A DANGEROUS NEUTRALITY: RONALD REAGAN, ARGENTINA, AND
THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS
_______________
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University
_______________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
History
_______________
by
Ramiro Juan Frausto
Summer 2016
iii
Copyright © 2016
by
Ramiro Juan Frausto
All Rights Reserved
iv
Dedicada a las mujeres de mi vida: mi esposa, mi madre, y mis hermanas.
No fui solo yo, fuimos todos nosotros.
v
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
A Dangerous Neutrality: Ronald Reagan, Argentina, and the South
Atlantic Crisis
by
Ramiro Juan Frausto
Master of Arts in History
San Diego State University, 2016
Cold War historians traditionally portray Third World nations as trapped between two
world superpowers, however, the reality is complicated and much more interesting. While
the Cold War often played out in foreign theatres through foreign actors, the world was not a
static chessboard and these actors were not simple proxies. On the contrary, the United States
and the Soviet Union struggled to manage the regional politics of nonaligned nations and the
goals of their own international agendas. In Latin America, where the Cold War was rarely
cold, political and military leaders adopted strategies of accommodation or opposition to
negotiate their asymmetric positions. Thus, this thesis seeks to address the Cold War myth of
superpower bilateralism through a transnational analysis of the Falklands War/Guerra del
Atlántico Sur. I argue that President Ronald Reagan collaborated with the Argentine military
in Nicaragua and El Salvador as a means to circumvent public opinion and congressional
oversight. The Argentine decision to invade the Malvinas/Falklands Islands imperiled this
strategy and forced the Reagan administration into a compromised position. While Argentine
leaders hoped to capitalize on their budding alliance with the Reagan administration, the
British expected nothing less than complete political and military support.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………...v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………….vii
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................1
1 SEEKING A THIRD WAY IN THE “THIRLD WORLD”………………………………...8
2 FRAGILE FRIENDSHIPS………………………………………………………………...32
3 A DANGEROUS NEUTRALITY…………………………………………………………55
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………71
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………78
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the unconditional support of my
family.
Mamá, gracias por todo lo que has hecho por mí y por nuestra familia. Con fé y amor
nos enseñaste que tenemos que seguir luchando para salir adelante. No tengo palabras para
demostrarte cuanto te amo y agradezco todos tus esfuerzos. Tú eres el angel que Dios envió
para cuidar de nosotros, tus hijos. ¡Que Dios y Maria Santísima siempre te bendigan!
To my loving wife, Tanya, thank you for all of your unconditional love, patience, and
support. I could not have done this without you! You were always there to pick me up when I
became frustrated or disillusioned. You always believe in me, even when I do not believe in
myself. I thank God every day for bringing you into my life. I look forward to creating a
lifetime full of joyful memories and adventures with you, you and me against the world.
Adriana, Lupita, Gaby, Rosie, and Katy, thank you for all that you have done to help
your little brother succeed. I could not have asked for five better or crazier sisters to grow up
with. Adriana, thank you for all that you have done for our family. Sometimes, I think you do
not truly understand what you have done for us. I still remember the day you took me to
SDSU with you, it helped shaped the work I do and the man I am today. Thank you. Lupita, I
will never forget the time you took me shopping for a new outfit. During a time that we had
nothing, this selfless act gifted me with a sense of pride for which I will always be grateful.
Gaby, I will never forget the week you used your hard earned money to buy me and Katy
lunch every day. Your generosity has no limits. Thank you for always being willing to help
in every way. Rosie, you love without pretense, thank you for always being there for me
unconditionally. Your love and generosity sustained me during a tumultuous time in my life.
viii
Thank you. You still have more to do in this world, Rosa Mariposa, I look forward to seeing
what comes next. Katy, you were my partner in crime, sensei, bully and body guard. Thank
you for always looking out for me, which you continue to do to this day. You are a beautiful,
generous soul. I love you all and I am proud of the family we created!
Youngblood, God sent you to our family at a time that I desperately needed a male
role model. Thank you for being the man that you are. The days you spent studying on a
broken-down pool table in the refuge of the old sunroom showed me the lengths one should
go to in order to achieve academic success. Thank you for the countless memories, I love you
brother.
Tío Rafael, Tía Nena, Tío Ramon and Tía Norma, thank you for all that you did to
help my mother and our family during the darkest of days. I have no doubt that we would not
be in the place we are today without your love, sacrifice, and support. Thank you, Tío Ramon
and Tía Norma, for always welcoming me into your home and for never giving up on me.
You welcomed an extra child into your home and on your family vacations. Some of the
most beautiful memories of my childhood would not have been possible without your love
and generosity. Thank you.
Shelley, thank you for being an amazing and supportive boss and friend. You never
failed to support my requests throughout this entire process. Thank you for your
unconditional support and faith. May God continue to bless you and Ricky in all of your
endeavors.
1
Introduction
From 1947 to 1991 the world endured forty four years of political tension during
which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. vied for economic, political, and cultural supremacy. Historians
traditionally portrayed Third World nations as trapped in the middle of an ideological war,
forced to align with one of the two diametrically opposed superpowers. This reoccurring
myth of the Cold War functions under the assumption that the Americans and Soviets
manipulated emerging nations as pawns in their proxy wars. The storytellers of our society
reinforce this myth. In literature, film, and primary studies, the United States and Soviet
Russia appear as omnipotent powers determining the destiny of the world. Yet the reality is
complicated and much more interesting. While the Cold War often played out in foreign
theatres through foreign actors, the world was not a static chessboard and these actors were
not simple proxies. On the contrary, the two superpowers struggled to manage the regional
politics of nonaligned nations and the goals of their own international agendas.
In Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser’s anthology, In from the Cold: Latin
America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, eleven North American, Latin American, and
European scholars begin to dispel the myth of a bi-polar conflict by providing examples in
which developing nations influenced, if not determined, the course of the Cold War. In “The
View from Havana: Lesson’s from Cuba’s African Journey, 1959-1976,” Piero Gleijeses
argues that Cuba skillfully exercised political and military agency by defying the U.S. in a
theatre where it was relatively weak, Africa. By engaging in the battle for Angolan
2
independence, the Cubans succeeded in intercontinental military intervention, while avoiding
direct conflict with the U.S. and maintaining the support of the Soviets. In
“Transnationalizing the Dirty War: Argentina in Central America,” Ariel C. Armony
confronts the bipolar narrative and expands the lens through which we examine regional
conflict by illustrating Argentina’s political and military autonomy. Politically, the Argentine
government asserted its right to pursue self-serving policies by selling grain to the Soviet
Union during the U.S. embargo. Militarily, Argentina projected influence beyond its borders
as a leading force against Communism in Latin America, a position the Argentine Military
Junta sought to exploit during the Falklands War.1
This thesis builds on the work of these scholars to continue deconstructing the Cold
War myth of superpower bilateralism. Specifically, I examine the 1982 conflict between
Argentina and the United Kingdom to explore how regional politics complicated U.S. foreign
policy during the Cold War. What appeared to be a distant battle over an insignificant group
of islands became an international incident, which forced the Reagan administration into a
compromised position between two strategic allies: one emergent, one eternal. While
Argentine leaders hoped to capitalize on their budding alliance with the Reagan
administration, the British expected nothing less than complete political and military support.
By initially declaring neutrality on the issue of sovereignty and then subsequently supporting
the British, the Reagan administration managed to disappoint both its British and Argentine
allies. Thus, I ask: 1) What need did the Reagan Administration have for Argentine allies?
2) Why would the Argentine Military Junta pursue a policy of accommodation with the U.S.?
1
I recognize the contested sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Therefore, the islands are referred to
by both names throughout the work.
3
3) And most importantly, what happened to this arrangement when U.S. and Argentine
interests conflicted?
In order to understand the nuances of the Reagan administration’s actions during a
blatant act of Argentine aggression, it is vital to investigate the relationship between
Argentina and the United States during the years leading up to 1982. In March of 1976,
General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Brigadier General
Orlando Ramon Agosti led a right-wing coup d’état in Argentina. Ruling as a Military Junta,
the government quickly turned into a dictatorship that utilized brutal tactics to extinguish
internal dissent; these violent, clandestine methods of psychological warfare epitomized the
Junta’s “Dirty War.”2 After consolidating power in Argentina, the military government began
to persecute external “communist threats” by exporting its terror tactics throughout Latin
America.3 In Nicaragua, for example, the Junta gained regional influence by providing
training and resources. In addition to selling military equipment to Nicaragua’s dictator,
Anastasio Somoza, Argentine military officials provided instruction in suppression tactics,
which included: disappearances, compartmentalized task forces (for kidnapping, murder,
intelligence, etc.), the use of unmarked cars and men in daylight operations, and the notorious
use of planes and helicopters to carry out politically motivated murders.4 Although successful
in the Latin American arena, President Jimmy Carter ultimately severed diplomatic relations
with Argentina in protest of the systemic violations of human rights. The Presidency of
The term “Dirty War” is used throughout this work as it is currently understood in political writings. However,
it is important to note that the conflict was not a war between two belligerent forces but instead an era of state
sponsored violence against a domestic population.
3
Ariel C. Armony, “Transnationalizing the Dirty War: Argentina in Central America,” In From the Cold: Latin
America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke UP,
2008), 143.
4
Ibid., 146.
2
4
Jimmy Carter ushered in a brief but decisive break with the prevailing approach to U.S.
foreign policy during the Cold War.
Argentina’s frosty relationship with the U.S. did not last long however. Weary and
demoralized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, double-digit inflation, the Iranian
Revolution and subsequent hostage humiliation, and the OPEC-induced oil crisis, American
voters perceived Carter as weak and ineffective. Ronald Reagan, in contrast, embodied a
return to prominence. By promising to restore American self-confidence and rebuild U.S.
national power he achieved one of the greatest victories in American electoral history.5 Thus,
the election of Ronald Reagan transformed Argentina’s Dirty War from liability to asset as
President Reagan sought to engage rollback policies.
Far from the Soviet sphere, Nicaragua emerged as a strategically viable theatre for
Reagan to enact his aggressive foreign policy and establish political credibility at minimal
risk and cost.6 The Reagan administration entered the Whitehouse during a period of
emerging autonomy of Latin American states, and in the wake of American failure in
Vietnam and the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Direct intervention presented too great a
risk because it would reinforce the Democratic Party’s critique of Reagan as warmonger and
jeopardize his domestic economic agenda. Therefore, he moved to revitalize covert
operations in Latin America.
The Reagan administration and the Argentine Junta found a common enemy in the
Sandinista government. To Reagan, the Sandinistas epitomized the threat of expanding
Communist influence in the west. To the Junta, Nicaragua was “the Cold War’s new
5
Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War,
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 122-123.
6
Ibid., 126.
5
‘ideological frontier’ in the Western Hemisphere and a dangerous sanctuary where the
surviving remnants of Argentina’s decimated Montonero and Ejercito Revolucionario del
Pueblo guerrillas had fled to regroup.”7 More importantly, however, the Junta sought to
realign with the United States in order to secure military aid, bolster its regional influence,
and gain protection from international criticism of its human rights violations.
The relationship between the Reagan White House and the Argentine Junta flourished
on the shared commitment to the expulsion of leftist movements throughout Central and
South America. Within a month of the inauguration, high-ranking Argentine and U.S.
officials embarked on several visits to Washington D.C. and Buenos Aires in order to achieve
their respective agendas. The U.S. sought support for its Latin American rollback policies
and Argentina sought U.S. aid and support in the international arena. The relationship paid
dividends almost immediately for the Argentine military leadership in the form of support in
the United Nations and revived aid and loans. Bolstered by this early success, the Junta
calculated U.S. silent consent, if not cooperation, into the Malvinas Islands campaign.
Moving beyond an exclusively diplomatic treatment of U.S.-Latin American
relations, my research engages in a transnational analysis of President Reagan’s Cold War
strategy in Central America. I hope to contribute a unique interpretation by applying two
concepts put forth by Harvard political scientist Stephen Walt. According to Walt, other
governments utilize the strategies of “regional balancing” and “bonding” to contend with
U.S. hegemony.8 I argue that the Argentine Military Junta utilized regional balancing as a
tactic to maintain influence throughout Latin America especially as its domestic control
7
Ibid., 134.
In Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy Stephen Walt details strategies of
opposition and accommodation to U.S. policies. For the purposes of this thesis, I only introduce two strategies
of accommodation.
8
6
began to wane, and bonding as a strategy to gain U.S. support in order to mitigate
international criticism of Argentine human rights violations and ultimately in its ill-fated
decision to invade the Malvinas.
In Chapter One I examine Reagan’s decision to expand the role of Latin American
anti-communist policy and policy makers in Central America. Through an analysis of U.S.
public opinion and the tensions between Reagan and Congress, I seek to illuminate the
complex political environment of that era. I argue that although Carter did not win a second
term, the human rights sentiment that initially brought him to the White House lingered long
after he was gone. Both American public opinion and Congress would constitute an
enormous obstacle to Reagan’s Cold War strategy in Central America. This domestic
resistance, especially in the case of widely publicized human rights violations in El Salvador,
forced the Reagan administration to collaborate with Argentina in its attempt to suppress
counterinsurgency.
In Chapter Two I build on the work of Armony’s Argentina, the United States, and
the Ant-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977-1984 by investigating the impact on
the social identity of anti-Sandinista forces. In addition, I provide an analysis of the political
motivations for the Junta’s decision to support President Reagan’s operations in Central
America. I contend that the Argentine Government utilized “regional balancing” as a tactic to
relieve internal tension and bolster its domestic authority. Furthermore, I seek to demonstrate
Argentine political agency through the Junta’s decision to employ “bonding” as a tactic to
gain U.S. support in the form of loans, military aid, and protection from international
criticism of its human rights violations.
7
Chapter Three is an in-depth examination of the diplomatic crisis created by the 1982
invasion of the Malvinas Islands. Through a thorough analysis of U.S. diplomatic cables,
National Security Council meeting notes and other White House documents I argue that
Reagan faced internal and external pressure to appease both his Argentine and English allies,
and ultimately managed to antagonize both. In addition, I argue that the Argentine Junta
demonstrated complete autonomy by seeking military aid from the Soviet Union in spite of
its own anti-Communist policies.
8
Chapter One: Seeking a Third Way in the “Third World”
In the words of Gilbert M. Joseph, “…Latin America’s Cold War experience was
rarely cold.”1 Almost immediately after the Allied Victory, Latin American nations were
burdened with the “Third World” label attracting unwanted attention from the two competing
superpowers. Most political scientists identify the period between the early 1950s to the
1990s as the height of U.S. Cold War interventionism, acknowledging that the gradual
consolidation of democracy in the 1990s ended unilateral U.S. domination. In this narrative,
President Reagan emerges as the final Cold Warrior ushering America to victory. In this
chapter, I provide a contrasting narrative exposing how even the capacity to execute covert
operations in Latin America was increasingly challenged in the 1980s. Through an
examination of U.S. public opinion and the tensions between Reagan and Congress, I seek to
illuminate the complex political environment of that era. I argue that although President
Jimmy Carter did not win a second term, the human rights sentiment that initially brought
him to the White House lingered long after he was gone. Both American public opinion and
Congress constituted an enormous obstacle to Reagan’s Cold War strategy in Central
America. This domestic resistance, especially in the case of widely publicized human rights
Gilbert M. Joseph, In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M.
Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke UP, 2008), 3.
1
9
violations in El Salvador, forced Reagan to collaborate with Argentina, which was already
actively combating leftist movements in Central America.
The U.S. identity in 1980 was deeply wounded. Widespread unemployment and
uncontrollable inflation dominated the domestic political agenda; stagflation had taken its toll
on the American Dream. The United States was losing in the international arena as well.
Only four years after the humiliating U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis served as further visceral illustrations of American
frailty. Enter Ronald Reagan: charismatic, well-spoken, and unapologetically belligerent.
Reagan was the quintessential cure for the Carter syndrome. The 1980 Republican platform
tapped into the very tangible fear of American vulnerability: “These events…mark a
continuing downward spiral in economic vitality and international influence. History could
record, if we let the drift go on, that the American experiment, so marvelously successful for
200 years, came strangely, needlessly, tragically to a dismal end early in our third century.” 2
Although obviously hyperbolic, Republicans articulated the widespread concern that Carter
had strayed too far from American interests in pursuit of a global community, a criticism the
Reagan campaign would exploit throughout the months leading to the election.
The criticism painted Carter as a naïve do-gooder who passively allowed the Soviet
Union to increase its international influence. In Latin America specifically, Carter’s Human
Rights agenda produced adverse effects on U.S. national interests. It was during the Carter
administration that leftists seized power in Nicaragua, and destabilized El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala. The Administration’s alienation of conservative dictatorships
compounded these foreign policy failures. Relationships that were built over decades of
2
Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1980," July 15, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844.
10
military and economic cooperation were terminated or strained in light of human rights
violations. Former director of the Defensive Intelligence Agency and Reagan advisor on
military matters, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, condemned Carter’s policy, “There is a growing
hostility toward the United States all over the region, [you] can’t find one country which is
more friendly to us now than when Carter took office.”3
In contrast to Carter, Reagan embodied the romantic bravado of the old western
cowboy. Where Carter stressed diplomacy and compromise, Reagan proposed “peace
through strength.”4 Where Carter addressed international incidents as independent
occurrences, Reagan espoused the policy of “linkage.” Where Carter saw violators of human
rights, Reagan saw allies in the Cold War. Although effective, the hardline rhetoric exposed
Reagan to the accusation of warmongering which would follow him into his presidency.
Addressing the Soviet threat was a priority of President Reagan’s agenda and within
the first month of his administration he initiated plans to address that threat. In determining
where to focus U.S. efforts, El Salvador emerged as the most attractive option because it was
a low-cost, high-reward opportunity to indirectly confront the Soviet Union. The offensive
strategy, however, was immediately constrained by public opinion and congressional
opposition. The Administration countered this domestic resistance with the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (C.B.I.), but ratification proved too cumbersome. Reagan and his advisors quickly
realized that congressional legislation was a slow and ineffective mechanism through which
to achieve an aggressive Cold War strategy. In response, the Administration sought to
Stephen Kinzer, Globe Correspondent. “Latin Rightiests Hope for Reagan Win.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997
Fulltext), Oct. 07, 1980, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294011646?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5,
2012).
4
Ibid.
3
11
collaborate with Argentina in order to circumvent congressional oversight and avoid stoking
the fears of a war-weary public.
The “Reagan Doctrine” of rollback interventionism initiated a new and unprecedented
phase in the Cold War, which moved beyond containment strategies to actively sponsoring
“counter-revolutionary” campaigns. William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence,
articulated the internal justification for U.S. interventionism in a letter to President Reagan.
In the letter, Casey warns that the Soviet influence in Central America posed the greatest
threat to the U.S. margin of safety, citing the fulfillment of Nikita Khrushchev’s prophecy
that “Communism would ‘win not by nuclear war, which could destroy the world, not by
conventional war, which could lead to nuclear war, but by wars of liberation.’”5 The wars of
liberation Casey referenced had occurred on every major continent; Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Nicaragua illustrated the success of subversive Soviet
imperialism.6
The first meeting of Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC) concentrated on
addressing Soviet-backed Cuban influence in the Caribbean Basin. The thirty-three states of
the Caribbean Basin posed a threat because they were “small, beset by problems, and
vulnerable to outside force.”7 Although the Reagan team understood that socio-economic
turmoil was one motivating factor, Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted that the
“countries could manage if it were not for Cuba.”8 Cuba quickly emerged as the ubiquitous
boogeyman, subverting the American effort and spreading the Marxist plague.
5
Letter, William J. Casey to Ronald Reagan, Dec. 10, 1984, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat Meeting Files, NSC
61-70, Box 2, Loc: 152/01/7, Ronald Reagan Library.
6
Ibid.
7
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 2, Executive
Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
8
Ibid.
12
The NSC meeting narrowed in on the deteriorating situation in El Salvador. The
recent Sandinista victory in the neighboring state of Nicaragua posed the greatest threat to the
U.S.-backed government because of its potential to serve as a gateway for Cuban support.
Secretary Haig and Director Casey reported that the Cubans had already shipped 700 tons of
arms into El Salvador.9 Haig called for an immediate response, “The first order of business is
to show the Nicaraguans that we will not tolerate violations as did the past administration.”10
And although there was no explicit reference to a domino effect in Central America, he was
quick to invoke the Vietnam metaphor, “The worst thing would be to have the U.S. dragged
into another draining experience like Vietnam.”11 The council ultimately decided to test the
new strategy in El Salvador. This strategy was particularly attractive because it allowed the
Reagan administration to address all of the regional issues. If successful, it would accomplish
three very important goals: 1) provide a politically legitimate reason for intervention in
Nicaragua, 2) prove the benefit of alignment with the U.S. to the developing world, 3) and
put a very public end to Cuban adventurism in the Western Hemisphere. President Reagan
reiterated his purpose, “For too many years, we have been telling adversaries what we can’t
do. It’s time we make them start wondering what we will do.”12
Although the Reagan administration operated in a strict Cold War context, it was not
oblivious to social and economic turmoil in Central America. In January of 1981, one month
before the first NSC meeting, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, described
the situation in El Salvador. In his description, Allen painted the nation as a “small
overpopulated coffee republic with a tradition of oligarchical rule and military repression of
9
Ibid., 3.
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 4.
12
Ibid., 6.
10
13
popular discontent.”13 In essence, it was like many other countries in the region, which is
why it was so dangerous. El Salvador was an archetype of social unrest in Latin America.
The success or failure of the U.S. effort in the small coffee republic would reverberate
throughout the developing world.
The developing world, however, had become much more complex. Criticism of
Reagan’s aggressive tactics emerged early in his first term. Latin America had changed
dramatically from the days when the U.S. could act unilaterally with impunity and regional
support. Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela illustrated the rising autonomy and
political agency of Latin American states. Mexico and Venezuela, in particular, utilized their
oil wealth in dealing with the U.S. and expanding their influence in the region.14
Many of these nations drew upon their own experience when identifying that poverty
and political repression were key factors driving leftist popular movements, factors that the
Cubans exploited but did not create. In fact, by 1981 fourteen Latin American nations had
embassies in Cuba, compared to only one in the early 1960s.15 The trend toward political
autonomy was growing throughout Latin America. In 1965 the Organization of American
States (O.A.S.) overwhelmingly endorsed the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic.
Less than two decades later the O.A.S. refused the U.S. request for an inter-American
military force in Nicaragua.16 Reagan and his administration were faced with a particular
13
Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 2, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC
1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
14
Alan Riding, Special to the New York Times. “News Analysis; REAGAN AND THE LATINS; Foreign
Policy Third in a Series of Occasional Articles on International Problems Facing the Reagan Administration.”
New York Times, Feb. 13, 1981, http://search.proquest.com/docview/424061020?accountid=13758 (accessed
October 5, 2012).
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
14
challenge; they had to implement an offensive Cold War strategy without the historic ability
to rely on broad regional support.
The strategy in El Salvador consisted of a three-tiered approach. The first tier aimed
to put a decisive halt to purported Sandinista interventionism in El Salvador. The second tier
provided economic aid to the struggling Salvadoran Junta. Finally, the third tier provided for
military support which included military training teams (M.T.T.) and military hardware.
The National Security Council moved first to address the external threat of Soviet
insurgency. According to NSC intelligence, Nicaragua was the gateway for Soviet-backed
Cuban infiltration in El Salvador.17 A 1982 intelligence assessment detailed Sandinista
efforts “to create a modern military establishment capable of defending against any regional
threat in Central America.”18 The Nicaraguan effort to create a “greater military power ha[d]
dovetailed with the Communist attempts to expand influence in Central America.”19
According to the report, which was admittedly limited by “information shortfalls,” the
U.S.S.R., in conjunction with its European satellite states, and Cuba provided approximately
$127 million in arms and other materials to Nicaragua in 1981. In February 1981, American
intelligence reports estimated that approximately 800 tons of arms were allocated for El
Salvador from Soviet surrogates. At the time of the report 200 tons had already reached El
Salvador and an additional 600 tons remained in Nicaragua awaiting transshipment.20 The
Nicaraguan threat had to be addressed; the U.S. could not allow external forces to undermine
its efforts in El Salvador. President Reagan stressed this point to his cabinet, “if the Junta
Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, “El Salvador,” Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat:
Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
18
Intelligence Assessment, Office of Global Issues, “Nicaragua: Arms Buildup,” Nov. 1982, pg. 1, Executive
Secretariat Meeting Files, NSC 61-70, Box 2, Loc: 152/01/7, Ronald Reagan Library.
19
Ibid., iii.
20
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Central America,” Feb. 11, 1981, pg. 1-2, Executive Secretariat:
Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
17
15
falls in El Salvador, it will be seen as an American defeat…we must not let Central America
become another Cuba on the mainland.”21
In dealing with the Nicaragua issue, Reagan had inherited a convenient bargaining
chip from his predecessor. In 1979 President Carter diplomatically acknowledged the
Sandinista government, and provided approximately $100 million to support the recovery
effort and to bolster the private sector after the devastating civil war. In 1980 the U.S.
Congress authorized an additional $75 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) contingent
on the determination that “the Government of Nicaragua was not aiding or abetting violence
in other countries.”22 In 1980 the Sandinista regime was on the brink of failure. The
economic recovery was failing, relations with neighboring and donor countries were
becoming strained, and popular support was waning.23 However, because the Sandinista
government was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Nicaraguan state, the
Reagan administration had to be careful not to publicly violate American law or alienate an
autonomous Central American nation. To Reagan’s benefit, the contingency within the aid
made him responsible for determining Nicaragua’s compliance, which provided the
proverbial stick and carrot.
In 1981 the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, issued a 30-day
deadline to cease the arms shipments into El Salvador or risk losing U.S. economic aid.
According to the American report, the Sandinistas admitted their involvement and guaranteed
that “they w[ould] stop because ‘the revolution [wa]s more important to them than victory in
21
Ibid., 5.
Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9,
1981, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
23
Ibid., 3.
22
16
El Salvador or friendship with Cuba.’”24 The Reagan administration responded with a
calculated delay of the President’s determination. By delaying the determination, the U.S.
bought time to ensure Nicaraguan compliance, remove non-essential embassy personnel, and
temper the Nicaraguan government’s handling of propaganda regarding the determination.25
As long as the carrot was still present, the Sandinista government would not react to the stick.
In addition to maintaining Nicaraguan cooperation, the delay served to undermine the
Sandinista government. By delaying $15 million of the $75 million, Reagan was able to put
additional pressure on the failing economy, which was already incapable of sustaining itself
or feeding the population.26 Furthermore, by delaying the badly needed funds, Reagan was
able to exacerbate the dire situation in Nicaragua and remind the developing world of the
challenges faced by those who did not align themselves with U.S. interests.27
Although Reagan was successful in temporarily quelling Nicaraguan interference,
that was not the only goal. In fact, it was not even the main goal. The larger objective, as
defined by Department of State internal documents, “was not the Nicaraguan role in El
Salvador, but the Cuban role.”28 In order for Reagan to successfully effect his Cold War
policy in Central America, however, he had to gain the support of Congress and the
American public.
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin – Poland – F15s (S),” Feb. 18, 1981, pg. 3,
Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
25
Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9,
1981, pgs. 4-5, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
26
Maggie Rivas and James L. Franklin, Globe Staff. “Ex-Nicaragua Official Raps Aggression’ Under Reagan.”
Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Apr. 03, 1981,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294079287?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012).
27
Ibid.
28
Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9,
1981, pg. 4, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
24
17
From the beginning, Reagan and his administration understood the limitations of
congressional oversight. Strategy meetings were replete with congressional references;
members of the NSC constantly made recommendations with the contingency that they be
approved by Congress. In a November 10, 1981, NSC meeting on the American strategy
toward Cuba and Central America, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David
Jones, articulated the impediment caused by Congress, lamenting that even “Castro knows
the President needs congressional support.”29 Because the Reagan administration interpreted
the leftist movements in Central America as a consequence of Cuban adventurism, they
sought to pressure Castro into talking. In contrast to Carter, who offered negotiations if Cuba
ceased to export its revolutionary efforts, the Reagan administration sought a reinterpretation
of brinksmanship. El Salvador and Nicaragua were the proving ground for the real world
application of “peace through strength,” a strategy that would be ineffective if the Reagan
administration were hamstrung by Congress.30
As expected, the administration encountered political opposition from the outset of
operations in El Salvador. One of the first groups to oppose the strategy was the Members of
Congress for Peace Through Law, a bipartisan group composed of members from both
chambers. On February 26, 1981, approximately seven weeks after Reagan was sworn into
office, Senator Carl Levin invited Ambassador to El Salvador under President Carter, Robert
E. White, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, to debate the issues. The
gist of the debate focused on the necessity of American intervention in El Salvador.31 White
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America,” Nov. 10, 1981, pg.
3, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 21-30, Box 3, Loc: 152/01/07, Ronald Reagan Library.
30
Ibid.
31
“Arms Aid and Advisers: Debating the New Policy in El Salvador.” New York Times, Mar. 08, 1981,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/424070211?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012).
29
18
applauded the Administration for effectively addressing Nicaragua’s involvement in El
Salvador, and argued against further military assistance. He insisted that “Now was the time
– when the leftists had been defeated – to emphasize a political solution.”32 In response,
Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that although the move was sufficient to stop Nicaragua, the
U.S. still had to deal with the Soviets. When White asserted that the new administration was
guilty of overenthusiastic involvement in El Salvador, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reiterated the
legitimacy of the threat, “I think that there’s only one power that is actively involved in
Central America, and it’s the Soviets by way of the Cubans.”33 The contentious debate
foreshadowed the resistance Reagan would encounter in implementing an offensive Central
American strategy.
The main challenge was that two tiers of Reagan’s three-tiered approach to El
Salvador hinged on his ability to secure congressional support. The strategy called for
increased economic aid to bolster the fledging economy of the Salvadoran government. In
fiscal year 1981 the U.S. provided $61 million in aid “directed primarily at employment
generation, support of private sector output, and agrarian reform.” 34 The preliminary report
generated for Reagan by Richard Allen on February 17, 1981, called for an increase of
approximately $100 million dollars and additional funding from the Export Import Bank.35
The economic aid was also intended to address Reagan’s critics, who accused him of
warmongering and overlooking the socio-economic turbulence in the developing world.
