of the RF by the courts in the
region of Irkutsk), 2 Sibirskii yuridicheskii vestnik (2006), p. 73.
18) One reason for this failure refers to the grouping of provider-related and consumer-related
offenses in a single article (for example, in Russia Article 218 of the Penal Code refers to drug-users,
whereas Article 228.1 refers to drug dealers).
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
191
make a finer distinction desirable (especially in further research), but not absolutely necessary.19
3. Anti-Drug Laws and Policies
The three countries under consideration adapted restrictive drug policies. They differ in degree rather than in kind. An overview of Penal Code norms referring to
drug-related crimes and anti-drug laws show a high degree of consistency between
the three post-Soviet countries (Table 1).20 Variability concerns mainly the amount
of fines, which reflects differences in income levels (all fines are converted into
euros using the exchange rate in 2007; in legal documents they are set in national
currencies). When interpreting these figures, it is worth keeping in mind that in 2001
Gross National Income per capita amounted to €815 in Ukraine, €1507 in Kazakhstan
and €1987.5 in the Russian Federation (converted to euro from 2007 US$ using
yearly average exchange rates).21 So the ratio was 1:1.85:2.44 (1:1.94:2.96 in 2006).
Table 1. Drug-related offences and corresponding punishments: a comparison of policies
in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Type of offence
Penal Code of the
Russian Federation
Penal Code of the
Republic of
Kazakhstan
Penal Code of
Ukraine
Unlawful purchase,
storage, transportation, production and
processing of drugs
or narcotic substances (with no
intention to sell)
Substantial quantity
(see Table 3): fine
up to the equivalent
of €1150 OR
compulsory work up
to 2 years OR
imprisonment up to
3 years
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
3 up to 10 years OR
fine up to €14350
(Article 228)
Substantial quantity: fine up to
€55700 OR
compulsory work up
to 2 years OR
imprisonment up to
3 years
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
3 up to 7 years
(Article 2591, 2592)
Restriction of
freedom up to 3
years OR imprisonment up to
3 years
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 2 up to 5 years
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
5 up to 8 years
(Article 309)
(Continued)
19) Indeed, the eventual decriminalization of drug use also undermines the character of drug trafficking as a crime. Being decriminalized, drugs are a regular commodity like many others.
20) This description provides a snapshot of the situation in the first half of the 2000s when the surveys were conducted.
21) World Bank, World Development Indicators, available online at: http://data.worldbank.org/data
-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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Table 1. (Con’t).
Type of offence
Penal Code of the
Republic of
Kazakhstan
Penal Code of
Ukraine
Unlawful production Imprisonment from
and sale of drugs or 4 up to 8 years
narcotic substances Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 5 up to
12 years WITH a
fine up to €14350
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
8 up to 20 years
WITH a fine up to
€28 700 (Article
228.1)
Transgression of
Fine up to €8615
norms regulating the OR imprisonment
turnover of drugs or up to 3 years
narcotic substances (Article 228.2)
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 7 up to
12 years
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
10 up to 15 years
(Article 259.3,
259.4)
Imprisonment from
3 up to 8 years
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 5 up to
10 years WITH
seizure
Very large quantity:
imprisonment from
8 up to 12 years
WITH seizure
(Article 307)
Fine up to €2800
OR imprisonment
up to 1 year
(Article 265)
Theft of drugs or
narcotic substances
Imprisonment from
3 up to 7 years
(Article 229)
Restriction of
freedom up to
3 years OR imprisonment up to 5
years (Article 230)
Imprisonment from
3 up to 7 years
(Article 260)
Restriction of
freedom up to
3 years OR imprisonment up to
4 years (Article 261)
Unlawful cultivation Fine up to €8615
of plants containing OR imprisonment
drugs
up to 2 years
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 3 up to 8 years
(Article 231)
Fine up to €4000
OR imprisonment
up to 2 years
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 3 up to 8 years
(Article 262)
Fine up to €150 OR
restriction of
freedom up to 4
years OR imprisonment up to 3 years
(Article 320)
Imprisonment from
3 up to 6 years
(Article 308)
Restriction of
freedom up to
5 years OR imprisonment from 2
up to 5 years
(Article 315)
Fine up to €150 OR
restriction of
freedom up to
3 years
Substantial quantity: imprisonment
from 3 up to
7 years (Article 310)
Imprisonment from
3 up to 5 years
(Article 317)
Involving a new
person in drug
consumption
Organization of
drug dens
Penal Code of the
Russian Federation
Imprisonment up to Imprisonment up to
4 years (Article 232) 4 years (Article 264)
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
193
Table 1. (Con’t).
