Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010) 824–829
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
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Report
Psychological distance boosts value-behavior correspondence in ultimatum
bargaining and integrative negotiation
Mauro Giacomantonio a,*, Carsten K.W. De Dreu b, Shaul Shalvi b, Daniel Sligte b, Susanne Leder c
a
Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Rome ‘‘Sapienza”, Via dei Marsi 78, 00185 Rome, Italy
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
c
Zeppelin University, Am Seemooser Horn 20, 88045 Friedrichshafen, Germany
b
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 4 January 2010
Available online 7 May 2010
Keywords:
Construal level
Value-behavior correspondence
Integrative negotiation
a b s t r a c t
The present research examined how construal level and social motivation interact in influencing individuals’ behavior in social decision making settings. Consistent with recent work on psychological distance
and value-behavior correspondence (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), it was predicted
that under high construal level individuals’ behavior is based on the social motivation they endorsed, no
matter whether pro-social or pro-self. Two experiments involving ultimatum game (Experiment 1) and
face to face negotiation (Experiment 2) supported the ‘‘increased value-behavior correspondence”
hypothesis by showing that pro-socials were more cooperative and pro-selves were more competitive
under high rather than low construal level. Implications for research on social decision making and psychological distance are discussed.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Construal Level Theory
Among the most pertinent questions pursued in psychological
science is when and why people cooperate with others, thus foregoing immediate personal gain and rendering themselves vulnerable to exploitation by others. What personality factors and
situational influences drive people to prefer fairness over personal
gain, and to seek mutually beneficial agreements rather than personal victory? To contribute to our further understanding of these
and related issues, the current research invokes Construal Level
Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Construal Level Theory distinguishes between concrete and specific construals that emerge
when people focus on psychologically close events and objects,
and more abstract and global construals that emerge when people
focus on psychologically distant events and objects. Extending recent work showing that an abstract level of construal may promote
cooperation (e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2009a, 2009b; Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006; Sanna, Chang, Parks, & Kennedy,
2009), we propose that high psychological distance and concomitant abstract construal strengthen the value-behavior correspondence – it renders people with pro-social motives more
cooperative, and people with selfish orientations less cooperative.
This hypothesis was tested in two experiments, one focusing on
(single-issue) ultimatum bargaining, and one focusing on (multiissue) integrative negotiation.
Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007;
Trope & Liberman, 2003) proceeds on the basis of the assumption
that people mentally represent or construe objects and events at
different levels of abstraction. The content of the higher level, more
abstract construals consists of the perceived essence, gist, or summary of the given information; the content of the lower level, more
concrete construals consists of context-dependent, readily observable features of objects and events. CLT further proposes that construal level is a function of psychological distance, with events and
objects at greater distance being subjected to more global, abstract
construal and events and objects at closer psychological distance
being subjected to more local, concrete construal. Psychological
distance derives from several sources, including temporal (present
versus future), spatial (nearby versus far away), and social (e.g., ingroup versus out-group; Trope & Liberman, 2003).
There is good evidence that construal level influences people’s
perceptions and behaviors. When individuals are primed with a
distant future, consider issues far away, or consider others categorized as out-group, they tend to adopt a higher level of construal in
which abstract and primary features such as goals, desirability concerns, and positive features and arguments are emphasized. When,
in contrast, individuals are primed with a proximal future, consider
issues nearby, or consider others categorized as in-group, they tend
to adopt a lower level of construal in which secondary, concrete
features such as means, feasibility concerns, and negative features
and arguments are emphasized. For e.g., Nussbaum, Trope and
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Giacomantonio).
0022-1031/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.001
M. Giacomantonio et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010) 824–829
Liberman (2003) found that when drawing inferences about others’ distant future behaviors, participants relied more on abstract,
stable dispositions (e.g., personality); when drawing inferences
about others’ short-term behaviors, participants relied more on
concrete situational influences. Similarly when primed with a distant future, individuals use relatively few categories to organize
material; when asked to think about a short-term future, they categorize items in a large number of small categories (Liberman,
Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; for a review see Liberman & Trope,
2008).
