Running head: REVIEW OF EU MILITARY POLICY
An Empathetic Review of European Union Military Policy
Sloan S. Cinelli
Pitzer College
Author Note
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union
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Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 4
An Empathetic Review of European Union Military Policy .............................................. 5
History................................................................................................................................. 5
Current Dilemma ................................................................................................................ 7
MCCE ............................................................................................................................. 7
Finabel............................................................................................................................. 8
EATC............................................................................................................................... 8
OCCAR ........................................................................................................................... 9
EAG ................................................................................................................................ 9
EGF ............................................................................................................................... 10
NATO ............................................................................................................................ 11
Why is an executable defense policy possible but not probable? ..................................... 12
NATO ............................................................................................................................ 13
Germany........................................................................................................................ 13
United States ................................................................................................................. 14
A Black Swan Moment ................................................................................................. 15
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 16
References ......................................................................................................................... 17
Footnotes ............................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
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Figures............................................................................................................................... 21
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Abstract
Why would a politico-economic union of twenty-eight nations not have a unified defense
policy? Ever since the European Political Cooperation was introduced in 1970, members of the
European Community have dreamt of a supranational and intergovernmental defense agreement.
Today, while there are eight leading multinational European defense organizations, none
incorporate every member of the European Union. As global terror continues on the rise, the
need for common security is heightened and in ways, has become a strategic imperative. Since
many member states have strengthened connections with Washington D.C. and NATO, intraUnion connections have weakened, making the idea of a unified EU defense policy vestigial.
This paper presents an empathetic examination of European military and defense policy, or lack
thereof. I attempt to describe three main things: (1) the incoherence of the EU’s defense policy;
(2) the necessity of multinational crisis management communication in our rapidly changing
world; and (3) what needs to be done.
Keywords: European Union, NATO, military, security policy
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An Empathetic Review of European Union Military Policy
The European Union is still somewhat nascent in terms of political constructs. On
November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, originally combining twelve countries as
the European Union. The EU was legally comprised of three pillars: the European Communities
which handled economic, environmental, and social policies; the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) addressed foreign policy and military matters; and Justice and Home Affairs
which brought together cooperation in the fight against crime. Unfortunately, the foreign security
matters have not yet been fully addressed.
History
From the signing of Treaty of Maastricht, a major problem with the European Union’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy has been the obvious imbalance between its ambitious
objectives and the negligible economic means the EU counts on to accomplish them. Initially,
the CFSP dealt with international political and diplomatic issues, including matters of security or
military orientation. The twenty-seven member state governments act on unanimous agreement
of the European Council (the heads of state/government) and the Council of the European Union
(Council of Ministers), the highest level of EU political authority. It meets quarterly, and
possibly more frequently if warranted by exceptional circumstances, including threats to
international security.
The European Union’s Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, amended this
international security policy. Four years after its birth, the EU first identified the main
instruments of the CFSP, such as Principles and Guidelines, Common Strategies, and Joint
Actions. This Treaty also proposed the development of a future common defense policy for the
EU. This inclusion would eventually become the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
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under the CFSP, and was designed to enable the European Union to adopt a coherent approach
when addressing security challenges. The Treaty states:
‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating
to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common
defense policy […] which might lead to a common defense, should the
European Council so decide’ (TEU Art.17).
Subsequently, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in October 2007 and entered into force on
December 1, 2009. It amended and modified the Maastricht Treaty. Its ‘Provisions on the
Common Foreign and Security Policy’ incorporated the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) and all of its developments since the Cologne European Council in 1999, and the CSDP.
The ESDP was the successor of the European Security and Defense Identity under NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization), but uniquely it falls under the jurisdiction of the European Union
itself, including countries with no ties to NATO. Under the treaty, “Permanent Structured
Cooperation” espoused that:
‘Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with
a view to the most demanding missions’ (Art. 42.6).
This was designed to contribute to further development of the CSDP and define a more
assertive role for the EU in the realm of security and defense. Still, the EU has no standing army.
Instead, under its Common Security and Defense Policy, it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by
EU countries for military operations.
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Current Dilemma
A conglomeration of multinational organizations currently provides the foundation for
security of the European Union. Twenty-two years since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
there are eight separate entities which act as the principal military forces. Each group has a
different set of members, with differing agenda regarding national and international security.
Simply and disconcertingly, this system lacks integration.
MCCE
The broadest platform is The Movement Coordination Centre Europe, an international military
logistics center, officially established on July 1, 2007, with the main purpose to coordinate and
optimize the use of airlift, sealift and land movement assets controlled by national militaries of
the member Nations (Krill, 2016). The member nations include: Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Romania, the United
States, Austria, Portugal, Czech Republic, Croatia, Lithuania and Slovakia. MCCE provides
coordination support to the EU, NATO and/or UN operations. Unfortunately, the establishment
and deployment of the MCCE has become a bureaucratic nightmare, with stations ostensibly to
be filled by military and/or civilian personnel from the member nations.