Type of offence
Penal Code of the
Russian Federation
Penal Code of the
Republic of
Kazakhstan
Falsification of
documents entitling
the bearer to get
drugs or narcotic
substances
Unlawful turnover of
tools used in
processing of drugs
and narcotic
substances
Smuggling in or out
drugs and narcotic
substances
Fine up to €2300
OR compulsory
work up to 1 year
OR imprisonment
up to 2 years
Fine up to €2800
OR compulsory
work up to 2 years
Penal Code of
Ukraine
Fine up to €150 OR
restriction of
freedom up to 3
years (Article 318,
319)
Imprisonment up to Fine up to €530 OR
6 years (Article 263) restriction of
freedom up to 3
years (Article 313)
Imprisonment from Imprisonment up to Imprisonment from
3 up to 7 years OR a 5 years (Article
3 up to 8 years
fine up to €28700
250.1)
(Article 305)
(Article 188.2)
The similarity of legal frameworks with regard to drug-related offences does not
necessarily involve uniformity in the application of the law. The ratio of drugrelated crimes to the total number of registered crimes varies over time and across
countries (Table 2). In the Russian Federation, the share of drug-related offences
rapidly increased during the 1990s, but it has been declining since the start of the
new century. The official data for Kazakhstan show a similar pattern, yet at the
peak of this trend, in 2000, illegal drug transactions constituted almost every fifth
crime.22 In Ukraine the upward trend has been less manifest, yet it continues to
the present. The lack of agreement as to how to enforce anti-drug laws aggravates
controversies related to the labeling of drug abuse and dependence a crime. So,
elements of arbitrariness seem inevitable both at the stage of drafting the laws and
that of enforcing them.
Practices — not uncommon in the post-Soviet context — of counting on antidrug laws if the police cannot collect enough evidence about a suspect’s involvement in more serious crimes serves a practical illustration of the arbitrariness of law
enforcement. If the suspect, who is believed dangerous by the police, cannot be sent
to jail due to lack of evidence, an accusation of illegal drug possession sometimes
becomes a strategy of ‘last resort’ for putting him or her behind bars.23 In contrast to
22) The author thanks Gesa Walcher of Penal Reform International for providing some secondary
data on the Kazakhstan case.
23) Similar practices have also been used in the US, at least in the past, where Al Capone was eventually jailed for tax evasion, not for the organization of a criminal syndicate, see P. Buckley and
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Table 2. Total number of registered crimes, thousands, selected years.
1990
1995
Russian
1839.5 2755.7
Federation
Including
16.3
79.9
drug-related
crimes
% of drug0.1
2.9
related
crimes
Kazakhstan
173.9* 183.9
Including
4.6
13.2
drug-related
crimes
% of drug2.6
7.2
related
crimes
Ukraine
369.8 641.9
Including
7.2
38.2
drug-related
crimes
%of drug1.9
5.95
related
crimes
1998
1999
2000
2001
2003
2005
2006
2581.9 3001.7 2952.4 2968.3 2756.4 3554.7 3855
190.1
7.4
142.1
18.7
13.2
576
39.9
6.9
216.4 243.6
7.2
8.25
139.4 150.8
21.1 23.3
15.1
15.5
241.6 181.7 175.2
8.1
4.9
5.5
152.2 118.5 109.3
17.4 11.7
5.3
105
6
11.4
6.6
212
9.9
4.9
5.7
559
567.8 514.6 566.4 491.8 428.2
42.7 45.75 47.9 57.4 65
64
7.6
8.1
9.3
10.1
13.2 15
Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Russian
Statistical Yearbook) (Moscow, 2006) Table 10.1; Y. Gilinski, Kriminologiya: Teoriya, istoriya, empiri­
cheskaya baza, sotsial’nyi kontrol’ (Criminology: Theory, History, Empirical Base and Social Control)
(St. Petersburg: Piter, 2002), p. 278; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, Statisticheskii
Ezhegodnik Kazakhstana (Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan) (Almaty, 2002), p. 126; A. Samailov
(ed.), Kazakhstan 1991-2002 (Almaty, 2002), p. 195; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy, Statistuchnyi
Shchorichnyk Ukrainy 2005 (Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine 2005) (Kyiv: Konsultant 2006), pp. 515-516;
Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy (available online at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/).
* Data for 1991.
the task of looking for hard evidence of the suspect’s involvement in a serious
crime, that of proving his or her possession of illegal drugs — taking into consideration the minimal quantities specified in the by-laws (the ‘substantial quantity’ can
be as small as 0.0001 gram in the case of LSD) — seems far easier. A ‘thief-in-law’,
i.e., a highly respectable individual outlaw in the Russian milieu (their high status
makes it unnecessary for them to transgress the law on their own), witnesses:
M. Meese, ‘The Financial Front in the Global War on Terrorism’, in R. Howard and R. Sawyer (eds),
Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 58.