Recent work has examined the impact of psychological distance
and construal level on cooperation in situations where cooperation
hurts self-interest yet promotes fairness, the interests of others,
and collective welfare. For e.g., Sanna et al. (2009) examined cooperation in a resource dilemma and found that participants cooperated more when construal level was high rather than low.
Likewise, Kortenkamp and Moore (2006) found that individuals
with a chronic concern with future consequences of their actions,
and who thus can be assumed to have a chronic tendency towards
an abstract level of construal, were more cooperative in a social dilemma. Finally, Henderson et al. (2006); also De Dreu, Giacomantonio, Shalvi, and Sligte (2009) showed that in multi-issue
negotiation, individuals under high construal level paid more
attention to interrelations among issues, developed a better understanding of the task, and negotiated more mutually beneficial, integrative agreements.
Construal level and social motivation: the present research
Whereas the effects of psychological distance and construal level on cooperation appear rather straightforward, the underlying
mechanism remains unclear – why does psychological distance
trigger cooperation rather than competition? In a partial answer
to this question, Agerström and Björklund (2009a, 2009b) recently
proposed that moral concerns are more likely to guide judgments
and behaviors about distant events because moral principles are
represented at an abstract level. In contrast, they argued, selfish
motives and hedonic considerations are represented at a more concrete level and thus are weighted more in a short-term perspective.
Put differently, moral principles are salient under higher levels of
construal whereas selfish, hedonistic values and considerations
are salient under lower levels of construal. And indeed, Agerström
and Björklund (2009a, 2009b) showed that participants under high
rather than low construal level were more willing to engage in
moral, altruistic behaviors across a variety of situations and scenarios. Furthermore, their work revealed that the effect of psychological distance on moral behavior was mediated by the salience of
moral values.
Psychological distance and concomitant construal level thus
seems to promote pro-social values and moral consideration, thereby increasing cooperative behavior. However, when examining the
relationship between construal level, concern for morality, and
cooperation, an alternative possibility emerges. Values have been
argued to serve as abstract psychological guides and should therefore be more likely to be activated when considering distant future
situations (Eyal et al., 2009; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009). When, in contrast, individuals consider near future events or behaviors, they are
driven more by peripheral and secondary aspects of the situation
such as time pressure or contingent mood states. Put differently,
at high construal level whatever values the individual endorse become a stronger driver of behavior than at low construal level. This
implies that an individual who endorses morality and fairness
(henceforth pro-social motivation; Van Lange, 1999) should become more cooperative under high rather than low construal, as
much as an individual who endorses self-interest and hedonism
825
(henceforth pro-self motivation) should become less cooperative
under high rather than low construal level. Put differently, integrating findings of Eyal et al. (2009) and Torelli and Kaikati (2009), we
suspect that at greater psychological distance individuals with prosocial motives are more likely to act cooperatively, whereas those
with pro-self motives are more likely to act in a competitive fashion. Chronically available or temporarily activated pro-social versus
pro-self motivations will have a stronger impact on cooperation under high rather than low psychological distance. This hypothesis is
consistent with the reasoning of Henderson et al. (2006) who proposed that: ‘‘one might predict that a temporally distant perspective would act as a kind of magnifying glass for negotiators’
motivational orientation, with those with an individualistic orientation exhibiting even more concern for themselves and those with
a cooperative orientation exhibiting even more concerns for others”
(p. 725). We tested this hypothesis by measuring (Experiment 1) or
manipulating (Experiment 2) social motivation while inducing high
(low) level of construal in Ultimatum Bargaining (Experiment 1)
and integrative negotiation (Experiment 2).
Experiment 1
Method
Design and participants
The experiment contained three distinct phases: measurement
of social value orientation to classify participants as pro-social versus pro-self motivated; the manipulation of level of construal; and
an ultimatum bargaining game to assess cooperation. Twenty-six
male and 44 female students of the University of Rome ‘‘Sapienza”
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (high versus low
construal level) 2 (pro-social versus pro-self value orientation)
between-subjects factorial design; money offered in the ultimatum
game was the main dependent variable.