(27 total, 23 EU, 4 non EU)
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Figure 1. The complicated personnel configuration of the MCCE.
Finabel
Finabel is a land forces organization comprised of 19 European Union members to promote
military interoperability. Finabel was founded in 1953, and is controlled by the member states'
army chiefs of staff. Its role is to produce studies encompassing research entrusted to the
working groups, agreements relating to the military characteristics of equipment, as well as
conventions that standardize procedures, testing methods and glossaries in order to facilitate
exchanges between member states (Finabel, 2016).
EATC
Another organization, the European Air Transport Command, is a fully integrated command
center that exercises the operational control of the majority of the aerial refueling capabilities and
military transport fleets of a consortium of seven Western European countries: Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and Italy. The combined fleet under the authority of
the EATC was established on September 1, 2010, and represents over 60% of the European air
transport capacity (EATC, 2016). The command of the EATC rotates between France and
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Germany. The EATC “plans, tasks, controls and reports on missions on behalf of the nations,”
and offers its member nation “a conditioned delegation of authority, but also the assured
availability of an asset.”
(7 total, 7 EU, 0 non EU)
OCCAR
The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation was established on November 12, 1996 by the
Defense Ministers of France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It is an
intergovernmental organization which manages collaborative armament programs between
member nations. The initial four members provide about 90 percent of the European-defenseindustrial base, with Belgium and Spain procuring membership respectively in 2003 and 2005.
Currently the EU and/or NATO members Turkey, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden
and Poland participate in one or more OCCAR programs without being formal members
(Hofbauer, 2012).
(6 total, 6 EU, — non EU)
EAG
The European Air Group is an association of the air forces of seven member nations. Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom collaborate to enhance the
tactical capabilities. The Group’s vision is “to operate together as one across the spectrum of
conflict” (EAG, 2016).
(7 total, 7 EU, 0 non EU)
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Figure 2. The complicated personnel rotation schedule of the EAG.
EGF
The European Gendarmerie Force was launched in 2006 between France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Romania joined in 2009 and Poland in 2011. Its purpose is to create a
European intervention force with militarized police function and specialized crisis management.
It was designed after the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Italian
Carabinieri (EGF, 2016).
(7 total, 7 EU, 0 non EU)
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Figure 3. The most straightforward personnel organization chart is for EGF, one of the smallest security operations.
NATO
The oldest and most prominent intergovernmental military alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. It is based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on April 4,1949.
NATO’s essential purpose is “to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through
political and military means.” NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, but if
diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management
operations.
(28 total, 24 EU, 4 non EU)
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Figure 4. A colorful review of the members in each security operation.
Why is an executable defense policy possible but not probable?
Complete security integration would demand a coherent policy that sets up a plan of
action, rather than in legislative hiatus to define it in the future. As we have enumerated, there are
many agencies, yet no omnibus authority or vision. It is critically important to coordinate and
harmonize EU member states’ internal and external security policies. The EU deploys troops to
peacekeeping missions globally, coordinates trade and economic sanctions, identifies terrorist
groups, and is active in the areas of immigration and asylum (Reichard, 2006). However, most
of its direct attention has been to economic affairs since the 1950s. As seen in the Common
Security and Defense Policy, the European Union still relies on ad hoc forces, only assembled
and deployed when a need arises. Under the CSDP, EU countries must make civilian and
military capabilities available for the EU to implement. Inherently, each nation state has different
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financial, human and armament resources regarding military capability. Even with the
acknowledgment of NATO, there is not unanimity within European Union members to subscribe
to NATO’s policies. This has manifested in tenaciously vague language within important
documents, most prominently the CFSP.
NATO
The CFSP saw NATO as responsible for the territorial defense of Europe and
reconciliation until 1999. Following the Kosovo War, the European Council agreed that "the
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the
means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international
crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (Berlin Plus Agreement, 1999). Since the
European Union is responsible for implementing missions, a phrase that is often used to describe
the relationship between the EU forces and NATO is "separable, but not separate” (Schmidt,
1999). So while NATO has broad participation, and represents the primary defense platform
within the EU, there is still more than a tacit commitment to autonomy.
Germany
Other challenges to unanimity include respective nations’ primary constitutions.
Germany, for example, acts as Europe’s unrivaled superpower, economically and politically. Yet,
there appears to be nothing that will get the German government to consider military
intervention.
The 2011 Libya conflict justified humanitarian intervention, as civilians were being
attacked by the air force of a psychotic despot The UN Security Council and the Arab League
approved interventions. Yet even though the no-fly zone was limited and low-risk for the
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participating states, Germany not only declined to send jets, but they withdrew their personnel
from NATO’s AWACS radar planes above the Mediterranean (Bittner, 2013).