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
195
‘They (the police) put stealthily illegal drugs or weapons to many thieves (in-law)… I met here
(in prison) Khobot (another thief-in-law, A.O.), he didn’t ever smoke even hashish! Yet he was
sentenced to three years of prison. He was really furious: other thieves-in-law got six months
of prison at maximum in a similar situation. He doesn’t smoke even poppy, not to speak about
heroin. They pretend to have found heroin in his pocket…’ (October 2000, a high-security
prison in the region of Murmansk).
It is worth mentioning that the minimal quantities are specified by decrees of the
government, not by the law. They are subject to more frequent changes, thereby
providing the executive with a venue for exercising the power of labeling (Table 3).
Even the procedure for calculating the quantities varies. The ‘substantial’ and
‘very large’ quantities replaced ‘average’ ones in Russian law enforcement practices in 2006.
An analysis of the dynamics of the share of prisoners convicted of drug related
offences (Table 4) shows further divergence in the policies of law enforcement.
Chances of receiving a sentence in cases involving drug-related offences are higher
than average in Kazakhstan whereas in the Russian Federation such cases result in
a sentence less frequently than average. This divergence might be due to different
priorities set in police investigations, depending on the type of offense to variability
Table 3. Quantities of illegal drugs the possession of which leads to criminal prosecution,
selected illegal drugs, the Russian Federation, 2004 and 2006.
Quantities (g) May 2004
Average
Marijuana, dried
Marijuana, non-dried
Cocaine
LSD
Opium
Hashish
Heroin
2
14
0.15
0.0003
0.5
0.5
0.1
Quantities (g) February 2006
Substantial
Very large
6
n.a.
0.5
0.0001
1
2
0.5
100
n.a.
5
0.005
25
25
2.5
Sources: Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii No.231 ot 6.5.2004 ob utverzhdenii srednih
razovyh doz narkoricheskih i psikhotropnyh veshchestv dlya tselei statei 228, 228.1 and 229
Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Rossiiskoj Federatsii (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation
No.231 from May 5, 2004 on average doses of narcotic and psychotropic materials specified in Articles
228, 228.1 and 229 of Penal Code of the Russian Federation) and Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi
Federatsii No.76 ot 7.2.2006 ob utverzhdenii krupnogo i osobo krupnogo razmerov narkoricheskih i
psikhotropnyh veshchestv dlya tselei statei 228, 228.1 and 229 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No.76 from February 7, 2006 on
substantial and very large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic materials specified in Articles 228,
228.1 and 229 of Penal Code of the Russian Federation).
196
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
Table 4. Number of convicted, thousands, selected years.
1990
Russian
Federation
Including
convicted of
drug-related
offences
%
Kazakhstan
Including
convicted of
drug-related
offences
%
Ukraine
Including
convicted of
drug-related
offences
%
1995
1998
537.6 1035.8 1071.1
1999
2000
2001
2003
2005
1223.3
1183.6 1244.2 773.9
878.9
7
38.6
101.5
115.2
99.1
126.9
84.4
61.2
1.3
n.a.
n.a.
3.7
93
8.3
9.5
58.4
10.2
9.4
66.3
15
8.4
78
19.8
10.2
70.9
13
10.9
50.3
9.3
7
38.4
n.a.
n.a.
8.9
104.2 212.9
n.a.
n.a.
17.5
232.6
21.6
22.6
222.2
24.4
25.4
230.9
25
18.4
202.6
25.4
11
10.8
12.5
n.a.
n.a.
9.3
18.5 n.a.
201.1 176.9
30
32.3
14.9
18.3
Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, loc. cit., Table 10.6; Y. Gilinski, loc. cit.,
p. 279; Ministertstvo Vnutrennih Del, Prestupnost’ i pravonarusheniya: 1996-2000 (Crime and
Delinquency: 1996-2000) (Moscow, 2001), p. 156; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, loc.
cit., p. 127; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Kazakhstana
(Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan) (Almaty, 1999), pp. 110-111; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki
Ukrainy, loc. cit., p. 516; Derzhavnyi Komitet statistiki Ukrainy (available online at: http://www
.ukrstat.gov.ua/); Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Analiz stanu zdiisnennya sudochinstva sudamy zagal’noi
yurisdiksii v 2005 r. (Survey of court decisions in 2005) (Kyiv, 2005); Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Sudymist’
osib ta priznachennya mir kriminal’nogo pokarannya u 2003 r. (Convictions and criminal penalties in
2003) (Kyiv, 2003), Verkovnyi Sud Ukrainy, Rozglyad sudamy sprav pro zlochiny u sferi obigu
narkotuchnyh zasobiv u 2001-2002 r. (Legal practice in regard to drug-related offences) (Kyiv, 2002).
