Florida State University Libraries
2016
Ramzan Kadyrov: Russia's Vanguard of
Security or Long-Term Liability?
Hannah Salyers Kibler
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY
RAMZAN KADYROV:
RUSSIA’S VANGUARD OF SECURITY OR LONG-TERM LIABILITY?
By
HANNAH SAYERS KIBLER
A Thesis submitted to the
Program in Russian and Eastern European Studies
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
2016
Hannah Salyers Kibler defended this thesis on April 11, 2016.
The members of the supervisory committee were:
Jonathan Grant
Professor Directing Thesis
Michael Creswell
Committee Member
Mark Souva
Committee Member
The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and
certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements.
ii
This work is dedicated to Dr. Weeks and the memory of Dr. Mahoney for their encouragement
and guidance during my undergraduate studies.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my committee for their continual help in forming and writing this thesis. I
am also very grateful to my father for his assistance and encouragement. Finally, I am thankful to
my family for their relentless support of my educational pursuits.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
vi
INTRODUCTION
1
1. CHECHEN SECURITY MEASURES
11
2. THE CHECHEN ECONOMY
50
3. RADICAL ISLAM
76
CONCLUSION
104
REFERENCES
107
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
114
v
ABSTRACT
Given its geographical position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, the North Caucasus
plays an important role in buffering Russia from outside threats. In exchange for unwavering
loyalty and the stabilization of the region, Russian President Vladimir Putin has entrusted
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov with nearly unfettered control over Chechnya. On the
surface, it appears that he has achieved a state of stability. Unemployment has significantly
dropped from that of the war period, the Chechen capital of Grozny has dramatically transformed
from a pile of rubble to a bustling city and, most significantly, the number of politically
motivated attacks have dramatically decreased.
This “transformation,” however, comes at a very high cost, making it both superficial and
unstable. In order to snuff out extremism since his rise to power, Kadyrov has committed and
continues to commit a plethora of human rights abuses, ranging from kidnapping to murder.
From an economic perspective, the cost of Kadyrov’s loyalty is staggering, and both the private
and public sectors are plagued by corruption. Radical Islam also poses a significant threat as
groups such as the Caucasus Emirate and the Islamic State vie for influence in the region.
This research aims to answer whether Kadyrov’s abusive policies, as well as related
outside factors, pose a threat of renewed political violence in Chechnya by analyzing policies
regarding Chechnya’s security apparatus, economy, and Islam. This analysis asserts that while
Kadyrov’s methods of leadership have provided short term benefits in stabilizing Chechnya,
these successes have come at a very high cost and factors which contribute to the likelihood of
political violence persist.
vi
INTRODUCTION
The North Caucasus, often referred to as the bridge between Europe and Asia, plays an
important role in buffering the European portion of Russia from outside threats. Historically
speaking, this territory has repeatedly come at a cost to Russian powers and Russian rule has
been challenged by its indigenous inhabitants, particularly by fierce highlanders in what is now
Chechnya and Dagestan. Present day Chechens continue to hold pride in their rebellious past.
Figures such as Sheik Mansur, who led a holy war against Catherine the Great’s forces in the late
eighteenth century, and Imam Shamil, who fought the Russian Empire in the Caucasian War of
the nineteenth century, are revered as national heroes. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Chechnya
would challenge Russian rule again under more secular principles.
The result was the First Chechen War in 1994, an extremely violent conflict that would
result in the decimation of the capital city of Grozny, as well as many other towns, and a civilian
death toll with conservative estimates of 30,000. Although the self-proclaimed Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria would gain de facto independence when the Russian Federation withdrew
from the region, the state would slip into lawlessness as the central government lost control to
competing warlords and Islamic extremists. The combination of this instability, attempts by
insurgent forces to invade Dagestan, and a series of terrorist attacks led the Russian Federation to
initiate what it deemed “counterterrorism operations.” Despite the difference in semantics, the
brutal tactics and their consequences were very similar to that of the first war.
What set this conflict apart from the First Chechen War was President Vladimir Putin’s
divide and conquer tactics in winning war-weary Chechens back to the side of Moscow.
Specifically, Putin relied on the loyalty of Akhmad Kadyrov, a former separatist and Chief Mufti
of the breakaway region who became disenfranchised with the breakaway government’s inability
1
to reign in extremists and warlords. Kadyrov was “elected” to the position of president of the
region in order to provide Moscow an ethnically Chechen figurehead from whom to exert
influence. This political strategy has been referred to as “Chechenization” and has been the
subject of much research and controversy. The Putin administration faced a significant setback
to Chechenization when Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated in 2004.
Lacking other viable alternatives, Putin turned to Akhmad’s son, Ramzan Kadyrov and,
based on experts’ observations, prepped Kadyrov for the presidency until he was of age.
Although he was not yet 30 years old, the age minimum for the position, Kadyrov continued to
command the real source of power in war-torn Chechnya, the presidential security force known
as the Kadyrovtsy. As Kadyrov’s influence grew, he was able to take out political rivals. In
exchange for loyalty and establishing stability, Putin has incrementally entrusted Ramzan
Kadyrov with nearly unlimited control of Chechnya. On the surface, it appears that he has
achieved stability. Unemployment has significantly dropped, and Grozny has dramatically
transformed from a pile of rubble to a bustling city. Most significantly, politically motivated
attacks have dramatically decreased. However, persisting variables pose a threat to renewed
violence in Chechnya’s future.
This analysis asserts that while Kadyrov’s methods of leadership have provided short
term benefits in stabilizing Chechnya, these successes have come at a very high cost and factors
which contribute to the likelihood of political violence persist. The weaknesses of Kadyrov’s
leadership and the matter in which Moscow handles Kadyrov’s actions leave room for the
possibility of unrest or the less likely potential defection of Kadyrov and his security forces from
Russia. This work is divided into three sections regarding variables at work in maintaining
stability in Chechnya. Specifically, these are: maintaining security, stimulating the Chechen
2
economy, and combating Islamic extremism. When looking at these, it is clear that the heavy
handed policies towards his opponents and policies which enable systematic corruption by his
allies threaten foment discontent in Chechen society and amongst other Russian political forces
in a way that could destabilize the region.
Kadyrov’s efforts at restoring law and order, the subject of the first chapter of this
analysis, have been an immensely controversial topic. He and his kadyrovtsy are often directly
or indirectly linked to allegations of human rights abuses ranging from kidnappings to high
profile assassinations. Seemingly, Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh policies have achieved the goal of
restoring stability in the once troubled region of Chechnya. The number of attacks committed
within Chechen territories have plummeted, and terror groups have been forced either
underground or across Chechnya’s border. By analyzing Kadyrov’s policies and their effects, it
is clear that by allowing regional forces to grow to such a significant level of power, Moscow has
essentially relinquished control over Chechnya itself and has enabled systematic abuse and
corruption at the hands of Kadyrov and those within his circle. This will only continue to grow
as a liability for the Russian Federation as Kadyrov’s practices breed discontent and Chechens
fighting abroad in conflict zones such as Syria attempt to return home.
Another significant component in maintaining stability in Chechnya, and the North
Caucasus in general, is economic reconstruction. This is a topic that was further emphasized
under former Russian President Medvedev who promoted greater attention to economic policy in
Chechnya. Although one may compare current pictures of the Chechen capital Grozny to its post
war state and see a dramatic transformation, the massive amounts of funding allocated to the
Northern Caucasus generates significant controversy. In addition to the grim reality that the
majority of the North Caucasus’s budget is subsidized by the Federal budget, corruption poses a
3
major challenge in reconstruction efforts. Corruption is not unique problem within the Russian
Federation, but Chechnya has its own unique brand that is exacerbated by the distinctive
personality of President Ramzan Kadyrov and unique clan based social structures. Furthermore,
Chechnya is currently facing a growing youth bulge, a factor which, alongside unemployment
and a weak economy, is linked to an increased likelihood of political violence. Through the
analysis of Chechnya’s economy and spending, it is clear that Chechen dependence on
government subsidies and systematic corruption will pose a threat to the stability of the region if
awareness of relative deprivation grows amongst the youth. These risks could be exacerbated by
outside economic forces as the federal government is forced to contend with economic recession
and to finance military intervention outside of Russia.
The analysis ends with the most complex and controversial topic of assessing the stability
of Kadyrov’s policy: Chechnya’s relationship to Islam. The current role of Islam in Chechnya is
dynamic and at times contradictory since Ramzan Kadyrov has imposed his own perception of
Islam onto his population while targeting those who practice Islam in any way that displeases
him. Given the complexities of this relationship, a portion of the chapter is devoted to furthering
an understanding that Islamic extremism is something that developed throughout the Chechen
conflict rather than something that ignited it. This information is significant since Ramzan
Kadyrov asserts that only he can safeguard the region from the threat of radical Islam, yet he
carries out the policies which fostered it in the first place. In addition to rousing discontent
amongst certain Islamic populations, Kadyrov routinely enforces Sharia inspired laws that
undermine the laws of the Russian Federation. This serves as a source of embarrassment for the
Kremlin by suggesting that Moscow has only limited practical control over Kadyrov and his
population.
4
Although one of these factors will not likely inspire political violence, the combination of
these factors regarding human rights abuses, lack of economic opportunity, and the spread of
radical Islam provide individuals with incentives to participate in acts of political violence. Such
risks have been explored in various works on Relative Deprivation Theory and are referenced in
Federal documents written as guides for intelligence community’s assessment of insurgent
activities.1,2
This analysis relies on a combination of primary and secondary sources in analyzing
stability of Chechnya. One significant weakness of this study is the limited Russian language
skills of the author which prevented access to scholarly works not translated into English. As a
result, most sources, particularly in the case of articles very recently published, are
predominately western oriented. Although this weakness is persistent, Kadyrov’s mammoth
social media presence and lack of filter in expressing his personal opinions have afforded the
author both direct and indirect insight into his perspective on various relevant issues.
Given that Kadyrov’s ability to maintain stability is a contemporary issue that is
continuing to unfold, this thesis is most heavily dependent on news articles. Much valuable
information has been obtained via Radio Free Europe. Articles from this source, often penned
by Caucasus expert Liz Fuller, provide in-depth coverage that is derived from a combination of
Russian reports, direct interviews, and investigative reporting. Many articles also contain
commentary which express a clear distaste for Kadyrov’s leadership and must be evaluated with
1
Ian Walker and Thomas F. Petigrew, “Relative Deprivation Theory: An Overview and
Conceptual Critique,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 23 no. 1 (1984): 302.
2
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide, (2009), 10. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.
5
this bias in mind. Other frequently consulted news sources includes BBC, The Washington Post,
The New York Times, The Guardian, The Independent, RT and The Moscow Times.
In addition to these general news sources, this analysis employs more specialized
publications. Given the lack of transparency regarding spending in Chechnya, this research is
heavily reliant on coverage of meetings between the federal Russian government and the
regional Chechen government when analyzing the economic viability of Chechnya. Economic
journals and papers were particularly helpful in providing such information. Sources included
the Financial Times, International Business Times, and Bloomberg News. While researching the
Kadyrovtsy, the author heavily relied on the above news sources as well as the Caucasian Knot,
which provides in depth coverage of human rights abuses within the region.
In order to provide an understanding of Chechnya’s present state, it is necessary to have
an understanding of its complex past. A variety of books were consulted in order to address the
evolution of the conflict. Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal’s work provides a combination of
journalistic and historical analysis. The work largely focuses on how Boris Yeltsin’s and
Dzhokhar Dudayev’s leadership blunders shaped the First Chechen War and argues that if
Russian politicians had a better understanding of the history of Russo-Chechen relations, the
First Chechen War may have been avoided. They also dismissed that Islam was only a
secondary in the conflict.3
James Hughes’s work, on the other hand, argues that historicist interpretations
oversimplify a contemporary struggle, likely due to his background in sociology. In addition to
providing an alternative perspective that political forces beyond animosity rooted in history
3
Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, (New York:
New York University Press, 1998).
6
drove the conflict, Hughes’s easy-to-follow narrative portrays how the Russo-Chechen conflict
evolved from a nationalist struggle to a jihadist struggle. His work traces a plethora of human
rights abuses and argues that such abuses led to the radicalization of Muslims within Chechnya.4
Although these books were before or during the rise of Ramzan Kadyrov, the combination of
Gall and de Waal’s and Hughes’s works provided significant insight into the formation of Putin’s
policy of Chechenization and the development of radical Islam as they relate to Kadyrov’s
current policies.
Seemingly, academic discussion on the state of Chechnya peaked at the onset of
President Putin’s “counterterrorism operations” and has declined since its conclusion. It is likely
that this occurred as insurgent activities moved to bordering regions of Dagestan and issues such
as the crisis in Crimea emerged in importance. Nonetheless, several leading specialists
continued to publish works which analyze issues such as security maintenance, efforts at
combating ideological extremism, and economic reconstruction within Chechnya. A variety of
these secondary sources were employed in this study’s multidimensional approach in assessing
the stability of Kadyrov’s Chechnya.
One such author includes Emil Souleimanov, who has produced a variety of works
regarding the factors shaping both the engagement and disengagement of insurgents.
Souleimanov’s approach explores both macro and micro factors that range from individual
decision making to political and societal forces. Like in Gall and De Wall’s and Hughes’s
earlier works, a recurrent theme is the importance of cultural knowledge when assessing the
Chechen insurgency. Rather than focusing on historically based animosities, Souleimanov
4
James Hughes, Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
7
focuses on the Chechen traditions of blood feuds and clan structures. 5,6 Souleimanov’s findings
were important when assessing securitization of Chechnya since it provides valuable insight into
why many insurgents chose to engage in activities against Russia and why they defected back to
Moscow. It was also valuable in explaining why the spread of radical Islam dramatically altered
the approach in combating insurgents in Chechnya since jihadists are less likely to defect from
armed struggles.
In recent years, the formation of the Kadyrovtsy has emerged as a popular topic of
discussion in academia. Tomáš Šmíd and Miroslav Mareš’s work reaches back and analyzes the
evolution of the Kadyrovtsy from its beginnings as a paramilitary force under Akhmad Kadyrov,
former Chechen President and father to current president Ramzan Kadyrov. Unlike other works,
the authors provide a detailed narrative of how Putin’s control over the force declined as the
Kadyrovtsy were able to overtake similar Moscow backed groups meant to limit Akhmad
Kadyrov’s power in Chechnya. While this thesis interprets this and other evidence to conclude
that Ramzan Kadyrov’s power was derived from his control over the Kadyrovtsy since no other
alternative existed at the time of his father’s death, Šmíd and Mareš argue that Kadyrov was
dependent on Putin’s propaganda campaign due to limited popularity amongst the public. 7
Nonetheless, their analysis was ultimately in line with the conclusion that the Kadyrovtsy are
posing a threat to Chechnya’s stability due to their rampant abuses of human rights.
5
Emil Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s
Policy of Chechenization,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 2 (2015): 101, accessed January 1, 2016,
DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2014.900976.
6
Emil Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, Individual Disengagement of Avengers,
Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North
Caucasus, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 66. eISBN:9781137498830.
7
Tomáš Šmíd and Miroslav Mareš, “‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy
and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38 no. 5 (2015), accessed
January 1, 2016, DOI:10.1080/01402390.2014.942035.
8
Matthew N. Janeczko also traces the evolution in Chechen security and the acquisition of
authority by Kadyrov’s forces. Like Šmíd and Mareš Janeczko, he asserts that this was a choice
of necessity, but differs in arguing that it was one that one was grudgingly made. Like this
thesis, Janeczko concludes that the Putin regime continues to worsen its position with Chechnya
as it continues to grant more power to the security force but the author does not explore the
potential for popular discontent and radicalization due to human rights violations in any detail.8
Given the lack of transparency regarding government spending in Chechnya and waxing
and waning interest in the matter in the international media, it is difficult to find modern analyses
on the Chechen economy that is not glossed over by Chechen officials. However, there are a
limited amount of research regarding Chechnya’s reconstruction with a recurring theme of how
massive amounts of money that pass through the Kadyrov regime and how it buys his loyalty.
An examples of such research includes the work of Yuliya Zabyelina, which focuses on the
benefits and costs of corruption.9 Musa Basnukaev also provides an in-depth look at examples of
corrupt activities in Chechnya and how they limit the region’s recovery. As a professor at
Chechen State University, Basnukaev also serves as a more insider perspective and provides
more individual examples.10 This thesis combines these works with news articles to provide a
comprehensive illustration of the various factors which contribute to the threat of political
violence.
Matthew N. Janeczko, “The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 2:
Success, But at What Cost? 1999 – 2004,” Small Wars Journal (2012).
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13462.
9
Yuliya G. Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya: Challenges of Post-Conflict
Reconstruction in The Public Sector,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8 no. 3 (2013):
42, accessed December 31, 2015, DOI:10.1080/15423166.2013.860343.
10
Musa Basnukaev, “Reconstruction in Chechnya: At the Intersection between Politics
and the Economy” in Chechnya at War and Beyond, ed. Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin,
Amandine Regamey, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (New York: Routledge, 2014), 76.
8
9
Another valuable source when evaluating policy in the North Caucasus has been
government documents. Congressional reports have proved particularly valuable in providing an
assessment of the Northern Caucasus with a wider scope than other sources. Since the United
States has formally supported Russia’s efforts to combat terrorism in the Northern Caucasus,
particularly after September 11, and has provided significant levels of funding in rebuilding
Chechnya, such reports provide skepticism and concerns for abusive practices while
acknowledging Russian interests in the region. Russian Federation statistics in regards to
economic indicators were also consulted when assessing the economic policy of Ramzan
Kadyrov.
The state of Chechnya is a complex issue with a multitude of factors in play. While
Kadyrov’s policies have been analyzed from an economic and security perspective, and much
has been penned on allegations of human rights abuses, this paper combines these sources in the
hope of providing a comprehensive analysis of threats of renewed violence in Chechnya. This
research employs numerous other primary and secondary sources to support that while political
violence has decreased in Chechnya, those factors which contribute to the likelihood of political
violence persist.
10
CHAPTER 1
CHECHEN SECURITY MEASURES
Kadyrovtsy and Long-term Implications of Human Rights Abuses
After visiting Chechnya in March 2009, Vladimir Vasilyev, head of the Duma Security
Committee referred to the former warzone as “an example to other regions of how terrorism
should be countered.” He continued on to say that “the experience and positive practice
employed here in the fight against terrorism are of great interest, particularly in the background
of the unstable situation that remains in some regions of the North Caucasus.”11 Although
Chechnya had been significantly restored after two wars and certainly appears to have been
transformed when looking down Putin Avenue in Grozny, Vasilyev’s words were controversial.
Since the conclusion of the Second Chechen War, referred to as “counterterrorism operations” by
the Russian Federation, Moscow appointed officials have continued to carry out heavy handed
approaches in regional security in order to weed out extremist individuals and groups. Rather
than directly implementing these violent practices, President Vladimir Putin has come to rely on
ethnic Chechens loyal to Moscow in a process called “Chechenization.”
In recent years, the office of President of Chechnya has been held by Ramzan Kadyrov,
an eccentric leader plagued by allegations of human rights abuses ranging from kidnappings to
illegal executions. Seemingly, Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh policies have achieved the goal of
restoring stability in the once troubled region of Chechnya. The number of attacks committed
within Chechen territories have plummeted, and terror groups have been forced either
11
Jim Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus:
Recent Developments,” Congressional Research Service Report RL34613 (2010): 19, accessed
October 10, 2015. CRDC-Id: CRS-2010-FDT-0999.
11
underground or across Chechnya’s border. These illusory achievements, however, have come at
a significant cost to the Chechen people as Kadyrov continues to engage in human rights abuses
against those with even the loosest connections to extremists in the name of preserving law and
order. By analyzing Kadyrov’s policies and their effects, it is clear that by allowing regional
forces to grow to such a significant level of power in exchange for a loyal leadership, Moscow
has essentially relinquished control over Chechnya itself. Although this set up provides an array
of short term benefits, Kadyrov has placed President Putin a more precarious situation as he
grows bolder, targeting human rights activists, politicians who speak against himself and Putin.
This decentralization is and will continue to be a growing liability for the Russian Federation as
Kadyrov’s abuses practices breed discontent, creating an ideal recruitment pool for Chechen
insurgents currently underground or abroad.
The Decentralization of Factors Guiding the Evolution of Governance and Security
In order to understand Kadyrov’s security measures as they exist today, it is necessary to
understand how and why such methods evolved from the Chechen Wars. Many of the factors
which ensured the extent of Ramzan Kadyrov’s power were shaped in the years prior to his rise
to the Chechen presidency. Rather, they occurred as his father consolidated his role in in
Chechnya during the Russo-Chechen conflict. Throughout the “counterterrorism operations” of
President Vladimir Putin, authority was shifted from the army, to federal internal security forces,
and then to regional security forces. At each stage of this shift, security forces retained the same
brutal tactics in combating insurgents. Originally, this decentralization provided an array of
benefits that enhanced effectiveness and efficiency and ensured a balance of power between the
Kadyrovs and other armed factions. Over time, however, the Kadyrovs were able to neutralize
those competing factions, buy unwavering loyalty by providing financial and social support to
12
their forces, and build up those security forces into a small army. This has allowed Kadyrov to
repeatedly challenge the limits of Moscow and the Chechen population since both see no better
alternative to the regime.