Fundamental to a unified defense sentiment, Article 42.7 of the Maastricht Treaty
stipulates that “if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their
power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter”. Germany's path of "security,
freedom - no war" has met with some resistance (Strack, 2015). After the terrorist attacks in Paris
late 2015, Germany voted to send non-combatant help. The German defense minister, Ursula von
der Leyen, said that the French invocation of the mutual defense clause meant only that there
was “a basis for consultation” (Trainer, 2015).
United States
While we explore the intercourse of EU nations, there needs to be acknowledgement to
the impact of the United States. It is observed that Northern European powerhouses are more
comfortable working with Washington D.C. than South European countries. Driven in part by
the United States’ hegemonic pursuits and deep pockets, the EU has largely been protected by
US resources. As a preventative aspect of its own foreign policy, the US has been significantly
bankrolling NATO, contributing up to a quarter of the organization’s annual budget, and up to
75% of its defense spending. So while there is discussion about a unified EU defense policy,
much of the existing support emanates from NATO, which, in effect the US highly subsidizes.
A simple conclusion may be drawn in assessing why defense cohesion has yet to be realized
within the fraternity of member countries: the EU benefits with a defense apparatus which is paid
for by someone else. And this contribution of nearly a billion dollars a year means that member
countries need not come out of pocket themselves to underwrite the aggregate cost.
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There is a broad disparity in terms of the economic health of the EU nations, from the
Northern economies (Germany) to the Southern economies, particularly the PIIGS (Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). The latter have such dismal economies; the wherewithal to
support a continental defense system does not exist. Consider that after the U.S., the largest
contributors to NATO's military budget are Germany (16.6 %); France (12.4 %); United
Kingdom (12 %); Italy (7.8 %); Canada (5 %); Spain (4.2 %); Netherlands (3.3 %); Belgium (2.6
%); Poland (2.3 %); Turkey (1.8 %); Denmark (1.7 %); and Norway (1.6 %). Fifteen countries
make up the remaining 5.8 percent (Morgan, 2011). In many ways, the EU is “having its cake
and eating it too”, as it enjoys a defense umbrella, but doesn’t need to entirely commit to altering
indigenous budgets and economies, as it has a very staunch financial partner.
A Black Swan Moment
Yet one must consider alternative realities, particularly in light of the global war on
terrorism. Proffered by author Nassim Taleb, the theory of “black swan events” might be an
appropriate metaphor for EU outcomes. The theory holds that there are certain events that may
come as a surprise, which have a major effect, and are then rationalized after the fact with the
benefit of hindsight. Certainly 9/11 was a surprise attack, but in reflection, there were apparently
telltale signs of terrorist activities including proposed attacks on the US mainland (Taleb, 2007).
Consider now the defense of the EU. What would happen if the US took a different tact
in terms of financially supporting NATO to the extent it does? There is growing economic
uncertainty in the US and with an election season upon it, with hawks and doves flying about,
might there be a “surprise cutback” of US resources to support the European theatre? Obviously,
the EU doesn’t expect that to happen, however, if the US reverts from its current hegemony to
more domestic protection, how does that leave the EU in its capacity to defend itself?
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Conclusion
It is clearly apparent that the European Union, and each of its sovereign states, needs an
adequate defense apparatus particularly in the current climate. Over the years, since the
formation of the Union, it has assembled various groups, entities, and initiatives to create some
level of protection from unseemly influences. Yet in many ways, the efforts have been limited
and fractured, but with NATO, there has not been a sense of urgency or even reality. The status
quo of US support has fomented procrastination and sporadic policy development. Will the EU
find the collective wisdom and energy to develop an internally managed and financed defense,
assuming the US wanes its role? And if called upon, will member states comply with the need to
contribute to the common effort, or will this too lead to further posturing of more desired
autonomy such as evident with GREXIT and BREXIT? While we live at at time of elevated
risk, to mitigate that risk there are things to be done and such things need to be paid for. It is not
a “given” that the status quo remains given existential threats and moods. The EU needs to
assess its “opportunity costs,” even if that leads to a changed geo-political structure.
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References
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Hofbauer, J. (2012). Budgets, regulatory frameworks, and the industrial base. European Defense
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Strack, C. (2015, ). Germany's political response to the paris attacks. Deutsche Welle
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Figures
Figure 1. The complicated personnel configuration of the MCCE
Movement Coordination Centre Europe. (2015). MCCE at a glance. Netherlands: MCCE.
Figure 2. The complicated personnel rotation schedule of the EAG
European Air Group. (2016). About EAG.http://www.euroairgroup.org/about-eag/
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Figure 3. The most straightforward personnel organization chart is for EGF, one of the
smallest security operations.
The european gendarmerie force. (2016). , 2016, from
http://www.eurogendfor.org/organisation/what-is-eurogendfor
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Figure 4. A colorful review of the members in each security operation
Finabel. (2016). Structure., 2016, from http://www.finabel.org/about
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