CHAPTER 3:
UNITED STATES AND PERSIAN GULF
32
Introduction
It has been ages that Persian Gulf has been in the attention of super powers. These countries by
realizing the Persian Gulf strategic and geopolitics‘ conditions tried to dominate the region.
United States is no exception to this rule.
In this chapter the US policy in Persian Gulf will be examined and by mentioning the history of
US relation with Saudi Arabia and United Arab of Emirate in one hand and Iraq on the other
hand, with emphasizes on recent two decades evolutions we will attempt to understand the
reason for US presence in the region and his contrary manner with different actors of the region
(Here Iraq, United Arab of Emirate and Saudi Arabia).
During the cold war Unites State‘s outlook to Persian Gulf was affected by its general policy
towards world which was counter communism and US containment policy. According to this
policy US supported Bagdad treaty in 19551 and signed defensive agreement with Iran in 19592.
The economic motives of US in its policy also should not be ignored as the present of Aramco
Petroleum Company in Saudi Arabia and the role of US in 1953 coup against Dr. Mosadiq can
be mentioned which had a great economical interest for US. However on that period the focus of
US policy was on Cold War issue. After the declaration of United Kingdom for leaving east
region of Suez Channel including Persian Gulf in 19683, power gap was obvious in the region. In
that time before any action of Soviet Union, US by presenting Nixon Twin Pillar Doctrine4was
able to overcome the threat of Soviet Union. So Iran and Saudi Arabia as Two Pillars in the
region undertake the responsibility for regional stability. In 1979 Iran as one of these pillars that
1
Edmund Ghareeb, Beth K. Dougherty, Historical Dictionary of IRAQ, Scarecrow Press, 2004, page 35
Joseph J. St. Marie, Shahdad Naghshpour, Ashgate Publishing Lt, 2011, page 92
3
Talat Parveen, Iran’s Policy Towards the Gulf, Concept Publishing Company, 2006, Page 11
4
Charles Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and The west, WCRC Press,2012, Page 21
2
33
faced a great challenge of instability by the collapse of Shah Regime and new regime was a
significant challenge for US as well as region countries. US by supporting the establishment of
Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which the members consist of south countries of
Persian Gulf and also by supporting Iraq in war against Iran tried to control the situation and
overcome the challenge. By Iraq invasion to Kuwait in 1990 US existence in the region entered
to a new stage, especially when US became the sole power in the world after Cold War. This
topic will be discussed in detail in future.
In this part the relation of US with Iraq and Saudi Arabia as two effectual Arabic countries in the
region will be reviewed. The relation between US and two countries show two different pattern
of US policy in Persian Gulf. Unlike Saudi Arabia that mostly had a friendly and stable relation
with US, Iraq and US relation has been intense and inconsistence, even it results two full scale
war in 1991 and 2003.
Short History of United State – Iraq Relation
However during the cold war Iraq at first was in alignment with West Block and even joined
Bagdad treaty but after the collapse of Monarch Regime in 19581 this country changed his policy
direction toward East Block, by more tendency toward Soviet Union, Iraq was getting more and
more away from US in as much as it result to disassociate of diplomatic relation between US and
Iraq in 19672 in such a way that even several repeatedly coups did not change the situation.
In 1968 Baath Regime got the power in Iraq and the policy toward Soviet Union continued, in
this a military agreement was signed between Iraq and Soviet Union in 19723.
1
Zaki Shalom, The Role of US Diplomacy in the lead up to the six day war, Sussex Academic Press, 2012, page 16.
Fayazmanesh Sas, The United States and Iran, Psychology Press, 2008, page 34
3
Shahram Chubin, Sepehr Zabih, The foreign Relation of Iran, University of California Press, 1974, page 265
2
34
After the Iran Revolution in 1979, US lost one of his allies in Middle East. Radical deployment
of Republic Islamic of Iran against US revolutionized the situation in the region. Hostage
holding of US diplomats by Iran made a critical relation between US and new government of
Iran. Failure of US different projects in releasing his hostages discouraged US for direct
involvement in region but US could not ignore the threat of Iran because the Islamic Republic of
Iran was continuously talking about revolution in the region and supporting Islamist Groups in
other countries so it was capable to destabilize Middle East especially Persian Gulf area and
being a threat to US interests in the region. This situation provokes a close relation between US
and Iraq because Iraq was also concerned about the spread of Iranian attitude among his Shiite
people. In addition there was a border dispute between Iraq and Iran which worked as incentive
for Saadam Hussein to pursue his aim for attacking Iran. There is enough evidence that US
encouraged Iraq to invade Iran1.
During eight years war between Iran and Iraq there was a significant improvement in US-Iraq
relation. In 1984 by opening embassy2 the tie between these two countries got closer. US support
from Iraq was unstoppable during this period which can be seen in selling armament to Iraq,
financial support, security cooperation and Security Council resolution in United Nation during
eight years war3.
The invasion of Iraq to Kuwait entered the relation of US-Iraq into a new stage.
1
M. Saleem Kidiwai, US Policy Towards The Muslim Word, 2010, page 109
Touraj Daryaee, The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History, Oxford University Press, 2012, Page 375
3
Farhang Rajaee, The Iran Iraq War, University Press of Florida, 1993, Page 106
2
35
Persian Gulf War
In 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi petroleum through slant drilling, although some
Iraqi sources indicated Saddam Hussein‘s decision to attack Kuwait was made only a few
months before the actual invasion. Some feel there were several reasons for the Iraqi move,
including Iraq's inability to pay more than $80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the IranIraq war and Kuwaiti overproduction of petroleum which kept revenues down for IraqThe
invasion started on 2 August 1990, and within two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti
Armed Forces were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard or escaped to neighboring
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The state of Kuwait was annexed, and Hussein announced in a few
days that it was the 19th province of Iraq1.
Kuwait was a close ally of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war and functioned as the country‘s major
port once Basra was shut down by the fighting. However, after the war ended, the friendly
relations between the two neighboring Arab countries turned sour for several economic and
diplomatic reasons that culminated in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Dispute over the financial debt2
Kuwait had heavily funded the eight-year-long Iraqi war against Iran. Kuwait's large-scale
economic assistance to Iraq often triggered hostile Iranian actions against it. Iran repeatedly
1
2
Spencer C. Tucker, Battles That changed History, ABC-CLIO, 2010, Page 592
Eur, The Middle East and North Africa 2003, Routledge, 2003, page 440
36
targeted Kuwaiti oil tankers in 19841 and fired weapons at Kuwaiti security personnel stationed
on Bubiyan Island in 19882
By the time the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the US$14
billion it borrowed from Kuwait to finance its war and requested Kuwait to forgive the debt. Iraq
argued that the war had prevented the rise of Persian influence in the Arab World. However,
Kuwait's reluctance to pardon the debt created strains in the relationship between the two Arab
countries. During late 1989, several official meetings were held between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi
leaders but they were unable to break the deadlock between the two.
Economic warfare and slant drilling3
In 1988, Iraq's then Oil Minister, Issam al-Chalabi, stressed a further reduction in the crude oil
production quota of OPEC members so as to end the 1980s oil glut. Chalabi argued that higher
oil prices would help Iraq increase its revenues and pay back its US$60 billion debt. However,
given its large downstream petroleum industry, Kuwait was less concerned about the prices of
crude oil and in 1989, Kuwait requested OPEC to increase the country's total oil production
ceiling by 50% to 1.35 million bpd. Throughout much of the 1980s, Kuwait's oil production was
considerably above its mandatory OPEC quota and this had prevented a further increase in crude
oil prices. A lack of consensus among OPEC members undermined Iraq's efforts to end the oil
glut and consequently prevented the recovery of its war-crippled economy. According to former
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, "every US$1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a US$1
1
Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990, page 100
Saskia Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, I.B. Tauris, 1999, page 30
3
Eur, Previous
2
37
billion drop in Iraq's annual revenues triggering an acute financial crisis in Baghdad."1 It was
estimated that between 1985 and 1989, Iraq lost US$14 billion a year due to Kuwait's oil price
strategy2. Kuwait's refusal to decrease its oil production was viewed by Iraq as an act of
aggression against it.
The increasingly tense relations between Iraq and Kuwait were further aggravated when Iraq
alleged that Kuwait was slant-drilling across the international border into Iraq's Rumaila field3.
The dispute over Rumaila field started in 1960 when an Arab League declaration marked the
Iraq-Kuwait border 2 miles north of the southern-most tip of the Rumaila field. During the Iran–
Iraq War, Iraqi oil drilling operations in Rumaila declined while Kuwait's operations increased.
In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of using "advanced drilling techniques" to exploit oil from its share
of the Rumaila field. Iraq estimated that US$2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil was "stolen" by Kuwait
and demanded compensation4. Kuwait dismissed the accusations as a false Iraqi ploy to justify
military action against it. Several foreign firms working in the Rumaila field also dismissed
Iraq's slant-drilling claims as a "smokescreen to disguise Iraq's more ambitious intentions".