Estimated figures in italics (incomplete data on the number of some drug-related offences).
in the level of tolerance to particular delinquent acts. At any rate, the divergent
trends confirm that law enforcement in the area of drug-related offences depends
less on their nature than on priorities in social control and a number of other
external factors. In function of a particular context, the same use of drugs might or
might not lead to a sentence, all other things, e.g., the legal framework, being equal.
From the point of view of a drug user or addict, the chances of landing in prison
are the question of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ luck. Unlike professional criminals, they do not
see any reason in including prison in their ‘curriculum’ and they do not prepare
themselves for such ‘course’. After arriving in prison, they must start to adapt to a
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
197
new life and to learn new norms of behavior. Prison has its own ‘constitution’ composed of both formal and informal norms. The latter often contradict the former
(set in the Correctional Code, by-laws and internal regulations). Hence, a ­significant
part of the population — its relative size can be assessed with the help of Prison
Population Rate (PPR, the number of inmates per 100 000 of the national population) — lives under a constitution which departs from the official one (Table 5).
Prison subculture as an alternative system to officially imposed norms reaches
a high level of sophistication in post-Soviet countries, especially in Russia. Its origins go back to the 1930s, i.e., to the period of large-scale mass imprisonment in
labor camps. The administration was unable to control such large prison populations day and night. Informal leaders — organized in a hierarchy topped by
thieves-in-law24 — started to perform functions of everyday management and
Table 5. Relative size and composition of prison populations, 2006.
% of prisoners convicted of drug related crimes
Russian
Federation
Official
data
n.a.
% of female prisoners 7.0
19 years old or less
22.7
20-25 years old
26-30 years old
31-35 years old
53.6
36-40 years old
41-45 years old
46-50 years old
51-60 years old
1.3
61 years old and older
{
{
{
Republic of
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Survey
sample
Official
data
Survey
sample
Official
data
Survey
sample
6.4
19.7
15
27.2
22.9
11.9
9.4
6.3
3.4
3.5
0.3
n.a.
7.0
19.2
3.8
9
25.5
25.5
14.7
11.4
9
3.3
1.1
0.5
n.a.
6.3
5.1
12.5
22.2
1.6
24.4
31.1
20.7
10.9
5.2
2.6
2.1
1.6
n.a.
{
40.1
26.7
1.5
0.8
{
{
{
{
Sources: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, loc. cit., Table 10.10; R. Walmsley, World
Prison Population List (6th edition) (London: International Center for Prison Studies, 2006);
Derzhavna Penitentsiarna Sluzhba Ukrainy (available online at: http://www.kvs.gov.ua/peniten/
control/main/uk/index); International Centre For Prison Studies (available online at: http://www
.prisonstudies.org/). Dates of survey: Russian Federation, December 2005; Republic of Kazakhstan,
August 2006; Ukraine, September 2006; total number of prisoners: Russian Federation, 869 814;
Republic of Kazakhstan, 49 292; Ukraine, 165 716; PPR: Russian Federation, 611; Republic of
Kazakhstan, 340; Ukraine, 356.
24) See more on informal leaders and their justice in A. Oleinik, loc. cit., pp. 71-101.
198
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
conflict resolution enforcing particular norms, the ponyatiya. The ponyatiya
derived from criminal traditions and common sense (from this point of view, one
can argue that they lie close to the logic of natural law), in contrast to the codified
system of rules and norms imposed by the penitentiary administration.
In most cases those convicted of drug-related crimes serve their sentences
together with those convicted of other crimes. Even if the latter tend to be sent to
particular penitentiaries (e.g., specialized labor camps in Kazakhstan), the separation is never perfect. Professional criminals and other delinquents, including drug
users, interact on a daily basis. To adjust one’s actions to others’ behavior, they
need to refer to the same norms.
Officially imposed norms can hardly serve this purpose since inmates associate
them with punishment and lost freedom. For this reason, the rejection of official
norms characterizes everyday life of inmates in most total institutions,25 even if
drug users and drug addicts are housed separate from other delinquents. Social
action in prison appears embedded in the ponyatiya and the mechanisms for their
enforcement personified by informal leaders. ‘Action is “social” insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in
its course’.26 If both parties of a conflict respect the ponyatiya, this gives them a
chance for finding a common language and mutual understanding.
4. Comparing the Social Organization of Two Groups of Inmates
The idea of interiorization of the ponyatiya by everybody who has acquired experience of life in total institutions, which leads to the spread of a particular subculture in the society as a whole, seems neither new nor too radical. For instance, Yuri
Levada and his associates indicate that the experience of compulsory military service in the Soviet army contributed to re-socialization of young men in the sense
of their rejection of official values and norms. Recruits must learn to substitute
informal norms, this learning is commonly called dedovshchina (the priority of
submission to the older rather than the formal superior) in post-Soviet countries,
for official ones deriving from army regulations.27
The scope of this study does not allow me to analyze mechanisms of this resocialization in total institutions, specifically in prison. The question as to whether
25) I. Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
26) M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology Vol. 1 (New York, NY:
Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 4.
