The notion of emergence
Classic Paper
The notion of emergence
E.S. Russell, C.R. Morris and W. Leslie Mackenzie
with an introduction by Jeffrey A. Goldstein
Previously published as
Russell, E.S., Morris, C.R., and Mackenzie, W.L. (1926) “The notion of emergence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0309-7013, Supplementary Volumes, 6: 3968. Reproduced by kind permission.
Introduction: Emergence, complexity, aggregation, and
transformation
T
his issue’s classic paper was the write-up of a thoughtful and timely conversation on emergence among three leading British scientists and men of letters in
the mid nineteen twenties. The immediate context consisted of how the idea of
emergence was being put forward in Emergent Evolutionism which, at that time, had
significant status in the British Isles and the United States but also with deep connections to influences from Germany, France, and other countries. The very fact that
the discussion was published in the prestigious journal Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society attests to the eminent conceptual position which the idea of emergence had
then attained.
Many of the preceding classic papers published in E:CO have also come out of
Emergent Evolutionism. To emphasize a point often mentioned previously in these
introductions to the classic papers, the phenomenon of emergence had not only
been identified over a century before its current renaissance in the sciences of complex systems, emergence was the subject of rigorous and wide-ranging philosophical
speculation during the first half of the twentieth century. These early discourses on
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emergence remain today as a valuable resource for the key issues, ramifications, and
implications of emergence. I am consistently surprised at the high degree of reinventing the wheel which can be discerned in contemporary discussions of emergence,
especially in philosophy journals. I would have hoped that a little knowledge of history might have gone a long way in avoiding a rehash of the same ideas, many of
which had been more fully and rigorously been developed before. Time could be better spent in the elicitation of fresh perspectives on emergence in the light of new constructs and methods, mathematical and conceptual, as well as the new “laboratories”
of emergence (e.g., computational, biological, and others) which have arisen since the
heyday of Emergent Evolutionism.
The philosopher Brian McLaughlin (1992) has contended that the relevance of
Emergent Evolutionism faded away with the arrival of the quantum bonding theory
of chemical reactions, because it offered a better explication of the emergence of new
properties via micro-constituents and their dynamics than the one associated with
emergence. Since the new properties of chemical compounds supposedly yielded
to this non-emergence explication, there was no longer a need to appeal to emergence. In Goldstein (2013), I draw attention to several contemporary chemists/philosophers of chemistry (Hendy, 2010; Luisi, 2002; and Scerri, 2007) who have dismantled
McLaughlin’s claim. As a result, I suggested that chemical reactions might be a particularly apt image for emergence since they present a powerful conception of transformation even though certain chemical reactions may not be cases of emergence.
But besides the fact that Emergent Evolutionism proposed chemical reactions as
exemplars of emergence, it is important to notice that the main issues of emergence
were taken quite seriously by this sample of prominent scientists and philosophers
ninety years ago. Edward Stuart Russell was an eminent Scottish biologist and philosopher of biology whose perspective leaned towards holism, particularly in regards
to animal morphology which framed his view of emergence. Indeed, at the time of
Emergent Evolutionism, the idea of emergence was often linked with the notion of
whole-making tendencies in nature. This connection prompted attempts to see in
emergence the linchpin of still another philosophy of holism or to separate emergence into a holist and a non-holist variety. According to Talbott (1999), Russell insisted that in a living organism, there were in actuality no separate parts, for a part could
only be sufficiently characterized in terms of its relations to the whole. For Russell,
consequently, the emergent living whole required a shift away from the traditional
mereological viewpoint of separate parts, relating to each other from their position of
being separate parts, and forming an arrangement or aggregation which was taken as
the whole.
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The notion of emergence
W. Leslie Mackenzie was a well-known Scottish medical doctor whose expertise
also included, like Russell, the philosophy of biology as well as forays into the role of
science within human culture medicine and the crucial role of mothers in child development. Moreover, Mackenzie’s work represents the common transciplinarity characterizing emergentist thinkers ever since Mill’s “heteropathic” causality, which acted as
a precursor to the idea of emergence.
