essentials
ELECTRO M AG NE TIC SPECTRU M (EMS)
The New Wave of Warfare
– Battling to Dominate the
Electromagnetic Spectrum
By Dr. J. Phillip London
The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
68
T
he most vital element of
US National security is not
secure. The electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) is the range
of all possible frequencies of
electromagnetic radiation,
including radio waves, microwaves,
gamma, X-ray, and infrared. Its importance lies in the fact that virtually
every technology used today needs to
access and exploit the EMS, from cellular
to Wi-Fi, to advanced military weaponry.
The National security requirements are
extensive, such as getting directions
from a global positioning system, using
radar to land a plane, flying a drone,
finding and detonating an improvised
explosive device, or simply communicating with a forward operating base.1
These technologies bring great capabilities and promise, but are accompanied
by vulnerabilities based upon a dependency for reliable access to the EMS.
Challenges come in a variety of forms
and combinations to make EMS dependency a particularly vexing problem.
Dependencies span military operations,
civilian infrastructure, critical government capabilities, the global economy
and public safety. Furthermore, they are
aggravated by a limited spectrum faced
with seemingly endless requirements for
more spectrum allocation.
The EMS is a maneuver space that
transcends all operational domains; air,
space, land, sea and cyber. The cyber
domain, in particular, is defined by the
physics of the electromagnetic spectrum,
electronics, and the systems used to access and exploit their characteristics.
Cyber is America’s center of gravity,
enabling indispensable daily functions,
like power generation, transportation,
industrial processes, communications, logistics, financial and legal transactions,
as well as military operations including exploitation, attack and computer
network defense, C5ISR and Electronic
Warfare (EW). Cyber superiority is the
prerequisite for effective operations in all
domains, from tactical to strategic levels.
It is critically important for the US
to achieve and maintain a dominant
capability in the use of the EMS for
military applications. Despite its ubiquitous importance, the spectrum’s role
in national security has not been recog-
nized and acted upon, partially because
of the United States’ confidence in its
technological and military superiority.
Potential adversaries are systematically working to reduce that superiority
by “developing and fielding Electronic
Attack (EA) and cyberspace technologies that are intended to significantly
reduce the ability of DoD to access the
spectrum and conduct military operations.”2 Russia’s recently-demonstrated
ability to disconnect Ukrainian forces
in Crimea from their command and control confirmed two disconcerting facts:
the dexterity of Russia’s cyber warfare
capabilities and that the US was no longer the only country capable of doing
this non-kinetically. Similarly, known
in Chinese military doctrine as the “5th
battlefield”, Chinese information operations/cyber units are fully integrated
The electromagnetic spectrum is the distribution of electromagnetic radiation. Virtually every
technology used today needs to access and exploit the EMS. (NASA)
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MANEUVERING ROOM
American defense, whether defined
by strategic paradigms, like cross-domain dominance and air-sea-battle, or
capabilities, such as drones and cyber attack, depends upon the ability to employ
and exploit the EMS. “Electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) access is a prerequisite
for modern military operations. DOD’s
growing requirements to gather, analyze and share information rapidly; to
control an increasing number of automated Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; to command geographically dispersed and mobile forces to gain access into denied
areas; and to ‘train-as-we-fight’ requires
that DOD maintain sufficient spectrum
access.”4 The military, however, isn’t
alone in their need for sufficient spectrum support.
The exponential growth of modern
conveniences, communications and
technologies has crowded the spectrum.