On 25 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit daily oil output to 1.5 million barrels,
thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq5. At the time of the
settlement, more than 100,000 Iraqi troops were deployed along Iraq-Kuwait border and
1
Darwin C. Hall, Oil and National Security, Energy Policy, November 1992
Pratheek Praveen Kumar, My Time, My World, PRATHEEK, 2009, Page 65
3
Henri J. Barkey, Scott B. Lansensky, Phebe Marr, Iraq, Its Neighbors and the United States, US Institute of Peace
Press, 2011, Page 31
4
Idem
5
Professor Rodney P Carlisle, John S. Bowman, Persian Gulf War, Infobase Publishing, 2003, Page 53
2
38
American officials expressed little indication of decline in tensions despite the OPEC
settlement1.
Iraqi hegemonic claims2
Many westerners believed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was largely motivated by its desire to
take control over the latter's vast oil reserves. The Iraqi government justified its invasion by
claiming that Kuwait was a natural part of Iraq carved off as a result of British imperialism. After
signing the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the United Kingdom split Kuwait from the
Ottoman territories into a separate sheikhdom3. The Iraqi government also argued that the
Kuwaiti Emir was a highly unpopular figure among the Kuwaiti populace. By overthrowing the
Emir, Iraq claimed that it granted Kuwaitis greater economic and political freedom.
Kuwait had been loosely under the authority of the Ottoman vilâyet of Basra, and although its
ruling dynasty, the Al Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that
assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede
from the Ottoman Empire4. For this reason, its borders with the rest of Basra province were
never clearly defined or mutually agreed. Furthermore, Iraq alleged that the British High
Commissioner "drew lines that deliberately constricted Iraq's access to the oceans so that any
future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain's domination of the Persian
Gulf".
1
Idem
Eur, Previous
3
Michael S. Casey, The history of Kuwait, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, Page 86
4
Al Sadi, Crushing State’s Sovereignty, AuthorHouse, 2011, page 76
2
39
Diplomatic row1
Post Iran–Iraq War and dispute over Rumaila oilfield, the diplomatic relations between Iraq and
Kuwait deteriorated dramatically, triggering several heated exchanges between Iraqi and Kuwaiti
diplomats during various regional and Persian Gulf Cooperation Council summits.
Iraqi-American relations
On 25 July 1990, the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, April Glaspie, asked the Iraqi high command to
explain the military preparations in progress, including the massing of Iraqi troops near the
border.
The American ambassador declared to her Iraqi interlocutor that Washington, ―inspired by the
friendship and not by confrontation, does not have an opinion‖ on the disagreement between
Kuwait and Iraq, stating "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts2."
She also let Saddam Hussein know that the U.S. did not intend "to start an economic war against
Iraq". These statements may have caused Saddam to believe he had received a diplomatic green
light from the United States to invade Kuwait3.
According to Prof. Richard E. Rubenstein, Glaspie was later asked by British journalists why she
had said that, her response was "we didn't think he would go that far" meaning invade and annex
the whole country. Although no follow-up question was asked, one might assume that what the
US government thought in July 1990 was that Saddam Hussein was only interested in pressuring
Kuwait into debt forgiveness and to lower oil production.
1
Eur, Previous
Martha C. Howell, Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources, Cornell University Press, 2001, Page 73
3
Idem
2
40
The Invasion
On 2 August 1990 at 2:00 am, local time, Iraq launched an invasion of Kuwait with four elite
Iraqi Republican Guard divisions (1st Hammurabi Armoured Division, 2nd al-Medinah alMunawera Armoured Division, 3rd Tawalkalna ala-Allah Mechanized Infantry Division and 6th
Nebuchadnezzar Motorized Infantry Division) and Iraqi Army special forces units equivalent to
a full division1. The main thrust was conducted by the commandos deployed by helicopters and
boats to attack Kuwait City , while the other divisions seized the airports and two airbases.
In support of these units, the Iraqi Army deployed a squadron of Mil Mi-25helicopter gunships,
several units of Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters, as well as a squadron of Bell 412
helicopters. The foremost mission of the helicopter units was to transport and support Iraqi
commandos into Kuwait City, and subsequently to support the advance of ground troops. The
Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) had at least two squadrons of Sukhoi Su-22, one of Su-25, one of Mirage
F1 and two of MiG-23fighter-bombers2. The main task of the IrAF was to establish air
superiority through limited counter-air strikes against two main air bases of Kuwaiti Air Force,
whose planes consisted mainly of Mirage F1's and Douglas (T)A-4KU Skyhawks. Meanwhile,
certain targets in the capital of Kuwait City were bombed by Iraqi aircraft.
In spite of months of Iraqi sabre-rattling, Kuwait did not have its forces on alert and was caught
unaware. The first indication of the Iraqi ground advance was from a radar-equipped aerostat that
detected an Iraqi armour column moving south Kuwaiti air, ground, and naval forces resisted,
but were vastly outnumbered. In central Kuwait, the 35th Armoured Brigade deployed
1
Captain Les’ Melnyk, Mobilizing for the Storm, National Guard Bureau office of Public Affairs, Historical Service
Division, 2001,
2
Idem
41
approximately a battalion of Chieftain tanks, BMPs, and an Artillery battery against the Iraqis
and fought delaying actions near Al Jahra, west of Kuwait City. In the south, the 15th Armoured
Brigade moved immediately to evacuate its forces to Saudi Arabia. Of the small Kuwaiti Navy,
two missile boats were able to evade capture or destruction.
Kuwait Air Force aircraft were scrambled, but approximately 20% were lost or captured. An air
battle with the Iraqi helicopter airborne forces was fought over Kuwait City, inflicting heavy
losses on the Iraqi elite troops, and a few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces.
The remaining 80% were then evacuated to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, some aircraft even taking
off from the highways adjacent to the bases as the runways were overrun. While these aircraft
were not used in support of the subsequent Persian Gulf War, the "Free Kuwait Air Force"
assisted Saudi Arabia in patrolling the southern border with Yemen, which was considered a
threat by the Saudis because of Yemen–Iraq ties1.
Iraqi troops attacked Dasman Palace, the Royal Residence, resulting in the Battle of Dasman
Palace. The Kuwaiti Emiri Guard, supported by local police and M-84 tanks managed to repel an
Airborne assault by Iraqi Special Forces, but the Palace fell after a landing by Iraqi Marines
(Dasman Palace is located on the coast). The Kuwaiti National Guard, as well as additional
Emiri Guards arrived, but the palace remained occupied, and Republican Guard tanks rolled into
Kuwait City after several hours of heavy fighting.
The Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah had already fled into the Saudi desert2.
His younger half brother, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, was shot and killed by
invading Iraqi forces as he attempted to defend Dasman Palace after which his body was placed
1
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14472626/Geopolitics-Oil-Dilpomacy (The Oil World, A Geopolitical Warfield)
Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, iUniverse, 2003, page 103
2
42
in front of a tank and run over, according to an Iraqi soldier who was present and deserted after
the assault.1
Towards the end of the first day of the invasion, only pockets of resistance were left in the
country. By 3 August, the last military units were desperately fighting delaying actions at choke
points and other defensible positions throughout the country until out of ammunition or overrun
by Iraqi forces. Ali al-Salim air base of the Kuwaiti Air Force was the only base still unoccupied
on 3 August, and Kuwaiti Aircraft flew resupply missions from Saudi Arabia throughout the day
in an effort to mount a defense. However by nightfall, Ali al-Salim air base had been overrun by
Iraqi forces. From then on it was only a matter of time until all units of the Kuwaiti Military were
forced to retreat or be overrun2.
The last few Kuwaiti Chieftain tanks of the 35th Mechanized Brigade fought until the afternoon
of 4 August; left without ammunition and fuel, they were then forced to pull back into Saudi
Arabia. This effectively ended military resistance to the Iraqi invasion.
Basically, America had been looking for a good excuse to gain a stronger military presence in
the Middle East for 50 years and this was the perfect excuse, the Bush administration wasn‘t
going to let it slip away. At the same time, it was in the interest of all of the developed world,
and much of the Arab world, not to let Iraq become any stronger, which is why a coalition was
able to be put together, basically everyone wanted to keep Iraq down.
Essentially, Iraq was becoming too powerful. Despite its setbacks during the Iran/Iraq war Iraq
was still a ―well run‖ and progressive country in 1990. The Iraqi people were well educated,
1
2
Idem
Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm, Government Printing Office, 1999, Page 197
43
healthcare was good, and the military strength of Iraq was still strong. On top of that the Bush
administration was well aware of the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction programs because
America was partly responsible for the development of the Iraqi weapons programs.
Because of all these factors, the Bush administration was intent on being able to destroy Iraqi
infrastructure as well as significantly hurting the Iraqi military in such a way that Iraq would be
greatly set back developmentally so that Iraq would not be able to become increasingly
successful, at least not under Saddam.
There was no attempt to overthrow Saddam at the time because it was felt that it may destabilize
the region, and because there had not been enough time to put together a satisfactory replacement
government. There were many other political issues involved as well, such as George Bush‘s fear
that American casualties in a push towards Baghdad would lower his popularity rating and hurt
his chances at re-election.
Diplomatic means
Within hours of the invasion, Kuwait and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the United
Nations Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and
demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops.1 On 3 August, the Arab League passed its own
resolution, which called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against
outside intervention; Iraq and Libya were the only two Arab League states which opposed a
resolution for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.2 The PLO opposed it as well.[48][49] The Arab states
of Yemen and Jordan – a Western ally which bordered Iraq and relied on the country for
1
2
Elias C. Hill, The Rise, the Fall and the Recovery of the USA, Xlibris Corporation, 2009, Page 195
Eur, Previous, Page 596
44
economic support – opposed military intervention from non-Arab states. The Arab state of Sudan
aligned itself with Saddam.
