Bureaucratic Responsiveness:
Conceptual Issues and Current Research
Grace Hall Saltzstein
University of California, Riverside
ABSTRACT
An examination of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical
atwlyses of burmucratic responsiveness rmeuls that, despite years of
research, therc is considerable confusion and arnbigui!y. Assessments
as to the extent and nuture of bureuucratic responn'veness va y
tremendously; conflicting definitions of the central concept are
commonly d ;and competing--~nd perhaps equally validconceptualiufions often are ignored entirely. Drawing upon releaant
literature, this crsay m i n e s the concept of burmucratic
responsiuentss and attempts to delintnte ( 1 ) the major boundaries of
the concept, (2) the primM@
thwreticul and methodological
lirnifutions of various approaches, and (3) the main questions that
have been thus fir amlooked or inadqua tely addrssed.
The problem of bureaucratic responsiveness remains a significant concern to theorists, researchers, government officials,
and the public in general. The growth and evolution of large,
powerful public organizations with limited and ambiguous
constitutional justification has fed these concerns. Inevitably,
questions revolve around how to reconcile bureaucratic policy
making with democracy in the absence of standard mechanisms of direct popular control.
Interest in these questions has waxed and waned, with a
marked resurgence evident in recent years as observers have
responded to the surprisingly successful attempts of the
Reagan administration to direct the bureaucracy and as the
"new institutionalism" in political science has brought renewed
interest in all institutions of government. Yet years of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical analyses have failed to eliminate or even acknowledge fully the confusion and ambiguity
su mounding the problem.
Assessments of the extent and nature of bureaucratic
responsiveness vary considerably, as preferences for a1ternative
63/]oumal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Bureaucratic Responsiveness
definitions of democracy and of basic democratic values lead
scholars to adopt conflicting definitions of the central concept,
while ignoring or dismissing equally valid alternative concep
tualizations. While recent analyses show some promise for
acknowledging alternative views, oversights and biases
continue to affect research. Drawing upon relevant literature,
this essay examines the concept of bureaucratic responsiveness
and attempts to delineate (1) the major boundaries of the concept, (2) the prinapal theoretical and methodological limitations of various approaches, and (3) the main questions that
have been thus far overlooked or inadequately addressed.
While belief in the concept of a politics/administration
dichotomy may never have been either as widespread or as
uncritical as some have maintained (Martin 1988), the general
influence of the concept did let analysts avoid some of the
thornier theoretical problems inherent in the separation of
powers (OTToole 1987). Hence, xholarly interest in bureaucratic responsiveness awaited recognition that administration
could not be divorced from politics, but was instead a "continuation of the legislative process" (Herring 1936, 218).
Scholars taking this perspective focusd on the problems of
exerting democratic control over a policy making bureaucracy,
and argued over the extent of the problem and how best to
alleviate i t (see, for example, Appleby 1965; Finer 1941;
Friedrich 1940). Further, analysts at this point tended to
associate responsiveness with accountability, with the entire
literature "pitched at a high theoretical level" (Hill 1981). Later
scholars shifted focus to the effects of s e f i c accountability
mechanisms, or utilized research on legislative responsiveness
(Ingram et al. 1980; Eulau and Prewitt 1973) as a model for
analyzing general issues of bureauaatic representation and
responsiveness (Mann 1976; Tucker and Ziegler 1980). These
scholars' efforts to develop measurable indicators of responsiveness inevitably refocused attention on central theoretical
and conceptual issues regarding the meaning of responsiveness. More recent general analyses of bureauaatic controllability expand on these issues (Gruber 1987; Cormley 19891,
while a large and growing literature uses rational models and
empirical tests of these models to explore elements of responsiveness in the context of relationships between Congress and
the bureaucracy and between bureaucratic agents and political
principals generally (for reviews, see Moe 1987; March and
Olsen 1989; Bendor 1990; Levinthal 1988).