32
Ibid.
Ibid.
34
Memo, to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador,” Feb. 17, 1981, pg. 5, Executive
Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
35
Ibid., 6.
33
19
Unfortunately for Reagan, this strategic approach would also endure congressional
chastisement.
Though President Carter’s humanitarian diplomacy was not politically successful, the
emphasis on human rights persisted. As early as January of 1981, bills were introduced into
Congress to stop aid to El Salvador on a humanitarian basis. On April 2, 1981,
Representative Stephen J. Solarez introduced House Bill 3009. Entitled the El Salvador
Assistance Act of 1981, the bill made all future grants of military and economic aid to El
Salvador contingent on President Reagan’s certification that the Salvadoran government: was
not engaged in consistent human rights violations, achieved control of the armed forces;
implemented economic and political reform, moved toward free elections, and demonstrated
a willingness to negotiate a diplomatic end to the conflict.36 Reagan and his cabinet protested
the stipulations, arguing that the requirements compromised the Salvadoran government’s
ability to continue fighting its volatile civil war. In an attempt to sway the Senate Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Reagan sent President Jose Napoleon Duarte to testify on the limitations
caused by the legislation. President Duarte asserted that “the restrictive language would be
‘an unacceptable imposition on a government friendly to the United States.’”37 Unfortunately
for Reagan and Duarte, their protestations were to no avail.
The House bill was eventually incorporated into Senate Bill 1196, a broader piece of
legislation that applied similar stipulations to all U.S. military and economic aid. The bill
passed through a Republican-dominated Senate with a vote of 57-42 and was signed into law
36
El Salvador Assistance Act of 1981, Bill Summary and Status 97 th Congress (1981-1982) H.R. 3009, The
Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov.
37
“Reagan and El Salvador.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Nov. 07, 1981,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/249219121?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012).
20
by President Reagan on December 29, 1981.38 Although an initial success for Reagan’s
detractors, the law was limited in application. Amid reports in the New York Times and
Boston Globe of a government massacre in the mountain village of El Mozote, Reagan
certified the Salvadoran government on January 28, 1982, clearing the way for $25 million in
military aid and $40 million in economic assistance.39 Because the Act did not provide a
means for a congressional challenge to the President’s certification, $65 million in combined
aid was sent to the Salvadoran government based primarily on President Reagan’s word.
Though Reagan was able to maneuver through congressional provisions, it was evident that
the days of unencumbered intervention in Latin America were quickly fading, a fact that was
not lost on the Department of State.
The third tier of Reagan’s approach consisted of military aid to El Salvador. Again,
Reagan’s strategy was at risk of congressional authority. The ability to deploy American
forces is governed by the War Powers Resolution, which requires the President to consult
with Congress when utilizing the armed forces.40 Furthermore, the rise in regional criticism
and the domestic pressure to avoid another Vietnam greatly influenced the Administration’s
decision to maintain a low military profile. In addition, an increased U.S. presence would
blur the line between “trainer” and “advisor,” creating the opportunity for the legitimate
introduction of Cuban and Nicaraguan advisors.41Adjusting for this limitation, the military
effort was consciously inconspicuous. It consisted mainly of M.T.T.s and Operational
Planning and Assistance Teams (O.P.A.T.). The deployment of M.T.T.s and O.P.A.T.s was
38
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Bill Summary and Status 97 th Congress
(1981 – 1982) S.1196, http://thomas.loc.gov.
39
“Reagan’s Certification Reported Given Salvador.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Jan. 28, 1982,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294085746?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012).
40
Memo, to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador,” Feb. 17, 1981, pg. 7, Executive
Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
41
Ibid., 4.
21
intended to utilize the Salvadoran armed forces in order to demonstrate the Junta’s autonomy
and minimize U.S. visibility. And although the initial presence of M.T.T.s did not trigger the
War Powers requirements, the Reagan administration fully expected to introduce more
American military personnel into El Salvador. The Department of State considered several
options to circumvent congressional authority, but ultimately accepted that the strategy
would need some form of congressional support.42 In an effort to avoid conflict with
Congress, the Department of State encouraged Reagan to involve “Congress directly in
deciding how the U.S. should respond to [the] communist challenge close to the United
States.”43 The stifling nature of these limitations made collaboration with Argentina, a Latin
American regime already involved in Central American operations, all the more appealing.
In executing their Cold War policy, Reagan and his administration made a concerted
effort to avoid the constraints of Congress, and they were successful to a limited degree.
Ultimately, however, they had to contend with more than just congressional conflict; they
also encountered resistance from the American public and the international community. In
the eyes of the American public, only six years removed from the ravages of Vietnam,
Reagan posed a threat to peace. This concern was present even before Reagan was President.
In a New York Times/CBS poll administered in September of 1980, 35 percent of those polled
registered a concern that Reagan would lead the U.S. into war.44 When contesting aid to El
Salvador the following year, Republican Representative, Silvio O. Conte, cited the increased
correspondence he had received from his constituents. According to Conte, of the 600 letters
he had recently received, they were approximately twenty-five to one against military aid and
42
Ibid., 7-9.
Ibid., 7.
44
Adam Clymer. “Reagan and Carter Exchange Charges on Election Fears.” New York Times, Sep. 23, 1980,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/423971749?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012).
43
22
advisors in El Salvador.45 Similarly, aides to Republican Senator and chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and Sponsor of Senate Bill 1196, Charles H. Percy, reported
that the Senator had received over 300 letters a week, 75 percent of which expressed
opposition to the military aid.46 Representative Michael D. Barnes, Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Latin America, concurred with his colleagues that “El
Salvador was the ‘heaviest issue around’ and that ‘100 percent’ of his letters were against the
Administration’s policy.”47
It would be an overstatement to assert that the increased correspondence represented a
unanimous American opinion however. In fact, a Gallup poll taken in March of 1981
revealed that only 63 percent of Americans were informed on the El Salvador issue. In the
poll, “informed” was defined as aware of the struggle in El Salvador and knowledgeable of
the American stance. Of the 63 percent that were “informed,” 28 percent recommended some
form of assistance. However, only 2 percent of the 28 percent that advocated involvement
supported sending American troops.48 Polemics aside, what is evident from the reports of
increased congressional correspondence and public opinion polls is that opposition to
American involvement prompted congressional action, and those who did advocate action
supported a non-military approach.
In addition to the fear of becoming embroiled in yet another Cold War quagmire, the
Reagan administration had to contend with post-Cold War attitudes. Senator Paul Tsongas of
Massachusetts articulated this new understanding of conflict in Central America and the
Judith Miller, Special to the New York Times. “Congress Mail Heavy on El Salvador Issue.” New York
Times, Mar. 26, 1981, http://search.proquest.com/docview/424058971?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5,
2012).
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
45
23
developing world. In his criticism of Reagan’s policy, Senator Tsongas drew on his early
experiences as a Peace Corps volunteer in Africa in the 1960s asserting that the East-West
approach was “all right when you’re dealing with Europe or Russia, but it doesn’t make
sense when you’re dealing with the third world.”49 Tsongas’ attitude was shared by many
leaders in the international community. French Foreign Minister, Jean Francois-Poncet,
whose government strongly opposed Soviet interventionism, called for an emphasis on
“reform and political reconciliation” in lieu of a military solution.50 In Latin America, where
the OAS had recently demonstrated an increased independence and a deliberate shift away
from U.S. cronyism, the sentiment was the same. Mexico and Venezuela, both of which were
demonstrating increased autonomy as a result of oil wealth, expressed their belief that
turmoil in El Salvador was the result of the “intolerable condition of life in that beleaguered
land,” as opposed to a “’textbook case’ of Soviet-inspired insurgency.”51 It appeared that
Reagan’s policy in El Salvador had drawn criticism on every front. Congress, the American
public, and the international community were hesitant to accept the old argument that Soviet
insurgency justified American interventionism.
President Reagan responded to the intense public criticism with the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. A Central American reinterpretation of the Marshall Plan, the policy called for
$650 million in economic aid, $60 million in military aid, and trade incentives to countries at
the greatest risk of Cuban-inspired insurgency. Reagan had long accused the Carter
Benjamin Taylor, Globe Staff. “N.E. Congressmen Lead El Salvador Opposition.” Boston Globe (Pre-1197
Fulltext), Feb. 24, 1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5,
2012).
50
Bernard Gwerzman, Special to the New York Times. “REAGAN’S MOVES ON SALVADOR MEET WITH
MIXED RECEPTION; News Analysis. “New York Times, Feb. 26, 1981,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).
51
“America’s New Foreign Policy.” New York Times, Aug. 23, 1981,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).
49
24
administration of undermining American interests by alienating U.S. allies and empowering
leftist revolutionaries. He moved to rectify the situation by enacting a sustained policy that
demonstrated American resolve. Reagan put the stakes into perspective for his National
Security Council, declaring that “Cuban adventurism must be met in our own front yard not
only to defend our local interests, but also to defend our global stakes in the rule of law and
international order….”52 In developing its strategy, the Administration recognized that
“unless the root social, economic, and political causes [were] effectively addressed,
insurgency remain[ed] an ever-attractive alternative for the alienated population.”53
Furthermore, it became the useful political token C.B.I. architect and National Security
Advisor, Richard Allen, called for at the Administration’s first NSC meeting, “We need a
positive policy for the region that provides justification for everything we do.”54
By the time C.B.I. was announced in February of 1982, Reagan was a veteran of
congressional warfare. When he requested economic aid for the Salvadoran government, it
was tied up for several months in political wrangling. When he moved to introduce military
personnel in El Salvador, Congress responded with allegations of warmongering and invoked
references to Vietnam. C.B.I. was an intentional effort to address his critics and reestablish a
strong working relationship with Latin American neighbors. Strategically announcing the
initiative at a meeting of the Organization of American States, Reagan moved to reframe his
Cold War rhetoric asserting that socio-economic turmoil had “provided a fresh opening to the
Memo, L. Paul Bremer to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for NSC Meeting March 26,” March 24, 1981, pg. 2,
Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
53
Ibid., 10.
54
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 6, Executive
Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
52
25
enemies of freedom, national independence and peaceful development.”55 C.B.I. was his
economic weapon; a weapon that would make a strong statement to the world while keeping
American boots off foreign soil. The initiative received mixed reactions. Some critics
focused on the conspicuous fact that a large portion of the aid would be sent to El Salvador
and that although the funds were intended for economic development, there were no
restrictions on its use.56 Domestically, criticism focused on Reagan’s willingness to spend
money abroad while executing huge budget cuts at home.57 Even though he enjoyed the
benefit of a Republican-dominated Senate, it would be another two years before the initiative
was ratified by Congress. Reagan was repeatedly forced to justify an aggressive Cold War
strategy; it appeared that the Administration’s policy in Central America was destined for
political limbo. There was another option, however, an option his predecessor was not
willing to exploit.
In November of 1979, Georgetown Professor, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, published an
impressively comprehensive analysis of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy in
Commentary Magazine. In the article, entitled “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” she
dissected Carter’s policy with academic precision. Her criticism focused on the failure of a
policy built on an impractical humanitarian ideology, “The foreign policy of the Carter
Administration fail[ed] not for lack of good intentions but lack of realism about the nature of
traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the relation of each to the American national
“Reagan Unveils Caribbean Plan; Hopes to Aid Trade, Ensure Security in Region.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997
Fulltext) Feb. 24, 1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5,
2012).
56
Curtis Wilkie, Globe Staff. “Reagan Proposes $350m Aid Plan for Caribbean Area.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997
Fulltext), Feb. 25, 1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5,
2012).
57
Associated Press. “Central Americans Split on Reagan Plan.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Feb. 25,
1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).
55
26
interest.”58 Kirkpatrick illustrated the consequences of this approach through the examples of
Iran and Nicaragua, citing that the Administration not only failed to achieve its goal, “it
actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests
with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.”59
The article’s greatest impact was its eloquent articulation of the realpolitik approach
that Reagan would espouse throughout his presidency. In addressing the corruption of
dictatorships, a concept that strikes at the very heart of American democracy, Kirkpatrick
observed that leftist autocrats were guilty of the same vices. Through her perspective, rightwing regimes were the lesser evil because of their proclivity toward American interests.
Building on her analysis of Iran and Nicaragua, she highlighted the value of both, asserting
that they “were not only anti-communist, they were positively friendly to the United States.”
They were active in Washington political and social spheres, they consistently voted in
accord with the U.S. in the United Nations, and they “regularly support[ed] American
interests and positions even when these entailed a personal and political cost.”60 Kirkpatrick
was so successful in articulating the failures of the Carter administration and the justification
for allying with right-wing autocracies, Reagan recruited her into his administration and
appointed her as his Ambassador to the United Nations.
The impact of this shift in U.S. foreign policy is best illustrated by the Latin
American response to the Carter-Reagan campaign. As early as July of 1980, Carter’s efforts
in Guatemala were impeded by the impending vote. Ruling generals and conservative
businessmen spurned Carter’s call for further land reform and the nationalization of the
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Dictators and Double Standards,” Commentary, November 1979, pg. 13,
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standards/.
59
Ibid., 1.
60
Ibid., 2.
58
27
country’s banks, opting instead to gamble on a Reagan victory.61 In Bolivia the sentiment
was much the same. After the July 17th coup of the Bolivian government, Carter cut off
economic aid. The director of Bolivia’s national bank registered his response in the New York
Times, stating his confidence that Reagan would restore the aid if elected, “After all he said,
‘we are fighting against communism just as you are.’”62 In El Salvador, the results of the
election became apparent within sixteen days when two murder victims were discovered with
a sign that declared, “With Ronald Reagan, the miscreants and guerillas [sic] of Central
America and El Salvador will be finished.”63 Although the latter incident was the fanatical
expression of right-wing extremists, it is a poignant example of the potential impact of U.S.
foreign policy in Latin America. Because of their parallel political interests right-wing
regimes understood their value to a President like Reagan. After all, subversive socialist
movements posed the same threat to Reagan’s policy as they did to conservative
dictatorships. These benefits would be almost immediately exploited by a Reagan
administration facing consistent pressure and criticism from Congress, the American public,
and the international community.
Reagan’s willingness to work with right-wing regimes was evident throughout his
election campaign. He consistently criticized Carter for destabilizing U.S. foreign policy and
alienating American allies. In contrast to Carter’s emphasis on diplomacy, the Reagan
Alan Riding, Special to the New York Times. “U.S. Loses Ground in Central America and Backs Changes in
Bid to Recoup, New York Times, (1923-Current File); July 9, 1980; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New
York Times (1851-2008) pg. A10, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed
October 5, 2012).
62
Frank del Olmo, “For Reagan, New Trouble to the South? Some in Latin America Think He Could
Encourage Military Regimes There,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File); Sep. 4, 1980; ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008),
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).
63
“Reagan and Latin America.” The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1980,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).
