Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
Focusing on Women in the Internal
Politics of Iran
M K
G F
Attorney/Activist
Islamic Republic of Iran
Translator
O,  I R  Iran is a cohesive regime that appears to not
experience any conflicts in the interaction of its internal organs. Conflicts become apparent, however, once the legal system of this harmonious socio-political state is faced
with the social realities that result from Iran’s contact with Western culture. Upon
examining the interaction between the Iranian government and Iranian society, the
conflicts of the Islamic Republic become evident and are ever more strong and present
in the internal politics of Iran 30 years after the Islamic revolution.
An overview of the events that took place in Iran after the 1979 revolution shows
the imbalance that exists between the legal policies of Iran and Iran’s internal social
realities. This article will report on this conflict and aggression, specifically in the context
of gender and femininity. “Femininity” is a political symbol that has been influencing Iranian political exchanges for over 150 years. In the opinion of the revolutionary
fundamentalist, femininity was the most important tool of the Western cultural and
civil invasion and a dangerous phenomenon that, if enabled, could topple the religious
government and undermine Islamic values. Fundamentalist revolutionaries, whose
opinion of women was expressed in the preamble of the 1979 constitution, have desired
to use women as a tool to strengthen the bases of their government. Yet they have failed
in the last 30 years to achieve this mission. Now, the behavior of women has turned
into the revolutionaries’ number one qualm of internal politics. The revolutionaries
feel that a large number of Iranian women, who effectively symbolize Western culture
and civilization, are trying to undermine the revolution’s ideological roots.
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M K is an internationally renowned attorney, writer and activist working toward the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights within the framework of Islamic law in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Despite her efforts being frequently impeded and curtailed by the intelligence services
of the Islamic republic, she has been an active public defender in Iran’s civil and criminal courts and
has published regularly in several influential and independent Iranian journals. She is currently a Visiting scholar at American University’s Washington College of Law.
Copyright © 2008 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
F/W  •  ,  
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WOMEN’S SHARE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
Much of the contemporary history of Iran is a narrative of clashes between aspiration
for political participation and the obstacles impeding that participation. Herein is
also a tale of conflict between Westernization and tradition, which at times has lead
to dramatic consequences, including two revolutions. A change from an autocratic
system to a constitutional monarchy spurred Iran’s first Constitutional Revolution of
1906-1911.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Iranian people were on course for
political participation under a parliamentary system. Such a development naturally
shook two groups: politicians who were used to political despotism and radical Islamic
leaders who believed laws were divine. The latter group had the power to rally the people
to oppose the newly formed constitution. The nascent parliamentary system soon found
itself confronted by traditional forces that perceived the constitutional mode of government as an affront to prevailing religious tenants. Using the vocabulary of ordinary
people, these forces objected to religious rules being trampled upon through Westernstyle legislative process, warning ordinary citizens of the danger of losing their religion.
Using their pulpits, they denounced the decidedly “modern” legislation as an affront and
threat to a sacred Islam. Here, we will point out a few events. Ever since 1906, women’s
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rights and physical “bodies”––and how they chose to use or present them––have continuously been the center and axis of all political challenges. For example, even though
at the time of the constitution of 1906 women were not forbidden from voting, the
second parliament (Majlis-e Showrayeh Melli) passed the Parliamentary Electoral Law of
1909, Article 10 of which deprived the women from the right to vote in parliamentary
elections. Article 13 of the law forbade women from running for parliamentary seats. At
the time, women were not in a position to complain of the inequalities and injustices
they were subjected to in an organized and effective manner. They were not feared by
the kings (shahs) who reigned after the constitutional revolution either. Thus, early
The revolutionaries feel that a large number 20th century Iranian parliaments completely excluded half
of Iranian women, who effectively symbolize of the population from politiWestern culture and civilization, are trying to cal participation. This form of
legislation clearly showed the
undermine the revolution’s ideological roots. extent to which traditionalism
dominated the intellectuals and the elite who wanted to form a constitutional monarchy
to provide the masses with the right of political participation.