In the early stages of the contemporary Russo-Chechen conflict, secessionists were the
point of focus in maintaining regional security. Like other peoples of the former Soviet Union,
Chechens seized their opportunity for independence as the Soviet system collapse. Although
Chechnya was able to obtain de facto independence following the First Chechen War, the region
became too great a liability as it was overrun by the ineffective Dudayev regime and warlords
who seized control of different areas.
Whereas the First Chechen War was initiated in order to restore constitutional order in a
breakaway republic, the Second Chechen War was formerly labeled as a “counterterror
operation” by Vladimir Putin and his administration. A crucial component of containing radicals
during the “counterterrorism operations” was the infamous zachistka, best translated as a mop-up
operation. Such practices were aimed at identifying members of insurgent units and stores of
weapons and ammunition. Since populations were presumably tied with the bandits and,
therefore, able to influence their behavior, garrisons were installed within town centers in order
to intimidate residents into stopping rebels. Concurrently, this would prevent rebels from
attacking garrisons since they were located in the population of their own people.
In Chechnya, mop up operations were often carried out preemptively and involved
surrounding entire villages with soldiers, armed vehicles, and tanks in order to prevent residents
from leaving. In addition to unwelcome blanket searches and detainments, these sweeps are also
associated with indiscriminate torture, executions, pillaging, and rape of rebels, their supporters,
and their families. According to Memorial, a Russian human rights and humanitarian society,
13
thousands of young Chechen men were kidnapped and relocated to various filtration camps
during such sweeps. Given that arrests were indiscriminate and lacked documentation, much
less evidence leading to the arrest, testimony was the sole form of evidence. Therefore,
interrogators frequently obtained confessions through beatings and torture. By 2003, 20 to 30
filtration camps existed in Chechnya with outsider entrance prohibited. Many were found in
mass graves years later, fifty were acknowledge by the Chechen government by 2005, and some
were released after relatives paid for their ransom.12
Setting aside concerns of human rights abuses, even Akhmad Kadyrov, a rebel who
defected from the Chechen rebels and joined the Russian Federation as the Russian appointed
president of Chechnya, recognized practical issues posed by this strategy. Akhmad Kadyrov
asserted that when Russian soldiers arrived in Chechen villages it caused panic, rendering the
measures ineffective. As he described such operations, “The soldiers just arrest everybody
indiscriminately, including the completely innocent.”13 Another practical problem materialized
as federal troops were unable to collect sufficient local intelligence in their search for rebels.
It was from this precedent that “Chechenized” security forces emerged. In order to
respond to the limitation of Russian led zachistkas, the Russian Federation, under the guidance of
Vladimir Putin, shifted control from the military to law enforcement. From 1999 to 2003,
operations were administered by the Unified Grouping of Federal Forces in Chechnya (OGV).
This was comprised of units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, anti-riot Police, the Federal
Security Service (FSB), the Federal Border Patrol, Special Forces (spetsnaz) and all other
branches of the military, the Federal Service of Railway Troops, and surveillance specialists
12
13
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 101.
Ibid., 31.
14
from the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information.14 In 2003 this
power was transferred to the Interior Ministry (MVD), finalizing the shift of the responsibility
for combatting extremism from the military.
In addition to transitioning security activities from the military to law enforcement, the
Russian Federation proceeded to establish a Moscow approved government to represent, or
appear to represent, the Chechen people in order to gain more legitimacy in its hold on
Chechnya. After federal troops regained control over much of Chechnya, the federal
government virtually appointed Akhmad Kadyrov as the president of Chechnya. Although he
was formally elected in 2003, most independent observers claim that it fell short of being
democratic.
While the choice may seem curious given Kadyrov and his son’s history as rebels, a
Russian political scientist explains that it’s difficult to find reliable Chechens in Chechnya since
“they are either loyal to Moscow, but have no influence in Chechnya, or have influence and
support in Chechnya, but are not loyal to Moscow.”15 Alternatives to Kadyrov were ruled out
due to a lack of influence or too risky of a criminal background. Although Kadyrov posed a risk,
he represented the “reformed separatist” who abandoned the rebels after the emergence of radical
Islam. In addition to posing the least perceived risk, his selection was significant in winning the
favor of war weary Chechens who sat on the fence regarding whether to rejoin Russia. Finally,
Kadyrov also retained loose connections with Chechen warlords who exercised power in the
region, connections which lessoned the likelihood of their resistance after Russian rule was
established. Selecting a past rebel also had benefits in terms of international relations. Given his
14
15
Janeczko, “Chechnya Part 2: Success, But at What Cost?”
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 102.
15
past, Moscow hoped to convince the Chechen population and the international community that
Russia was sincerely attempting to engage with Chechens in reaching peace.
Although this Chechenization policy carried great risk, the Russian Federation initially
took measures to counterbalance Kadyrov’s hold power. This was achieved by appointing other
leaders, often formerly competing warlords, as leaders of various military and special police
security forces, in order to counterbalance Kadyrov. These included Musa Gazimagomadov, the
commander of Chechnya’s special police force OMON; Sulim Yamadayev, the head of the
Spetsnaz battalion Vostok, an elite military force; and Said-Mafomed Kakiyev the head of the
Spetsnaz battalion Zapad. All three of these individuals were highly suspicious of Kadyrov,
something which the Russian government likely saw as an opportunity to keep Kadyrov in
check. In addition to these checks on power, Kadyrov shared power with Chechnya’s prime
minister, a Moscow appointee and ethnic Russian. According to Emil Souleimanov, these
competing positions indicate that Kadyrov’s role was initially intended to be “largely
decorative.”16 Kadyrov, and, subsequently, his son would transform their decorative positions
into real power as the conflict evolved.
As a whole, the role of law enforcement would continue to evolve as the Russian
Federation carried out the “Chechenization” of the breakaway republic. In terms of law
enforcement and counterterrorism measures, this process provided the Kremlin with the benefits
of loyalty while allowing it to free up Russian Federation military and law enforcement
personnel and resources. Although Kadyrov’s election as Chechen president was secured,
maintaining the support of the Russian Federation was dependent on his ability to suppress the
resistance movement within Chechnya.
16
Ibid., 102.
16
One of the ways in which the Kadyrovs were able to provide for normalization of
Chechnya was by bringing former rebels into pro-Moscow security forces. This created the
need for a new legal framework and means of reorganizing law enforcement through
localization. A first wave of amnesty was declared by the Russian parliament in December 1999
at the request of Putin. This was naturally met with much skepticism from former rebels who
were concerned that the declaration was a way of tricking rebels into handing over weapons and
turning themselves in. Those closest to the Kadyrovs benefited the most from such amnesties as
a result. Several hundred insurgents took part in the amnesty, including those who held
important positions such as field commanders but who had personally known Kadyrov during
the First Chechen War. The amnesty was also limited to those not accused of felonies or the
implementation of terrorist attacks. In order to determine eligibility, applications for amnesties
were individually processed by the police and the courts.
Given the level of Kadyrov’s influence, he significantly benefited from this system by
transforming many of those who took advantage of pardons into his personal security force.
Some estimates assert that by 2003, about two-thirds to three-quarters of Kadyrovtsy units were
composed of former rebels. 17 These units would play a significant role in the rise of his son
Ramzan Kadyrov who headed the forces and would become president of Chechnya following his
father’s assassination.
While seemingly merciful, the Chechnya Justice Initiative 2003 report suggests that many
of those 397 people who were amnestied were either Russian service personnel who feared
prosecution for their war crimes or Chechen fighters who were already loyal to Akhmad
Kadyrov in the first place. As responsibility shifted from the Russian military, tactics shifted
17
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 105.
17
from large-scale military sweep operations to night-time abductions, disappearances, forced
detentions, and summary executions under Chechen directives. Over time the presidential
security force Kadyrovtsy was transformed into a new Chechen militia. This force was given
responsibility for both general law enforcement and to conduct special operations to combat
terrorism.18 In Ramzan Kadyrov’s own words, his forces combined “American uniforms,
Russian weapons, Islamic beliefs and a Chechen spirit,” a combination which made them
“invincible.”19
The development of the Kadyrovtsy provided a variety of short-term benefits to both
Moscow and Grozny. In terms of ensuring loyalty of those Chechen rebels brought into the
security force, recruitment of Chechen men into the Kadyrovtsy appears to be the greatest
success story of normalization through Chechenization. The motivations of individuals with in
the Kadyrovtsy significantly varied. Many sought to ensure survival for themselves and their
families. Although being a part of the paramilitary group entailed its own risks, it provided a
degree of impunity and security in a chaotic environment. As part of the Kadyrovtsy, young men
would remove themselves as targets in Russian mop up operations. In addition to physical
protection, being part of the security forces provided economic security not offered by most
insurgent groups. This was particularly significant to men with families since Chechen families
are usually large and young Chechen men faced near total unemployment in this time frame.
18
Cerwyn Moore, “Combating Terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan,” Cambridge Review
of International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2007): 3, accessed December 12, 2015,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557570701414666.
19
John Russel, “Ramzan Kadyrov: The Indigenous Key to Success in Putin’s
Chechenization Strategy?” Nationalities Paper 36 no. 4 (2008): 678, accessed January 19, 2016,
DOI:10.1080/00905990802230605.
18
In addition to being drawn to the promise of financial security, many Chechen men were
drawn to the supportive social structures of the Kadyrovtsy. This further cemented loyalties
within the group. Since Chechen clan structures were also significantly weakened due to years
of war, many members who had lost family members regarded the mutual protection as a
substitute. In other case, Chechen clan structures served to strengthen the Kadyrovtsy.
Individuals linked to Kadyrov or his associates would recommend potential recruits, often family
members, ensuring complete loyalty. Other methods of maintaining total loyalty allegedly
included an initiation in which a new member of the paramilitary group murdered a member of
the insurgency or his family member.
By 2010, there were about 7000 members, meaning that about 100,000 Chechens, or
about 10 percent of the population, were tied to Kadyrov through the Kadyrovtsy. Although this
did little to quell human rights abuses by security forces, the shift of mop-up operations from the
Russian military to Chechen troops significantly increased the amount and quality of local
intelligence. In addition to intelligence, Chechen villagers were far more willing to provide
food, basic supplies, and shelter to ethnic Chechens. 20
The growing strength of the Kadyrovtsy would play a significant role in shaping the
relationship between Moscow and Grozny as well as between the Chechen leadership and its
people. Despite their influence, the Kadyrovtsy had no legal status and could legally be defined
as an illegal armed groups.21 Instead their power derived from Russian authorities’ willingness
to look the other way as long as the job was taken care of. This is significant since it would set a
20
21
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 106.
Šmíd and Mareš, “Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 652.
19
precedent for its leader Ramzan Kadyrov who would later rise to the Chechen presidency and
continue to expand the Kadyrovtsy forces.
Although such a fighting force can seem like its own phenomena as other similar armies
have been forgotten, the Kadyrovtsy were not as unique as they seem. This further suggests that
the virtually unchecked powers of Kadyrov evolved over time. Another such group which was
allowed to exist was one that evolved from the National Guard of the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria. Its second battalion, commanded by Dzhabrail and Sulim Yamadayev, would prove to
be important for the evolution of Chechen militarism. Like the Kadyrovs, they were disturbed
by the jihadist ideas being imported by Arab Salafists and the actions of Shamil Basayev, a
separatist deemed a terrorist by both Russian and Western governments, even going to war with
Basayev and taking sides with federal forces during the counterterrorism campaign of Putin.
This group, which was also technically illegal, became known as Yamadayevtsy and operated
independently of the Kadyrovtsy. Although they initially worked together, a power struggle
ensued.22 While the Kadyrovtsy developed relations with Russia’s Ministry of the Interior
(MVD), the Yamadayevtsy developed into a special company under the military command of the
Mountain Group of the Ministry of Defense and grew into the Vostok battalion by 2003.23
The Rise of President Ramzan Kadyrov and Sources of Power
President Putin’s “Chechenization” experienced a major setback when President Akhmad
Kadyrov was assassinated in May 2004. Although Akhmad’s son was too young to assume the
presidency, Ramzan Kadyrov continued to head the Kadyrovtsy while Alu Alkhanov served as
president, further cementing the Kadyrovsty’s loyalty to Ramzan. When Ramzan reached the
22
23
Šmíd and Mareš, “Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 654.
Ibid., 654.
20
legal age for the position of president and Alkhanov formally resigned in 2007, Putin was quick
to nominate the Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov to take his place. This came as little
surprise to many experts who had been speculating on the nomination since Kadyrov had
reached the minimum age to run for president of the region, thirty.24
Ramzan Kadyrov began his career in politics and was appointed as Deputy Prime
Minister of Chechnya, his only obvious qualification was being the son of the former president
Akhmad Kadyrov.25 By analyzing Kadyrov’s rise to power, it is clear that Kadyrov’s authority
was, at least initially, derived from his ability to exert force against those who threatened his
power. While presiding over the presidential security force, Kadyrov oversaw several thousand
men in the Kadyrovtsy as well as a private prison where Russian journalist’s claim that those
suspected of assisting the resistance force were tortured and often killed in the process.
Although Kadyrov routinely denies such allegations, evidence in the form of videos and victim
testimonies suggest otherwise.26 Despite allegations of human rights abuses and his increasing
levels of influence, Moscow was willing to look the other way in order to maintain a leadership
who was loyal to Putin and willing to crush threats to the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation.
This assurance of loyalty, however, would ironically lead to Moscow’s modern
dependence on Kadyrov’s leadership and a growing liability in his security force. On April 16,
2009 the Kremlin formally announced the end of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya.
24
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 659.
Liz Fuller, “The Unstoppable Rise of Ramzan Kadyrov,” Radio Free Europe, January
19, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/profile-ramzan-kadyrov-chechnya-russiaputin/26802368.html
26
Liz Fuller, “What Direction for Chechnya?” Radio Free Europe, July 08, 2008,
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Direction_For_Chechnya/1182441.html
25
21
Kadyrov applauded this declaration and the lifting of various security restrictions by the National
counterterrorism Committee, claiming that it “confirmed the fact that the nest of terrorism has
been crushed.”27 In addition to allowing Kadyrov to claim a significant role in crushing
“terrorists,” it is important to note that the term terrorist was used to denote most rebels, it
consolidated his hold on power, formally disbanding the defense ministry’s Vostok and Zapad
battalions and eventually resulting in the withdrawal of about 20,000 MVD troops. Despite the
end of operations, the then leader of the insurgency Doku Umarov continued to coordinate terror
attacks throughout the north Caucasian republics.28
Ramzan’s role in the Kadyrovtsy would play the crucial role of ensuring him a security
force unquestionably loyal to him. In addition to previously discussed characteristics of the
group, the organization has had a very hierarchical structure with personal bonds playing an
important role in its cohesion. The inner circle of the Kadyrovtsy consists of members of or with
special connections to Kadyrov’s teip, a Chechen tribal organization or clan. Throughout its
existence, it has been difficult to track the number of Kadyrovtsy since such numbers are not
publically disclosed.29 Kadyrov has asserted that he has 70,000 trained volunteers at his disposal
on social media.30 Kadyrov has reason to inflate this figure. Although the number is contested,
some estimate that the number of Kadyrov’s men is close to 30,000.31 A significant number of
27
“Russia ends Chechnya Operation,'” BBC, April 16, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8001495.stm.
28
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 19.
29
Šmíd and Mareš, “Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy,”652.
30
Daria Litvinova, “Kadyrov to Get another Term, Say Kremlin,” Moscow Times, March
16, 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kadyrov-to-get-another-term-saykremlin-sources-exclusive/562640.html.
31
“13 Takeaways from Ilya Yashin’s Kadyrov Report,” Institute of Modern Russia,
February 25, 2015, http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2515-13-takeaways-from-ilyayashin%E2%80%99s-kadyrov-report.
22
these men are personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, making them accountable to the
Russian Federation. In reality, however, they are under the command of Kadyrov.
By reviewing the evolution of Chechen security forces, it is clear that decentralization
provided an array of benefits that enhanced effectiveness and efficiency and ensured a balance of
power between the Kadyrovs and other armed factions. As Kadyrov cemented the loyalty of
former rebels, however, he was able to remove those competing armed factions propped up by
Moscow. Although Akhmad Kadyrov did not challenge the Moscow leadership, Ramzan
Kadyrov would evolve to express unwavering loyalty to Putin while rejecting the authority of
components of the Russian Federation. Given these general trends, this analysis will provide a
more detailed look into the benefits and disadvantages of reliance on the Kadyrovtsy and their
brutal methods in deterring terrorism and insurgencies.
Benefits and Disadvantages of the Chechenization of Security Forces
Particularly in the short-term, reliance on Kadyrov and the Kadyrovtsy have provided a
variety of advantages to Moscow in maintaining stability in Chechnya. A common argument for
the necessity of relinquishing Federal control of security in Chechnya is that any other route was
not possible or would at least result in less desirable outcomes. As John Russel explains, “as
long as the conflict remained one Russian occupiers against the Chechen resistance, the odds
against Putin achieving a military victory were very long indeed…”32 By soliciting the support
of Kadyrov and other pro-Moscow factions, Putin was able to bring Chechen faces to the
counterinsurgency and gain legitimacy amongst the population. Since the Kadyrovs eliminated
any challenge to their leadership, Moscow was met with no choice but to continue supporting
Kadyrov since he was the only viable pro-Moscow but ethnically option.
32
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 662.
23
While there were few, in any, viable alternatives to Kadyrov, the partnership did provide
an array of advantages. This agreement allowed relief to a war weary nation whose wellbeing
had been neglected by both Russia and the Republic of Ichkeria, the name of the breakaway
Chechen Republic, since the beginning of the First Chechen War. Furthermore, by forming this
partnership, the Kremlin seemingly gained a variety of tactical, operational and strategic
advantages in maintaining stability. This perception was further perpetuated after the September
11, 2001 attacks on the United States when Chechnya was presented as Russia’s frontline in the
global war on terrorism.33
Other claims of successes are found in Russian law enforcements’ policy of employing
‘special operations’ which employ human intelligence and local knowledge pooled by proMoscow Chechen groups in order to neutralize leading figures of the opposition. Much of these
operations have centered on eliminating prominent figures in the Chechen rebels’ ranging from
moderate government-in-exile leaders to jihadist leaders. Successful targets liquidated within
Chechnya itself include Aslan Maskhadov, the third president of the Republic of Ichkeria, and
his successor Abdul Khalim Sadulayev. In March 2002, the renowned Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi
Arabian born jihadist and Chechen separatist, was killed with a poisoned letter. Shamil Basayev
was also killed in a special operation in Ingushetia. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, acting president of
Ichkeria following Dudayev’s assassination, was killed in 2004 by Russian agents in Qatar as he
sought political asylum. Foreign fighters who were liquidated in similar fashion include Abu
Walid, Abu Zaid, Abu Jafar, and Abu Hafs.34 These assassinations served to weaken groups by
destroying key figureheads and instilling confusion in the leadership.
33
34
Ibid., 663.
Moore, “Combating Terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan,” 318.
24
Although, Kadyrov and his security forces may claim a variety of successes during the
“Counterterrorism Operations,” Kadyrov continues to carry out heavy handed practices against
those who threaten his authority, whether they be insurgents or human rights activists. These
could create a long-term liability for the Russian government as Kadyrov inspires discontent in
Chechnya and the Russian Federation. According to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency
Guide, excessive violence by a government can provide insurgents with recruitment material.
Specifically, “if insurgents can provoke excessive government action against a population, then
death, injury, mistreatment, or dishonor can become a power motivator for retributive action
against the government.”35
Human rights abuses in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus have, long been a concern
of the international community and are therefore well documented. In 2010 the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution against human rights abuses in the
Northern Caucasus. It also expressed concerns over the cult of personality surrounding Kadyrov
and his efforts to convince Chechens in exile in Europe to return to Chechnya.36 Corruption was
something recognized as an impediment to recovery and the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE
approved a resolution that suggested that Russian government should combat terrorism within
the rule of law, referring to the Northern Caucasus as the “most serious and most delicate
situation from the standpoint of safeguarding human rights and upholding the rule of law, in the
entire geographical area covered by the Council of Europe.”37 It also urged that those members
35
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide, (2009), 10. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.
36
“PACE Vote Mirrors Shift in Russia's North Caucasus Policy,” Radio Free Europe,
July 1, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/PACE_Vote_Mirrors_Shift_In_Russias_North_Caucasus_Policy/20
88254.html.
37
“Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 21.