Unfortunately, theoretical advances in the study of
bureauaatic responsiveness have been hindered by the tendency of earlier researchers either to adopt narrow concep
tualizations of responsiveness or to borrow conceptualizations
,
from studies of legislative responsiveness, while the focus of - I
I
more-recent research on amtrd of bureaucracy sometimes
slights key elements of responsiveness. Nonetheless, the evolution of reclent research on political control of bureaucracy
promises to bring renewed attention to the theoretical and
conceptual complexity of bureaumatic responsiveness. Ream t
=rch
at least has begun to acknowledge the sometimescomplex links between conceptions of demouacy, specific
democratic n o m and values, and specific institutional mechanisms to promote those norms (e
Cmber 1987). As Pateman
(1971,304) has argued in regard to democratic norms generally, "there is more than one way to intnpnt
norms and
values traditionally associated with d-cy;
there is more
than one view on what 'really' oonstitutes responsiveness of
leaders," and differences in interpretation are tied to notions
about which forms of institutions "give practical expression to
those norms and values" (emphasis in the original). Such interrelationships are evident in the way in which two very different views of bureaucraq's represmtational role in a dernocratic system appear to shape analyst$ conceptions of bureaucratic responsiveness
. ..
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSWENESS.TO
THE PUBLICS WISHES
One perspective sees the bureaucracy as a representative
of the public and defins bureaucratic responsiveness in much
the same fashion as legislative responsiveness. That is, it is
assumed that bureaucratic responsiveness entails responding to
the wishes of the public However, few authors adopting this
perspectiw acknowledge any disagreement over the appropriate fashion by which public wishes are to be entered into
bureaucratic deliberations, despite the fact that pronounced
disagreement as to the proper channels of interaction between
citizens and bureaucracy is evident in both the theory and the
practice of public administration.
The traditional view defines elected officials as the legiti m t e representatives of the public, with the bureaucracy serving as a neutral instrument that elected officials are to use in
meeting public demands. According to this view, elected officials are a m r d e d sole responsibility for representing public
interests The bureaucracy provides no independent assessment
of public wishes; it responds to the public solely through faithful adherence to elected officials' interpretation of public
wishes. Obviously compatible with Woodrow Wilson's 1887 beatise on administration, which stimulated the acceptance of the
65/]-PART,January 1992
:
Bureaucratic Responsiveness
politics/adminisbation dichotomy, this view-labeled "ovcrhead democracy" by Redford (1969) and the "formalist" modcl
by Frug (1984bretained strong support among administaton
and analysts even after support for the politia/administration
dichotomy waned. Gruber (1987,11), for example, argues that
"bureaucracies pose a problem for democracy when thcy makc
governmental decisions--that is, public policyand thereby
short arcuit electoral channels of public control." Similarly,
Ziegler et al. (1974,6) argue that, "At the risk of ovmimplification, the thrust of standard political W r y is that, even
though a balance between efficiency and responsiveness must
be maintained, the ultimate policy initiative should rest with
the elected representatives." Social criticism for some time has
focused on the difficulties of maintaining an appropriate lcvcl
of legislative dominance (Calbaith 1965; Hynemn 1950; Lowi
19691, and empirical nzearch continues to show that many
practicing administrators believe that elected officials can and
should exercise at least some degree of dominance over them
(Greene 1982; Gruber 1987).
An alternative perspective on the bureaucracfs role in thc
democratic political system is evident both in administrative
practice and in democratic theory. This view allows much
more autonomy on the part of the bureaucracy because it
assumes that the bureauaacy exercises independent representational functions that may be equivalent to the representational functions performed by elected officials. Thmtical
justification for this perspective tends to focus on the fad that
popular sovereignty in the American political system is
expressed through a structure that "is republican in charadera system of institutions sharing power and thereby giving vent
to democratic will, but also seeking to curb its excesses and
those of its rulers" (Burke 1989,183). Hence, it has been argued
that "the people" delegate their authority to three equal
branches of government, that elections are simply one of
several means of selecting authorized agents of the people, and
that elected and nonelected officers alike may "represent" the
public in direct fashion (Rohr 1986; Storing 1976). Some
analysts contend that the bureaucracy actually may be superior
to the legislature in representing the public. Long (1952,
811-13), for example, argues that vital interests are "unrepresented, underrepresented, or malrepresented" in Congress and
that bureaucrats
are likely to be more responsive to the desires and needs of the broad
public than r highly s e l d slice whose responsiveness is enforced
by r mechanism of e k d o n s that frequently places more power in the
hands of campaign backers than voters.