The most important religious leader who pressured the constitutionalist elites and
led the radical Islamic viewpoint of the time was a clergyman named Sheikh Fazlollah
     
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Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
Nuri. The constitutionalists executed the Sheikh so he would not have the ability to lead
the religious and uneducated people of Iran to oppose the constitutional revolution. In
the course of the Islamic revolution of 1979, which will be explained below, opinions
like that of Sheikh Nuri’s came into play once more and clearly demonstrated that the
ideology of a religious leader does not die once he is executed. To the contrary, the
revolution showed that such ideas are strengthened and organized in hiding, waiting
for a chance to blossom and dominate. Many of the decisions made after the Islamic
revolution of 1979 were rooted in the religious ideology of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri,
particularly those concerning the women. An overview of the historical events in Iran
in the past century shows that many challenges and clashes between the Western style
of life and Islamic values started with the constitutional revolution. These challenges
and clashes revealed themselves in the laws that were devised about women in the first
constitution and again in the Islamic constitution. Though many years have passed,
the challenges and clashes continue to exist and show their many façades.
WOMEN IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF REZA SHAH
After the constitutional revolution of 1906, the political conflicts revolving around
women did not improve, and legal discrimination arose too. As mentioned above,
women were forbidden from electing or being elected. The shah did not care to change
this state of affairs. This was until Reza Shah Pahlavi was crowned king of Iran in 1925
and audaciously entered the realm of women’s social rights. Reza Shah, a true dictator,
wholeheartedly believed that the only way Iran could improve was to Westernize in all
aspects possible. He formed a national army, established a modern judiciary, and built
a cross-country railroad, among other things.
On 7 January 1936, Reza Shah unexpectedly abolished the veil for women by a
royal decree. This order created a bloody clash between the government and the citizens concerning the status of women since the constitutional revolution, and it would
become significantly more violent and severe. One of the most notable of these clashes
was the 1939 massacre at Goharshad mosque in the holy city of Mashhad. Reza Shah
took a huge risk by issuing the unveiling order. However, he did not extend to women
the right to vote or run for office. Nor did he improve their situation in Civil and Family Laws. After the unveiling of women, femininity was turned into a socio-political
challenge in Iran––a challenge that is absent in all other Muslim countries with the
exception of Turkey (which is a semi-European state). Seventy years after the issuance
of the unveiling decree, too, this challenge continues to exist in Iran.
There have been two equally strong views in Iran regarding the forced unveiling.
Some believe that Reza Shah did well by unveiling the women, particularly because he
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F/W  •  ,  
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followed the order by opening the doors of the universities and work forces to women
and by improving other areas of women’s social status. Another view states that forced
unveiling was the most damaging thing Reza Shah could have done under the circumstances, since the resulting backlash significantly undermined women’s advancement
Reza Shah, a true dictator, whole- in Iran. This view states that religious radicals,
for whom veiling is a holy tenant, became more
heartedly believed that the only way fundamental and vengeful in their views toward
Iran could improve was to Western- women after the forced unveiling. These radicals
hid their resistance in the cloak of anti-impeize in all aspects possible.
rialism. However, when they finally did gain
power in the 1979 revolution, the first decision they made was to mandate the forced
veiling of women. It is believed by those adhering to the second view that the decision
to mandate use of the veil was a direct result of Reza Shah’s forced unveiling in 1936.
What is apparent is that, had Reza Shah not forced unveiling, the contact between
Iran and the West would have caused veiling to become optional, as it did at the time
of the second Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah.
WOMEN AND THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH
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Political challenges regarding the rights of women existed in Iran in many forms ever
since the constitutional revolution. At times, these challenges even produced political
crises. After the second Pahlavi monarch took the throne, veiling became optional
and women gained the right to choose their clothing. Those who chose to wear the
veil had no religious limitation in the style of veil they could wear. Among a series of
milestones in this process, a number of decisive changes stand out. In 1964, Articles 10
and 13 of the Electoral Law of 1909 were amended to allow women to vote and serve
in the parliament. This marked the start of a new political development in twentieth
century Iran that, at least legally, allowed the other half of the population to enjoy the
right of political participation. However, before the right of women to participate in
politics was put into law,1 the political situation was severely shaky. The opposition of
the Grand Ayatollahs led to the bloody revolt of 5 June 1962, during which time the
cities of Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, and Tabriz witnessed violent confrontations with
those opposed to the shah’s decree. The leader of this entire movement was Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, who went on to lead the Islamic revolution in 1979. Granting
women the right of political participation was an important event, and many experts
believe that it precipitated the Islamic revolution. Many religious people and followers
of Ayatollah Khomeini were killed during this unstable period. The Ayatollah himself
was exiled to Turkey and the movement went underground. Thus, from 1964, Iranian
     
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Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
women were legally given the right to enter elections. Accordingly, a number of women
who supported the government’s policies without question and whose characters were
endorsed by security organs of the country entered local councils and the legislature.
