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The "New World Order" and International Security
After the Gulf War: An Assessment
Amitav Acharya
Department of Political Science
National University of Singapore
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"The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic
period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times...a new world order - can emerge: a new era, freeer
from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in
which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony."
(President George Bush, Address to Congress, 11 September 1990)
Soon after President George Bush committed US forces to the Gulf in response to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, he asserted that the crisis would test his commitment to a "New World Order".i
The concept was not entirely novel. It had evolved in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the retreat
of Soviet power from Third World regional conflict theatres. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was clearly a
watershed in the transition of the international system from the Cold War era. The Iraqi aggression was
clearly the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. It was also seen, as a New York Times editorial put it,
"to be most important as the precedent for how the post-Cold War world manages trouble".ii
Thus, the American response to the Gulf crisis assumed significance amidst widespread hopes and
expectations for fundamental changes to the Cold War international security milieu. The New World Order
was supposed to differ from the Old in three crucial respects.
First, the pervasive superpower competition of the Cold War era was supposed to give way to close
understanding and cooperation between the US and the then Soviet Union in curbing the arms race and
resolving regional conflicts. In the Cold War era, superpower competition defined the geopolitical faultlines
in many volatile parts of the Third World. But President Gorbachev's "new thinking" on regional conflicts
had led to the progressive settlement of a number of regional conflict situations, including those in
Southern Africa, Afghanistan and Central America, in which Soviet-supported regimes were challenged by
anti-communist rebellions financed and armed by the US.iii But until the Gulf crisis, U.S.-Soviet regional
security cooperation had been limited to resolving existing conflicts, rather than creating a broad
framework of understanding and mutual support to contain and control new conflicts, especially those
conflicts caused by Third World states seeking regional domination. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait thus
provided the first real opportunity for the 11111joint management of a regional conflict by the
superpowers.
A second expectation regarding change to the Cold War security system concerned international
institutions for conflict management. In the Old Order, the US viewed the United Nations with suspicion and
hostility as a radical platform for pro-Soviet forces in the Third World, while the Soviets exploited the
anti-Americanism of its Third World majority for political advantage without making any contribution to its
peacemaking and peacekeeping roles. The New World Order espoused the revival of the doctrine of
collective security.iv Hopes for this was especially strong in the wake of the UN's successful mediation and
peacekeeping role in a number of regional conflicts, including Afghanistan conflict, the Iran-Iraq War and
the issue of Namibian independence. Brian Urquhart, a former top UN official, looked forward to the day
when "a small nation that believes itself to be threatened can come to the UN Security Council and get both
reassurance and, if necessary, practical measures to guarantee its security, instead of making desperate
measures of its own".v
Third, the essential bipolarity of the international security system of the Cold War Order was
supposed to give way to a multipolar New World Order. Underlying this assumption was a belief in the
relative decline of both the superpowers, coinciding with the "arrival" of Japan and Germany as principal
actors in world politics on the basis of their economic power and potential.
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What sort of an order is emerging from the America's historic victory in the Arabian desert? What
are the lessons of the Gulf crisis and the events since then for those hopes and assumptions which had
emerged regarding fundamental changes to the old security order prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait? This
paper seeks to provide some tentative answers.
Superpower Cooperation
What are the lessons of the Gulf War for the hopes concerning the first element of Bush's New
World Order? The Gulf War was clearly a milestone in the evolving security cooperation between the US
and the Soviet Union. A number of aspects of the this during the Gulf crisis are worth highlighting:
1. A joint statement by Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
in Moscow condemning the Iraqi invasion. This is the first joint declaration by the superpowers in which the
Soviets publicly condemned a treaty ally, Iraq;
2. Moscow's support for sanctions and other measures against Iraq adopted by the UN at the
urging of the US;.