27) Y. Levada, Entre passé et l’avenir: L’homme soviétique ordinaire. Enquête (Paris: Presses de la
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), pp. 139-144, see also F. Daucé and E. SiecaKozlowski (eds), Dedovshchina in Post-Soviet Military: Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a
Comparative Perspective (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006).
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
199
the re-socialization results from ‘contamination’ of newcomers by their contact
with professional criminals28 or from the institutional organization of total institutions, e.g. particular characteristics of power relationships causing the rejection
of official authority by those subject to it,29 calls for additional inquiries. My task
will simply consist in testing the hypothesis about the similarity of social organization of two groups of inmates: those convicted of drug-related crimes and those
convicted of all other crimes combined.
The separation between the two groups is never perfect. They partly overlap in
at least three manners. First, drug users often commit other offenses, e.g., thefts, in
order to sustain their drug habit. According to the Cambridge Study in Delinquent
Development, drug use is one predictor of a criminal career.30 In the UK, 65% of
all arrestees tested positive for drugs in 1999-2002.31 In the reported study, the percentage of respondents convicted of other crimes in addition to drug-related ones
varies from 5% (in Kazakhstan) to 21% (in Russia in 2003).
Second, as in the above discussed case of the thief-in-law, non-drug users can
nevertheless be sentenced for drug-related offences. The procedure chosen for
placing the respondent in one of the two groups, when the group of drug offenders
is composed exclusively of those who have only an illegal drug-related sentence,
addresses the first of these issues only partly (addressing the second would require
access to the personal data of convicts), which somewhat limits validity of
reported findings.
The level of measurement of several variables relevant for testing this hypothesis is nominal, which explains the use of chi-square (χ2) statistics, unsophisticated and imperfect, yet the most appropriate measure of association or the lack
thereof between the membership in one of the two groups of prisoners and a
series of social indicators describing the organization of everyday interactions.
Statistically significant values of χ2 are reported separately for sections of the
tables corresponding to particular countries (i.e., the unit of analysis is the group
of convicts in a particular country, individual convicts being the unit of observation). The choice of χ2 statistics can be further justified by the fact that I aim to
demonstrate the absence of association, whereas the ‘null hypothesis’ states that
28) This thesis is explored in V. Anisimkov, loc. cit.
29) See A. Oleinik, loc. cit.
30) D. Farrington, J. Coid, L. Harnett, D. Jolliffe, N. Soteriou, R. Turner and D. West, ‘Criminal Careers
and Life Success: New Findings From the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Behavior’, Findings Volume
281 (London: The Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2006).
31) K. Holloway, T. Bennett and C. Lower, ‘Trends in Drug Use and Offending: the Results of the
NEW-ADAM Programme 1999-2002’, Findings Volume 219 (London: The Home Office, Research,
Development and Statistics Directorate, 2004).
200
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
the association exists (χ2 statistics are powerful enough to detect the association
yet it fails to assess its strength and direction).
Let us examine whether the social indicators show statistically significant variability between the two groups of prisoners in all four cases (I consider results of
the two surveys conducted in Russian prisons separately for the sake of increasing
the reliability of findings). For instance, both drug offenders and other offenders
equally reject the system of official authority (members of the penitentiary administration are vested in this type of authority). Their willingness to take part in mass
protest actions does not vary across the groups (Table 6). Only in one case (the
Ukrainian sample) the modal answer is ‘no’,32 whereas in the three other cases a
majority of respondents from both groups declare their readiness to join mass
protest actions either unconditionally or on the condition that they are led by
persons respectable in the prison milieu. It is worth noting the projective character of this question: such actions are explicitly prohibited by the law (Article 321
‘Disorganization of the work of penitentiary institutions’ of the Penal Code of the
Russian Federation; Article 392 of the Penal Code of Ukraine and Article 361 of the
Penal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The readiness to participate in prison
riots mainly serves as a proxy indicator for the perception of official authority and
the degree of obedience/disobedience to its representatives.
A second indicator useful for evaluating the perception of official authority
refers to the level of trust in the penitentiary administration. Both Russian surveys
show no statistically significant difference between the group convicted of
drug related crimes and that of other convicts (Table 7; here and in what follows
Table 6. Are you ready to take part in mass protest actions? % of valid responses.