25
of the security forces who had engaged in human rights violations be prosecuted and that victims
of abuse have access to the courts.38
While it is clear that human rights abuses are prevalent in Chechnya, if and how they
should be addressed is less clear. There have been modest attempts at addressing human rights
abuses in Chechnya. Some scholars present Medvedev as having tried to renew
constitutionalism and stem corruption in the North Caucasus.39 Following the spikes of terrorist
activities in 2009, which will be discussed in the next section, Medvedev called for a purge of
corrupt policemen throughout the North Caucasus in order to combat inefficiency. This call for
efficiency, however, fell short of restoring the rights of the individual and also included legal and
judicial changes that reduced procedural rights of those accused of terrorist activity.40
Given the prominent role of clans in Chechen society, a particularly threatening form of
human rights abuses in Chechnya is collective punishment, a practice that is illegal under federal
law in Russia. After an attack in Grozny in December 2014, which resulted in the death of 14
police officers, 10 militants, and 1 civilian, Kadyrov proclaimed that he would destroy the homes
of those involved and to expel their relatives from Chechnya, an action that would violate the
Russian Constitution according to human rights activists. Following this statement, at least 8
homes were burned, four of which did not even belong to the militants. Alarmingly, these events
were met with little criticism from Putin who expressed that Kadyrov’s response was
38
Ibid.
Richard Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus: Chechenization and the Duel State in
Russia,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 38 no. 5 (2012): 611,
accessed October 5, 2010, DOI:10.1080/00905992.2010.498468.
40
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 5.
39
26
“understandable” but that no one had the right to vigilantism.41 Public shaming has also been
extended to human rights activists who make public statements against Kadyrov. Only days
after a Chechen living in France posted a video condemning another public shaming, his brother
and another relative were forced to denounce his statement and disown him on a local television
station. On January 2, 2016 Chechen emigres in Oslo, Norway held a protest rally against
Kadyrov’s methods and to defend Ayshat Inayeva, a social worker who was publically shamed
for criticizing corruption involving the Chechen leader.42 According to the United States
Department of State, clan-based societies are particularly inclined to join insurgencies against
abuses governments since “the support of the support of one tribe or faction for the government
may often predispose tribal rivals to support the insurgents, and vice versa.”43
Collective punishments will only serve to increase support for various insurgency groups
in Chechnya. In addition to being supported by general conclusions such as that drawn by the
Department of State, this claim is supported by region-specific studies. Such analyses reveal
“tit-for-tat” responses between rebel forces and law enforcement due to the societal structures
within Chechnya. In historical terms, Chechens long lived in absence of formal laws imposed by
the state. Subsequently, Chechens relied on adat, or customary law, in order to regulate
behaviors. While years of Russian and Soviet Rule, industrialization, and urbanization have
altered Chechens relationship to adat, a word derived from Arabic which describes concepts of
honor that still play a significant role in Chechen society. The most significant component of
this honor system is that of the blood feud which are used to address wrongdoings related to
41
Claire Bigg, “Kadyrov's Collective Punishment, Public Shamings Anger Chechens,”
Radio Free Europe, January 6, 20, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-chechnya-kadyrovcollective-punishment-shamings/27472027.html.
42
Ibid.
43
Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 10.
27
humiliation, physical injury, death, and rape. When such an act is committed, it is the
responsibility of the patriarchs of the family to answer the ch’ir, or blood feud, toward the
immediate offender or his male relatives. To not respond to such an insult results in defamation
and humiliation within a clan and possibly on the entire clan. In practice, the blood feud has no
time limit and may continue for decades and involved individuals only distantly related to the
initial offender or offended.44
To target a terror suspect and their families through collective punishment, therefore, is to
foster collective humiliation and resentment. This could offer incentive for individuals to carry
out acts of revenge against Kadyrov, members of his teip, or his security forces, something
which could be particularly damaging if individuals seek out avenues for revenge and security in
extremist groups.
Toft and Zhukov also provide region-specific research regarding the spread of the
insurgency in Chechnya. Specifically, they describe how, in terms of counterinsurgency,
coercion may be used to prevent the spread of violence to new areas and to deter fighting in
disputed areas. According to the study, containment tactics may center on “denial” or
“punishment.” “Denial” raises the cost of spreading fighting by preventing communication and
movement through cordoning, roadblocks, and other means of isolation. Subsequently, the
conflict zone is reduced to a closed system in which insurgents are unable to flee or reinforce
insurgent groups in other geographical areas. “Punishment” tactics, in the meantime, raise the
cost of engaging in insurgent violence by inflicting physical pain or physical losses in order to
44
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 97.
28
“gain coercive leverage” and test the insurgents’ resolve.45 Typically, this coercion comes in the
form of search-and-destroy missions, artillery shelling, air strikes, and raids of or near sites of
violence. While some scholars argue that the use of such force is effective, particularly if the
state is strong, others have found that where states impose such deterrents, they create sympathy
for the insurgency, reducing the costs of recruitment.46 Such tactics are not mutually exclusive
and may be considered to be successful if it negatively impacts the recovery rate and the
transmissibility of the violence.
By mapping out instances of engagement, the study found that punishment actions often
serve to increase cases of insurgent violence in the cause of Chechnya and surrounding regions
of the North Caucasus. This was particularly true for previously nonviolent municipalities
whose risk for renewed violence was over 9 times more likely than municipalities where
punishment was not employed.47 This is significant when considering how Kadyrov would react
to the threat of renewed calls for separatism or outside threats from Islamic extremism.
Another regionally focused study by Souleimanov and Aliyev interviewed individuals
who fought with separatists during the Russo-Chechen conflict. Often those who were mobilized
into fighting against the Russian Federation were driven to do so out of retaliation and
fulfillment of a blood feud. As explained by one former fighter “We are normal people, just like
any other, and our main goal is to have families and raise children… [Fighting] was something I
never dreamt of […] Still, I had to avenge to not lose respect toward myself.”48 According to
45
Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M Zhukov, “Denial and Punishment in the North
Caucasus: Evaluating Effectiveness of Coercive Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Peace
Research, 49 no. 6 (2012): 788, accessed December 6, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721662.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., 793.
48
Souleimanov and Aliyev, Individual Disengagement, 66.
29
many of the interviews, they were driven to mobilize by experiences of torture, injury, and/or
humiliation while detained by Russian forces.49 When Kadyrov’s continued use of such violence
and force in addressing both real and imagined components, it is likely that as he continued to
increase his abusive practices, he will further foster resentment.
The combination of these studies clearly reflect the need for revenge as being a powerful
recruiting tool for insurgent recruitment in the North Caucasus. In addition to carrying out
human rights abuses, Kadyrov continues to eliminate all sources of political expression against
him. The only political party active in Chechnya is Kadyrov’s Edinaya Rossiya, United Russia.
Although “free elections” are held, independent observers are not able to practice oversight due
to personal safety concerns. Furthermore, human rights activists who speak out against Kadyrov
are constantly threatened with violence which sometimes materializes. A recent uptick in attacks
on human rights activists suggests that Kadyrov is only cracking down on those opposed to him.
A recent example occurred on December 13, 2014 when the Grozny office of the
Committee against Torture was burned. After relocating to an apartment by one the employees
of the office, their service vehicles were vandalized by a group who had come from a meeting in
Grozny, which was organized by Kadyrov, wearing masks and carrying sledgehammers. After
this incident, the Committee against Torture announced that it would close the office due to
safety concerns.
In March 2016, a minibus transporting journalists and human rights activists associated
with the group was attacked as it approached Chechnya. This attack was particularly noteworthy
since one of this journalists was from Sweden and another was from Norway. All passengers
were beaten to the point of hospitalization. They were on a press tour around the Northern
49
Souleimanov and Aliyev, Individual Disengagement, 67.
30
Caucasus in order to introduce journalists to victims of torture and those whose families had
been kidnapped. Swedish reporter Maria Persson Lofgren claims that the attackers accused the
activists of being terrorists who were killing the Chechen people, and a lawyer from the
Committee against Torture argues that the goal was to send a message of fear since the attackers
said that there was nothing for the reporters in Chechnya. This is significant since, as the
Guardian points out, the targeting of foreign reporters is unusual and suggests that attempts at
intimidation are escalating.
The head of the Committee against Torture, Igor Kalyapin, who was assaulted at his hotel
in Grozny by a group of Chechens himself shortly after the incident, calls the attack “a
demonstration that they are all-powerful.” Oftentimes, Kadyrov paints his opponents as foreign
agents and forces many activist groups to register as such. According to Kadyrov’s Instagram
account, Kalyapin is working for western intelligence or is helping the Islamic insurgency. A few
hours after the attack on the journalists, armed men attacked the offices of the Joint Mobile
Group in Ingushetia. Luckily, no workers were in the office. Thus far, it appears that law
enforcement has not made any meaningful efforts to investigate the incident, opening questions
to who carried out the attack.50
Some argue that although some rebels have renounced terrorist attacks such as those
inspired by Shamil Basayev, they continue to engage in attacks since they are excluded from any
legitimate political or economic role in Chechnya, forcing them to express themselves by
illegitimate means.51 When considering this conclusion, it is likely that the risk for terrorist
50
Shaun Walker, “Journalist and Activists Beaten and Bus Torched on Chechnya Tour,”
The Guardian, March 10, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/10/journalistsbeaten-and-bus-torched-on-chechnya-tour-say-activists.
51
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 675.
31
attacks will only increase as Kadyrov continues to limit Chechens’ ability to voice any concerns
about abuses in Chechnya, much less legitimately participate in the political process.
Patterns in Terrorist Attacks
The threat of terrorism may also be analyzed through the number of attacks throughout
the Northern Caucasus. Rather than simply declining since the end of Putin’s anti-terror
operations, violence has waxed and waned. The operations were formally “ended” in April
2009. Nonetheless, terrorist attacks continued throughout 2009 and spiked in 2010. On June 5,
2009 the Dagestani Internal Affairs Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov was murdered, leading
President Medvedev to fly to Dagestan and discuss regional counter-measures against terrorism
with the Russian Security Council. Here, he reported that over 300 acts of terrorism had taken
place in the North Caucasus alone. This included over 100 bombings and those slain included 75
local government officials and 48 civilians. The president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov
was severely wounded by a bomb blast during an attempt on his life on June 22, 2009.52
Political figures were not the only target. A prominent human rights advocate was
abducted in Chechnya in July 2009 and later found dead in Ingushetia. Two coordinators of a
child rehabilitation center in Chechnya were also murdered in August. Attacks on law
enforcement resulted in the deaths of civilians, including a suicide truck bombing in Ingushetia
which killed 25 and wounded 136 in August, 2009. Moscow was also shaken by attacks closer
to home including the bombing of the Nevsky Express railway train, which was targeted on
November 27, 2009. In the same month, 10 men embarked on a suicide mission to shoot police
and set fire to houses and cars in Tsentoroy. The ultimate intended target was Ramzan Kadyrov.
Furthermore, 2009 marked the spread of insurgent violence into the neighboring territories of
52
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 4.
32
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Throughout the North Caucasus attacks on
security forces and government officials were widespread. Even official sources from the
Russian Federation reported that the number of terrorist increased by 30 percent that year.53
This pattern continued into 2010 which witnessed 37 acts of terrorism, up 300 percent
from the preceding year, and 246 terrorist related crimes. 149 police officers and military
personal were killed in such attacks and 384 were wounded according to Deputy ProsecutorGeneral in the North Caucasus Federal District Ivan Sidoruk. Bordering Dagestan was
particularly hard hit, experiencing two-thirds of the losses. In merely the first 6 months of 2010,
158 people were killed and 186 were wounded in such attacks in Dagestan.54
Sources such as the Caucasian Knot, which tracks instances of violence in the Northern
Caucasus, places deaths at a much higher rate than those of the Russian authorities. Between
2010 and 2013, there were 5,291 victims of violence in the North Caucasus with Dagestan as the
worst hit. Moscow was targeted by suicide bombers on March 29, 2010 who killed 40 and
wounded more than 70 civilians. Following this attack, Umarov issued the chilling statement
that “war will come to your streets, and you will feel it with your own lives and skins.”55
Chechnya, however, had its own share of victims with 726 victims killed or injured. Notable
attacks within the Northern Caucasus during 2010 included an attack on a hydroelectric plant in
Kabardino-Balkaria which destroyed two turbines and led to increased security at infrastructure
53
Ibid., 5.
Aslan Doukaev, “Is Khloponin The Right Man For The North Caucasus?” Radio Free
Europe, October 9, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_Khloponin_The_Right_Man_For_The_North_Caucasus/218552
1.html.
55
Elena Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Networks: The Evolution of Terrorism in
Russia’s North Caucasus, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLc, 2015), Location 135, Kindle
Edition.
54
33
facilities, and a raid on the Chechen Republic legislative building which resulted in the death of
three and the wounding of 17.56
According to the Caucasian Knot, Chechnya was the only region in the North Caucasus
in which casualties from fighting between security forces and suspected militants increased from
2013 to 2014. In 2014 52 people died from fighting in Chechnya, 1.5 times more than in 2013.
Two of these were civilians, 24 were allegedly militants and 26 were siloviki, a Russian word for
politicians from security or military services.57 In 2015 attacks significantly decreased in the
Northern Caucasus. The National Anti-Terrorist Committee of Russia claims that the number of
terror related crimes in the Northern Caucasus decreased by 2.5 times. While there is reason to
be skeptical that official Russian numbers may be inflated, Kavkaz Uzel, which tracks armed
incidents and human rights violations in the Northern Caucasus claims that terrorist attacks
decreased by 33 percent from the preceding year and that death and injuries resulting from
terrorist acts were nearly halved.58 From these proceeding statistics, it appears that the threat of
insurgent violence is waning in Chechnya.
The Islamic State and Kadyrov’s Role in Combating It
Giving these statistics, it appears that the threat of an insurgency is at a low point within
Chechnya. Despite this, when looking at news headlines, one would think that the Islamic State
(IS) poses the greatest threat to the security of the Northern Caucasus and Russia as a whole.
While Kadyrov’s role in combating IS is unclear due to contradictory information from the local
56
Ibid.
Ivan Sukhov, “Chechnya’s Growing Image Problem,” The Moscow Times, February 5,
2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/chechnyas-growing-imageproblem/515493.html.
58
Sergey Markedonov, “The Reasons behind Turbulence in Russia’s North Caucasus,”
Russia Direct, March 9, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/reasons-behind-increasingturbulence-russias-north-caucasus.
57
34
Chechen government and Moscow, it is clear that he recognizes the influence that the terrorist
group can have on his image and is using the threat of ISIS in order to justify human rights
abuses.
Thus far, bordering republics have been the targets of attacks by IS. There is little reason
to believe that IS does not pose a threat to Chechnya. On June 21, 2015, the Islamic State
formally acknowledged commander of the Chechen insurgency wing Aslan Byutukayev’s pledge
of allegiance to the Islamic State. It appears that the groups received similar allegiances from
other wings of the Caucasus Emirate in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria which
later lead to the announcement of a newly created North Caucasus subsidiary of the Islamic
State. This is significant when considering that those pledging to ISIS have carried out
successful attacks. Chechens under the command of Byutukayev carried out an attack on
Grozny in December, 2014 in which it was able to occupy the central press and media building
and a school resulting in the death of 14 police and security personnel. In Kadyrov’s own home
village of Tsentaroy, a black jihadi banner with the message “Khosi-Yurt is support ISIS” was
painted on a wall in February, 2015. Prominent figures within the Russian Federation agree that
IS poses an imminent threat to Russian security. The Federal Nationalities Minister Igor Barinov
has named the Islamic State as one of the most serious problems that Russia will face.59
Although Russia has ulterior motives given its participation in the Syrian conflict, concerns
became a reality in December 2015 when IS claimed credit for a shooting in Dagestan that
59
Liz Fuller, “Is Chechen Stability Tenable or Deceptive,” Radio Free Europe, July 21,
2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/is-chechen-stability-tenable-or-deceptive/27141249.html.
35
resulted in death of one person and the injury of 11. The attack, which occurred at the Derbent
citadel, allegedly targeted Russian intelligence agency officers.60
While, in practice, IS activities in Chechnya has been limited, Kadyrov clearly
recognized value in playing a leading role in combating the group. A look at current events
regarding IS in Chechnya suggests that he is attempting to exploit the threat in order to further
his own agenda and public image.
An example of Kadyrov claiming responsibility for taking on IS in Syria occurred in
February 2016 when Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Special Forces infiltrated IS controlled
territory in Syria as part of an organized intelligence-gathering mission. While filming for a
documentary that is to be aired on Russia One, a state controlled television channel, Kadyrov
describes his “best fighters” who were sent on an undercover mission to train with IS fighters in
order to gather intelligence. According to Kadyrov, these forces have also safeguarded Russian
air strikes “at the cost of their own lives”61 Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to
questions about Kadyrov’s claims by saying “one should not speak about the Chechen special
task force but about relevant federal units.”62 Given that Moscow has routinely denied the
presence of troops of the ground, there could be a variety of reasons for this discrepancy.
Kadyrov could be telling the truth and is operating out of Moscow’s control, or disclosing
information that Moscow wishes to keep silent for the time being. Another possibility is that
Kadyrov is lying but trying to further his image.
60
“Russia Attack: IS Claims Shooting in Dagestan,” BBC, December 31, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35205165.
61
Nadia Beard, “Chechen Special Forces in Syria have ‘Infiltrated ISIS’ says Kadyrov,”
The Independent, February 9, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/chechen-special-forces-are-on-the-ground-in-syria-and-have-infiltrated-isis-cells-saysramzan-a6861586.html.
62
Ibid.
36
Under the leadership of Kadyrov, Chechen security forces have discovered and detained
a variety of individuals and groups who allegedly intended to attack Chechen political targets.
Several of these incidences, however, were presented with details that were contradictory or did
not add up. For example, in October 2015, security forces apprehended three fighters who it
claimed had undergone training at an Islamic State military camp in Syria and had arrived in
Grozny with the intention of committing attacks on Grozny day, October 5, and President
Vladimir Putin’s birthday, October 7. Critics question the validity of these claims since Kadyrov
failed to explain why the special operation which apprehended the terror suspects occurred after
the holidays, on October 8, or why they failed to commit the attacks before being apprehended.
Finally, critics question how the three perpetrators were able to be identified so quickly when
they were supposedly not carrying any forms of identification.63
On November 2, 2015, a Chechen news network reported that a plot by a group of 20
young men to kill Kadyrov had been discovered and that the authorities successfully intervened
and detained the young men. Kadyrov posted on his Instagram that the young men had been
indoctrinated into Wahhabism, a type of Islam associated with jihadists, by a self-taught Imam.
According to Kadyrov, he ultimately granted them clemency since they acknowledged the error
of their ways and their parents are to ensure that they do not commit crimes in the future. Such a
benevolent decision in a regime fraught with a history of human rights violations was naturally
met with skepticism with some human rights groups, experts on the regions, and Chechen
63
Liz Fuller, “Kadyrov's Account of Killing of IS Fighters In Grozny Less Than
Convincing,” Radio Free Europe, October 9, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasusreport-chechnya-kadyrov-islamic-state-attacks/27297540.html.
37
residents. Residents of Argun, the city in which the young suspects reside, claim that the men
merely liked to meet in a boiler room of a local mosque in order to discuss current events
regarding Syria.64 Given Kadyrov’s brutal background, it seems more likely that the men were
utilized in a public relations campaign than an actual terrorist threat.
A variety of peculiarities also exist which support that the incident was a publicity stunt.
Some factors include how Chechen authorities never identified the Imam who supposedly
indoctrinated the young men, how the men were not beaten the way that most extremist suspects
are in Chechnya. They were also given regular meals and were permitted to pray. Most
significantly, Kadyrov never explained what the actual evidence was which suggested the young
men’s guilt. This implications of this are twofold since if such evidence doesn’t exist is confirms
that this move was a public relations maneuver and if it does, Kadyrov willingly ignored the
intent to commit an act of terrorism, something which is technically illegal under Russian
Criminal Code.
Explanations for the Decrease in Insurgent Activities
If Kadyrov’s policies are so risky and apt to pose discontent, the question remains as to
why his policies appear to be so effective in the short-term. One explanation of the decrease in
terrorist attacks in Chechnya is a shift in how Chechen authorities defined terrorism. Semantics
play a significant role in defining the number of attacks since the end of the “counterterrorism
operations.” In 2006, the Russian State Duma narrowed the definition of “terrorism.” A
Professor from Rostov-na-Donu points out that this has since caused the registered number of
acts of terrorism to fall sharply, while the number of “crimes of a terrorist nature” rose. Issa
64
Liz Fuller, “Has Chechen Republic Head Laid Himself Open To Criminal Charge?”
Radio Free Europe, November 9, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/chechnya-kadyrovassassination-plot-clemency/27353759.html.
38
Kostoyev, a legal adviser to the Federation Council chairman also raised awareness to how most
killings of police officers in the Northern Caucasus are “acts of terrorism” but are not formally
classified as such in reports.65
In addition to a change in the formal definition of terrorism, transparency has
significantly declined in recent years under Kadyrov in what could potentially explain why terror
levels have risen in surrounding regions while plummeting in Chechnya. As political scientist
Stanislav Belkovskii states, “In fact, nobody knows what is now going on in Chechnya.
