Explaining Ethnic AutonomyRegimes
in LatinA m e r i c a I
Donna Lee Van Cott
Through a systematic examination of nine cases, the author identifies factors that
enabled indigenous movements in five Latin American countries to secure formal
recognition of politico-territorial autonomy regimes. All nine cases occurred within
the framework of a larger regime bargain---either (1) peace talks intended to end
armed struggle when the regime faced a serious challenge to maintain political
order or territorial control, or (2) a severe crisis of legitimacy and governability
that forced political elites to renegotiate fundamental regime structures via the process of constitutional reform. In the five successful cases, changes in the political
opportunity structure occurred that favored indigenous autonomy claimants. These
changes were the opening of access to decision-making spheres and the emergence
of an influential ally.
During the last two decades indigenous peoples '2 organizations throughout
Latin America converged on an alternative, "pluricultural" vision of the state.
In the pluricultural state they propose, indigenous peoples are preconstituted
and self-governing collective entities within the national political community.
The key institutional component of this vision is the construction of politicoterritorial autonomy regimes in which each indigenous culture may freely develop without interference from the state and non-indigenous society.
Indigenous peoples constitute 10 percent of the total population of the Americas, or an estimated 40 million persons belonging to approximately 400 distinct groups. They are concentrated in southern Mexico, Central America, and
the central Andes. Indigenous peoples are the only ethnic group in Latin America
whose claims challenge the territoriality of states. 3 Their autonomy claims
vary with respect to the level at which they desire autonomy to be e x e r c i s e d - the community, municipality, state, or region--and whether autonomous units
are to be mono- or multiethnic. Yet, despite the great diversity among indigenous peoples, contemporary indigenous autonomy claims exhibit a striking
similarity, owing to almost three decades of intensive dialogue among indigenous organizations in the Americas (Zufiiga 1998: 143). The claims converge
Donna Lee Van Cott is assistant professor of polmcal science at the Umvermty of Tennessee, Knoxville. She
is author of The Friendly LiquMation of the Past. The Pohtics of Diversity in Latin America and editor of
Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latm Amerzca.
Studies in Comparative lnternationalDevelopment, Winter 2001, Vol. 35, No 4, pp 30-58.
Van Cott
31
on a demand for political and administrative self-government powers, legal
jurisdiction to create norms and sanction behavior, and the right to manage
their own resources and those of the state corresponding to their territory and/
or the population thereon.
As D/az Polanco observes, the autonomy claim should not be considered as
one among a list of demands indigenous peoples make for special recognition
and rights--for bilingual education, protection of cultural artifacts, etc. Autonomy is the "articulating d e m a n d " - - t h e demand through which all other
claims are fulfilled. Neither should we consider autonomy to refer merely to
the protection and survival of indigenous cultures. Autonomy is an explicitly
political demand requiring a change in the distribution of political power and
the creation of new institutions that facilitate the political participation of previously excluded groups (Dfaz Polanco 1998: 216-217).
Indigenous claims to politico-territorial autonomy (hereinafter "autonomy")
are nothing new. They are based on centuries of attachment to specific territories and self-government practices that endured due to the persistence of colonial-era laws in some states that recognized territorial rights, as well as the
incomplete penetration by Latin American states and the market into geographically remote spaces (Ardito 1997: 4; Bengoa 1994: 21; Diaz Polanco 1991:
75-77). What is new about indigenous autonomy claims is that they emerged
on the national political agenda framed in similar terminology throughout Latin
America in the 1980s and 1990s. Only one case of successful autonomy claims
occurred prior to that time (Panama 1925-1938). What explains the recent
political salience of autonomy claims?
First, neoliberal economic policies introduced in the 1980s and 1990s-particularly those emphasizing privatization and market competition--threaten
indigenous communities' hold on the territorial basis of their political and cultural institutions and their capacity to control the means of production necessary
to reproduce their cultures (Brysk and Wise 1997: 82-88; Yashar 1998: 34). The
popularity of decentralization in the 1990s--part of the neoliberal policy package--appears to be facilitating the realization of indigenous movements' aspiration for autonomy within the state (Assies 1998: 7). Indigenous organizations
advocate transferring competencies of the central state either to new, anomalous, subnational units designated only for indigenous peoples (similar to the
policy in the United States and Canada) or to existing, universalized, subnational
units where Indians constitute a majority of the population and are empowered
to govern themselves according to their own customs and laws. Changes in the
state's territorial organization that achieve these transfers are easier for indigenous organizations to justify in the context of a more decentralized state.
Second, indigenous organizations joined other social movements in the
struggle for democracy in the late 1970s and 1980s and, in the post-transition
conjuncture, in critiquing the exclusionary quality of democratic citizenship
(Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998: 1-2). Through these struggles indigenous movements forged identities as bearers of rights, specifically citizenship rights. The frame of "indigenous citizenship" developed by them connotes
a distinct form of collective citizenship derived from the right of a people to an
autonomous territory within the state.
32
Studies In Comparative International Development 1 Winter 2001
Finally, the effort within the United Nations since 1982 to develop a convention protecting indigenous rights created an international forum for indigenous
representatives to articulate collectively a vision of autonomy, and generated
exemplary developments in indigenous self-government rights in industrialized
countries like Australia, Canada, and Denmark (Banton 1996: 89-103; Bengoa
1994: 35; Dandier 1996: 5-8). Contact with the transnational movement's discourse on self-determination helped local and national indigenous leaders
to converge on a c o m m o n claim to autonomy based on the rights of peoples
or nations. In this way indigenous peoples' collective identities became
multiple and cumulative. This final identity-construction--as peoples with
the right to self-determination under international law--was crucial to the
development of the movement's argument that indigenous peoples have a right
to political autonomy, that the space they occupy must be considered territory, and that the states in w h i c h they r e s i d e m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d
"pluricultural" or even "plurinational" (Zufiiga 1998: 144-145).
TheArgument
Most Latin American states have to some degree incorporated the principles
of non-discrimination and multiculturalism into their legal framework, either
directly in their constitutions or through the adoption of international human
rights conventions with constitutional rank (see Van Cott 2000: ch. 9). Only
five Latin American states (Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela), however, constitutionally codified ethnically defined autonomy
regimes. I explain why indigenous autonomy claims in these countries were
successful while in four other countries they failed. I argue that indigenous
peoples' organizations were successful when they could raise their autonomy
claims in a forum that was part of a larger regime bargain, allowing them to
insert their claims in a discussion of fundamental regime issues. Without the
urgency of the larger regime bargain, governments are free to ignore indigenous autonomy claims. The cases exhibit two distinct negotiating sites for
this larger regime bargain: (1) peace talks resolving an armed conflict between
the government and indigenous combatants; and (2) debates on constitutional
reform generated by larger crises of governability and legitimacy that required
the renegotiation of fundamental regime issues.
Since larger regime bargains emerged in all nine cases discussed here, they
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful autonomy claims.
Successful cases are distinguished from failed cases by the occurrence of
changes in the political opportunity structure (POS) that assisted indigenous
organizations in making their claims. 4 Two changes occurred in all successful cases: (1) channels of access to decision-making power opened for indigenous autonomy claimants, and (2) influential allies emerged to support
these claimants. Potential social movements perceive changes in POS as
signals that the formation of a social m o v e m e n t - - o r the mobilization of
its m e m b e r s - - i s likely to be successful, that is, likely to lead to the achievement of the group's goals. I seek to discover whether those signals were
accurate and, if so, under what circumstances. I recognize that social move-
33
Van CoU
ments themselves cause changes in POS. They do not always wait on the sidelines watching for signals; they often jump into the fray to force changes in the
opportunity structure to occur, particularly, as Andolina argues with respect to
Ecuador in 1997, during periods of acute conflict and legitimacy crisis when
the opportunity structure becomes more fluid (Andolina 1998: 3).
In the "successful" cases discussed later, indigenous communities or organizations achieved constitutional recognition of politico-territorial structures
in which their own authorities have autonomous powers of self-government,
administration of justice, and control over state resources. By that measure
they are all successful. Yet the scope of autonomy achieved varies among them.
The geographic extension of autonomy and access to state resources is greatest in Colombia and Panama, where indigenous authority structures are wellinstitutionalized and widely supported among the indigenous population. These
two also are among the oldest cases--more time has passed since legal recognition of autonomy to enable indigenous organizations to secure its practical
realization. In Nicaragua, autonomy regimes were legally established but
full realization of autonomy rights has been impeded by natural disasters,
recuperation from war, infighting among the multiethnic inhabitants of
the zone of autonomy, and the reluctance of the central government to transfer power and resources (Hannum 1996: 204, 224-225; Gonzfilez Perez
1997; Sollis 1989: 516-520). In Ecuador and Venezuela, the scope and
content of constitutional recognition of autonomy in 1998 and 1999, respectively, is potentially greater, on paper, than in the earlier cases. However, until pending statutory legislation is approved it is difficult to assess
how these cases compare since both constitutions leave important details
to statutory law. In Ecuador, the indigenous political party MUPP submitted a
statutory proposal to congress in January 2000. It awaits consideration while
the country addresses severe economic and political crises. MUPP gains in
local and national elections since the constitutional reform should help facilitate the passage of statutory legislation. In Venezuela, the congress responsible for considering this legislation was seated after elections held in June
2000 and the indigenous organizations are still working on their implementation proposals. Despite the unfolding nature of autonomy rights in these
two cases, the achievement of constitutional recognition of the main components of indigenous movements' vision of a u t o n o m y - - t h e criterion for
scoring a successful case in this study--provides a crucial tool for its ultimate
realization.