On 6 August, Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq. Resolution 665 followed soon
after, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions. It said the ―use of measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward and
outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure strict implementation of resolution 661.‖1
From the beginning, U.S. officials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without any
linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, fearing any concessions would strengthen Iraqi
influence in the region for years to come.
On 12 August 1990, Saddam called for compromise via Baghdad radio and the former Iraqi
News Agency. Hussein "propose[d] that all cases of occupation, and those cases that have been
portrayed as occupation, in the region, be resolved simultaneously". Specifically, he called for
Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, Syria to withdraw
from Lebanon, and "mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iran and arrangement for the situation in
Kuwait."2 He also called for a replacement of U.S. troops that mobilized in Saudi Arabia in
response to Kuwait's invasion with "an Arab force", as long as that force did not involve Egypt.
Additionally, he requested an "immediate freeze of all boycott and siege decisions" and a general
1
2
Eur, Previous, Page 441
Eur, Previous, Page 440
45
normalization of relations with Iraq From the beginning of the crisis, Bush was strongly opposed
to any "linkage" between Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue.1
On 23 August, Saddam appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had
refused exit visas. In the video, he asks a young British boy, Stuart Lockwood, whether he is
getting his milk, and goes on to say, through his interpreter, "We hope your presence as guests
here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent the
scourge of war."2
Another Iraqi proposal communicated in August 1990 was delivered to U.S. National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft by an unidentified Iraqi official. The official communicated to the
White House that Iraq would "withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave" provided
that the U.N. lifted sanctions, allowed "'guaranteed access' to the Persian Gulf through the
Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah", and allowed Iraq to "gain full control of the Rumaila
oil field that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory". The proposal also "include[d] offers to
negotiate an oil agreement with the United States 'satisfactory to both nations' national security
interests,' develop a joint plan 'to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems' and 'jointly
work on the stability of the gulf.'"3
In December 1990, Iraq made a proposal to withdraw from Kuwait provided that their forces
were not attacked as they left, and that a consensus was reached regarding the banning of WMD
in the Palestinian region.4 The White House rejected the proposal. The PLO's Yasser Arafat
1
Idem
Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, Iraq Speaks: Document on the Gulf Crisis, DIANE Publishing,
1993, Page 916
3
Newsweek, Volume 116, 1990
4
Dilip Hiro, Previous, Page 289
2
46
expressed that neither he nor Saddam insisted that solving the Israel-Palestine issues should be a
precondition to solving the issues in Kuwait, though he did acknowledge a "strong link" between
these problems.
Ultimately, the U.S. stuck to its position that there would be no negotiations until Iraq withdrew
from Kuwait and that they should not grant Iraq concessions, lest they give the impression that
Iraq benefited from its military campaign. Also, when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met
with Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland, for last minute peace talks in early 1991, Aziz
reportedly made no concrete proposals and did not outline any hypothetical Iraqi moves.1
On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which gave Iraq until 15
January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait and empowered states to use "all necessary means" to
force Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline.2
One of the West's main concerns was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia.
Following Kuwait's conquest, the Iraqi Army was within easy striking distance of Saudi oil
fields. Control of these fields, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have given Saddam
control over the majority of the world's oil reserves. Iraq also had a number of grievances with
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq some 26 billion dollars during its war with Iran. 3 The
Saudis backed Iraq, as they feared the influence of Shiites Iran's Islamic revolutionon its own
Shiite minority. After the war, Saddam felt he shouldn't have to repay the loans due to the help
he had given the Saudis by fighting Iran.
1
Richard Alan Schwartz, The 1990s, Infobase Publishing, 2009, Page 105
st
Alex Conte, Security in The 21 Century, Ashgate Publishing, 2005, Page 123
3
http://www.madison.va.gov/features/Operation_Desert.asp (Operation Desert Shield)
2
47
Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudis. He argued that
the U.S.-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy guardian of the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina. He combined the language of the Islamist groups that had recently fought in
Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.
Acting on the Carter Doctrine's policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an invasion
of Saudi Arabia, U.S. President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would
launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia under the
codename Operation Desert Shield.1 Operation Desert Shield began on 7 August 1990 when U.S.
troops were sent to Saudi Arabia due also to the request of its monarch, King Fahd, who had
earlier called for U.S. military assistance.2
U.S. decoy attacks by air attacks and naval gunfire the night before Kuwait's liberation were
designed to make the Iraqis believe the main Coalition ground attack would focus on central
Kuwait.
For months, American units in Saudi Arabia had been under almost constant Iraqi artillery fire,
as well as threats from Scud missile or chemical attacks. On 24 February 1991, the 1st and 2nd
Marine Divisions, and the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion crossed into Kuwait and headed
toward Kuwait City.3 They encountered trenches, barbed wire, and minefields. However, these
positions were poorly defended, and were overrun in the first few hours. Several tank battles
took place, but apart from that, Coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi
troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before
1
Elias C. Hill, Previous, Page 195
Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm, DIANE Publishing, 1999, Page 4
3
Craig L. Symonds, William J. Clipson, The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the US Navy, Naval Institute Press,
2001 ,226
2
48
surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine U.S. aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from
Arab states advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few
casualties.1
Despite the successes of Coalition forces, it was feared that the Iraqi Republican Guard would
escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into
Kuwait fifteen hours ahead of schedule, and to send U.S. forces after the Republican Guard. The
Coalition advance was preceded by a heavy artillery and rocket barrage, after which 150,000
troops and 1,500 tanks began their advance. Iraqi forces in Kuwait counterattacked against U.S.
troops, acting on a direct order from Saddam himself. Despite the intense combat, the Americans
repulsed the Iraqis and continued to advance towards Kuwait City.2
Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only light resistance. The
Kuwaitis lost one soldier killed and one plane shot down, and quickly liberated the city. On 27
February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and Bush declared it liberated. 3 However, an
Iraqi unit at Kuwait International Airport appeared not to have gotten the message, and fiercely
resisted. U.S. Marines had to fight for hours before securing the airport, after which Kuwait was
declared secure. After four days of fighting, Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. As part of a
scorched earth policy, they set fire to nearly 700 oil wells, and placed land mines around the
wells to make extinguishing the fires more difficult.4
Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of
Palestinians, due to PLO support of Saddam. Yasser Arafat didn't apologize for his support of
1
http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Gulf-War.pdf (Persian Gulf War)
Idem
3
Sam Pender, America’s War With Saddam, Virtualbookworm Publishing,2004, Page 51
4
Bob Rees, Jane Bigham, Gulf War with Iraq, Raintree, 2013, 39
2
49
Iraq, but after his death, the Fatah under Mahmoud Abbas' authority formally apologized in
2004.1
Shortly afterward coalition force under the leadership of US entered into Iraq and Sedum‘s army
was defeated. In Coalition-occupied Iraqi territory, a peace conference was held where a
ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides. At the conference, Iraq was
approved to fly armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for
government transit due to the damage done to civilian infrastructure2. Soon after, these
helicopters and much of Iraq's military were used to fight a Shiite uprising in the south. The
rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The Voice of Free Iraq" on 2 February 1991, which
was broadcast from a CIA-run radio station out of Saudi Arabia.3 The Arabic service of the
Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was large, and that they
soon would be liberated from Saddam.4
In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they would support an uprising to
heart, and began fighting, hoping to trigger a coup d'état. However, when no U.S. support came,
Iraqi generals remained loyal to Saddam and brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising. Millions of
Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran5
There was some criticism of the Bush administration, as they chose to allow Saddam to remain
in power instead of pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their
co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft argued that such a
1
http://www.europeanforum.net/country/palestinian_territories
Nina Eckert, The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath, GRIN Verlag, 2008, Page 4
3
th
Joseph J Conte, The 14 Final Crusade to Middle East, AuthorHouse, 2010, Page 36
4
Idem
5
Joseph J Conte, Previous, Page 37
2
50
course would have fractured the alliance, and would have had many unnecessary political and
human costs associated with it.
There were different consequences by the end of the war.
On 6 August 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
661 which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, providing for a full trade embargo, excluding
medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, these to be determined by the
Council's sanctions committee. From 1991 until 2003, the effects of government policy and
sanctions regime led to hyperinflation, widespread poverty and malnutrition.
During the late 1990s, the U.N. considered relaxing the sanctions imposed because of the
hardships suffered by ordinary Iraqis. According to U.N. estimates, between 500,000 and 1.2
million children died during the years of the sanctions.1
Clinton Foreign Policy toward Iraq
Clinton was also confronted with problems in Iraq. In 1991, two years before Clinton became
president, the United States under President George H. W. Bush participated in the Persian Gulf
War to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. In 1991, the warring parties signed a cease-fire
agreement and the United Nations Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 687 requiring Iraq
to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and allow inspectors from the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) to monitor the country's adherence to the agreement. In
addition to UN inspections, to ensure the Iraqi compliance of UNSC Resolution 688 which
called for Iraq to end its oppression of Iraqi citizens, the no-fly zones over Iraq were established
1
Wendell Gary M DIV, Wendell Gary, Save me in Night, AuthorHouse, 2011, Page 531
51
by the U.S. and its allies to protect the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Shiites in southern Iraq
from aerial attacks by the Iraqi government.