&/I-PART, January 1992
Bureaucratic Responsioencss
While analysts frequently disagree as to how far administrators
rnay go in competing with the legislature, dear support for an
independent reprrsentational role for bureaucracy has been
evident in pluralist theories (Dahl 19561, in analyses of burcaucratic politics, in administrative reforms during the New Deal
period, and in the "new public administration" of the 1970s
More recently, analysts attempting to develop an ethics of
bureauaacy have acknowledged the complexity of the constitutional system and the ways in which mu1tiple democratic
norms (e.g., procedural respect and public orientation) rnay
conflict, concluding that d i m obligations to the public may
override allegiance to either elected officials or the judiciary
(Thompson 1980 and 1988; Cooper 1982; Burke 1989).
Hence, one mapr perspective on bureaucratic responsive
ness views the bureaucracy as a representative of the public.
However, analysts adopting this perspective disagree as to
whether the bureaucracy owes responsiveness directly and
independently to the public or whether such responsiveness is
indirect only, flowing from el&
officials' representation of
the public.
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS TO
THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE
A mapr alternative perspective toward bureaucratic reprc .'
senta tion emphasizes the responsibility of the bureaucracy to
"represent" the state in interactions with the public (Pitkin
1%7,41). Indeed, Rosenbloom (1974,163) argues that
The history of the United States bureaucracy and some of the most
fundamental features of the personnel system support this view more
than they support any other. Political neutrality regulations, byaltysecurity provisions, and the traditional judicial doctrine concerning
the constitutional rights of public employees have all been prcmiscd
largely on a conception of federal w a n t s as being representative. of
the government or state, rathe than of any outside group or as their
own agents.
Looking at the representative function of bureaucracy
from this perspective focuses at tention on the instrumental
nature of bureaucratic existence and the objective, substantive
functions performed by bureaucracy. Thus, it is emphasized -,
that administrative agencies were created for specific purposes, I1
and that their primary responsibility is to provide "good
administration," which may be defined in a variety of ways.
Theoretical support for this view of the representational
function of bureaucracy typically ascribes a unique role to the
bureaucracy that may be independent of the wishes of either
6 7 / ] - P A R T ,January 1992
Bureaucratic Rtsponsivnuss
elected officials or the public. Here, bureaucraaes may be I
viewed as "agents of the law" (Wood 1988), providing the
"ballast that maintains the ship of state in unsteady seas"
(Abehch and Rockman 1988). 'Iheorisk and analysts adopt.
ing this perspective a s u i i a ~ r i e t yof roles to bureaucracy,
contending, for example, that bureaucrats may represent faitl
fully "static coalitions from the past" (Wood 1988, 231 embedded in policy against the enthusiasm of transitory elected
officials, or they may ad as "administrative statesmen" to
provide sober, dispassionate a s s s m e n t of the whims and
passions of the public (Herring 1936; Appleby 1965; Waldo
1948).
In this fashion, a bureaucracy performing as a repmentative of the state may act as a counterbalance to the v i m
inherent in more popular mechanisms of demucratic control.
According to this view, responsiveness frequently is assess&
on the basis of substantive actions of bureaucracy rather than
on the link between bureaucratic actions and public or elected
offiaals' prefemces. Commonly utilized standards of assessment include efficiency, fiscal integrity, accountability, equity,
neutral competence, expertise, and professionalism (Fesler
1980; Kaufman 1969; Wilson 1%7), and bureaucrats may be
expected to respond to objective needs in addition to, or even
instead of, public preferemes (Schumaker and Loomis 19791.'
1
I
CONSEQUENCES OF ALTEKNATlVE PERSPECITVES
No single perspective on bureaucratic responsiveness has
gained dominance in either the practice or study of public
administration, despite the fact that different perspectives
inevitably lead to contradictory conclusions as to what responsiveness requires in any given situation. Of course, as Gruber
(1987) and others acknowledge, the selection by bureaucrats of
a perspective on responsiveness may be cruaal. The perspective becomes an important component of the bureaucrats'
generalized role conceptions that-presumably--affect their
behavior.
Those bureauaak who adopt one or the other version of
the first penpective-emphasizing responsiveness to the
\
public's wishes-are likely to behaw in characteristic ways.
For example, those who* theoretical conception of the bureaucratic role has been iduenced by notions of administrative
'Pitkin (1967
and
pluralism are likely to employ such "political" decision making
that responsiveness may rquire more
than mere reaction to demands; hence, techniques as bargaining, coalition building, and compromising
responsiven- may
opp
among competing groups, while those who believe in either
ritlon to or in the absenoe of public
legislative or presidential dominance are more likely to
opinion or demands.
emphasize obedience to rules and direct orders.
-
1
I .'