Kadyrov’s people monopolized the sphere of administration in the republic and the federal center
is not only not involved in the process of administration, but also does not receive any
information about the real state of affairs…”66
The lack of transparency may have even seeped into less biased assessments. Sources of
data for determining statistics such as death rates often rely on media reports which are subject to
censorship, particularly in the case of Chechnya. Even former President Medvedev has
questioned the reliability of such reports. While at a meeting of police and security officials in
the North Caucasus Federal district on November 19, 2010, he said that crime had increased and
solving rates had declined but that “we cannot believe the statistics because they are often
nonsense.” 67 The Director of the FSB Aleksandr Bortnikov, however, challenged the president
and asserted that terrorist activity had declined. Nonetheless, he agreed that the situation was
“complicated” and “required additional measures” in terms of both security and economic
development.68
65
“Defining 'Terrorism' In the North Caucasus,” Radio Free Europe, October 31, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Defining_Terrorism_In_The_North_Caucasus/2206483.html.
66
Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Networks, Location 1083.
67
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 4.
68
Ibid., 6.
39
The Insurgency has Spread to Bordering Regions
Various studies trace how as violence decreased in Chechnya after the Second Chechen
War, conflict in the Northern Caucasus as a whole intensified. While some of this may be
explained by lessening in Chechnya’s transparency, analysists suggest that rebels sought relief
by retreating to surrounding areas. By 2008, segments of the Chechen leadership was expanding
its military aims into the region surrounding Chechnya. By 2009, Ingushetia and Dagestan were
particularly affected with an upsurge in violence against police, military and political figures,
and many experts at the time predicted wider and deeper conflicts in the future.69
Specifically, according to the Russian Federation, violent incidents in Chechnya
significantly decline in 2010 from the previous year, from 452 in 2009 to 241 in the first eleven
months of 2010. Meanwhile, incidents in Dagestan increased from 384 in 2009 to 412 in 2010.
In Kabardino-Balkaria incidents increased from 70 to 147. Finally, in Stavropol, incidents
increased from 6 to 11.70
Insurgents are Leaving Chechnya for Iraq and Syria
The Kremlin has confirmed an increase in contacts between the Islamic State and
underground terrorist cells in the North Caucasus. While the extent of this is unclear, groups of
Chechen separatists have left for other conflicts in the past after the Second Chechen War was
lost. One ongoing example of this may be found in Ukraine. The Dzhokhar Dudayev
international peacekeeping battalion is an example of such fighting. The group came back into
light last year when Isa Munayev, the commander of the group, died near Debaltseye on
69
John O’Loughlin and Frank D.W. Witmer, “The Diffusion of Violence in the North
Caucasus of Russia, 1999–2010,” Environment and Planning A 44 no. 10 (2010): 2379-2396,
accessed October 10, 2015, DOI:10.1068/a44366.
70
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 4.
40
February 1 while leading his men into the front lines. His detachment consisted of troops from
the North Caucasus, as well as the South Caucasus, who wished to fight against the Russian
backed separatists. Fitting in line with previously discussed motives of mobilized insurgents,
Munayev has lost both his father and daughter in the Chechen war and was living in Denmark
when he decided to fight in Ukraine. He was an ideological separatist who gained experience as
a brigadier general in the separatist army, a minister in the separatist government, and as a
military commandant of Grozny. His chosen successor, Adam Osmayev, was charged with a
planned assassination attempt against Putin.71 His example is one of many of Chechens
avenging wronged family members by engaging in armed conflict against the Russian
Federation.
The greater threat is posed by those Chechen militants returning to the North Caucasus
from Syria. The chief of the Russian Security Council suggested that the Islamic State is starting
to gain influence in Russia and that those who return to Russia could “bring sophisticated
terrorist skills to our lands, including the creation of groups calling themselves the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant, which does not have anything to do with Islam.”72
Some Russian sources suggest that this movement is actually purposely coordinated by
Russian authorities. According to investigations by Milashina of Novaya Gazeta, the FSB even
aides in moving extremists out of Chechnya and Dagestan into Syria in order to reduce the
terrorist burden within Russia itself. According to the investigation, one percent of Novosasitili,
71
Sukhov, “Chechnya’s Growing Image Problem.”
Joanna Paraszczuk, “Russia Unveils New Post To Wage 'War On IS,'” Radio Free
Europe, March 13, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-isis-islamic-state/26899257.html.
72
41
a village in Dagestan, has been “funneled” into the conflict in Syria and Iraq causing violence to
dramatically decrease.73
The Successes and Failures of the Chechenized Security Forces in a Political Context
The limitations and long term risks of Chechen security initiatives are not limited to the
Kadyrovtsy. From a political standpoint, Chechenization has failed to achieve its original goal.
Rather than bringing a Russian region back to stability, it has created “a separatist Chechnya
under the Russian flag” in which both the Putin and Kadyrov regimes can only superficially
claim to have achieved its goals. As a result, many problems that led to the Russo-Chechen
conflict remain unresolved. Scholars such as Richard Sakwa argue that the Russian Federation’s
willingness to rely on a “blatantly authoritarian leader” in Chechnya is a sign of the clear
“fragility of the dualism of the Russian state.” Since Chechnya’s virtually independent regional
system has little in common with the federal system that it is supposedly operating under, no true
political conclusion was ever reached in the Chechen conflict.74
Furthermore, as many scholars point out, Chechenization is heavily dependent on its
central players. As Richard Sakwa puts it, “its fate is defined by the struggle between the
factions at the center.”75 Policy towards Chechnya has often been a point of contention within
Moscow. Although Putin refrains from offering comments specifically regarding Kadyrov, he
present him with various award medals which opponents believe that he has not earned.
Kadyrov, on the other hand, is very open regarding his loyalty to Putin stating, “Let clarify. I’m
73
Jeremy Bender, “Russia’s War against Terrorism isn’t What it Seems,” Business
Insider, August 24, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/russias-war-on-terror-not-what-itseems-2015-8.
74
Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus,” 611.
75
Ibid., 601.
42
not a president’s man. I’m not an FSB, interior ministry, GRU or prosecutor general’s office
man. I’m Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s man.”76
Putin and Kadyrov’s mutual dependence has been illustrated after Kadyrov resigned from
the presidency in early March. Given Kadyrov’s claims that he would only return as leader of
Chechnya if it was the will of the Russian president, it appears that the move was simply a power
play. Although this dual state of power implies a degree of stability between the demands of
regional and federal governments, the lack of an available successor reveals the instability that
could arise if either Kadyrov or Putin were to fall out of power. A state of tension was also
revealed as Putin asserted the need for Chechnya to obey federal laws as well as to tone down
threatening rhetoric against political opponents, which Putin described as being detrimental to
the stability of the region.
Clashes between Russian Federation and Chechen Security Forces and Assassinations
These violations of federal law and threatening rhetoric have increased in frequency as
Kadyrov has asserted his worth to the kremlin. One of the most alarming forms of disobedience
is his hostility towards federal and regional security forces. This is something that he exhibited
since his earliest years in power. In January 2005, 150 of his Kadyrovtsy crossed into Dagestan
where they assaulted Khasavyourt policemen who had been holding Kadyrov’s sister after her
and her entourage failed to produce documents. This event was significant since it violated
Federal law for the sake of personal vendetta. Similarly, in September 2006, Kadyrov threatened
to deploy Kadyrovtsy if the local authorities didn’t intervene when anti-Chechen riots emerged in
Kondopoga.
76
Ibid., 608.
43
In addition to posing a direct challenge to the federal leadership, Chechnya’s hostilities
towards outside security apparatuses present a point of weakness in the event of countering a
major terrorist threat. In the mid-2000s, some scholars were pointing to the inability for the
Russian Ministry of the Interior and regional police units of the North Caucasus to coordinate in
combatting the terrorist threat. In 2004, several large-scale attacks on Russian law enforcement
personnel, the most notable being in Nazran and Grozny, illustrated the inability of the Russian
military and law enforcement to coordinate with one another.77 In May 2009, Kadyrov
announced that no Chechens would be conscripted into the Russian armed forces for a year,
further revealing the regime’s disregard for federal law.78
Concerns about Chechnya’s disregard for federal law and hostility towards outside
security forces have reemerged in the last year. After a Chechen named Dzhambulat Dadayev
was suspected of having committed a crime in Stavropol Krai he was pursued to Grozny where
he was gunned down by Stavropol police and personnel from the Federal Interior Ministry’s
Temporary Operative Grouping of Organs and Sub-Units in Chechnya. In response, Kadyrov
ordered Chechen security forces to “shoot to kill” if non-Chechen police entered Chechnya
without notification. Although the Russian Interior Ministry responded with a criticism of
Kadyrov’s statements, that was the limit of the Kremlin’s response.79
In December 2015, Kadyrov mobilized the Interior Ministry spetsnaz twice within a 24
hour span, for antiterrorism drills aimed at preparing the spetsnaz to repel terrorist attacks
operating individually or in small groups. The problem with these drills is that Kadyrov does not
77
Moore, “Combating Terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan,” 313.
Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus,” 611.
79
“Russian Interior Ministry Slams Kadyrov’s 'Shoot-To-Kill' Remark,” Radio Free
Europe, May 23, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/kadyrov-authorizes-shooting-of-securityoustide-chechnya/26974169.html.
78
44
formally have the power to give these forces orders, making the moves, according to State Duma
Defense and Security Committee Deputy Chairman Frants Klintsevich, illegal.80
It is most likely that these drills were conducted in order to create the perception that
Kadyrov is the most capable of deflecting terrorist threats. This is culturally significant given
Russia’s affinity for strong leadership in combatting threats to the population and how Kadyrov’s
continued leadership is necessary for stability in the region. In other words, Kadyrov’s cult of
personality served in feeding into the concept that only strong leadership can combat terrorism
ant that “too much democracy” only contributes to the disorder of the region.81
These clashes are not limited to local law enforcement and many of Kadyrov’s enemies
have been killed in extrajudicial assassinations. A former bodyguard of Kadyrov’s father and the
commander of the Gorets detachment, Movladi Baisarov accused Kadyrov of seizing power and
of wanting “everyone to be subordinate and subservient to him” to Moscow News in October
2006. Shortly thereafter, Kadyrov ordered that the highlander detachment be dissolved and
disarmed. The following month Baisarov was shot dead by forces of the Chechen Ministry of
Internal Affairs, which are under Kadyrov’s control in Moscow.
Another target was Umar Israilov, a former separatists who worked under Kadyrov and
described how Kadyrov would orchestrate kidnappings and torture between 2003 and 2005.
According to Israilov, he would sometimes visit and personally torture prisoners. In 2009
Israilov was shot and killed in Vienna.82 Although three of the four Chechens charged with her
murder were given lengthy prison sentences, the fourth escaped to Chechnya where he was never
80
Fuller, “Is Chechen Stability Tenable or Deceptive.”
Moore, “Combating Terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan,” 314.
82
“13 Takeaways.”
81
45
handed over to Russian authorities. Kadyrov also failed to appear as a witness in the trial after
being summoned to Vienna.83
On October 7, 2006, a notorious assassination occurred when Anna Politkovskaya was
killed in the entryway of her Moscow apartment. Politkovskaya interviewed Kadyrov in 2004
and presented him in a less than favorable light. The reporter continued her criticism of Kadyrov
in the years leading up to her death, citing his human rights abuses.84 Just two days before, on
Kadyrov’s birthday, she called Kadyrov “a Stalin of our times” and “coward, armed to the teeth,
who sits surrounded by bodyguards” while speaking on Radio Svoboda and discussed her goals
to inspire a criminal case against Kadyrov. In 2004, Kadyrov told the journalist, “You have
come between Chechens. You are an enemy. You are worse than Basayev.”85 Technically,
those responsible for her murder were never found and Kadyrov was never questioned regarding
her death.86
In 2009, Memorial, a Russian historical and civil rights group, employee was kidnapped
in Grozny. Natalia Estemirova’s body was later found and she had been shot in the head and
chest. Oleg Orlov fervently blamed Kadyrov stating, “I know who is guilty of Estemirova’s
slaying… His name is Ramzan Kadyrov. He threatened Natalia, insulted her, and considered her
his personal enemy.”87 While investigators never determined the perpetrators, her body was
dumped on the main road, making it clear that her death was meant to send a message.88
83
Sukhov, “Chechnya’s Growing Image Problem.”
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 662.
85
“13 Takeaways.”
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Luke Harding, “Award-Winning Human Rights Campaigner Murdered in Chechnya,”
The Guardian, July 15, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/15/chechnya-nataliaestemirova-murdered.
84
46
One such clash occurred with Sulim Yamadayev, who was formerly discussed as the
former commander of the Vostok battalion, had been suspected of being responsible for the
assassination of his father.89 After Yamadayev was dismissed from the Vostok battalion, he fled
to Dubai where he was shot in March 2009. Authorities claimed that one of the assassins said
that his murder weapon was acquired from the guard of the first cousin of Kadyrov, Adam
Delimkhanov, who had served as Chechen deputy prime minister in 2006-2007 and was serving
as a United Russia Duma deputy. Kadyrov has also been tied to a series of deaths including the
murder of Movladi Baisarov, the head of an FSB-staffed special operations units and other
counter-balancing forces to Kadyrov.90
Mysterious political assassinations continue to be associated with Kadyrov and his
security forces. On February 27, 2015, outspoken opposition leader and former Deputy Prime
Minister Boris Nemtsov was assassinated near the Kremlin. Nemtsov had routinely criticized
Kadyrov and the unwillingness of Russian law enforcement to do anything about his actions.
These personal criticisms led to Kadyrov telling Newsweek that “All those who criticize Putin
are subhuman, and are my personal enemies. As long as Putin supports me, I can do anything,
Allah Akbar!” Although Moscow’s investigation failed to reveal who ordered his killing or why,
investigators found that he was shot by Zaur Dadaev, the former deputy head of a battalion
controlled by Kadyrov. Furthermore, the investigator ignored requests from Nemtsov’s lawyers
to question Kadyrov since Kadyrov defended Dadaev as a Russian patriot.91 Chechnya’s
89
Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus,” 611.
Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus,” 611.
91
“Russia and Chechnya: Putin’s Chechen Enforcer,” The Economist, February 6, 2016,
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21690046-alarming-world-ramzan-kadyrov-putinschechen-enforcer.
90
47
unwillingness to compromise is also illustrated by reports that investigators were unable to
question one suspect after he fled to Chechnya.92
Over time, Kadyrov’s lack of inhibitions has attracted more and more unwanted attention
for the Kremlin. In early 2016, he called liberal opponents “vile jackals” and “enemies of the
people.”93 In an article for Izvestia Kadyrov offered psychiatric treatment to opponents to
President Putin. Just before the one year anniversary of the murder of Boris Nemstov by a
member of Kadyrov’s security forces, Kadyrov posted an ominous video on his Instagram page.
In the video former Prime Minister Mikail Kasyanov was pictured in the crosshairs of a sniper
rifle. In the comments section, Mr. Kadyrov wrote that “Kasyanov is in Strasbourg to get money
for the opposition. Whoever still doesn’t get it, will.”94 He also used the occasion to criticize
American democracy when Instagram pulled the video, stating “As soon as I said a few words
about the U.S. hellhounds, they have deleted my post on Instagram… Here you have it, the
celebrated American freedom of speech.”95
It is not surprising that opposition figures were alarmed by his comments, it seems,
however, that he has gone too far for independent figures this time. Ella Panfilova, a human
rights overseer in the Kremlin, said that that Kadyrov should be examined for signs of
“extremism.” The Levada Centre found that 60 percent of Russians deemed the recent rhetoric
of Kadyrov as unacceptable. Similarly, a politician from Krasnoyarsk called Mr. Kadyrov a
92
Neil MacFarquhar, “Chechen Leader’s Advice on Women: Lock Them In,” New York
Times, May 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/world/europe/chechen-leadersadvice-on-women-lock-them-in.html?partner=bloomberg.
93
“Russia and Chechnya: Putin’s Chechen Enforcer.”
94
Ibid.
95
Neil MacFarquhar, “Menacing Video Posted by Chechen Leader Alarms Critics of
Putin in Russia,” New York Times, February 1, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/world/europe/menacing-video-posted-by-chechen-leaderalarms-critics-of-putin-in-russia.html?_r=0.
48
disgrace to Russia on his Facebook, resulting in a barrage of threatening calls from Chechnya
and Senchenko’s subsequent apology.96
While not necessarily posing the existential threat of an insurgency, the negative attention
attracted by Kadyrov, poses the threat that Putin will reassess his relationship with Kadyrov. If
Putin decides to replace Kadyrov, whose source of power rests on his Kadyrovtsy, he may
provoke another war in the North Caucasus, a problematic situation given that Russia is already
spread thin as a result of conflicts such as that in Crimea and Syria. However, Putin may lose
support from Russian politicians and, more importantly, Russian security forces outside of
Chechnya who face threats from Kadyrov.
Conclusion
Although Chechnya had been significantly restored after two wars and appears to have
been transformed, the current security apparatus is strong but threatens stability in the region as it
carries out abusive practices. The Kadyrovtsy continues to foster resentment against the Chechen
government, something which will likely be exacerbated as Kadyrov continues to rely on brutal
practices in order to weed out real and imagined terrorist threats with the growing threat of IS.
Furthermore, Kadyrov’s blatant disregard for Federal law has only intensified throughout the
years, placing Putin in a precarious position. This, in combination with economic and
recruitment efforts of Islamic groups, which will be discussed in proceeding chapters, provide
for a combination of factors which makes Chechnya vulnerable to a renewed insurgency.
96
“Russia and Chechnya: Putin’s Chechen Enforcer.”
49
CHAPTER 2
THE CHECHEN ECONOMY
A Façade of Success and a Threat to Stability
One of the most significant components of maintaining stability in Chechnya is economic
reconstruction. Although one may compare current pictures of the Chechen capital Grozny to its
post war state and see a dramatic transformation, the massive amounts of funding allocated to the
Northern Caucasus generates significant controversy. In addition to the grim reality that the
majority of the North Caucasus budget is subsidized by the Federal budget, corruption runs
rampant, leading a small group of elites to prosper while others struggle to secure desperately
needed jobs and public services.
Due to the distinctive personality of President Ramzan Kadyrov and social structures
based on teips, a Chechen tribal or clan organization based on ancestry, the financial stability of
Chechnya presents its own unique dilemmas. Currently, Chechnya’s youth population is
swelling at rates that far exceed its economic growth, threatening to worsen its unemployment
rate which already hoovers at 20 percent. These problems could threaten the stability of
Chechnya itself and could have a ripple effect on other dimensions of security in the region and
the Russian Federation as a whole. Kadyrov does little to hide his federally funded wealth and
frequently shows off extravagant purchases ranging from his collection of mansions to visits
from western celebrities. Furthermore, clan structures and personal connections play a
significant role in determining success in this economic system, creating social stratification.
These combined factors are alarming when considering that youth bulges and unemployment,
alongside the awareness of relative deprivation, are frequently cited as precursors of collective
50
political violence.97 Through the analysis of Chechnya’s economy and spending, it is clear that
Chechnya will face economic challenges that could have particularly adverse effects on its youth,
lending to possibilities of political violence.
A Beacon of Success?
In order to assess the current implications of Chechnya’s economy, it is necessary to
provide a point of comparison to its state immediately following the Chechen Wars. In May
2004, President Vladimir visited what remained of Grozny for the funeral of Akhmad Kadyrov,
the former president of Chechnya who had been assassinated by Chechen separatists, and was
shocked by the scenes of devastation. Given the absolute destruction inflicted on Grozny and
other major urban centers in Chechnya, it is not surprising that economic rehabilitation has
emerged as a component in combating separatists and jihadists in Chechnya. More than 154,000
houses and apartments in municipal buildings in Chechnya were fully or partially destroyed.
The extent of completely ruined buildings stretched for over 391,000 square meters, with
376,770 in Grozny, which absorbed the bulk of devastation. Regarding places of residence, 70
percent of all apartments and homes in the city were destroyed. Not surprisingly, Chechnya
became Russia’s weakest economic region with little prospect due to its decimated industries and
infrastructure.98 Due to the extent of damage, Chechnya faced a long uphill battle to reach full
economic recovery. Nonetheless, Chechnya made substantial strides towards reconstruction
under a coordinated effort between Russian and local Chechen leadership.
97
Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Counsel on
Foreign Relations, April, 27, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civilconflicts/p13093#p1.
98
Basnukaev, “Reconstruction in Chechnya,” 76.
51
In 2015, a little over a decade after Putin’s visit, Chechnya’s economy minister Muslim
Khuchiyev insisted that the Chechen capital of Grozny was a beacon of success in comparison
with the rest of Russia.99 At first glance, there is little reason to question his claims. Currently,
the landscape of Grozny showcases the Grozny-city towers, a modern skyscraper complex. The
main street of Grozny, which has supposedly been renamed Putin Avenue as a sign of gratitude
for the president’s contributions for aiding in the rebuilding of the city, presents those who can
afford it with choices of cafes, designer clothing shops, and sushi bars. Khuchiyev’s claims
regarding the city were shared by reporters who saw the destruction of the first two wars and
often referred to the reconstructed city as unrecognizable.