On June 26, 1993, Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service's
(IIS)1 principal command and control complex in Baghdad, publicly announced as retaliation for
the assassination attempt by the IIS on former President George H. W. Bush while he was
visiting Kuwait in April of that year to commemorate a coalition victory over Iraq in the Persian
Gulf War. Fourteen cruise missiles were launched from the USS Peterson and nine were
launched from the USS Chancellorsville2. Sixteen of the missiles hit the target; three struck a
residential area, killing nine civilians and wounding 12. Four of the missiles were unaccounted
for. This strike was in violation of international law, although that point is contentious
In October 1994, Baghdad once again began mobilizing around 50,000 Iraqi troops near the
Kuwaiti border3 because of their expressed frustrations of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq
by the United Nations Security Council. In response, the U.S. begins to deploy troops in the
Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
In Clinton's 1998 State of the Union Address, he warned Congress of Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein's possible pursuit of nuclear weapons:4
The UNSCOM team faced resistance from Iraq, which blocked inspections and hid deadly germ
agents and warheads. Clinton then threatened military action several times when Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein attempted to stall the UNSCOM inspections. To weaken Saddam Hussein's grip
1
Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars, ABC, 2010, 1690
Idem
3
Micheal Pracher, JonathanWikenfeld, Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press, 1997, Page 322
4
Jr George Dunlap Burns, Our Dying Republic, Xulon Press, 2011, Page 255
2
52
of power, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law on October 31, 1998, which instituted a
policy of "regime change" against Iraq1, though it explicitly stated it did not speak to the use of
American military forces. On December 16–19, 1998, Clinton ordered four days of concentrated
air attacks against military installations in Iraq2. This was in response to Saddam's refusal to
cooperate with UN inspectors. After the bombing, Hussein blocked any further UN inspections
and announced its attempt to shoot down Coalition aircraft in the no-fly zones over Iraq3. For
several years afterward, U.S. and Coalition aircraft routinely attacked hostile Iraqi defense
installations in Iraq, in response to what the Clinton administration claimed were "provocations"
by the Iraqi military, including antiaircraft fire and radar locks on U.S. and Coalition aircraft.
The UN sanctions against Iraq that the United Nations Security Council imposed after the
Persian Gulf War remained in place during the Clinton administration. These sanctions are
alleged to have contributed to increased child mortality there. Albright later wrote "Saddam
Hussein could have prevented any child from suffering simply by meeting his obligations.4
George Bush Jr Foreign Policy Toward Iraq
In late 2002 and early 2003, Bush urged the United Nations to enforce Iraqi disarmament
mandates, precipitating a diplomatic crisis5. On November 13, 2002, under UN Security Council
Resolution 1441, Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei led UN weapons inspectors in Iraq6. There
1
Spencer C. Tucker, Previous, Page 623
Deepak Sarkar, Kolki, Real Path to 9/11, Trafford Publishing, 2010, Page 28
3
Albert J. Mauroni, Where Are the WMDs?, Naval Institute Press, 2006, Page 112
4
Joy Gordon, Invisible War, Harvard University Press, 2010, Page 18
5
Matthew J. Flynn, First Strike, Taylor & Francis, 2008, Page 215
6
Idem
2
53
was controversy over the efficacy of inspections and lapses in Iraqi compliance. UN inspection
teams departed Iraq upon U.S. advisement given four days prior to the U.S. invasion, despite
their requests for more time to complete their tasks. The U.S. initially sought a UN Security
Council resolution authorizing the use of military force pursuant to Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. Upon facing vigorous opposition from several nations (primarily France and
Germany), however, the U.S. dropped the bid for UN approval and began to prepare for war;
Benjamin Ferencz, a former chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg Trials argued that for these
actions Bush, with his Administration, could be prosecuted for war crimes.1Kofi Annan, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, as well as leaders of several nations made similar statements, implying that the
attack constitutes a war crime.2
In order to comply with the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution by Congress, on March 18, 2003, Bush certified to Congress that he had "determined
that: (1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic and other peaceful means alone will
neither (A) adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq nor (B) likely lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and (2) acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public Law
107-243 is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary
actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations,
organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001.3
1
Peter Phillips, Andrew Roth, Censored 2009, Seven Stories Press, 2011, Page 60
Gregg Barak, Criminal Justice, ABC-CLIO, 2007, Page 184
3
th
United States of America Congressional Record proceeding and Depates of the 110 congress, Government
Printing Office, 2008, Page 11871
2
54
The war effort was joined by more than 20 other nations (most notably the United Kingdom and
Australia) who the Bush Administration designated the "coalition of the willing. The invasion of
Iraq commenced on March 20, 20031, ostensibly to pre-empt Iraqi WMD deployment and
remove Saddam from power. The Iraqi military was quickly defeated. The capital, Baghdad, fell
on April 9, 2003.2 On May 1, 2003, Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq in
a speech from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln.3 This speech would become known as his
"Mission Accomplished" speech due to a banner with that slogan in view overhead. At the outset
of the speech, Bush stated: "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the Battle of Iraq,
the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and
reconstructing that country. In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the
peace of the world‖4
The initial success of U.S. operations had increased Bush‘s popularity, but the U.S. and allied
forces faced a growing insurgency led by sectarian groups. As the situation deteriorated, Bush's
May 1, 2003 "Mission Accomplished" speech would be criticized as premature. The Bush
Administration was also criticized in subsequent months following the report of the Iraq Survey
Group, which did not find the large quantities of weapons that the regime was believed to
possess. On December 14, 2005, while discussing the WMD issue, Bush stated that "It is true
that much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong‖5. Bush nevertheless continued to assert the
war had been worthwhile and confirmed he would have made the same decision if he had known
more.
1
Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East, University of California Press, 2010, Page 204
Mehran Karmrava, Previous, Page 205
3
Amy V. Cardosa, Iraq at the Crossroads, Nova Publishers, 2007, Page 52
4
George W. Bush, Jay Nordlinger, We Will Prevail, Continuum International Publishing, 2003, Page 259
5
Sami El Soudani, In The Beginning, Xlibris Corporation, 2010, Page 650
2
55
In 2004 through 2006 the situation in Iraq deteriorated, with some observers arguing that the
country was on the brink of, if not already engaged in, a full scale civil war. Bush's policies
regarding global terrorism and the war in Iraq met increasing criticism, with increasing demands
within the United States in 2006 to set a timetable to withdraw troops from Iraq. Sectarian
violence and political deadlock in Iraq at the end of 2006 increased negative impressions of
Bush's leadership and of the situation in Iraq.
The report of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group led by Republican James Baker came out in late
2006, concluding that the situation in Iraq was "grave and deteriorating"1 and recommending that
the then present military course of action be modified. In particular, the ISG recommended that
the Bush administration (1) launch a diplomatic offensive with Iraq's neighbor states, particularly
Iran, to help achieve stability2, and (2) redeploy U.S. forces to shift their focus from combat and
security operations to that of supporting the Iraqi army, with the expectation that U.S. combat
forces not necessary for force protection could be withdrawn from Iraq by March 20083
They accused critics, mainly Democrats who have called for a U.S. troop pullout or a timetable
for withdrawal, of advocating a policy of "cut-and-run. Bush accept that there were some
strategic mistake in Iraq and later in NATO Summit 2006 he emphasized that "We'll continue to
be flexible, and we'll make the changes necessary to succeed. But there's one thing I'm not going
to do: I'm not going to pull our troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete."4
1
Duncan Watts, Dictionary of American Government and Politics, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, Page 33.
Kishore Mahbubani, The new Asian Hemisphere, Public Affairs, 2009, Page 278
3
A.R. Korteweg, The Superpower, The Bridge Builder and the Hesitant Ally, Amsterdam University Press, 2011,
Page 202
4
United State President ( 2000-2009), United State office of the Federal Register, George W. Bush, Government
Printing Office, 2009, Page 2130 - 2131.
2
56
In 2008, the American and Iraqi governments signed the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement
which stipulates that all American forces should withdraw from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and
from Iraqi territory altogether by 31 December 20111. On 14 December 2008, then-U.S. George
W. Bush signed the security pact with Iraq.2 In his fourth and final trip to Iraq, the president
appeared with Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and said more work is to be done
Obama Foreign Policy toward Iraq
Barack Obama was against the war in Iraq since it's inception, referring to it as a "dumb war"
and repeatedly stated that we should be as "careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting
into it"3. He has asserted that his position was that an invasion would embolden extremism and
distract from the war on terror. This opposition goes as far back as 2002 and extends through the
entirety of the 2008 election. As part of his presidential campaign, Senator Obama pledged
repeatedly to withdraw forces at a pace of 1-2 brigades per month and to have all troops out
within 16 months
Although Obama had previously said he wanted all the U.S. troops out of Iraq within 16 months
of becoming President4, after he won the primary, he said he might "refine" that promise. After
assuming office, Obama abandoned the previous withdraw plan and followed a plan set up by
Bush in the Iraqis in late 2008.