On the other hand, those bureaucrats who adopt the m n d perspective-emphasizing responsiveness to the interests of the state--are likely to respond according to their own
interpretation of the requirements of this role. For example,
those iduenced by the vestiges of a politio/administration
dichotomy and norm of neutral competence may approach
substantive responsiveness in t m of expertise or professionalism. Administrators adopting this perspective, referred to by -j
Dotson (1957) as the "corporate objectivity approach to adrnin- ,
istrative responsibility," assume that scientific standards and
expertise should provide-& basis of administrative response, ,
especially when policies cannot easily be judged by the public
or by elected officials' In those cases, e o n a l i t y will deterto substantive policy needs.
mine bureaucratic
Others may act as administrative statesmen (Appleby 1965;
Storing 1980; Waldo 1948), responding to their interpretations
of the public interest, or as change agents with primary
equity (Marini 1971).
responsibilities to achieve soda1
''
~~
DEFINTNG RESPONSIVENESS
Even if analysts can agrtx on a particular perspective on
bureaucratic responsiveness, difficulties arise in defining the
general concept of responsiveness. In order to operationalize
the concept, certain assumptions must be made about the
appropriate targets o~govemmentalresponsiveness, the wishes
or interests to which government should respond, and the
fo-m that governmental responses-sJo@d take. Consequently,
the boundaries of the concept are established by answering the
questions of responsiveness to whom? to what? and in what
form? Yet answering these questions is anything but simple,
and the questions themselves often are overlooked in current
analyses (Gruber 1987; Gormley 1989).
the dferenccs
cormley
)'8gl
and Wvber (lg8' sua3at'
~nalystsdisagree as to when or
,,hethe the plt,bc or doffikls
,re Icapable than are bureauaats
II judgng public pol~aes
AS
I
I
For example, those who advocate bureaucratic responsive I
ness to the public frequently sidestep the problems of defining
the relevant public. Here, an initial problem of "appropriate
inclusion" arises in defining the population to be considered
as the community for decision making purposes (Dahl and
Lindblom 1953). Where should the boundaries of the relevant
community be drawn: at the level of neighborhoods, cities,
states, or regions, or at the level of the nation as a whole? The
theoretical problem arises because a bare maprity within a
particular community can become a minority in a slightly
larger community, such that "however impeccable democratic
decision making may be within a given community, the outCOW
are in some sense determined by the previous and
inescapably undemocratic decisions that defined them in the
first place" (Whelan 1983).
69/J-PART,January 1992
\ I
I
Bureaucratic Rctponsivcncss
While responsiveness to a particular population, such as
residents of a neighborhood, may preclude responsiveness to
an alternately defined population, such as residents of the
entire city, analysts of bureaucratic responsiveness or, more
recently, of the political "control" of bureaucracy, continue to
examine a single population as the appropriate target of
-,
responsiveness and ignore the effect of bureaucratic decisions '
on other potential populations. Yet, as Salamon and Warnsley
(1975) note, bureaucrats often are afforded dirretion in
designating a target population and hence legitimately might
be chastised fbr ignoring any potential population.
Similarly, questions arise as to whose- interests within any
given community should engender aresponse. Should institu-,
tions be responsive to the interests of the mass public, voters,
attentive elites, organired groups,or individuals? Adrninistrators face demands from numerous acton, including individual
legislators, legislative committees, legislative chambers,chief
executives, agency superiors, agency constituents, individuals
affected by a policy, immediate clientele, or some specific
group, such as the socially disadvantaged.
Not surprisingly, these potential populations often express '
conflicting p r e f m e s , and theory provides little guidance as
to which combatants should be heard. Again, other democratic
beliefs are liable to influence preferences such that-proponents
of legislative
-- dominance look for deference to the legislature,
pluralists expect deference to group interests, and public
choice proponents call for maximizing individual utility in
market-exchange terms. The conclusions of any given approach I
thus are determined by the premises of the argument, so that
the lack of ability to decide to whom bureauo-acies should
respond critically constrains the ability to assess the extent of
responsiveness in bureaucracy.
Analysts' tendency to focus on a single target group and
extrapolate to the general population exacerbates the likelihood
of inaccurately or inadequately assessing responsiveness
Responsiveness to low-income clientele may displease middle
income constituents (Viteritti 1983); responsiveness to actual
users of a public service may come at the expense of potential
users who are " m e e d out" (Katz et al. 1975; Nelson 1980);
deference to legisla tors may come at the expense of responsiveness to the president (Wood 1988) or to a general public
interest (Moe 1987). A focus on any one target group rather
than an alternate group thus can result in radically different
conclusions about the responsiveness of the bureaucracy.