In addition to the cosmetic transformation of Grozny, the Chechen Finance Minister
presented statistics that paint a picture of success. He argued that Chechnya is creating a
business friendly environment with private investment accounting for 79 percent of fixed asset
investment in 2014.100 He also described a select few private industries as success stories with
his prized example being an advanced greenhouse structure in Russia, Rodina Farm. The
unemployment rate has dramatically declined since the emergence of President Ramzan
Kadyrov. When Kadyrov came to power, the region was facing a 67.7 percent rate of
unemployment.101 In 2014, the most recent public figures, the rate was 21.5 percent.102 While
the validity of these numbers is questionable given the limited oversight over Chechnya, the
figures are significant gains in relative terms.
99
Kathrine Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown,” Financial
Times, April 28, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8233d33c-ecd0-11e4-a81a00144feab7de.html#axzz41D2zNlYu.
100
Ibid.
101
“Chechnya, Republic of- Unemployment Rate,” World Data Atlas, accessed March 3,
2016, http://knoema.com/atlas/Russian-Federation/Chechnya-Republic-of/Unemployment-rate.
102
Ibid.
52
Federal Funding of Chechnya: The Cost of Kadyrov’s Loyalty
Although Chechnya may appear to be in an improved and stable economic position,
analysis of other factors suggests otherwise. This stability is based on a cycle of dependence and
weakened by systematic corruption. Between 2001 and 2014, 464 million rubles were allocated
from the budget of the Russian Federation to Chechnya in the form of subsidies, subventions,
and grants.103 This sum that does not even include money allocated to rebuilding Chechnya
following the Chechen Wars.
These staggering numbers serve as a significant drain on the budget of Russia’s federal
budget. However, there are a variety of factors used to justify Chechnya’s and the rest of the
North Caucasus current dependence on federal subsidies. Some historians point out that the
Northern Caucasus have long been dependent on funding from the central government. Prior to
the collapse of the Soviet Union, over fifty percent of the region’s budget was dependent on
subsidies from the Federal government.104 Even during the short-lived Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria, President Dudayev accepted Russian funds that continued to trickle into the republic
through sources such as pensions while refusing to pay taxes owed to the Russian federal
government. This history of dependence suggests that dependence on Moscow is contingent on
factors beyond that of the faulty leadership of Kadyrov.
Some sources also point out that other districts receive far more funding than Chechnya,
and other regions of the North Caucasus. In 2010, for example, the Volga Federal District
received 303 billion rubles, the Siberian Federal District received 240 billion rubles, and the Far
Eastern Federal District received 196 billion rubles. Chechnya, meanwhile, received 13.1 billion
103
“13 Takeaways.”
Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace. (Portland,
OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 7.
104
53
of the total of 156 billion rubles for the North Caucasus Federal District. In terms of spending
per capita, the North Caucasus received less in subsidies than geographically larger, less densely
populations in the Far East.105 Furthermore, the level of subsidies as a percentage of budget
spending had decreased. While less dramatic of an improvement than other countries, Chechnya
decreased its level of subsidies from 95 percent in 2008 to about 90 percent in 2013.106 The most
recent figures place subsidies at 85 percent of its budget.
These figures suggest a positive picture. From an alternative perceptive, however, one
may see that the North Caucasus continues to lag behind the rest of Russia. The total amount
that Moscow is contributing to Chechnya, and the rest of the Northern Caucasus Federal District,
is rising faster than the national average. This is a cause for concern given Russia’s shrinking
economy. In 2013, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said, without specifying the time period,
that the total subsidies has risen by 20 percent as a whole in comparison to a 5 percent increase
for Russia as a whole. Despite all of this spending, Kadyrov routinely complains that current
subsidies are not enough, stating “We do have complaints. We are in debt, we have taken out
loans, and whatever was possible.”107
Early Concerns and Successes
Despite these points of comparison, socio-economic issues and concerns about corruption
have emerged as a point of focus since even before the “Counterterrorism Operations,” otherwise
known as the Second Chechen War, which came to a close in 2009. In 2004, a group of Chechen
and Ingush separatists took over a thousand people hostage in a North Ossetia school, resulting
105
“North Caucasus Leaders Reject Criticism of Budget Spending,” Radio Free Europe,
August 23, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/north-caucasus-budget-spending/25083917.html.
106
“North Caucasus Leaders Reject Criticism of Budget Spending.”
107
“13 Takeaways.”
54
in the death of nearly 400, many of which were children. In response, Putin announced a variety
of administrative changes in the Caucasus, including the creation of a commission for
coordinating federal powers within the North Caucasian Federal District. In addition to being
tasked with more direct measures of counterterrorism, the committee was assigned to assess the
reasons for Chechnya’s state of deprivation and poverty. The Kozak Commission, headed by
Dmitry Kozak, determined that the region was plagued by corruption, poverty, economic
stagnation, and lack of investment. Furthermore, it predicted that these factors would result in an
increase in radicalism.108
In some respects, Putin and Kadyrov were able to utilize the factors of corruption,
poverty, and stagnation to their advantage in the building of Chechen security forces and
stemming violence from separatists. Between 2003 and 2006, Kadyrov advocated a campaign
for amnesty for former rebel fighters wishing to switch sides and join the Chechen police and
militia. Service in this paramilitary was seen as a desirable alternative to economic insecurity.
An average member of the force could earn the equivalent of $500 a month, a sum that could be
invaluable to supporting a Chechen family, which is often large.109 It even presented the
incentive of combat benefits and military pensions under the “Veterans of the Resistance” fund.
This was particularly appealing to young men who grew up during the first war, and thus held no
formal education and no skill sets beyond handling weapons. In addition to gaining financial
security, participating in the security force could help avoid years of trial and imprisonment.110
Immediately following the First Chechen War, this stream of funding seemed particularly
108
Mark Galeotti and Neil Robinson, Politics of Security in Modern Russia, (Burlington:
Routledge, 2006), 100.
109
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 670.
110
Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency,” 106.
55
enticing in comparison to the sporadic funding of separatists and foreign religious extremists.111
The extent of employment for security forces is illustrated by the payroll for the Kadyrovtsy
forces which came to at least $72 million in 2005.112
While this set-up was an ingenious way to win back war weary and disillusioned
separatist fighters, at least from a short-term perspective, the Russian government recognized the
importance of addressing widespread deprivation in the Chechen Republic. At the conclusion of
the Antiterrorism Operation in Chechnya in 2009, Medvedev addressed the Federal Assembly.
He asked for an invigorated socioeconomic development effort in the North Caucasus, a strategy
which was formally implemented in September, 2010. The outlined goals included the
development of the area until 2025 through investments in agriculture, stimulation of the tourism
industry, the construction of health resorts, recovery and further development of energy and
mining, and the development of light industry.113 The strategy projected an ideal scenario by
which wages would increase 250 percent and unemployment would decrease by 70 percent by
2025.114
In January 2010, Moscow also created a North Caucasus Federal District with a capital in
Pyatigorsk in the Stavropol region and Alexander Khloponin as head of the body. His
appointment was significant since he had no experience with the kind of security structures relied
upon by Kadyrov, and he was granted the power to dismiss the head of any federal agency in the
region. Medvedev urged for the use of “primarily economic methods” over coercive ones.
These changes also formally required regional leaders to communicate with the federal
111
Russel, “The Indigenous Key,” 670.
Ibid.
113
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 7.
114
Ibid., 7.
112
56
authorities through the body, a move which was likely aimed at Kadyrov since he enjoyed the
most direct access. A comment by Medvedev that “a financial manager is needed, as opposed to
just a hard man also appeared to be directed at Kadyrov.”115 Lack of oversight and
accountability, however, has prevented the goals from being realized.
Kadyrov and Chechnya’s Bloated Bureaucracy
As both president and prime minister, Medvedev would address the money drain posed
by the Northern Caucasus, particularly in the case of Chechnya. Several North Caucasian
leaders defended how they spent their vast amount of government subsidies to Medvedev in
2013. This came after Medvedev asked them to reallocate budget funds in order to fulfill
priority tasks set forth by President Putin in May 2012. According to Medvedev, while speaking
at a session on development of the North Caucasus Federal District, the region failed to meet any
of the outlined goals. This included increasing public-sector salaries which remained 40 percent
below the national average.116
The Finance minister Anton Siluanov drew attention to the bloated bureaucracy of the
republics. While the Russian average was 1.8 government officials per 1,000 inhabitants, it is
4.6 in Ingushetia, 3.5 in Chechnya, and 2.1 for the North Caucasus Federal District as a whole.
Chechnya, Siluanov pointed out, had the highest number of government cars, which amounted to
half the cars in the North Caucasus Federal District. Both Ingushetia and Chechnya contested
the figures as inaccurate and Kadyrov’s press spokesman Alvi Karimov argued that Kadyrov is
constantly improving government efficiency and had merged three ministries as recently as
several months before. What he did not mention, however, was that one of these three ministries
115
116
Sawka, “The Revenge of the Caucasus,” 614.
“North Caucasus Leaders Reject Criticism of Budget Spending.”
57
was created only two months before the merge. He also argued that the true ratio of government
officials to the population was half that of other regions.117
Coercive Sources of Revenue and Kadyrov’s Unexplained Personal Wealth
Following the Russo-Chechen wars, corruption was prevalent but the federal authorities
practiced greater oversight. Therefore, the majority of funding was allocated to the
reconstruction of homes, schools, hospitals, roads, and support for the unemployed.118
Overtime, however, Kadyrov has managed to gain greater control over the allocation of such
funding while concurrently decreasing transparency, making it difficult to access where much of
Chechnya’s funding is going. Currently, Chechnya receives its funding from Moscow
authorities in a way that is unique from other regions. While other regions must disclose what
funds they have available from their own regional budgets when determining federal subsidies,
Chechnya directly receives money from Moscow on a project-by-project basis. When describing
the purpose behind this system, a senior official in the North Caucasus Federal District explained
it as “a political decision—to provide funding required to fully restore the Republic from zero.
The funding scheme was as follows: huge amounts of federal monies were granted simply on the
applications submitted by the leaders of the Chechen Republic. Neither the Finance Ministry nor
the Court of Auditors did anything to prevent this scheme.”119
This lack of transparency is exacerbated by Kadyrov’s acquisitions of alternative funds in
addition to those allocated by Moscow. Kadyrov has brought about sizeable investments from
wealthy Chechen diaspora families and from investments from abroad, the most notable being
117
Ibid.
Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown.”
119
Basnukaev, “Reconstruction in Chechnya,” 78.
118
58
from a United Arab Emirates investor courted by Kadyrov.120 Over the years Kadyrov has
combined federal and foreign contributions with that from the Akhmad Kadyrov Fund in order to
rebuild Chechen infrastructure.
The Akhmad Kadyrov Fund provides an even safer avenue for embezzlement since it is
based on “voluntary” contribution. In reality, all of those who work in the public sector are
expected to contribute to what has been described as “an entire parallel tax system” by Varvara
Pakhomenko, an analyst at the International Crisis Group.121 Funds are even deducted from
social security payments such as maternity bonuses.122 How the money collected by this
foundation is spent is an even greater mystery than funds allocated by the federal government.
The most recent publication on this data was issued in 2013 and claimed that there were 1.45
million rubles in its accounts. Other information concerning the amount in the account or any
information concerning the foundation’s revenue is unavailable in public sources.123
One potential source of expenditures is Kadyrov himself. While it is doubtful that
Kadyrov is the only Russian leader skimming reconstruction funds, he is unique in that rather
than making an effort to conceal his unexplained personal wealth, he flaunts it. Kadyrov has
hosted a variety of rock concerts, paid 2 million euros for Mike Tyson to visit Chechnya, paid
Diego Maradona 1 million euros to play in a soccer match with him, and paid actress Hilary
Swank 1 million euros to fly to Grozny and wish him a happy birthday.124,125 Kadyrov himself
owns a fleet of Porsche and Ferrari sports cars and several mansions. He also has his own
120
Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown.”
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
“13 Takeaways.”
124
Russel, “The Indigenous Key, 670.
125
“13 Takeaways.”
121
59
private zoo and valuable racehorses. For his 35th birthday in 2011 he held a large celebration,
which included a troupe of foreign acrobats and a performance by the British violinist VanessaMae.126 When he was asked about where his wealth comes from by journalists, Kadyrov
responded “from Allah” with a laugh.127
In addition to spending money for personal pleasure and acquisition of personal property,
he also has a notable habit of flaunting his wealth through lavish gifts. When making high
profile appearances, he often hands out $100 and 1000 ruble bills to attendees. He is also known
for giving lavish gifts such as a 100,000 euro watch that he gave to the stylist Sergey Zverev and
a Porsche Cayenne car worth 250,000 euros which he gave to the television host Yana
Rudkovskaya.128
In 2011, Kadyrov’s salary was about 4,105,876 rubles, according to official documents.
At the time, this was the equivalent of $135,000. Such an annual salary obviously does not begin
to cover the aforementioned expenses. As a citizen of Grozny said in an interview with Radio
Free Europe when they were visiting one of Kadyrov’s compounds, “I don’t know what exact
salary they have, but I know that to build such houses, to buy the luxury cars which they drive, to
have the gold and diamonds for their women, they need to have a huge salary. If [Kadyrov] has
an income of only 4 million rubles, how can he give people all the gifts that he does?"129 While
126
Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Anger Grows over Chechnya Subsidies,” New York
Times, October 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/europe/chechnyas-costs-stiranger-as-russia-approaches-elections.html?_r=0.
127
Ibid.
128
“13 Takeaways.”
129
“Lion Tamers Are Tax Deductible (Or, Ramzan Kadyrov's Gross Income),” Radio
Free Europe, May 14, 2012,
http://www.rferl.org/content/ramzan_kadyrov_wealth_taxes_2011/24580386.html.
60
they may not reap the benefits of Kadyrov’s immediate family, members of Kadyrov’s teip also
benefit from his corrupt handling of Chechen funding.
Teips, Economic Inequality, and Economic Coercion
What makes Chechen corruption unique is its social structure based on the teip, “a clan
identified based on common decent and/or geographical region of origin.”130 Some scholars
such as Tomas Smid and Miroslav Mares assert that, with the exception of more isolated
mountainous regions, contemporary clans in Chechnya have limited links with the traditional
teips of their ancestors. This is mostly due to urbanization and modernization diminishing their
value. Instead, they have been replaced by other looser forms of social organizations of
political, criminal, and paramilitary groups.131 Nonetheless, teips can still play a significant role
in terms of allocating economic resources.
Since aid to Chechnya runs through Kadyrov, provisions of material assistance and
positions of power are often allocated in less than socially just ways and Benoi, Kadyrov’s clan,
has formed a new and powerful political elite. His nephew Islam Kadyrov heads the Executive
Office of the Head of Chechnya, his cousin Abubakar Edelgeriev serves as Chechen Prime
Minister, his sister Zulay Kadyrova serves as the deputy head of the Administration of the
President of the Republic, his other sister Zargan Kadyrova oversees preschool education and his
cousin Adam Delimkhanov is a current deputy of the Russian Federation Duma from Kadyrov’s
party. Kadyrov has gone so far as to call Delimkhanov his successor. 132 Although individuals
130
Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya,” 42.
Šmíd and Mareš, “Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 650.
132
“13 Takeaways.”
131
61
from outside of Benoi are able to reach positions of power, an example being Grozny Muslim
Khuchiev, such men are isolated in their positions.133
In addition to ensuring loyalty in the highest ranks and ensuring economic opportunity
for those within his teip, inclusive structure allows Kadyrov to economically punish those who
oppose him. For example, after the release of a Russian documentary on the allegations of
corruption and human rights abuses in Chechnya, Kadyrov took economic reprisals against those
who spoke against him. The mother of a former police officer who told stories of torture and
other crimes committed by Chechen special police task forces and others loyal to the Chechen
president was fired from a job. The reasons were not even concealed and she was told that it was
due to her son’s appearance in the film.134
The Benefits to Systematic Corruption and Long-term Threats
Some experts cite the short-term benefits of such corruption when analyzing the Chechen
economy. According to Yuliya G. Zabyelina’s study on how corruption has shaped the
reconstruction of Chechnya, corruption is a “nature response to social welfare shortages and the
Chechen bureaucratic system’s overall ineptitude.”135 This is because history of informal
practices to obtain scarce resources in Chechen society “made it possible to make the inefficient
system of state administration function.”136 As previously discussed, past failed leadership of the
region led to warlords taking control of Chechnya in the 1990s. Subsequently, citizens had to
systematically engage in corrupt exchanges as instruments of survival. Black market purchases
133
Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya,” 42.
Alexei Druzhinin, “Stars of Russian Documentary About Chechen Strongman Face
Reprisals, Say Filmmakers,” The Moscow Times, June 2, 2015,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/stars-of-russian-documentary-about-chechenstrongman-face-reprisals-say-filmmakers/522911.html.
135
Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya,” 41.
136
Ibid., 41.
134
62
of goods and services, as well as political favors, were commonplace. According to Zabyelina,
some of these corrupt practices already existed and simply shifted under Putin and former
Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov.137 In other words, it was easier to build onto preexisting
structures in the short term than to build entirely anew since the corrupt system was preferable to
the ongoing violence.
Assuming this argument to be true, the benefits of this corrupt system have long expired
as the Kremlin’s interests continue to shift from suppressing violence to creating a region that is
economically stable and more independent. As this shift takes place, Chechnya will be limited
by its own clan structures. As teips who are closer to the resources continue to take advantage of
their positions over other teips, the credibility of public welfare institutions, and government for
that matter, will likely create greater public dissatisfactions and episodes of violence. When
transparency and accountability are absent, corruption can undermine not only the effectiveness
but also the legitimacy of a political system. This in turn may sway more moderate citizens
towards centers of power who may serve their basic needs better.138
The Façade of a Private Sector, Failures of Social Programs, and Relative Deprivation
The lack of economic opportunity, when combined with other factors, may serve as a
motivating force behind political violence. There are a variety of works which discuss “relative
deprivation theory.” According to such studies, populations are more likely to engage in
political violence when expectations of their environment fall significantly short of reality.
Furthermore, they must feel that they are relatively deprived compared to “their own past,
137
138
Ibid.
Ibid., 38.
63
another person, group, ideal, or other social category.”139 In addition to seeing Kadyrov flaunt
his absurd wealth, Chechens who fall outside of Kadyrov’s teip are often denied economic
opportunity as Chechnya fails to create a private sector for economic opportunity, enables
corruption, and fails to offer compensation and justice to those victimized by the Chechen wars.
A lack of a private sector provides a significant threat to Chechnya since it limits
economic opportunity and keeps Chechnya dependent on federal subsidies. Although Chechnya
appears to have reached a significant level of prosperity compared to its state following the
Russo-Chechen Wars, most of this progress is built on the previously mentioned subsidies. As
Musa Basnukaev, an economist at Chechen State University, states, “The real [private] sector is
almost nonexistent in our economy… we have more of a command economy.”140 The
previously mentioned Rodina complex, which was a collective farm under the Soviet Union,
serves as Chechnya’s shining example of private investment. The land, which had been covered
with landmines, was transformed into orchards and strawberry fields through private investments
by Abubakar Arsamakov.141
This instance of private enterprise in an exception rather than a typical example. The
limited private sector that does exist is plagued by corruption and heavily dependent on contract
work with the government. A prominent example may be found in the booming construction
industry around Grozny, which has presented corrupt officials and businessmen embezzlement
opportunities. In addition to increasing project costs, rampant corruption within the industry
lends to economic uncertainty for investors in Grozny who would otherwise invest in the
139
Ian Walker and Thomas F. Petigrew, “Relative Deprivation Theory: An Overview and
Conceptual Critique,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 23 no. 1 (1984): 302.
140
Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown.”
141
Ibid.
64
projects. Common practices include claiming fictional workers and falsifying construction costs
in order to increase federal subsidies or to avoid paying taxes on income claimed. Other
amounts are simply embezzled by managers who bribe officials in the government.142 Even the
former deputy director of the state construction administration Col. Oleg Kaziurin created 48
million rubles, $1.5 million, worth of fake contracts and spent 21 million of the rubles on casinos
in Moscow. This resulted in four years in a low security prison and a mere 100,000 ruble fine
for “swindling.”143
Construction is not the only industry plagued by corruption. Vakhid Bersanov was also
tried for “swindling” after allegedly submitting fake invoices for the reconstruction of several
gas facilities while working as the head of Chechengazprom. This act coordinated with
INCHEST LLC which accepted a 9 million ruble transfer for the ghost project. The money was
then split between Bersanov and Zubayrayev. The court ordered INCHEST to pay workers’
wages for the period of 2003-2004 and pay moral damages in the amount of over 5 million
rubles. Instead of abiding by court orders, Bersanov fled investigators for a year before he was
caught with a forged passport and was subsequently charged with “swindling,”
“misappropriation or embezzlement,” “non-execution of a Court’s judgment and forgery,” and
“manufacture or sale of falsified documents.”144
While some individuals are able to capitalize off of a system that is ripe for corruption,
those without connections often fail to obtain employment, and oftentimes forms of
compensation and social welfare that they are legally entitled to. This is particularly tragic for
142
Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya,” 43.
Ibid., 44.
144
Ibid.
143
65
those who lost everything to war. Public polls, as well as reports on human rights in Chechnya,
suggest that allocation of war related compensation is the most corrupt area of reconstruction.