61
28
doctrine asserted that the best defense was a strong offense, and he moved to establish that
offense prior to being elected into office. In October of 1980, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham visited
Argentina on Reagan’s behalf; the prototypical nation that Reagan referred to when
condemning Carter of alienating U.S. allies in Latin America.64 After assuming power in
1976, the Argentine Military Junta embarked on a campaign to persecute socialist
movements within Argentina and throughout Latin America. As a result of this campaign and
the subsequent litany of human rights violations, the Carter administration severed
diplomatic relations with the country. When commenting on these abuses, Graham
emphasized Reagan’s realpolitik approach, “One has to treat it as an independent state….We
didn’t create the situation down there and we can’t change it that much.”65 Another Reagan
advisor, Roger Fontaine, went further, declaring that “as President, Reagan would ‘stop
engaging in public pillorying of the regime.’” In the context of Kirkpatrick’s intellectual
argument and Reagan’s political stance, Argentina emerged as a valuable resource for
pursuing the Administration’s policy in Central America.
In the early stages of strategic planning for the deteriorating situation in El Salvador,
Reagan made his stance very clear to his administration. From the NSC meeting notes it is
evident that Reagan operated in a strict Cold War rationale. He reminded his staff that the
conservative dictatorships, which had been so badly chastised by the previous administration,
were not “as guilty of human rights violations as [were] Cuba and the U.S.SR.”66 He further
encouraged them to reestablish these relations, proclaiming that “We don’t throw out our
Stephen Kinzer, Globe Correspondent. “Latin Rightiests Hope for Reagan Win.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997
Fulltext), Oct. 07, 1980, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294011646?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5,
2012).
65
Ibid.
66
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 4, Executive
Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
64
29
friends just because they can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights.”67 Ambassador
Kirkpatrick, the author of “Dictators and Double Standards,” emerged as the architect of the
Administration’s strategy. Illustrating the value of these relationships to her NSC colleagues,
she asserted that “El Salvador had to be stabilized first. Then we should move on Nicaragua
and let others do the work for us.”68
The work that Kirkpatrick referred to was training. However, sending the requisite
military personnel into El Salvador was a very delicate issue within the Reagan
administration for various reasons. Domestically, it was an unattractive option because it
would require congressional approval under the War Powers Resolution. Even worse, it
would serve to substantiate Democratic claims that Reagan was a warmonger, embroiling the
U.S. in a tragic reenactment of Vietnam. Internationally, deploying military personnel would
send the wrong message to Latin American leaders. In friendly nations, it threatened
governments looking to remain independent. To Cuba and Nicaragua, an augmented
American force could serve to legitimize the introduction of communist advisors into El
Salvador.69 Again, it was Ambassador Kirkpatrick who stressed the Argentines as a viable
solution, noting that “The Argentine military has a very good training capability and [were]
active in Bolivia.”70 It was a political no-brainer. Collaborating with the Argentine military
would allow the Reagan administration to pursue an offensive strategy in El Salvador while
circumventing congressional authority, evading the Vietnam issue, reassuring Latin
American allies, and avoiding political legitimation for Cuban interventionism.
67
Ibid.
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America,” Nov. 10, 1981, pg.
4, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 21-30, Box 3, Loc: 152/01/07, Ronald Reagan Library.
69
Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, “El Salvador,” Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 3, Executive Secretariat:
Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
70
Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9,
1981, pg. 5, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
68
30
By the time President Reagan took office, the global political climate had changed
dramatically. Gone were the days when U.S. policy makers could rely on unanimous regional
support for unilateral policies in Latin America. Longtime client states such as Mexico,
Venezuela, and Brazil demonstrated increasing autonomy and expanded their influence in the
region. Even crossing the communist line was no longer as dangerous as it once was, as
evidenced by Argentina’s disregard for Carter’s Soviet grain embargo.71 More importantly,
communism had established a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The successful Cuban
Revolution and subsequent efforts to support emerging communist movements in Africa and
Latin America undermined U.S. hegemony. The consequence of this diminished influence
was clearly illustrated by the OAS’ refusal to support an inter-American intervention in
Nicaragua. In sharp contrast to the overwhelming support for the occupation of the
Dominican Republic in 1965, many Latin American states were now openly pursuing their
own agenda independent of U.S. policy.
The domestic political climate had also been transformed. The moral and military
superiority that followed World War II had been overshadowed by political scandals and the
Vietnam tragedy. Americans were now much more aware of the domestic consequences of
U.S. foreign policy and were less willing to send young men to die for policy alone.
Additionally, the human rights agenda that had been growing in Congress since the Nixon
administration was now strong enough to influence U.S. policy makers.72 Backed by a
deluge of correspondence from concerned citizens, legislators from both parties constituted a
major obstacle to President Reagan’s strategy in El Salvador. Constrained by the Congress
Ariel C. Armony, “Transnationalizing the Dirty War,” in In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter
with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke UP, 2008), 141.
72
James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Military Dictatorship in the United States
(Durham: Duke UP, 2010), 248-253.
71
31
and U.S. public opinion, Reagan sought to collaborate with Argentina because they were
already active in the region and they were free of congressional oversight. Understanding
Reagan’s motives for pursuing an Argentine alliance only provides partial context; as we will
see in Chapter Three, the Junta accommodated Reagan’s strategy in order to further
Argentine interests.
32
Chapter Two: Fragile Friendships
On March 24, 1976, a military junta led by the commanders in chief of the army,
navy, and air force executed a coup of the Argentine government. The Junta seized a nation
in the throes of chaos at the hands of left and right wing terrorism, guerilla activity, economic
turmoil, and a vacuum of political power.1 The Junta proclaimed its plan to resuscitate the
nation’s once glorious past. Known as the “Proceso,” the Act of National Reorganization
consisted of a goal-oriented strategy intended to restore morality, representative democracy,
national security, and economic efficiency.2 The promise of recovery, however, devolved
into an era of repression that projected beyond Argentine borders. National security,
ultimately defined by the Junta as the elimination of any political opposition, became a
central tenet of the Proceso almost immediately and the justification for international
tyrannical repression.3
The March 1976 coup initiated seven years of state-sponsored violence perpetrated by
a military government committed to exterminating the Marxist threat in Argentina and
throughout Latin America. In Argentina, the government maintained control through a
calculated program of fear.4 Life under the Junta included the omnipresent threat of torture,
1
Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 19771984 (Athens: Ohio UP, 1997), 4.
2
David Pion-Berlin, “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983,” Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (1985): 57, http://www.jstor.org/stable/165718.
3
Ibid.
4
Armony, Argentina, the United States and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 5.
33
murder, or worse. From 1975 to 1980, more than 6,000 people were disappeared by the
Argentine armed forces.5 In Latin America, the Argentine government and military supported
right-wing authoritarian governments by providing military aid and counterinsurgency
training. Through its training programs and military relationships, the Argentine government
built a network of anti-Marxist regimes and projected its fear-based tactics throughout the
region.
Through an analysis of the Argentine Junta’s foreign policy during the Carter and
Reagan Administrations, I seek to specify the political motivations for the Junta’s decision to
support President Reagan’s operations in Central America. I contend that the Argentine
Government utilized a “Bonding” tactic to relieve internal tension and bolster its domestic
authority. As defined by Stephen Walt, Bonding involves cultivating a close strategic
relationship with key U.S. leaders with the intention of gaining direct influence over U.S.
policy deliberations and foreign policy initiatives.6 In effect, the Argentine Government
provided its military network in exchange for loans, military aid, and protection from
international criticism of its human rights violations.
In the’ article “The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the
‘Dirty War’ in Argentina,” David Pion-Berlin analyzed the authoritarian response to political
dissension during the Proceso. According to Pion-Berlin, the Argentine Junta ignored
political components, utilized terror versus development to influence the general public, and
ultimately “redefined the subversive threat to become a catchall for all enemies of the state.”7
Juan de Onis, “Argentina Arrests Key Rights Activists,” New York Times, March 1, 1981, pg. A1, Proquest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
6
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company Ltd., 2006), 191.
7
Ibid., 402.
5
34
In the wake of stalled reform, the Military Junta declared a counterinsurgency war on its
citizens and identified any political dissident as an insurgent.
The emphasis on state security over other aspects of the National Reorganization
Process was evident to all observers, and specifically to the United States. In a confidential
cable to the U.S. Secretary of State, officials at the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires
commented on the government’s tactics, “Moral and long term political costs appear less
important than security considerations.”8 By all accounts, the Junta successfully defeated
Montonero guerilla combat forces by the end of 1976; however, state violence actually
increased in 1977 and remained at a similar level throughout the Junta’s tenure.9 The initial
campaign to neutralize Montonero opposition evolved into a permanent state of repression
that projected beyond Argentine borders.
A select group of political actors, including various U.S. officials, welcomed
Argentina’s thrust into Central America. Retired U.S. Colonel, John Collins, for example,
urged the geopolitical consideration of guerilla warfare combatants such as Võ Nguyên Giáp,
Ho Chi Minh, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.10 By the time the Military Junta took power in
Argentina, Cuba and Vietnam represented successful guerilla campaigns that resulted in
Communist states. The 1979 victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
created a regional threat; a concern the Junta took very seriously. They also felt deserted by
the U.S.
U.S. embassy, Buenos Aires, confidential cable, “The Tactic of Disappearance,” to Secretary of State,
September 26, 1980, quoted in Ibid., 8.
9
Pion-Berlin, “The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina,”
Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 3 (September 1988): 385.
10
Ibid.
8
35
The Presidency of Jimmy Carter ushered in a brief but decisive break with the
prevailing approach to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. In contrast to his
predecessors, Carter supported popular movements and broke ties with authoritarian
governments. The passing of the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment in 1976 and President
Carter’s very public criticism of human rights violators significantly strained the relationship
between the United States and Argentina. By 1977, the relationship was functionally
terminated when Argentina rejected a diminished aid package that President Carter attributed
to unchecked human rights violations.11 To Argentina and its allies in Latin America, the
U.S. appeared to have abdicated its role as defender of Western ideals against the threat of
Cuban and Soviet interventionism in the Western Hemisphere. This perception grew in
consequence after the Carter administration ended military assistance to Chile, Uruguay, and
Argentina.12 In the words of one Brazilian official, “the Southern Cone was abandoned, just
as Angola was abandoned, and just as South Africa is being abandoned now.”13 The resulting
vacuum of influence in Latin America created the purported need for Argentine
interventionism.
Operating in a Cold War context, the Argentine Junta viewed Latin America as the
battleground of the East-West conflict. Thus, the progress of Marxism, victorious in
Nicaragua in 1979 and burgeoning in El Salvador, epitomized the threat of Soviet
expansionism.14 A threat the Argentine military defeated in the Montonero movement. In an
1975 intelligence report produced by the Army General Staff (EMGE), the Marxist
Steven C. Poe, “Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter,”
American Journal of Political Science 36, No. 1 (1992): 158. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111428
12
Ibid., 10-11.
13
Terezinha de Castro, “El Atlántico,” in Geopolítica y Relaciones Internacionales, ed. Luis Dallanegra
Pedraza (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1981), quoted in Ibid., 11.
14
Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 12-13.
11
36
subversive strategy in Argentina was observed to first “win over the psyche of the population
and, subsequently, to take control of the nation’s resources.”15 As the threat expanded
throughout Central America, the Junta utilized the expertise gained from domestic operations
and assumed the role vacated by the Carter administration.
During the 1977 Conference of American Armies (CEA), Anastasio Somoza Debayle
became one of the first beneficiaries of Argentine patronage. At the conference, Somoza met
with Argentine General Roberto Viola and Admiral Emilio Massera who guaranteed their
support for a Somoza led government.16 Argentine support came in the form of military sales
and Argentine advisors.17 Argentina’s Nicaraguan campaign continued through the fall of
Somoza and ultimately translated into extensive support of the Contras. Two years later,
Gen. Viola announced the Junta’s foreign policy at the 1979 CEA, “Argentine armed forces
had both the responsibility and the right to intervene in other Latin American countries in
defense of regimes threatened by ‘internal aggressions.’”18 According to Viola, this conflict
was “Unlike classic wars, this war ha[d] neither a definite beginning in time nor a final battle
crowning its victory.”19 Essentially, the Argentine Junta viewed the entirety of Latin America
as a battleground of international Communism over which it stood alone as the recent victor
of these forces at home. This philosophy fueled the extensive expansion of Argentine
influence throughout the region.
The first major victory of Argentine interventionism occurred in the neighboring
nation of Bolivia. From 1978 to 1980, the Bolivian government suffered through four regime
15
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 77.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid., p. 14
19
Quoted in Donald C. Hodges, Argentina’s “Dirty War”: An Intellectual Biography (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1991), 129.
16
37
changes, including two military coups. By the summer of 1980, the Bolivian Congress
prepared to appoint Hernán Siles Zuazo, the left-leaning Democratic and Popular Unity
(UDP) candidate, as President.20 Siles Zuazo, who had earned the largest share of the votes
during two elections marred by opposition corruption, would have marked the return of
democratic rule. Unfortunately for the Bolivian people, General Luis García Meza’s brutally
violent coup, executed with support from the Argentine military, interrupted the transition to
democratic rule.
Argentina’s role in this bloody chapter of Bolivian history originated within the
leadership of the Argentine Army. In a 1987 Somos magazine interview, Argentine
intelligence officer, Leonardo Sanchez Reisse revealed, “The idea was born in the First Army
Corps and then went to the presidency…All the leadership came from the First Army
Corps.”21 According to Sanchez Reisse, the concept of “ideological frontiers” justified
Argentine interventionism abroad. He went on to define the philosophy, “The idea that
frontiers don’t terminate with the individual geography of each state but that it is necessary to
defend Western politics wherever necessary. That is to say, if subversion fights
internationally there must be an international defense.”22 After the coup, Argentine President,
General Videla, immediately recognized the new government, and declared the move
necessary to prevent a “situation in the heartland of South America that would amount to
what Cuba represent[ed] in Central America.”23 The Argentine Military Junta did not intend
to remain idle in the Cold War game. On the contrary, the lack of a civilian government and
20
Rex A. Hudson and Dennis M. Hanratty, editors. Bolivia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library
of Congress, “Transition to Democracy,” accessed April 4, 2014, http://countrystudies.us/bolivia/24.htm.
21
Interview with Leandro Sanchez Reisse, Somos (Buenos Aires), February 25, 1987, quoted in Peter Dale
Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991), 43.
22
Ibid.
23
Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1980, quoted in Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 44.
38
the extensive influence of military strategy on political policy resulted in an aggressive
international campaign.
U.S. news sources documented the extensive implementation of Argentine tactics that
persisted throughout the coup and into the subsequent regime. The New York Times reported
an estimated two hundred Argentine military personnel active in Bolivia to facilitate the
coup.24 The Los Angeles Times reported methods that mirrored those utilized in the
repression of opposition in Argentina, which included a premeditated list of opponents to
neutralize by means of imprisonment, torture and murder.25 In late 1981, Newsweek reported
the continued role of Argentine influence noting, “At least 40 Bolivian officers ha[d] traveled
to Argentina to study ‘anti-subversive’ techniques.”26 Retired Admiral Alberto R. Varela
revealed the rationalization for extended intervention in a 1993 interview; he stated, “It was
part of the cold war [sic] game. We had to do the dirty job in Bolivia.”27 Thus, the perceived
threat of Soviet-Cuban expansion functioned as ideological justification and political
motivation for Argentine interventionism.