,,
'
Bureaucratic Rtsponsivnvss
Similar problems confront the msearcher in determining
which aspects of a target population's wishes or interests
require a response. In general, researchers have assumed that
responsiveness is owed either to the demands and preferences
of the designated population, to the interests or needs of the
population, or to sosome combination of the two. Those who
assume that responsiveness means "reflecting and giving
expression to the will of the people" must still determine how
to measure the people's will (Pennock 1952,790-807). Should
one measure articulated demands, general public opinion, or
some combination of the two?
Furthermore, which demands must be rnet--all of them,
even if they are contradictory, or only the most intensely feltor most intensely a r t i ' c u ' l a ~ ~ ? 'If general public opinion
is the basis of action, which opinions are relevant; how much
support must an opinion have before action is taken; and how
d o we assess u~nf0I'medopinions, strongly felt minority
opinions, or situations in which opinion is divided or absent
en tirely? Is responsiveness a winner-takeall proposition or
does it require some attempt to give weight to competing
claims or to provide something for everyone?
Complications multiply if one allows the possibility - 1
that bureaucratic responsiveness may entail responding to
community heeds," as well aeven in opposition t+
community wishes (Schumaker and Loomis 1979). Reflecting
the "independence" p s i tion in the "mandate-independence"
problem in representation theory (Pitkin 1%7; Eulau and Karps
1977; Pennock 19791, this view asserts the possibility of
responsiveness in the absence d apparent public opinion or
even in the presence of public opinion that contradicts the
representative's perception of the situation.
This view also assumes that public desires may well
"suggest" the inkrests of the public, but that the representative
must "do what is best" for the public by putting "interests"
ahead of "desires" when the two codict or when "desires" are
not evident (Pitkin 1967, 162-64). Additionally, this view
assumes that the superior position of representatives provides
them with greater insight into the "me" interests of their
constituents (Pitkin 1967; Pennodc 1979,323).
%ee Schumaker (1975); Sharp (1981);
MLdenkr (1981);Mcier and
(1984); -ley
ec rl. (1983); and
Wood (1986).
Thus, those who argue for responsiveness to needs .
typically assert that the primary obligation of the represents- tive is to respond to the objective interests and needs of those
represented, t?Spddly if the preferences of those represented
are ill-informed or not immediately evident.
71 /J-PART, January 1992
Bureaucratic Rcsponsbcnm
While the possibility of legislaton acting as Burkean
"trustes" (rather than instructed delegates) some or all of the
time is widely acknowledged and accepted in democratic
theory, analysts evidence greater ambivalence about allowing
bureaucrats such r role Yet the strain between competencies of
representatives and thov rrpamted in many ways is most
pronounced in the a s e of bureaucratic representatives.
Bureaucrats are selected, train&, and rewarded on the basis of
substantive expertise or 'wisdomn; how much and under what
cimrnstances should they defer to the public or to elected
officials in policy making?
Sharp (1981,34) has raised this question in regard to one
type of responsiveness, noting that "perhaps .. responsive- -
.
ness does not consist of a correspondence between policy
maker priorities and those of the public, but rather a willingness to strike some balance between professional standards
and values and community priorities." Similarly, Ingraham and
Ban (1988) look at control by elected officials (exercised
through political appointees) and argue that "neither political i
control nor career expertise and o b ' j v i t y are superior; both I
are simply component parts of a necessary process."
The problem for theorists remains that genuine wisdom
and objectivity on the part of b u r u u u a t s may be h n t or
consistently inferior to that of the public or of elected officials; /
bureaucrats may act simply according to whim or personal
preference under the guise of neutral competence or wisdom.
For example, analysts have noted a tendency of professionals
to inflate the value of their training and to define value-laden
issues as narrow matten to be decided by experts (Stone 1980).
Professionalism and superior objectivity then provide a convenien t rationalization for ignoring outside opinion (Greene
1982). Analysts encountering bureaucratic pderences at odds
with those of the public face the problem of differentiating
between genuine responsiveness to needs and rationalizations.