1
Marty Piatt Architect, If I Was President, My Blueprint For America, AuthorHouse, 2012, Page 141
John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad ad Back, Naval Institute Press, 2012, Page
206
3
John Davis, Barack Obama & US Foreign Policy, AuthorHouse, 2009, Page 49
4
Calvin F. Exoo, The Pen and the Sword, Sage, 2009, Page 148
2
57
All American military forces were mandated to withdraw from Iraqi territory by 31 December
2011 under the terms of a bilateral agreement signed in 2008 by Bush, The withdrawal was
started in June 2009 and was completed by December 2011, bringing an end to the Iraq War.1
However after exit of US troops the US is likely to continue to exert considerable influence over
Iraq issues as American influence in Baghdad will be guaranteed by the presence of the largest
US Embassy in the world. With an overall staff of nearly 17,000,2 the Embassy, together with the
State Department (DoS), will play a central role in channeling political influence, economic aid,
and overseeing on-going training operations, particularly the Iraqi Police Development Program
(DPD).3
United State and Saudi Arabia Relation
During Cold War
Saudi Arabia after independence has always been supported by West block and his foreign
policy has been parallel with global policy of West blocks especially United States. Saudi Arabia
is one of the important players in the region and responsible for protecting west countries interest
and his role is like a balancer in radical Arab world policy.(Jamal Abdul Nasser policy)
This country has the largest oil reserves in the world. The contract of oil discovery that was
signed between Malik Abdul Aziz Benn Saud and Standard Oil Company in California. 4 When
the reserve oil and its production has increased especially in mid twenties century the relation
between United States and Saudi Arabia has also increased. For the first time Franklin Roosevelt
1
Spencer C. Tucker, Previous, Page 1159
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR009/tardelli.pdf
3
Idem
4
Russ Baker, Family of Secrets, Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2010, Page 288.
2
58
in 1943 asserted the importance of Saudi Arabia as a Strategic country for United State
interest.1From Truman government in 1950 all the presidents of United States were responsible
for protecting the unity in Saudi Arabia territory.
After the defeat in Vietnam, Unites State changed his policy during the Cold War. US policy in
this regard was according to Nixon‘s Twin Pillar policy which Iran as one of the pillars and
Saudi Arabia as other one were two pillars in Middle East. US by sending military supply to
these two great powers in the region was after protecting the security in Persian Gulf for
continuity of US interest. According to this doctrine Iran was a military pillar and Saudi Arabia
was financial pillar as well as Godfather for Arab countries in the region.
Despite friendly relation between US and Saudi Arabia they faced obstacles in their relation as In
November 1964, Faisal became the new king after the conflicts he had with his brother Saud, the
erstwhile king.2 The US, on the other hand was not sure about the outcome of such unplanned
change in the Saudi monarchy. King Faisal was cooperating neatly with the US until October 20,
1973; it was the relationship‘s largest obstacle before 9/11. King Faisal had decided to contribute
in an oil embargo against the United States and Europe in favor of the Arab position in the Yom
Kippur War causing an energy crisis in the US.3 ―America‘s complete Israel support against the
Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United States with oil, or even
remain friends with the United States‖4 King Faisal in an interview with international media. By
1974, after a lot of changes that happened at that era, Saudi Arabia started pumping oil to the US
1
st
Robert J. Lieber, The American Era, Power and Strategy for the 21 Century, Cambridge University Press, 2005,
Page 128
2
Spencer C. Tucker, Previous, Page 135-136
3
Spencer C. Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts, The Encyclopedia of the Arab –Israel Conflict, ABC-CLIO, 2008, Page
133
4
Sreedhar, War for Kuwait, ABC Pub. House, 1991, Page 31
59
again.1 Although the embargo was not running for a long time, it truly had a great impact on the
world‘s foreign policies and the US-Saudi relations. Since the oil embargo, the US-Saudi
relations had been in the process of rebuilding another healthy relationship. The Saudis increase
of oil production to stabilize the oil price and the support of anti-communism have all
contributed to closer relations with the US.
With the evolution in seventies this policy changed to a UniPillar policy as Saddam Hussein tried
to extend his influence in the region and in Iran ,political Islam emerged. So Saudi Arabia was
counted as the axis in the US policy in the region and Unipillar policy improved.
With the change in balance of power in Persian Gulf after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, US for
protecting security in the region and his interest empowered Saudi Arabia military force so that
he can replace the gendarme of region. Saudi Arabia due to influence of Washington strategic
interest and also his security concern in eighties and nineties spent a huge amount for buying
military armament between 1985-1991. Military purchase of US arms by Saudi Arabia was one
of the important and stable axis between US-Saudi Arabia relation and always a concern for US
policy. In 1980 United State start the establishment of military bases for Saudi Arabia and spend
billions of dollars.
In the end of 1990 decade, the collapse of Soviet Union and end of communism threat, end of
Iran – Iraq war and Kuwait occupation by Iraq changed the type of concern and security threats
of Saudi Arabia and also it changed the US strategy in region.
Post Cold War
The Persian Gulf War
1
http://www.socialistalternative.org/literature/gulfwar/ch1.html
60
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had sparked the beginning of another bloody war, the
Persian Gulf War. During the Persian Gulf War, the security relationship had greatly increased
and strengthened. After the invasion, Fahad, the king of Saudi Arabia at that time, had officially
declared war against Iraq. Also, President George H. W. Bush had declared war against Saddam
Hussein who invaded an ally nation and risked the oil interests in the nation. Also the US was
concerned about the safety of Saudi Arabia against Saddam's intention to invade and control the
oil reserves in the region. As a result, President Bush sent a great number of troops to
protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion after Fahad‘s approval; this operation was called Desert
Shield. Furthermore, the US had sent additional troops in operation Desert Storm with nearly
100,000 Saudi troops1 sent by Fahad to form a US-Saudi army alliance and including other
troops from allies‘ countries to attack Iraqi troops in Kuwait to stop further invasion. During
the Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi troops were defeated easily within four days of the operation
causing the Iraqis to flee back to Iraq.
Relation in 1992 – 2001
The end of the Cold War eliminated the shared anti-Communist interests that had helped define
U.S. Saudi security relations since the late 1940s. Continuing interests in preventing conflict
from threatening the political status quo in the Persian Gulf region and from interrupting the
continued flow of Saudi oil to international markets remained strong. U.S.-Saudi differences
over the Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional issues also persisted.
The U.S.-Saudi relationship went less well during the Clinton administration. Clinton was not
interested in Saudi Arabia. He got off to a very bad start with the Saudis, and relations went on
―autopilot,‖ The Saudis got so worried that in fall of 1998, then-Crown Prince Abdullah (now the
1
Sherifa Zuhur, Saudi Arabia, ABC-CLIO, 2011, Page 65
61
king) came to Washington to attempt to revive the relationship1. He met with all the old U.S. oil
companies that had been in Saudi Arabia and essentially said, ―We‘re open for business.‖ He
invited them to submit proposals for coming back into the kingdom to look for gas and perhaps
later oil.2
The Clinton Administration‘s policy of― dual containment‖3 of both Iraq and Iran was supported
in part by U.S. military personnel based in Saudi Arabia, 24 of whom were killed and hundreds
of whom were injured in two terrorist bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and Dhahran in 1996.4Inside
the kingdom, Saudi political activists sought to reopen domestic debates over fiscal policy
,constitutional government, and foreign policy that had been largely proscribed by the
government since the 1950s and 1960s. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, citizens submitted
several petitions to King Fahd calling for reform, and several Islamist opposition figures who
were critical of the Saudi government were imprisoned. The pan-Islamic solidarity movement
that drove Saudi involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s continued to inspire international
activism among Saudis, as private Saudi citizens, Saudi government charitable committees, and
international Islamic charity organizations based in the kingdom funneled financial and material
support to a range of Muslim groups around the world.5 This included support for entities and
individuals engaged in or victimized by nationalist conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Kashmir, Kosovo, and the West Bank and Gaza. At times, this support complicated U.S. policy
and peacemaking efforts in those regions and, whether directly or indirectly, contributed to the
development and sustainment of a transnational network of violent activists, some of whom were
affiliated with Al Qaeda. U.S. policy makers‘ concern about these trends predated the
1
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1421.200908.ottaway.ussaudiarabia.html
Idem
3
John Davis, Previous, Page 23
4
Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: background and US relations, DIANE Publishing, 2010, Page 5
5
Idem
2
62
September11, 2001, terrorist attacks, as evidenced by Clinton Administration‘s efforts to secure
Saudi cooperation with regard to Saudi detainees and citizens suspected of supporting
international terrorism.1
As the first post-Cold War decade of U.S.-Saudi relations came to a close, the bilateral
relationship remained strong in traditional areas such as defense cooperation, but showed signs
of weakness in other areas. Political ties were challenged by the lingering effects of anti-U.S
.terrorist attacks, disagreements over the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian fighting from late2000onward, and basic incompatibilities in some U.S. and Saudi figures‘ expectations
concerning political reform and human rights in the kingdom.2
Impact of 9/11 event on US-Saudi Arabia Relation
The direct participation of 15 Saudi nationals in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks kindled
strong criticism in the United States of Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in
acting against terrorist groups. Saudi Arabia issued a statement on the day of the terrorist attacks
on America's World Trade Center and Pentagon, calling them "regrettable and inhuman." 3 Saudi
recognition to the Taliban stopped and as of November 2001, the Bush administration continued
to publicly praise Saudi support for the war on terrorism. However, published media reports have
indicated US frustration with Saudi in action The attacks constituted the most serious challenge
to U.S.-Saudi relations4since the 1973-1974 oil embargoes, and some analysts have since
contended that Al Qaeda planners may have chosen a large number of Saudi participants for the
attacks in an attempt to damage U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi officials have acknowledged the
1
Idem
David R. Nagunian, Saudi Arabia: a hotbed of unrest?, Nova Science Publishers, 2009, Page 8
3
Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty First Century, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003, Page
254
4
David R. Nagunian, Previous
2
63
deeply negative effect the attacks had on Saudi Arabia‘s relations with the United States. Al
Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden is a Saudi national, although Saudi authorities revoked his
citizenship in 1994.1Some critical commentators have gone as far as to accuse Saudi government
officials of responsibility for the September 11 attacks through design or negligence. Others have
taken a longer-term view and argued that Saudi policy decisions over several decades directly or
indirectly supported the development of certain types of religious extremism and international
terrorism, which now threaten citizens of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. In
particular, many critics of Saudi policies have cited reports that the Saudi government permitted
or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by some charitable religious groups and foundations
that espoused extremist ideologies or were linked to or exploited by Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.2 As noted above, this trend emerged as an outgrowth of a pan-Islamic solidarity
movement in Saudi Arabia that began under King Faisal in the 1960s and 1970s and was
embraced by the United States in the 1980s as an asset during the anti-Soviet struggle in
Afghanistan .Nevertheless, by the 1990s, Osama bin Laden and other Saudi dissidents had
increased their criticism of the Saudi government‘s domestic and foreign policies and its close
relationship with the United States.3 Bin Laden and his followers declared war on the United
States in 1996,4ostensibly to secure the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Arabian Peninsula
and the broader Middle East.12 Following September 11, 2001, Bin Laden sought to justify the
attacks as are sponse to what he and his supporters perceived to be anti-Islamic U.S. policies in
the Middle East and other regions. However, Al Qaeda rhetoric condemning secular democracy,
U.S. society ,and aspects of Western culture leads many observers to question the notion that Bin
1
Nino P. Tollitz, Saudi Arabia: Terrorism, US relation and Oil, Nova Publishers, 2005, 29
David R. Nagunian, Previouse, Page 9
3
Christopher M. Blanchard, Previous, Page 6
4
Idem
2
64
Laden and other Al Qaeda figures were then or are now motivated by political concerns that can
be distinguished from a broader religious or cultural agenda. Al Qaeda attacks in the kingdom
following the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops in 2003 created further doubts about Al
Qaeda‘s stated motives.