The electromagnetic spectrum is a competitive and managed space, with the
American radio frequency spectrum allocated among federal and non-federal
services, and governed by different organizations.5 The greatest competition for
spectrum access today comes from the
global wireless broadband industry as it
tries to meet the growing consumer demand for mobility and data. The conflicts
are troubling Chief of Naval Operations,
ADM Jonathan Greenert, “The Federal
Communications Commission came to the
Defense Department and said industry
would like to purchase rights to some
frequency bands to do broadband. We
would need for you guys to move off this
band if we want to sell it. To me, I said
this never is going to end.”6
The importance and urgency in resolving these challenges is amplified by
the need to train in, and through, the
spectrum. “Our forces need to be able
to deny adversary sensors the ability to
track our ships, but if that fails, they
need to be able to rapidly coordinate the
optimal countermeasures across multiple
ships and aircraft which will provide protection to everyone in the line of fire.”7
As operations in the EMS evolve, new
and specialized facilities for testing and
training will be necessary. Also key to the
concept of spectrum warfare is the ability
s p e ctr um
(EMS)
erable challenges. “DOD recognizes that
the electromagnetic environment (EME)
will be increasingly congested and contested wherever military operations occur. DOD’s spectrum access will continue
to be challenged by adversaries on the
battlefield and debated in National and
international forums where leadership
will need to balance National defense,
economic, and other National interests.
DOD must be able to address these challenges to provide spectrum access when
and where needed by the warfighter.”8
What makes the EMS a leading National
security priority is that others are already
taking this challenge head on.
The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
with EW to operate across the electromagnetic spectrum.3
Increasing demonstrations by state
(and non-state actors) show that the
first battle of any future war will be for
command of the air, space and the EMS.
However, the US is neither adequately
prepared to withstand and counter the
growing threat, nor armed with sufficiently robust offensive capacity. The
growing challenge for the US is to be able
to successfully exploit the spectrum – as
a capability and as a battlefield.
e letromagnetic
69
A US Navy cryptologic technician monitors the electromagnetic spectrum of air and surface
contacts in the combat information center aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Ramage. (US
Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jared King/Released)
for commanders to understand the electromagnetic environment; to ascertain
and achieve the most advantageous electromagnetic configurations; to determine
which electromagnetic spectra are likely
to be beneficial to an adversary; and to
impose denial/disruptive conditions on
the adversary. Such electromagnetic situational awareness must become intuitive
and automated, with awareness and tools
to match.
The importance of spectrum management and the complexity of training
throughout the spectrum present consid-
BLINDING THREATS
While the electromagnetic spectrum
has always existed, its importance in
battle only emerged in the last century. In 1904, a Russian telegraph operator jammed the radio of an attacking
Japanese ship. By World War II, the disruption of enemy radar and communications was a common practice. During the
Cold War, both super powers invested in
exploitation of the EMS, but the United
States was believed to be a generation
ahead of any other country in developing the electronic warfare equipment
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and skills.9 In the early 1990s, the US
military’s radio-frequency jammers were
expensive and secretive technologies.
e le ctromagnetic
s p e ctr um
This dominance began to quickly erode
with the decline of the old world order
and rise of new technological innovation.
The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
70
A U.S. Army electronic warfare officer inspects a component of a counter radio-controlled
electronic warfare (CREW) system at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt.
Jarred Woods, 1st Sustainment Command)
(EMS)
Through 12 years of war in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the US realized that
technological superiority wasn’t necessarily a great advantage, as demonstrated by introduction of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs). Around 2002,
al-Qaeda bomb-makers were making
radio-controlled weapons by cramming
radio frequency receivers and simple
digital signal decoders into fluorescent
lamps, and then connecting them to firing circuits and Soviet-era munitions.10
An expanded number of threat actors
have access to cheaper and more deadly
weapons. “Inexpensive jammers, signal
detectors, computer processors and radios
make it easier for unfriendly states, terrorists, and criminals to manage their
efforts while jamming our own ability
to sense and communicate. Meanwhile,
the number of users in the EM spectrum
has grown dramatically over the last two
decades. The result is an environment we
struggle to sense, understand and use in
warfare.”11
The struggle is further complicated by
distance. Land-based conflicts where US
forces create a physical presence offered
some protection for military networks.