Table 1
Scoring of Cases of Attempted Autonomy Claims
ARMED CONFLICT
NEGOTIATINGSITE
CONSTITUTIONALREFORM
NEGOTIATINGSITE
SUCCESS
Nicaragua(1984-1987),
Panama (1925-1938)
Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998)
Venezuela(1999)
FAILURE
Guatemala (1994-1995),
Mexico (1994-1996)
Bolivia (1993-1997), Peru (1993)
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Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
Case Selection
The universe of cases includes Latin American countries with an indigenous
population asserting autonomy claims--a total of 17. 5 From this universe, case
selection occurred in two stages. I first considered all successful cases to see
what they had in common. From these five successful cases I concluded, first,
that success depends on indigenous actors' ability to present autonomy claims
in the context of a larger regime bargain and, second, that two types of regime
bargains had occurred: peace negotiations (Panama, Nicaragua) and constitutional reform (Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela). I divided the five successful
cases according to the type of regime bargain that occurred.
I next looked for cases of failed autonomy claims in the context of either of
the regime bargains in order to explain what distinguished successful from
failed cases. For the peace talks negotiating site, the criteria for further consideration was armed struggle in the 20th century between the state and an organized sector of the indigenous population that engages in offensive and defensive
armed actions to secure or defend its political and territorial autonomy. The
armed indigenous movement must pose a threat to territorial security and integration credible and significant enough to convince the state to engage in peace
negotiations. This criterion excludes cases where indigenous peoples have organized an essentially defensive armed response to aggression from the state
or non-state actors, where rebellions have been quickly eradicated militarily,
or where agrarian conflicts persist mainly between indigenous communities
and landowners and their local government cronies. I found two failed cases
meeting these criteria (Guatemala, Mexico) and included both in the next stage
of analysis. Thus, the study includes all four cases in the case universe--failed
and successful--in which autonomy claims were brought to the table during
peace negotiations.
The subset of cases eligible for consideration with respect to the second
negotiating site, constitutional reform, was much larger. Most Latin American
countries have undertaken extensive constitutional reforms since the wave of
transitions to democracy began in 1979, some of them several times, and most
of these have indigenous populations asserting autonomy claims. 6 More than
10 cases were eligible for further consideration (our original 17, minus the
four being considered in the peace talks site and the three successful cases),
since some cases include multiple constitutional reforms. The author did not
have the resources to investigate whether or why indigenous peoples' organizations unsuccessfully asserted autonomy claims during each instance of constitutional reform in all 10 Latin American countries. In the absence of a
theoretically salient criterion for selection, I included Bolivia and Peru because they were the only cases remaining in the universe whose indigenous
population exceeds one-third of their total population. In all other eligible cases
the indigenous population is under 10 percent. The criterion of population size
is arbitrary in relation to the argument developed, but it reduces the cases chosen for further consideration to a manageable size and ensures the inclusion of
cases of greatest interest to political scientists. 7 The explanatory value of population size in predicting success or failure is discussed at the end of the article.
Van Co~
35
A complete understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions for attaining
ethnic autonomy regimes would require the application of my findings to countries with small indigenous populations where autonomy claims failed to thrive
during constitutional reforms.
Negotiating Site !: Peace Talks to End Armed Conflict
I first discuss the circumstances in each case that led to the establishment of
the negotiating site--peace talks to end armed conflict between the government and indigenous combatants. I then present evidence that the two POS
variables--opened access to decision-making spheres and an influential ally-were present in the two successful cases and absent in the failed ones (see
Table 2).
Getting to Peace Talks
In Panama in 1925 the Kuna demanded autonomy in order to expel an abusive police presence and to prevent increasing interference from foreigners
and Panamanians who suppressed Kuna cultural practices (Howe 1986: 19).
With the encouragement of American adventurer Richard Marsh, in the last
week of February, Kuna soldiers murdered or chased off all Panamanian police
and officials within San Blas, the archipelago of islands on the Caribbean coast
the Kuna traditionally have occupied, and declared the formation of a selfgoverning Kuna Republic. The uprising challenged the capacity of the new
Panamanian government to retain control of the former Colombian province.
The United States brokered peace talks on March 4 between Panamanian officials and chiefs from thirteen Kuna communities. The agreement guaranteed
the Kuna the rights of other Panamanian citizens and recognized their right to
"maintain order among themselves" without the interference of police--a partial concession to their autonomy claims (Howe 1998: 280-289).
Table 2
Peace Talks to End Armed Conflict: Explanatory Variables
Successful Cases
CASE
PANAMA
(1925-1938)
Failed Cases
NICARAGUA GUATEMALA MEXICO
(1984-1987) (1994-1995)
(1994-1996)
OPENED ACCESS
yes
TO DECISIONMAKING SPHERES,
i.e., Indiansclaiming
autonomyparticipate
directlyin negotiations
yes
no
no
INFLUENTIALALLY yes,
United States
yes,
UnitedStates
no
no
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Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
Although the Kuna gained local self-government powers and evicted the
police, the issue of land rights and the relationship of the Kuna to the Panamanian government remained unsettled. Worse, soon after the agreement was
signed the government began punitive actions against rebel villages. Low intensity warfare, stalemated negotiations, and pleas for American intervention
persisted throughout the 1920s. After the Kuna sought out leaders of a newly
formed labor union to act as go-between, negotiations resumed in 1930. Passage of a bill recognizing partial Kuna autonomy on San Blas--and including
protection of Kuna land rights--was secured by the end of the year. Negotiations continued until 1938, when San Bias was officially recognized as an autonomous c o m a r c a . 8 Throughout this period Kuna maintained possession of
their arms and successfully resisted attempts to pacify San Blas (Howe 1998:
292).
As in Panama, Miskitu and other ethnic minorities on Nicaragua's Atlantic
coast resented an increasing government military presence and the failure of
the Sandinistas to understand the fundamentally ethnic and cultural nature of
Miskitu opposition to centralized rule imposed by Managua (Hale 1994: 154;
Sollis 1989: 499-501). After nearly four years of armed conflict, 9 peace talks,
and autonomy negotiations began within the context of a larger regime bargain
concerning the nature of national identity, the relationship of the eastern third
of the country to the rest of Nicaragua, and the efforts of the Sandinistas to
consolidate their revolution in the face of external and internal military pressure.
The Nicaraguan case is unique in that the indigenous combatants, rather
than being parties to the resulting autonomy agreement, acted (unintentionally) as a lever that motivated the Sandinistas to negotiate autonomy with diverse non-belligerent representatives of all six ethnic groups on the Atlantic
coast. Thus, the Sandinistas established two simultaneous negotiating sites.
They commenced autonomy discussions with civil society leaders in December 1984 as a means to defuse support for the Miskitu guerrillas. The Sandinistas
realized that they could not militarily eradicate "a well-armed and motivated
insurgency, receiving substantial support from the local population, from refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica as well as from the United States" (Sollis
1 9 8 9 : 5 0 9 - 5 1 0 ) . As Hale recalls, by early 1983, the government was unable to
extend its influence in many parts of the Atlantic Coast controlled by Miskitu
guerrillas, whose military strength and public support was at its height in April
1984. Moreover, in October 1984 the military power of the Contras had reached
its apex. The Sandinistas concluded that "a continued effort to win the war by
purely military means would be prohibitively costly and doomed to failure"
(Hale 1994: 174).
In October 1984, the Sandinistas commenced peace negotiations with two
rival guerrilla organizations, MISURASATA and MISURA. The talks proved
difficult, and were suspended. 1~ Thereafter, the government's autonomy proposal evolved in direct opposition to the proposals of MISURASATA and
MISURA, which the government portrayed as ethnocentric, intransigent, and
counter-revolutionary (Hale 1994:175). It created a National Autonomy Commission and two Regional Autonomy Commissions in December 1984 to pre-
Van Cott
37
pare a draft proposal for discussion with Atlantic Coast residents. As consultations took place during the second half of 1985, the tide of community support
turned in favor of the autonomy process and against an armed solution. The
National Constituent Assembly approved the basic outlines of the autonomy
proposal in November 1986. By 1986, popular opinion in Miskitu communities had shifted from supporting the guerrillas toward a more ambiguous position of participating in the autonomy process and trying to move both sides
towards peace and reconciliation, while maintaining clandestine support for
the Miskitu guerrillas and remaining firmly committed to pursuing Miskitu
rights when conditions were more favorable (Hale 1994: 167, 190; Sollis 1989:
512-13). On 22 April 1987, 220 elected delegates and some 2,000 representatives from most communities on the Atlantic Coast attended a Multi-Ethnic
Assembly to discuss a final, consensus proposal (Sollis 1989: 514). They approved 95 percent of the articles unanimously (Gonzfiles Perez 1997: 279).