Indeed, these women were not representatives of the female population of Iran and
could not speak for the diverse needs and pains of these women, nor demand their full
rights. As a result, they failed to enjoy the support of other women who were active in
different political circles and, carrying the stigma of being part of the ruling system,
could not achieve popularity among women of Iran as a whole. Sometimes they were
called by the deriding epithet of “the appointed beauties.” In Iranian society, such a
label is sufficient to reduce the influence and prestige of these women politicians to
practically nothing, depriving them of popular support. These women politicians were
seen as representatives of a specific group of Iranian women, and their presence on the
scene has been described as more symbolic than genuine.
WOMEN DURING AND AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
WOMEN IN THE VIEW OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE 1979 REVOLUTION
Before 1979, clergies in Iran did not deem it religiously justified for women to be
present in public places or participate in the political arena of the country. They were
constantly issuing edicts stating that this presence is against the sharia, or the Islamic
religious code of conduct. These edicts, exegesis, and preachings prohibited women
from leaving the home, riding horses, showing jewelry, and attending prayers, among
other things. As a result, public opinion tended to agree with the prohibition of the
appearance of women in society while a large group of women fully participated in the
political arena and held public posts.
In spite of this religiously inspired opinion of women, it was quite astonishing
that the Islamic republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, not only allowed women to
vote or participate in politics, but also announced that women are bound by sharia
to participate in the political arena. The reason for this unexpected move was that the
religious leaders needed the votes of women to prove their popularity. However, the
religious leaders brought about significant change in Iran. Even women from very
religious families where the men did not allow women to go out into public filled the
streets by order of the Ayatollah Khomeini, whose order superseded the will of the male
members of the family. From a populist perspective, this did not bode well for women’s
rights in Iran, since these women formally and openly approved of the government.
However, this change in status that took the religious women from passive resistor to
active participant caused many women to start asking new questions and encouraged,
albeit very limitedly, a discourse on women rights in Islam. It is true that women kept
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F/W  •  ,  
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their political rights after the revolution, but the constitution—whether directly or indirectly—created obstacles2 for women so they could not enter other positions of power
and decision-making. The government
Candidates who support the separation of allows only those women who adhere
religion and state are not allowed to have a to the regime’s opinion to serve as
voice. They are not given permission to have politicians. The female candidates
who make it to the Majlis—the new
a party, a candidate, or a newspaper.
parliament—all have the mindset of
the regime, so advocates of women’s rights do not have a voice in the Iranian government. At present, it is close to impossible to amend this problem since there is a body
called the Guardian Council that must approve all candidates before they can go on the
election ballot.3 Membership in the Guardian Council is by appointment only. Thus,
this body only approves candidates who have the least, if any, disagreement with the
conservative radicals in power. More moderate candidates have no room for maneuver
in Iran. Those who support the separation of religion and state, for example, are not
allowed to have a voice. They are not given permission to have a party, a candidate, or
a newspaper.
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WOMEN’S SHARE IN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Women were as involved as men in the Islamic revolution. Both veiled and unveiled women joined different revolutionary groups and fought alongside men. Two
years before the revolution, veiling turned from a religious issue into a political one.
This was a sign of the storm that awaited Iran, but the shah and his supporters did
not want to consider it a serious matter or reconsider their own policies. An increasing
number of women, mostly young and urban, had chosen a particular form of veiling
that was political, and not necessarily a testament to their religious beliefs. Veiling had
become a symbol through which these young women could express their opposition
to the shah. Even young women in the northern parts of Tehran, which was home to
the most modern and Western-oriented social groups, could be seen wearing the veil
in schools and in social gatherings. This new practice was very different from that of
the generations before. This veiling was a reactionary response objecting to the shah’s
reforms (his “White Revolution”) and to the changing legal status of women, as well
as demonstrating approval for Ayatollah Khomeini’s orders from Najaf. Hence, many
groups of women who were not veiled accepted the advice of the religious revolutionary
men and the mosques to wear the veil. The veil was a political tool to “combat imperialism,” yet these newly veiled women intended to take the veil off once the shah was
ousted and a democratic government was put in place. As soon as the revolution succeeded on 11 February 1979, the unveiled, working middle-class women were targeted
     
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Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
by the Islamic fundamentalists who were building a basis for their new government.