But, those networks become increasingly
vulnerable as security interests and operations move into new territory or as
distances increase. A prime example is
the challenge of the Asia pivot, from the
sheer size of the region (mostly ocean)
to the dependence on regional allies for
America’s physical presence. “Things get
much harder against Far East targets
when we don’t have a dominating US
military footprint in the region as we
did with Iraq and Afghanistan. Command
and control become even more exposed
to attack, because we lack the resources
on the ground to protect it. Also, without
a physical footprint we rely even more
greatly on unmanned systems.”12 This fact
is not lost within the region.
In 2011, the former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Information
Dominance stated that his greatest concern wasn’t a fighter jet or anti-ship ballistic missile, but “‘China’s capabilities
for non-kinetic combat, its potential
to ‘develop capabilities to dominate in
the electromagnetic spectrum,’ which…
Marine Corps
Spectrum
Maneuver Warfare
OCTOBER 28-29 2015 | MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC
RATION
T
S
I
G
E
R
PEN!
NOW O s.org
crow
www.
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As the Marine Corps moves forward to
reconfigure and refit to meet the vision
of Expeditionary Force 21 it understands that freedom of movement in
the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace is the key enabler to 21st
century military operations, and one of the critical challenges when developing
these capabilities is integrating and synchronizing EMS and cyberspace operations.
Successfully integrating the F-35 Lightning II, current and planned UAS systems, and
ground based EW and SIGINT platforms to employ game changing technologies will enable
the MAGTF to take full advantage of vulnerabilities and opportunities in the EMS and Cyberspace
to execute C3, maneuver, and kinetic and non-kinetic fires. This Marine Corps Spectrum Maneuver Warfare Conference will address
the challenges of employing a system-of-systems approach to gain EMS and cyberspace superiority. Four sessions will provide
information on the Marine Corps vision, emerging doctrine, future threat, capability requirements, the Cyber Electronic Warfare
Coordination Cell and EW training. The conference will culminate with working groups that will address some of the challenges the
Marine Corps faces as it moves forward in acquiring and integrating the capabilities required to provide EMS situational awareness,
and synchronized operations in the EMS and cyber domain. The conference will also include tours of the ICAP III simulators and
a flight line static display featuring the EA-6B, EA-18G, F-35 (TBD), RQ-7B and Marine Corps ground EW platforms. Register now!
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KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
LtGen Jon M. Davis
MGen H. Stacy Clardy
Deputy Commandant for Aviation
Headquarters Marine Corps
Deputy Director for Force Management,
Application and Support, J8
(invited)
BGen Loretta Reynolds
(invited)
Principal Director OUSD Policy
South/Southeast Asia
E X H I B I T TAB L ES AVAIL A B L E! C O N TAC T S H EL L E Y F ROS T, F ROS T @ CROWS . ORG, F OR MORE I NF ORMAT I ON.
R E G I S T E R N O W A T WWW.CROWS.ORG
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could be ‘game-changing.’”13 Since the
emergence of its first information warfare units in the early 1990s, the driving force in Chinese military strategy
has been gaining leverage. The EMS is no
exception. China “views EW as an ‘important force multiplier,’” particularly in its
The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
72
e le ctromagnetic
s p e ctr um
sential to American naval might.” The
Army would also feel the sting of such
EMS capabilities, as unmanned ground
vehicles and ground-based drones could
be made inoperable by Chinese jammers.15
Recent statements concerning space and
counter-space operations and capabili-
China is considered to be the biggest challenger to the U.S. across the spectrum. (DoD photo by
D. Myles Cullen/Released)
goals to achieve information advantages.
According to the Pentagon, China has
already “begun to incorporate EW within
other existing and emerging systems such
as aircraft and armored ground.”14 Of note
was how quickly the Chinese Air Force
has been closing the capabilities gap.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is
a prime example. “The Air Force takes
the threat of a Chinese electromagnetic
assault so seriously that it’s stepping up
efforts to train its pilots how to fly without the aid of GPS, radar, or even radio
communications. The Navy, meanwhile,
is testing an antenna that will hopefully allow drones to quickly reestablish
links with GPS satellites in the wake of
a significant jamming attack.” To protect
their forces from similar vulnerability,
China is expected to complete work on
its own 35-satellite navigation system
called Compass by 2020. Further Chinese
developments include jamming systems
that could neutralize radar-dependent
guided weapons, such as air-to-air missiles and cruise missiles, “a weapon es-
ties also reveal Chinese intentions to
contest the US advantage in space and
the EMS utilization associated with that
advantage.