3. The summit meeting between President Gorbachev and President Bush in Helsinki which served
to dramatise the new superpower understanding over regional security issues;
4. Moscow's refusal to fall for Saddam Hussein's overtures seeking Soviet backing, or at least to
secure a more neutral stand by Moscow on the conflict;
5. U.S. acceptance of a Soviet political and security role in the Middle East after successfully
excluding it from the Middle East peace process since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Washington has even
hinted that it would not oppose a Soviet military presence in the Gulf;
6. The offers by the Soviet military and the KGB to provide the U.S. with vital information regarding
the capabilities of weapons sold to Iraq and other Iraqi military secrets.
Despite such efforts at collaboration, it was clear that Moscow's stakes in the Gulf crisis were quite
different from Washington's.vi For one thing, the Soviet Union had actually something to gain from the Gulf
crisis. The steep increase in oil prices provided the USSR with significant increases in its oil revenues. It had
opened the way for major Soviet diplomatic gains: by coincidence steeped in considerable irony, Moscow
has managed to restore almost simultaneously diplomatic relations with the two key regional actors, Saudi
Arabia and Israel. The Gulf crisis provided Moscow with an additional opportunity to prove to the world that
the Gorbachev era represented a qualitatively different phase in Soviet geopolitical thinking and action. It
also prompted the Soviet Union to reiterate its proposals to strengthen the UN collective security system,
which would in turn allow the Soviet Union to continue to play a major role in world affairs, despite the
virtual loss of its superpower status.
The initial understanding between the superpowers masked major areas of difference. Moscow
clearly indicated that its participation in military operations against Iraq would be strictly within the UN
framework. The long-term strategic objectives of the two countries seemed to diverge, as Moscow
indicated its disapproval of the U.S. concept of a "regional security structure" in the Middle East. Later,
Moscow pushed vigorously for a political settlement to the crisis in a way that appeared to contradict U.S.
goals. As the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal approached, the differences between the two superpowers
was such that it seemed to affect other areas of cooperation. Some claimed that it was a return to the Cold
War maneuvering. Moscow's assertion of independence might have been reassuring to those who feared a
post-Cold War collusion between the superpowers. But it also served as a powerful reminder that the
competitive influence-seeking in regional troublespots in the Third World, which marked the Cold War
order, may not entirely be a thing of the past in the New World Order.
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The subsequent demise of the Soviet Union marks a further blow to Bush's blueprint for joint
superpower management of regional conflicts. While Russia has replaced the former Soviet Union at the UN
Security Council and as the co-chairman of Middle East peace talks, Russia's internal problems and limited
influence in the Third World undermine its worth as a security partner of the US as envisaged by the New
World Order concept.
The Role of the United Nations
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN had scored impressive successes in negotiating peace
agreements in a number of regional conflicts, especially in the Gulf itself (the Iran-Iraq War), Afghanistan,
and Southern Afirca (Namibia).vii But in each of the previous cases, the UN was merely a facilitator of
agreements which resulted from superpower rapprochement, rather than a provider of "collective security"
through punitive measures, such as sanctions, and their enforcement through military means. It was the
Gulf crisis which provided the context of the first real test of the collective security role of the United
Nations.
In this respect, the invasion of Kuwait assumed particular importance as it is the first case before
the UN involving the forceful annexation of one member country by another. In many respects, the UN
response to the Gulf crisis is a significant milestone in the history of the organisation. At the outset, the
Security Council achieved a rare consensus in unequivocally condemning the Iraqi aggression. But more
importantly, on 6 August, it agreed on the most comprehensive package of mandatory economic sanctions
ever imposed on a country. Later, it agreed to authorise the use of force to enforce such sanctions, the first
time the UN has approved such action since the Korean war.