After the success of the Bolivian coup, the Argentine Junta expanded operations into
yet another nation. A mere forty-seven days after the Bolivian campaign, Argentina hosted
the 1980 conference of the Latin American Anticommunist League (C.A.L.). The conference,
hosted by General Suarez Mason, head of the notorious Battalion 601, facilitated
collaboration between Argentine military leaders and like-minded political actors throughout
Latin America. Through cooperation with right-wing governments and militaries, the sphere
24
Ibid.
Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 45.
26
Newsweek, November 23, 1981, quoted in Ibid.
27
Author’s interview with Admiral Alberto Varela (ret.), August 17, 1993, quoted in Armony, Argentina, the
United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 29.
25
39
of Argentine influence grew to include Nicaragua, Bolivia and El Salvador, Guatemala,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Political and military actors of these
nations either collaborated with or benefited from Argentine counterinsurgency tactics,
specifically during the Carter administration’s human rights informed policy toward Latin
America.28
Argentina’s success in Bolivia bolstered its position as a regional power in Latin
America and opened the door for expanded campaigns. While hosting Rafael Flores Lima, a
Colonel in the Salvadoran Army, Argentine General Antonio Vaquero proclaimed, “The
Argentine Army …[understood] and value[d] the struggle of the Salvadoran Armed Forces
and people and [would] provide its assistance, as much as feasible, to a friendly nation in a
difficult situation.”29 In a visit to El Salvador, Gen. Vaquero contextualized this assistance,
“two concepts of ways of life are at stake…on one hand, respect for the dignity of mankind –
God’s creations – and on the other, terrorism, men at the services of an atheistic, omnipotent
state.”30 In response, Salvadoran General, Alfredo Saint Jean welcomed “the Argentine
armed forces [who had] acquired internationally-renowned experience in unconventional
warfare and [were] willing to offer training and all kind of cooperation to allied countries.”31
This scenario reoccurred throughout Latin America. Fearful of socialist movements,
conservative governments welcomed the expertise of Argentine counterinsurgency veterans
to suppress and exterminate the perceived threats.
28
Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 76.
Noticias Argentinas (Buenos Aires), February 24, 1982, quoted in Ibid., 89.
30
Ibid.
31
El Día (Mexico), March 19, 1981, quoted in Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist
Crusade in Central America, 89.
29
40
The Argentine military advisors utilized the same strategy in their Nicaraguan
campaign –contextualizing counterinsurgency training within anticommunist ideologies.
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (F.D.N.) intelligence officer, Rodolfo Ampié Quiróz, shared
his experience in an interview, “The Argentines stressed the fact that the guerilla movements
in Latin America were coordinated under a central command. The FSLN played a major role
in organizing and promoting insurgent operations throughout the hemisphere.”32 Another
Contra fighter, Marian Morales, stressed the same point, “The Argentines emphasized their
anti-Communist zeal and their total support for our cause. They blamed the United States for
failing to prevent Nicaragua’s fall into Communism.”33 The process of politicizing
anticommunist forces was vital for the success of Argentine intervention in Nicaragua and
the subsequent Contra efforts.
The politicization process proved crucial to motivate combatants because the
Nicaraguan Revolution was not a simple dichotomous conflict. While the Argentine military,
and later the Reagan administration, sought to simplify the conflict into an East-West issue, it
was a complex battle between political, economic, and social interests. Contra fighter, Jorge
Ramírez Zelaya, who fled to the Argentine embassy after the collapse of the Somoza regime,
described the process,
The soldiers were indoctrinated with the mystique of the counterrevolutionary
struggle, as it was so beautifully put. It was drummed into them, piece by piece. We
explained to them that we were dealing with a Communist government, under which
human rights were violated, freedom of expression was prohibited, and repressive
mass organization ruled.34
Author’s interviews with Rodolfo Ampié Quiróz, Managua, July 2 and 5, 1993, quoted in Armony,
Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 129.
33
Author’s interview with Mariano Morales, Managua, July 7, 1993, quoted in Armony, Argentina, the United
States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 127.
34
Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón, The Contras: Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas, trans. Synthesis Publications
(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1985), 33.
32
41
Disregarding the tragically comedic hypocrisy, the account reveals the extent to which
ideological indoctrination accompanied tactical training.
As the anti-Sandinista efforts grew to recruit participants lacking an organic political
or historical perspective, military leaders distilled the anticommunist message into simple
rhetoric. The rhetoric honed in on emotionally salient issues ubiquitous in Nicaraguan
society. Contra recruiter, Pedro Espinoza Sánchez, described the challenge, commenting
“They are real farmers and don’t know beans about politics or history. They have also never
been hungry. These were the people we had to win over.”35 To recruit this segment of
society, anti-Sandinista propaganda reduced the FSLN economic policy into one ominous
process, “In this confusion, someone came and politicized me. He made it clear to me that
the revolutionary process would make everything Communist. That’s what it all came down
to. He told me that when you have a cow and Communism comes, the government takes your
cow away.”36
Regardless of the population, recruiters successfully adjusted the process of antiCommunist indoctrination to coincide with the potential recruits’ worldview. When potential
combatants were poor or landless, the propaganda message sought to exploit religious
inclinations. In the case of an impoverished Honduran woman, a devout Catholic who joined
the movement after falling in love with an anti-Sandinista, the propaganda incorporated
religious concerns. Describing her politicization process, she stated, “They told us that the
state was taking everything away from the peasants who had worked their whole lives and
35
36
Ibid., 137.
Ibid., 108.
42
owned very little livestock, and that it was taking over private property, houses for example,
and that there was no religious freedom.”37
Argentine military assistance was vital for the success of the Contra movement,
especially during its initial phases, which occurred during the Carter administration.
Incorporating ideological indoctrination into tactical training also functioned to bolster
Argentine prominence amongst conservative military and political actors throughout Latin
America. F.D.N. intelligence officer, Ampie Quiróz, described his admiration of the
Argentine military, “[They] are first rate professionals: most of us had taken courses with
them at the School of the Americas. [They] had the experience of suppressing the guerilla
movement in Tucumán and we wanted to learn from that.”38
The rise in Argentine regional influence emanated from the success of the Argentine
armed forces. In an interview about his training at the Argentine run Fifth School at Ciudad
Nueva in Tegucigalpa, Contra fighter, Jorge Ramírez Zelaya, was asked about the perception
of the Contra forces, “why is it that in Latin American these military personnel are called
gorillas?” Ramírez Zelaya took immediate offense to the term and admonished the perception
declaring, “I don’t know where that expression comes from, hairy soldiers with clubs…I had
learned technically and theoretically. I did all of this in order to enter the service of my
country after having received this comprehensive training, just like military men do in the
U.S. and Argentina.”39 Thus in seeking to legitimize his training, he demonstrated the
prominence of the Argentine military in the Latin American sphere by invoking the
comparative authority of the United States and Argentina. Upon the inauguration of the
37
Ibid., 60.
Ampié Quiróz interview, quoted in Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade
in Central America, 77.
39
Ibid., 40.
38
43
Reagan Administration, this network of political and military alliances emerged as a strategic
alternative to combat Cuban interventionism in Central America.
In El Salvador, the Administration inherited a Cold War conundrum: how to address
the potential success of another socialist movement in the Western Hemisphere without
stoking the lingering fears of Vietnam. In a CBS News interview with President Reagan,
Walter Cronkite opened with this very question, “Do you see any parallel in our committing
advisers and military assistance to El Salvador and the early stages of our involvement in
Vietnam?” Reagan redirected the question to focus on Cuban and the Soviet interventionism;
he concluded by making the distinction between military advisors that train and military
advisors active in battle.40 Publically, Ronald Reagan struggled to gain support for his
agenda. Privately, in an NSC meeting, he directed his Cabinet to devise an effective strategy
to support the Duarte government without “getting bogged down in that Old Yankee
interventionist question.”41 Ambassador Kirkpatrick recommended a potential solution, “On
the question of training, can we use the Argentines? The Argentine military has a very good
training capability…[they] might help if given the right signal.”42
Indeed, the Argentines showed interest in a renewed relationship with the U.S.;
however, they sought support not surrogacy. The Argentina encountered by the Reagan
Administration showed fierce independence and placed priority on its own domestic issues.
For example, Argentina defied the U.S. grain embargo and maintained favorable trade
relations with the Soviets. In 1981, the U.S.S.R. not only represented Argentina’s largest
40
The Office of the Federal Registry, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982), 191-192.
41
National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin – Poland – F15s (S),” Feb. 18, 1981, pg. 6,
Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.
42
Ibid., 5.
44
export market for grain and beef, it also provided the Argentines with hard water for nuclear
reactors.43 Argentine Foreign Minister, Oscar Camilión asserted that while Argentina
“considered itself a part of the ‘Western World’ it [would] also maintain an independent
posture toward the Soviet Union.”44
The independent posture toward the Soviets derived from economic rather than
political factors. By the early 1980’s, the Military Junta had succeeded in its battle against
internal and external threats; however, it had not attained economic growth or even economic
stability. Thus, the U.S.S.R. provided a viable outlet for Argentine exports and a muchneeded infusion to the economy. Politically, however, the Argentines had much more in
common with Reagan and the United States.
The Argentine Military Junta understood its value to U.S. policy makers. In a 1993
interview, Captain Carlos H. Raimondi, Director of Politics at the Argentine Foreign
Ministry under the military regime, recounted the challenges faced by the U.S., “The United
States was losing the war in Central America. It was a war that the Americans could not win
by themselves. Had they remained alone, there would have been another Vietnam.”45 For the
Reagan Administration and the CIA’s William Casey, the combination of a mutual goal and
an extensive military network in Central America created a very attractive option in
Argentina. According to CIA Deputy Director, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, “Bill Casey was
Edward Schumacher, “Argentine Defends Human Rights Stand: Foreign Ministers Asserts Approach Won’t
Be Changed to Improve Relations with the U.S.,” New York Times, April 13, 1981, pg. A7, Proquest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
44
Ibid.
45
Author’s interview with Carlos H. Raimondi (ret.), Buenos Aires, August 18, 1993, quoted in Armony,
Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 68.
43
45
absolutely delighted. He knew that the Argentines’ hope was to unseat the Sandinistas. And
that was further than the U.S. Congress was ready to let us go.”46
This strategic position allowed the Argentines to pursue a “bonding” tactic, in which
a nation aligns itself with the U.S. in order to gain influence over U.S. foreign policy or
derive favorable treatment. Foreign Minister Camilión expressed the Junta’s intentions in
normalizing relations, “’We hope to reestablish normal relations with the United States...The
United States is a traditional friend and it is an important country with which we have a lot in
common’” In return, “The Argentine military wanted spare parts for its American-made
equipment and military training for its men. But…the most important benefit of resumed
close military relations would be personal contact among senior officers.”47 Ultimately, the
close personal contact extended beyond senior military officers to include the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., the Secretary of State, and even the President.
A string of mutual visitations by high-ranking military personnel and politicians in
the winter and spring of 1981 heralded the resurgent relationship between the Reagan
Administration and the Argentine Military Junta. The visits began as soon as February when
Republican Senator of Mississippi, Thad Cochran, led a five-member mission on a factfinding tour to Argentina, Brazil, and Peru.48 That same week, Secretary of State, Alexander
Haig, met with Henry Ford II to brief Ford before his visits to Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay. The official reason for his trip was to visit Ford plants, but the trip also included a
meeting with each country’s president. The talking points presented to Haig in the
46
Quoted in Joseph E. Persico, Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey: from the OSS to the CIA
(New York: Viking, 1990), 273.
47
“Argentine Defends Human Rights Stand: Foreign Ministers Asserts Approach Won’t Be Changed to
Improve Relations with the U.S.”
48
“U.S. Mission Visits Argentina,” New York Times, February 12, 1981, pg. A13, ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
46
Department of State Briefing Memorandum focused mainly on the U.S. effort to “improve
relations with Argentina across the board.”49 An underlined passage emphasized the key
goals, “achieve improved cooperation on East-West, hemispheric security, and nuclear
issues.”50
Just one week later, Secretary Haig sent retired general and Deputy Director of the
CIA during the Nixon Administration, Vernon Walters, on a goodwill tour of South
American capitals to seek support for U.S. aid to El Salvador.51 In Buenos Aires, Walters met
with President Jorge Videla and President-designate, Roberto Viola, both of whom
capitalized on the opportunity to “bond” with the new Administration. In his meeting with
President Videla, Walters relayed the Reagan Administration’s desire to work with the
Argentines in “a process of consultation with…Friends and Allies.”52 Videla responded with
great appreciation for the consultation, which he acknowledged, “had not been the case in
recent years.”53 He further moved to align Argentine and U.S. agendas, asserting, “Argentina
was a Western nation by choice, not just by geographic accident. [It] recognized the United
States as the natural leader of the west and wished to help…share the burden of the defense
of human freedom in any way [it] could.”54 The meeting with Viola reiterated the
arrangement between Walters and Videla. Viola assured Walters “that he had talked to
49
Briefing Memorandum, 8104285, John Bushnell to Alexander Haig, Your Meeting with Henry Ford II, 5:00
pm, February 13, pg. 3, Digital National Security Archives; Argentina, 1975-1980,
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_
at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAR02374.
50
Ibid., 2.
51
Juan de Onis, “U.S, Improving Ties to Latin Rightists: Reagan Invitations to Generals to Visit Washington
Reflect His Concern Over Security,” New York Times, pg. 4, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York
Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
52
Cable, 001311, Harry Shlaudeman to Department of State, My Talk with President Videla, pg. 1, Digital
National Security Archives, Argentina 1975-1980, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_ at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAR02377.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid., 3.
47
President Videla and that their views were in complete agreement … and he wished to be
helpful in every way he could.”55 Throughout both encounters, Videla and Viola stressed two
main points: they greatly valued consultation with the Reagan Administration and their
willingness to support Reagan’s agenda in Central America.
The flurry of diplomatic engagements did not go unnoticed. In a Special to the New
York Times entitled, “U.S. Military Wooing Argentina, But Rights Issue Could Interfere,”
Edward Schumacher documented the envoys and detailed the tone and implications of the
visits. The visitors included General Edward C. Meyer, the United States Army Chief of
Staff; Rear Admiral Peter K. Cullins, commander of the United States South Atlantic forces;
Admiral Harry Train, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic; and Brigadier General Richard A. Ingram, commander of the Air
Force Command and Staff School.56 In response to inquiries about the dramatic shift in
policy from the Carter years, Reagan Administration officials commented, “the arms sale
embargo [was] counterproductive and human rights in Argentina [had] improved.”57 An
Argentine representative commented on the implications of the resuscitated relationship,
“’this will facilitate political, military and institutional cooperation – and everything you can
imagine – between our two countries.”58 Although the visits remained subdued, the message
was definitely clear to the Argentines who “privately marvel[ed] that a member of the Joint
55
Cable, 001335, Harry Shlaudeman to Department of State, My Talk with President-Elect Viola, pg. 1, Digital
National Security Archives, Argentina 1975-1980, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_ at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAR02379.
56
Edward Schumacher, “U.S Military Wooing Argentina, But Rights Issue Could Interfere,” New York Times,
April 8, 1981, pg. A1, Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (18511993).