The Military Counterintelligence Service and Department for Fighting Economic Crime of the
Chief Interior Administration of Moscow arrested six individuals for embezzling 71 million
rubles, $2.3 million, of combat bonuses owed to 71 Chechen veterans who were part of the
“counterterrorist operations.” Chechens who legitimately lost their homes are often unable to
receive reparations while forged applications are submitted by the thousands. The healthcare
industry has also become a medium for fraud. This includes falsification of maternity benefits, a
scandal which resulted in several demonstrations in Grozny. Investigations also revealed that
birth certificates were being issued for babies that did not exist and that a maternity nurse in a
hospital in Argun was forging documents in order to receive state maternity benefits for
childcare. Another individual was detained after claiming 48 million rubles, $1.5 million, of
benefits from 300 other women. Since cashing maternity capital certificates is a complicated and
lengthy procedure, she would offer assistance to mothers in obtaining their benefits under the
guise of working for both public and private organizations. Once the funds were obtained, she
would pocket them and vanish.145
Chechens who experienced human rights abuses as a result of the Russian government’s
indiscriminant use of force during the Chechen wars have been and continue to be unable to find
justice on the international stage as well. The European Court of Human Rights in the Council
of Europe has repeatedly ruled that the government failed to investigate and prosecute Russian
personnel. Although the government has paid damages to plaintiffs, reforming the justice system
has been a bottom priority; furthermore, various plaintiffs have mysteriously been attacked and
145
Ibid., 45.
66
even killed before their cases were decided.146 While it is difficult to measure such an assertion,
it is logical that this further victimization discourages others from seeking justice or blowing the
whistle on corruption.
All of these factors contribute to a relative deprivation felt by victims of Chechen
corruption. While this factor alone is not enough to place Chechnya at risk of renewed
instability, this combines with other factors such as the youth bulge and prevailing
unemployment in the Chechen economy
Attempts to Curb Corruption and Chechen Public Perception
Given the role of relative deprivation in encouraging political violence, it is important to
assess Russian attempts to combat corruption and how such efforts affect public opinion, since
corruption is irrelevant if Chechens don’t see it as a component of relative deprivation. As the
reader may see from the previous examples, local, regional, and federal authorities have
succeeded in catching some perpetrators. However, penalties significantly vary by the case, and
those closer to Kadyrov are the most insulated from consequences for illegal acts. Overall, the
Kadyrov administration’s strategy has been described as “a catch-and-jail approach
predominantly concerned with removing selected low-level bureaucrats and public-sector
employees rather than an integrated response to corruption.”147 Given the way in which he and
his teip benefit from the current system, this is not surprising.
This has had a profoundly negative effect on public perceptions of corruption. A
December 2008-May 2009 survey by the Caucasus Times found that 83 percent of respondents
in the capitals of the republics in the NCFD felt that they were repeatedly exposed to corruption.
146
147
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 19.
Zabyelina, “Buying Peace in Chechnya,” 45.
67
When asked which level of government was the most corrupt, 45 percent believed that it was the
local government, 30 percent believed it to be federal agencies, and about 30 percent blamed
citizens engaging in corrupt exchanges as a means of obtaining goods and services. Respondents
claimed that the most “outrageous” forms of corruption were carried out by law enforcement,
higher education, health services, the judiciary, and tax agencies and that corrupt practices have
actually worsened of the years. 49 percent of these respondents expected corruption to only get
worse in the future and only 4 percent believed that corruption would decline in the future.
These figures suggest that Kadyrov’s public relations campaign has been less successful
than often depicted by western media. Nonetheless, his public relations campaign places a
significant role in his perception to many Chechens, as it should be, given the extent of the
campaign. While it is virtually impossible to access the accounting of such expenses, some
insiders claim that Kadyrov spends as much as $200,000 a month on a public image firm.148 One
of his greatest innovations, from even a global perspective, is his extremely successful account
on Instagram which boasts of 1.6 million followers. This makes his account on the photograph
sharing site more popular than any current U.S. presidential candidate. His consecutive posts
include photographs and videos of his government meetings and interactions with both
international and domestic public figures.
He also uses the account to communicate ideas about how he spends his personal life:
working out, enthusing about guns, praying, and wrestling crocodiles.149 Since announcing his
148
Howard Amos, “‘Mountain-Dweller to Arab Prince’: The PR Campaign to Sell
Russia’s Chechen Strongman Ramzan Kadyrov,” International Business Times, February 8,
2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/mountain-dweller-arab-prince-pr-campaign-sell-russias-chechenstrongman-ramzan-2297219.
149
Ibid.
68
resignation, many of his posts have pertained to sports.150 Another common theme has been
Islamic women’s fashion and the promotion of tourism to Chechnya.151 These macho and trendy
images greatly appeal to young Chechens across the North Caucasus.152
It is difficult to assess Kadyrov’s approval rating within Chechnya since such surveys are
conducted by Chechen officials, diminishing their credibility. While this image is appealing to
some Chechens who view him as the key to a return to normalcy. Others claim that he is to be
tolerated as he holds off Russian aggression while a renewed insurgency gains strength. Some
who dare even aggressively paint him as a traitor to all Chechens.153 These are indicators that at
least a portion of the population has been or is beginning to foresee the need for rebellion in
order to gain independence for Chechnya.
The Role of Ethnicity in Rebuilding the Chechen Economy
Western Russians are not so caught up in this personality cult. The question of how
resources should be allocated within the Caucasus has long been a topic of debate in the
Kremlin. Movements such as “Stop feeding the Caucasus,” formed in December 2011, have
served to bring liberal activists and anti-Chechen nationalists together.154 Several months prior
150
Raman Kadyrov, Personal Instagram Account: Kadyrov_95,
https://www.instagram.com/kadyrov_95/.
151
Ibid.
152
Amos, “Mountain-Dweller to Arab Prince.”
153
Katherine S. Layton, Chechens: Culture and Society, (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2014),
https://books.google.com/books?id=MAi4BgAAQBAJ&pg=PT48&lpg=PT48&dq=kadyrov+app
roval+ratings&source=bl&ots=NMz_4NAve3&sig=XGbnxBS3w58q4Pt0w7wyMJTf_lo&hl=en
&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjLjqiupjMAhXIJB4KHVHpDw4Q6AEINTAE#v=onepage&q=kadyrov%20approval%20ratings&f=f
alse.
154
Ben Judah, “Putin’s Medieval Peace Pact in Chechnya,” Bloomberg View, April 25,
2013, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-04-25/putin-s-medieval-peace-pact-inchechnya.
69
to the formalization of the group, several hundred mostly young men marched from Putin’s
office across the Moscow River shouting, “Stop feeding the Caucasus.”155 These sentiments
extend beyond a few hundred young men. According to a 2011 survey by the Levada Center, an
independent organization, 51 percent of Russians would not mind if Chechnya were to be
separated from Russia and 59 percent agree with the slogan “Russia for Russians.”156
As previously mentioned, the North Caucasus is far from being the only region in Russia
dependent on federal subsidies. Other regions’ subsidies are not typically protested, a factor
which some suggest may be due to bias against Chechens and other North Caucasians.157
Protests focus on benefits of Chechens over other predominately ethnic Russian populated
regions. For example, during one “stop feeding the Caucasus” protest, demonstrators pointed out
that while Kadyrov’s Chechnya reaped the benefits of the construction boom, which included a
multimillion-dollar stadium and a giant mosque at the center Grozny, some regions in central
Russia still lack basic plumbing and electricity.158 An organizer of anti-Caucasus protests,
Konstantin Krylov describes the reason for dissatisfaction as resources being spent in a hopeless
region. “Our infrastructure is degrading, the population is getting poorer, and along with many
other bad things, we see huge amounts of tribute being paid to the Caucasus.”159
Ethnic prejudice by groups of ethnic Russians against Northern Caucasians are further
reflected in the number of hate crimes against these groups. The Moscow Human Rights Bureau
estimated that about 170 xenophobic attacks were carried out in Russia in 2010, resulting in the
injury of 213 individuals and death of 39. Some of these hate crimes were committed by
155
Schwirtz, “Russian Anger Grows over Chechnya Subsidies.”
Judah, “Putin’s Medieval Peace Pact in Chechnya.”
157
Schwirtz, “Russian Anger Grows over Chechnya Subsidies.”
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
156
70
veterans of the Chechen Wars. Tensions were also illustrated on December 7, 2010 when soccer
fans chanting ethnic slurs rioted after an ethnic Russian soccer fan was killed during a clash with
Northern Caucasians. Four days later, 5,000 marched in protest, including neo-Nazis and
ultranationalists in Moscow, against the killing. Later, Northern Caucasians were assaulted on
the subway, earning a denouncement from Kadyrov.
In addition to threatening resources allocated to the Chechnya, ethnic tensions on both
sides have created a brain drain effect in Chechnya. During the Chechen Wars, ethnic Russians
were often victimized by Russian separatists leading them to flee the region. When Medvedev
and the Federal Assembly set forth their plans for economic development in 2009, they
addressed one of the less obvious obstructions to economic development in post-war Chechnya:
ethnic homogeneity. The plan encouraged ethnic Russians to resettle the Northern Caucasus by
establishing employment quotas for ethnic Russians. In addition to addressing the brain drain
experience by the region, it targeted the practice of allocated jobs by teip rather than merit.160
Such endeavors were met with concerns that the policy would favor Russians too much.
In 2010, he therefore proposed forging a new “Russian identity” in the Caucasus to alleviate
ethnic tensions, and asked various ethnic groups of the North Caucasus to stop being so “touchy”
and “sensitive” to actions carried out by his appointed governors. Alarmingly, in line with this
call to move on, he dismissed calls to investigate past extrajudicial killings as focusing on the
past and rejected the term “guerillas” over “terrorists” since “Dagestan is part of Russia.”161
160
161
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 7.
Ibid., 15.
71
Addressing the Youth and Its Present Significance
As previously mentioned, the youth bulge in the North Caucasus poses a significant
threat to the future stability of Chechnya if its economic woes are not addressed. The
significance of this segment of the population is something that the Russian Federation has
begun to express interest in. During a meeting of the Council for Civil Society Institutions and
Human Rights in May 2010, President Medvedev addressed this long overlooked demographic.
Medvedev argued that there needed to be a specific youth policy for the North Caucasus. This is
a point of vast significance since by 2010, young adults in Chechnya had spent most to all of
their lives in a war-torn Chechnya. Medvedev stressed that the 20 percent unemployment most
heavily impacted young adults, and therefore asked that his presidential staff study the issues of
the region’s declining schooling and healthcare in order to increase the prospects for
employment through better education and health.
This point is significant since Chechnya’s unemployment rate is still alarmingly high.
According to 2015’s unemployment figures, 20 percent of Chechnya’s working-age population is
still unemployed. Given that the Chechen population is increasing at a significantly higher rate
than the Russian average, increasing 1.95 percent in 2014 compared to the national average of .2
percent,162 and that Russian unemployment rose 15 percent in 2015,163 it is unlikely under
current policies that employment rates will improve. This is especially when considered with
external economic factors.
162
Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown.”
“Unemployment in Russia Rises 15 Percent,” Moscow Times, October 22, 2015,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/unemployment-in-russia-rises-15percent/540117.html.
163
72
External Factors in Chechnya’s not so Certain Future
It often seems absurd that Ramzan Kadyrov’s spending and fostering of corruption is
allowed by Moscow. This sentiment is shared with many analysts such as political scientist
Dmitry Oreshkin who discusses Chechnya as a political phenomenon. “As a result of
[Kadyrov’s acquisition of authority] the federal authorities now depend on Kadyrov… This is an
‘inside-out empire,’ one in which it is not the center that dictates its own interests, but one in
which the colony has a stranglehold on the center and extracts as much money as it needs.”164 In
Putin’s own words in August, 2011, “Through [the North Caucasus], we affirm and defend a
significant portion of our geopolitical interests in this part of the world.”165 Throughout 2015,
subsidies to Chechnya were scheduled to decrease by 50 percent and economic decline has led to
an increase in competition for limited resources.166 Instead, funding for Chechnya rose 8 percent
while overall budget transfers decreased 3 percent.167
This may not continue into 2016, however, due to factors both outside and inside of
Moscow. Currently, Kadyrov and Putin are leaning upon one another. If Moscow were to end or
drastically reduce subsidies, Chechnya’s unemployment rate would further increase due to the
labor market’s dependence on reconstruction and other subsidized industry. Joblessness could
potentially incite protests or revolts against local corruption. Some political scientists suggest
that in the absence of the benefits granted to him by Putin, Kadyrov’s loyalty could waver and
his Kadyrovtsy could reignite a separatist insurgency. This is more than speculation since
Moscow is already reassessing its budget and whether to keep Kadyrov in power.
164
“13 Takeaways.”
Schwirtz, “Russian Anger Grows over Chechnya Subsidies.”
166
Sukhov, “Chechnya’s Growing Image Problem.”
167
“Russia and Chechnya: Putin’s Chechen Enforcer.”
165
73
One source of economic pressure has been the United States’ and the European Union’s
sanctions against the Russian Federation after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and
ongoing separatist conflict in East Ukraine. These sanctions were followed by a less foreseeable
collapse in the price of crude oil, making the sanctions more impactful. The State Department
warned U.S. companies of the “risks—both economic and reputational—associated with a return
to business as usual with Russia.”168 Although Russia does not have much debt to contend with,
its foreign currency reserves are dwindling. Without access to foreign capital, the Russian
government, banks, and corporations could face major financial hardships, and analysts predict
that at current rates, Russia will have to cut spending or run out of its reserves in a few years.169
The pressures felt by Moscow are reflected by its consideration of selling Eurobonds in order to
assist in maintaining its federal budget which has been significantly strained. Chechnya, like the
rest of Russia, will likely be facing cuts.
This will not be the first time that Chechnya has faced budget cut. It already faced cuts to
its subsidies in 2012 when the recovery program ended. However, a significant level of funding
continued to sustain the fragile Chechen economy. This year, federal subsidies are projected to
be 48.5 billion rubles, compared to 69.5 allocated in 2011. When considering the inflation of the
ruble by 12.9 percent last year, this cut is even more significant than it seems and will mean a
168
Todd L. Wood, “Economic Warfare: U.S. asks Banks not to Help Russia Sell Bonds:
State Department Ties Ukraine Destabilization to ‘High Risk,’” Washington Times, February 25,
2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/25/l-todd-wood-economic-warfare-usasks-banks-n/.
169
Ibid.
74
tightening on the Kadyrov regime.170 Some believe that Kadyrov’s resignation, which has yet to
be formally accepted or rejected is a ploy to ensure more funding.171
In addition to threats of further cuts to subsidies from Moscow, Chechnya faces greater
challenges in attracting private investment, particularly since the West has imposed sanctions on
Russia. Investors such as the previously mentioned Arsamakov are less likely to invest in
Chechnya in such a climate of economic uncertainty. A specific example of how sanctions are
stunting economic progress in Russia includes Ruslan Baisarov’s plan to build a ski resort in
mountains south of Grozny. The project was halted when work on the road leading from the
resort to the capitol stopped because Baisarov had trouble securing loans from VTB, which was
hit by sanctions.172 Other surrounding regions have already illustrated the correlation of
economic decline with stability in the Northern Caucasus. For example, in Kabardino-Balkaria
the main industries of the region, including the Tyrnyauz Mining Complex, have already closed.
Conclusion
While Grozny’s trendy main street and business towers may suggest a state of economic
stability in Chechnya, this is only a superficial indicator of success. In reality, Chechnya remains
in a fragile economic state that is entirely dependent on Russian subsidies and wrought with
corruption. This places Moscow in a precarious situation. By continuing to provide for
Kadyrov’s insatiable demand for government subsidies, the Russian Federation may continue to
create a false sense of economic stability in the region and fund corruption in the region. This
170
Maria Tsvetkova and Christian Lowe, “Russia's Putin Reminds Wayward Chechnya
Leader: I'm the Boss,” Reuters, March 24, 2016,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3508154/Russias-Putin-reminds-waywardChechnya-leader-Im-boss.
171
Ibid.
172
Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by Slowdown.”
75
decision, however, is becoming increasingly less politically popular in light of continuing
economic pressures imposed by sanctions, declining gas prices, and rising unemployment. To
not continue such subsidies, however, could pose even greater threats to stability and bring
awareness to relative deprivation as Chechnya is even less able to provide jobs and social
services to its youth bulge.
76
CHAPTER 3
COMBATING RADICAL ISLAM
Reevaluating Chechnya’s Relationship with Islam and Security Implications
The current role of Islam in Chechnya is dynamic and at times contradictory since
Ramzan Kadyrov has imposed his own perception of Islam onto his population. In many ways,
Kadyrov has renewed Islamic pride within Chechnya through cultural projects such as the
construction of a giant mosque in the center of Grozny and the expansion of Islamic education.
While some changes instill pride in Chechen culture, others represent the rejection of federal law
and the targeting of individuals whose Islamic practices fall out of line with that of Kadyrov.
This is particularly true for those suspected to practice “Wahhabism” who are often victims of
violence and disappearances.
The state of Islam has wider reaching implications. The contemporary role of Islam in
fostering violence and rebellion in Chechnya has been a significant but controversial topic
among experts since the initiation of the First Chechen War. Specifically, experts disagree on
when radical Islamic influences became prevalent, the degree of their influence, and whether or
not they remain as a threat. While they may disagree on these factors, the volume of literature
alone reflects the significance of understanding Islam in the region. Although there has been a
lull in the exploration of the topic as violence has subsided in the past few years, this topic is
regaining significance due to Russia’s intervention in Syria and supposed upcoming withdrawals
from the conflict. Ramzan Kadyrov asserts that only he can safeguard the region from the threat
of radical Islam. Further analysis, however, suggests that he threatens the stability of Chechnya
by fostering resentment in those who do not adhere to his brand of Islam and routinely violating
federal law, and subsequently Putin’s image, in order to promote his brand of Islam.
77
The Evolution of Islam in Chechnya and Historical Identity
In order to understand Chechnya’s current relationship with Islam and the current threat
of radical Islam to the security of Chechnya and the Russian Federation as a whole, it is
necessary to understand the way in which adherence to Islam evolved in the region. Although
the Northern Caucasus is the most Islamic region of the Russian Federation, the interpretation of
Islam is as diverse as the population itself which consists of over 50 ethnic groups.173 Prior to
Russian occupation of the Caucasus, Sunni Islam, the dominate form of Islam, had slowly
penetrated into the Caucasus region and grew in influence. While some regions adhere to more
strict interpretations of Islam, others have adopted the Islamic faith while rejecting those
practices that cannot coexist with their way of life. In the case of Chechens, they accepted Sufi
Islam, a typically Sunni form of Islam which focuses on mysticism, while retaining many pagan
beliefs and practices of their ancestors. This mixed religion is sometimes summarized as
“Islamic-animist.”174
Islam was largely suppressed during the Soviet Union and the loosening of controls by
Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a religious revival for many people of the
North Caucasus. Some experts such as Moshe Gammer argue that restrictive practices actually
strengthened Sufi brotherhoods since the religious leadership was so effective at operating
clandestinely.175 Regardless, those who had never been able to fulfill the religious obligation of
participating in the Hajj by traveling to Mecca or to practice other inspiring religious experiences
173
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 17.
John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.
175
Chen Bram and Moshe Gammer, “Radical Islam, Traditional Islam and EthnoNationalism in the Northern Caucasus,” Middle Eastern Studies, 49 no. 2 (2013): 300, accessed
January 2, 2016. DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.763797.
174
78
were finally free to do so.176 Consequently, many Chechens began to look to their past for
sources of historical and religious identity.
Chechens take much pride in their history of rebellious Islamic leaders rising against
imperialistic Russian powers. For example, Chechens celebrate Sheik Mansur who spread holy
war against Russia throughout the Northern Caucasus in 1785.177 Though he was not an ethnic
Chechen, Chechens also hold historic pride for the Imam Shamil, a figure whose image would
often be evoked by separatists during the contemporary Chechen Wars.
In addition to providing Chechens a source of identity, Shamil’s Rebellion provides an
example of how Chechens have generally rejected aspects of Islam that contradict local customs.
Shamil was known for waging war and establishing Sharia law in those territories of which he
seized control. However, he was never able to fully impose Sharia on the stubborn Chechens
who found that strict enforcement of Sharia did not fit with their way of life.178 Shamil
continuously complained that although the Chechens were excellent warriors, they were not
pious Muslims.179 While forbidding such practices, Shamil was never able to stop Chechens
from smoking, playing music, or dancing.180
During the First Chechen War, Dzhokhar Dudayev, the President of the separatist
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, frequently invoked Shamil’s image and sometimes relied on
religious rhetoric to foster support. Subsequently, both during and after the First Chechen War,
176
Hughes, Nationalism to Jihad, 69.
Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya,13.
178
Anna Zelkina, “Jih # d in the Name of God: Shaykh Shamil as the Religious Leader of
the Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey 21 no 3 (2002): 257, accessed November 3, 2015,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0263493022000039971.
179
Gall and de Waal, Calamity in the Caucasus, 76.
180
Thomas de Waal, “Greetings from Grozny: Fighting for Chechnya, Is Islam a Factor?”