But the UN's response was also marked
by significant failures. Its effort to secure the release of the large number of hostages in Kuwait and Iraq did
not borne fruit. Nor did the UN achieve any breakthrough in peacemaking over the basic of the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait. More significantly, the initial US pressure on the UN gave the impression that the
world body was being manipulated for the narrow strategic purpose of a superpower. Although the US
sought to inject a degree of legitimacy to its actions by seeking UN endorsement, in the final analysis, the
Bush Administration pursued its strategic options irrespective of the UN mandate. The US reserved the right
to unilateral action to launch a military strike against Iraq if, for example, American hostages are harmed by
Iraq. As Richard Falk put it:
...behind this formal mandate from the United Nations [to the US approach to the Gulf crisis] lie extremely
serious questions about whether the Un has been true to its own Charter, and to the larger
purposes of peace and justice that it was established to serve. And beyond these concerns is the
disturbing impression that the United Nations has been converted into a virtual tool of US foreign
policy, thus compromising its future credibility, regardless of how the Gulf crisis turns out".viii
To be sure, in the unique context of the Iraqi invasion, which aroused the near universal revulsion
of the international community, the UN proved to be an attractive framework for channelling the collective
international anger into a potent instrument of conflict management. But the consensus achieved over the
Iraqi act would not be easily duplicated, and in this sense mere superpower cooperation was insufficient as
a foundation on which to build an era of globalism spearheaded by the UN. As a former US ambassador saw
it, even in the absence of superpower rivalry,
UN conflict-resolution and peace keeping activities will continue to be limited by power relationships, by
bloc activities and in particular the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as and in
addition to great power rivalries. Regional powers, and the various voting blocs in the UN, will
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continue to make their influence felt."ix
The system of collective security envisaged after World War II was supposed to feature regional
arrangements in a complimentary role, as "stepping stones" to world order. x Like the UN's collective
security and conflict-resolution role, the sanctity and viability of regionalist doctrines, and the
crisis-management role of the Arab League were put to test by the Iraqi invasion. At issue was the question
whether regionalism could to be counted either as an alternative or a supplement to other instruments of
conflict-control in the post-Cold War era.
At the end, the Gulf war severely undermined faith in the ability of regional organisations to contain
and peacefully resolve regional conflicts. The regionalist position was zealously upheld by King Hussein of
Jordan, who relentlessly pressed for an "Arab solution" to the conflict. Yet neither the King nor any other
regional actors came up with a formula that would provide an acceptable framework for settlement. The
Iraqi invasion was a blatant violation of the principle of non-intervention that theoretically forms the core of
the basic norms of the League's professed regional collective security system. It was precisely the kind of
intra-regional conflict that regional bodies like the League were designed to prevent, control and resolve.
Yet the crisis not only proved to be beyond the mediation authority of the League, but led to its de facto
disintegration.
At its first meeting held after the Iraqi invasion, the League failed to produce a consensus, with 7
out of 21 members voting against a resolution asking for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. At the next
meeting, 12 League members voted to support the UN embargo against Iraq, endorsed Saudi Arabia's
decision to allow U.S. troops on its soil, and agreed to send a joint Arab defence force to Saudi Arabia to
counter the threat posed by Iraq. This move was strongly opposed by Iraq, Libya and the PLO.
The main lessons of the Arab League's handling of the Gulf crisis point to several limitations for
regional organisations in so far as their peacemaking role in international disputes is concerned. The
League's supposed function in providing stable and effective legal norms and judicial procedures for
conflict-resolution was far from evident. The second was the failure of conflict-management and mediation.
Apart from the limited effort by its secretary-general at the beginning of the crisis, the League played no
mediating role in the crisis. Instead, mediation efforts focused on the individual roles of President Mubarak
and King Hussein, a sort of lone wolf. The Arab League also fell victim to the familiar weakness of regional
groups, namely manipulation by their dominant member(s) seeking to fulfil a parochial objective. Thus, on
behalf of an anti-Saddam coalition, Egypt managed to manipulate the Arab League to send an Arab Force to
Saudi Arabia. Fourthly, the Gulf crisis also undermined faith in the ability of regional groups to ensure
conflict-isolation. The League proved to be an exceptionally weak champion of regional autonomy from
extra-regional Great Powers. The irony here is a major one; the Arab League, traditionally a source of
virulent anti-Americanism over the U.S. backing of Israel, is now playing a key role in providing indirect
legitimacy to U.S. strategic goals in the region. This comes at a time when the U.S. is acting against a major
Arab power championing the sacred Arab objective of liberating Palestine from Israeli occupation.