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
48
Chiefs of Staff [spent] six days in a country formerly considered of only modest strategic
importance.”59
The diplomatic doors did not only open in Argentina. On the eve of his inauguration,
President-designate Viola arrived in Washington D.C. for a meeting with the nation’s
highest-ranking policy makers. In Washington, Viola met with congressional leaders,
Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Vice President George
Bush, and President Reagan.60 Viola confirmed to news reporters that “his main goal ‘was to
establish very fluid communications channels between the United States and Argentina to
upgrade relations to an optimum level.’”61 Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration sought to
“influence Argentina toward greater cooperation with the West on East-West issues.”62
According to the White House summary of the meeting, both parties agreed to maintain open
communications and collaborate on “any effort to contain Communism and promote
freedom.”63
In addition to bolstered communication channels, Viola sought support for the human
rights issue in Argentina. “There is nothing special to ask except a comprehension of our
problems,” Viola told Reagan. He continued, “The problems belonged in the past, and in the
past a real war was fought in Argentina.”64 By “problems,” Viola referred to the extensive
59
Ibid.
“Argentine, in U.S., Says Ties Are Sure to Improve,“ New York Times, March 17, 1981, pg. A10, Proquest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
61
Ibid.
62
Action Memorandum, NP01871, Memorandum to the President for His Meeting with Roberto Viola,
President-Designate of Argentina, Digital National Security Archives, Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_
at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CNP01871.
63
Memorandum of Conversation, CO00998, Summary of the President’s Meeting with Argentine PresidentDesignate General Roberto O. [sic] Viola, pg. 2, Digital National Security Archives, CIA Covert Operations
1977-2010, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_
at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CCO00998.
64
Ibid., 3.
60
49
cases of disappearances, torture, and murder of civilians committed by the Junta during its
self-declared war on insurgency. In contrast to Carter, Reagan proved much more
sympathetic to the actions of the Junta. Reagan reassured Viola of his stance, “in Argentina’s
past, a real terrorist war had been launched, and the terrorists felt free in taking human life…
he [understood] that firm actions needed to be taken to curb the violence.”65 The meeting
proved fruitful for both parties. The Reagan Administration accomplished its goal of securing
cooperation from Argentina on East-West issues and Argentina succeeded in its goal to
restore good relations with the U.S., previously one its principal critics on human rights
abuses.66
The restored relations paid quick dividends for the Argentines. Upon taking office,
Reagan and his administration lobbied to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment, which
prevented the U.S. from providing military aid to Argentina and other strategic governments.
Although not fully repealed, the request to lift the ban on aid to Argentina passed in the
House of Representatives on May 8, 1981.67 Four days later, the measure passed in the
Senate, with the requirement that President Reagan certify “significant progress” on human
rights abuses by the Argentine Junta.68
In addition to military and foreign aid, Argentina benefitted from international loans
at the behest of President Reagan. On April 6, 1981, the Inter-American Development Bank
65
Ibid., 4.
Cable, AR02385, Alexander Haig to United States Embassy Argentina, Private Visit of Argentine PresidentDesignate Viola, Digital National Security Archives, Argentina 1975-1980,
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_
at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAR02385.
67
“Military Aid for Argentina Passes Hurdle in House: Progress on Rights Reported List of Arms Prepared,”
New York Times, May 8, 1981, pg. A7, Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010)
with Index (1851-1993).
68
Judith Miller, “Senate Panel Votes Curbs on Salvadoran Arms Aid,” New York Times, pg. A10, Proquest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
66
50
approved a $48 million loan to Argentina for an irrigation modernization project. In July of
1981, President Reagan ordered American delegates to support international development
loans totaling $483.8 million to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay after the U.S. State
Department determined that the nations demonstrated significant improvement in human
rights issues.6970 Later that year, on December 20, 1981, the House and Senate approved
President Reagan’s request for $11.5 billion in foreign aid for fiscal years 1982 and 1983,
which included Argentina for the first time since 1978.71
The foreign aid and international development loans provided a new, if brief, boost to
the Argentine economy. However, the greatest benefit of the new relationship with the U.S.
centered on the human rights issue. During the Carter Administration, the Argentine
government suffered tremendous pressure from the U.N. and other international bodies to
improve its human rights record. Unbeknownst to the world, an internal struggle brewed
between junior officers in the military and the military government. In a memo from
Townsend B. Friedman, a senior Foreign Service Office at the U.S. embassy in Buenos
Aires, to the Carter White House, Friedman concluded it possible “that policy-making levels
of the GOA [were] prisoners and victims of the intelligence services…particularly the Army
601 Battalion.”72 Friedman pointed to a series of events in which Battalion 601 acted without
the consent of senior government officials. The kidnapping of Montoneros in Peru and their
subsequent murder caused President Videla to cancel his trip to the nation because Battalion
“Loans Announced for Latin America,” New York Times, April 7, 1981, pg. D15, Proquest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
70
Judith Miller, “U.S., in Change, Is Backing Loans to 4 Latin Lands,” New York Times, July 9, 1981, pg. A1,
Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
71
“Votes in Congress: Last Week’s Tally for the Metropolitan Area,” New York Times, December 20, 1981, pg.
71, Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
72
Memorandum, BO009, Hypothesis – The GOA As Prisoner of Army Intelligence, Townsend Friedman to
Political Files, National Security Archives, Electronic Briefing Book No. 73 – Part I,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/800818dos.pdf.
69
51
601 acted without notifying the Peruvian Government. “Anybody with an ounce of political
sense in the GOA would have aborted, if he had been able, these operations,” Friedman
reported.73 “Of greater concern,” Friedman noted, “is the thought that they or it (the 601)
continue to have extraordinary influence here.”74
In a subsequent memo, Friedman elaborated on the unrest among junior officers.
According to his source, the discontent stemmed from three major issues: 1) the
government’s pro-Soviet foreign policy, 2) dissatisfaction with salaries, and 3) discontent
with the overall performance of José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, Minister of the Economy
under the Videla government.75 The greatest point of conflict, however, is what Viola called
the “Nuremburg” issue, referring the court trials of German officers after World War II. 76
According to U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, Harry W. Shlaudeman, Viola and other senior
officials sought to avoid prosecution for their actions during the “Dirty War.”77 Thus, in
order to avoid prosecution Viola sought support from the U.S. in the U.N., specifically in
avoiding a public accounting of all the civilian casualties and those responsible.
The first foreign policy test of the new relationship between the Reagan
Administration and the Argentine Government emerged in Geneva, Switzerland when the
United Nations Human Rights Commission (U.N.H.R.C.) prepared to investigate reports of
disappeared persons believed to be victims of political violence.78 On January 23, 1981,
73
Ibid.
Ibid.
75
Memorandum, BO011, Townsend Friedman to File, A source in Argentine intelligence services reviewed the
following subjects with me, National Security Archives,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/800821.pdf.
76
Harry A. Shlaudeman, “Fragmentation of Power,” in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, ed. Hans
Binnendijk (Washington: GPO, 1987), 236.
77
Ibid.
78
Cable, 032626, Alexander Haig, Meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Argentina
and Dissappeajances [sic], Digital National Security Archives, Argentina 1975-1980,
74
52
Ambassador Shlaudeman met with Enrique Ros, the Foreign Minister Director of Political
Affairs and Ambassador Gabriel Martinez, Argentina’s Permanent Representative to the
United Nations. Ambassador Shlaudeman reported to the Secretary of State that the
Argentines would “attempt to have the U.N. Working Group on Disappeared Persons placed
under rules of confidentiality…and seek to avoid any mention of specific countries in the
resolution of the WG report.”79 The Argentines prepared to “stonewall” the working group in
an effort to prevent it, or any other international organization, from investigating the
“excesses committed in Argentina’s war against subversion…”80
The consequence of an external investigation far exceeded international criticism or
sanctions; it threatened the very foundation of the Argentine Junta’s power. Presidentdesignate Viola admitted the predicament to Ambassador Shlaudeman, “[he] insisted to me
that any attempt to render an accounting of the ‘disappeared’ would immediately
‘destabilize’ the government. The officers who are vulnerable would conclude that they are
being set up and would act accordingly.”81 Thus, the actions of the U.N. only served to
impede the goal of Argentine reconciliation because it strengthened “those in the officer
corps who played on the fears of their followers in order to prevent liberalization and
maintain the apparatus of repression intact.”82 Meanwhile, the relatively moderate VidelaViola Administration struggled to implement its goals of liberalization under the threat of the
officer corps.
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_
at=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAR02373.
79
Ibid., pg. 2.
80
Ibid., 3.
81
Ibid., 4.
82
Ibid., 5.
53
The Reagan Administration’s decision to support Argentine interests in the U.N.
proved strategic for two reasons. First, the Senate required President Reagan certify
improved human rights conditions in Argentina before it would allow disbursement of
foreign aid. Thus, preventing an in-depth U.N. accounting of Argentine atrocities facilitated
Reagan’s certification while simultaneously preventing his congressional rivals from gaining
political fodder. Second, the Reagan Administration relied on the support of the Argentine
Military Junta in its Central American campaign. The collapse of the Argentine Government
would hinder Reagan’s effort to circumvent Congress’ restriction on U.S. actions in El
Salvador and Nicaragua.
In Geneva, the U.S. delegation declared its intention to vote against European
motions in the U.N.H.R.C. Ultimately, the Argentine delegates reached a compromise that
prevented further delving into Argentine human rights abuses by United Nations
investigators.83 However, the U.S. continued to support Argentine interests in the U.N. On
February 20, 1981, the United States joined Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to vote against a
resolution authorizing the U.N.H.R.C. to continue investigating the human rights situation in
Chile.84 With the support of the U.S., Argentina succeeded in its effort to stave off an
international investigation into human rights abuses. The burgeoning relationship between
the Reagan administration and the Argentine Junta proved mutually beneficial early on. As
we will see in Chapter Three, the Junta sought to leverage this relationship during the
Milt Freudenheim, “The World in Summary: President Reagan Mends Fences South of the Border,” New
York Times, March 22, 1981, pg. E2, Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with
Index (1851-1993).
84
“U.S. Opposes Plan on Rights Issue in Chile,” New York Times, February 27, 1981, pg. A8, Proquest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010) with Index (1851-1993).
83
54
invasion of the Malvinas Islands, which ultimately proved disastrous for the Junta, the
Reagan administration, and their budding alliance.
55
Chapter Three: A Dangerous Neutrality
During the early morning hours of April 2, 1982, approximately 4,500 Argentine
troops stormed the shores of the Malvinas Islands. Within twenty four hours they had
captured the scant British Marine forces and appointed a military governor. That afternoon
over 10,000 Argentines gathered at the presidential palace to hear the victory speech of their
leader, General Leopoldo Galtieri. In a swelling of nationalistic pride the mob of supporters
celebrated the victorious culmination of a 150 year-old stalemate over the sovereignty of the
islands.1 For three quick months in the spring of 1982, this group of islands which Ronald
Reagan once referred to as “that ice cold bunch of land down there,” captivated the American
President’s attention.2
Argentina’s 1982 amphibious assault on the disputed shores of the Malvinas Islands
serves as a clear example of how regional politics could complicate U.S. foreign policy
during the Cold War. The distant conflict over a seemingly insignificant group of islands
erupted into an international incident that forced the Reagan administration into a difficult
position between a N.A.T.O. ally and a strategic Latin American collaborator. While the
British expected to capitalize on their “special relationship” with the United States
(anticipating nothing less than complete political and military support), Argentine leaders
Situation Report 1, Falklands Islands Working Group, April 2, 1982, folder “Fontaine , Roger W.: RAC Box
8, WHORM: Alpha File, Ronald Reagan Library.
2
Louise Richardson, When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 121.
1
56
calculated that their efforts in El Salvador and Nicaragua garnered special privileges of their
own. They believed that they could count on U.S. neutrality or even tacit support. By initially
declaring neutrality and subsequently supporting the British, the Regan administration
managed to disappoint and alienate both its British and Argentine allies. Through an analysis
of White House internal communications during the 1982 South Atlantic crisis, I aim to
expose how the Argentine Junta’s invasion threatened Reagan’s Latin-American agenda,
forcing the administration to act as a mediator between two strategic allies. Through this
clear example of Third World agency, I seek to challenge the myth of a bi-polar Cold War
conflict.
In Asymmetric Conflicts, T.V. Paul provides an excellent analysis of the Argentine
Junta’s decision to invade the Falklands and engage the British military machine. Paul argues
that Argentine leaders expected that the British would not respond with military action, and if
they did it would be limited. Moreover, if the British did respond with force, the Argentine
military Junta assumed that the U.S. would intervene as a neutral party willing to facilitate
the negotiation process. An assumption bolstered by early success in gaining U.S. foreign
aid, international development loans, and U.S. support in the United Nations.
According to Paul, the Junta’s motivation to invade the islands was growing social
discontent over the execution of Dirty War tactics in Argentina, which was exacerbating the
effects of a failing economy, and undermining the dictatorship’s political base.3 The
Argentine leadership saw the Malvinas invasion as a manageable opportunity to improve
regional influence, and more importantly, generate domestic nationalism and support for the
regime. They predicted that their strategic contribution to the anti-communist operations in
3
T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation By Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 160.
57
Latin America would garner a privileged position with the Reagan administration. Although
the Junta did not expect full support it did expect that the U.S. would remain neutral and even
act as a mediator between Argentina and the U.K., an expectation that was fulfilled until
negotiations broke down and the Reagan administration ultimately supported its N.A.T.O.
ally. Paul’s analysis is essential to understand the counterintuitive action of attacking a
stronger, more politically powerful foe.
On the eve of Argentina’s invasion of the Malvinas Islands, President Regan phoned
General Galtieri in a last ditch effort to persuade the Argentine President to abandon his plan.
As reported in the New York Times, ABC Evening News, and NBC’s Nightly News,
Reagan’s surprising phone call revealed the value of the President’s relationship with his
Argentine counterpart. The decision to call Galtieri was especially surprising because it was
one of the few times that the President “had directly intervened in an international crisis, and
it was said to be the longest call he had made with any foreign leader.”4 During the
conversation, Reagan attempted to convince Galtieri that British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher would not give in to the pressure. More importantly, Reagan stressed that the use of
force would be interpreted negatively by the U.S. public and would harm the recent
developments in U.S. – Argentine relations. The CBS Evening News went on to comment
that Reagan was uncomfortable and embarrassed. “Uncomfortable because both Argentina
and Great Britain are close allies. Embarrassed because the President took the unprecedented
step of telephoning the President of Argentina [sic].”5 Scribbled on the left hand margin of
the CBS Evening News transcript, a White House aide noted the above quote, and included a
Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan, in a Phone Call, Tried to Deter Invasion,” New York Times, April 3, 1982,
Special in the New York Times. folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 30,” Ronald Reagan Library.
5
Transcript of the CBS Evening News: WHORM: Falklands, Ronald Reagan Library.
4
58
message to a fellow aid. The message, written on a White House notepad page, criticized the
release of the revealing details precisely because it exposed the President’s precarious
position.6 These reports served to foreshadow the coming weeks of intense efforts by the
Reagan administration to negotiate a peaceful solution to the South Atlantic Crisis.