Other probterns arise due to the various f o m responsiveness can take. Responsiveness has been operationalized by
various researchen as opinion concurrence between T m n ta tives and the designated public, procedural openness, agenda
setting, advocacy of or support for specific poliaes during the
decision making stage, policy enactments, policy implementation, and policy impacts. Schumaker (1975) categorizes the
basic forms of mponsiveness as (1) sccess mponsiveness, (2)
agenda responsiveness, (3) policy responsiveness, (4) output
responsivemss, and (5) impact mponsiveness.
R/J-PART, January 1992
!
I
Bureaucratic Rcsponr k m r r
Many of the problems that arise in operationalizing each
type of responsiveness have been d i d elsewhere.' The
difficulties are more pronounced as the researchefs attention
moves from opinion concurrence to policy impacts. Additionally, problems of operatio~lizingeach type of responsiveness
are more complex in the bureaucratic setting than in the legislative setting. Thus, if the test of responsiveness is concurrence
on policy agendas, the researcher must d d d e if administrators' agenda preferences should match W of citizens or of
elected officials.
.
Is the administratofs opinion regarding the matter salient
to operationalizing the concept? What if the adminishatofs
expertise dictates an agenda different from that of the public or
of elected officials? Should impact responsiveness be assessed
in terms of substantive policy impacts (e.g., improved health
care) or in terms of citizen satisfaction (e.g., approval of the
health delivery system)? As Cruber (19871, Mann (19761, and
others have illustrated, professional judgments of what is
needed or wantd in dealing with a particular policy problem
may conflict with citizen preferences, so how the concept is
operationalized may affect evaluations of adminishation
responsiveness.
STUDIES TOUCHING ON RESPONSXVENESS
As n o t 4 earlier, a considerable amount of theoretical and
empirical work that touches on or has implications for bureaucratic responsiveness does exist, though much of it does not
focus explicitly on bureauuatic responsiveness. The following
discussion delineates the models underlying much of that
research and uses examples from various studies to illustrate
problems asxiated with this field of research.
Models and Focus of Research
-
Most theorizing and empirical research tends to emphasize one or another model of bureaucratic democracy to the
,
exclusion of others. Until fairly recently, the dominant model
of responsiveness in empirical tesedrch focused on responses
to the wishes or demands of the public in general or some particular segments of the public (Mladenka 1981), while ignoring
both the traditional public administration emphasis on responsiveness to elected representatives of the public and the perspective that emphasizes responsiveness to the interests of the
state. Utilizing public choicze approaches, this research defines
responsiveness in terms of "the capacity to satisfy the preferences of citizens" (Ostrom 1975,275), especially those "who are
dependent upon the institution."
This approach focuses exdusively on the link between
bureaucratic agencies and their clientele, applying a "consumer
model" to bureaucratic responsiveness. Sharp (1981,34-35)
delineates the components of the model by noting that the
approach
rrsponsiveness In the public policy realm in a manner similar to
msponsiveness in the marketing realm. Cituens are viewed as consumers of policy outputs, and public officials are expgted to base
their actions on citizen evaluation of those outputs, in much the samc
way that the nurktpkce supposedly provides signals to producers of
any product. .Under the mnnuner model, responsiveness had to
do with the satisfaction of citizen pRfaences or demands, or at least
with the relationship between citizen prtkrenca/demands and
policymaker priorities, beliefs, or actions.
treats
..
However appealing and influential this perspective has
been, it has been justifiably critiated for applying an overly
narrow definition of the public even within the public choice
hamework, and, more broadly, for ignoring
competing perspectives on the appropriate mle of public organizations in a democratic mciety even though no compelling msons an?
offered as to why we ought to favor the public preference position
and reject the others (Mladenka 1981,145).
As noted earlier, a competing perspective, more in tune with
dominant orientations in public administration theory, is evident in recent attempts to develop a general theory of institutions through a focus, in part, on congressional control of
bureaucracy and principal/agent relationships in the bureaucratic context.
These latter works tend to apply a "neutral executor" modcl of bureaucratic responsiveness that demands bureaucratic responsiveness to elected offiaals. Analysts working
within this framework assume, implicitly and sometimes
control of bureaucracy is to be
explicitly, that ddtic
exerted through elected officials. Considerable disagreement is
evident among such analysts as to which elected officials
should and do exert conhol, and r m t analyses have done
more to acknowledge the possible existence of alternative perspectives on bureaucratic responsiveness. Nonetheless, much of
this literature continues to assume that democracy can be
served only by bureaucratic subservience to the demands of
elected officials (or some specific subset of elected officials).