Two other regional groups also either fell by the wayside or suffered serious erosion of credibility as
a result of the Gulf crisis. Of these, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was meant to promote cooperation
between Egypt, Yemen and Iraq, while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was more of an alliance directed
against Iran at the outset of its war with Iraq. It is a matter of profound irony that while the former partners
of the ACC are now arch-enemies of the region, the latter lost one of its members to invader without
putting up any resistance. The GCC's much-vaunted mechanism for collective defence, which had been a
key element of its response to the Iran-Iraq war, failed to measure up to its first major test. However, the
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GCC should not be entirely blamed for this. The grouping had from the outset been intended as a bulwark
against internal subversion, rather than outright aggression such as that inflicted by Iraq on Kuwait.
The performance of regional forums in the Gulf war was a serious indictment of the main regionalist
premise that neighbours sharing historical, cultural and other affinities can best understand the
complexities of a local crisis and offer mediation and assistance to contain and resolve it. The Gulf crisis
showed the political divisions and consequently lack of impartiality that would vitiate regional
conflict-control measures.
International Security in an "Unipolar World"
Among the most significant casualties of the US victory in Operation Desert Storm is the view of the
so-called American "declinists" who acaepted Paul Kennedy's thesis concerning America's "imperial
overstretch". To their opponents, the US victory clearly testified to the preponderance of American power
and justified its claim to be the "keeper" of order in the international system.
According to this view, the Gulf War tested and proved the preeminence of both the "Hard" and
"Soft" side of American power. xi The "hard power" element was the impressive and effective
demonstration of America's global power projection capabilities and its ability to overwhelm one of the
most heavily armed regimes in the Third World. None of the previous tests of the U.S. ability to intervene in
regional conflicts, a list which includes interventions in Grenada and Panama, were as serious as the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. The prompt arrival of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring Gulf states not
only deterred any Iraqi move beyond Kuwait, (although the Pentagon's accomplishments were marred by
its failure to apply its doctrine of preemption when warnings of an Iraqi build-up had been evidentxii) but
also in dissuading Saddam Hussein of any hope that he might get away with his fait accompli without dire
consequences. Later, it succeeded in securing Iraq's eviction from Kuwait.
The "soft" side has revolved around a painstaking effort by George Bush to raise and maintain
collective opposition to expansionist Iraqi power on two levels. The first was a regional coalition with Egypt
and Saudi Arabia acting as linchpins. Such a front helped dilute the political fallout from the presence of U.S.
forces in the region, and countered the impression that the crisis is an Iraq-U.S. problem. The second was
securing support from America's Western allies. The level of support was all the more impressive, given that
historically, the Western alliance has found it difficult to reach a consensus on conflicts beyond the
geostrategic perimeters of the European theatre. In the Gulf War, U.S. was successful in securing from its
allies support in two crucial areas: first, securing financial support from rich allies (such as Japan and
Germany) for its operations, as well as help for those Arab countries most affected by the crisis; and second,
securing military contributions from those allies willing and able to make them.
Sceptics may find numerous problems with such reasoning and interpretation of the lessons of the
Gulf War. In so far as hard power is concerned, the euphoria concerning "perfect operation" should be
tempered by the fact that the Gulf had for long been earmarked as a most likely theatre for U.S. military
operations, and assigned a place in US strategic planning second only to Europe. Washington had
traditionally regarded it as a arena vital to its interests, and those of the Westxiii and successive American
Presidents since World War II had committed U.S. power and prestige in the arena because of the region's
historical, economic, strategic and political importance to the U.S.xiv America's ability to respond to regional
conflict situations in the Third World had been revitalised by two earlier Gulf crises: the Iranian revolution
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed, the swift and impressive demonstration of U.S. power
projection capacity was hardly surprising.xv It is also worth keeping in mind the unique attributes of the Gulf
as a theatre of military operations, especially terrain conditions favouring air power and the cooperation of
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the Gulf Cooperation Council members in providing unrestricted access to facilities for US forces.