Russia
2003
Russia
2000-2001
Kazakhstan
2001
Ukraine
2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 76* N = 320 N = 26* N = 182
Yes
Itdepends on
requirements
Itdepends on
participants
No
Don’t know
Missing
17.39
39.13
22.65
39.23
2.13
51.06
12.86
50.43
13.16
67.11
14.01
53.19
3.85
30.77
3.43
16
21.74
6.63
14.89
10.57
6.58
10.51
3.85
1.71
8.69
13.04
4.35
13.26
18.23
4.97
19.15
12.77
4.26
13.43
12.71
2.86
2.63
10.53
0
10.19
12.10
1.91
42.31
19.23
0
60.57
18.29
4
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
32) The analysis of some other indicators also suggests the ‘deviant’ character of the Ukrainian case.
This might be due to particularities of the sample in Ukraine mentioned in Section 2.
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
201
Table 7. Do you trust the prison administration? % of valid responses.
Russia 2003
Yes
No
Missing
Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001
Ukraine 2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720
N = 76*
N = 320 N = 26* N = 182
36.36
63.64
9.09
17.81**
82.19
4.11
28.62
71.38
5.26
22.7
77.3
16.56
27.66
72.34
4.26
19.23
80.77
6.51
40***
60
30
73.53
26.47
7.06
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 3.5 at p = 0.06.
*** χ2 = 9.57 at p = 0.002.
statistically significant differences are indicated in italics). In Kazakhstan and
Ukraine the two groups differ (in the former case — at the margin of statistical
significance), yet, somewhat counterintuitively, drug users tend to trust the prison
administration even less than other convicts! They seem to exercise a kind of retribution toward official authorities for the arbitrary definition of their crime. The
question of institutional trust at the higher level, namely trust in the national government, has the same pattern of responses (Table 8): convicts for drug-related
crimes either do not differ from the rest of the prison population or trust the government even less than their fellow inmates.
As for the endorsement of the ponyatiya (the alternative to the official norms
imposed by state representatives) by the informal leaders in the prison milieu,
convicts for drug-related crimes are again on the same side as the rest of the prison
population. For instance, they appear in full support of one of the key elements of
the informal constitution of life in reclusion, the norm ‘Don’t do anything that
might be harmful to all of us’ (Table 9).33 The respect given to the unofficial constitution at the expense of the official one is further exemplified by the high level
of trust in the informal leaders. Members of both groups of respondents trust the
informal leaders more than members of the prison administration in all countries
except Ukraine (Table 10). Only in one case (the 2000-2001 Russian survey) there
is a statistically significant difference in the level of support given to the informal
leaders between the two groups.
More general social indicators, like the level of generalized trust (the percentage of those who believe that ‘people in general can be trusted’) and the level of
trust in fellow inmates (the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates the lack
thereof), also show a high degree of agreement between members of the two
groups. Except for Ukraine, where convicts for drug-related crimes trust other
33) For a list of particular ponyatiya and the level of support that inmates give to each of them see V.
Anisimkov, loc. cit., p. 28; A. Oleinik, loc. cit., p. 80.
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A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
Table 8. Do you trust the government? % of valid responses.
Russia 2003
Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001 Ukraine 2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720
Yes
10.53
No
89.47
Missing 26.32
6.88
93.12
18.75
4.17
95.83
2.08
11.18
88.82
8.76
N = 76* N = 320 N = 26*
5.33** 20.07
94.67 79.93
1.33
8.84
N = 182
17.39*** 37.42
82.61
62.58
13.04
11.66
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 9.5 at p = 0.0025.
*** χ2 = 3.56 at p = 0.059.
Table 9. Do you agree with the principle that “One should not do anything that might be
harmful to all of us”? % of valid responses.
Russia 2003
Yes
No
Missing
Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001
Ukraine 2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49*
N = 720 N = 76* N = 320
N = 26* N = 182
91.3
8.7
4.35
92.68
7.32
19.8
92
8
4
88
12
13.77
93.18
6.82
11.36
98.63
1.37
4.11
97.1
2.9
15.94
93.17
6.83
13.04
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
Table 10. ‘Do you trust the informal leaders? % of valid responses’.
Russia 2003
Russia 2000-2001
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49*
Yes
50
No
50
Missing 71.43
55.86
44.14
31.03
25.64**
74.36
25.64
Kazakhstan 2001 Ukraine 2003
N = 720
N = 76*
N = 320 N = 26* N = 182
45.6
54.4
15.2
46.48
53.52
7.04
45.33
54.67
10.73
18.18
81.82
18.18
12.95
87.05
30.94
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 5.92 at p = 0.015.
people and fellow inmates less than convicts for other crimes, there are no statistically significant differences between them (Tables 11 and 12). These findings confirm the commonsense wisdom that prison teaches mistrust; after all, this is the
major lesson of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Not surprisingly, prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes do not necessarily
believe that life outside prison walls is easier than in reclusion. After learning rules
of a new game, they gain the full rights of citizenship in the prison community.