An a1ternative model that has been largely ignored by
rational theory and public choice theory alike is one that
allows for an independent role for bureaucracy. Such a model
may be fashioned on views of bureaucrats acting as
74/1-PART, January 1992
I
I
Bunaucratic Rapotuivrmsr
representatives of the state or responding to either elected
officials or the public at the independence end of the mandate
independence continuum. Sharp's "professional responsibility"
model (1981,34), which equates responsiveness with "action
based on professional judgements of need," would fit in here.
So would Ingraham and Ban's "public service" model (1988,
13), which equates'responsivmess with a "dialogue" between
bureaucrats and their mnhollen 'carried out with the intent of
achieving some larger, broader public good." Similarly,
administrative statesmen, bureauaatic pluralists, and New
Public Administration "change agents" alike might all be seen
a s operating within this model; the crucial factor is that all
presume an independent role for the bureaucracy, allowing it
to be something other than completely subservient to eithcr
elected officials' or the publics' wishes.
Relevant Research
R e a r c h touching on issues of bureaucratic responsiven w has arisen in a variety of contexts and has adopted a widc
array of substantive foci. As noted earlier, while a small body
of m a r c h has focused explicitly on general issues of bureaucratic responsiveness, recent research having the broadest
implications for responsiveness raises the question indirectly
by focusing on "controlling" or "taming" bureaucracy (Grubcr
1987; Cannley 1989).
Additionally, a variety of more specific topics provide
analyses of particular elements or aspects of bureaucratic
responsiveness. For example, m s a h on urban service distribution and alkrnatiw dce-delivery systems addresses thc
link between services provided and neighborhood or group
needs or wishes (Mladenka 1981; Antunes and Plumle 1977;
Ebyle and Jacobs 1982). Analysts interested in questions of
representative bureaucracy have focused on links between
"passive" representation of groups in bureaucracy and "active"
representation, or responsiveness to the g ~ o u pinterest, in
policy making (Thompson 1976; Meier et al. 1991). Similarly,
those looking at "public encounters" with bureaucracy continuc
to focus on the bureaucraws responsiveness to individuals or
specific groups (Katz et al. 1975; Goodsell 1981).
More recently, a substantial body of work has developed 1
extending p
i tive theory to bureaucratic behavior, espt?cially
regarding bureauua tic responsiveness to political control. As
part of an attempt to create a "general theory of political
institutions," one strand of research purports to have established a new h r y of "congressional dominance" of the
bureaucra~y.~
Analysts working within this framework
75/1-PART, January 1992
Bnmancra tic Rtspotu i v w s s
essentially assert that Consuccessfully uses a variety of
rewards and sanctions to control the bureaucracy. This perspective assumes that the particular tools utilized and the
s m f i c actors within Congress who employ them are a function of the internal decision proceses of C o n p s and of
legislators' overriding concern with reelection (Moe 1987).
Working within this framework, analysts demonstrate why
cong~essionalsupervision often takes the form of "fire alann"
oversight rather than "police pabol" (McCubbins and Schwartz
19841, and why Congress's apparent lack of concern with ovcrsight can actually be a sign that this particular form of control
is very effective.
Principal-agent analysis f
m on the problems of
control inherent in any structures that use self-interested
individuals as agents for other self-intemsted individuals
(Bendor 1990, Levinthal 1988). As delineated by Bendor (19901,
hue principal+gent analyses assume that the agent has some
information that is not available to the principal and that selfinterest encourages the agent tb'exploit this advantage. This
focuses attention on creating and manipulating inmtives to
compel or persuade the agent to act in the principal's interest.
Any number of empirical analyses have attempted to analyze
administrative (especially regulatory) agenciesnactions within
the context of principalsgent relations by searching for evidence of links between bureaucratic actions and the preferences of elected officials (see, e.g., Chubb 1985; Moe 1982;
Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood 1988; Sdroltz and Wei 1986).
Both formal theory and empirical analyses employing this
approach can be seen as complementing the traditional "overhead democracy" perspective on the relationship between the
bureaucracy and the larger political system (Eisner and Meier
1990).
Any number of other studies raise questions relevant to
bureaucratic responsiveness, but the studies noted above provide evidence of common problems that arise when this topic
is addressed. Consequently, the following brief discussion will
utilize examples from this research to demonstrate problems
stemming from theoretical and conceptual ambiguity regarding
the topic and from inattention to competing models of
responsiveness.