With respect to soft power, here again some caution is in order in assessing the significance of the
Bush administration's coalition-building exercise. Problems and challenges to coalition-building were many.
The allied response to American calls for military contributions was at best a mixed response. Britain and
France contributed the most troops -- 13,000 troops from France and 15,000 troops from Britain. Most
other allies, constrained by lack of resources and/or political will, made token or no contributionsxvi. In
addition, U.S. efforts to carve out an out-of-area role for NATO deliberations over out-of area roles for
NATO proved futile in the face of "Europeanists", led by France, which reject transatlantic fora such as
NATO in favour of indigenous European institutions such as the Western European Union, or the ECxvii.
Even more important, the roles expected of Japan and Germany in the Gulf crisis and war proved
elusive. The Gulf war presented a significant test of the potential role of Japan and Germany in Third World
conflicts, coming as it did at a time when the Cold War constraints on Japan's and Germany's security roles
had become increasingly obsolete. The U.S. took the opportunity provided by the Iraqi invasion to
persuade the two emergent global powers to assume a greater share of the burden of ensuring
international security and order according to the American blue-print. It sought both financial and military
support from Germany and Japan. In the case of the former, the effort was generally successful, (after initial
disappointment over US $2 billion from Germany and US $4 billion from Japan). But American policymakers
clearly expected more.
In terms of military contribution, the allied record was less impressive. Germany's stated intention
to amend its basic law so that it can send forces outside the NATO area, which would have been one of the
most significant results of the Gulf crisis, did not materialise. In Japan, a proposal by Prime Minister Kaifu to
create a United Nations Peace Cooperation Force which might provide non-combat support for Western
forces in the Gulf had to be aborted in the face of severe domestic and some regional (especially Chinese)
opposition.
Despite, or perhaps because of, these limitations of the Bush administration's coalition-building
exercise, sections of the American policy-making community were quick to proclaim the advent of an
"unipolar world". Arguing that unipolarity should be given due recognition in the formulation of US foreign
policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Charles Krauthammer, perhaps the most outspoken advocate of
unipolarity, contends:
We have entered a period of Pax Americana. Why deny it? Every other nation would like to be in America's
position. Why be embarrassed by it?xviii
The claims regarding "unipolarity" are even more subject to skepticism than the arguments of the
"revivalists". Economic factors could be the final determinant of polarity in the post-Cold War international
system, notwithstanding the claims about the "remilitarisation" of international relations in the wake of the
Gulf war. As Pfaff put it: "Trying to order its [the Middle East region's] torbulence, or that of other regions of
the Third World through military measures (which is what the `one superpower' idea seems to imply) is not
very promising undertaking for a nation whose standard of living is threatened by the economic efficiency
and technological inventiveness of its Japanese and European rivals."xix Indeed, both Japan and Germany
are likely to actively resist the idea of a unipolar international system, a resistance which the economically
weaker U.S. might not be able to overcome.xx
But taken together, the arguments of both the "revivalists" and "unipolarists" contain at least two
major implications for the prospective role of American military power in the Third World. The first
concerns the virtual absence of a power projection balance in the international system. The Gulf war was
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proof, as argued by former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, that the US was "the only ones really able
to project power on a large scale".xxi In the absence of a countervailing power, the New World Order may
lead to a situation where Third World may lack effective means of resistance to American unilateralism.
Thus, the ability of Third World states to maximise regional autonomy would be seriously compromised.
