Report on the Dynamic of Attitudes Towards Democracy and Participation in
Contemporary Britain: 5000 word summary
Background
The project involved collecting and analysing a series of survey datasets concerned
with the preparedness of British citizens to engage in different forms of political
participation, and their attitudes towards democracy. The surveys also collected data
relating to the likely independent variables that underpin people’s propensities to
engage in political participation. A pilot survey, which tested out the draft
questionnaire, was conducted in April 2000. The main data collection involved
administering the same questionnaire each month to a representative sample of the
UK electorate, over the period July 2000 to December 2002. A new set of randomly
selected respondents was interviewed by telephone each month. The fieldwork was
conducted by the Gallup organisation. The project was extended by ESRC in
February 2003 to add a further set of questions about the British public’s attitudes
towards the US/UK war against Iraq. The extended survey instrument went into the
field in February, March and April of 2003. The March study involved an
experiment in which two identical surveys were conducted – one by telephone and a
parallel one using the internet. A final (telephone) post-war survey was conducted in
September 2003.
Objectives
In light of the supplementary award made by ESRC to study the impact of the Iraq
War, the project had four main aims.
•
•
•
•
To collect time-series survey data that would allow for the measurement and
exploration of the interrelationships between political participation and
citizen (dis)satisfaction with democracy in Britain.
To consider the explanatory power of five rival models of political
participation: relative deprivation, cognitive mobilisation, civic engagement,
rational action, and social capital.
To consider the impact of the Iraq War on public opinion in Britain, and in
particular to account for citizens’ changing attitudes towards the war.
To explore the similarities and differences between telephone and Internet
survey modes as vehicles for assessing UK public opinion.
Methods
As noted above, the source data for the project was a series of monthly telephone
surveys. Respondents were contacted using random digit dialling and the results
were weighted (by the polling agency, Gallup) to conform to the demographic
1
profile of the UK population. The data collected under the project are both
multifaceted and extensive. They provide for three sorts of dataset. First, each
monthly survey can be analysed as a resource in its own right. Second, the
individual-level data from the surveys can be combined to yield a ‘pooled crosssection time-series’ dataset for the 2000-2003 period as a whole. This dataset,
which contains around 30,000 cases, can used to analyse individual attitudes and
behaviour whilst controlling for the changing political and economic conditions of
the period analysed. Finally, the individual survey data can be aggregated to
produce a monthly time-series dataset of the sort typically employed in vote function
analysis and in time-series econometric modelling more generally. Our core aim
throughout the analysis was to collect data that would enable us to operationalise and
test a number of competing theories about political participation. Thus, the survey
questions that were included in our monthly questionnaires were all designed to
measure either people’s preparedness to engage in political participation or a
particular independent variable that a priori theorising had suggested should have an
impact on participation. We employed a range of standard statistical techniques to
check and analyse the data. These are described in detail in the results section
below.
Results
Since the final monthly dataset was collected in September 2003, we have only
recently begun to explore the full potential of the data for answering our original
research questions. Nonetheless, throughout the period of data collection, we have
analysed ‘the data we have collected thus far’. It is the results of these interim
studies that are reported here. We will engage in fuller and more extensive analysis
in later studies. We organise the reporting of our findings to correspond to the four
research questions above.
(1) The dynamics of attitudes towards participation and democracy in Britain
We measured the British public’s attitudes to political participation by asking
respondents to indicate, on a series of 0-10 scales, how likely it was that they would
engage in various forms of political activity. These activities ranged from voting in
general and European elections to participating in protest demonstrations and taking
collective action in the local community. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the
average distribution of the UK public’s preparedness to engage in protest activity
during the 2000-2002 period.
The period we surveyed spanned the final year the 1997 parliament and the first two
years of the 2001 parliament – with the 2001 general election occurring just before
the ‘middle’ of the series. Our broad results show that, while attitudes towards
community action do not change much during the electoral cycle, attitudes to voting
and protest activity vary systematically over time. Unsurprisingly, simple trend
(LOESS) models indicate that the preparedness of people to participate in voting
2
activity increases as the general election approaches and then gradually declines after
the election has occurred. Less obviously, as Figure 2 shows, interest in protest
activity follows exactly the opposite trend: the preparedness to protest declines as the
election approaches and rises after it has occurred. At the same time, average
satisfaction with ‘democracy in Britain’ (measured on a 4-point scale) also rises in
the run-up to the election and falls in its aftermath (See Nominated Output #1, Figure
20). These latter two trends together suggest the possibility that even a low-turnout
general election, such as that in 2001, can serve a legitimising function for the
political system as a whole. Not only can a general election act as a ‘safety valve’ for
some of the pressures that stimulate protest activity, but it can also help to refresh
people’s general sense of satisfaction with the democratic process.
F ig u re 1. Pro ba bility o f P a rtic ip a tin g in a Pro tes t
M e a n = 2 .9 , M e d i a n = 2 . 0
40
38
35
30
Percent
25
20
15
10
11
10
8
5
7
6
4
5
5
6
7
8
5
0
Ve ry U n lik e ly
1
2
3
4
5
9
V e ry L ik e ly
Probability of Participating in Protes t (0 -1 0 Scale )
3
Figure 2. Trend in Likelihood of Participating
in a Protest, July 2000 - Dece m ber 2002
3.4
Likely to Protest (0-10 Scale)
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.0
2.9
2.8
2.7
2001-->
Election
2.6
2.5
July
2000
Dec
2002
Date
Notwithstanding these clear trend patterns, more systematic time-series analysis
indicates that voters’ economic perceptions play a crucial role in both attitudes
towards protest and satisfaction with democracy. Table 1 reports the results of
estimating a simple time-series model of the average propensity to engage in protest
activity. The model shows that, the more positively people evaluate their recent
personal economic circumstances, the less likely they are to consider engaging in
protest. The model also indicates that, over and above these strong economic effects,
the preparedness to engage in protest is stimulated in the short-term by ‘successful’
large-scale protest by others. Both the ‘fuel protests’ of September 2000 and the
Countryside Alliance protests of September 2002 (lagged by one month) temporarily
raised the protest potential of the UK public as a whole. However, the ‘discount rate’
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (b=.31) suggests that these ‘contagion
effects’ decayed rapidly after their initial impact.
Table 1. Estimates of the effects of retrospective personal economic
evaluations and ‘protest events’ on the likelihood of joining a protest or
demonstration, August 2000 – December 2002
Independent variable
Protest Potentialt-1 (average score on 0-10 scale)
Aggregate Personal Retrospective Evaluationst
(%)
September 2000 dummy
October 2002 dummy
Constant
Corrected R2
Serial Correlation LM(12) chisquared
Coefficient
.31
-.01
St error
.16
.005
.36
.25
2.05
.51
9.81
.16
.14
.49
Prob
.07
.06
.04
.06
.00
.63
4
Estimation by OLS. N=29. Sample: August 2000 – December 2002. DW=2.29
We have explored the individual-level sources of satisfaction with democracy in a
companion study (the British Election Study) and report our detailed findings using
BES data in Clarke et al (2004, forthcoming). Our analysis of the time-series data
collected as part of this project suggests that voters’ emotional reactions to economic
conditions have an important impact on the level of democratic satisfaction. Each
month, we asked our respondents to indicate which of eight words (four positive and
four negative) they associated with their current economic circumstances. Table 2
reports the results of using a summary measure of the voters’ negative emotional
responses (where respondents had indicated they felt uneasy, afraid, disgusted or
angry about the economy) as a predictor variable for democratic satisfaction. The
model is well-determined and passes the standard battery of diagnostic tests. Put
simply, the model shows that negative emotional responses to economic conditions
are associated with reduced satisfaction with democracy. Although we do not report
the results here, we also explored the possible interconnections between attitudes
towards protest and democratic satisfaction. We found no evidence of any
connection between them.
Table 2. Estimates of the effects of negative emotional reactions to the
economy on satisfaction with democracy, August 2000 – December 2002
Independent variable
Coefficient Std error Prob
Satisfaction with Democracy t-1 (1-4 scale)
.35
.15
.03
Aggregate Negative Emotional Reactionst (%)
-.01
.00
.00
Constant
1.95
.43
.00
Corrected R2
.42
Serial Correlation LM(12) chisquared
4.06
.98
Estimation by OLS. N=29. Sample: August 2000 – December 2002. DW=1.86
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are at present no more than suggestive. They
nonetheless have an important implication. They indicate that, just as there appears
to be a political economy of voting in many countries, there is also a political
economy of both protest potential and satisfaction with democracy in Britain. Not
only do both of these latter phenomena vary over the short-term, they are also linked
systematically to voters’ changing perceptions of economic conditions. This is
clearly a finding that requires further investigation in future research.