Procedure, tasks, and independent variables
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were seated behind
a computer screen via which all measures and instructions were
administered. Social value orientation was measured using a computerized version of the nine-item decomposed games measure
which has been shown to be a reliable, internally consistent method with high construct validity (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995;
Parks, 1994; Van Lange, 1999). Each item involved a choice among
three different outcomes combinations for the participant and a
hypothetical other (e.g., Option 1: 480 points to You, and 80 points
to Other; Option 2: 540 points to You, and 280 points to Other; Option 3: 480 points to You and 480 points to Other). Option 1 is the
competitive option because it maximizes the difference between
oneself and the other (480–80 = 400); Option 2 is the individualistic choice because it maximizes individual outcome (540 points);
Option 3 is the pro-social choice because it maximizes equality
and joint outcome (480 + 480 = 960). Following past work (e.g.,
De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Parks, 1994) we classified individuals
as pro-social when they made at least six pro-social choices
(N = 26; 37%), and as pro-self when they made at least six competitive or individualistic choices (N = 32, 53%). Twelve (17%) participants were inconsistent in their choices and were excluded from
the analyses. This distribution is consistent with previous research
showing that about 15% of the participants do not make at least six
consistent choices and that about 50% of the remaining population
can be classified as pro-social and the other 50% as pro-self (De
Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008).
Hereafter participants were introduced to an ostensibly unrelated task designed to manipulate psychological distance and concomitant level of construal. Specifically, participants were asked to
M. Giacomantonio et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010) 824–829
write down ten activities or events in which they could be involved
in the near future (Monday next week) or in the distant future
(Monday next year). Typical examples of what participants reported is: ‘‘I will wake up and get a shower” (near future condition)
or ‘‘I will be happy with a new boyfriend” (distant future condition). The manipulation was considered valid when participants reported at least seven activities or events. All participants reached
this threshold. Previous work has shown that this manipulation induces a local versus more global construal level and influences
negotiation processes and outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2009).
Subsequently, participants were told that they would take part
in a computer mediated decision making task involving another
person. Instructions explained that participants were in the role
of a proposer who would make an offer to the other participant
about how to distribute 100€ between themselves and the other.
They learned that they could propose any distribution and that
their offer could be either accepted or rejected by the other participant. We further explained that if the other person would accept,
the money would be distributed as proposed; if, however, the
other person would reject the offer, neither the participant nor
the other person would receive anything (Guth, Schmittberger, &
Schwarze, 1982; see also Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Participants
were ensured that they did not know the other player and would
not meet him or her. Hereafter, participants proposed a division
which was stored in the computer and allegedly communicated
to the other player. They were presented with a short questionnaire that included a manipulation check, and upon completion
participants were thanked and debriefed.
Dependent measures
The main dependent variable was the offer made by participants. To check the adequacy of the construal level manipulation,
participants were asked to rate as a whole the events, actions or
feelings they reported during the manipulation task using four
semantic differential items on scales from 1 to 7 (Burrus & Roese,
2006): (a) important–not important, (b) high priority–low priority,
(c) central in life–secondary in life, (d) long term goal–short-term
goal. Ratings were averaged (a = 0.81) and lower (higher) scores
indicate a lower (higher) level of construal.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
A 2 (pro-self versus pro-social value orientation) 2 (temporal
distance: high versus low) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed
that participants adopted a higher construal level in the high rather
than low temporal distance condition, M = 5.27 versus M = 4.15;
F(1, 53) = 9.85, p < .01, g2 = .16. No other effects were significant.
Ultimatum offer
A 2 2 ANOVA on the ultimatum offer revealed a marginal
main effect for social value orientation, F(1, 53) = 3.54, p = .06,
g2 = .06. Consistent with past work, pro-social individuals offered
more than pro-selves (M = 47.50 versus M = 43.70). This effect
was qualified by a two-way interaction between construal level
and social value orientation, F(1, 53) = 7.39, p < .01, g2 = .12. Fig. 1
shows greater cooperation among pro-social rather than pro-self
individuals in the high temporal distance condition, F(1,
53) = 10.23, p < .01. In the low distance condition, social value orientation had no effect, F < 1. Furthermore, pro-social individuals
made higher offers in the high rather than low distance condition
(M = 50.36 versus M = 44.10), F(1, 53) = 4.20, p < .05, whereas proself individuals offered less money in the high rather than low distance condition (M = 40.77 versus M = 45.83), F(1, 53) = 3.20,
p < .10 (marginal). This result is consistent with the ‘‘value-behavior correspondence hypothesis”.