The 1987 Autonomy Statute, which the Sandinista legislature passed on 2 September 1987, established two multiethnic Atlantic Coast autonomous regions.
Guatemalan guerrillas were not fighting for indigenous autonomy. Non-Indians who launched the struggle in 1963 sought far-reaching social, political,
and economic change. The case is included here because by the early 1970s
many Maya had joined the guerrillas, a consequence of the armed movement's
decision to shift to the mainly Maya western zone and actively to recruit Maya
combatants, and the government repression of Maya communities that followed
this shift (Coello and Duarte 1993: 236; Smith 1991: 32). When peace talks
began in the 1990s, the URNG incorporated Maya organizations' demands in
their agenda, despite the fact that its leadership was mainly Ladino and the
central issue for the armed movement remained class, rather than ethnic, conflict. The topic of indigenous rights and identity was strategically important
for the URNG "both in terms of the URNG's political future and in terms of its
immediate credibility with civil sector groups and its own field commanders
and combatants" (Central America Report, 3 Feb. 1995: p. 8).
The military threat posed by the guerrillas had been eliminated by the mid1980s. Peace talks commenced in the 1990s in order to consolidate a democratic transition that occurred formally in 1985, particularly with respect to
the supremacy of civilians over a military whose political role was exaggerated by the lingering, low-intensity armed conflict. Peace talks also were intended to resolve fundamental questions of socioeconomic equity and the nature
of national identity. The Mayan rights movement had received increasing national and international attention in the wake of the award of 1992's Nobel
Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchtl, who became an international icon of indigenous rights struggles.
Direct peace talks began in Mexico in April 1991 between the government
and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), a coordinating
body representing four armed leftist groups. The pace of progress accelerated
following the failed self-coup that culminated in the unlikely presidency of
former Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro de Le6n Carpio. The new president generated some trust among Maya organizations by naming a top leader
of the COMG (Coordination of Mayan Peoples Organizations) as Minister of
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Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
Education (Coello and Duarte 1993: 249). The COMG, formed in 1991 and
representing some 15 Maya organizations, was the first Maya organization to
explicitly demand territorial and political autonomy (Plant 2000: 35; Smith
1991:30).
After De Le6n Carpio became president, the United Nations restructured
and moderated the peace negotiations. Indigenous identity and rights were
among the most difficult issues remaining on the agenda. The March 1994
round of talks failed when participants realized that constitutional reforms would
be necessary to achieve real advances. The Coordinator of Organizations of
the Mayan People of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), formed in May 1994 to draft
peace proposals on behalf of some 300 organizations representing the Maya,
Xinca, and Garifuna, had called for a sweeping constitutional reform to create
a "pluri-cultural and multilingual" state. Among the rights claimed were local
self-government, recognition of customary law, and collective land ownership
that would constitute language-based political and administrative autonomy in
zones where Maya predominate. COPMAGUA argued that "for the full participation, rights and decision-making powers of the Mayan peoples, it is essential that the structure of the present state, Constitution, and electoral and
political legislation be changed" (Inter Press Service, 4 November 1994). In
late 1994 the conservative-dominated congress vowed to block constitutional
reforms resulting from the peace process and to continue blocking ratification
of International Labor Organization Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Ibid.)
The government and URNG negotiators met four times in 1994 to discuss
indigenous rights. Conflict on this issue caused the suspension of peace talks
between October 1994 and January 1995. When an Accord on the Identity and
Rights of Indigenous Peoples finally was signed on 31 March 1995 it was hailed
as a major breakthrough in the peace talks. But the accord makes no mention
of political-administrative autonomy for ethno-linguistic communities, as
Mayan organizations had wanted (Plant 2000: 35). Instead, it confers some
autonomous powers with respect to education and economic development within
linguistically defined regions. In fact, there is little in the accords to challenge
Guatemala's existing political-juridical institutionality (Mendoza 2000: 5).
Once the Accord entered into effect in December 1996, joint government-indigenous commissions met to negotiate the details of implementation through
constitutional reform and statutory law. In this second negotiating opportunity
Maya activists attempted to insert more emphasis on autonomy. They failed
and, in fact, language in the accords was weakened in the resulting constitutional reform proposal. In the event, the matter became moot. In 1999 Guatemalan voters narrowly rejected the proposed constitution.
As in Guatemala, the original agenda of Mexico's mainly indigenous armed
movement, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), encompassed
an extensive list of economic, political, and social demands. Indigenous autonomy claims were not explicitly advanced until the rapid consolidation of a
national movement for indigenous autonomy in the months following the initial 1 January 1994 uprising. The growth of that movement throughout Mexico
influenced the emergence of autonomy as a key principle of the Zapatista's
Van Co~
39
reform proposal (Mattiace 1998: 4). Although the stand-off with the Mexican
government has dragged on since 1994, the actual armed conflict was brief,
encompassing a few weeks in January 1994 and a second, briefer offensive at
the end of that year. The EZLN's offensive military threat was quickly neutralized. What continued and, arguably, has intensified, is a state of militarization
and tension in the conflict zone, attributable mainly to the presence of paramilitary groups clashing with pro-EZLN communities.
The Zapatista uprising, and the government's response, provoked a larger
national debate on the quality of Mexican democracy during the twilight of
PRI hegemony, and on the nature of Mexican national identity, long subsumed
within a national myth of "cosmic" mestizaje. The first round of peace talks
failed, in part due to political and economic instability surrounding the 1994
national elections and the collapse of the peso. The 11 March 1995 Law for
Dialogue, Conciliation and Dignified Peace in Chiapas established a legal framework for peace negotiations. After five months of negotiations on the format
and scope of the talks, four months of negotiations followed on substantive
issues. The EZLN invited representatives from diverse sectors of civil society,
experts, and intellectuals, to act as advisors and guests during the talks. Meanwhile, indigenous organizations mobilized independently throughout Mexico
to articulate their own rights claims. The EZLN sponsored a National Indigenous Forum on 3-8 January 1996, where 500 delegates from 178 organizations shared their views on indigenous rights (Hernandez Navarro 1999). In
February 1996, negotiations began in San Andr6s Larrafnzar. The parties signed
Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture on February 16.
The San Andr6s Accords mention autonomy but do not specify the territorial level at which it is exercised (Fox et al. 1999; G6mez Rivera 1999). The
omission of specific reference to municipal or regional autonomy disappointed
the Chiapas-based autonomy movement and sectors of the EZLN command
(Ruiz 2000: 45). Nevertheless, they have since fought for implementation of
the Accords as a minimum threshold for indigenous rights. In October 1996,
the EZLN and the multi-partisan congressional Commission for Concord and
Pacification (COCOPA) established a commission, which included Mexican
government representatives, to draft constitutional reforms implementing the
Accords and to establish terms for their verification. The EZLN accepted the
resulting legislative proposal. In December, the Zedillo administration rejected
the proposal, claiming it would "balkanize" the country, and offered a counterproposal unacceptable to the EZLN (Barcenas 1999). Unable to force the EZLN
and COCOPA to revise their proposal, and in violation of the San Andr6s Accords, which required any constitutional reform proposal on indigenous rights
to be jointly presented by both parties, Zedillo submitted his own proposal to
congress on 15 March 1998. That proposal confines autonomy to the impotent
community and "cultural" levels, and eliminates the status as subjects of public law conferred on indigenous communities by the Accords (Assies 1998;
Barcenas 1999). The COCOPA-sponsored proposal, based on community rights,
had opened the door to municipal-level autonomy. Zedillo's unilateral initiative on indigenous rights, and his failure to implement the San Andr6s Accords
and to accept the COCOPA proposal, outraged the EZLN and indigenous orga-
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Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
nizations and effectively ended the peace negotiations for the remainder of
Zedillo's administration.
Although autonomy rights formally have not been recognized, movements
for indigenous autonomy have in some cases achieved de facto recognition.
Following the uprising, taking advantage of the turbulent political environment and the Mexican government's reluctance to use deadly force against
impoverished Indians under the watchful eye of the international media, many
pro-EZLN municipalities declared themselves in rebellion and established de
facto autonomy regimes. On Columbus Day, 1994, an organization uniting 280
Chiapan indigenous and peasant organizations declared seven multiethnic autonomous regions. Two months later, behind an EZLN military offensive, indigenous organizations seized dozens of municipalities in Chiapas, declaring
them "free municipalities" and establishing de facto Pluriethnic Autonomous
Regions (RAPs) (Lomelf 2000:228-238; Mattiace 1998: 5). Since 1994, 38
municipalities and pluriethnic regions have declared their autonomy and established self-governing structures (Fox et al. 1999). Although the Mexican
army quickly recuperated many of these, some continue to declare their autonomy, refusing to pay taxes or to permit the military to enter. The Zedillo
administration's immediate response was military--using state force to disband the autonomy governments. In 1998, in an effort to reduce tensions, the
Chiapas government began negotiations with some rebel municipalities, partially recognizing their legal status as "Transitional Municipal Councils" (Mexican Government 1998:37). Notwithstanding these isolated cases of de facto
success, indigenous autonomy regimes lack constitutional recognition and are
contingent upon shifting political forces.