PBS, July 25, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/greetings-fromgrozny/fighting-for-chechnya-is-islam-a-factor/?p=3078.
177
79
Dudayev was accused of wanting to create an Islamic state, or as Yeltsin said himself “An
Islamic Republic.”181 Dudayev was far removed from wanting to establish an Islamic State,
however. Instead, he tried to present himself as tolerant of all religious practices and a leader of
a people who simply wanted to practice their right to self-determination when appealing to those
outside of Chechnya. To Chechens, on the other hand, he would clumsily portray himself as
“either a quasi-religious leader, the sage of his people, or an oriental despot, mixing a brutality
and ruthlessness that people unfamiliar with post-soviet or Caucasian politics would find
distasteful.”182 In the end, appeals to Islam were mostly rhetorical and his understanding of the
religion was superficial at best. Dudayev was far more dependent on promoting “war paranoia”
than Islam and would confuse basic concepts such as the number of daily prayers expected under
the pillars of Islam.183
The way in which the independent Chechen state was founded also supports that early
separatist’s adhered to secular aims over that of Islam. When Dudayev first declared the
independent Chechen state in November 1991, it was called the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,”
reaching back to the ancient Chechen name for the mountainous part of Chechnya rather than an
Islamic name.184 Another important factor is how Dudayev focused not on a God given right to
independence, but on the constitutional legality of secession from Russia. Additionally,
Dudayev’s historical justification of succession focused on human rights abuses over religious
issues. For example, instead of calling Russia infidels, leading officials focused on Russian and
Soviet imperialist history, often condemning Soviet deportation of Chechens and comparing
181
Hughes, Nationalism to Jihad, 68.
Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000, 93.
183
de Waal, “Greetings from Grozny: Fighting for Chechnya, Is Islam a Factor?”
184
Hughes, Nationalism to Jihad, 25.
182
80
Russia to Nazi Germany.185,186 Finally, the Dudayev’s regime’s support for a secular state over
an Islamic one is supported by the secular Chechen constitution whose preamble proclaimed a
state guided by the “idea of humanism.” Similarly, article four of the constitution provided for
the separation of state and religion through freedom of worship and opinions. 187
This sentiment seems to have been shared with the Chechen people. During the First
Chechen War, both Western and Russian reporters were allowed a significant amount of access
to Chechnya, at least in comparison to the Second Chechen War. Journalists such as Carlotta
Gall and Thomas de Waal claim that Chechens rarely spoke of their faith, suggesting that the
Islamic extremists which emerged early in the conflict represented a minority of Chechens.188
While Dudayev’s focuses were not based on establishing an Islamic State, it is important
to note that his leadership emerged at a time when the Russian population was reassessing its
identity and religious revitalization. Although fewer analysists suggest that religion was always
a prevalent factor in the Chechen conflict, most agree that religious extremism intensified
between the first and Chechen war or during the second Chechen war. Russian analysts such as
Aleksey Malashenko suggest that the North Caucasus region was and continues to be
experiencing “retraditionalization” and that Sufism and others of Islam were being woven into
the social fabric of the region. This, Malashenko argues, is leading the Northern Caucasus to
reassess its identity, and political sphere, as being separate from that of the rest of Russia.189
185
de Waal, “Greetings from Grozny: Fighting for Chechnya, Is Islam a Factor?”
Hughes, Nationalism to Jihad, 26.
187
Ibid., 65.
188
Gall and de Waal, Calamity in the Caucasus, 76.
189
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 17.
186
81
Foreign Aid and the Emergence of Wahhabism
Following Dudayev’s death, more radical and foreign forms of Islam began to emerge as
separatist groups splintered and Middle Eastern jihadists became a source of supplies and money.
Most often, these radical groups are associated with “Wahhabism.” Although Wahhabism
literally describes a Saudi brand of Fundamentalist Islam, it has taken on a new meaning in the
North Caucasus. Here Wahhabism doesn’t necessarily relate to the Saudi brand of Islamic
fundamentalism and is often used with a negative connotation by most Chechens.
In the Northern Caucasus, “Wahhabis” were mainly young Muslims who had completed
religious studies, typically abroad or from teachers from the Middle East. Their teachings called
for them to return to the “pure Islam” that existed at the time of the prophet and the reign of the
four pious caliphs and they typically refer to themselves “Unitarians” or “Salafists.” During the
first Chechen War, Wahhabism didn’t firmly take root in Chechnya and was largely focused in
Dagestan. However, it began to spread as young men sought Islamic education outside of
Chechnya. As previously mentioned, Chechen culture can often contradict Islamic practices.
Subsequently, these young men began to identify these contradictions as they were educated in
fundamentalism and publically criticize them, inspiring animosity from those who were content
with their way of life. Some Wahhabis call for the establishment of fundamentalism and an
Islamic order made them an easy target for authorities to mark them as a threat.190
Although Wahhabism sharply diverges from Chechen Sufism, Wahhabism played a
significant role in shaping the Chechen conflict. Those rebel groups structured under strict
Wahhabi doctrines were able to provide the discipline, as well as external funding, needed to
190
Artem Kroupenev, “Radical Islam in Chechnya,” International Institute for Modern
Terrorism, January 29, 2009, http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=1057.
82
counter Russian offensives.191 Furthermore, waves of Wahhabi volunteers came from Arab
countries. While motives often varied, many Chechens readily joined them since they were well
armed. Those who met with Wahhabis were exposed to their religious doctrine, trained in
guerrilla tactics, and provided with a social network. As the First Chechen War came to a close,
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was left in ruin, leading many to seek meaning in Islam, some
specifically in Wahhabism.192
Although Wahhabism provided some separatist units with a solid since of solidarity and
discipline, it also provided President Vladimir Putin, who rose to the office of presidency
through his tough stance on the Chechen conflict, with a perfect narrative to rebrand renew
efforts to reign in Chechnya. Rather than referring to the conflict as the “Second Chechen War,”
the Prime Minister Putin labeled efforts to quell Chechen guerilla forces as an “anti-terrorist”
operation, dispelling criticisms from both within and outside of Russia.193 Furthermore, rather
than correctly portraying political divisions within competing factions of Chechen leadership,
Putin generalized Chechen leaders as religious extremist terrorists. Putin focused on figures such
as the radical field commanders Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduev who wished to
aggressively pursue an Islamic state. In reality, the Chechen leadership was significantly
fragmented with some factions even advocating independence within Russia. The extent of
191
Ibid.
Bram and Gammer, “Radical Islam, Traditional Islam and Ethno-Nationalism,” 303.
193
Anna Kordunsky, “Russian Reporter’s Murder Was Meant as a Message,” New York
Times (Moscow, Russia), 9 November 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/europe/russian-investigator-speaks-about-annapolitkovskayakilling.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPolitkovskaya%2C%20Anna&action=click&cont
entCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlace
ment=7&pgtype=collection&_r=0.
192
83
division is reflected in the Chechen religious leadership in which some of the Muslim elite still
favored remaining as a part of Russia.194
Elements of the Chechen separatist movements had long engaged in terrorism as a
political tool, particularly with figures such as Shamil Basayev. These types of attacks increased
as guerilla units were forced underground and were cast as being more internationally jihadist
than they were. Immediately before Putin’s anti-terrorist campaigns, the nation was gripped by a
series of apartment bombings in cities throughout Russia. The attack was immediately linked to
Ibn Al-Khattab and Al Qaeda, despite his denial of the attacks. This is significant since denying
a terrorist attack defies the objective of terrorism to terrorize populations into political change.
Following another attack on a Beslan School, a hostage crisis which resulted in the deaths of
hundreds, the Russian government quickly drew connections between the attackers and groups
such as Al-Qaeda, also claiming that nine of the hostage takers were from the “Arab World.”
While the claim was never substantiated, it ignited public support for anti-terrorist campaigns in
Chechnya and surrounding regions.
Many complained that most casualties resulted from Russian forces storming the school,
and Putin responded to such criticisms with impassioned rhetoric, comparing negotiations with
the hostage takers to inviting Bin Laden to the Whitehouse.195 In addition to garnering support at
home, Putin, to borrow a phrase from Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, “internationalised”
the conflict in order to recast Chechen terrorism as a global force. This is reflected in his 1999
statement that “Russia is really standing at the forefront of the war against terrorism. And
194
Uwe Halbach, “Islam in the North Caucasus,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des
Religions, 46 no. 115 (2001): 103, accessed December 2, 2015.
http://www.jstor.org/stable30127239.
195
“Putin Rejects ‘Child Killer Talks,’” BBC, 7 September 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3633668.stm
84
Europe ought to fall on its knees and express its great thankfulness that we, unfortunately, are
fighting it alone.” 196
This placed figures such as the Chechen president Maskhadov in a precarious situation as
Maskhadov’s hold on Chechnya loosened and several Chechen warlords’ demand to create an
Islamic state intensified. Maskhadov finally conceded and imposed Sharia law in early 1999.
While many officials in Moscow exploited this decision to show that Maskhadov too was a
figure of Islamic extremism, the manner in which he conceded suggests otherwise. In July 1998,
a group of Chechen Wahhabis commanded by Arbi Barayev and Abdul-Malik Medzhidov led an
assault on Gudermes. This revealed significant weaknesses in the Chechen government when
Maskhadov had to rely on the support of a local warlord to quell the assault. In addition to this,
Basayev had moved to establish a “military-patriotic” administration to enforce Sharia law in
order to order to bypass Maskhadov. In what was likely a move to retain as much control of the
situation as possible, Maskhadov announced the establishment of a Sharia government in
Chechnya on Feb 3, 1999. Instead of retaining control, Maskhadov’s show of weakness led
other figures to continue acting on their own accord. Basayev, Khattab, and Mavladi Udogov led
troops into neighboring Dagestan in August 1999.197
While warlords may have held the physical might to goad Maskhadov into approving an
Islamic state, it does not mean that the Chechen people fully stood behind figures such as
Basayev. An opinion poll from Groznenskii Rabochy in which it was found that only 6 percent
of Chechens trusted Basayev in contrast to the nearly 50 percent that trusted Maskhadov. This
was further reflected in the presidential elections of January 1997 in which Maskhadov received
196
Souleimanov and Ditrych, “The Internationalisation of the Russian-Chechen Conflict:
Myths and Reality,” Europe Asia Studies 60, no 7 (2008): 1199.
197
Kroupenev, “Radical Islam in Chechnya.”
85
64.8 percent of the vote and Basayev received 23.5 percent.198 This is a sentiment that carried on
after Basayev’s death. As one expert explains, “From the ordinary Chechen's point of view, you
may hate the Russians and despise the pro-Moscow government as puppets […] But
increasingly, the rebels are not even ethnic Chechens, so that from the ordinary Chechen's point
of view these Islamic extremists are just another bunch of invaders using Chechnya as their own
battleground."199
Although the Second Chechen War was formally deemed an “anti-terrorist” campaign
and most Chechens did not side with Islamic extremists, it contributed to further radicalizing the
Chechen leadership. It could claim a variety of successes such as the killing of Maskhadov and
other leaders which debilitated their hold on power. Overtime, the conflict devolved into guerilla
warfare that decreased the intensity of fighting in Chechnya but spread the insurgency beyond its
borders as insurgent groups were forced underground. Shamil Basayev and several other jihadist
warlords declared the establishment of a Caucasian Front in the hope of inspiring other jihadists
to unite against Russia.200
As the Russian Federation continued to rely on political assassinations, the leadership
that followed was significantly more Islamic in ideology. This led to the marginalization of
those politicians who put nationalism ahead of Islam and would lead to the strengthening of
various terror organization.201 A series of assassinations led former Security Minister Doku
Umarov to become president in 2006. Umarov took the Islamic aims of his predecessors to a
198
Ekaterina Sokirianskaya, “The State and Violence in Chechnya: 1997-1999” in
Chechnya at War and Beyond, ed. Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Amandine Regamey, and
Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (New York: Routledge, 2014).
199
“Rebels Dilemma after Dudayev’s Death,” BBC, July 12, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5168984.stm.
200
Souleimanov and Aliyev, Individual Disengagement, 55.
201
Bram and Gammer, “Radical Islam, Traditional Islam and Ethno-Nationalism,” 307.
86
new level by abolishing the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and establishing the Caucasus
Emirate. The Caucasus Emirate was to be a Multinational Islamic State governed by Sharia law
spanning all of the North Caucasus. Although Akhmed Zakayev formerly took control of the
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the government lost all real control of the territory and went into
exile, rendering it insignificant as the Russian Federation regained control. In 2007, Umarov
declared that Zakayev, who valued an independent Chechnya over other aims, was a foreign
minister and sentenced him to death for pursuing “democratic religion” over Islam.202
As witnessed in the above narrative, the original Chechen government was predominately
secular. However, the Caucasus Emirate led Chechnya into a self-fulfilling prophecy as
Usmanov out to establish and independent Islamic State under Sharia law and to wage global
jihad. Since it considers neither the Putin regime not local governments of the North Caucasus
to be legitimate, it only recognized leaders selected within the Caucasus Emirate.203
Although it is not the only terrorist groups operating in the North Caucasus, it has
remained the most influential. The group has a hierarchical structure consisting of six provinces
that report to their designated emirs in Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia, Nogay Steppe,
Cherkess and Southern Krasnodar Krai, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay.
Members of these provinces report to the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. This position was held
by Umarov until his death in 2014 when it was passed to Ali Abu Muhammad. In addition to
this formal structure, the Caucasus Emirate has also served as an umbrella organization for other
terrorist groups including Yarmuk Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria, Shariat Jamaat of Dagestan,
the Ingush Jamaat, and Riyadus Salikhin. In addition to embracing jihad throughout the
202
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 9.
“Mapping Militant Organizations: Caucasus Emirate,” Stanford University, April 11,
2004, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/255.
203
87
Northern Caucasus, the Caucasus Emirate declared allegiance to the global jihadi movement in
2009 at a meeting in Chechnya. In subsequent years, it and those terror groups under its
umbrella were responsible for about a dozen major attack and many minor attacks. 204 Like many
Islamic jihad groups, it uses suicide bombings as a primary method of attack, but also relies on
kidnapping to extract ransom in the style of many Chechen outlaws. At one point the group
condemned the targeting of civilians following protests against Putin in February 2012. This
was short-lived, however, and by July 2013 Umarov was calling for attacks in Sochi.
Overtime, the group has expanded its activities outside of Russia. Since 2011, the
Russian Federation, the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the United
Nations have recognized the Caucasus Emirate as a terrorist organization. In addition from
receiving significant funding from Al Qaeda, the groups receives funds from members of the
Chechen government, even those within current President Ramzan Kadyrov’s inner circle.205
Although it has always had a jihadist component under the leadership of Umarov, its increased
adherence to a jihadist ideology stemmed from a growing reliance on organizations such as Al
Qaeda and the Taliban. 206
From the preceding illustration of the evolution of Islam in Chechnya, it is clear that
radical jihadist groups are not inherent to Chechen understanding of Islam. Rather, it is a
phenomena that evolved as Islamists filled power vacuums left as more secular leaders were
eliminated in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Now that some elements of the Caucasus
Emirate have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and have promised revenge for Russian
204
Ibid.
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
205
88
intervention, understanding this evolution will aid in understanding both the appeals and
limitations of radical Islam in modern Chechnya.
The Benefits of Islam over Nationalism
Understanding the benefits of Islam to Chechen insurgent forces over nationalism is key
to understanding how current terrorist threats in Chechnya may be able to recruit and carry out
attacks. In a variety of respects, Islam was more efficient than nationalism since it was more
effective in mobilizing new recruits, spreading resistance to other parts of the Northern
Caucasus, and soliciting aid from outside of Chechnya.207 In addition to these broader
implications, Islam provided for a far more loyal and unwavering recruit. Such recruits are much
more willing to die for their cause and far less likely to disengage since they see themselves as
serving God and as having rewards in the afterlife that worldly rewards could never exceed.
Religious motivations also lead such individuals to be much more willing to kill civilians who
they perceive as being infidels.
This phenomena, as it relates to Chechnya specifically, is best summarized in a study by
Emil Souleimanov and Aliyev Huseyn who interviewed former separatists in Chechnya and
summarized their findings in “Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and
Jihadists.” The study categorized those who disengaged from violence in Chechnya as
“avengers,” “nationalists,” or “jihadists.” While individuals can be members of multiple groups,
they typically identified with one over the others. They found that it is far more common for
those participating in nationalist units in the Russ-Chechen conflict to switch over to jihadist
units than vice-versa, suggesting a greater degree of loyalty to religious aims than nationalistic
aims. In line with this assertion, the study actually had difficulty finding disengaged jihadists,
207
Bram and Gammer, “Radical Islam, Traditional Islam and Ethno-Nationalism,” 307.
89
further reflecting their loyalty to their cause over other groups. Unlike those driven by
nationalism or atonement, jihadists are less driven by short term goals and to achieve
independence for Chechnya is but a component in achieving more global aims. In addition to
being less likely to engage when short term goals are met, they are less likely to back down when
goals are not met since they are less fearful of punishment tactics to themselves or their
people.208 In addition to the role of ideology, jihadists are less likely to disengage since their
groups often provide strong social bonds, much like that of a religious cult. Members are often
isolated from the outside worlds, including from their families, further enhancing their social
bonds within the group. 209
The Limits of Islamic Influences
Just as Islam has its strengths in mobilizing individuals into violence in Chechnya, the
diverse interpretation of Islam within Chechnya weakens its appeal and degrades leadership
structures as key figures disagree on various issues. Scholars such as Ondrej Ditrych stress that
historically held clan structures of the Northern Caucasus significantly overshadow outside
Islamic forces. Instead, Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus are more likely to join in
solidarity under Islam in a fashion similar to that under the historical Imam Shamil. As an ironic
consequence, the Caucasus Emirate’s greatest strength was its greatest weakness. Although it
was able to obtain an ideological framework, financial aid, and weapons support from abroad, its
foreign attributes and willingness to attack civilian populations limited its local popular
support.210
208
Souleimanov and Aliyev, Individual Disengagement, 39.
Ibid., 41.
210
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 17.
209
90
Separatists’ divisions continued even within the leadership of the Caucasus Emirate as
Emirs Mansur Hussein Gakayev, Aslan Vadalov, Tarkhan Gaziyev, and Jordanian Abu Anas
Muhannad challenged Umarov’s governance. In response, Umarov stripped them of their posts,
leading them to form their own Caucasus Emirate under the leadership of Gakayev.211 Whether
or not to ally with the Islamic State in the Northern Caucasus has also emerged as a point of
contention since 2013 when a commander Umar Shishani of Jaish al-Muhajireen walAnsarbegan (JMA), an affiliate of the Caucasus Emirate, began networking with the IS. After he
was appointed as a military commander for IS in Syria, he and his men left JMA. His successor,
however, remained loyal to the Caucasus Emirate over IS and JMA renamed itself “Caucasus
Emirate in Syria.” Matters were further complicated when these two groups found themselves
on the opposite sides of fighting between various Syrian Islamic groups and IS. Although it
refused to fight fellow Chechens, the Caucasus Emirate in Syria grew closer to rival Al Qaeda
backed groups and continues to fight with them against the Assad Regime.
To add to the rift, several Caucasus Emirate factions in Dagestan pledged allegiance to IS
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This is a pledge that has been formally recognized by leading
members of the Islamic State in Syria. Some analysts suggest that this is a new attempt at
striking the North Caucasus from within. This is beginning to seem less and less farfetched as
the Islamic State continues to claim various attacks in Dagestan including a shooting212 and a car
bomb.213 Russia also reasonably suspects plans for larger scaled attacks. In March 2016,
211
Ibid., 9.
“ISIS claims responsibility for southern Russian car bombing that killed 2, injured
17,” RT, February 15, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/332457-car-bomb-explosion-dagestan/.
213
“Islamic State Group Claims Deadly Shooting in Dagestan,” France24, December 31,
2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20151231-dagestan-attack-islamic-state-group-shootingterrorism.
212
91
Dagestani police arrested three Islamic State affiliates and seized over one ton of explosives and
five kilograms of TNT in homemade bombs.214
Kadyrov, Wahhabism, and Human Rights Abuses
“Wahabbism” and the Caucasus Emirate are not the only current Islamic threat to the
stability of Chechnya. Another source of instability arises from Kadyrov’s ruthlessness in
promoting his own form of Islam and violently targeting suspected Wahhabis. In order to
combat jihadist forces, President Razman Kadyrov has actively appealed to “traditional” Islam in
Chechnya. This policy of Islamization is a source of embarrassment given that the First Chechen
War was carried out to restore the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and that the
Chechen Counterterrorism Operations were carried out in order to combat Islamic extremism.
To some degree, Kadyrov’s promotion of traditional Islam has had a positive impact on
the moral of a population who has suffered through two wars. It seems reasonable for him to
have engaged with the Islamic population since 81 percent of Chechens claim that religion plays
a significant role in their lives. Some officials suggest that such efforts have been met with
gratitude in Chechnya and surrounding regions. Reporters may find examples such as a
Cherkess businessman who praised Ramzan for teaching the population “how to pray.” Kadyrov
has also been extremely effective at establishing symbols of the triumph of his traditional form
of Islam over that of fundamentalism.