Money Offered to the Receiver
826
55
50
45
40
Proself
35
Prosocial
30
Low
High
Construal Level
Fig. 1. Money offered to the receiver as a function of construal level and social value
orientation (Experiment 1).
Discussion and introduction to Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided initial support for the idea that construal
level strengthens the value-behavior correspondence. That is, psychological distance amplified the effect of social value orientation
on proposers’ offers. Experiment 2 was designed to obtain a conceptual replication of this effect in the context of multi-issue, integrative negotiation. We used a richer task, and instead of asking for one
offer, we engaged participants in a fifteen minute dyadic interaction. We measured cooperation as well as the joint outcome participants reached. Prior work on CLT has shown that, in general,
negotiators are more cooperative and reach high joint outcome under high rather than low levels of construal. Based on our findings in
Experiment 1, we hypothesized this effect to emerge when participants have a pro-social rather than pro-self motivation; with a proself motivation, higher levels of construal may actually impede constructive negotiation and result in lower joint outcome.
Another extension of Experiment 1 was that we replaced the
measure of social value orientation by a manipulation of social motives. There is good evidence that pro-social versus pro-self motivation can be temporarily activated using manipulations of
incentives (e.g., a bonus for dyadic versus personal performance),
instructions (e.g., a third party instructing participants to be cooperative versus competitive), or priming (e.g., describing the other
party as ‘‘partner” versus ‘‘opponent”; for a meta-analytic review
see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). In Experiment 2 we used
a priming manipulation to induce, at the dyadic level, pro-social
versus pro-self motivation. We expected social motivation to have
a stronger impact on cooperation and joint outcome in the high
rather than low psychological distance conditions.
Method
Design and participants
Eighty students at the University of Amsterdam participated for
7€ ($9.3 USD). Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and
dyads were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (pro-social
versus pro-self motivation) 2 (high versus low construal level)
between-dyads factorial design. Dependent variables were cooperation, and joint outcome.
Task and procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants received written
instructions for an upcoming labor–management negotiation. Participants were assigned the role of a union [management] repre-
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M. Giacomantonio et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010) 824–829
Dependent variables
Joint outcome was obtained by summing the outcomes reached
by the union and the management representatives. In the questionnaire we assessed cooperation with three items (e.g., ‘‘I tried
to accommodate the other party;” 1 = not at all, to 6 = very much),
and to check whether participants understood the instructions of
both manipulations, participants were asked how much they considered their partner’s (own) interests, how much they saw the
partner as an opponent (partner) and whether they had been asked
to describe activities to engage in next Monday or Monday next
year.
Results and discussion
Manipulations checks
All the participants (n = 40, 100%) in the low construal level
condition answered correctly that they were asked to describe
activities they will engage in next Monday. Similarly, all the participants (n = 40, 100%) in the high construal condition answered correctly that they were asked to describe activities they will engage
in a Monday next year. This indicates that instructions regarding
construal level were well understood.
A 2 2 ANOVA showed that participants were more likely to
see the other negotiator as their partner in the pro-social motivation condition than in the pro-self motivation condition, M = 3.48
versus M = 3.02; F(1, 36) = 5.19, p < .05, g2=.13. No other effects
were significant.
1
We deliberately placed the social motive manipulation before the manipulation
of construal level to avoid the latter influencing the effectiveness of the social motive
manipulation (e.g., that individuals with a local construal level paid more attention to
the specific framing than those with a global construal).
1550
1500
Joint Outcome
sentative to negotiate with a management [union] representative
about the conditions of an employment contract for the firm’s
employees. Negotiation involved six issues. A scoring system indicating the number of points the participant would obtain for various options within each of the six issues (participants were not
shown the payoffs to their counterpart). The scoring system was
designed so that each negotiator could reach an outcome between
0 (in case of total victory to his counterpart) and 1350 (in case of a
total defeat of the counterpart). Because some issues were more
valuable (i.e., provided more points) than others, and rank order
in terms of importance differed within dyads, negotiators could
make tradeoffs that resulted in higher joint gain (maximum
1680) than a middle-of-the-road compromise on each of the six issues (maximum 1350). However, because individuals did not receive their counterpart’s issue chart and were told not to
exchange these issue charts during the negotiation, they were unaware of this integrative potential, and through negotiation and the
exchange of information, they had to uncover possibilities for
trade-off and high-joint gain.