While China may be the United States’
greatest competitor in the electromagnetic spectrum, other countries and threat
actors are willing – and able – to compete in this maneuver space. For example,
“Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine
and their state sponsors have ‘very definitely’ been using advanced electronic
warfare equipment.”16 The availability of
$25 Chinese-made jammers online is just
one example of the increasing accessibility of EMS capabilities and tools to more
non-state and individual threat actors.
“The reality today is that the spectrum
is a very busy place in wartime, and an
adversary will migrate to whichever segment the US is not controlling and exploit
that vulnerability to their advantage.”17
To fight and win in today’s asymmetric
threat environment, the US cannot afford
to lose any advantages. Nor can it display
any vulnerability.
(EMS)
RIDING THE WAVE
As early as 1973, a Soviet admiral predicted that “The next war will be won
by the side that best exploits the electromagnetic spectrum.”18 As the strategic concepts driving National security
embrace cross-domain dominance, it
has become clear that control of their
operating space – the electromagnetic
spectrum – is fundamental. “Command of
the electromagnetic spectrum has come
to be regarded as a crucial advantage in
modern combat, in much the same way
that command of the sea and command of
the air are.”19 Access to, and dominance
of, the EMS maneuver space can no longer
be taken for granted.
The DOD’s 2013 Electromagnetic
Spectrum Strategy emphasized access
management and technology solutions
for freeing up spectrum, driven by the
growing demand for timely information at
every level of the military. “Increasingly,
lower echelons, including individual
soldiers, require situational awareness
information resulting in more spectrumenabled network links. The growth in the
complexity of modern military systems
has similarly led to an increase in spectrum requirements.”20 The new strategy is
not enough to meet these demands. First,
implementation requires new regulatory
and policy initiatives. Second, existing
technologies have to be adapted to new
spectrum requirements. Third, funding
is needed to retroactively build spectrum
flexibility into older weapon systems.
“Most new systems today are much more
agile on the frequency side and in the
electromagnetic spectrum as a whole, but
some of the older, legacy systems, that’s
where we have to work through on the
implementation plan to see how we want
to address those.”21
The next steps in the Pentagon’s spectrum strategy will focus on “developing
an implementation plan that includes a
governance structure, a road map and action plan that will chart our way to meeting the strategy’s vision.”22 The Services
have been making some headway. The
Army has issued a doctrine for cyber
electromagnetic activities. The Navy has
been investing in both its defensive and
offensive EMS capabilities, such as its
Inaugural Cyber
Electromagnetic
Activity 2015
Synchronizing Cyber Electromagnetic
Activities to Win in a Complex World
OCTOBER 6-8, 2015 / A BE RDEEN, MD
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The International AOC and APG Susquehanna Chapter of the AOC, under a co-sponsorship
agreement with Army Team C4ISR APG, will hold the Inaugural CEMA 2015 Conference at
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
The theme for the inaugural CEMA 2015 event is “Synchronizing Cyber Electromagnetic Activities to
Win in a Complex World.” The newly published Army Operating Concept emphasizes the importance
of ready land forces and their significance to the joint and coalition fight, and recognizes the need
for continued innovation to “Win in a Complex World.” Cyberspace operations, in conjunction with
electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations are identified in the Army Operating
Concept as one of the seven core Army competency areas critical to shaping the operational
environment and winning decisively. Equally new is the concept of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities,
or CEMA, which is outlined in the first doctrinal field manual of its kind that integrates and
synchronizes cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations
(SMO). The CEMA 2015 event will allow for an exchange of ideas, concepts and information, and
provide a venue to address these new and emerging concepts and a framework to discuss ongoing
and future research and development to set the conditions for innovation and success.