In their opinion, unveiled and employed women were symbols of the shah’s regime,
imperialism, and Westernization. From this point on, the issues of women’s rights and
Iranian social realities have remained among the most important internal conflicts of
Iran. Before the new government could establish new legislative bodies, the decisions
against the rights of women were advanced by fatwas, or religious edicts, by Ayatollah
Khomeini, and by other jurists. Actions against the rights of women started with the
discussion of enforcing the veil and continued with the limitation of other rights of
women:
•In early March 1979, in a lecture given during a visit with Islamic jurists and
seminary students in Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini asked women employed within
the government sector to observe the Islamic veil within their work places. On
8 March 1979, women gathered in front of the judiciary building to object to
forced veiling. They chanted and yelled slogans against the proposition. The opposition continued, yet certain groups of fundamentalists attacked the women
and dispersed their gatherings. Such attacks—later portrayed as spontaneous
violence by civilians—were followed by broad arrests and the purging of women.
Additionally, many of those who opposed to these policies were dismissed from
their professions, sometimes from positions they had held for many years. The
arrest and dismissals became a lesson for many women, who decided against
public protest in an effort to hold on to their jobs and to stay out of prison. This
policy continues and takes more violent forms in each progressive period. Currently, although the veiling policy has changed names and is more systematic, it is
being enforced strongly and violently by the government. However, the number
of young women who resist the government dress code is rising as well. These
young women have turned the veil into a fashion statement.
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•Through a precise and well-planned strategy, Ayatollah Khomeini commented on
the Family Law,4 approved in 1974 by the shah. The intent of Khomeini’s comments, which were rooted in radical Islam, was to label all legal measures designed
to improve the status of women during the shah’s regime as contradicting sharia,
rendering these measures ineffective. Those opposed to women’s advancement
first targeted legal gains, which resulted in denying women the rights they had
gained with respect to divorce and child custody. But Khomeini never reversed
women’s right to vote, which was provided to them under the shah. With this
clever strategy, Khomeini was able to mobilize Iranian women’s votes in support
of the establishment of the Islamic Republic while changing the law to the fun-
F/W  •  ,  
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damentalists’ liking. Demonstrations by women against the reversal of the Family
Law suffered the same fate as the previous demonstrations.
•On 3 March 1979, another significant act against women took place: the announcement of women’s inability to be judges.5 There were significant reactions
regarding this decision, including protests by young legal clerks at the prosecutor’s
office. However, in the span of one afternoon, this demonstration suffered the
same fate as all the others and all the protesting young women were forced out
of the building. Around the same time, women’s right to be members in the
political envoys was taken away so they were deprived of the chance to become
ambassadors or serve in consulates.
•What were described above were the more outstanding forms of violations committed against the rights of the women. Violation of the rights of women seeped
through other arenas such as cinema, theater, fine arts, and music. In all these arenas, women faced many limitations under the name of Islam and revolution.
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WOMEN’S ROLE IN STABILIZING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (WOMEN AGAINST WOMEN)
During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, a large number of Iranian women refrained
from any political participation and refused to adopt Western values, such as unveiling, dancing, listening to pop music, participating in sports, and interacting with the
opposite sex in any social arena. At the same time, other Iranian women adhered to
all Western principles, participated in the political arena, and held posts as singers and
musicians, dancers, teachers, lawyers, judges, professors, and business owners. The arenas
for public interactions of people of both sexes––discos, clubs, theaters, et cetera––were
always brimming with excited youth ready to practice what essentially was a Western
style of life. These two groups coexisted harmoniously even within the same family.
After the Islamic revolution, this peaceful coexistence between the two types of women
was disrupted as the veil became a political tool.
After the revolution, it became more acceptable for religious women to participate
in the political arena, and those who had refrained earlier from participation became
more involved. They mostly concerned themselves with admiring and applauding the
sharia. As mentioned above, they faithfully approved of the government’s policy of
forced veiling. However, at the time of the revolution, it had been four decades since
veiling was made optional. Women who had chosen to unveil themselves became very
angry and disheartened with the regime. They started demonstrations that were crushed
with the aid of the religious women. Slowly, a phenomenon formed in Iran that was
non-existent before the revolution: women who were enemies of other women.
     
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Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
This “women against women” phenomenon, strengthened by women who were
strictly faithful to the radical policies of the fundamentalists, has formed a symbiotic
relationship with the revolution and still exists after 30 years. Since these religious women
were able to enter important decision-making institutions such as the parliament, the
phenomenon has become an impeding force working against the promotion of women’s
rights in Iran. This group of religious women enjoys intra-governmental support and
heads organizations that the government supports and promotes. This educated elite,
who came out of the women against women after the revolution, has so far served to
prevent the government from focusing on the issues of women.