Social motivation was manipulated through instructions (e.g.,
De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006). In the pro-social motive conditions, we consistently referred to the other party as ‘‘your
partner.” In the pro-self motive condition, we consistently referred
to the other party as ‘‘your opponent.” Construal level was then
manipulated as in Experiment 1, after participants had read the
negotiation instructions.1 Upon completion of the construal manipulation task, participants were seated as dyads and given 15 min to
reach an agreement. After 15 min of negotiation, or before if dyads
reached an agreement earlier, the experimenter collected all materials and gave each participant a post-task questionnaire to be filled
out individually and without consulting the counterpart. Then, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and
dismissed.
1450
1400
Prosocial
1350
Proself
1300
Low
High
Construal Level
Fig. 2. Joint outcome as a function of construal level and social motives (Experiment 2).
Joint outcomes
A 2 2 (Construal level Social Motives) ANOVA showed that
pro-socially motivated dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than
pro-self motivated dyads, M = 1477.5 versus M = 1420.5), F(1,
36) = 3.62, p = .07, g2 = .09 (marginal). This effect was qualified by
the construal level social motives interaction, F(1, 36) = 7.78,
p < .01, g2 = .18. Simple effects showed no effect of social motivation in the low distance condition, M = 1475.5 versus M = 1444.1,
F < 1. In the high distance condition, however, pro-socially motivated dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than pro-self motivated dyads, M = 1518.5 versus M = 1353.3, F(1, 36) = 9.92, p < .01
(see Fig. 2). This pattern supports the value-behavior correspondence hypothesis.
Cooperative behavior
A 2 2 ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1,
36) = 4.35, p < .05, g2 = .11. Simple effect analysis showed that under low construal level, social motivation had no effect on cooperation, M = 3.45 versus M = 3.36, F < 1. Under high construal level,
however, pro-socially motivated dyads were more cooperative
than pro-self motivated dyads, M = 3.93 versus M = 3.22, F(1,
36) = 6.24, p < .05, g2 = .15. No other effects were significant. This
pattern supports the value-behavior correspondence hypothesis.
Cooperation correlated with joint outcomes, r = .51, p < .01. To
test for mediation, we regressed the joint outcomes on the dummy-coded main effects of construal level and social motives and
their interaction before and after cooperative behavior had been
controlled for.2 Results showed that the originally significant regression of joint outcome on the interaction term, b = .41, t(36) = 2.79,
p < .01, decreased to a marginally significant level when cooperation
was entered in the model, b = .28, t(36) = 1.96, p = .06. The association between cooperative behavior and joint outcome remained
when the predictors were controlled for, b = .41, t(36) = 2.78,
p = .01, and a directional Sobel-test showed that the change from
simple to multiple regression was significant, z = 1.67, p < .05. In
short, the interaction of construal level and social motivation on
joint outcome was partially mediated by cooperative behavior.
2
The relevance of establishing mediation derives from the fact that joint outcomes
in a negotiation can be achieved through other means than cooperative exchanges.
For e.g., Pruitt and Lewis (1975) showed that integrative agreements can be achieved
through trial-and-error (also see Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, in press), and when
cooperation takes the form of unconditional concession making, it may actually
undermine the development of mutually beneficial, integrative agreements (De Dreu
et al., 2006).
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Conclusions and general discussion
In two experiments, using different tasks and methods, we obtained evidence for the value-behavior correspondence hypothesis: under high rather than low psychological distance and
ensuing abstract rather than concrete levels of construal, pro-socially motivated individuals engage in more fair, cooperative
behavior and achieved more mutually beneficial agreements
whereas pro-self motivated individual engage in less cooperation
and achieve less mutually beneficial, integrative deals. These findings are in line with a basic assumption in Construal Level Theory
(e.g., Eyal et al., 2009) and extend the theory to the domain of social decision making, cooperation, and integrative negotiation.