(2) The relative explanatory power of different models of protest activity
Existing academic research has developed five major models of people’s
preparedness to engage in protest and related political activities.
The Relative Deprivation account of political participation focuses on the role played
by the sense of injustice that can impel people to act when they feel that current
political or social arrangements are inequitable or unfair (Muller, 1979; Hochschild,
1981). In his classic study of the problem, Gurr (1970) argues that people feel a
5
sense of relative deprivation when there is a gap between their ‘value expectations’
(what they think they ought to get out of life) and their ‘perceived value capabilities’
(what they think they will get). These feelings of deprivation in turn provide an
emotional mobilising spur to political participation.
The Cognitive Engagement model stresses the importance of education and political
knowledge as sources of political mobilisation (Dalton, 1996; Nie, Junn and StehlikBarry, 1996). It argues that well-educated people are more aware of political events
and public affairs. They are more capable of processing politically relevant
information. They are also more inclined to make responsibility attributions to
governmental institutions and political actors for policy outcomes. And they are in
turn potentially more dissatisfied with government performance in key policy areas.
All of these characteristics mean that the cognitively engaged are more likely to
participate in all forms of political activity, including protest, in order to effect
meaningful change in the political system and in the wider social order.
The Civic Voluntarism model argues that churches, voluntary associations and
workplaces are important social settings that encourage their members to acquire the
information, resources and civic skills that are necessary for effective political
participation. This participation can involve ‘conventional’ activities like voting and
involvement in local party organisations, as well as communal and protest politics
like demonstrations and marches (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Huckfeldt
and Sprague, 1995; Mutz, 1998). The Civic Voluntarism model suggests that
participation in protest politics is driven by three key sets of variables. First,
participation is more likely if the individual is psychologically engaged with the
political system. Such engagement is variously manifested through people’s sense of
political efficacy (the feeling that politicians respond to the citizens’ concerns),
interest in politics, and the extent to which they identify with established political
parties. An efficacious, interested partisan, it is claimed, will be much more
psychologically engaged than an inefficacious, uninterested non-identifier. Second,
individuals who possess politically relevant resources (such as education, income
and the access to more free time that is typically associated with a higher social
class) are more likely to participate than individuals who lack resources. Third,
participation is more likely among people who are in a position to be mobilised into
activity by the persuasive efforts other people. To put it simply, some people do
things because they are asked. Others are more available to participate in new forms
of political activity because, as a result of having volunteered to participate in the
past, they have more social contacts that are conducive to future participation.
Social Capital consists in the existence of informal social networks that link people
in a community, and in the presence of relatively high levels of social trust between
the members of that community. Like physical capital, social capital is alleged to
have important productive consequences. First, network activities and trust together
facilitate reciprocity in social relations and reduce the transactions costs of
monitoring compliance with public goods provision (Becker, 1976; Coleman, 1988;
Jackman and Miller, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Second, high levels of social
capital are conducive to citizens’ being actively engaged with the political system.
6
Although social capital theorists typically associate this engagement with relatively
high levels of voting, the idea that social engagement lends itself to political
involvement can be extended to other forms of political activity. Indeed, it can be
hypothesised that people who are relatively involved in their local communities will
be more likely than those who are uninvolved to engage in protest activity. By the
same token, those who exhibit higher levels of social trust should be more inclined to
embrace the sort of collective action that is engendered by protest activity.
The Rational Actor model has been deployed in a variety of political and economic
contexts. However, its potential value in explaining political participation is readily
apparent. Individuals undertake actions only if the benefits accruing from them
outweigh the costs (Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965). The core version of the model,
introduced by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), can be expressed as Ui = pB – C.
That is, the utility of a given action (Ui) is a function of the perceived benefits of the
action discounted by probability of receiving those benefits (hence the multiplicative
pB term) minus the perceived costs of participation in the action itself.
This ‘Core’ Rational Actor model, however, embraces a very narrow definition of
rationality. The ‘Modified’ Rational Actor model seeks to extend the boundaries of
rationality so that the calculus of action is not based exclusively on personal costs
and benefits (Whiteley and Seyd, 1994). This formulation was anticipated in Riker
and Ordeshook’s addition of a ‘civic duty’ term to their Ui = pB – C equation for
electoral participation, thereby converting it into Ui = pB – C + D. A variety of
possible terms could be added to the core formulation in a model of protest. Given
that the notion of civic duty has little relevance to participation in protest activity,
three further terms stand out as being of obvious importance. The first refers to the
possibility that people may participate in protests not to obtain benefits for people
like themselves but for other groups that they care about. In order to take account of
this possibility we add term for ‘Group Benefits’ to the ‘core’ Rational Actor
equation. Our second additional term concerns people’s ‘Risk orientations’. There is
always a possibility that any given protest might transmute into an activity that many
of the original participants did not intend. Accordingly, we hypothesise that
individuals who are generally highly acceptant of risks will be more likely to join
protests and demonstrations than those who are generally risk averse. Finally, we
add a term for ‘Expressive Benefits’. We associate these benefits with the expression
of the individual’s dissatisfaction with the operation of the democratic process and
with life in general. We hypothesise that the more intense these dissatisfactions are,
the more they will act as a stimulus for the individual to express them in the form of
protest activity.
Our survey design involved asking respondents a series of questions that sought to
capture the key features of each of these models. The detailed ways in which we
sought to operationalise the various models are described in Nominated Output #1.
Our modelling strategy consisted in specifying each model as a single equation and
then estimating the coefficients of that equation using a pooled individual-level
dataset in which individual interviewed in our various monthly surveys was regarded
as a single case. Each estimation included statistical controls for the possible
7
‘contagion effects’ of large-scale protest referred to above and for the proximity of
the general election. Having estimated each model separately, we then conducted a
‘tournament’ of models based on ‘encompassing tests’. This process suggested that
none of the models – apart from the social capital account – was ‘encompassed’ by
any of the others. That is to say, each model (apart from social capital) had some
role to play in explaining individual variations in protest potential. In consequence,
we specified and estimated a ‘hybrid’ ‘composite model’ that combined elements of
the various models. This model is reported in Table 3.
The detailed inferences that can be drawn from Table 3, as well as some of the
qualifications relating to the model, are outlined in Nominated Output #1. The key
point, however, is that variables from the relative deprivation, cognitive
mobilisation, civic voluntarism and rational actor models all have statistically
significant effects on the probability of protest. Almost all of these effects,
moreover, are in the theoretically predicted direction. Higher levels of deprivation,
of cognitive engagement and of civic voluntarism are associated with an increased
probability of engaging in protest. The rational actor model also performs well. The
perceived personal benefits of participation, discounted for personal political
efficacy, and perceived group benefits both positively affects protest participation.
Equally, perceptions of the costs of participation have a negative impact on
participation. Finally, people’s general orientations towards risk and their levels of
satisfaction with democracy also have theoretically plausible effects on protest.
People who are generally inclined to take risks are more likely to engage in what,
potentially, could be ‘risky’ protest action; those who are more satisfied with
democracy are less likely to engage in protest activity. The model also shows that
there was a ‘contagion effect’ associated with the fuel protests of autumn 2000 –
though, as Nominated Output #1 indicates, these effects have disappeared by
November 2000. In sum, Table 3 demonstrates the importance of three ‘old’ factors
that underpin protest activity (rational calculation, relative deprivation and
mobilisation) and two ‘new’ ones (people’s risk orientations and the ‘contagion
effects’ of successful protest events by others).
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Table 3. Estimated Individual-level ‘Hybrid’ Model of Probability of Engaging
in Protest (0-10 scale), July 2000 – December 2002
Source Model/Independent variable
Coeff
Relative Deprivation
Government is unfair to people like me
.18
Negative Economic Emotions
.25
Life Satisfaction
-.12
Cognitive Engagement
Government Record
-.12
Interest in Politics
.19
Level of Education
.09
Civic Voluntarism
Personal Efficacy
.13
Partisanship Strength
.11
Asked to Participate
.67
Volunteered to Participate
.99
Rational Actor/General Incentives
Efficacy* Personal Benefits of Participation
.09
Perceived Costs of Participation
-.35
Group Benefits from Participation
.38
Positive Rick Orientation
.37
Satisfaction with Democracy
-.35
Controls
Age
-.03
Income level
-.09
Social Class (higher score means more middle
-.13
class)
September 2000 dummy
.25
October 2002 dummy
.24
Constant
2.61
Estimation by OLS. N=13123. Corrected R2 = .19. SE = 2.81.
St err
Prob
.06
.06
.04
.00
.00
.00
.06
.01
.02
.03
.00
.00
.01
.03
.07
.07
.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
.05
.07
.03
.04
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
.03
.00
.00
.00
.10
.11
.22
.01
.03
.00
(3) The impact of the Iraq War on UK public opinion and the sources of attitudes
towards the War itself
The Iraq war affected UK public opinion in a variety of ways. Support for Labour
and for Tony Blair personally was initially stimulated by the outbreak of hostilities.