OpenedAccess to Decision-Making Spheres
In this negotiating site, access to decision-making spheres is considered to
be open when indigenous organizations claiming autonomy are able to directly
represent themselves in peace negotiations--unmediated by third parties empowered to secure an agreement without their consent. Direct participation in
negotiations enables autonomy claimants to engage in brinkmanship, i.e., the
exposure of an adversary to a shared risk (Schelling 1960: 200). The ability to
threaten to reject the entire bargain if their claims were denied dramatically
increased indigenous autonomy claimants' bargaining leverage.
In Panama, Kuna chiefs participated in all negotiating situations and agreement could not be achieved without their consent. In Nicaragua, the situation
was more complex. There were serious divisions between the Miskitu, on one
hand, and the Sumu, Rama, and creole groups, on the other, the latter deeply
resenting the Miskitu's capacity to monopolize channels of dialogue with
the Sandinistas. Moreover, internal divisions existed among Miskitu guerrilla leaders and between them and Miskitu favoring a peaceful, political
solution. Nevertheless, the region's indigenous population actively participated in the lengthy consultations on autonomy and their elected representatives in the Multi-Ethnic Assembly approved the autonomy statute (Dfaz
Polanco 1991" 191).
Van CoR
41
In Guatemala and Mexico, indigenous organizations claiming autonomy
rights fought unsuccessfully for direct participation in negotiations on indigenous rights accords that were part of larger peace agreements. Beginning in
1990, Guatemalan Maya organizations sponsored numerous fora on the peace
process. Documents emerging from these discussions explicitly demanded
political and administrative autonomy, specifically the restructuring of the state
along linguistic and ethnic lines. Maya organizations argued that recognition
as peoples with the right to self-determination was the indispensable basis for
other rights claims (Coello and Duarte 1993: 245-247). They demanded direct
participation in negotiations between the URNG and government through representatives elected by Maya organizations. As Maya leaders argued, "[w]ithin
the dialogue between the government and the URNG they are going to speak
of the indigenous question, without the presence of the indigenous. Peace cannot be achieved without the opportunity for the majority to express itself" (translation by the author; Coello and Duarte 1993: 245).
The extent of direct participation by Maya organizations in the peace negotiations was nil. A Cakchiquel leader who was Deputy Minister of Education
at the time was the only Maya to actually sign the agreement (Plant 2000: 35).
Maya "participation" occurred mainly through public statements, informal
meetings with URNG leaders, and participation with other civil society organizations in the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC), a forum the United Nations
established in 1993 during the restructuring of the peace talks to channel civil
society proposals to both negotiating parties. The ASC included representatives from the URNG, NGOs, human rights, labor, church, and indigenous organizations and produced non-binding proposals on all substantive issues in
the negotiations. Maya organizations formed COPMAGUA in 1994 to coordinate indigenous representation in the ASC. It produced a set of proposals for
the peace negotiations based on COMG's earlier work, including the first draft
of the 1995 indigenous rights accord. COPMAGUA's influence was limited,
however, because Maya organizations were a minority within an Assembly
dominated by Ladino popular organizations allied with the URNG. The ASC
revised COPMAGUA's indigenous rights proposal, removing "some contentious issues relating to political autonomy," prior to submitting it to both sides
(Plant 2000: 35; see also, Brett 2000).
Although the URNG sought to secure a strong package of indigenous cultural rights, and the ASC provided a means for indigenous leaders to express
their demands, neither the URNG nor the ASC advanced indigenous autonomy
claims. Why? First, some URNG negotiators did not understand the claim and
what it would entail practically; others were concerned about how it would
affect their ability to politically control their base. A more important reason is
that URNG negotiators worried the territorial autonomy claim would reduce
chances for an agreement, given the vocal opposition of the government and
private sector. Similarly, civil society sectors were reluctant to advance "extreme" claims that might make their own "more moderate" demands more difficult to achieve, or which might reverse gains already made. It is difficult to
measure the extent to which the URNG's failure to advance the autonomy claim
may be attributed to strategic versus normative criteria, since participants are
42
Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
reluctant to admit they opposed autonomy and prefer to blame the government
and the private sector} t In any case, the failure of the Maya to secure direct
participation effectively removed the claim from the negotiating table.
Mexican indigenous organizations were also excluded from the peace negotiations. Although the EZLN is composed mainly of indigenous combatants,
indigenous organizations have had to compete with other civil society organizations for a voice within the armed movement and to place their demands on
the EZLN agenda (G6mez Nufiez 2000: 180; Ruiz 2000: 27). The main indigenous organizations leading the autonomy movement--the Plural National Indigenous Assembly for Autonomy and the Chiapas State Council of Indigenous
and Peasant Organizations~2--were able to offer their proposals to the EZLN
leadership prior to negotiations with the government on indigenous rights following "enormous efforts" to get the issue of autonomy on the negotiating
table, but they were excluded from the actual negotiations at San Andr6s
Larrafnzar in February 1996. In fact, only six of the EZLN's 20 negotiators at
San Andr6s were indigenous, and none of these were from Chiapas (Ruiz 2000:
27-28, 44; G6mez Nufiez 2000: 184).
lnfluential Ally
An influential ally increases the bargaining leverage of the autonomy claimant
by taking the part of the armed indigenous group against the government. The
ally's actions increase the costs to the government (e.g., strained relations with
a vital foreign ally, further warfare with a U.S.-backed guerrilla force) of failing to achieve an agreement. The precise actions taken vary in the two cases.
In Panama, the ally pressures the government to enter into peace talks, mediates those talks, and acts as guarantor of the resulting agreement. In Nicaragua
the ally provides financial and military resources to armed indigenous combatants. In this case the ally prefers that peace talks do not take place.
In Panama, Marsh repeatedly attempted to provoke American intervention
on behalf of the Kuna. On 24 February 1925, the Kuna petitioned the American Minister in Panama for protection against the brutality of the Panamanian
government, and promised to submit to American rule. Despite these efforts,
throughout the rebellion, the United States repeatedly assured Panama that it
was in no way fomenting or supporting the Indian rebellion on San Bias (Howe
1998: 263-277). Rather than inspiring American assistance, Marsh created a
messy diplomatic situation that the United States could not ignore, given the
vital strategic and economic importance of the Canal Zone. His public claims
of U.S. backing prompted the U.S. minister John Glover South to visit the site
of the rebellion in order to deport Marsh and to discourage the Kuna from
further violence. South arrived aboard the war ship USS Cleveland on February 27, five days after the uprising began. It docked off shore between the
coast and a ship sent by the Panamanian government with a force of 160 policemen charged with putting down the rebellion, effectively preventing that
intervention. The rebel Kuna leaders' persuasive arguments changed South's
mind. Believing the Kuna's cause to be just, and that a military campaign against
them would be "an expensive failure," with the approval of Washington he
Van CoU
43
attempted to negotiate a solution (Howe 1998: 280-286). Historian James Howe
describes what happened next:
It is unclear just what conjunction of forces, personalities, and circumstances brought
the Panamanian government to the negotiating table. On some issues, especially those
concerned with canal security, the Americans simply insisted. In this case, however,
nothing suggests that South issued an ultimatum, and the Panamanians may simply
have decided that if public opinion would allow it, they should follow the path of least
resistance. (Howe 1998: 287)
U.S. participation was crucial to bringing about peace talks and to securing
Panamanian government concessions. It also secured Kuna participation and
approval. South later claimed that the Kuna accepted the agreement because
he had persuaded them that it consisted of "a public promise made before the
whole world, and especially before the United States government, and was in
the nature of an assurance to the United States as well as a promise to the
Indians themselves" (cited in Howe 1998: 289).
U.S. intervention also was decisive in Nicaragua. As part of its strategy to
dislodge the Sandinistas, the United States took advantage of the long-standing conflict between the Coast and Managua by putting special emphasis on
destabilizing the region (Dfaz Polanco 1991: 191). The U.S. role in the
Sandinista-Miskitu conflict is not fully known, since many CIA documents
remain classified. Nevertheless, USAID funded the headquarters of the Managua
office of MISURASATA and offered other logistical support. After hostilities
broke out in 1981, the CIA became the Miskitu's main source of finance and
access to weaponry. That year the Reagan administration approved $19 million in direct covert aid for the Contras. Aid increased after thousands of Miskitu
youths fled to Honduras to join them. By 1982, U.S. funds had underwritten
the formation of headquarters for both MISURASATA and MISURA in Costa
Rica and Honduras, respectively. Hale attributes increasing popular support
for MISURASATA to the appearance of fancy technology in the hands of the
Miskitu by 1983: "it must have seemed foolish not to support the side that had
such a powerful ally" (Hale 1994: 153). Once the Sandinistas began to fear
that U.S. invasion was imminent, they altered their centralist views of public
administration and attempted to negotiate an autonomy regime for the Atlantic
Coast (Hannum 1996: 210).