For example, Chechnya’s construction of Europe’s largest mosque, which can hold
10,000 worshippers, in the middle of Grozny remains a symbol which some scholars argue “far
[outweighs] the admittedly irritating decrees directed at religious observance emanating from the
214
“Security Forces Arrest ISIS-Linked Militants, Seize Ton of Explosives in Southern
Russia,” RT, March 17, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/335977-russia-isis-explosives-arrests/
92
‘cult of personality’ by which he is surrounded.”215 His successes at combated radicalism were
also showcased in February 2009 when Kadyrov personally questioned former leaders of the
separatist movement who had been persuaded to join his side.216 He also made symbolic
gestures such as removing a monument to his father since figurative statues are against Islamic
law.
More secular forces within Russian, both inside and outside of Chechnya, have found
sources of irritation at the implementation of Islamic law that do not fit well with modern
Russian culture, and sometimes even with Russian law. While not fully imposing Sharia,
Kadyrov has banned alcohol and even energy drinks and has instituted Islamic dress in
government offices. Restaurants must close during Ramadan.
Chechen law enforcement has
been recorded while shooting “immodestly” dressed women with paintball guns from passing
vehicles. Gangs of men who were educated at his Centre for Spiritual and Moral Education wear
black and walk around the streets to lecture those passing by about the evils of alcohol and the
right kind of Islam.
While there are positive aspects and simply irritating aspects of Kadyrov’s Islamic
policies, Kadyrov’s push for tradition Islam has a dark side. In Chechnya, Kadyrov ruthless
imposes his image of “traditional Chechen Islam” on nearly all of the Muslim clergy. Even
religious leaders are abused when they dare to question Kadyrov’s interpretation of Islam. For
example when Imam Movsar Ismailov of Gekhi denounced a Christmas tree which Kadyrov had
placed in the center of Grozni, he was abducted and brutally beaten.
215
John Russel, “Chechen Elites: Control, Cooption or Substitution?” Europe-Asia
Studies, 53 no. 6 (2011): 1082, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.585758.
216
Ibid.
93
The most endangered are suspected Wahhabis. Authorities turn to Sufi Imams in
Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia in order to identify Wahhabi Muslims. Often the
individuals are subsequently arrested, extra-judiciously killed, or disappeared. Young men are
particularly at risk of being targeted by both Wahhabi recruiters and law enforcement. Since
young people were not raised under the established traditions of Sufi Islam as their parents were
due to the disruptions of war, they are considered to be more susceptible to adopting jihadist
causes. Attending certain mosques frequently or attending early services can bring attention to
young men. Also, since Sufis tend to pray longer than “Wahhabis,” leaving a most too early can
also bring attention to oneself.217
Young men who travel to Daghestan to attend prayers at mosques there are frequently
subjected to detainment and beatings. In May, 2015 police assaulted three young women in head
scarves, leading young men of the village to clash with the police. Recent examples of religious
impressions includes reports that dozens of young men with Salafi style beards, long beards with
the upper lip cleanly shaven, being detained in various Chechen towns on the suspicion of
adhering to Salafi Islam and having their beards forcibly shaved.218
Local Imams are expected to aid the Chechen authorities in identifying Wahhabis. Like
in Chechen business, those leaders in Kadyrov’s favor fare better than those who criticize them.
Imams who refuse to aid Kadyrov are considered to be disloyal to him and are routinely
dismissed.219 Given that some men who are accused of siding with Wahhabi terrorists simply
217
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 17.
Fuller, “Has Chechen Republic Head Laid Himself Open To Criminal Charge?”
219
Ash, “'Exorcisms' Performed on Chechen Stolen Brides.”
218
94
disappear at night, never to be seen again, there is much incentive for such religious leaders to
report suspected Wahhabis, regardless of how scanty the evidence.220
Alarmingly, Kadyrov has also tried to expand his religious influence into bordering
Dagestan, suggesting that Kadyrov has religious aims beyond Chechnya’s borders. In early
2010, Kadyrov arranged a series of meeting with one of four recognized Daghestani sheikhs,
Said-Afandi Chirkeisky, at the time. This sheik was responsible for passing anti-Wahhabism
legislation in Dagestan during this time and was the most influential sheik with the largest
number of murids. Many of these were members of the policy and security apparatus of
Dagestan. Kadyrov repeatedly invited him to Chechnya to witness the revival of his “traditional
Islam.”221
These human rights abuses and overreaches have a variety of implications for the legal
status and stability in Chechnya. One potential threat is pushing targets in the direction of
extremism as the feel disenfranchised from their government. Furthermore, these attacks provide
Islamic groups with recruitment material and incentive for reprisal actions. This is supported by
limited reports that foreign Sunni Salafi terrorists operating in the North Caucasus are targeting
Sufis in retaliation.222 Furthermore, Kadyrov’s security forces carry out acts of torture,
extrajudicial killings, and reprisals against suspects’ families. This is significant, since in doing
220
Lucy Ash, “'Exorcisms' Performed on Chechen Stolen Brides,” BBC, August 10,
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-10913297.
221
“Ramzan on a roll,” Radio Free Europe, March 18, 2011,
http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus_report_ramzan_on_a_roll/2342891.html.
222
Nichol, “Stability in Russia's Chechnya,” 17.
95
so, Kadyrov is acting outside of federal laws of the Russian Federation, further weakening
Russia’s claims to be in real control of the region.223
Women and Kadyrov’s Islam
Women’s rights have also become an item of controversy as Kadyrov have imposed
various restrictions on women. This is significant to this analysis since these restrictions often
run counter to federal laws. In 2007, he issued an edict which prohibited women and girls not
wearing a headscarf from entering school, universities and other public buildings. Since the
edict was issued, young men were recorded as shooting paintballs at uncovered women and girls
while driving around the center of Grozny. Although he denied knowing who was responsible,
he said that he hoped to express his gratitude to them. His view on the matter was also clearly
expressed when he told a BBC reporter that “Women are so much more interesting when they
are covered up” during the summer before the edict.224
Marriage has also attracted major attention within Kadyrov’s Chechnya. Although
homosexuality is not tolerated in any part of Russia, polygamy is a civil office under Russian
federal law. Nonetheless, Kadyrov advocates polygamy as part of “traditional Muslim culture.”
Kadyrov has boasted that Chechen men can take “second, third and fourth wives” and has even
stated that polygamy is the best way to revive Chechnya after the ravages of war due to the large
ratio of women to men.225
In the summer of 2015, interest in the matter exploded when a 57-year-old police chief
in Chechnya coerced a 17-year-old girl into becoming his second wife. According to the
223
Owen Mathews, "Putin and the Polygamists: The Kremlin is Tying Itself in
Ideological Knots as it Tries to Make New Friends in the Muslim World," Spectator, August 8,
2015, accessed March 7, 2015, LexisNexis.
224
Ash, “'Exorcisms' Performed on Chechen Stolen Brides.”
225
Ibid.
96
villagers of Batarki, who brought the story to Novaya Gazeta, their chief of police threatened a
family in the village to hand over their daughter or he would claim her by force, allegedly
posting law enforcement around the village in order to prevent the young woman from escaping.
In addition to violating the civil law against polygamy, the incident violated law on the legal age
of consent, which was raised to 18 in 2012, and against bride kidnapping, a 2010 law that
targeted a once common Caucasian practice in which a prospective bride was kidnapped from
her parents’ house.226
When liberals raised concern about the clear disregard for federal law, Kadyrov
responded by hosting the nuptials himself, calling the event “the wedding of the millennium”
during a Russian TV news interview and compared it to the marriage of Prince William and Kate
Middleton.227 He also said that he had personally investigated the situation and found that both
the underage bride and her family agreed to the ceremony, and accused liberals of inciting antiChechen sentiment before firing his minister of information. He also quoted Alexander Pushkin
“to love all ages surrender.” Following the ceremony, his chief of staff was quoted as saying
polygamy should be legalized in Russia.228 When asked about the ceremony himself, Kadyrov
wrote that “we have followed the norms of Islamic law and national tradition.”229
The incident also led to public criticism, largely via social media which Chechens used to
mock Kadyrov’s push for polygamy. People posted political cartoons of the police chief as well
as memes depicting “The Unequal Marriage,” a well-known 19th century oil painting of a young
and sorrowful bride being married off. About a dozen Chechens who particularly offended
226
Mathews, "Putin and the Polygamists.”
Ibid.
228
MacFarquhar, “Chechen Leader’s Advice on Women: Lock Them In.”
229
Ibid.
227
97
Kadyrov with their posts were summoned to Kadyrov in order to be lectured in front of the
groom himself. Kadyrov urged that men “lock [women] in, do not let them go out, and they will
not post anything” through locally televised message filmed in his governmental palace.230
In 2009, Kadyrov opened the Center for Islamic Medicine in Grozny which specializes in
the exorcism of “djinns.” The building was expensively renovated from what was once the
headquarters of the Shamil Basayev. This jihadi separatist is notorious for the Beslan school
hostage crisis in 2004. A reporter with BBC descried the building as full of “spine-chilling
yells” which are “stifled by incantations from the Koran.” Many of the patients are young
women suffering breakdowns after being forced into marriage and are brought to the center to be
exorcised.231
Although the practice was made illegal by Kadyrov, an alarming number of Chechen
marriages begin when a girl is kidnapped and forced into a car by her future husband and his
accomplices. In 2010, it was estimated that 1 in 5 Chechen marriages began in such a way.
While parents sometimes intervene, the girl is most often pressured into marrying the man in
order to preserve family honor and avoid blood feuds. While some women are able to find a
surprising degree of happiness in their arrangement, others, who may be subject to rape and other
forms of domestic violence, are not with some falling into states of depression and hysteria.
Typically brides brought into the Center are brought by their mother-in-laws who believe
that the girls’ reaction to the stressful ordeal is a sign of possession by the evil spirits. They hope
that by exorcising the girls, they can turn her into the “nice, quiet, hardworking woman in the
house” that is expected of Chechen women. The practices of exorcism include beating the
230
231
Ibid.
Ash, “'Exorcisms' Performed on Chechen Stolen Brides.”
98
patient. One such patient includes a woman who was 16 when she was kidnapped for marriage
and had since undergone two divorces. While she yelled “Shut up!” and “Leave me alone” as
she was being beaten and chanted at, Mullah Mairbek Yusupov explained that the genie was
speaking through the girl. The girl’s family had brought her to the Center for the tenth times in
the hope of inspiring obedience so that the woman could be married off again.232 In line with
Kadyrov’s pattern of awarding positions to those in his clan or inner circle, the medical center is
run by his personal doctor. In its first year of being open, it claimed to cure 60,000 people of
“phycho-neurological disease.”233
The reaction from Moscow, like its reaction towards most of Kadyrov’s disregard for
federal law, was mostly that of silence. One Kremlin official, however, had his own
controversial statement. According to Pavel Astakhov during a radio interview, women are
“shriveled” by the age of 27 and look like how most Russian women look at age 50 making it
understandable that men would want younger brides.234
The Drawbacks of Allowing Kadyrov’s Islamic Policies
By allowing Chechnya to ignore federal law in order to implement various Islamic
practices, Putin is delegitimizing the authority of the federal government over that of the regional
government, as does allowing his security measures as discussed in chapter one.
In addition to holding the image of bringing order to the troubled region of Chechnya, Putin has
advanced an image of a defender of Russian Orthodox values. In 1999, 58 percent of Russians
were in favor of legalizing polygamy for Muslims. In a 2016 survey, 58 percent of Russians
were against polygamy for Muslims. In both surveys, an overwhelming majority of 85 percent
232
Ibid.
Ibid.
234
MacFarquhar, “Chechen Leader’s Advice on Women: Lock Them In.”
233
99
were against a blanket legalization of polygamy.235 This factor is significant on the international
stage as well as the crises in Syria unfolds. In Britain, Nigel Farage said “in the war against
Islamic extremism… [Putin] is actually on our side. Matteo Salvini of Italy’s Northern league
also applauded Russia as “the main bulwark against the spread of barbaric Islamic
extremism.”236
Some argue that Putin’s tolerance for Kadyrov’s controversial policies are in line with
other policies regarding Islam and his goals of reaching out to Muslim allies. In June, 2015,
prominent Russian Orthodox clerics and Muslim religious leaders from near and abroad attended
a meeting in Moscow to discuss Russia’s “strategic partnership” with the Muslim world.
Furthermore, a mammoth mosque is scheduled to open its doors to Moscow in September, 2016.
An economist reporter also argues that by supporting polygamy, the Kremlin can carry out its
international war against western values in the same way that it has done with gay rights. For
example, in July, a Russian-led alliance of conservative Muslim and African states voted through
a motion in the United Nation’s Human Rights Council to uphold the conventional family and to
counter European and US attempts to validate gay partnerships.
In reality, however, Putin has built an image on combating religious extremism and the
Islamization of Chechnya contradicts that image and presents a source of embarrassment for
Moscow. It is likely that Putin is losing patience with violations of federal in terms of both
Kadyrov’s security policy and policy towards Islam. After Kadyrov’s theatrical resignation,
which was likely a power play with the Kremlin, President Putin reappointed him as acting
republic head. This appointment also came with a clear warner for a need for “closer
235
236
Mathews, "Putin and the Polygamists.”
Ibid.
100
coordination” with federal authorities. Putin also told the Chechen president that “as the future
leader of the republic, you should do everything to ensure full compliance with Russian laws in
all spheres of life -- I want to stress this, in all spheres of life."237 This is not the first explicit
warning issued to the leader. In December 2014, Putin warned, in a more subtle voice, Kadyrov
to not target suspected insurgents families in dealing with suspected terrorists.238
Despite the array of examples of Kadyrov upholding Islamic law over Russian law, his
officials denies any discrepancy. This is also in spite of comments such as when Kadyrov
publically announced that “sharia is higher than Russian law” and even that the “enemies of
Islam must be destroy.” The same is true for those old Chechen traditions that have been
interwoven with Islam in modern Chechen society. Although the previously mentioned practice
of wife snatching is legal, it is still prevalent. Also, according to Chechen traditions, children are
raised by the husband and his family. It is only in rare cases that wives get custody, despite their
rights under Russian law. Some are dismissive about the idea that women would want to leave
their husbands. For example, Mairbek, the doctor at the Medical Center simply blame evil spirits
for planting the idea of divorce in her head.239
Implications of the Current State of Islam
Although life in Chechnya is much more stable than it was during the Chechen wars,
some hold that the current Islamization of the Republic is creating the ideal conditions for
recruitment into radical Muslim organizations. The fastest growing threat appears to be the
Islamic State. While the threat that the Islamic State poses for Russia is far, the terrorist groups
237
Liz Fuller, “Putin Cautions Kadyrov, But Gives Green Light for His Reelection,”
Radio Free Europe, March 26, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-putinkadyrov-reelection/27637133.html.
238
Fuller, “Putin Cautions Kadyrov, But Gives Green Light for His Reelection.”
239
Ash, “'Exorcisms' Performed on Chechen Stolen Brides.
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has successfully created a recruitment network in Chechnya from which it sends predominately
young Chechen men to IS controlled territories in Middle East. In 2013 it was discovered the
daughter of the head of the Chechen Department of the Federal Migration had left Russia in
order to join IS in Syria.
Many, particularly liberal political figures such as Ilya Yashin, give credit to Kadyrov’s
political regime who prohibits them from having a political voice and implements a policy of
Islamization that run contrary to the norms of Islam. Journalists such as Elena Milahina of
Novaya Gazeta argue that “Chechens often go to live in the Islamic State, and not only to fight…
It’s Kadyrov they are fleeing from. Such people are shut out of Europe, and thus they are forced
to seek refuge in Syria.”240
Regardless of motives for joining IS, the Federal Nationalities Minister Igor Barinov has
named the Islamic State as one of the most serious problems that Russia will face.241 The greater
threat is posed by those Chechen militants returning to the North Caucasus from Syria. The
chief of the Russian Security Council suggested that the Islamic State is starting to gain influence
in Russia and that those who return to Russia could “bring sophisticated terrorist skills to our
lands, including the creation of groups calling themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, which does not have anything to do with Islam.”242
Conclusion
Chechnya has a complex history in regard to its relationship to Islam which has wide
reaching implications in terms of security and how Chechnya fits within the Russian Federation.
Ramzan Kadyrov asserts that only he can safeguard the region from the threat of radical Islam.
240
“13 Takeaways.”
Fuller, “Is Chechen Stability Tenable or Deceptive.”
242
Joanna Paraszczuk, “Russia Unveils New Post To Wage 'War On IS.'”
241
102
In reality, he threatens the stability of Chechnya by fostering resentment in those who do not
adhere to his brand of Islam and routinely violating federal law, and subsequently Putin’s image,
in order to promote his brand of Islam.
103
CONCLUSION
Although Ramzan Kadyrov and his authoritarian style of leadership has provided shortterm benefits in stabilizing Chechnya, these successes have come at a very high cost and his
abusive practices and enabling of corruption contribute to the likelihood of political violence. In
order to snuff out extremism since his rise to power, Kadyrov has committed and continues to
commit a plethora of human rights abuses, ranging from kidnappings to murder. From an
economic perspective, the cost of Kadyrov’s loyalty is staggering and both the private and public
sectors are plagued by corruption. Radical Islam also poses a significant threat now that groups
such as the Caucasus Emirate and the Islamic State vie for influence in the region, recruiting
disenfranchised Chechen youth.
These pose both a practical and ideological problem for the Russian Federation. By
engaging in such brutal practices, Kadyrov threatens to sow discontent amongst those who are
targeted and encourage sentiments of relative deprivation, a significant factor when assessing the
likelihood of political violence ensuing in a population. Furthermore, it appears that rather than
eliminating terrorist threats as he claims he has done, Kadyrov’s policies have simply routed
many rebels. Such career insurgents have moved to surrounding regions of the North Caucasus
as well as conflicts abroad such as that in Syria, where Chechens have joined ISIS and other rival
rebel groups fighting Assad. As Russia withdraws from Syria, it is likely that rebels may try to
return to Chechnya and threaten the stability of the Kadyrov regime or join with insurgents in
bordering regions.
These factors are closely related to how the Kadyrov regime handles radical Islam.
These efforts have reaching implications in terms of security and how Chechnya fits within the
Russian Federation. Currently, Kadyrov marginalizes and disenfranchises those who engage in
104
more fundamental brands of Islam and/or have the loosest connections to jihadists. This could
present particularly negative consequences by providing incentive for young Muslims to join
jihadist groups if Chechens return from conflict zones since jihadists are far less likely to
disengage than those who are simply avenging past wrongs.
Chechnya’s claims of economic recovery are also questionable and could pose major
threats to stability. While Grozny’s trendy main street and business towers may suggest a state
of economic stability in Chechnya, this is only a superficial indicator of success. In reality,
Chechnya remains in a fragile economic state that is entirely dependent on Russian subsidies and
wrought with corruption. Such factors play a significant role in contributing to economic
disparities between Chechen teips. Currently, Chechnya is facing an impending threat of a youth
bulge, a factor which, when combined with a perception of relative deprivation, increases the
likelihood of political violence.
While Chechnya’s economy has been sustained by the federal government, it is
threatened by budget cuts due to military spending, impacts of sanctions and decreased oil prices,
and nationalist movements protesting the massive amount of spending in the North Caucasus. It
is important to not exaggerate threats to economic stability in the short-term while insurgent
groups remain fractured and Kadyrov continues to receive maximum amounts of funding from
Moscow. Nonetheless, since economic opportunity enticed many Chechen insurgents to defect
to Moscow, there is little reason to believe that they would not side with insurgents who may
provide greater economic opportunities. This is particularly trough with youth populations who
perceive relative deprivation.
All of these factors are closely intertwined and are important when assessing Chechnya’s
stability. Just as economic incentive drove former insurgents to defect from separatist causes
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and join the Kadyrovtsy, lack of economic opportunity could drive them away from loyalty to
the Kadyrov regime. Just as indiscriminate violence of the Chechen Wars led groups of rebels to
embark in efforts of avengement and jihad, so too could an escalation of Kadyrov’s abusive
policies. Finally, just as Putin is dependent on Kadyrov, Kadyrov is dependent on Putin. If
Kadyrov is unable to deliver on his promises of stability or Putin is unable to allow Kadyrov vast
power and wealth, both Chechnya’s security apparatus and economy could falter. The greatest
threat to renewed political violence, however, is a bulging youth population combined with a
lack of economic opportunity and awareness of relative depravation, a combination of factors
which often give rise to insurgencies.
The North Caucasus is a complex region that plays a pivotal role in Chechen security,
and this is particularly true in the case of Chechnya. In light of these complexities, this analysis
hopes to contribute to research surrounding the leadership of Ramzan Kadyrov as it relates to the
stability of Chechnya by providing the aforementioned multidimensional approach in the
analysis of threats to renewed political violence in Chechnya.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Hannah Salyers Kibler received her B.S. in Economics and her B.A. in History from
West Virginia Wesleyan College in 2012. During the summer of 2015, she studied at Moscow
State University. She will receive her M.A. in Russian and Eastern European Studies in the
spring of 2016 from Florida State University.
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