In 2003, several attacks occurred inside Saudi Arabia. The attacks targeted US compounds,
Saudis ministry of interior and many other places.1 Many people were killed in those attacks
including mostly Saudis and Americans. Furthermore, the US decided to redevelop the Saudi law
enforcement agencies by providing them with anti-terrorism education, latest technologies, and
by giving them the chance to interact with US law enforcement agencies2 to gain efficient
knowledge and power needed to handle terrorist cases and to enforce anti-terrorist laws . In an
interview with lieutenant colonel Dr. Tariq Al sheddi, head adviser of the Saudi General
Directorate of Investigation, he stated that the large US-Saudi law enforcement cooperation
handled both the political and information-sharing aspects in the counter-terrorism issues. For
instance, they created a mechanism of pressure on ―the countries and organization that support
terrorism‖. Also, according to Dr. Al sheddi, a ―communication channel‖ has been created after
the 9/11 attacks, but it was not very open until the terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia that made the
flow of information between the US and Saudi law enforcements much stronger.
After these changes, the Saudi government was obviously able to prevent terrorist activities.
They had caught a large number of Saudi terrorists and terrorists from other countries (some of
them were Americans) that had connections with Al-Qaida in one way or another. Some of these
criminals were leaders with a high rank in the terrorist society which helped to stop many
1
2
Elena Mastors, Alyssa Deffenbaugh, The Lesser Jihad, Rowman & Litttlefield, 2007, Page 47
Anthony H. Cordesman, Previous, Page 216
65
terrorist cells. In matter of months Saudi law enforcement officials were successfully able to stop
and prevent terrorist activities.1 Also they were successful of finding the source of terrorist
financing.
Funding terrorism
Some of the public charities were found to be the main source of money for Al-Qaeda and
their terrorist activities . At the same time, public charities were to be investigated by Saudi law
enforcement to make sure that the money was not supporting terrorism
Money is the most important resources for terrorism, Saudi Arabia with the aid of America has
establish money transfer control unit to assure the eligibility of any money transfer said Dr.
Alsheddi. After these activities domestic and terrorism clearly declined since they don‘t have
efficient money to finance their activities. Today, terrorist activities are well under control in
Saudi Arabia by the strong anti-terrorism US-Saudi cooperation .
The two nations still cooperate and share information about the latest Al-Qaeda movements to
make sure that Al-Qaeda‘s propaganda doesn‘t spread and contaminate people and to prevent
new terrorist movements and attacks. The US-Saudi anti-terrorist cooperation has obviously
enhanced the relationship to be beyond oil, making Saudi Arabia America‘s most important
security-wise nation.2Furthermore, leaders from both countries have met in many occasions
discussing a broad vision of the relationship varying from oil to terrorism.
Diplomatic Visit
1
Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: National Security in Trouble Region, ABC-CLIO, 2009, Page 51
USA International Business Publication, Saudi Arabia King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz, Int’l Business Publication, 2005,
Page 192
2
66
After President George W. Bush's two visits to Saudi Arabia in 20081—which was the first time
a US president visited a foreign country twice in less than four months—and King Abdullah‘s
three visits to the US—2002 (Crown Prince), 2005 and 2008—the relations have surely reached
their peak.2 The two nations have expanded their relationship beyond oil and terrorism. For
example, King Abdullah has allocated funds for young Saudis to study in the United States.3 One
of the most important reasons that King Abdullah has given full scholarships to young Saudis is
to give them western perspective and to impart a positive impression of Saudi Arabia to the
American people. On the other hand, President Bush discussed the world economic crisis and
what the US-Saudi relationship can do about it. Also, during the meetings with the Saudis, the
Bush Administration took the Saudi policies very seriously because of its economic and defense
powers in the region and its great media influence on the Islamic world. By and large, the two
leaders have made many decisions that deal with security, economy, and business aspects of the
relationship, making it in the top of its fame.
The Israel-Arab conflict is still and will probably stay as a major disagreement between the two
sides, especially after Saudi King Abdullah's initiative aimed at solving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
The Obama Era
By contrast, President Obama has gotten off to a good start with the Saudis in the sense that
he‘s saying the things they‘ve long wanted to hear. This is an American president who says
we‘ve got to get peace talks going at the beginning of his administration, not waiting until the
1
Spencer C. Tucker, Previous, Page 4
2
USA International Business Publications, Previous, Page 30
Mereno Muffatto, Paolo Giacon, Entrepreneurial Strategies and Policies for Economic Growth,
Libreriaunivesitaria.it.ed, 2012, Page 197
3
67
end of his administration. He‘s putting pressure on the Israelis to stop settlements before the
West Bank can no longer be a viable state for the Palestinians. His first interview with any
international publication was with al-Arabiya, a Saudi-run television station. He went to Saudi
Arabia before he went to Cairo on June 23 20091 and made his speech to the Muslim world. So
he‘s off to a good start, but when he went to Saudi Arabia before Cairo, he was trying to push the
king to take steps toward initial recognition by Saudi Arabia of Israel. Things like allowing their
diplomats or people with Israeli passports into the kingdom, possibly allowing Israeli planes to
overfly Saudi Arabia.2 From the Saudi point of view, these are things you do at the end of the
process, not at the beginning, because they‘re bargaining chips in the negotiating process
between the Palestinians and Israel. And this is not even to mention Iraq. While US supporting
the government of President Nouri al-Maliki, the Saudis have refused to open an embassy in
Iraq. They will not invite Maliki to Saudi Arabia, regarding him as an agent of Iran.3
So US was struggling to identify areas where we can cooperate. Most recently the issue has been
the price of oil, where the Saudis now want to get the price up to $75-80 per barrel and
Americans want to keep it lower because of the economic situation. Whether the two
governments can establish (or reestablish) a sound economic and security relationship remains a
work in progress.4
United State – United Arab of Emirate Relation
1
Sherifa Zuhur, Previous, Page 499
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1421.200908.ottaway.ussaudiarabia.html
3
Idem
4
Idem
2
68
The United States was the third country to establish formal diplomatic relations with the UAE
and has had an ambassador resident in the UAE since 1974.1 The two countries have enjoyed
friendly relations with each other and have developed strong government-to-government ties
including a close security cooperation.