The successful removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime within a few weeks of the
commencement of hostilities gave a further boost both to Labour’s and to Blair’s
popularity. The insistent and persistent questioning of the justification for the war –
focusing on the nature of the evidence relating to Iraq’s possession (or not) of
WMDs – gradually eroded both government popularity and the PM’s personal
ratings. In April, some 41% of respondents indicated their intention to vote Labour
in the next general election and fully 49% of voters thought that Tony Blair would
9
make the best Prime Minister. By September, these figures had fallen, respectively,
to 38% and 35%.
However, the simple story of how opinion towards the parties and leaders changed in
the aftermath of the war is of less analytic interest than the calculations that
underpinned voters’ attitudes towards – their approval or disapproval of – the war
itself. In order to explore this calculus, we adopted the sort of ‘modified rational
actor’ approach that had proved successful (see Table 3 above) in analysing the
sources of voters’ protest potential. The core of this model is the U=pB – C costbenefit calculation articulated above in our model of protest. In the context of the
war, the p term refers to the probability of winning the war (rather than to the
respondent’s own sense of political efficacy); the benefits refer to the benefits to
Britain that accrue from a successful prosecution of the war; and the costs refer to
the likely damage both to the respondent’s personal interests and to Britain’s longterm interests generally as a result of the war. Extending beyond this narrowly
rational core, in place of Riker and Ordeshook’s ‘duty’ term, we substitute a term for
the respondent’s view of the morality of Britain’s going to war with only US support
so that our core specification is U=pB – C + M(orality). We also add controls for
partisanship, leader preferences and various standard demographics as follows:
Degree of Approval of the War = B0
+ B1 Benefits of the war discounted by the probability they will occur
- B2 Threat to me/my family implied by the war
- B3 Damage to British interests arising from the war
+ B4 Extent to which there is a moral case for the war
+ Controls + ei
Table 4 reports the results of estimating this ‘modified rational actor’ model for
March 2003, immediately after the outbreak of the war, but well before its successful
conclusion four weeks later. The data used are based on a telephone survey
conducted by Gallup, a point that becomes relevant in section (4) below.
The main substantive conclusions implied by Table 4 are relatively straightforward.
First, the pB term – the perceived benefits of Britain’s participation in the war
discounted by the probability that the war would be brought to a successful
conclusion – has a significant positive coefficient. As predicted by the rational actor
model, other things being equal, people were more likely to approve of the war if
they thought its discounted benefits were relatively high. Second, as also predicted
by the rational actor model, the coefficients on both of the cost terms are negative –
though the ‘personal’ cost term is not quite significant at conventional levels. Third,
the coefficient for the ‘moral case for war’ variable is positive and highly significant,
suggesting that the British public were just as concerned about the morality of the
war as they were about its likely costs and benefits for Britain and for themselves.
Finally, the pattern of coefficients among the various control variables suggests that
partisanship may have acted as a sort of cognitive shortcut in the formation of
opinion about the war. People who took a more positive view of Blair were
significantly more likely to approve of the war, as were Conservative identifiers. In
10
contrast, those who had strong positive feelings about Kennedy were significantly
less likely to approve of the war. We note, however, that this relationship may
reflect a tendency for those who already disapproved of the war to take a more
positive view of the Liberal Democrat leader after he expressed his own reservations
about the wisdom of military action without specific UN sanction. Crucially,
however, the model suggests that fully 63% of the variation in the British public’s
approval/disapproval of the war can be explained by a combination of rationality,
moral judgement and partisan heuristics. We regard this ‘modified rational actor’
approach as an important advance in understanding public opinion in Britain.
Table 4. Estimated Individual-level Modified Rational Actor Model of
Approval/Disapproval of the War against Iraq, March 2003
Independent variable
Coeff
pB: Probability of the war being prosecuted
successfully*Benefits accruing to Britain from the
.02
war
Costs (1): The war threatens the safety of me and my
family (5-point scale)
-.04
Costs (2): The war will inflict long-term damage on
British interests (5-point scale)
-.22
Morality: Britain has a moral case for war (5-point
scale)
.48
Feelings about Blair (0-10 scale)
.05
Feelings about Duncan Smith (0-10 scale)
.00
Feelings about Kennedy (0-10 scale)
-.04
Labour identifier/not
.06
Conservative identifier/not
.15
Controls
Gender (male)
.07
Social class (ABC1/not)
.03
Age
-.01
Education
.00
Constant
1.90
Estimation by OLS. N=1001. Corrected R2 = .63. SE = .87.
St err
Prob
.00
.00
.02
.06
.03
.00
.02
.01
.01
.01
.06
.07
.00
.00
.54
.00
.32
.04
.05
.05
.00
.02
.21
.14
.52
.01
.70
.00
The final stage of our analysis of the impact of the war on public opinion was
conducted in October 2003 when we carried out a ‘post-war’ telephone survey that,
as far as possible, asked identical questions to those asked in March 2003. Instead of
asking how likely it was that the war would be prosecuted successfully, we asked
respondents to indicate how successful they thought the war had been, again on a 010 scale. We used this ‘degree of success’ measure as the ‘p’ term in our post-war
model of approval/disapproval of the war. The results, which are shown in Table 5,
indicate that our modified rational actor continues to perform well. The overall
pattern of coefficient signs and significance levels is similar in both tables. The only
notable differences relate to the magnitude of the constant (which is lower in the
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October survey, reflecting the fall in approval for the war); the coefficient for
feelings about Kennedy (which is non-significant in the October model, perhaps
reflecting Kennedy’s relatively reduced visibility as an opponent of the war); and the
increased significance of the gender variable (in March, there was no significant
difference in the attitudes of men and women; by October, women were more
disapproving of the war than men). Overall, however, the results show that the basic
calculus underlying people’s attitudes to the war remained a combination of
rationality, moral judgement and heuristics.
Table 5. Estimated Individual-level Modified Rational Actor Model of
Approval/Disapproval of the War against Iraq, October 2003
Independent variable
Coeff
pB: Degree of success of the war*Benefits accruing
to Britain from the war
.05
Costs (1): The war threatens the safety of me and my
family (5-point scale)
-.04
Costs (2): The war will inflict long-term damage on
British interests (5-point scale)
-.12
Morality: Britain has a moral case for war (5-point
scale)
.44
Feelings about Blair (0-10 scale)
.02
Feelings about Duncan Smith (0-10 scale)
.00
Feelings about Kennedy (0-10 scale)
.00
Labour identifier/not
.05
Conservative identifier/not
.17
Controls
Gender (male)
.13
Social class (ABC1/not)
.01
Age
-.01
Education
.00
Constant
1.34
Estimation by OLS. N=982. Corrected R2 = .60. SE = .81.
St err
Prob
.00
.00
.03
.11
.03
.00
.03
.01
.01
.01
.07
.08
.00
.06
.74
.82
.50
.03
.06
.06
.00
.02
.21
.03
.82
.07
.83
.00
(4) Comparing telephone and internet survey modes
Two sets of circumstances have combined to make it increasingly important that
academic research seriously consider the potential merits of internet polling. First,
response rates to conventional telephone and face-to-face quota sample polls,
particularly those concerned with political questions, are now so low ( between 10
and 20 percent) that questions must be raised about the extent to which the people
who agree to be interviewed are genuinely ‘representative’ of the underlying
population. Second, internet polls are very much cheaper to commission than
conventional polls and therefore significantly reduce the costs of conducting
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repeated survey designs of the sort conducted in the present study. One standard
objection to internet polling, of course, is that such polls involve ‘the respondent
coming to the agency’ rather than ‘the agency seeking out the respondent’. In fact,
internet polling agencies now establish fairly large ‘rolling pools’ of potential
respondents (often involving over 100,000 individuals) who have agreed in principle
to complete internet survey questionnaires. The internet polling agencies then
randomly sample from these pools in order to conduct any given poll. There is
nonetheless clearly a question mark over the potential representativeness of opinion
sample in this way. However, it is an empirical, rather than a theoretical, question as
whether the internet method, with its obvious limitations is in any way inferior to
‘traditional’ quota sample or RDD methods that involve response rates under 20%
and often as low as 10%. Preliminary evidence from both the United States and the
UK suggests that the marginal distributions of key variables are typically not very
different whether internet or ‘traditional’ methods are employed. Crucially, the
available UK evidence also suggests that theoretical inferences drawn from statistical
models estimated using data derived traditional polling methods are not substantially
different from those using internet polling data (Sanders et al 2004, forthcoming). If
UK social science is to benefit from the huge cost savings associated with internet
polling, as well as to tap into the opinions of population sub-groups (such as the
young) who are very difficult to contact using traditional methods, then it clearly
needs to explore the extent to which traditional and internet polls produce similar
results.