Attending the CEMA 2015 event will also provide the Army and DoD Electronic Warfare and
Cyber communities of interest an opportunity to meet with and discuss the current and emerging
Electronic and Cyber Warfare requirements with Coalition partners, industry technicians,
engineers, and scientists and other Government agencies and learn from their successes.
There are a number of keynote and breakout sessions, along with hands-on product
demonstrations that will offer a combination of current and emerging requirements, engineering
theory and practical operations of the latest electronic warfare and offensive cyber capabilities.
K E Y N O T E
AGENDA
(subject to change)
Monday October 5, 2015
(invitation only)
AFTERNOON
Session 1: Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activity
(CEMA) Cell User Session (invitation only)
Tuesday October 6, 2015
MORNING
Session 2: Trends in Electromagnetic Spectrum
Capabilities (Unclassified)
AFTERNOON
Session 3: Threats, Capability Gaps, and
Requirements (Classified Rel FVEY)
Wednesday October 7, 2015
MORNING
Session 4: Cyber EW Convergence (Unclassified)
AFTERNOON
Session 5: Technology Trends and Challenges for
Cyber EW Convergence (Classified Rel FVEY)
Thursday October 8, 2015
MORNING
Session 6: Tactical Cyber Operations and
Concepts (Classified Rel FVEY)
S P E A K E R S
MG Stephen Fogarty, USA
Commanding General,
Cyber Center of Excellence
Mr. Jay Kistler (invited)
ASD (RDE) Electronic
Warfare
MG Bruce Crawford, USA (invited)
Commanding General
CECOM & APG
Mr. Mike McConnell
Former Director National Security Agency
and Director of National Intelligence
Session 7: Team C4ISR Leadership CEMA
Panel (Classified Rel FVEY)
R E G I S T E R N O W A T WWW.CROWS.ORG
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The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
74
The Pentagon’s EMS strategy aims to balance access management and the development of
capabilities in a shared-access environment.
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement
Program (SEWIP), the Next Generation
Jammer (NGJ) program, as well as “new
weapon programs that use directed energy and electromagnetic forces to cut
costs.”23 The Marine Corps has invested
in tactical programs that combine the
ability to network signals intelligence
from multiple sources with a compact
electronic system and jam communications. The Air Force is examining how to
modernize aircraft and self-protection
systems for electronic warfare. In May
2015, the Air Force also confirmed that
it had developed with Boeing an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon called
CHAMP using high-energy bursts, fire
multiple times, pinpointing and blacking
out only essential targets without causing collateral damage.24 However, success
in generating warfighting capabilities
and unified joint employment strategies
which regain US dominance in the EMS
maneuver space will take focus and further investment.
On the broader front, EMS dominance
requires coordinated effort across all
American government agencies and commercial users. Worldwide reporting of the
Stuxnet virus demonstrated how highly
protected infrastructure is vulnerable
to manipulation and destruction. In the
(EMS)
US, over 85% of critical infrastructure is
owned by the private sector, and it is not
highly protected. A sense of urgency is
needed to be properly protected.
The first battle of any future war
will be for command and dominance of
space and the EMS. Yet the US is neither adequately prepared to counter the
growing threat, nor armed with sufficiently robust capabilities. As America’s
strategic focus shifts away from conflicts in which it held an overwhelming
technological advantage to operations
in Anti-Access and Area Denial environments (A2AD), against adversaries
who command both economic heft and
sophisticated technologies, superiority can no longer be taken for granted.