In Guatemala, international actors--principally the United Nations and the
Group of Friends--pressured the government and URNG to reach an agreement. The government also felt pressure to reach a settlement to improve
Guatemala's negative international image, which by the 1990s had resulted in
its diplomatic isolation and caused the private export sector to experience difficulty engaging in international trade (McCleary 1996: 103). Throughout the
peace talks the United States applied diplomatic and economic pressure--threatening, for example, to suspend tariff access under the Generalized System of
Preferences--and offered the carrot of resumed military aid. But this international pressure was not tied to indigenous rights, only to a peace settlement
and progress on human rights (Inter Press Service, 13 March 1995). The Clinton
administration was mainly interested in resolving human rights cases involv-
44
Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
ing U.S. citizens (Financial Times of London, 17 May 1995, 11 May 1995).
Mexico, in turn, was keen to end the armed conflict in light of the I994 uprising on its Guatemalan border.
In Mexico, the international media and human rights monitoring organizations pressured the government to respect the human rights of the mostly indigenous combatants and their civilian supporters, but there is no evidence
of international pressure to accept indigenous rights claims. A potential ally at
the time peace talks began was the leftist PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution). However, despite the diffuse support of PRD militants, tensions between PRD and EZLN leaders precluded a firm alliance during the negotiating
period. In any case, PRD held a small minority in a national legislature dominated by the PRI and PAN.
Both successful cases in the armed struggle negotiating site occurred under
unique circumstances that are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Nevertheless, the two early examples of indigenous movements gaining autonomy regimes inspired indigenous movements elsewhere and provided two influential
models of politico-territorial autonomy.
Negotiating Site I!: Constitutional Reform Amidst Legitimacy and Governability
Crises
In all five countries in this negotiating site, indigenous organizations took
advantage of national debates on constitutional reform to present their autonomy
claims as part of a solution to deep-seated crises of legitimacy and governability.
Only in Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were indigenous organizations able
to constitutionally codify an autonomy regime in which indigenous authorities
were authorized to exercise public administrative functions and manage state
resources in a manner comparable to other subnational, autonomous units of
government. Explanations for success in these cases are listed in Table 3.
The condition giving rise to this negotiating site is legitimacy and
governability crises that are sufficiently severe to generate extreme political
instability and convince elites to consider radical solutions to fundamental
conflicts. The most important variables explaining the constitutional recognition of ethnic autonomy regimes in this negotiating site are grouped under the
two POS factors discussed with respect to the peace talks scenario: (1) the
opening of access to decision-making spheres, and (2) the presence of an influential ally.
Getting to Radical Constitutional Reform
Legitimacy and governability crises were most severe in Colombia and Ecuador. In Colombia, the monopoly on political representation held by the Conservative and Liberal parties generated powerful anti-state armed movements
that by 1989 controlled much of the territory. The state's inability to protect
citizens from rapidly increasing guerrilla and paramilitary violence, from the
increasingly lethal terrorist attacks of the drug cartels, or from human rights
violations attributable to state agents, drained legitimacy from the state and
Van CoU
45
Table 3
Constitutional Reform Amidst Legitimacy and Governability
Crises: Explanatory Variables
Failed Cases
Successful Cases
COLOMBIA
CASE
ECUADOR
VENEZUELA
PERU
BOLIVIA
OPENED ACCESS TO
DECISION-MAKING
SPHERES
DLreclly elected
c~nsutucnt assembly
yes, 1991
y~,1998
yes, 1999
no
yes, 1993
u lmitgcnoes delegat~
pamctlmte directly m
assembly
2 elected, 1
appointed
7 MUPP dclegatcs
dected (3
mdig~s)
3 guaranteed sea~s,
2 elected
not applicable
no
J Coherent center-left blou
allies with Indians
yes
yes
yes
no
nO
u, Popular, dormnant
president supports
indigenous nghts
yes
yes
w~ksuppon
nO
INFLUENTIAL ALLY
democratic regime. The result was extreme political instability that many at
the time believed to seriously threaten the persistence of Colombia as a democracy and as a state. An unprecedented wave of political violence that
included the assassination of three presidential candidates forced to the center
of the political agenda the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly in
1991 to radically reform the democratic regime.
In Ecuador, profound legitimacy and governability crises converged when a
national indigenous organization representing 80 percent of the country's Indians (the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE)
led other civil society organizations in a movement to oust President Abdalfi
Bucaram and force the convocation of a constituent assembly. Nearly 15 percent of the country's population participated in mass demonstrations that took
place in February 1997 (Andolina 1998: 4). The popular demand to convoke a
constituent assembly was expressed at a time when Ecuadorian political institutions had completely lost their authority. The fragmentation, corruption, and
lack of representativeness of the political party system, and the outrageous
behavior of the president, had provoked a demand from civil society for better
representation and for the establishment of citizen rights, particularly for excluded groups. ~3
In Venezuela, a moderately severe political crisis was associated with the
disintegration of the bipartisan pact that had governed since 1958 and of the
political party system itself amidst corruption scandals and the failure of traditional parties to incorporate new social actors. The inability of the petroleum
economy after 1985 to continue to fund generous public spending, two failed
military coups in 1992, and the impeachment of President Carlos Andr6s P6rez
in 1993 for corruption, shook the foundations of one of the region's most stable
46
Studies in Comparative International Development/ Winter 2001
democratic regimes. The stunning 1998 electoral victory of former coup leader
Hugo Ch~ivez intensified a period of political instability that persisted throughout the constitutional reform period. Ch~ivez' main campaign theme was the
convocation of a constituent assembly to erase the prevailing party-based political model and construct a more participatory, honest one (Garcia-Guadilla
and Hurtado 2000: 15). Thus, in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, severe
crises of legitimacy and governability generated extreme political instability
and strong popular support for radical, participatory constitutional reform.
Crises of legitimacy and governability were significant but less severe in
Bolivia and Peru. In Bolivia, political party elites sought to reform the constitution to address the legitimacy crisis caused by the ascension to the presidency of the third-place winner in the 1989 elections and to resolve a political
scandal involving the judicial branch. Pressure for constitutional reform came
mainly from within the tiny political elite, which effectively controlled the
reform process. In Peru, Fujimori sought to restore democratic legitimacy following his April 1992 "self-coup." Pressure for constitutional reform came
mainly from Fujimori, who used the reform to centralize and concentrate his
power and legalize presidential reelection, and from the international community, which condemned the "self-coup." In neither case was there an organized
popular movement for radical constitutional reform.
OpenedAccess to Decision-Making Spheres
Two conditions in this subset of cases opened access to decision-making
spheres: the convocation of a directly elected constituent assembly and the election or designation of indigenous delegates. Autonomy claimants' direct participation in the assemblies enabled them to threaten not to sign the new constitution.
In this negotiating site, brinkmanship consists of the threat that no bargain would
occur and that crises of legitimacy and governability would continue or worsen.
In the context of extensive media coverage and generally favorable public opinion of indigenous delegates, and the widespread belief that Indians were the
most disadvantaged group in society, the withholding of those delegates' signatures seriously would have impaired the legitimacy of the new charter.
Directly elected constituent assembly. In four of our five cases constituent
assemblies were convened and directly elected. The exception is Bolivia, where
President Gonzalo S~nchez de Lozada directed the reform via the only constitutionally sanctioned route--passage of a law by two successive legislatures.
Consensus among the three dominant parties secured legislative approval of a
draft constitutional reform law during the Paz Zamora regime (1989-1993).
Sfinchez de Lozada used his legislative voting majority to secure the second
congressional approval in 1994, together with a set of statutory laws with constitutional implications. S~inchez de Lozada had no need or desire to negotiate
his vision of constitutional reform with opposition parties or unrepresented
social movements (Molina 1997). L4
Indigenous delegates participate directly in assembly. In the three successful cases articulate, charismatic, and experienced indigenous leaders directly
represented indigenous movements in constituent assemblies. Nina Pacari in
Van Cott
47
Ecuador, Lorenzo Muelas and Francisco Rojas Birry in Colombia, and Noell
Pocaterra and Luis Jose Gonzales in Venezuela were particularly effective. Each
had more than ten years experience with indigenous politics and commanded
the admiration of non-indigenous delegates and the attention of the media. In all
three cases indigenous delegates entered the assembly with concrete proposals
that had been vetted and approved by their constituents in a series of public assemblies. This was particularly important in Ecuador, where there was no effective
presidential leadership of the assembly and few other delegates arrived with
coherent reform proposals. Early preparation and strong constituent support
allowed indigenous delegates to focus on building alliances. ~5
In Colombia, indigenous candidates placed 19th and 27th among 70 delegates, an enormous surprise given their lack of resources or campaign experience, the minuscule size of the indigenous population, and its low level of
voter registration. A third indigenous delegate joined the constituent assembly
in April to represent the Quintin Lame guerrillas. ~6 Despite their ideological
and strategic differences, the indigenous delegates presented similar proposals
with respect to indigenous rights and worked together at crucial moments. 17
On one such occasion the latent brinkmanship scenario described earlier became an overt strategy. During the last week of the constituent assembly, indigenous delegates threatened not to sign the agreement if it did not contain
their rights to territorial autonomy. On the last day of the assembly, language
was included creating special indigenous territories with self-governing rights
(Van Cott 2000:77).