WOMEN’S ROLE IN THE ELECTION OF MOHAMMAD KHATAMI AND THEIR SHARE OF THE
REFORM
In 1988, after the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the country opened up
somewhat to Western media. Once it did, the media slowly reported stories that
showed the extent of movements, protests, revolts, and anger behind the black masses
of women. Hence, the Western media started to understand and report the internal
conflicts and the social realities in Iranian society. One of the events that transpired
during this period was the publication of a few cultural, secular magazines such as
Adineh, Donyayeh Sokhan, and Gardun, as well as the religious intellectual publication
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Kian. Also, a newspaper called Salam, belonging to the clergies critical to the policies
of then-president Hashemi Rafsanjani, started publication.
This was the context for the 23 May 1997 election, in which Mohammad Khatami
was elected with an overwhelming number of votes from the Iranian people. His campaign was based on rule of law, making the government less violent, providing rights
for the opposition groups, and so forth. Before the election, an article was published by
Khatami in which he had said that he would give women the opportunity to increase
their participation in political affairs and
Most women have come to the conclusion
thereby “increase their political weight.”
What this implied was that Khatami in- that until religion is separated from the
tended to elect a few women as ministers state, there is no hope for the improvein his cabinet.6 This became an attraction
that separated Khatami from other can- ment of the situation of women in Iran.
didates and filled his campaign offices with women of all ages. It is thus believed that
an overwhelming number of women voted for Mohammad Khatami. For eight years,
Khatami, his cabinet, and his advisors—a combination of religious intellectuals and
critical clergies—had control of the government, and for four years they had control
of the Sixth Majlis. During this period, women were empowered in media and in
government-permitted NGOs. Hence, in the internal politics of Iran, a new conflict
F/W  •  ,  
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formed. Before this period, only women who were known as strictly religious and very
faithful to the principle of velayat-e faqih (which serves as the theological basis for
the Supreme Leader’s right to rule Iran) could start organizations for women’s rights.
Khatami’s policies allowed women who desired equality with men in the eyes of the
law—in other words, secular women—to organize.
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WOMEN IN THE FUNDAMENTALIST PERIOD (AHMADINEJAD)
After the end of the reform, the radicals once more ruled the government and held
the majority in the Majlis. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became an outspoken
symbol of the Islamic values that were trampled upon during the eight years of reform.
Once again, the Iranian radicals targeted women. Many changes have been enacted
that undid the relaxed approach of the reform period, such as a new focus on combating improper veiling.7 Whatever little achievement was made in the area of women’s
rights during the period of reform has been destroyed in the fundamentalist period.
The NGOs that registered during Khatami’s presidency with the aim of promoting
women’s rights have been especially weakened. Women who gained entry into the
Seventh Majlis (2004–2008) were demonstrative of the “women against women” phenomenon. They used the Majlis tribune to defend appalling behavior, such as polygamy
and the execution of prostitutes. Women’s legal needs have not been considered in this
period, and the Majlis has never contacted women’s rights activists inside the country
for advice. Radical clergies support this new policy and constantly accuse women who
desire equality with men to be immoral and Westernized.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that women’s rights is a significantly sensitive issue when it comes to policymaking in Iran. When the Pahlavi regime wanted to create changes in Iran, it invested
in and took risks on women. However, the religious government that came to power
after the 1979 revolution has controlled the rights of women, their style of clothing,
and their individual and social behavior. This situation continues. Consider that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The age of maturity for a girl is nine and for a boy is fifteen lunar years.8
In the case of a murder, the blood money of a woman is half that of a man.9
In most cases, the testimony of a woman is not valid in a court of law.10
A woman cannot leave the country without her husband’s approval.11
A woman is legally obligated to be obedient to her husband.12
A man may take more than one wife.13
A man may prohibit his wife from employment.14
A man has the undisputed and unequivocal right to divorce.15
     
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Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran
Instead of moving toward a solution and a positive change in the laws, the radical policies of the current administration constantly add to the severity of action and
increase the conflict between society and government over the issue of women. Signs
of this conflict are apparent in different forms. Due to the lack of policies that meet
the needs of women, rates of divorce, addiction, crime, prostitution, AIDS, poverty,
and homelessness among women have increased, according to official government
statistics.
Government bodies follow Article four of the Islamic Constitution, which says,
“All laws and regulations including civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, or otherwise must be based on Islamic principles.