In March of 2003 we accordingly conducted identical surveys using telephone and
internet modes. There were some differences in the marginal distributions of
important political attitude variables. It seems likely, however, most of these
differences were attributable to ‘mode’ measurement effects rather than to systematic
differences in the telephone and internet samples. For example, the internet mode
produced a much higher incidence of ‘don’t know’ responses than the telephone
instrument. From an analytic point of view, we were interested primarily in whether
the use of the internet instrument produced different causal inferences about the
sources of key attitudes from the inferences that would be drawn using the telephone
instrument.
We therefore estimated a series of identical explanatory models using three different
dependent variables – party preference, protest potential, and attitude to the Iraq war
– and tested for differences in the estimated coefficients provided by the two survey
modes. Although we do not report all of the detailed results here, we found that
although there were some minor differences in coefficient magnitudes across the
three models, the two modes overall provided results that suggested very similar
substantive conclusions.
Table 6 provides illustrative results for the model that was estimated using telephone
poll data only in Table 4. The technique that we employ is to pool the two datasets
and to specify a series of interaction terms that test to see if the internet coefficient
for each term in the model is different from the telephone coefficient. The bottom
segment of the table measures the extent to which each coefficient in the internet
13
sample shifts away from the coefficient estimated for the telephone sample. The
significance levels indicate whether each shift is significant or not. Inspection of the
significance levels of these shifts indicates there are some differences between the
models’ estimated coefficients. Crucially, however, the two sets of results produce
virtually identical theoretical conclusions:
• With regard to the pB term, there is no statistical difference in the estimates of
the two models (see the non-significant coefficient for the pB term in the bottom
segment of Table 5.
• The Personal Costs effect is slightly larger in the internet sample (b=-.04 -.05 =
-.09) than in the telephone sample. However, the effect is both negative and at
the margin of significance in both samples.
• The Costs to Britain effect is slightly smaller in the internet sample (b=-.22-.
10=-.12), but again it is significant and negative in both samples.
• The Morality effect is slightly smaller in the internet sample (b=.48 -.18 = .30),
but it is still significant and positive in both samples.
• The Blair effect is slightly bigger in the internet sample (b=.05 + .04 = .09), but
is again significant and positive in both samples.
• Finally, the constant is slightly larger in the internet sample (b=1.9+.9=2.8),
indicating that the internet sample was marginally more sympathetic towards the
war.
The key point is that, using either internet or telephone sampling methods, the
evidence strongly supports the kind of modified rational actor account of attitudes
towards the Iraq war that we have proposed. We conclude that the time is now ripe
for the academic community to explore ways of using internet polling methods mode
to measure relevant aspects of UK public opinion.
Table 6. Estimated Individual-level Modified Rational Actor Model of
Approval/Disapproval of the War against Iraq, March 2003; Telephone and
Internet Coefficient Estimates Compared
Independent variable
Coeff
St err
Prob
Telephone instrument coefficients (by definition identical to Table 4)
pB: Prob of successful war* Benefits to Britain
Costs (1): War threatens me and my family
Costs (2): War damages British interests
Morality: Britain has a moral case for war
Feelings about Blair (0-10 scale)
Feelings about Duncan Smith (0-10 scale)
Feelings about Kennedy (0-10 scale)
Labour identifier/not
Conservative identifier/not
Gender (male)
Social class (ABC1/not)
Age
Education
.02
-.04
-.22
.48
.05
.00
-.04
.06
.15
.07
.03
-.01
.00
.00
.02
.03
.02
.01
.01
.01
.06
.07
.05
.05
.00
.02
.00
.06
.00
.00
.00
.54
.00
.32
.04
.14
.52
.01
.70
14
Constant
1.90
.21
.00
Differences between Telephone instrument and Internet instrument
coefficients (interaction terms)
pB: Prob of successful war* Benefits to Britain
-.00
.00
.49
Costs (1): War threatens me and my family
-.05
.03
.07
Costs (2): War damages British interests
-.10
.03
.00
Morality: Britain has a moral case for war
-.18
.03
.00
Feelings about Blair (0-10 scale)
.04
.01
.00
Feelings about Duncan Smith (0-10 scale)
.00
.02
.98
Feelings about Kennedy (0-10 scale)
.00
.01
.51
Labour identifier/not
-.12
.09
.14
Conservative identifier/not
.04
.10
.69
Gender (male)
-.01
.07
.88
Social class (ABC1/not)
.00
.07
.97
Age
.00
.00
.38
Education
.04
.03
.08
Constant
.90
.26
.00
Estimation by OLS. N=1001 for telephone; 1371 for internet. Ctd R2=.67 SE=.79
15
Activities
We attended and gave presentations to all of the special intra-programme
conferences that were held under the auspices of the Democracy and Participation
Programme. In addition, we gave the following conference papers and
presentations.
Paul Whiteley, Harold Clarke, David Sanders and Marianne Stewart, “(Not) At The
Polls: Electoral Turnout and Political Choice in Contemporary Britain.” Paper
presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political
Research, Turin, Italy, March 22-27, 2002.
Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul F. Whiteley.
“Downs, Stokes and Modified Rational Choice: Modelling Turnout in 2001.” Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, MA, August 28-September 1, 2002, and the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 25-28, 2002.
David Sanders, “The British General Election of 2001 and The State of Democracy
in Contemporary Britain.” University of Aberystwyth, Aberystwyth, Wales, October
2002.
David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, Harold Clarke and Paul Whiteley, “Public
Attitudes Towards Political Protest in Britain, 2000-2002.” Paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, Leicester University,
Leicester, England, April 15-17, 2003.
David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, “Models
of protest and political participation in contemporary Britain”. Paper presented at
the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Leicester, April
14-17th 2003.
David Sanders, ‘The state of democracy in contemporary Britain’. Harvard
University, April 2003.
Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley,
“Calculating Conflict – The Dynamics of Public Attitudes to the Iraq War in
Britain.” Presentation at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Conference,
Political Studies Association Specialist Group, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales,
September 12-14, 2003.
David Sanders, “Internet versus telephone polling and UK public opinion”. Speaker
at Roundtable discussion at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Conference,
Political Studies Association Specialist Group, University of Cardiff, September 1214th 2003.
David Sanders, Harold Clarke and Marianne Stewart, “Is There a Crisis of
Democracy?” Presentation at the Democracy and Participation Programme, Key
Findings and Policy Implications Conference, Westminster, London, September 24,
2003.
16
David Sanders, ‘Correlation and Causality: Why Exogeneity Tests May Not be the
Answer’. Paper to be presented at Workshop on ‘Perceptions, preferences and
rationalisations: overcoming the problem of causal inference in the study of political
behaviour’ Nuffield College, Oxford, May 7-8 2004.
Outputs
David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley. “The
Dynamics of Protest in Britain, 2000-2002.” Parliamentary Affairs, 56, (2003: 687699).
Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley. Political
Choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, Harold Clarke and Paul Whiteley, “Public
Attitudes Towards Political Protest in Britain, 2000-2002” in Justin Fisher and Roger
Scully (eds) British Elections and Parties Review, Volume 14 (London: Frank Cass,
2004 forthcoming).
Two datasets are currently being prepared for lodging with the UK Data Archive.
One is the complete individual-level repeated cross-section data file, for the period
August 2000-October 2003. The other is an aggregate time-series version of the
same dataset.
Impacts
None.
Future Research Priorities
The research team (plus Whiteley) have secured funding from the US National
Science Foundation (c$400,000) to continue collecting monthly data on political
attitudes and participation in the UK for a 4-year period beginning April 2004. The
surveys will be conducted using the internet survey instrument.
17
References
Becker, G. S. 1975. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Clarke, H., D. Sanders, M. Stewart and P. Whiteley. 2004. Political Choice in
Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coleman, J. S. 1988. ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.’ American
Journal of Sociology 94:95-120.
Conover, P. J. and S. Feldman. 1986. ‘Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm
Mad as Hell and I'm Not Going to Take It Anymore.’ American Journal of Political
Science. 30:50-78.
Dalton, R. J. 1996. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. 2nd edition. Chatham:
Chatham House Publishers.
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hendry, David F. 1995. Dynamic Econometrics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hochschild. J. L. 1981. What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Huckfeldt, R. and J. Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackman, R. W. and R. A. Miller. 1998. ‘Social Capital and Politics.’ In N. W.
Polsby, ed., American Review of Political Science, vol. 1. Palo Alto: Annual
Reviews.