Second, the US conduct during the Gulf War prompted some analysts, echoed by Third World
countries such as Malaysia and India, to voice a concern that "the New World Order may turn out to be an
attempt to re-establish `the American Century' in military terms, as the American economic and industrial
dominance of the last 50 years is lost".xxii While this may seem a bit too far-fetched, it is reasonable to
assume that US decisions relating to need for intervention in Third World regional conflicts would remained
tied to its own conception of "vital interests". This implies a great measure of unilateralism in US
interventionist posture, since:
Vital interests lie in a continuum that starts with geopolitics (regional stability, oil flow) and extends to
concepts like the national reputation for consistency and the investment of national and
presidential prestige. By definition, vital interests are those that cannot be left to the discretion of
others and which justify Washington in deciding how to assert them in its own way.xxiii
Conclusion
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was perhaps, as one analyst called it, "the most serious challenge to
world stability since the outbreak of Korean war in 1950".xxiv It provided a crucial test of expectations
concerning the instruments and processes of conflict-control in international conflicts in the post-Cold War
era. The Bush administration's concept of a New World Order promised "new ways of working with other
nations to deter aggression, to achieve stability, prosperity and above all, peace".xxv Bush's handling of the
Gulf was a brilliant exercise in "working with other nations" to defeat aggression. But the Gulf crisis may
turn out to be the exception that did not prove the rule. American actions, especially with the respect to the
UN and arms sales create room for serious doubt regarding the whether the victory over Iraq would turn
into an era of collective security and peace in troubled regions such as the Middle East. Hopes for a
leadership role of the U.S. subject to the collective security framework of a revived and revitalised United
Nations, and a durable form of superpower understanding over regional security issues proved too
optimistic.
Bush's concept of a New World Order was largely an attempt to impart a sense of direction to
America's post-Cold War foreign policy. It was born out of the fact that Washington seemed "lost without
something to contain" after "winning" the Cold War.xxvi With the Iraqi invasion, the U.S. not only found its
enemy, but also found itself in an unprecedented position to fundamentally reshape the international
security system. This was the challenge of the New World Order. But the New World Order as
operationalised during the Gulf War and its aftermath contains too many contradictions to pass the test.
Commenting on the Bush administration's handling of the Gulf war, the former National Security Adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski noted: "...once the symbolism of collective action was stripped away, it was largely an
American decision and relied primarily on American military power". xxvii This evident American
unilateralism betrayed the professed aim of the New World Order to replace Cold War geopolitics with
collective security.xxviii
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NOTES
i.
The idea of the New World Order was repeatedly invoked throughout the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath. See:
George Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order", Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 May 1991, p.450-452
ii.
"Make the Case for War", New York Times
November 1990, p.6
editorial, reproduced in International Herald Tribune, 5
iii.
For a detailed study of Gorbachev's "New Thinking" on regional conflicts, see: Jiri Valenta and Frank Cibulka,
eds. Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990). See also, Roger E.
Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej, The Cold War as Cooperation: Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict
Management (London: Macmillan, 1991)
iv.
Roger A. Coate and Donald J. Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current
Assessment", Journal of Peace Research, vol.27 (1990), pp.127-140
v.
Cited in Harvey Feldman, "The United Nation and Conflict Resolution", paper presented to the Symposium
on "The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping", Singapore, 13-15 March 1991,
p. 1
vi.
For a Soviet perpspective on the Gulf crisis, see: "Theme of the Month: Saddam Hussein is Testing the World
Community", International Affairs (Moscow), no.11 (November 1990),pp. 46-54
vii.
See: "Renaissance on the East River: The Economist, 15 December 1990,pp. 43-44; Roger A. Coate and Donald
J. Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current Assessment", Journal of Peace Research, vol.27,
no.2 (April 1990),pp. 127-140;
viii.
Richard Falk, 'UN being made a tool of US foreign policy", Guardian Weekly, 27 January 1991, p.12. See also,
"The Use and Abuse of the UN in the Gulf Crisis", Middle East Report, no.169 (March-April 1991). For a more positive
assessment of the UN's role see: Sir Anthony Parsons, "The United Nations After the Gulf War", The Round Table,
no.319 (July 1991),pp. 265-274
ix.