This article applies generally on all the articles of the constitution and other laws and
regulations. It will be decided by the clergies of the Guardian Council whether or not
such laws and regulations conform to this article.” Hence, discriminatory laws may
very well persist.
With enough will, however, there is some hope that these laws will be improved.
First, Iran is a party to various international laws governing human rights, including the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The country is therefore obligated to
improve its own laws, which are currently not in accordance with these documents.
Second, women’s social movements, which are advocating for legal changes and
gender equality, are burgeoning in Iran.16 These groups have taken advantage of the
Internet, which has helped the activists voice their demands has given them a means
to plan activities.
Finally, most women have come to the conclusion that until religion is separated
from the state, there is no hope for the improvement of the situation of women in
Iran. However, there are religious jurists and scholars in Iran who believe there can
be an appropriate interpretation of Islam that matches the conditions of the time and
facilitates the removal of discrimination against women.17 So far, these jurists have not
been influential, since like other critics, they do not enjoy freedom of speech. Hence,
the most important challenge of the Iranian people in general, and Iranian women in
particular, is achieving freedom of speech. W
A
85
NOTES
1. In 1962, the shah started a reform in Iran that he called the “White Revolution.” The shah put all six
articles of the White Revolution reform to a referendum and, for the first time in the Iranian post-revolution history, he announced that women also had the right to vote in this referendum.
2. See Article 115 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which directly prohibits women
from becoming president, and Article 157 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
F/W  •  ,  
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indirectly prohibits women from becoming the Head of the Judiciary.
3. See Articles 91 and 99 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
4. The Family Protection Law of 1967 and 1974 contained important points in favor of improving
women’s legal status in the family, particularly with regard to divorce. According to this law, men, for the
first time in Iran’s judicial history, could not divorce their wives without the court’s interference. This law
also restricted paternal grandfather’s guardianship rights in favor of the mother. The Family Protection
Law was nullified right after the revolution.
5. Since 1969, women could become ruling judges and even preside over the court in Iran. However,
right after the revolution, women judges were barred from their positions and were assigned to do office
work in the prosecutorial offices. This decision was based on Article 167 of the Iranian constitution, which
insists that the qualities of the judge must be according to the qualities prescribed in Islamic jurisprudence.
Hence, the radical clergies in Iran believe that women cannot become judges in Islam, and immediately after
the success of the revolution women were barred from holding such positions and presiding over courts.
6. Khatami tried to appoint women for his cabinet but was not given permission by the conservative
ruling elite. What he could do was to appoint a female Vice President who was the head of the Environmental Protection Organization of Iran, Mrs. Masoumeh Ebtekar. Perhaps the reason for conservatives’
acceptance of Masoumeh Ebtekar was that she was one of the students who stormed the U.S. Embassy
in 1979.
7. The violent campaigns by the police with the aim of combating the improper veiling are done called
the “Social Security Plan” and the “Mental Health Plan.” These plans are currently executed by the Law
Enforcement Forces in Iran.
8. See Article 49 of Islamic Penal Code and Comment 1 of Article 1210 of the Iranian Civil Code.
9. See Articles 209, 213, 300, and 301 of the Islamic Penal Code.
10. See Articles 76, 153, 118, 117, 128, 170, and 237 of the Islamic Penal Code.
11. See the Immigration and Passport Regulations Law, ratified in 1971.
12. See Articles 1114, 1109, and 1108 of the Iranian Civil Code.
13. See Article 942 of the Iranian Civil Code.
14. See Article 1117 of the Iranian Civil Code.
15. See Article 1133 of the Iranian Civil Code.
16. Many campaigns have been started to remedy these situations. See, e.g., the Change for Equality
Campaign, http://www.we-change.org/english/; the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, http://www.meydaan.
com/english/aboutcamp.aspx?cid=46; the Say No to the New Draft of Family Law Campaign, http://meydaan.org/English/aboutcamp.aspx?cid=53; the Open Stadiums to Women Audiences Campaign, http://
www.meydaan.com/english/campaign.aspx?cid=44; the Young Lawyers Campaign for Gender Equality in
Family Law, http://www.meydaan.com/english/campaign.aspx?cid=45; and the Right to Pass Nationality:
Iranian Mother, Iranian Child Campaign, http://www.meydaan.com/english/campaign.aspx?cid=43.
17. Mehrangiz Kar, “Sharia law in Iran” in ed. Paul Marshall, Radical Islam’s Rule (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005). See also Kar, Iranian Law and Women’s Rights (Berkeley, CA: Berkley
Electronic Press, 2007).
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