“To command this new environment,
EM-cyber operations will need to become an inherent element of how we
operate and fight in every situation, all
the time. America’s key military advantage for the past 20 years has been its
ability to sense and create a picture of
our surroundings and use that picture
to control the air, sea, and undersea
domains…That will not be the case in
future conflicts.”25 The United States
urgently needs new methods to deliver
C4ISR, EW, and other kinetic and nonkinetic effects in a contested, full-electromagnetic spectrum EW/cyber warfare
environment. The ability to anticipate,
plan for, and execute operations against
enhanced adversaries’ capabilities – exploiting opponents’ vulnerabilities while
compensating for America’s own – will
be paramount.
“In the near future, if the US technological edge continues to erode, US
forces may not be able to employ their
sensors, or use their computers and communication links effectively in combat,
exposing the vulnerability of heavy emphasis on such systems in current military doctrine. Adversaries have proven
they can use electronic technologies to
elude destruction by US forces while
delivering potent blows against America
and its allies.”26 China and Russia have
clearly demonstrated that EMS investments have paid off. Without persistent
senior leadership attaching a higher
priority to EMS dominance, the US will
4th Annual AOC
Pacific Conference
O CTO B E R 6 -8 , 2 0 1 5 / ABE R DE E N, MD
THIS CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD WITH U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND UNDER A
CO-SPONSORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH AOC.
The co-sponsored symposium consists of two days of unclassified presentations and panel discussions, followed by a classified working
group at Camp H.M. Smith. This working group will be open to US, Australia, Canada, Great Britain and New Zealand (FVEY) nations only.
This year’s event, in association with USPACOM, will cover the role of Information Operations, Electronic Warfare (EW), Cyber
Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), EM Spectrum Operations (EMSO), other Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) and AOC mission
areas, with specific operational and conceptual focus on the emergent threats and challenges posed by Hybrid Warfare. As in previous
Pacific events the Symposium will include Global Allies and Partners from around the Pacific region, who will present their unique
perspectives. The symposium continues 22 October with a classified working group at the SECRET REL FVEY at HQs U.S. Pacific
Command at Camp H.M. Smith. The agenda and instructions for attendance for the classified working group will be coordinated through
official military channels with PACOM J39.
The purpose of the symposium is to bring together government, military, industry, academia, small business and other stakeholders
for discussions on the operational challenges facing the practitioners of these IRCs, and to explore possible technological and tactics/
procedural solutions. To stimulate wider interest and inquiry into these issues, the symposium and related activities and events will
be open to registration by government, industry and academia representatives without regard to their AOC membership status (both
AOC Members and non-members may register) except that access of foreign and any other persons may be restricted as necessary in
accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
GEN Vincent K. Brooks,
Commanding General,
U.S. Army Pacific (Invited)
Lt. Gen. Robert Elder,
USAF (Ret.) - Past AOC President
(confirmed)
Admiral Michael Rogers,
Commander USCYBERCOM, US
(Invited)
Maj Gen Max Tsung-Chi Yu,
Political Warfare Division, Taiwan
Ministry of Defense, ROC (confirmed)
Dr. Paul Zablocky,
Director, I&IW Directorate,
CERDEC, US (confirmed)
SPONSORSHIPS
AND TABLE TOP
DISPLAYS AVAILABLE!
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have trouble riding the next wave of
warfare. Time is of the essence and the
time for aggressive action is now. a
Dr. J. Phillip “Jack” London is Executive
Chairman and Chairman of the Board of
e le ctromagnetic
s p e ctr um
CACI International Inc. He previously
served as President and Chief Executive
Officer (1984-2007). A retired US Navy
captain, London served 12 years active
duty as a naval aviator and 12 years reserve
duty as a designated Naval Aeronautical
(EMS)
Engineering Duty Officer and commanding
officer of aeronautical engineering reserve
units with the Naval Air Systems Command.
He is a graduate of the US Naval Academy,
the US Naval Postgraduate School, and
George Washington University.
Endnotes
1 Patrick Tucker, “How the Army Plans to Fight a War Across the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” DefenseOne, February 26, 2014,
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/02/inside-armys-first-field-manual-cyber-electromagnetic-war/79498/.
2 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” Department of Defense, February 20, 2014,
http://www.defense.gov/news/dodspectrumstrategy.pdf.