The UAE‘s strategic relationship with the United States dates back to the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.2 Subsequent to joining the military effort, the two countries signed an agreement in late
1992 allowing for US bases on Emirate soil.3 July 25, 1994, a formal Defense Cooperation
Agreement has been in place.4Ten years later, despite publicly opposing the US led war on Iraq,
the UAE permitted a minimal amount of US forces to support the operation from the Al Dhafra
air base, Jebel Ali, and naval facilities at Fujairah.5 Enhancing security relations, has been a US
arms sale in March 2000 to the Emirates, valued at $8 billion and included over $2 billion worth
of weapons, munitions, and services.6
A nuclear deal was signed between the US and the UAE meant to supply nuclear technology,
expertise and fuel. Despite international opposition to neighboring Iran‘s nuclear developments,
the US is confident of the UAE‘s compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and
the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to refrain from enriching uranium and
extracting plutonium. It firmly believes this agreement "has the potential to usher in an era of
responsible nuclear-energy development throughout the Middle East.‖Global Security.org, "New
1
Malcolm C. Peck, The A to Z of the Gulf Arab State, Scarecrow Press, 2010, Page 30
Kourosh Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf, Psychology Press, 2008, Page 184
3
Edward V. Linden, Focus on Terrorism, Volume 7, Nova Publisher, 2007, Page 80
4
Malcolm C. Peck, Previous, page 59
5
Keneth Katzman, United Arab Emirates: issue for US policy, DIANA Publishing, 2010, Page 9
6
Anthony H. Cordesman, Khalid R AL – Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars , Greenwood,
Publishing Group, 2007, Page 289
2
69
U.S.-U.A.E. Deal Raises Eyebrows Amid Concern Over Iran's Nuclear Program," January 16,
2009.1
On January 15, 2009, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the United
Arab Emirates, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a bilateral agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation that enhances international standards of nuclear non-proliferation.2
President Barack Obama subsequently endorsed the agreement and submitted it to Congress on
May 20, 2009 for the mandatory 90-day review. After a hearing on Capitol Hill in July 2009,
leaders of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees issued
resolutions supporting the US-UAE nuclear cooperation agreement."
On April 23, 2009, ABC News released a video of UAE Royal Sheikh Issa bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, "the crown prince's brother torturing a man, allegedly because he cheated him on a grain
deal."3 On April 29, 2009,CNN reported that the controversy over the torture tape was delaying
the ratification of the US-UAE nuclear agreement .Ultimately, the tape didn't lend up holding up
the agreement, which was officially submitted to Congress by President Obama in May 2009and
endorsed by key Congressional leaders in the subsequent months.4
Commercially, the UAE is also the States' largest export market in the Middle East constituting
$11.6 billion in exports annually.5
The source of the UAE‘s sovereign wealth has been oil sales. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the
federation‘s proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of
1
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2009/usa-090116-rferl01.htm (January 16, 2009)
Christopher M. Blanchard, United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed US nuclear Cooperation, DIANA
publishing, 2010, Page 5
3
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=7402099#.UNUrH29QTks (April 22, 2009)
4
Kenneth Katzman, previous, Page 7
5
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/pegged-to-dollar-gulf-currencies-have-depreciatedreport_10035374.html (April 06 2008)
2
70
exports at the current production rate of about 2.5 million–2.7 million barrels per day (mbd). Of
that, over 2 mbd are exported, and the UAE may have as much as 500,000 bpd of spare
capacity.1Small amounts of its oil exports go to the United States. 2
In March 2005, the US opened negotiations on a free trade agreement3 and despite recent
increasing depreciation of Persian Gulf currencies, the UAE dirham remains pegged to the
plunging dollar. The two countries have also maintained close ties through an exchange of
cultural and educational partnerships which include the Guggenheim Museum, and a number of
American Universities opening campuses in the Emirates.4
Reasons for Presence of US in Persian Gulf
As it is clear from above discussion Persian Gulf has a significant position in the US foreign
policy. US has been trying to have an outstanding presence in the region, a presence which even
after the cold war not only decreased but it also increased, forasmuch this country entered into
two full scale war in 1991 and 2003 with Iraq and now he has concluded military and security
agreement with all Arabic states in Persian Gulf.
Here the question rises that what is the reason of this much US attention to Persian Gulf and why
US follows a contradictory relation with different states of the region. When he has a friendly
relation with countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab of Emirate and other monarch
countries in such a way that even when a tension happened he tried to solve it in a peaceful way.
On the other hand he entered twice into the war with Iraq and imposed tough sanctions against
this country in intervals of these two wars.
1
Kenneth Katzman, Previous, Page 12
Idem
3
Leslie Alan Glick, Guide To United States Customs and Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2010, Page 257
4
http://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/partnerships?id=99
2
71
In following the most important reasons have been mentioned for the presence of United States
in Persian Gulf and attempt has been made to examine the validity of issue.
1. Clash of Civilization
The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington, stating that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source
of conflict in the post-Cold War world.
This theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture at the American Enterprise
Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of
Civilizations?", in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the
Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order.
Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global
politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human
rights, liberal democracy, and capitalist free market economy had become the only
remaining
ideological
alternative
for
nations
in
the
post-Cold
War
world.
Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a
Hegelian sense.1
1
Paul A. Cantor, Gilligan Unbound: Pop Culture in the Age of Globalization, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, Page 37
72
Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted
to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that
the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.1
As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of
cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.
In the end of the article, he writes:
This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth
descriptive hypothesis as to what the future may be like.2
Huntington also articulates the clash of Western and Islamic world and different factors
leading to this clash.3 There are also other newly emerged factors which had intensified the
interaction, more recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote,
are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of
Western universalism—that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western
values—that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists.4 All these historical and modern factors
combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail
in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western
civilizations.
Accordingly some believe that US presence in Persian Gulf is under a West-Islam clash
framework and a fight with Islamic Fundamentalism, while history and available reality
shows the invalidity of this view. Unites State in eighties by a close cooperation with one
1
Ram Puniyani, Contemporary India: overcoming sectarianism and terrorism, Hope India Publication, 2008, Page
315
2
Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, Geopolitics Reader, Psychology Press, 2006, Page 169
3
Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Lethal, Jon Wiley & Sons, 2011, Page 122
4
Idem
73
of the most fundamentalist countries viz Saudi Arabia organized and equipped Islamic
extremists groups to fight against the opponent super power (Soviet Union) during the
Afghanistan occupation. Even if we justify the US act in accordance with fight against
communism expansion(in that time)what we can say about the close relation between
Unites sate and Saudi Arabia after cold war? US in a situation when guaranteed stability
and security in Saudi Arabia on the other hand following an unfriendly relation with Iraq
which ultimately lead to collapse of Baath Regime. Despite Saddam‘s regime was a non
democratic, human right violator and minatory to region stability but it was not definitely
an Islamic country let alone to be fundamentalism. So the presence of United State in
Persian Gulf according to Clash of Civilization does not sound base on available reality.
1. Human right and Democracy
Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people around the world has
found renewed importance in the American foreign policy after the Cold war. Concern for
human rights is nothing new in this policy. For instance, the US State Department has been
placing the Annual Human rights Report (AHRR) before the American Congress since 1977
for discussions on human rights conditions around the world.1 The report contains human
rights practices and abuses in every individual country. The importance of this report has
enhanced greatly after the assistance to individual countries. On the basis of this, the US
Congress often decides American assistance to individual countries. The importance of this
report has enhanced greatly after the cold war because the label of biased evaluation put on it
during the Cold War by non Western block has been removed. The AHRR is now considered
as an important, mostly unbiased, document on human rights. The US Congress puts a bar on
1
Chatterjee Aneek, International Relations Today: concept and application, Pearson Education India, 2010, Page
231
74
American financial and security assistance to those countries accused of human rights
violation by this report. Sometimes, American diplomatic relations suffer with countries
accused of human rights violation by the AHRR. Normally, the US tries to avoid relations of
economic, political or security-related significance with countries alleged by the AHRR of
violation of human rights. But there are exceptions in case of important powers. For instance,
China is almost regularly accused by the report of gross violations of human rights. Going by
normal practices, the US would need to avoid any significant relationship with China. But
after the Cold War, American economic and political ties with China have been growing
significantly. US-CHINA two-way trade is almost ten times more than US-India bilateral
trade. Although the US congress admonishes China almost regularly for human rights
violation. The attraction of a huge market in China is impossible to ignore for the American
private and government businesses.1 The market potentiality of China provides and
explanation for the soft American attitude toward China, although at the same time the US
take a very hard stance in case of smaller countries (and markets) like North Korea, Libya,
Sudan, Serbia, etc2.- all accused by the AHRR of human rights violations. This proves that
for an economic and industrial giant like the US, trade and economic interests often score
over human rights issues.
In Persian Gulf however some are trying to certify the presence of US in the region as an
attempt to protect human right and expansion of democracy and try to prove their claim by
citing to Iraq case, but the reality is that the US action in the region is affected by other
factors. Americans might have forgotten but Kurds and especially Shiites groups have not
forgotten how in 1991 when they revolted against Saddam by relying on US support, US at
1
2
Idem
Idem
75
the same time announced ceasefire with Saddam and left them alone with Baath suppressor
Regime.
Also In spite of US government obligation by his Congress on limiting military and security
cooperation with the countries that violate human rights1 but still we can see broad security
cooperation and selling of military equipment by this country to non democratic and human
rights violator countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab of Emirate.
Even during Libyan revolution while US with the aim of supporting revolutionists under
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had military intervention in Libya, but still
in the people‘s revolt against Bahrain government, US played a passive role and no serious
action had been taken by him against Al Khalifa regime. Even when Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates send their military forces into Bahrain2 to help the government against people,
US did not condemn their action. So as it was discussed earlier the presence of Unites States
base on protecting human rights and expanding democracy is out of reality.
2. Oil
The Persian Gulf region is home to Two-Third of the world‘s proven crude oil reserves.3 It is
also world‘s main supplier of fossil fuel energy .The United States is the world‘s major
energy consumer, spending almost one-fourth of the global energy. Crude oil, natural gas,
coal, nuclear, and renewable materials are the main energy sources for the United States.