Muller, E. N. 1970. Aggressive Political Participation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Mutz, D. C. 1998. Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives
Affect Political Attitudes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nie, N. H., J. Junn and K. Stehlik-Barry. 1996. Education and Democratic
Citizenship in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken Books.
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Riker, W. and P. C. Ordeshook. 1968. ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’,
American Political Science Review, 62: 25-42.
Sanders, D., H. Clarke, M. Stewart P. Whiteley and J. Twyman. 2004. ‘The 2001
British Election Study Internet Poll: A Methodological Experiment.’ Journal of
Political Marketing, forthcoming.
18
Verba, S., K. L. Schlozman and H. E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Whiteley, P. and P. Seyd. 1998. ‘The dynamics of Party Activism in Britain’. British
Journal of Political Science, 28: 113-138.
19
1000 word summary
The project involved collecting and analysing a series of survey datasets concerned
with the preparedness of British citizens to engage in different forms of political
participation, and their attitudes towards democracy. The surveys also collected data
relating to variables that potentially explain people’s propensities to engage in
political participation. A pilot survey, which tested out the draft questionnaire, was
conducted in April 2000. The main data collection involved administering the same
questionnaire each month to a representative sample of the UK electorate, over the
period July 2000 to December 2002. A new set of randomly selected respondents
was interviewed by telephone each month. The fieldwork was conducted by the
Gallup organisation. The project was extended by ESRC in February 2003 to add a
further set of questions about the British public’s attitudes towards the US/UK war
against Iraq. The extended survey instrument went into the field in February, March
and April of 2003. The March study involved an experiment in which two identical
surveys were conducted – one by telephone and a parallel one using the internet. A
final (telephone) post-war survey was conducted in September 2003.
In light of the supplementary award made by ESRC to study the impact of the Iraq
War, the project had four main aims.
•
•
•
•
To collect time-series survey data that would allow for the measurement and
exploration of the interrelationships between political participation and
citizen (dis)satisfaction with democracy in Britain.
To consider the explanatory power of five rival models of political
participation: relative deprivation, cognitive mobilisation, civic engagement,
rational action, and social capital.
To consider the impact of the Iraq War on public opinion in Britain, and in
particular to account for citizens’ changing attitudes towards the war.
To explore the similarities and differences between telephone and Internet
survey modes as vehicles for assessing UK public opinion.
(1) The dynamics of attitudes towards participation and democracy in Britain
Simple trend analyses suggest that the 2001 general election, which occurred
roughly in the middle of the period covered by our surveys, helped temporarily to
lower people’s preparedness to participate in protest activity and to increase their
overall satisfaction with democracy in Britain. Notwithstanding these clear trend
patterns, more systematic time-series analysis indicates that voters’ economic
perceptions play a crucial role in both attitudes towards protest and satisfaction with
democracy. The more positively that people evaluate their personal economic
circumstances, the less likely they are to consider engaging in protest; the more
positive their emotional responses to the economy, the higher their levels of
democratic satisfaction. We also find that, over and above these strong economic
effects, the preparedness to engage in protest is stimulated in the short-term by
‘successful’ large-scale protest by others. Both the ‘fuel protests’ of September 2000
and the Countryside Alliance protests of autumn 2002 temporarily raised the protest
potential of the UK public as a whole. The effects of these ‘contagion effects’
decayed fairly rapidly, however.
(2) The relative explanatory power of different models of protest activity
Existing academic research has developed five major models of people’s
preparedness to engage in protest and other political activities. The ‘relative
deprivation’ model argues that protest is most likely when there is a gap between
what people think they ought to get and what they think they will get from the
political system. The ‘civic voluntarism’ model suggests that participation is driven
primarily by the resources (time, income, education) that people have available to
them, by their psychological engagement with the political system, and by others’
mobilisation efforts. The ‘cognitive mobilisation’ model stresses people’s
information, knowledge and political interest as sources of their political activism.
The ‘social capital’ model attributes political activism to relatively high levels of
social trust and involvement in informal social groups. Finally, the ‘rational actor’
model sees protest as the result of a rational calculus on the part of each individual
about the likely costs and benefits of activism. Our survey design involved asking
respondents a series of questions that sought to capture the key features of each of
these models. In addition, we also attempted to measure people’s general
orientations towards risk. Analysis of the responses suggests that none of the
models, considered in isolation, provides a convincing account of protest potential in
the UK. Rather, a hybrid ‘general incentives model’, which has a ‘hard’ rational actor
cost-benefit calculation at its core but which is supplemented by a set of ‘softer’
considerations drawn from the other models, provides a reasonably convincing
statistical account of the pattern of responses. Our empirical results indicate the
importance of three ‘old’ factors (rational calculation, relative deprivation and
mobilisation) and two ‘new’ ones (people’s risk orientations and the ‘contagion
effects’ of successful protest events by others).
(3) Accounting for UK attitudes towards the Iraq War
Our analysis of attitudes towards the war follows directly from the ‘general
incentives’ model of protest referred to above. We hypothesised that attitudes
towards the war could be represented as a modified cost-benefit calculation of the
form:
Degree of Approval of the War = B0
+ B1 Benefits of the war discounted by the probability they will occur
- B2 Threat to me/my family implied by the war
- B3 Damage to British interests arising from the war
+ B4 Extent to which there is a moral case for the war
+ Controls + ei
Our empirical results strongly support this account of the sources of support for the
war. Controlling for a range other potentially relevant variables, the set of variables
identified above provides a robust and parsimonious statistical account of individual
attitudes towards the war.
(4) Comparing telephone and internet survey modes
Two sets of circumstances have combined to make it increasingly important that
academic research seriously consider the potential merits of internet polling. First,
response rates to conventional telephone and face-to-face quota sample polls are
now so low that questions must be raised about their ‘representativeness’. Second,
internet polls are very much cheaper to commission than conventional polls and
therefore significantly reduce the costs of conducting repeated survey designs of the
sort conducted in this study. In March of 2003 we conducted identical surveys using
telephone and internet modes. We estimated a series of identical explanatory models
using three different dependent variables – party preference, protest potential, and
attitude to the Iraq war – and tested for differences in the estimated coefficients
provided by the two survey modes. We found that although there were some minor
differences in coefficient magnitudes, the two modes overall provided results that
suggested very similar substantive conclusions. We conclude that the time is now
ripe for the academic community to explore ways of using internet polling methods
mode to measure relevant aspects of UK public opinion.
FIELD FINAL – 9 JANUARY, 2002
DP,CAT11188
P188
(REVISIONS ON LAST PAGE)
AC 5590
Project Registration # 135590
X APPROVED BY CLIENT
TELEPHONE OMNIBUS
Omni Week 2-Cati A
The Gallup Organization, Inc.
Copyright, The Gallup Organization
Kathryn Smyth, Project Administrator
Nancy Laverge, Specwriter
INTERVIEWED BY _________________
Simon Sarkar, Researcher
January, 2002
n = 1000
I.D.#:
______(1- 6)
**AREA CODE AND TELEPHONE NUMBER: ( )______________________
____ ___(633.16)
**INTERVIEW TIME: --------------------------------------------------------------------------____ ____(716.6)
** Region
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
(Code from Fonefile)
Rest of South East
East Anglia
South West
Wales
West Midlands
North West
Yorks & Humberside
North
Scotland
East Midlands
Greater London
(n=193)
(n=37)
(n=85)
(n=52)
(n=94)
(n=111)
(n=88)
(n=56)
(n=89)
(n=72)
(n=123)
____ ____
(52.2)
____ ____ ____
(127.3)
** New Constituency Code (Code from Fonefile)
**TV Region (Code from Fonefile)
(136.2)
** The following section is coded from Constituency File
701-710
711
712
713
714
715-720
Weight
age Weight Factor
Social Class Weight Factor
Cars Weight Factor
Homes Weight Factor
Hold additional Weight Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
x
y
London
Midlands
Lancs
Yorks
Scotland Central
Wales and West
Southern
Tyne Tees
Anglia
North Scotland
South West
Border
Urbanicity Indication
(CODE FROM FONEFILE) (204)
1
2
3
4
Extra-urban
Urban
Sub-urban
Rural
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
HOLD
HOLD
HOLD
HOLD
HOLD
HOLD
130.2 % Majority
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
136.2
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
0-2
3-5
6-9
10-12
13-15
16-17
18-20
21-25
29-29
30-39
40+
T.V. Region
Anglia
Border
Carlton & LWT
Central
Grampian
Granada
HTV
Meridian
Scottish
Tyne –tees
West Country
Yorkshire
1
HOLD
132.2 LD% of the Vote
01
02
03
04
06
07
08
09
10
HOLD
0-9
10-14
15-19
20-22
26-28
29-31
32-35
36-39
40+
134.2 1st and 2nd Party
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
HOLD
1st Con, 2nd Lab
1st con, 2nd LD
1st Con, 2nd Nat
1st Lab, 2nd Con
1st Lab, 2nd LD
1st Lab, 2nd Nat/Oth
1st LD, 2nd Con
1st LD, 2nd Lab
1st LD, 2nd Nat
1st Nat, 2nd Lab
1st Nat, 2nd Lab
1st Nat, 2nd LD
1st Other, 2nd Any
12/04/05
CATI A
Hello, my name is _____________________________. I’m calling on behalf of the Gallup Poll. We are
conducting a general survey and hope that you or someone else in your household will be able to spare some
time to answer a few questions.