United States involvement in the affair began two days before the invasion. When
British intelligence predicted that Argentina was prepared to strike, they shared the
information with U.S. diplomats and asked for American intervention.7 This presumably led
to the lengthy conversation between the U.S. and Argentine Presidents. Soon after the
invasion, reports poured into the White House. An initial update, time-stamped April 2, 1982
0600 EST, reported the time and location of the invasion, British actions in the U.N., and
most importantly gave instructions for the American response. The update, sent to the
Department of State Operations Center instructed U.S. officials to tell the press that “the US
strongly support[ed] the UN Security Council’s call for the exercise of the utmost restraint
and avoidance of the use of or threat of force.”8 The official stance was to encourage mutual
restraint in an effort to stall, and create the opportunity for U.S. diplomatic intervention.
On April 3, 1982, Great Britain moved to motivate its American ally, demanding that
the Reagan administration condemn the invasion, sever diplomatic ties, and place an
embargo on arms shipments to Argentina. Moreover, Great Britain planned to utilize
America’s allies in the Western Hemisphere, requesting that the U.S. support the British in
the deliberations of the Organization of American States.9 In addition to calling on their
special relationship with the United States, the British quickly moved to garner international
6
Ibid.
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 116.
8
Situation Report 1, Falklands Working Group, April 2, 1982.
9
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 118.
7
59
support. Documented in an April 6, 1982 Bureau of Intelligence and Research analysis, the
Reagan administration expected the British effort to us their “allies to help pressure
Argentina economically and politically.”10 It was evident that Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher expected nothing less that complete support from her N.A.T.O. ally. Reagan’s
decision to avoid the sovereignty issue insulted the British, who considered Galtieri a
“bargain basement Mussolini.”11
The Argentine response was comparatively more tempered in its expectations of the
United States. Keenly aware of its burgeoning relationship with the Reagan White House,
Argentina correctly assumed that the “the U.S. w[ould] limit its role to ‘tacit diplomatic
support’ for the British.”12 The assumption was based on Argentina’s strategic position in
Latin America. If the U.S. failed to support its anti-Communist ally, it risked losing
Argentina’s support in the anti-Sandinista operation in Nicaragua. Or worse, the Soviets
could emerge as a defender of Latin American sovereignty, and a potential rival source of
military aid.13 It was not long before the threat of Soviet involvement materialized.
According to an April 3 Department of State Situation Report, the Argentines expected
“Soviet and perhaps Chinese support in the UN Security Council.”14
In response to the emergent crisis, Reagan convened a National Security Council
meeting on April 7, 1982 to weigh his options. The President’s divided cabinet reflected the
political dilemma of opposing allies. Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence
Eagleburger, argued in support of the British. He warned that failing to do so would
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Analysis, April 6, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 8,”
Ronald Reagan Library.
11
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 134.
12
Situation Report No. 4, Falklands Islands Working Group, April 3, 1982, folder “Fontaine , Roger W.: RAC
Box 8, WHORM: Alpha File, Ronald Reagan Library.
13
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 134.
14
Situation Report No. 4, Falklands Working Group, April 6, 1982.
10
60
undermine America’s allegiance to the N.A.T.O. agreement.15 Conversely, Thomas Enders,
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American affairs, warned that supporting the British position
could sabotage the administration’s Latin American agenda.16 Ultimately, Secretary of State,
Alexander Haig, and Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, convinced Reagan that the
United States should attempt to negotiate a peaceful solution between its allies. If that failed,
Haig, who had previously served as Allied Commander in Europe for N.A.T.O., pushed to
support the British position.17 Reagan agreed; the following day Secretary of State Haig
departed Washington with the mission of facilitating the negotiations.
Haig’s first destination was London, where he met with Prime Minister Thatcher and
Foreign Secretary Francis Pym.18 After meeting with the two for over five hours, Haig
reported that Thatcher had “the bit in her teeth,” and was prepared to use force. In addition to
believing that she was correct on mere principle, Haig revealed that she was basing her
decisions on political pressure from Parliament.19 As presented to Haig. Thatcher’s three
requirements were: 1) Immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces 2) Restoration of British
administration of the Islands and 3) The Islanders’ right to exercise self-determination.
Although a predictable response to invasion of sovereign territory, her requests had grave
political implications.20 By demanding withdrawal and a restoration of British rule, Thatcher
essentially sought support for the initial claim of British sovereignty.
Haig presented a solution which he felt met Thatcher’s needs. His proposal included
withdrawal of Argentine forces, an interim international administration, and swift resumption
15
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 118.
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 119.
18
Telegram, Alexander Haig to Ronald Reagan, April 9, 1982, folder “Falklands War,” WHORM File:
Executive Secretariat, Ronald Reagan Library.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
16
61
of negotiations.21 As expected, Thatcher’s greatest resistance focused on the proposed
international administration because it “would impinge on British authority,” a fact she
argued, “ha[d] not been affected by aggression.”22 Sounding slightly dejected, Haig reported
to Reagan that there was little room for negotiating Thatcher’s position. However, with
Pym’s support, he successfully convinced Thatcher to at least consider diplomatic
possibilities. 23 After meeting with Thatcher and Pym in London, Haig prepared to depart for
Argentina.
In Buenos Aires, he continued his mission as mediator, choosing not to reveal to the
Argentines that Thatcher was considering a diplomatic solution. Instead, he “convey[ed] a
picture of total British resolve,” in an attempt to draw concessions from the Argentines.24
Haig’s trip to Buenos Aires was as unsuccessful as his trip to London. Because Argentine
leaders still enjoyed domestic support for capturing the Islands, they were not willing to
compromise their position. Stifled, Haig turned to Reagan for advice.
Responding to Haig’s cable, Reagan agreed that the primary point of contention
centered on the issue of administrative rule over the Islands if a troop withdrawal occurred.
To both the British and the Argentines, the issue was one of sovereignty and political
pressure. Neither administration could suffer the political fallout of losing control of the
Islands through negotiation. To Reagan, it was of upmost importance to negotiate peace
without losing support of either ally. Reagan revealed his struggle to Haig, lamenting “how
difficult it [would] be to foster a compromise that [gave] Maggie enough to carry on and at
21
Ibid.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
22
62
the same time [met] the test of ‘equity’ with our Latin neighbors. “25 Reagan closed his cable
by reminding Haig of the official U.S. response of neutrality to the press, “On the press line
you propose with respect to the Falklands, I agree. We are saying nothing from here to color
expectations.”26 Soon after this cable, the media exposed Reagan’s vulnerability with stories
of U.S.-British collusion and Soviet support of Argentina.
One of the first controversial reports the Reagan administration tackled addressed a
dinner held at the Argentine embassy on the day of the invasion for U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick. The dinner, held in her honor and planned far in advance of
American knowledge of the invasion, incited a strong response from the British. Sir Nicholas
Henderson, a British diplomat, likened the event to his dining with the Iranians at the time
the U.S. embassy was taken hostage, an analogy Kirkpatrick considered inappropriate.27 The
administration acted quickly to address the accusations. As an April 13 White House press
worksheet revealed, the administration prepared to defend its stance. The chief question
posed by the press, and addressed on the worksheet was, “Did you mean to indicate last week
that U.S. friendship with Britain and Argentina was equal?”28 The official response for U.S.
representatives was to reinforce the call for a peaceful solution, support the UN call for a
cease fire, and the resumption of peaceful negotiations.29 It was of upmost importance to
remain neutral in the eyes of the media, and by extension, British and Argentines
perceptions. Failure to do so would undermine American efforts, which were already
experiencing difficulties without the added aggravation.
25
Ibid.
Ibid.
27
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 119.
28
Press Preparation Worksheet, April 13, 1982, file “Falklands Islands,” WHORM: Meese Edwin, Ronald
Reagan Library
29
Ibid.
26
63
As would be expected of a Cold War conflict, the Soviets moved to capitalize on the
opportunity to undermine U.S. credibility in Latin America. Exposing the Anglo-American
connection, Moscow accused the U.S. of giving the British a “go-ahead” to take action
against Argentina.30 American acquiescence to a British military response was not the case,
at least at the time the accusation was printed. Another Red Square accusation however,
would prove more troublesome. Moscow accused the U.S. of seeking to acquire a base in the
Falklands and asserted that America was providing intelligence information to the British,
which undermined the U.S. contention that it was an “even handed broker.’’31 Although
unconfirmed at the time, this accusation later proved correct. The U.S. military did provide
intelligence at the same time that the U.S. State Department attempted to broker a bargain.
Reports soon surfaced that the Argentines, who had supplied grain to the Soviets during the
recent U.S. embargo and who recently sought Soviet support in the U.N., were also receiving
military intelligence from Moscow. In Washington, Argentine Ambassador Esteban
emphatically denied receiving any intelligence assistance from the Soviet Union, and
continued to downplay reports of U.S.-British collusion.32 The press’ treatment of behindthe-scenes agreements and shadowy alliances only served to exacerbate the conflict; Reagan
acted quickly to personally counteract the effect.
Concerned over recent developments and the threat to his alliance, President Galtieri
reached out to Reagan via phone on April 15.33 During the call, Reagan urged him to show
continued restraint until a peaceful solution could be reached. More importantly, it was also
State Summary on Moscow’s Position on the Falklands Dispute, April 10, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.:
RAC Box 8,” Ronald Reagan Library.
31
Ibid.
32
Print out for Fontaine, April 14, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 8,” Ronald Reagan Library.
33
Ibid.
30
64
an opportunity for Reagan to bolster the tenuous relationship with his Latin American
collaborator. U.S. “administration officials were particularly pleased at General Galtieri’s
call because they had been worried that the Argentine government might question United
States evenhandedness in mediating the dispute.”34 Reagan stressed the need to maintain a
working relationship with the Argentines, admitting that ‘‘a conflict in the hemisphere
between two Western nations would be a tragedy and would leave a bitter legacy.”35 The
article articulated Reagan’s apprehensions, maintaining the support of his anti-communist
ally in Latin America was a chief concern and weighed heavy on his approach to negotiating
the South Atlantic Crisis.
By the time Secretary of State Alexander Haig prepared for his second trans-Atlantic
trip, initial enthusiasm was waning. It was quickly becoming clear that Reagan only
maintained a vested interest in negotiating peace. Keenly aware of the dire situation and time
constraints Haig moved to employ more creative tactics. In a top secret telegram sent to U.S.
National Security Advisor Judge William Clark on April 18, Haig applauded Clark for his
management of a recent phone call between the two.36 In the telegram Haig also revealed that
the phone call was a ploy to get the Argentines to react. By using an open line, which was
certainly being monitored in Buenos Aires, Haig hoped to break the “impossible impasse” by
creating the “impression that British military action was about to take place.”37 The tone of
the call, which Haig admitted was “over-theatrical,” was an attempt by the U.S. to break the
34
Ibid.
Ibid.
36
Telegram, Alexander Haig to William Clark, April 18, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 8,”
Ronald Reagan Library.
37
Ibid.
35
65
stalemate as neither the Argentines or the British were willing to budge. Time was running
out for the American hope of a negotiated peace process.
The following day, April 19, Haig sent a message to British Foreign Minister Pym,
updating him on the lack of recent developments in Argentina. The tone of the telegram is
blatantly uninspired. Haig admitted to Pym that his “own disappointment with [the Argentine
response] prevents [him] from attempting to influence [Pym] in any way.”38 Unfortunately,
the 150 year-old issue remained, as both parties refused to surrender sovereignty over the
islands. Haig continued to reveal his disappointment, asserting that he did “not know whether
more can be wrung out of the Argentines.”39 Haig closed his comment by concluding that
“[he] can do no better at [that] point.”40 With the British Navy in full steam to the islands and
no new diplomatic developments, a violent conclusion became all the more evident.
On that same day, Haig made his departure statement in Buenos Aires. Although he
promised to relay the new Argentine position to Thatcher and Reagan, he clearly insinuated
that Thatcher would not accept it. He again urged a compromise, and alluded to the fact that
the U.S. would ultimately have to support the British.41 Reagan increasingly faced pressure
from the British and members of his own cabinet. Haig closed with a warning, “And I am
more convinced than ever that war in the South Atlantic would be the greatest of tragedies,
and that time is, indeed, running out.”42 And time did indeed run out for the Argentines and
for Reagan’s plan to appease both his N.A.T.O. ally in Europe and his anti-communist
collaborator in Central America.
Telegram, Alexander Haig to Francis Pym, April 19, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 8,” Ronald
Reagan Library.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Telegram, Alexander Haig to American Embassy in Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger
W.: RAC Box 8,” Ronald Reagan Library.
42
Ibid.
38
66
With the arrival of the British destroyers in the South Atlantic and the failure of a
diplomatic solution, Reagan was finally forced to take a stance. On April 29th, White House
officials drafted a press statement for Haig. The statement served as a manifesto of the
American attempt to broker peace between the two belligerent nations. In the declaration,
Haig confirmed that the U.S. had continually supported U.N. resolution 502, which called for
an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Argentine forces, and a diplomatic resolution.43 The
statement also revealed much about the influence of Argentina’s role as a staunch
anticommunist ally in Latin America. Haig admitted that, the intense effort to broker a
compromise was made “because the crisis raised vital issues of hemispheric solidarity at a
time when Communist adversaries [sought] positions of influence on the mainland of the
Americas.”44 Haig continued, “We have also recently developed a better relationship with
Argentina, as part of our success in revitalizing the community of American states.”45 In a
final nod to the Argentines, Haig asserted that “We took no position on the merits of either
the British or the Argentine claims to the islands.”46 Eventually, Haig announced that the
U.S. supported the British decision and would suspend its official relationship with
Argentina; however, it only came after no less than three conciliatory remarks aimed at the
Argentines.
On May 14, 1982 President Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive
34. The directive, issued by William Clark and disseminated to several high ranking U.S.
officials including the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the
Draft of a Press Statement for Haig, April 29, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 30,” Ronald
Reagan Library.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
43
67
C.I.A., outlined the official U.S. actions in the South Atlantic Crisis. These actions included
public support for the U.K., the suspension of all military exports to Argentina, and the
withholding of all future munitions sales, bank credits, and Commodity Credit Corporation
guarantees.47 The hardline American stance also included a top secret directive for “A private
warning to Argentina that the measures announced do not encompass the full range of
economic sanctions the U.S. [had] at its disposal and which could be applied depending on
circumstances.”48 Although resolute in his directive, Reagan’s decision to execute a tiered
approach in his sanctions of Argentina revealed a hope to salvage a future working
relationship with his Argentine ally.
As Reagan feared, and Enders predicted, the decision to support the British cause
garnered a critical response from the Latin American community. Argentine President
Galtieri expressed his bitter disappointment with the American response.49 In a more drastic
and pressing matter, Latin American countries moved to support the Argentines citing the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Foreign Minister Javier Arias
announced Peru’s decision to support Argentina by invoking Article Three of the Rio Treaty.
The Falkland Working Group, a committee Reagan assembled to advise him on the crisis,
interpreted the action as a commitment to military aid. In response, the White House
mobilized to make its case to the ministers of the Rio Treaty.