Replicating previous findings (De Dreu et al., 2000; McClintock
& Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange, 1999), the current work documented
that social motives influences cooperativeness. The current results
contribute to this line of work by demonstrating that these tendencies are amplified when construal level is high and attenuated
when construal level is low. These findings suggest new research
questions. For e.g., under concrete construal, which factors, instead
of social motives, drive negotiators’ behavior? According to CLT,
contextual factors such as, for e.g., time pressure or the negotiation
frame (gain versus loss) could be good candidates. In the present
research such contextual features were held constant across conditions, and new research is needed to further examine this
possibility.
With regard to past work on psychological distance and cooperation, current findings seem to deviate from the replicated finding
that high psychological distance promotes cooperation across the
board (e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2009a, 2009b; De Dreu et al.,
2009; Henderson et al., 2006; Sanna et al., 2009). Specifically, we
replicated this general effect among pro-social individuals, but
found the reverse for pro-self individuals. Two issues are noteworthy, however. First, most of past work did neither measure nor
manipulate social motivation, and it may be that the default for
the majority of research participants in these prior studies has
been to adopt a pro-social rather than pro-self orientation. Indeed,
Experiment 2 revealed how subtle changes in the instructions
effectively induce people to adopt a pro-social or, instead, pro-self
motivation. Perhaps the instructions or tasks used in past work
inadvertently emphasized pro-social values, thus creating the
impression that abstract rather than concrete level of construal
fosters cooperation among all. It should be noted, however, that
Henderson et al. (2006), see also (Henderson & Trope, 2009) held
constant participants’ motivation by instructing them to adopt a
pro-self orientation. This exception brings us to the second issue,
namely that the influence of construal level on cooperation and
negotiation cannot be reduced to an increase versus decrease in value-behavior correspondence. For e.g., in addition to strengthening
the value-behavior correspondence, construal level promotes
simultaneous (versus sequential) offer behavior (Henderson
et al., 2006), facilitates overcoming of obstacles (De Dreu et al.,
2009), and focuses the individual on fundamental interests underlying issues (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010). Indeed,
the second study showed that cooperative behavior – a behavioral
manifestation of the value-behavior correspondence – partially but
not fully mediated effects of construal level and social motivation
on joint outcomes from the negotiation.
A limitation to the current work is that we operationalized psychological distance in terms of the temporal dimension only, leaving open whether other forms of psychological distance such as
spatial or social distance have similar effects. Within CLT social distance is hypothesized to engender abstract levels of construal, but
work on social dilemmas (e.g., Kramer & Brewer, 1984) and negotiation (e.g., Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999) suggest
that facing out-group members induces pro-self motivation
whereas dealing with in-group members fosters pro-social motivation (De Dreu et al., 2000). Thus, when psychological distance is
operationalized as social distance (e.g., Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman,
2008), people not only adopt higher levels of construal but also
more pro-self motivation. More research is needed because, as
shown by the present findings and suggested by previous reasoning, the effect of construal level on cooperation depends on intricate social motives along with the specific dimensions of
psychological distance that are rendered salient.
In many social situations conflict of interest looms around the
corner and long-term futures are at stake. When focusing on the
immediate pleasures and pains, personal successes and failures,
on the short-term consequences of their own behavior, and that
of others, people construe objects and events in concrete, specific
terms. Their basic values and motivational orientations have relatively little impact on their behavioral actions, as they are driven
more by the ‘‘spur of the moment.” But when focusing on the distal
future, including their own behavior, and that of others, people
construe objects and events in more global, abstract terms. Their
basic values and motivational orientations more prominently drive
behavioral tendencies. The distal future renders pro-self individuals less cooperative and undermines their ability to negotiate constructively. Reversely, it renders pro-social individuals more
cooperative, and facilitates them in finding mutually beneficial
agreements. To promote cooperation so as to develop a sustainable
future for many rather than some, we not only need policy makers,
diplomats, and politicians to have pro-social values and endorse
fairness. We also need them to adopt a long-term perspective with
a concomitant abstract level of construal. Only then will they ‘‘walk
the talk” and act in line with their values and basic principles.
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