In Ecuador, three indigenous delegates and four non-indigenous sympathizers were elected to the 70-seat constituent assembly. All seven represented the
Plurinational Pachakutik Unity Movement (MUPP), which was founded by
CONAIE and other social movements before the 1996 elections. The indigenous movement worked formally from within the assembly through its delegates, and informally as a social movement organization through a lobbying
team composed of CONAIE's experienced leaders and advisors (Nielsen and
Zetterberg 1999). MUPP indigenous delegate Nina Pacari presided over the
Assembly's First Commission, enabling her to control the timing of debate on
collective rights and its submission to the full assembly. In addition, the MUPP
simultaneously controlled 10 percent of seats in the fragmented National Congress, which remained in session during the Assembly and passed, at a crucial
moment late in the deliberations, ILO Convention 169.~8
In Venezuela, President Ch~ivez fulfilled a campaign promise by reserving
three seats for indigenous delegates in the 131-seat Assembly, all three of which
were filled by militants of the National Indian Council of Venezuela
(CONIVE).~9 The creation of a special status for Indians was unprecedented in
Venezuelan history and crucial to establishing the precedent of special treatment Indians would receive in the new constitution. 2~ In addition, two indigenous activists won seats in the ANC elections representing the states of Zulia
and Amazonas. The indigenous delegates convinced the assembly to dedicate
one of 21 working commissions to the topic of indigenous rights, elevating in
status what most participants had deemed to be a marginal issue. All members
of that committee were indigenous or allied with the indigenous movement.
48
Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
During the assembly 300 indigenous representatives attended a two-day
CONIVE-sponsored congress in Caracas to vote on a single, unified indigenous proposal, which was presented to the assembly president in a formal
ceremony covered amply by national media. The proposal was the fruit of
meetings to reach consensus on a unified platform that had begun in March.
The indigenous rights commission adopted it with technical changes. 21
In Peru, no representative of indigenous organizations served in the assembly. A working group composed of indigenous leaders, anthropologists, and
lawyers met during the assembly and elaborated a proposal on "Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Rights," but only two of its 19 articles were included in the
1993 constitution: the rhetorical recognition of the ethnic and cultural plurality
of the nation and the right to cultural identity, and the right to exercise customary
legal jurisdiction, which already was recognized by law (Urteaga 2000: 287-288).
In Bolivia, despite the fact that no constituent assembly was convened, the
government's ethnic affairs office consulted extensively with indigenous and
peasant leaders during the reform process. Indigenous leaders did not participate in formal discussions, which the president moderated during 1993-1994.
lnfluential Ally
Two types of strategic allies supported indigenous autonomy claims: a coherent center-left bloc within the constituent assembly and a popular president
who dominated the reform process and who supported indigenous rights claims.
The center-left bloc emerged in all three successful cases and none of the two
failed ones. The popular, dominant president emerged in two of the successful
cases and in one of the failed cases. Both types of strategic allies partially
compensated for the weak voting strength of indigenous delegates within the
constituent assemblies. Although international constitutional models were influential, and international experts consulted, external allies had no perceptible influence on the success of autonomy claims.
Coherent center-left bloc allies with Indians. In Colombia, Democratic Action M-19 (ADM-19), the party of the demobilized M-19 guerrillas, won nearly
one third of the seats in the 1990 constituent assembly elections. This stunning
success fractured the long-standing monopoly on political representation enjoyed by Colombia's two traditional parties since the 1950s. Indigenous delegates joined a leftist bloc dominated by ADM-19, which shared leadership of
the Assembly with the Liberal and Conservative parties. In the context of fragmentation and open division within both the Conservative and Liberal parties,
and a two-thirds decision rule in the final round of voting, the leftist bloc of 27
out of 74 delegates had sufficient strength to be included in all significant
substantive and procedural decisions. In return for their support, ADM-19 consistently voted with indigenous delegates on their territorial claims. This alliance was decisive in achieving sufficient support for the Indians' most
controversial proposals--those having to do with territorial autonomy.
The severe fragmentation of Ecuador's political party system gives minority parties a crucial role in the formation of coalitions. The MUPP's 7 delegates, plus three elected on allied lists, formed the basis of a 25-seat center-left
Van Cott
49
minority bloc capable of blocking proposals it opposed when, as commonly
occurs in Ecuador, center-right parties were divided along regional lines. The
center-right majority was composed of the Social Conservative Party (PSC)
(20 seats), Popular Democracy (DP) (10 seats), and several smaller parties and
independents (Andolina 1998:31). In the absence of elite consensus on important issues--chief among them, decentralization and the economic model-MUPP delegates exploited opportunities for strategic alliances (Nielsen and
Zetterberg 1999: 43-46). After the PSC abandoned the Assembly in May 1998
over the issue of privatizing social security and unfavorable changes in the
electoral regime, the center-left bloc completed the constitutional reform under the absolute-majority decision rule.
In Venezuela, President Ch~ivez' populist-leftist Patriotic Pole coalition dominated the assembly under electoral rules that converted 62.5 percent of the
votes into 94.5 percent of the seats. Most delegates were politically progressive and agreed with CMvez' rhetoric that paying the nation's historic debt
toward indigenous peoples was part of the great process of change that was
occurring in the country. The indigenous proposal had a strong affinity with
the human-rights centered, inclusionary, participatory vision of the president's
proposal, to which most assembly members were committed. 22 Opposition to
indigenous rights came from the conservative military sector within Ch~ivez'
coalition and economic elites outside the Ch~ivez coalition with contradictory
interests in the exploitation of natural resources. An intensive four-day negotiating session settled differences between military officers sitting on the Commission on Security and Defense and the Indigenous Rights Commission. Most
of the indigenous rights proposal--including the recognition of autonomous
indigenous municipalities--passed with 128 votes and 3 abstentions (El Universal, 12 Nov. 1999, p. 1). 2~
In Peru's constituent assembly, no leftist bloc emerged. This is attributable
to: the fragmentation of the non-violent left in the wake of the demise of socialism and the Shining Path's selective targeting of alternative civil society
and political party leaders in the previous decade; Fujimori's successful effort
to cripple labor unions and traditional political parties; and the latter's shallow
roots in society and poor performance in office. To protest the president's increasingly authoritarian behavior, the two largest parties decided not to run
candidates (Cameron 1994:155-12; McClintock 1993:112-119). The capture
of top Shining Path leaders two months prior to the constituent assembly elections contributed further to Fujimori's already robust public support. That support, together with manipulation of the constituent assembly elections and the
capacity to outspend rivals by a factor of at least three to one, garnered
Fujimori's coalition an absolute majority in the Democratic Constituent Congress that opened on December 30, 1992. 24
In Bolivia, no coherent leftist bloc with which indigenous organizations might
have allied existed within the national legislature, whose approval was required
twice to pass the Law of Constitutional Reform. The populist parties CONDEPA
and UCS were more interested in securing patronage for their militants than
promoting ethnic rights. The leftist MBL--part of the governing coalition-was too small to challenge S~inchez de Lozada.
Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
50
Popular, dominant president supports indigenous rights. Three of the four
constituent assemblies--Colombia, Peru, Venezuela--are characterized by
strong leadership from a sitting president. Colombia's president C6sar Gaviria
and Venezuela's Hugo Ch~ivez had a significant electoral 25 and substantive
mandate to oversee a radical reform of democratic institutions. Both campaigned
on the issue of constitutional reform. Both strongly supported indigenous rights
proposals during the assemblies, securing the passage of controversial articles
when opposition emerged. In Colombia, President Gaviria supported indigenous rights claims in speeches where he emphasized the importance of the
protection of rights to the quality of Colombian democracy. Gaviria incorporated indigenous rights claims in 1990 in a written agreement (Decree 1926)
among the major parties establishing the scope of reform (Van Cott 2000: 57).
In Venezuela, delegates ambivalent toward indigenous issues demonstrated a
personal loyalty to President Ch~ivez, who already had demonstrated a public
commitment to indigenous rights by naming the first indigenous cabinet member and guaranteeing three indigenous seats in the ANC.
Peruvian President Fujimori also dominated his constituent assembly and
enjoyed strong public support, but he opposed indigenous rights proposals and
they did not prosper. Ecuador's interim president played a minor role, often at
odds with the assembly, and had little influence. In the absence of a presidential ally, Ecuadorian Indians had to rely on their own impressive mobilizational
and negotiating skills, and the strategic opportunities created by the PSC's
abandonment of the Assembly. In Bolivia, S~nchez de Lozada was receptive to
some indigenous claims but not an active advocate of indigenous rights. His
vice president, Aymara leader Vfctor Hugo Cfirdenas, was not the champion of
indigenous rights observers had expected. Cfirdenas preferred to position himself as a political moderate and to devote his energy to educational reform.