3 Brendan Koerner, “Inside the New Arms Race to Control Bandwidth on the Battlefield,” Wired Magazine, February 18, 2014 http://www.
wired.com/2014/02/spectrum-warfare/; Joshua Phillip, “Chinese Military Gets Trained on Electronic Warfare,” Epoch Times, October 18,
2013, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/322299-chinese-military-gets-trained-on-electronic-warfare/.
4 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” op.cit.
5 Thomas Kidd and Mark Rossow, “Spectrum Isn’t Like ‘Other Natural Resources’,” Chips, October-December 2010,
http://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=2347.
6 Jeanette Steele, “Navy in 2014: Undersea drones, Arctic, Marines on new ships; Chief of Naval Operations discusses his to-do list, touches on
Barrio Logan debate,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 1, 2014,
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Feb/01/chief-nava-operations-greenert-agenda-2014/.
7 Office of Naval Research, “Jam Session: New ONR Technology Helps Sailors on the Digital Frontier,” August 5, 2014,
http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2014/Electronic-Warfare-Battle-Management-RIMPAC.aspx.
8 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 2013; A Call to Action,” op.cit.
9 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” Association of Old Crows, May 24, 2011,
http://www.myaoc.org/EWEB/images/aoc_library/Government_Affairs/AOC%20report.pdf.
The Journal of Electronic Defense | September 2015
76
10 Noah Shachtman, “The Secret History of Iraq’s Invisible War,” Wired, June 14, 2011,
http://www.wired.com/2011/06/iraqs-invisible-war/all/1.
11 Adm. Jonathan Greenert, “Wireless Cyberwar, the EM Spectrum, and the Changing Navy,” Breaking Defense, April 3, 2013,
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/04/adm-greenert-wireless-cyber-em-spectrum-changing-navy/.
12 Koerner, op.cit.
13 Robert Haddick, “Forget about China’s missiles and stealth fighter; worry instead about ‘non-kinetic’ combat,” Small Wars Journal, January
19, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/forget-about-chinas-missiles-and-stealth-fighter-worry-instead-about-non-kinetic-combat.
14 Mark Pomerleau, “DoD report cites China’s focus on cyber as a weapon of wartime,” Defense Systems, May 14, 2015,
http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2015/05/14/DOD-report-China-cyber-EW-space-UAVs.aspx?p=1.
15 Koerner, op.cit.
16 Joe Gould, “Guided-Bomb Makers Anticipate GPS Jammers,” Defense News, June 1, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
air-space/2015/05/31/guided-bomb-makers-gps-jammers-battlefield-spoof-munitions-laser-jdam/28117951/.
17 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” op.cit.
18 Koerner, op.cit.
19 Loren Thompson, “Raytheon Prevails Again in Jammer Contest,” Forbes, January 24, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/01/24/raytheon-prevails-again-in-jammer-contest/.
20 Amber Corrin, “DOD launches new spectrum strategy,” Federal Computer Week, February 20, 2014,
http://fcw.com/articles/2014/02/20/dod-spectrum.aspx.
21 George Leopold, “US Spectrum Warfare Strategy Stresses Flexibility,” Defense Systems, November 1, 2013,
http://defensesystems.com/articles/2013/11/01/spectrum-warfare.aspx.
22 “Press Briefing on Release of Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy,” February 20, 2014,
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5374.
23 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “ Navy To Focus on ‘Affordable Technology,’” National Defense, April 8, 2014,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1468.
24 Rich Smith, Boeing Unveils Amazing, Slightly Terrifying New Electromagnetic Pulse Weapon, Motley Fool, May 24, 2015,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/05/24/boeing-unveils-electromagnetic-pulse-weapon.aspx.
25 Adm. Jonathan Greenert, “Imminent Domain,” Proceedings, December 2012,
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-12/imminent-domain.
26 “Electronic Warfare, The Changing Face of Combat,” op.cit.