C.R. Morris was a distinguished English philosopher who continued the English
idealism of Bradley, Green, and McTaggart. His book on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
was well-known and so was his Introduction to an English version of Leibniz’s Monadology. He taught at Oxford and even had a short stint at the University of Michigan. These three commentators on emergence, then, were certainly no slouches in the
world of philosophy and biology. And, as can be easily discerned from wide-ranging
citations of the English emergentists C.D. Broad, C.L. Morgan, and Samuel Alexander
were capable of getting to the gist of several significant issues surrounding emergence.
The prototype for emergence weaving itself throughout this dialogue was the living organism. This focus on organisms partly stems from the fact that two of the participants were biologists and all three were known for their respective philosophical
takes on biology. One of the founders of Emergent Evolutionism, C.L. Morgan, was
himself an animal behaviorist, and the very notion of emergence was conceptualized
within the framework of evolutionary theory, hence Emergent ‘Evolution’. As emergent
phenomena, living organisms were held to be unpredictable from, and irreducible to,
their “lower” level physico-chemical substrates. At the same time, perhaps paradoxically, it was maintained that there was nothing left-over in emergent phenomena after
being reduced to their substrates (a key theme for Samuel Alexander). This apparent
dilemma was addressed by proto-emergentists through an appeal to the tenet that
the novel wholeness observed in emergent phenomena resulted from the novel arrangement of the substrates, the organization displayed in this new arrangement supposedly sufficing for the radically novel characteristics of emergent phenomena.
In my estimation, this answer on the part of early emergentists is inadequate since
I cannot see why a mere arrangement or rearrangement possesses enough potency
to render emergent phenomena radically novel enough from the substrates of which
the arrangement is composed, so that the emergent are unpredictable from, and irreducible to, the substrates. Consider, for example, E.S. Russell’s invocation of the typical
association of emergence with an increase in complexity, an idea Russell took from
Morgan and which has become a common theme among proponents of emergence
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to this day. For Alexander, the “complexity” relating to emergence was understood in
terms of novel “collocations” of the substrates. What he meant exactly, however, by
“collocation” was never particularly clear, an ambiguity amplified over the years mainly
because “collocation” has become a seldom used term even though at the time of
Emergent Evolution it appears to have meant something familiar to readers. Whatever
the case, “collocation” connoted some type of complicated arrangement or rearrangement of the substrate components.
Over the years, the increase of complexity resulting in an emergent “jump” to novel system behavior and properties has been understood in various ways besides Alexander’s collocations. One can find similar vague suggestions phrased around reaching a threshold of “complexity” in the works of Alan Turing, John von Neumann, and
the current complexity circle refrains about a purported “edge of chaos” or “phase
transition” in networks (even to the extent of recent, and in my opinion, ridiculous
pronouncements about the coming eschatological “singularity” presumably due to
the hyper-connectivity of social networks, universal cellular telephone coverage, and
cloud computing).
Quantitative change and qualitative change
T
he association of emergence with an increase in “complexity” has gained considerably more traction as formulations involving networks and graphs have become center stage in complex systems research. A somewhat farsical image for
all this hoopla about hyper-networks keeps coming to my mind: a telephone switchboard with an alarming increase in the number of plugs and cables that is overwhelming to the switchboard operators. But despite its parodic nature, I think there is a
sound intuition lurking in this image: why should a sheer increase in the quantity of
connections lead to the kind of qualitative radical novelty required for a credible concept of emergence? Of course, this touches on the long-standing metaphysical issue of how quantitative change becomes qualitative change if, in fact, it actually can.
Hegel’s dialectic, for one, struggled with this quandary but along the way, many would
contend, got mired in obscurantism.