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
203
Table 11. Do you believe people in general can be trusted? % of valid responses.
Russia 2003
Yes
No
Missing
Russia 2000-2001
Kazakhstan 2001
Ukraine 2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720
N = 76* N = 320
N = 26* N = 182
9.09
90.91
9.09
14.67
85.33
1.33
4.35** 25.82
95.65
74.18
13.04
0
14.84
85.16
4.4
10.2
89.8
0
15.75
84.25
4.05
20.28
79.72
9.97
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 5.25 at p = 0.022.
Table 12. Do you trust other inmates in this penitentiary? % of valid responses.
Russia 2003
N = 24*
Yes
27.27
No
45.46
Don’t know 27.27
Missing
9.09
Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001
Ukraine 2003
N = 190
N = 49*
N = 720
N = 24*
N = 190
N = 49* N = 720
25.53
35.11
39.36
1.06
16.33
53.06
30.61
0
14.79
43.24
41.97
1.41
11.84
38.16
50
0
15.43
43.09
41.48
2.89
7.69** 23.33
61.54 40.56
30.77 36.11
0
1.11
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 5.1 at p = 0.078.
Results of the 2000-2001 Russian survey deserve a more detailed discussion in this
regard. On the one hand, they indicate the only instance of statistically significant
difference between the two groups in answers to the question as to whether life is
easier in reclusion than outside prison walls (Table 13). On the other hand, the same
survey shows that 88% of convicts for drug-related crimes believe that they can
influence decisions taken in prison compared with 70.4% of convicts in the second
group who share this opinion (the difference is not statistically significant).
The reported similarities in the organization of everyday life of both groups
might raise doubts on the validity of the assumption that the group convicted of
drug-related crimes is mostly composed of delinquents who landed in prison
because of ‘bad luck’ as opposed to career criminals. Nevertheless, the composition of the 2000-2001 Russian sample, the most representative of the four, suggests
that newcomers represent indeed an absolute majority of this group of respondents (Table 14).
The structure of the sample in Kazakhstan gives a completely different picture:
here recidivists for whom the current sentence is fourth, fifth or sixth form a
modal group among those convicted for drug-related crimes. This fact brings us
back to the discussion of particularities of enforcement of anti-drug laws in
204
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
Table 13. Do you believe that life is easier in prison than outside prison walls?
% of valid responses.
Russia 2003
Russia 2000-2001 Kazakhstan 2001
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49*
Yes
27.27
No
72.73
Missing 9.09
27.67
72.33
19.5
N = 720 N = 24* N = 190
17.02** 30.69
82.98
69.31
4.25
7.78
20
80
1.33
26.1
73.9
8.48
Ukraine 2003
N = 49*
N = 720
37.5
62.5
8.33
38.73
61.27
5.2
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 3.92 at p = 0.048.
Table 14. Is the current sentence your first prison term? % of valid responses.
Russia
2003
Yes
No, 2nd
No, 3rd
No, 4th 5th etc.
Missing
Russia
2000-2001
Kazakhstan
2001
Ukraine
2003
N = 24* N = 190 N = 49* N = 720 N = 24*
N = 190 N = 49* N = 720
58.33
20.83
12.5
8.33
0
32.75
25.44
22.3
19.51
11.5
65.73
22.47
8.43
3.37
6.74
60**
17.5
17.5
5
22.5
35.15
29.48
17.69
17.69
63.26
10.53***
25
30.26
34.21
0
30.77
34.62
26.92
7.69
0
22.93
36.93
23.57
16.56
15.92
* Group of prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
** χ2 = 11.48 at p = 0.009.
*** χ2 = 17.9 at p = 0.0005.
Kazakhstan. Here chances of being sent to jail for a drug-related offence are higher
than in the two other post-Soviet countries. More rigorous policies of law enforcement and attempts to segregate convicts for drug-related crimes from other criminals in specialized camps do not prevent the former, in the period of time under
consideration, from interiorizing norms of the prison subculture during their multiple yet short-term stays in prison (62% of sentences in this group of respondents
do not exceed 2 years compared with only 6.6% of such sentences in the second
group of respondents in Kazakhstan). In short, the two groups of respondents
have different legal status and profiles in Kazakhstan too, yet their social profiles
nevertheless converge.
5. Conclusion: Should States De-Criminalize Drug Use?
This article offers a tentative demonstration of the thesis that prison re-socializes
individuals convicted of drug-related crimes. As a result of serving their prison
terms, the behavior of convicts becomes uniform regardless of the nature of the
A. Oleinik / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 185–206
205
crimes that they committed. Individuals convicted of drug-related crimes and
thieves or murderers refer to the ponyatiya and interiorize the values of the prison
subculture. Instead of being rehabilitated, drug users get closer to the traditional
criminal milieu. The arbitrariness in the enforcement of anti-drug laws further
aggravates the situation.