Harvey J. Feldman, "The United Nations and Conflict Resolution", paper presented to the sysmposium on "The
Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace Keeping", Singapore, March 13-15, 1991, p.2
x.
For the most significant study of the conflict-control role of regional organisations, see Joseph S. Nye, Peace in
Parts: Integration and Conflict within Regional Organisations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chapter 5
xi.
Joseph S. Nye, "America Has Not Been Declining", International Herald Tribune, 4 October 1990
xii.
Amitav Acharya, "Wasn't It U.S. Policy to Protect Kuwait?", International Herald Tribune, 30 August 1990, p.4
xiii.
For a detailed study of U.S. interests and strategic policy in the Gulf, see Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy
in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations (London and New York: Routledge,
1989)
xiv.
The three major policy goals of the U.S. in the Gulf have been (1) to secure access to Persian Gulf oil in
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sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices; (2) To contain Soviet influence in the region; (3) To ensure the survival of
the conservative Gulf states. Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf, chapter 1
xv.
By early November, the U.S. Central Command had deployed a force of about 210,000 army, naval, air and
marine contingents and support personnel to the Gulf region as part of operation Desert Shield. This included 54 naval
vessels in the Gulf, northern Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, including two carrier battle groups, a battleship and four
mine countermeasure ships. Another carrier group was deployed in the eastern Mediterranean. Along with 420
combat aircraft, 250 support planes were deployed over 30 military bases in the region.
xvi.
Jasper Mortimer, "Shambling into Line", The Middle East (October 1990), pp.15-17
xvii.
Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "The Alliance Has Work Enough In Its Own Garden", International
Herald Tribune, 26 October 1990, p.8. For a background to the debate concerning NATO's "Out-Of-Area" role in the
Gulf, see Amitav Acharya, "NATO and `Out-of-Area' Contingencies: The Persian Gulf Experience", International Defense
Review, no.5 (1987), pp.569-576
xviii.
Charles Krauthammer, "A believer in a robust U.S. role", International Herald Tribune, 23-24 March 1991, p.6
xix.
William Pfaff, "The place to apply the dividends of victory abraod is home", International Herald Tribune, 2
April 1991, p.6
xx.
Lothar Brock and Hans Henerik Holm, "European Security in Transition: Overlay and Undercurrents", Paper
presented at the IPSA World Congress, Buenos Aires, 21-25 July 1991, p. 7
xxi.
Don Oberdorfer, "Emerging from the Gulf war: a stronger U.S. both militarily and politically", International
Herald Tribune, 5 March 1991, p.5
xxii.
Pfaff, "The Place to Apply the Dividends...",
xxiii.
Steven S. Rosenfeld, "America's bigger load frees its hands", International Herald Tribune, 24-25 December
1990, p.6
xxiv.
507
Geoffrey Kemp, "The Gulf Crisis: Diplomacy or Force?", Survival, vol.32, no.6 (November/December 1990),p.
xxv.
"The World Order Changeth", The Economist, 22 June 1991, p.13
xxvi.
Walter Russell Mead, "A successful U.S. foreign policy will be realistic", International Herald Tribune 7
February 1991, p.6
xxvii.
p.2
"New World Order: An Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski", SAIS Review, vol. 11, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1991),
xxviii. For a recent appraisals of the New World Order concept, see: Ted Galen Carpenter, "The New World
Dosorder", Foreign Policy (Fall 1991),,pp. 24-39; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "New World Order or Hollow Victory?", Foreign
Affairs, vol.70, no.4 (Fall 1991),pp.53-65; Lawrence Freedman, "The Gulf War and the New World Order", Survival,
vol33, no.3 (May/June 1991),pp. 195-209; Han Xu, "New World Order: A Chinese Perspective", Beijing Review, vol.34,
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no.36 (September 9-15, 1991),pp. 31-34; "Editorial: After the Gu;f War: Regional and World Order Problems", The
Round Table, no.318 (April 1991),pp. 115-120
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