Mternative Explanations for Successful Autonomy Claims
Three additional variables may have contributed to the success of autonomy
claims. These did not vary systematically across all nine cases. Nevertheless,
because of their influence in some cases, their explanatory value merits further
study, particularly with respect to cases not considered here.
Decentralization
A strong tendency toward administrative and political decentralization or
federalism appears to be weakly correlated with two successful claims (Colombia and Venezuela) and to provide the possibility for future successful claims
at the state level in another (Mexico). Decentralization facilitates indigenous
autonomy claims by creating a territorial-administrative system in which indigenous autonomy may be inserted as a variant of autonomous subnational
units (Corao 1995: 402--407). 26 Constitutional debates on decentralization enabled indigenous representatives to form alliances with local and regional elites
who favored decentralization. In Colombia, for example, indigenous delegates
on the constituent assembly's Commission on Territorial Organization furthered
Van Cott
51
a process of decentralization that had begun in 1988 by allying with Liberal
Party representatives on the Commission. The success of decentralization alone
cannot be sufficient to achieve recognition of indigenous autonomy, however,
since constitutional reform resulted in municipal political and administrative
decentralization in Bolivia without recognition of indigenous autonomy claims.
Mexico and Venezuela are our only two cases that had federal systems prior
to constitutional reform. In Venezuela, although Ch~ivez thwarted demands for
greater decentralization of political and administrative authority and strengthened executive powers, he could not resist elite and popular demands to constitutionally recognize the current status of decentralization in Venezuelan
l a w - - a quasi-federal system of directly elected governors and mayors
(Combellas 2000: 7-8). The federal system formally recognized by the 1999
Constitution provides an auspicious framework for the realization of autonomy
aspirations. As indigenous delegate Guillermo Guevara explained:
[To] the extent that there exists a true federalism, indigenous peoples and persons inhabiting the most remote zones in the interior of the country can achieve an autonomy
that permits them to develop themselves and to evolve toward better living conditions.
(Translation by the author; cited in Zerpa 1999:16)
Although autonomy claims were denied at the national level, Mexico's federal system provides the potential for successful autonomy claims at the state
level (G6mez Rivera 1999). The prospects for this in Chiapas improved dramatically following the leftist PRD's victory in the August 2000 gubernatorial election, which observers believe offers new hope of successful peace
negotiations with the EZLN. The new governor, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, is
an indigenous-rights lawyer who helped negotiate the San Andr6s Accords (CNN
internet report, 21 August 2000). Indians in neighboring Oaxaca secured statelevel partial autonomy rights in 1995 (Fox et al. 1999).
In Ecuador and Peru no clear push toward decentralization occurred. In Ecuador, highland and coastal elites were sharply divided on the issue of decentralization and reached no consensus. The resulting 1998 Constitution lacks a
clear framework for the practical interpretation of Indigenous Territorial Circumscriptions, which are to have autonomous powers under the new charter. In
Peru, Fujimori centralized power in the executive in order to consolidate and
legitimate his April 1992 self-coup, and to facilitate the imposition of a
neoliberal austerity plan and the unfettered use of executive power to fight the
guerrillas. He also dissolved regional governments and centralized government
administration, thwarting the aspirations of many rural Peruvians, who rejected
the new constitution in large numbers (Fernandez Segado 1994: 28; P~isara
1994: 10).
In Panama and Nicaragua, autonomy regimes were established as anomalous structures within the larger, centralized organization of politics and administration. Larger debates on decentralization--apart from the ethnic conflict
and the historic cleavage between eastern and western Nicaragua--do not appear to have played a significant role in their establishment.
Studies in Comparative International Development / Winter 2001
52
Population Size
The author considered population size as a possible explanatory variable.
Logically, the proportional size of a country's indigenous population might
impact success in achieving its goals either (1) because concession to a proportionately smaller population would present less of a threat to the interests
of political and economic elites or, (2) because a proportionately large population has more resources (voters, demonstrators) on which to draw in its struggle.
Thus, logically, success may be correlated with either a small or a large population. It also is possible that both logics may combine to neutralize any systematic correlation between the size of the indigenous population and the
success of autonomy claims in Latin America.
Table 4 seems to support the first hypothesis. With the exception of Ecuador, the proportion of indigenous population in the "successful" cases tends to
be smaller than in the "failed" cases. The reader should recall, however, that in
order to reduce the number of cases, and to be sure to include cases of greatest
interest to political scientists, the criteria for inclusion of failed cases among
those eligible for consideration under the constitutional reform negotiating site
favored countries with proportionately large indigenous populations. All the
excluded "failed" cases had indigenous populations below 10 percent. The case
selection bias alone may account for the skewed results with respect to population size, since all the other failed cases have small indigenous populations.
Extensive field research--including approximately 150 interviews with participants and analysis of contemporaneous newspaper accounts--in four of the
cases considered (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), and secondary
research on the others, elicited no evidence giving explanatory weight to either
large or small population size.
Table 4
Size of Indigenous Population
CASE (OUTCOME)
Colombia (success)
Ecuador (success)
Nicaragua (success)
Panama (success)
Venezuela (success)
Bolivia (failure)
Guatemala (failure)
Mexico (failure)
Peru (failure)
PROPORTIONAL SIZE OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONa
3.7 percent
25/43 percent
7.6/5 percent
7.8/6 percent
1.5/2 percent
5 I/71 percent
48/66 percent
9.5/14 percent nationally, approximately 1/3 of population of
Chiapas state
38/47 percent
a Estimates of indigenous population vary. Where two figures are given, the first is from Deruyttere
(1997:1), which cites 1993 data from the Interamerican Indigenist Institute. The second, higher
figure is from the web site of the International Labour Organization. Population data for Colombia
is from the 1993 national census.
Van Co~
53
Cohesion and Organization of Indigenous Populations
Indigenous social movements that had generated a relatively cohesive national-level organization proved best able to take advantage of the constitutional reform negotiating site. All three successful cases in this site had unified
national organizations whose delegates participated actively in deliberations
on constitutional reform, while the two failed cases lacked such organizations.
This variable does not appear to operate under the peace talks scenario, where
other variables--such as local military effectiveness--may trump the importance of national-level organizational strength. The organizational cohesion
and strength of the national indigenous movement appears to be particularly
important in Ecuador, which boasts by far the strongest and most experienced
national indigenous organization among our five cases. The greater political
power of CONAIE relative to that of other national indigenous organizations
discussed here is evident from the fact that only in Ecuador was the indigenous
movement a major player in the convocation of the constituent assembly. In
February 1997, after the National Congress ousted Bucaram, CONAIE, working with other social movements and the left, demanded the convocation of an
assembly within 60 days. The interim Alarcon government stalled the convocation until the end of the year, after preparations for a CONAIE-sponsored
"Peoples Assembly" forced the issue to the top of the political agenda.
No national-level indigenous organization exists in Bolivia and the indigenous rights movement was weak at the time of the 1993-1996 constitutional
reforms. The highland peasant confederation, CSUTCB, created in 1979, was
in decline in the wake of harsh structural adjustment policies imposed after
1985 and the emergence of a rival movement to represent peasants through
traditional ethnic ayllu federations37 Amazonian Indians, who formed the
Confederation of Indians of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB) in 1982 to defend territorial claims and oppose timber extraction, were also relatively weak. 28 Thus,
there was no coherent national actor that could mobilize and credibly speak
for the majority indigenous population. This disunity was exemplified in 1996,
when CIDOB and several local peasant organizations negotiated an agrarian
reform law opposed by the CSUTCB. Peru's indigenous movement is arguably
the weakest among our cases. Shining Path guerrillas crippled Peru's incipient
movement in the 1980s by executing civic leaders offering an alternative to
armed struggle. Coordination between highland and lowland Indians has been
delayed by the institution of separate legal regimes in the 1970s and the absence of indigenous identity in the highlands, where an economically focused
"peasant" identity prevails and the term indio is considered an insult (Ardito
1997: 20). Peru's indigenous population only gained a national-level coordinating organization in 1999 (the Conference of Indigenous Peoples of Peru
[COCCIP]). At the regional level, multiple organizations vie for support of the
same population.
The Ecuadorian, Colombian, and Venezuelan movements also suffer from
severe divisions and face organizational challenges. However, they are capable
of unified mobilization at crucial moments and have permanent organizations
that can credibly claim to represent a majority of the indigenous population.
54
Studies in Comparative International Development/ Winter 2001
Conclusion
T h e p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n s u g g e s t s that a u t o n o m y c l a i m s s u c c e e d only w h e n
i n d i g e n o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n s are able to insert t h e m into larger r e g i m e bargains
and w h e n t e m p o r a r y c h a n g e s in the political o p p o r t u n i t y s t r u c t u r e - - o p e n e d
a c c e s s to d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g spheres and the e m e r g e n c e o f an influential a l l y - f a v o r i n d i g e n o u s claims. A u t o n o m y c l a i m s are u n l i k e l y to s u c c e e d w h e n they
are a d v a n c e d in isolation, outside the c o n t e x t o f a r e g i m e bargain, w h e r e c l a i m ants are not e m p o w e r e d to reject the entire bargain, and w h e r e they l a c k the
s u p p o r t o f an influential ally.