The findings of this study can be generalized to individuals convicted of other
types of victimless crimes and, even more generally, to any newcomers in the
prison milieu. As time in reclusion passes, they acquire characteristics specific to
the behavior of career criminals. A common solution to this problem — separate
detention of different classes of detainees — does not suffice, arguably (as the
case of Kazakhstan suggests). On the one hand, inmates interact on many occasions (for instance, separation can hardly be achieved in pretrial detention or during transfers between prisons). On the other hand, all inmates, regardless of the
nature of their crimes, are subject to the same institutional constraints, alienated
official authority being one of them.
The article focuses on the example of the three post-Soviet countries, Russia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The post-Soviet countries have a very similar legal
framework in regard to illegal drug use. However, the proposed overview of their
policies aimed at enforcing anti-drug laws shows divergent paths. The chances of
being sent to prison because of drug-related offences are higher in Kazakhstan (as
of the first half of the 2000s) than in Ukraine and especially in Russia. Accordingly,
Kazakhstan has the highest share of prisoners convicted of drug-related offences
in the total prison population.
These differences seem especially noteworthy taking into consideration similarities in the cultural background of the three countries and their common ‘point
of departure’ (the Soviet system of justice and law enforcement). The divergent
paths in law enforcement indicate that the amount and type of punishment
depends less on the nature of the delinquent act itself, as ‘natural law’ or the ‘economics of crime and punishment’34 would suggest, than on the particular socioeconomic context and priorities set by state representatives in a more or less
arbitrary manner. The arbitrariness in the application of anti-drug laws and the
re-socializing effects of prison prevent the rehabilitation of drug users and complicate their return to normal life instead of facilitating it. Findings about the
impact of partisan politics on variability in state-level law enforcement practices
in the USA35 indicate that the discrepancy between the nature of the offence and
the amount of punishment is not a country-specific phenomenon.
34) The economics of crime and punishment assumes that ‘some individuals become criminals
because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking into account
of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment’ (G.S. Becker,
‘Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior’, 101 Journal of Political Economy (1993),
385-409, at p. 390).
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While the first stages of the demonstration had a descriptive character, the next
stage involved the tentative analysis of the organization of social life of two groups
of inmates, those sentenced for drug-related crimes and those sentenced for other
crimes. The research hypothesis consists in assuming the lack of significant differences in the social organization of the two groups. The collected data do not refute
it, which means that drug users interiorize norms of the prison subculture and
undergo re-socialization during their stay in prison. Prison teaches mistrust, especially of official authorities. It also teaches how to refer to illicit norms (the ponyatiya) instead of the law in organizing everyday interactions and solving conflicts.
A research design with elements of a cohort study seems desirable to assess the
degree of durability of new orientations and ‘habitus’ acquired by drug users in
reclusion. Such a study would help assess the impact of the experience of incarceration on their life after release from prison (or, speaking more realistically,
between consecutive imprisonments). Do they continue to refer to norms and
values of the prison subculture in their life outside prison walls? Does their ‘drift
into delinquency’, to use David Matza’s expression,36 only strengthen as a result of
their stay in prison?
There exists an alternative explanation for the reported findings. The similarity
in the social organization of the two groups can be attributed to the spread of
criminal values and norms in the post-Soviet society as a whole. If this is true, then
one can familiarize him or herself with the prison subculture even prior to going
to prison. A deep mistrust in the government and official authorities, the substitution of informal norms for laws and the other elements of the prison subculture
then characterize the behavior of first-time offenders — and also the general
population. A large-scale survey research conducted on nationally representative
samples would be needed to test this hypothesis.37
The preceding analysis had a normative dimension: it indicates that criminalization of illegal drug use has numerous side-effects that are ignored or not taken seriously into consideration by policymakers. Instead of contributing to the creation of
a better society, criminalization of illegal drug use widens the gap between the state
and some groups of the population. Hence, a priority given to minimizing harm
rather than to maximizing benefits seems to be a better approach towards answering the question as to what degree the state should criminalize illegal drug use.
Approaches not involving incarceration38 seem promising from this point of view.
35) T. Stucky, K. Heimer and J. Lang, ‘A Bigger Piece of the Pie? State Corrections Spending and the
Politics of Social Order’, 44 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency (2007), 91-123.
36) D. Matza, Delinquency and Drift (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990).
37) For a first attempt to explore it, see A. Oleinik, loc. cit.
38) Including strategies of legalization of currently extralegal and criminal practices, see, for instance,
H. de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).