According to the 2006 Energy Outlook Report, US oil consumption is 40.08 percent.4
1
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 1999, Page 124
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011314124928850647.html
3
Joseph Joe Hobbs, Andrew Dolan , World Regional Geography, Cengage Learning, 2008, Page 228
4
US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2009, Government Printing Office, 2009, Page 112
2
76
In 2004, US demand for oil products reached 20.76 million bpd, of which 8.63 million
barrels were produced domestically and 12.11 million barrels were imports. With an average
growth rate of 1.1 percent in 2030, the figure will reach 57.27 million bpd. In 2030, US will
have to import 17.24 million bpd of crude and produce the rest domestically. Littoral States
of Persian Gulf is in third place of main sources of supply for US with 11.2 percent.1
In 2030, crude imports will make around 64 percent of its total energy, half of which will
come from OPEC2 member states. Crude imports from the North Sea, just like domestic
sector, will drop in that year. Canada and Mexico will also preserve their position as
important oil distributors in the period, though this will depend on the crude price in the
world market, since oil exploration and exploitation costs in these countries are still higher
than those in the Persian Gulf.
The report of 2001 entitled ‗Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the
World‘s Oil Report‘, was more skeptical in this respect. Based on the report, US crude
production of 8.5 million bpd in 2002 will decrease to 7 million bpd in 2020. At the same
time, the current consumption of 19.5 million bpd will go up by 25.5 million bpd.3
From what has been discussed it can be understood that Persian Gulf as one of the largest oil
reserve resources had and will continue to have an important position in US foreign policy.
The history can be traced back even after second World War and US policy in Persian Gulf
can be analyses under his attempt for reaching oil resources and securing oil production.
During the World War II, US officials were extremely concerned over the potentiality of
falling huge energy resources of Persian Gulf into the hands of their enemies. Those concerns
1
Mahmoud Yazdan Fam, Persian Gulf Oil: US Challenge and Policies, The Iranian Journal of International Affairs,
Vol.xx, Winter 2007-2008, Page 121
2
Previous, Page 125
3
Previous, Page 130
77
together with rivalry on control over the oil resources of the region became a major challenge
after the World War II. Price hikes of the 1970s and rising demand for oil in the industrial
nations intensified the so- called anxieties. During the period, US crushed nationalist
movements and fought against the intrusive policies of former Soviet Union in order to
secure and stabilize its own regional position and those of its European allies, especially
England. After the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal, the US became the only
force in charge of the security of oil supply to the industrial world. In 1970s, the Western
world witnessed the birth of a major player in the field of energy emerging since 1962 and
due to the developments in Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and the two Arab-Israeli wars of 1967
and 1973, a new player got more prominence role in the world oil market, it was the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),1 whose decisions pushed up oil
prices in the decades that followed. At the end of the 1979s, the US lost main ally (Iran) in
the Persian Gulf. A revolutionary group took control of Mecca‘s Grand Mosque2 and became
the symbol of resistance and instability in the world‘s biggest oil producing country. At the
same time, the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to get closer to the Persian Gulf.
These developments, plus the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, resulted in a 3.5 million bpd
drop in crude production for a period of six years, hence triggering the second oil shock. In
the 1980s, the Iraq-Iran war led to the so-called oil tanker wars in the Persian Gulf waters.
Consequently, the US had to re-register Kuwaiti oil tankers under its own flag to escort them
safely out of the region.3 It also did everything at its disposal to undermine the growing
influence of OPEC in the world market. It also institutionalized its military presence in the
1
Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: the secret relation between two most powerful Dynasties, Simon and
Schuster, 2004, Page 26
2
Wayne H. Bowen, The History of Saudi Arabia, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008, Page 119
3
Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, Page 16
78
Persian Gulf by establishment of several military bases and setting up the CENTCOM (US
Central Command). In the 1990s, oil became even more central to the US policies on the
Persian Gulf. In 1990, when the UN Security Council was reviewing the case of Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, oil was the most important factor on the agenda of US foreign policy. At
that time advisors to George H.W. Bush was advising him that, ‗Oil is as important as the
violation of international law. Iraq possesses 10 percent of the world‘s proven oil reserves
and has added up another ten percent to its reserves by invading Kuwait. If it also occupies
Saudi Arabia, it could then control over 40 percent of the world‘s oil reserves. Under the
circumstance, it could then easily put immense pressures on the industrial world,
undermining public welfare of Europe and the US.‘ Therefore, based on their opinion, Iraq
had other agenda on its mind that went beyond the attack on Kuwait. Saddam had targeted oil
and US had no other option but to wage war on Iraq. On August 15, 1990, Bush said, ―If
Saddam takes control of world‘s biggest oil reserves he could then threaten our jobs, our way
of life, freedom, and freedom of our allies around the globe.‖1 Therefore, the US and its allies
joined forces to destroy Iraq‘s military prowess and infrastructures, pushing Iraqi troops out
of Kuwait. They then imposed widespread sanctions against Iraq and designated its southern
and northern parts as no-fly zones. All these measures helped the United States to indirectly
control and cordon Iraq. However, amid the hostilities and continuous bombardments of Iraq,
it continued to supply 3.6 percent of US oil needs - second in Persian Gulf after Saudi Arabia
with 10.8 percent.2 In 2001 and during the tenure of President George W. Bush (the junior),
once again oil men became heavily involved in the American politics. President Bush chose
Condoleezza rice as his national security advisor and Dick Cheney as vice president. In their
1
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Eliot , Economic Sanction Reconsidered, Peterson Institute,
2008, Page 290
2
Mahmoud Yazdan Fam, Previous, Page 142
79
view, although a Saddam without oil posed a low risk threat, his Ba‘athist regime was still an
element of regional instability and a danger that could disrupt oil supply at any time. At a
meeting on January 30, 2001, they referred to Iraq as the element of regional instability,
announcing that a new Iraq should be established.
Almost nine months after George Bush became president, terrorists brought down the Twin
Towers of New York. The 9/11 attacks gave the much needed opportunity to the US Neo
Conservatives to sketch out their plan for further control of the oil-rich region of Persian
Gulf. In 2003, American forces launched extensive ground and air attacks against Iraq and
finally invaded and occupied that country. After the occupation, Iraq, which has the third
largest proven oil reserves in the world, became an American ally.
Conclusion:
The US dependency on oil imports has been in an ascending order and despite its many efforts
this will still be the case, and could even get worse, over the next 25 years. Having said that,
extensive measures taken by the United States on energy has helped that country to hold its grip
on the world‘s oil reserves, thus reducing its vulnerability to supply disruptions .Given to it's
over huge energy resources and its role in shaping global economy and policy, the Persian Gulf
has become a nodal point of strategic regional aspects and US foreign policy issues .Therefore
the region can serve as a valuable instrument to control other powers and maintain the US
hegemony. Given the regional and global position of the US, disruptions in oil exports from the
Persian Gulf could usher different results. The past terrorist attacks serve as further proof that
such actions has not had considerable or lasting effect on the world oil market. War between two
80
regional states (such as Iran and Iraq, or Iraq and Kuwait, or Iraq and the US), have had more
significant and sustainable impact on the world oil market though.
However the US has become stronger than ever against possible oil supply disruptions from the
Persian Gulf by reducing domestic vulnerability, diversifying energy resources as well as
holding its grip on the global energy reserves but still this country is more intent on stemming
the influence of other rivals and strengthening its own regional hegemony.
From Washington‘s point of the view, Iran and Russia have trouble-making governments. So the
White House is trying to eliminate their structural position in the world energy market as well as
the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea regions. These two nations have an obstacle in the way of
US hegemony over the huge energy reserves of these two strategic regions. Sabotage or
disruptions in oil supply can give pretext to US for justifying its control and presence in the
Persian Gulf in order to ensure order and stability. But sometimes Washington doesn‘t seem
really concerned over such disruptions since the temporary disputes would increase the need for
having the US forces in the region, which will inevitably increase the contribution of allies to its
agenda. As such, other consumers and rivals could appear more and more vulnerable and in the
long-run, this could go against the interests of independent forces and nations.
Briefly speaking United States by his presence in Persian Gulf is seeking two major purposes.
Primarily US as one of the greatest energy consumers tries to access one of the huge oil reserves
in the world which are is Persian Gulf. Secondly by domination in this region he can gain a
pressure lever (Controlling Oil reserves) in confronting his rivals and stabilize the hegemony,
with regard to that an instrumental role has been given to human right issues, democracy and
fight against Islamic fundamentalism which means anywhere that these factor can facilitate US
in achieving his goal, gravely emphasize has been given to them but when these factors do not
81
have this virtue US pay no attention to them. Accordingly we can clearly understand the US dual
behavior pattern in his relation with Iraq in one hand and fundamentalism Saudi Arabia and other
littoral authoritarian monarch countries in Persian Gulf in other hand. In other words ,there in no
conflict in US behavior.
United States follows significant objectives in the region (Domination on Persian Gulf oil
reserves for supplying his oil demand in one hand and make his rivals vulnerable on the other
hand and finally maintaining his hegemony in the world and for reaching his objectives he uses
different instruments such as human rights, democracy and fight against Islamic fundamentalism.
82