On May 27, 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig made a statement at the 20th
meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Rio Treaty. Haig opened his comments by highlighting
the allegiance that most Latin American countries shared with both Argentina and Great
Memorandum for on National Security Decision Directive, May 14, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC
Box 30,” Ronald Reagan Library.
48
Ibid.
49
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 120.
47
68
Britain, “Is there a country among us that has not counted itself a friend of both countries?”50
In the very next paragraph, Haig acknowledged Argentina’s value and underscored Reagan’s
commitment to the country, “President Reagan moved early in his administration to make
clear the high value we place on our relations with the Government of Argentina and the high
esteem in which we hold the Argentine people.”51 From the beginning he moved to establish
that Reagan acted with a sense of U.S.-Latin American reliance, reminding his “Latin
American neighbors” that it was Reagan who restored a political relationship with Argentina.
And that throughout the crisis, the U.S. diplomatically cooperated with Argentina on the
same level that it had with Great Britain. Although the move did not sit well with the British,
it did garner support among Latin American states.
Haig continued to use the platform to dispel any concerns of Anglo-American
collusion. When commenting on the efforts to resolve the conflict, Haig sought to clarify and
cement the American stance on the issue. Although the U.S. had supported a British military
response after diplomacy had failed, “the United States has not taken—and will not take—
any position on the substance of the dispute. We are completely neutral on the question of
who has sovereignty [sic].”52 Haig hoped to make it evident that the United States did
everything in its power to respect Argentina’s claim to sovereignty and to remain loyal to the
Rio Treaty.
Additionally, Haig used the opportunity to address Peru’s declaration to support
Argentina should it invoke the Rio Treaty. Haig argued that the Rio Treaty did not apply to
this particular crisis and continued with a nuanced call of restraint, “With full respect for the
Prospects for Peace in the South Atlantic, Transcript of Haig’s Speech to the Rio Treaty Foreign Ministers,
May 27, 1982, folder “Fontaine, Roger W.: RAC Box 8,” Ronald Reagan Library.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
50
69
views of others, the U.S. position is clear: Since the first use of force did not come from
outside the hemisphere, this is not a case for extracontinental aggression against which we
are all committed to rally [sic].”53 Haig sought to clarify that the U.S. acted in accord with
the Rio Treaty and that he hoped, or expected, that the remaining members of the
organization would agree. In another subtle acknowledgement of allegiance, Haig recognized
Latin American support in combating communism, declaring that the Western Hemisphere
“had suffered less from communist infiltration or aggression than any other part of the
developing world.”54 Throughout his speech the Secretary of State repeated three main
themes. These themes included a neutral stance on the issue of sovereignty,
acknowledgement that the incident did not fall under Rio Treaty regulations, and the topic of
collective security. Haig’s address to the meeting of Foreign Ministers offers a striking
insight of the Reagan administration’s approach to addressing the conflict. Even after the
U.S. declared public support for British military action, it sought to acknowledge the
important role Argentina played in the fight against communists in the Western Hemisphere.
Throughout the Malvinas war the Argentine government had also been waging a
propaganda campaign at home. Through falsified news reports and the tabloid press the Junta
deceived the populace into thinking that they were winning the war. The campaign
successfully united the nation and bolstered the fledging dictatorship to new heights of
domestic approval. Conversely, in the wake of defeat, the Junta would lose its political base
and be voted out of power in the 1983 elections. Ironically, it was a free democratic election
that threatened Reagan’s anti-communist operation in Nicaragua.
53
54
Ibid.
Ibid.
70
President Reagan’s decision to pursue a dangerous neutrality during the 1982 South
Atlantic Crisis was influenced by one major factor. Argentina had emerged as an anticommunist force throughout Latin America. After perfecting anti-insurgent tactics within
Argentina, the Junta shifted its efforts to persecute external threats to its military dictatorship.
Their efforts in Nicaragua were of a particular benefit to the U.S. President, who sought to
restore national power by prosecuting a roll back foreign policy. Although it was evident to
all involved that the U.S. would ultimately have to support its N.A.T.O. ally, President
Reagan endeavored to preserve his relationship with the Argentine Military Junta.
Articulating British discontent, Defense Minister Sir John Nott exclaimed “Reagan was
thoroughly unhelpful. We might have not been an ally as far as he was concerned.”55 The
disappointment stemmed from the U.S. decision to support UN Resolutions 502 and 505,
both of which called for an end to hostilities and a negotiated peace, but did not address the
issue of sovereignty; an issue that continues to this day. Throughout this conflict Reagan
appeared to be a conflicted diplomat, caught in a war between two Cold War allies that did
not involve him but would greatly affect him. And it is through this analysis that we gain a
better understanding of the complexities of the Cold War and move closer to shattering the
dualistic “master narrative myth.
55
Richardson, When Allies Differ, 121.
71
Conclusion
In 1823 President James Monroe declared to the world, specifically Europe, that the
United States of America claimed the responsibilities and privileges of policing the Western
Hemisphere. Through two World Wars and a forty yearlong Cold War, U.S. administrations
pursued the hegemonic policies that continue to this day. During the Cold War specifically,
political rhetoric dominated U.S. policy toward Latin America. In response, Latin American
leaders adopted strategies of accommodation or opposition to manage their asymmetric
position. In studying the conflict and consequences of these strategies we can continue to
move away from a bilateral perception of the Cold War to include the history of the global
Cold War experience.
Thus, this thesis seeks to contribute to an internationalized history of the Cold War by
deconstructing the newly formed alliance between President Reagan’s administration and the
Argentine military machine. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, he initiated a new and
unprecedented phase of the Cold War. The Reagan Doctrine moved beyond George
Keenan’s containment strategy to sponsor counter-revolutionary militias in interventionist
campaigns. Reagan perceived the success of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua as a
threat to Western society in the Americas, and the growing unrest in El Salvador emerged as
the ideal theatre to implement his preemptive policy. His strategy for El Salvador included
engaging perceived Sandinista interventionism and providing economic and military aid to
the fledging Salvadoran junta.
72
The political landscape, however, differed from the days of containment. In Latin
America, O.A.S. member states exhibited greater independence. By 1980 fourteen member
states maintained official diplomatic relations with Cuba in contrast to only one in 1960. In
the United States, the Nixon Scandal and Vietnam failure left Americans distrustful of their
politicians and weary of going to war. Restricted by congressional oversight and public
concern, President Reagan sought options to circumvent these obstacles. The War Powers
Resolution proved to be the greatest obstacle to his Salvadoran operation, specifically
because it limited the employment of Military Training Teams and Operational Planning and
Assistance Teams. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, author of “Dictators and Double
Standards,” promoted the Argentine military as a viable option. Kirkpatrick staunchly
supported the Argentine option because it achieved all that the administration required. The
Argentines exhibited considerable influence in the region and possessed the infrastructure to
support the Salvadoran regime. And most importantly, the Argentine military did not need
congressional approval and acted outside of the court of U.S. public opinion.
The infrastructure the Reagan administration sought to incorporate into its Central
American campaign was rooted in the brutal system of state violence that came to
characterize the Argentine military junta. The campaign of state-sanctioned domestic terror
included disappearances, torture, and murder. After successfully defeating its internal
opponent, the Argentine leadership turned its efforts to suppressing socialist movements
throughout Latin America. Argentina provided military aid and training to right-wing
authoritarian governments in Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, El Salvador and
Nicaragua. As a result, Argentina rose to prominence among Latin American military circles
and enjoyed increased political influence in the region. The Argentine leadership understood
73
the value of its privileged position to a hamstrung Reagan administration and moved to
capitalize on the opportunity.
Ironically, the same thing that made the Argentine military regime valuable to the
U.S. also made it vulnerable to domestic and international pressure. In the international
arena, the U.N. Human Rights Commission sought to investigate recent reports of
disappeared persons and victims of political violence. The impending investigation fueled
internal unrest among junior officers in the armed services who feared facing Nuremburglike prosecution for human rights violations. Thus, the Argentine leadership reciprocated
U.S. interest in collaboration. The price for Argentine collaboration included access to top
U.S. leadership – access the Reagan administration readily provided. The Reagan
administration began a series of visits by U.S. officers and politicians to Argentina and
hosted visits from top Argentine leadership almost immediately after the inauguration,
specifically President-designate Roberto Viola who met with the Secretary of State, Vice
President, and President in Washington D.C. The renewed access to U.S. policymakers
resulted in the lift of a ban on weapons sales to Argentina, international aid and development
loans, and most importantly, U.S. support for Argentina in the U.N. To their delight, the
Argentine leadership succeeded in employing its bonding tactic.
Unfortunately for the Argentine military junta, it miscalculated the degree to which it
succeeded in bonding with the Reagan administration during its failed campaign to reclaim
the Malvinas Islands. Two days prior to Argentina’s invasion, President Reagan called
Argentine President Galtieri in an effort to avoid mutually adverse consequences. As a result
of the invasion, Reagan had to choose between supporting a valuable Central American
collaborator and an invaluable N.A.T.O. ally. While Laurence Eagleburger argued for
74
complete support of the British, Thomas Enders and Jeane Kirkpatrick warned of the
consequences of losing Argentine support for the Nicaragua and El Salvador campaigns.
Ultimately, President Reagan dispatched Secretary of State Haig on a doomed mission to
achieve a diplomatic solution.
It is important to note that while the U.S. ultimately supported the British fully it did
so while also maintaining neutrality on the issue of island sovereignty. The lack of support
for British sovereignty drew the ire of British diplomats who complained that failure to do so
constituted a failure in allied support. In addition, the U.S. did fulfill the Argentine
expectation of mediator, and tempered its response to Argentine aggression by implementing
a tiered response allowing for Argentine withdrawal before incurring the complete burden of
U.S. sanctions.
The consequences of the failure of the Reagan-Argentine alliance represent a fertile
field of future research, specifically in the context of the Iran-Contra Scandal. On December
8, 1981 President Reagan signed the Finding that authorized the Central Intelligence Agency
to execute covert paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.1 The operations did not remain covert
for long, however. In March 1982, The Nation and The New York Times published major
articles exposing the paramilitary operations.2 In response, the U.S. Congress passed the
Boland Amendment in December 1982 in an explicit effort to constrict the Reagan
administration’s Nicaragua campaign. The tension between President Reagan’s
1
Ronald Reagan, Presidential Finding on Convert Operations in Nicaragua, December 1, 1981 in The IranContra Scandal: The Declassified History, ed. Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (The New Press: New York,
1993), 11.
2
The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, ed. Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (The New Press:
New York, 1993), 2.
75
administration and the U.S. Congress continued in a cycle of evasion and regulation
culminating in a national scandal, congressional hearings, and criminal prosecutions.
The Iran-Contra scandal resulted from the Reagan administration’s commitment to
supporting the counterrevolutionary army known as the Contras without congressional
consent and through extralegal methods. In addition, the National Security Administration
executed a lesser known campaign of domestic propaganda and lobbying efforts to build
public and political support. The goal of this apparatus, which utilized illegally transferred
C.I.A. funds, was “Congressional passage of aid to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.”3 The
campaign succeeded in gaining $100 million in aid for the C.I.A. to resume its supposedly
ceased activities. Unfortunately the aid came too late for the administration, the bill passed a
mere two weeks after Sandinista forces shot down the alleged C.I.A. cargo plan that initiated
the scandal.4 I contend that the absence of the Argentine military apparatus in Nicaragua and
El Salvador forced the C.I.A. to assume a larger role in supporting the Contra forces.
Essentially, collaboration with the Argentines could have allowed President Reagan’s
administration to circumvent the root causes of the Iran-Contra scandal.
Another direction for potential research is the internationalization of the Falklands
War. The United States was not the only non-combatant nation to be involved in the war. The
Argentine military junta initiated the war without the necessary weapons or money, $35
billion in national debt, and suffered a 209 percent average inflation rate during the conflict.5
Peru supported the Argentine cause unconditionally by providing the Argentine forces with
Daniel “Jake” Jacobowitz, “Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Educational
Campaign,” March 12, 1985 in Kornbluh, The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, 22.
4
Kornbluh, The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, xviii.
5
José Casado and Eliane Oliveira, “Malvinas: War Secrets,” O Globo, April 25, 2012, National News Section,
14.
All translations of Casado and Oliveira are the by the author.
3
76
twelve Mirage fighters, funneling weapons and funds, and granting access to its airports.6
Peru also lobbied other Latin American nations to enact the Rio Treaty in support of the
Argentines, a move Secretary Haig was forced to address in his speech to the O.A.S. Brazil
also provided support, although with more selfish intentions. On May 12 Brazilian President
João Figueiredo met with President Reagan in Washington D.C. Tension dominated the
meeting because the Argentines had informed the Brazilians about expected attacks on
Argentine mainland bases. Figueiredo expressed to Reagan that “an attack on any Argentine
bases would be considered an attack on the continent.”7 That same night Figueiredo also sent
a telegram to German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt requesting that he intervene with Prime
Minister Thatcher in an effort to avoid her bombing the Argentine mainland. The U.K.
adjusted its strategy and defeated the Argentine forces four weeks later without attacking any
mainland targets.8
An even more intriguing intervention came on behalf of the U.S.S.R. The Argentines,
desperate for financial and military aid, reached out to the Soviets and Chinese for support.
In what can only be considered Cold War logic, the Soviets mobilized the Cubans to support
a staunchly anticommunist dictatorship in an effort to indirectly confront the United States
and its N.A.T.O. ally. On the morning of April 10, 1982 Cuban diplomat Emilio Aragones
Navarro arrived in Argentina by way of Brazil with a message: Fidel Castro offered a supply
of weapons on behalf of the U.S.S.R.9 On April 17th, London informed Washington D.C. of
the Soviet “willingness to provide ships, planes, and missiles to Argentina in exchange for
José Casado and Eliane Oliveira, “Malvinas: War Secrets,” O Globo, April 22, 2012, National News Section,
third edition, 23.
7
José Casado and Eliane Oliveira, “Malvinas: War Secrets,” O Globo, April 26, 2012, National News Section,
third edition, 14.
8
Ibid.
9
José Casado and Eliane Oliveira, “Malvinas: War Secrets,” O Globo, April 22, 2012, National News Section,
22.
6
77
grain.”10 The Soviet weapons were provided by Libya to Cuba and smuggled through
Brazilian airspace into Argentina. At its height the weapons airlift grew two reach an average
of two daily flights.11 Although the U.K. and U.S. quickly pressured the Soviets to cease
providing arms to the Argentines, the complex and conflicting alliances illustrate the nuances
of the global Cold War experience. These revelations were presented in a well-documented
series published by O Globo, sources included government archives of Brasilia, Rio, Buenos
Aires and London, press archives, books, theses, and interviews.12 A thorough historical
treatment of these revelations would complement this thesis by contributing a greater
understanding of interdependent Cold War relations.
The study of Latin American agency during the Cold War is vital to a comprehensive
history of the Cold War. The next generation of scholars will benefit from newly released
documents and a prospective unadulterated by lived experience. I believe this prospective
will produce history written with the nuance and understanding necessary to move away
from the bilateral master narrative to include the global Cold War experience.
José Casado and Eliane Oliveira, “Malvinas: War Secrets,” O Globo, April 22, 2012, National News Section,
third edition, 23.
11
Ibid.
12
José Casado, email message to author, September 9, 2013.
10
78
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