To be sure, in research within the fields of networks and graphs, changes in the
dynamics and properties of networks can undergo what are called “phase transitions”
when certain connectivities reach critical levels, e.g., no matter how many nodes there
may be in a network, a small percentage of random linkages can suffice to link nearly
all nodes (Goldstein, Hazy, & Lichtenstein, 2011)—this percentage decreases as the
number of nodes increases. In the case of a social network with 300 nodes with ap134 | Russell, Morris, Mackenzie with Goldstein
The notion of emergence
proximately 50,000 possible links connecting the nodes, only 2% are needed to insure
that nearly all 300 nodes will be connected to each other, i.e., the emergence of a
“giant cluster.” If what is at issue is the flow of information within a network, then the
advent of a giant cluster implies that even marginalized zones of the network (zones
with few connections to more central zones) can be connected to the same information as the less marginalized zones. In terms of innovation this might entail that
“seeds” of novelty become diffused or that certain kinds of optimization via routes
through the network can be effectuated.
Nevertheless, the resulting new arrangements of the nodes in the network generated by the new connectivities have been exterior to the individual nodes themselves.
Certainly this external change of the organization of the system may introduce dramatic changes in the system, but I think such changes would have to stay within the
prescribed nature of the dynamics of the system. What I am trying to get at with this
can perhaps be made clearer with an example, namely, the dramatic nature of the
neural connectivity of human cerebral cortex in comparison to other animals (Hagmann et al., 2008). The different kinds of networks, concentrations of neural pathways, flows of chemico-electric stimulations and signaling and so on in the human
cerebral cortex obviously far outweighs the brain networks of the nematode but also
that of dogs or cats. And this dramatic difference can be observed in the radical difference in kind and scope of human “intelligence” in comparison to the intelligence of
nematodes, dogs, and cats.
But these radical changes associated with radically increased network linkages
must also radically effect the human neurons involved in these connectivities. That is,
vast differences in intelligence cannot be accounted for by the sheer quantitative increase in connectivities that result in the dramatically novel organization of the human
brain. Instead, the neurons themselves must be transformed. Yet the transformation
of the substrates is typically left out in related discussions of emergence, to the detriment, in my opinion, of the plausibility and usefulness of the doctrine of emergence.
Interpreting emergence in terms of an increase in complexity coming about through
an increase in connectivity and the resulting change in the arrangement or organization of the substrates can only serve as one element of a much larger series of
changes going on.
William Wimsatt’s (1997) idea of ‘aggregativity’ as a conceptual hurdle which a
viable view of emergence must surpass is pertinent here. It seems to me, on the one
hand, that a mere change in connectivity can only amount to a change in how aggregates are organized. But aggregates organized differently are still aggregates and
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integrations characterizing emergent phenomena must be more than aggregates if
they are to be considered emergent. On the other hand, seeing wholeness of emergent phenomena as actualizations of pre-existing wholes as found in Russell’s holist
version of emergence, also does not match the nature of how emergent wholeness
comes about via a transformation in the substrates themselves, and not just how they
are organized in relation to each other. Moreover, the pre-given wholes orientation of
Russell remains steeped in outmoded views of teleology, and thus do not appropriate
new approaches to the design of wholes via a complexity inspired, non-immaterialist
view of teleology (see, e.g., Alexander, 2011).
When the key to emergence includes the crucial factor of the transformation of
substrates, the novel emergent integration can be comprehended as the novel congruity comprised of the transformed substrates, not just their new arrangement. That
is, through transformation, the novel substrates can now relate to each other in radically novel ways. As Henri Bortoft (1996) expressed this new vision of wholeness:
The whole is nowhere to be encountered by stepping back to take an overview, for it is
not over and above the parts, as if it were some superior, all-encompassing entity. The
whole is to be encountered by stepping right into the parts (p. 12).
We can add “stepping right into the parts, as they are now radically transformed.”
