The View from Europe
By David Jessop
Fundamental challenges face US and Cuba in
seeking détente
On December 16, something quite extraordinary happened. President Obama and President Castro
spoke on the phone for nearly an hour. Beyond a handshake in South Africa, it was their first known
encounter. The following day, after more than a year of exchanges and negotiations involving a wide
range of figures including the Pope and other world leaders, a carefully choreographed series of
events designed to build confidence took place.
It began with a prisoner exchange, statements by both sides, and a six page US briefing note setting
out a wide range of measures to improve gradually many aspects of US-Cuba relations. Later there
was a less noticed statement from the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, confirming that a high level
team would visit Havana in January led by the Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere,
Roberta Jacobson. He also said that he would visit.
In their subsequent public statements, the US and Cuban Presidents indicated that they hoped for a
more normal future relationship between their two nations; with both saying in their own ways that
they were willing to discuss and solve their differences without renouncing their principles.
The measures announced, for which the US President does not need the approval of Congress,
involve the full restoration of diplomatic relations by both sides with full embassies formalising
exchanges on international issues, and matters of mutual concern such as counter narcotics cooperation, environmental protection, aviation and postal services.
The US President also made clear that more US citizens will be able to travel to Cuba within existing
categories. While this decision does not free US travel to Cuba, it should mean that it will become
easier for many more US citizens to obtain approval.
Further, trilateral talks are to be initiated involving the US, Mexico and Cuba on the delimitation of
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico, an area where significant oil reserves are likely to be
found; US institutions will be permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial
institutions; and US credit and debit cards will be permitted for use by travellers to Cuba. Other
measures include authorising an expansion in the export of US goods and services, allowing US
companies to improve infrastructure linking the US and Cuba for commercial telecommunications
and internet services, and foreign vessels will be able to enter the United States ‘after engaging in
certain humanitarian trade with Cuba’.
But of all the decisions the President announced, the single most important for the US, Cuba and
other nations, including those in the Caribbean, is his decision to authorise Secretary of State Kerry
to review, based on the facts, Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The increasingly
tough interpretation of this regulation by the US Treasury, despite Cuba for instance facilitating the
Colombian peace process, has severely constrained all third country trade, as many international
banks have withdrawn their support in order not to face huge fines.
What happens next in practical terms may be slow and uncertain, however it is clear that President
Obama has initiated a process that he thinks will be sustainable beyond any Democrat
administration.
In his statement, Secretary of State Kerry came close to saying that the US sees parallels between
the normalisation of relations with Cuba and its experience with Vietnam. “As we did with Vietnam,
changing our relationship with Cuba will require an investment of time, energy and resources,” Mr
Kerry said.
There, small but incremental changes in US regulations led quite rapidly to US business engaging in
such a manner that the pressure on Congress for the full normalisation of trade relations became
unstoppable. In other words, it may be that President Obama calculates, in the case of Cuba, that
the weight of US corporate interest and freer travel may force an unstoppable economic and social
opening that a Republican dominated House and Senate will not then wish to turn back.
That said, President Castro and President Obama both noted that the agreement to normalise
relations would be challenging and take time. Moreover it does not, as President Castro observed,
go to the heart of the matter. ‘The economic, commercial, and financial blockade (embargo) which
causes enormous human and economic damage to our country must cease,’ he said.
Despite this, the change is remarkable, not least because the US has accepted that there is a
communist nation just ninety miles from its shores.
This point and the strength of Cuba nationalism, however, is likely to continue to raise questions as
to how far and how fast either side is prepared to, or is able to move.
While a more normal relationship based on mutual respect and trust will most likely emerge from
regular diplomatic and other exchanges, fundamental differences exist.
Cuba is looking for an economic opening and being left alone, while the US continues to seek a
change in Cuban society and its governance. Put another way, younger Cubans may want more
materially but they are still Cuban patriots, highly educated and find much of the type of
commentary common in the US about their country or what they wish for, insulting.
There are many reasons why Cuba and the US decided to move now.
In US political terms, the timing was politically propitious. The US President cannot run for office
again and has time to see the process develop. The US mid-term elections are over; there will be a
new more pragmatic Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; the Cuban American
community are no longer monolithic and most want change; and key figures in the community are
considering returning as investors. In Washington, it is believed that the island will need to undergo
greater orientation towards the market if the economy is to grow, and large US corporations want a
part of this. There were probably strategic considerations in play.
In Cuba, the view was that when Raúl Castro steps down in 2018, a younger, more technocratic but
less experienced generation of leaders will take control. A change in US-Cuba relations now would
mean that up to that point the US and others will have the absolute certainty to know that what is
agreed can be delivered. This is not to say that the socialist leadership that follows will not continue
the process, but the sense was that more could be achieved while the country’s respected
revolutionary leadership remains in control. Moreover, Cuba recognised that it needed an opening
to the US, to ensure new and less constrained sources of investment to stimulate growth.
For both nations there were also hemispheric considerations. Cuba had won the global diplomatic
battle for legitimacy and Washington was finding itself ever more isolated in the Americas.
Normalisation means that both Presidents can go to the Summit of the Americas in April in Panama
to discuss issues.
Changing the US-Cuba relationship will not be a an easy or quick process but if détente works, it will
change forever the future political, economic and social trajectory of the countries of the Caribbean
Basin and Cuba’s role in it.
David Jessop is the Director of the Caribbean Council and can be contacted at
[email protected]
Previous columns can be found at www.caribbean-council.org
December 21st, 2014