To ensure that we are speaking to a representative mix of people throughout the country, could I please speak
with the person in your household aged 18 or over who had the most recent birthday.
S1.
Gender (DO NOT ASK, CODE ONLY)
1
2
S2.
Male
Female
_____(1002)
Form.
(NOTE TO SURVENT: HALF OF SAMPLE TO BE AUTOCODED AS
FORM 1; HALF OF SAMPLE TO BE AUTOCODED AS FORM 2)
1
2
D17.
Form 1
Form 2
___(2400)
Will you tell me your year of birth please. (INTERVIEWER NOTE: ENTER
LAST TWO DIGITS OF YEAR IN RANGE 00 - 83)
00
1900 or earlier
_____ (2046)
_____ (2047)
DK (Don’t Know)
RF (Refused)
IF D17 IS DK OR RF THEN ASK S2a; ELSE SKIP TO Q1
S2a.
In that case could you tell me which age band you would fall into?
(READ 2 - 5)
HOLD 1
16 – 17
2
3
4
5
18 - 24
25 - 39
40 - 54
55 or over
6
7
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
____(2048)
2
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR Q1 - Q9 POLITICAL QUESTIONS♣
1.
If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?
(READ AND ROTATE 06 - 09, AS APPROPRIATE, THEN READ 01)
01
02
03
04
05
Other party (DO NOT LIST)
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
HOLD
NONE (Never/won’t vote)
06
07
08
Conservative
Labour
The Liberal Democrats
09
(IF REGION IS 09 THEN INSERT) Scottish National Party
(IF REGION IS 04 THEN INSERT) Plaid Cymru (PLIED CUMRIE)
10
11
Green Party
UK Independence Party
_(1003)_(1004)
If Q1 is 02, 03 or 05 THEN ASK Q2; ELSE SKIP TO PROGRAMME NOTE BEFORE Q3
2.
Which party would you be most inclined to vote for? (OPEN END AND CODE)
01
Other party (DO NOT LIST)
02
03
04
05
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
HOLD
NONE (Never/won’t vote)
06
07
08
Conservative
Labour
The Liberal Democrats
09
(IF REGION IS 09 THEN INSERT) Scottish National Party
(IF REGION IS 04 THEN INSERT) Plaid Cymru (PLIED CUMRIE)
10
11
Green Party
UK Independence Party
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
_(1005)_(1006)
3
12/04/05
CATI A
IF D17 IS 00 - 80 OR S2a IS 2 - 7 THEN ASK Q3; ELSE SKIP TO Q4b
3.
4.
4b.
Did you vote in the General Election held June 7 2001, or were you prevented?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Yes, voted
No, prevented
} SKIP TO Q4b
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
} SKIP TO Q4b
} SKIP TO Q4b
5
Not old enough to vote in 2001 Elections
(VOLUNTEERED)
} SKIP TO Q4b
____(1007)
For which party did you vote?
(OPEN-END AND CODE)
01
Other party (DO NOT LIST)
02
03
04
05
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
HOLD
NONE
06
07
08
Conservative
Labour
The Liberal Democrats
09
(IF REGION IS 09 THEN INSERT) Scottish National Party
(IF REGION IS 04 THEN INSERT) Plaid Cymru (PLIED CUMRIE)
10
11
Green Party
UK Independence Party
_(1008)_(1009)
Who would make the best Prime Minister:
(READ CODES 1-3)
1
2
3
Tony Blair
Iain Duncan Smith
Charles Kennedy
4
5
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
_____(1010)
4
12/04/05
CATI A
5.
5b.
8.
9.
Do you approve or disapprove of the Government’s record to date?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Approve
Disapprove
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1011)
Do you think that the Government has, on balance, been honest and trustworthy,
or not?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Yes – honest and trustworthy
No - not honest and trustworthy
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1012)
How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the
next 12 months? Will it…
(READ OUT CODES 5 – 1)
5
4
3
2
1
Get a lot better
Get a little better
Stay the same
Get a little worse
Get a lot worse
6
7
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1025)
If Britain were in economic difficulties, which party do you think could handle
the problem best – the Conservative party or the Labour party ?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Conservatives
Labour
3
Neither (VOLUNTEERED)
4
5
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1026)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR Q1 - Q9 POLITICAL QUESTIONS♣
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
5
__(2154 - 2157)
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
11b.
12b.
13b.
14b.
How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over
the last 12 months? Has it: (READ 5 - 1)
5
4
3
2
1
Got a lot better
Got a little better
Stayed the same
Got a little worse
Got a lot worse
6
7
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
_____(1034)
How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over
the next 12 months? Will it: (READ 5 - 1)
5
4
3
2
1
Get a lot better
Get a little better
Stay the same
Get a little worse
Get a lot worse
6
7
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
_____(1035)
How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it
was 12 months ago? Has it: (READ 5 - 1)
5
4
3
2
1
Got a lot better
Got a little better
Stayed the same
Got a little worse
Got a lot worse
6
7
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
_____(1036)
Thinking of the Single European Currency, which of the following would come
closest to your own view? Do you think Britain should definitely join, wait and
see how it develops or definitely stay out? (OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
3
Definitely join
Wait and see how it develops
Definitely stay out
4
5
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
____(1037)
6
12/04/05
CATI A
15b.
16.
20.
Which one of the following do you think affects the general economic situation in
this country most? Would you say ……. (READ AND ROTATE 1 - 2)
1
2
The British Government
The European Union
3
4
Both equally (VOLUNTEERED)
Neither (VOLUNTEERED)
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1038)
Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of
Britain’s membership in the European Union? (OPEN END AND CODE)
4
3
2
1
Strongly approve
Approve
Disapprove
Strongly disapprove
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1039)
Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about the country’s
general economic situation. (READ AND ROTATE 01-08). (ALLOW 4
RESPONSES).
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Angry
Happy
Disgusted
Hopeful
Uneasy
Confident
Afraid
Proud
09
No-none (VOLUNTEERED)
10
11
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
96
No more responses
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
} SKIP TO Q21
} SKIP TO Q21
}
7
1st Response
_(1040)_(1041)
2nd Response
_(1042)_(1043)
3rd Response
_(1044)_(1045)
4th Response
_(1046)_(1047)
12/04/05
CATI A
21.
I am going to read the same list of words again. This time please tell me if any of
them describe your feelings about the financial condition of your household. If
they do please tell me which ones. (READ AND ROTATE 01-08). (ALLOW 4
RESPONSES).
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Angry
Happy
Disgusted
Hopeful
Uneasy
Confident
Afraid
Proud
09
No-none (VOLUNTEERED)
10
11
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
96
No more responses
} SKIP TO ‘NOTE’ BEFORE Q24
} SKIP TO ‘NOTE’ BEFORE Q24
}
1st Response
_(1075)_(1076)
2nd Response
_(1077)_(1078)
3rd Response
_(1079)_(1080)
4th Response
_(1081)_(1082)
IF REGION IS 04 THEN ASK Q24A; IF REGION IS 09 THEN ASK Q24B; ELSE CONTINUE.
24.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal
Democrat or what? (OPEN END AND CODE)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrat
Plaid Cymru
Scottish Nationalist
Green
Other Party
08
09
10
(No-none)
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
__(1056)_(1057)
ALL IN Q24 SKIP TO Q25
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
8
12/04/05
CATI A
24a.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal
Democrat, “Plaid Cymru” (PLIED CUMRIE) or what? (OPEN END AND
CODE)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrat
Plaid Cymru
Scottish Nationalist
Green
Other Party
08
09
10
(No-none)
(Don’t know))
(Refused)
_(1058)_(1059)
ALL IN Q24A SKIP TO Q25
24b.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal
Democrat, Scottish Nationalist or what? (OPEN END AND CODE)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrat
Plaid Cymru
Scottish Nationalist
Green
Other Party
08
09
10
(No-none)
(Don’t know))
(Refused)
_(1060)_(1061)
IF Q24, Q24a OR Q24b IS 08, 09 OR 10 THEN ASK Q25; ELSE SKIP TO Q26
25.
Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the
others? If yes please tell me which party? (OPEN END AND CODE)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrat
Plaid Cymru
Scottish Nationalist
Green
Other Party
08
09
10
(No-none)
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
_(1062)_(1063)
9
12/04/05
CATI A
IF Q24, Q24a OR Q24b IS 01 - 07 OR Q25 IS 01 - 07 THEN ASK Q26; ELSE SKIP TO Q32
26.
Would you call yourself very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly (IF
Q24 = 01-06, THEN INSERT RESPONSE FROM Q24; IF Q24a IS 01-06
THEN INSERT RESPONSE FROM Q24A; IF Q24b IS 01-06 THEN
INSERT RESPONSE FROM Q24b. IF Q25 IS 01-06 THEN INSERT
RESPONSE IN Q25; ELSE INSERT “affiliated with that party”)? (OPEN
END AND CODE)
1
2
3
Very Strongly
Fairly Strongly
Not Very Strongly
4
5
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
____(1064)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
___(1536 - 1539)
♣START CLOCK FOR NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
32.
33.
On a scale from 0 - 10 where 10 means a great deal of attention and 0 means no
attention, how much attention do you pay to politics and public affairs?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
10
09
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
Pay great deal of attention to politics
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
Pay no attention to politics
_(1100)_(1101)
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no
influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
10
09
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
You have a great deal of influence on politics
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
You have no influence on politics at all
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
_(1102)_(1103)
10
12/04/05
CATI A
34b.
Think for a moment about whether people with whom you have contact can be
trusted. Use the 0 - 10 scale again, where 10 means definitely can be trusted and 0
means definitely cannot be trusted.
(OPEN END AND CODE)
10
09
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
People definitely can be trusted
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
People definitely cannot be trusted
_(1106)_(1107)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
11
___(1520 - 1523)
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR 2nd NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
35.
Now, a few questions about how active you are in politics and community affairs.
Let’s think about the next few years. Using a scale from 0 - 10, where 0 means
very unlikely and 10 means very likely, how likely is it that you will…..?
(READ AND ROTATE A - E)
10
09
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
Very likely
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
a
Vote in the next general election
_(1108)_(1109)
b
Vote in the next election for the European Parliament
_(1110)_(1111)
c
Work actively with a group of people to address a public issue or solve a
problem (INTERVIEWER NOTE: If respondent needs clarification,
read: for example, like getting involved in a neighbourhood watch)
_(1112)_(1113)
Participate in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show your
concern about a public issue or problem
_(1114)_(1115)
Be active in a voluntary organization, like a community association, a
charity group, or a sports club
_(1116)_(1117)
d
e
Very unlikely
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 2nd NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
___(1524 - 1527)
♣START CLOCK FOR 3rd NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
36.
Over the past few years, has anyone asked you to get involved in politics or
community affairs?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Yes - I have been asked
No - I have not been asked
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
___(1118)
12
12/04/05
CATI A
37.
Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or
community affairs?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
1
2
Yes - I have volunteered
No - I have not volunteered
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
___(1119)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 3rd NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
___(1528 - 1531)
♣START CLOCK FOR 4th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
IF REGION IS 01, 02, 03, 05, 06, 07, 08, 10 OR 11 THEN ASK Q38a
38a.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as…..?
(READ AND ROTATE 01 - 03, THEN READ 04)
01
02
03
04
English
British
European
None of these
05
06
07
08
09
10
Scottish
Welsh
English and British
English and European
British and European
English, British and European
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
_(1120)_(1121)
IF REGION IS 09 THEN ASK Q38b
38b.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as…..?
(READ AND ROTATE 01 - 03, THEN READ 04)
01
02
03
04
Scottish
British
European
None of these
05
06
07
08
09
10
English
Welsh
Scottish and British
Scottish and European
British and European
Scottish, British and European
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
_(1122)_(1123)
13
12/04/05
CATI A
IF REGION IS 04 THEN ASK Q38c
38c.
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as…..?
(READ AND ROTATE 01 - 03, THEN READ 04)
01
02
03
04
Welsh
British
European
None of these
05
06
07
08
09
10
English
Scottish
Welsh and British
Welsh and European
British and European
Welsh, British and European
11
12
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
(VOLUNTEERED)
_(1124)_(1125)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 4th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
___(1532 - 1535)
♣START CLOCK FOR 5th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
39.
Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.
(READ AND ROTATE A - E, THEN READ AND ROTATE F - G)
1
2
Agree
Disagree
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
a
for
Being active in politics and public affairs is a good way to get benefits
___(1126)
yourself and your family
___(1127)
b
It takes too much time and effort to be active in politics and public affairs
c
for
Being active in politics and public affairs is a good way to get benefits
___(1128)
groups that people care about, like pensioners or the disabled
___(1129)
d
The Government generally treats people like yourself fairly
e
There is often a big gap between what people like yourself expect out of
life and what you actually get
f
The Government is doing a good job in managing the economy
g
The Government is doing a good job in managing public services, like
health care and education
___(1130)
___(1131)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 5th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
14
___(1132)
___(1558 - 1561)
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR 6th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
40b.
Generally speaking, how willing are you to take risks? Are you very willing,
somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to take risks?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
4
3
2
1
Very willing
Somewhat willing
Somewhat unwilling
Very unwilling
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
___(1134)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 6th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
___(1550 - 1553)
♣START CLOCK FOR 8th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
ROTATE Q42 AND Q43
42.
43.
Thinking about how well democracy works in this country, on the whole, are you
very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way
that democracy works in this country?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
4
3
2
1
Very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
A little dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
___(1137)
Thinking about your life as a whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with your life as a whole?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
4
3
2
1
Very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
A little dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
___(1138)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 8th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
15
___(1570 - 1573)
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR 9th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
44.
45.
How often do you read a daily morning newspaper - every day, sometimes or not
at all?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
3
2
1
Every day
Sometimes
Not at all
} SKIP TO DEMOGRAPHICS
4
5
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
} SKIP TO DEMOGRAPHICS
} SKIP TO DEMOGRAPHICS
___(1139)
Which daily morning newspaper do you read most often?
(OPEN END AND CODE)
01
Other
(PLEASE LIST)
02
03
04
05
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
(None most often)
HOLD
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Aberdeen Press and Journal
Daily Mail/Scottish Daily Mail
Daily Star/Daily Star of Scotland
Daily Telegraph
Express
Financial Times
Guardian
Independent
Mirror/Scottish Mirror/Daily Record
The Glasgow Herald
The Scotsman
The Sun
Times
Today
♣STOP CLOCK FOR 9th NEW UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS QUESTIONS♣
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
16
_(1140)_(1141)
___(1562 - 1565)
12/04/05
CATI A
♣START CLOCK FOR DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS♣
DEMOGRAPHICS
(INTERVIEWER READ: ) And finally, I have just a few
questions for classification purposes.
D1.
Do you or your family, own your own home or do you rent it?
1
2
D1a.
(Neither)
(Don’t Know)
} SKIP TO D1c
} SKIP TO D1c
5
(Refused)
} SKIP TO D2
Paid for }
Mortgage
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
} SKIP TO D2
}
_____ (2001)
Do you rent from a council or rent privately? OPEN END AND CODE)
Council
Privately
Housing Association/Other (volunteered)
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
}
}
} SKIP TO D2
}
_____ (2002)
Is your home some other form of accommodation such as a hostel or lodging?
1
2
3
4
D2.
_____ (2000)
Is your home paid for or do you have a mortgage?
1
2
3
3
4
D1c.
} CONTINUE
} SKIP TO D1B
3
4
1
2
3
4
D1b.
Own
Rent
Yes
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2003)
At what age did you or will you complete your full-time education? (OPENENDED CODE FROM PRE-CODED LIST)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
14 or under
15
16
17/18
19-20
21 or over
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
_____ (2004)
17
12/04/05
CATI A
D3.
D4.
Do you, or does anyone else in your household run a car including company
cars?
1
Yes
} CONTINUE
2
3
4
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
} SKIP TO D5
}
_____ (2005)
How many cars in total? (OPEN-ENDED AND CODE)
1
2
3
4
5
One
Two
Three or more
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2006)
ASK ALL:
D5.
How many people are there in your household. Please include both adults and
children? (OPEN ENDED AND CODE ACTUAL NUMBER)
98
99
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2007)
_____ (2008)
___________________ TOTAL
D6.
How many are aged 16 and over? (OPEN ENDED AND CODE ACTUAL
NUMBER)
98
99
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2009)
_____ (2010)
___________________ Adults 16+
(PROGRAMMING NOTE: IF D5 > D6 (excluding DK and RF) THEN ASK D7
Otherwise skip to D8a)
D7.