A p p l y i n g the P O S f r a m e w o r k to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f ethnic
a u t o n o m y r e g i m e s d r a w s attention to the fluid nature o f political life and to the
c a p a c i t y o f social m o v e m e n t s to m o b i l i z e in a r e l a t i v e l y rapid, f o c u s e d m a n n e r
to a c h i e v e a s i g n i f i c a n t f o r m a l c h a n g e in their status with r e s p e c t to the state
and o t h e r political actors. In the s u c c e s s f u l cases d i s c u s s e d earlier, m o s t favorable c h a n g e s in the P O S w e r e t e m p o r a r y b e c a u s e the larger r e g i m e bargain
o c c u r r e d in a relatively short t i m e p e r i o d - - u s u a l l y less than one year. C h a n nels o f access to political p o w e r g e n e r a t e d by c o n s t i t u e n t a s s e m b l i e s and p e a c e
talks c l o s e d o n c e b a r g a i n s had b e e n m a d e and public attention shifted elsewhere.
Notes
l.
2.
3.
4.
Research in Bolivia and Colombia in 1997 was sponsored by a Fulbnght doctoral dissertation
award. Research in Bolivia in 1998 was funded by the Cordell Hull Fund of the Department of
Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Research m Ecuador in 1999 and Venezuela in 2000 was sponsored by a University of Tennessee professional development award. I
would like to thank Willem Assies. Ruth Berins Collier, Jos6 Antonio Lucero, Katbleea O' Neill,
Shannan Mattiace, Sidney Tarrow, Deborah J. Yashar and the anonymous reviewers of this
journal for their comments.
The UN Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
defines indigenous peoples as follows: "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of
society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the bas~s of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems" Martinez
Cobo (1987: para. 379).
The descendants of African slaves and European and Asian immigrants rarely have made territorial claims, preferring improved treatment or a zone of "personal autonomy" for their members' religious or cultural practices (Wade 1997: 36-39).
The choice of a POS framework is not meant to diminish the importance of identity-construction and expression to the emergence, maturation, and success of indigenous social movements. Identity is one of many tools strategically mobdized by indigenous orgamzations, as
well as an autonomous cultural project in its own right. However, I concur w~th Foweraker
(1995: 16) that strategic approaches have been under-utilized in explaining the "why" and
"how" of social movements, particularly in how the changmg constraints in the political environment enabled historically weak actors to mobilize with unexpected effectiveness since the
transition to democracy. Strategic approaches shift the focus to the political system and the
state and to how indigenous movements developed over time in relation to changes in the
structure of the state, the correlation of political forces, and the emergence of political allies.
Van Cott
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
55
Thus, while acknowledging the importance of identities to indigenous peoples' politics, I focus on factors that have received less attention from scholars.
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. Uruguay has
virtually no indigenous population.
In the last 15 years, major constitutional reforms took place in Latin America as follows:
Argentina (1984), Bolivia (1994), Brazil (1988, 1994, 1997), Chile (1989, 1994, 1997), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1996, 1997), Ecuador (1997, 1998), Guyana (1999), Mexico (1994,
1995), Nicaragua (1987, 1995), Panama (1994), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1997)
and Venezuela (1999).
Although anthropologists work in all countries of Latin America, most political scientists studying indigenous politics favor the countries with the larger indigenous populations.
Law 2 of 1938 recognized the Comarca of San Blas. In 1945 the Kuna and the government
created a constitution that formalized the scope of regional governance. In 1953 the Panamanian congress passed comprehensive legislation concerning autonomy rights on San Blas (Howe
1986: 19-20). The Kuna General Congress was recognized as the maximum authority of the
Comarca pursuant to Law 16 of 1953. Constitutional recognition was achieved in 1972
(Stavenhagen 2000: 10).
Armed conflict erupted in February 1981 after the Sandinistas arrested some 50 MISURASATA
leaders. MISURASATA had been formed in November 1979 with Sandinista support to represent the three main indigenous groups on the Atlantic Coast and to indoctrinate the population in Sandinista ideology. The organization soon became an opponent of the government,
which was unable to challenge its hegemony in the region, due to the lack of government
officials who could speak indigenous languages or English. The 1981 arrests were intended to halt MISURASATA's increasing cooperation with the U.S. Embassy and to prevent the public presentation of MISURASATA's radical territorial demands--covering nearly
one third of national territory--which were sure to win widespread support on the coast. Outraged, thousands of MISURASATA supporters fled to Honduras, where they joined ex-Somoza
National Guardsmen (Hale 1994: 135). In 1982 internal leadership disputes led to the creation
of MISURA.
Peace talks with MISURASATA began in October 1984; they were halted in May 1985 in
response to pressure on MISURASATA leader Brooklyn Rivera from the United States and
other disagreements (Sollis 1989:510-511). They resumed in 1988, after the autonomy law
already had been approved. Peace talks with one MISURA leader concluded in an agreement
in May 1985. Remaining MISURA leaders, unsatisfied with the agreement continued aggressions against the Sandinistas under the aegis of a new organization, KISAN.
I am grateful for the insights of Rachel Sieder and Roderick Leslie Brett, on this point (personal communications, September 2000).
The Mexican autonomy movement has suffered from divisions over the geographic scope of
autonomy. Within the EZLN, and among indigenous organizations, there is a debate over two
models: a multiethnic model based on Nicaragua's multiethnic regions, which would create a
fourth level of government between the state and municipality, and a monoethnic model, which
would create autonomous units at the community, municipal or regional level.
Interviews, Jorge Le6n, Quito, 17 July 1999; Luis Verdesoto, Quito, 3 August 1999.
Interviews, Horst Grebe, La Paz, 30 May 1997; Juan Crist6bal Urioste, La Paz, 25 April 1997.
Interviews, Myriam Jimeno, Bogot~i, 6 February 1997; Jorge Ledn; Luis Verdesoto.
Demobilized guerrillas were allowed to send a representative. Those representing smaller groups,
like the Quintin Lame, had "voice" but no vote.
Interviews, Crsar Gaviria, Washington, December 1996; Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, Bogot~i, 28
January 1997; Humberto de la Calle, Bogotfi, 20 February 1997.
The importance of ratifying ILO Convention 169 is beyond the scope of the argument. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Colombia and Ecuador ratified the convention during their
constituent assemblies; Bolivia (1991) and Mexico (1990) did so prior to the emergence of the
negotiating site; Peru ratified the convention the year following the 1993 constituent assembly;
Guatemala did so in 1996 to fulfill its commitment made in the 1995 Accord on Indigenous
Identity and Rights. Other Latin American countries ratifying the convention are Costa Rica
56
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Studies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopment/ Winter2001
(1993), Honduras (1995), and Paraguay (1993). Argentina signed the convention in 1992, but
ratification documents have not been deposited with the ILO.
The delegates were chosen to represent the east, west, and south through a series of regional
and national indigenous congresses sponsored by CONIVE and its regional and local affiliates.
Interview, Janet Kelly, Caracas, 15 May 2000.
A group of dissenting, mainly Waytiu, Indians affiliated with the Democratic Action party
submitted its own proposal (El Mundo, 13 Oct. 1999, p.3). Interview, Luis Jestis Bello, Puerto
Ayacucho, Venezuela, 23 May 2000; Beatriz Bermtidez, Caracas, May 2000.
Interview, Maria Pilar Garcia-Guadilla, Caracas, 16 May 2000.
Interviews, Luis Gomez Calcafio, Caracas, 15 May 2000; Janet Kelly; Luis Jestis Bello. In
addition to Ch~ivez the Indians had a crucial ally in Foreign Minister Jos6 Vicente Rangel, who
published the ministry's position on indigenous rights in national newspapers on 9 November
1999. Rangel argued that recognition of Venezuelan Indians as "peoples" would not threaten
the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the republic (El Nacional, 9 nov. 1999).
Fujimori's coalition won 38 percent of valid votes in compulsory elections for the 80-member
assembly, five times more than any other party (The Economist, 28 Nov. 1992, start page 43,
via web).
Gaviria won more than twice the votes of his closest competitor; Ch~vez trounced his opponents with the largest victory margin in 40 years of democracy.
As an adviser to Nicaragua's MISURASATA argued,
Indigenous self-determination means simply decentralization. Control by Indians over Indian
affairs, lands, and resources, which would not threaten the central government, rather it would,
if anything, strengthen it politically, economically, and militarily. (Gonz~les 1997:251, citing
unpublished document by geographer Bernard Nietschman.)
Interviews, Rodolfo Erostegui, La Paz, 21 April 1997; Carlos Camargo, La Paz, 16 June 1997.
Ayllus are collectively owned, discontinuous territories located at differing elevations to allow
for more diverse economic production. They are governed by traditional Aymara and Quechua
authorities in western highland Bolivia.
Interviews, Ivan Arias, La Paz, 3 June 1997; Gustavo Fernandez, La Paz, 9 June 1997; Juan
Crist6bal Urioste, La Paz, 25 April 1997.
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