(These remarks on the transformation of substrates as a key for understanding emergence have been inspired by the remarkable insights of the Indologist and philosopher of mind Jonardon Ganeri, 2012, who was cited in Part 2 of my three part paper.
Mind and panpsychism
T
here is one other theme found in this classic paper that calls out for a few remarks because it is mostly a function of the epoch when the paper was published, namely, the role of “Mind” in emergence. “Mind” with the capital “M” is
somewhat anachronistic today, but during the time period of this classic paper, particularly in England and Scotland, “Mind” was more associated with the idealist tradition of Hegel, Bradley, Green, McTaggart and others of similar ilk than the contemporary issues of conceptualization, representation, mentation, and cognitive processes in
general. In his section of the paper, Russell attributed to Mind a special significance in
relation to emergence, an approach largely criticized later on in the article by Morris.
Russell held that the key to the uniqueness of certain vital characteristics (again, a living organism was the specific prototype of emergence alluded to in this discussion)
lay in the influence of Mind in the sense that “higher” organisms were more subject to
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The notion of emergence
perception-response relationships rather than the mere stimulus-reaction dynamics of
“lower” organisms. The influence of Mind was also demonstrated in an awareness of
temporal directionality, i.e., the sense of past and future and the difference between
them. This Mind perspective was a chief mark of A.N. Whitehead’s emergence-based
metaphysics in which the mental pole of each emergent actual occasion showed itself
in the futurity of an organism’s striving, an example of Whitehead’s commitment to
panpsychism.
Perhaps the closest cognate today to the earlier theme of Mind is the surprising
return to various versions of a panpsychist position on the part of contemporary thinkers caught up in interpreting consciousness as an emergent phenomena. This can be
seen, for example, in the work of David Chalmers (2006), Galen Strawson (2012) and
Gregg Rosenberg (2004). In Part 2 of a three-part paper on reimaging emergence,
I (Goldstein, 2013) recently contended that for various reasons it just doesn’t make
much sense to consider consciousness as emergent. Although I can see the point of
considering certain contents of consciousness as emergent, for example, thoughts/
feelings such as creative ideas or religious or artistic experiences, in my opinion, to
label consciousness itself (whatever that might mean since we are here entering some
very murky metaphysical territory) as emergent serves to stretch the meaning of the
latter term beyond any useful applicability.
References
Alexander, T.N. (2011). The Biologist’s Mistress: Rethinking Self-Organization in Art, Literature,
and Nature, ISBN 9780984216550.
Bortoft, H. (1996). The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s Way toward a Science of Conscious
Participation in Nature, ISBN 9780940262799.
Chalmers, D. (2012). Constructing the World, ISBN 9780199608577.
Ganeri, J. (2012). The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-person Stance, ISBN
9780199652365.
Goldstein, J. (2001). “Reimagining emergence: Part 2,” Emergence: Complexity & Organization,
ISSN 1521-3250, 15(3): 121-138.
Goldstein, J. (2000). “Emergence: A construct amid a thicket of conceptual snares,” Emergence:
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Goldstein, J., Hazy, J., and Lichtenstein, B. (2010). Complexity and the Nexus of Leadership:
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Hagmann, P., Cammoun, L., Gigandet, X., Meuli, R., Honey, C.J., Wedeen, V.J., and Sporns, O.
(2008). “Mapping the structural core of human cerebral cortex,” PLoS Biology, ISSN 1544-
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9173, 6(7) (online pages).
Hendry, R.F. (2010). “Emergence vs. reduction in chemistry,” in C. Macdonald and G.
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Luisi, P. (2002). “Emergence in chemistry: Chemistry as the embodiment of emergence,”
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McLaughlin, B. (1992) “The rise and fall of British Emergentism,” in A Beckermann, H. Flohr,
and J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive
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Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural
World, ISBN 9780195168143.
Scerri, E. (2007). “Reduction and emergence in chemistry: Two recent approaches,”
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Strawson, G. (2006). Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail
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