How many of those under 16 are: (READ A-D AND ENTER ACTUAL
NUMBER FOR EACH CATEGORY)
98
99
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
A
___________________ 11-15 years
B
___________________ 5-10 years
C
___________________ 1-4 years
D
___________________ Under 1 year
____ ____
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
18
(2011)(2012)
____ ____
(2013)(2014)
____ ____
(2015)(2016)
____ ____
(2017)(2018)
12/04/05
CATI A
(PROGRAMMING NOTE: IF SUM OF D6 AND D7A-D DO NOT EQUAL D5 EXCLUDING DK’S & RF’S RETURN TO D5 AND RE-ASK)
D8a.
D8b.
Are you employed now?
1
Yes
}
2
3
4
No
}
(Don’t Know)
(Refused) }
(ALL CONTINUE)
}
_____ (2020)
Are you the chief income earner in the household, that is the person with the
largest income, whether from employment, pensions, state benefits, investments
or any other source.
1
Yes
} Continue
2
3
4
No
}Skip to D12
(Don’t Know)
(Refused) } Skip to D12
} SKIP TO D12
_____ (2021)
(Programming note: If D8a = 2, 3 or 4 and D8b = 1, skip to D9c, otherwise continue)
D9a.
D9b.
Are you self-employed:
1
Yes
} SKIP TO D9f
2
3
4
No
}
(Don’t Know)
(Refused) }
_____ (2022)
About how many hours a week do you work? (Open ended & code actual
number)
98
99
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
___________________ TOTAL
D9c.
} CONTINUE
}
} All skip to D9f
_____ (2023)
_____ (2024))
}
Are you (READ 1-4) (IF CODES 2,3,4 IN QUESTION D8a AND CODE 1 IN
QD8B)
1
Unemployed
}
Continue
2
Retired, Pensioned
}
Skip to D9e
3
4
5
6
7
Housewife not otherwise employed
Student
(Other)
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
}
}
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
19
Skip to D14
}
}
_____ (2025)
12/04/05
CATI A
D9d.
D9e.
D9f.
D9fa.
Have you been unemployed for more than six months?
1
Yes
} Skip to D14
2
3
4
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
} Skip to D9f
}
Do you receive only the basic state retirement pension?
1
Yes
} Skip to D14
2
3
4
No
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
}
} Continue
}
_____ (2027)
Is your current/was your most recent job a manual or non-manual job?
1
Manual
} Skip to D9g
2
Non-manual
} Skip to D9h
3
(None/Have not worked)
} Skip to D14
4
5
6
(Neither)
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
}
} Continue
}
_____ (2028)
For purposes of classification only, we need to determine whether your job is/was
a manual or non-manual job. Examples of a manual job would be someone who
works with their hands, such as a farm worker, a mechanic, a machine operator, or
a waitress. Examples of a non-manual job would include an office worker, a
teacher, or a manager. Is/was your job manual or non-manual?
1
2
3
D9g.
_____ (2026)
Manual
Non-manual
(None/Have not worked)
} Continue
} Skip to D9h
} Skip to D14
_____(2029)
Is/was this manual job skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
(Never worked)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
}
}
}
}
}
(SKIP TO D14)
_____ (2030)
20
12/04/05
CATI A
D9h.
Which of the following best describes your occupation: (READ OUT 1-6
CODE ONE ONLY)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Director or Top level management
Highly specialised expert such as a surgeon or a barrister
Middle management executive/owner of a small business
Principal officer in local government or civil service
Junior manager
Salesperson, office worker
Other non-manual
8
9
10
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
(Never worked)
_____ (2031)
(Programme Note: ALL asked D9h, SKIP TO D14)
D12.
D13a.
D13b.
Is the Chief income earner employed now?
1
Yes
} CONTINUE
2
3
4
No
}
(Don’t Know)
(Refused) }
_____ (2032)
Is the Chief Income Earner in your household self-employed:
1
Yes
2
3
3
No
}
Don’t Know
(Refused) }
} SKIP TO D13f
} CONTINUE
_____ (2033)
How many hours a week does the Chief Income Earner in your household work:
98
99
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
___________________ TOTAL
D13c
} SKIP TO D13c
}
}
ALL SKIP TO D13f
}
_____ (2034)
_____ (2035)
Is the Chief Income Earner in your household (READ 1-4) (IF CODES 2,3,4 IN
QUESTIONS D12)
1
2
Unemployed
Retired, Pensioned
}
}
Continue
Skip to D13e
3
4
5
6
7
Housewife not otherwise employed
Student
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
(Other)
}
}
}
}
}
Skip to D14
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
21
_____ (2036)
12/04/05
CATI A
D13d.
D13e.
D13f.
D13fa.
Has the Chief Income Earner been unemployed for more than six months?
1
Yes
}
Skip to D14
2
3
4
No
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
}
}
}
Skip to D13f
Does the Chief Income Earner receive only the basic state retirement pension?
1
Yes
2
3
4
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
}
Skip to D14
}
Continue
_____ (2038)
Is the Chief Income Earner’s current/was the Chief Income Earner’s most recent
job a manual or non-manual job?
1
Manual
}SKIP TO D13G
2
Non-Manual
} SKIP TO D13H
3
(None/Have not worked)
} SKIP TO D14
4
5
6
Neither
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
}
} CONTINUE
}
_____ (2039)
For purposes of classification only, we need to determine whether the Chief
Income Earner’s job is/was a manual or non-manual job. Examples of a manual
job would be someone who works with their hands, such as a farm worker, a
mechanic, a machine operator, or a waitress. Examples of a non-manual job
would include an office worker, a teacher, or a manager. Is/was the Chief
Income Earner’s job manual or non-manual?
1
2
3
D13g.
_____ (2037)
Manual
Non-manual
(None/Have not worked)
} Continue
} Skip to D13h
} Skip to D14
_____(2040)
Is/was this manual job skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
(Never worked)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
}
}
}
}
}
}
(SKIP TO D14)
_____ (2041)
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CATI A
D13h.
D14.
Which of the following best describes the Chief Income Earner in your
household’s occupation: (READ OUT 1-6 CODE ONE ONLY)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Director or Top level management
Highly specialised expert such as a surgeon or a barrister
Middle management executive/owner of a small business
Principal officer in local government or civil service
Junior manager
Salesperson, office worker
Other non-manual
8
9
10
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
(Never worked)
What is your marital status? Are you … (READ OUT CODES 1-4)
1
2
3
4
5
6
D15.
_____ (2042)
Married
Living as married
Single
Widowed / Divorced / Separated
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2043)
Do you belong to a trade union?
1
2
3
4
Yes
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2044)
(PROGRAMME NOTE: IF D14 IS 1 THEN ASK D16, ELSE SKIP TO D17)
D16.
Does your husband/wife belong to a trade union?
1
2
3
4
5
Yes
No
No wife/husband
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____ (2045)
HOLD
D17.
Will you tell me your year of birth please. (INTERVIEWER NOTE: ENTER
LAST TWO DIGITS OF YEAR IN RANGE 00 - 84)
00
1900 or earlier
_____ (2046)
_____ (2047)
DK (Don’t Know)
RF (Refused)
IF D17 is 85-99 THEN Re-Administer D17
IF D17 IS DK OR RF THEN ASK D17a; ELSE SKIP TO D17d
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
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CATI A
HOLD
D17a.
D17d.
D18.
In that case could you tell me which age band you would fall into?. (READ 1-4)
1
2
3
4
16-24
25-39
40-54
55 or over
5
6
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
Could you please tell me, is your phone number ex-directory?
1
2
Yes, ex-directory
No
3
4
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
_____(2049)
And finally could you tell me your total annual household income? Would it be
over or under £10,000?
(If “under”, ask:)
Is it over or under £5,000
(If “over”, ask:)
(If “over”, ask:)
(If “over”, ask)
(If “over”, ask)
Is it over or under £15,000
Is it over or under £25,000
Is it over or under £35,000
Is it over or under £50,000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
D19.
_____(2048)
Less than £5,000
£5,000 to £9,999
£10,000 to £14,999
£15,000 to £24,999
£25,000 to £34,999
£35,000 to £49,999
£50,000 or more
(Don't Know) (DO NOT READ)
(Refused) (DO NOT READ)
_____ (2050)
On behalf of the Gallup Organization, I’d like to thank you for participating in
this study
We may be re-contacting some people sometime in the future to ask them a few
additional questions. Could we have your permission to call you again to learn a
bit more about your thoughts and opinions?
1
2
3
4
Yes
No
(Don’t Know)
(Refused)
_____(2051)
♣STOP CLOCK FOR DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS♣
___(2198 - 2201)
(VALIDATE PHONE NUMBER AND THANK RESPONDENT)
©THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION
OMNIBUS WEEK 2
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CATI A