THEOREXICAL, CONCEPTUAL,
AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Of recent writers, Cruber (1987) probably has done the
most to explore the broader. theoretical underpinnings of
efforts to "control" the bureaucracy through democratic
76/J-PART,January 1992
Bureaucratic Rnporuivrncu
mechanisms. Conceptualizing demwatic control (p. 12) as
legal constraint imposed by a democratic political actor (e.g.,
citizens "alone or in groups," elected legislators, or executives),
she explores a broad array of strategies to wntrol burcauaacy
and delineates the connections between specific stategies and
alternative views of democracy. In so doing she demonstrates
an unusual m i t i v i t y to the ways in which preferences for
different types of mntrols may be traced to differing beliefs
about such matters as the "relative capabilities of the rulers vs.
the ruled" and the relative value of a government oriented
toward substantive ends versus one designed to safeguard
individual liberty. Gordey (1989) t a b a similar, though less
theoretically oriented, tack but examhes a somewhat larger
nu*
of control mechanisms and d a w s a distinction
between controls exerted by citizens and those wielded by
elected officials.
While both analysts appear to be most concerned with the
policy implications of their arguments, their analyses also
might be expected to shed light on general issues of bureaucratic responsiveness. However, wen in these broad-ranging
analyses, neither author completely accepts the full range of
meanings of either control or responsiveness, and neither pays
any sustained attention to the theoretical complexities involved
in deciding who should control the bureaucracy and what
form control should take.
Cruber, for example, slights public service models of
bureaucratic activity. While she allows for some fairly
autonomous activity on her democratic wnstraint graph (p. 18)
and acknowledges theoretical arguments in support of even
greater bureaucratic autonomy consistent with democracy
(pp. 40.421, she never fully accepts such independent activity
on the part of bureaucracy as being democratic. While her
position on this may be due, in part, to her concern with
democratic control of bureaucracy rather than bureaucratic
responsiveness per se, her focus on control cannot account
fully for her lack of support for a more independent
bureaucracy.
Even if democratic control is defined as constraint
imposed by citizens or elected officials, one might still argue
that such control is exercised through adoption, support, and
maintenance of a particular governmental system of multiple
and varied competencies and responsibilities; of divergent
organizational incentives and motivators producing differing
institutional perspectives; and of countless checks and balances
governing relationships between the public, elected representatives, and bureaucracy. Hence, just as the judiciary operates
77/J-PART,January 1992
.
Bvrcaucra tic R e s p o ~ i o n u s s
within a different context of conhmol,many elements of the
existing v t e m suggest that the bureaucracy was designed and
intended to do more than respond blindly to immediate, direct
orders from any and all possible combinations of citizens and
elected officials.
'Cruber (1987) considers thc cxistcncc
of n r i o u arguments in favor of publicm
mdcls ofburcauaacy (pp.
W),but d m not give these arguand overlooks
mtirely r e n t conhibutions by analysb i c h as Burke (1989) and kohr
(1986).
'A,she not- (p. 32). 7 h c issuc is not
merely the proper distribution of
powm bethe rulers and the
bled, but also the rclationship bc
hvmn
ruJcd te
gethcr on the one hand and the
bureaumats on the other.'
'Beause of her assumption that bur a w a b are superior only in regard
to nuraw, spmialized cxpcrtix,
Gmber d i d argumcnis in favor
d bureaucratic wisdom k u x of
their 'inmistma-'
(p. 43). even
though she finds them important empirically. Yet many, if not most, such
argurnenb posit a very different role
and function for bwc~ucracyand bur e a w a l s than that delincatcd by
Gruber. Sce,f a eumplc, storing
0980); R o h (1986); a Burke (1989).
Going
further- 1-k at Waldo's
(1948) all f a an administrative class
'reumbling Plato's Guardian Qass'
a Appleby's notion (1%5,338) of
*e role d burcrucrrcv as %n
responding to such [kdtiple, =&addoryl demands. rccondling t h .
and in lhe
=POnse i n w n g
amddera tions d prudence, perspective, and prinaple, inducting regard
for other popular demands and
aspirations than t h e expressed in
the c h o w of the moment.'
Despite such evidence and additional widespread
evidence of substantial, b m d delegations of authority to
bureaucracy by atizens and elected officials, Gruber ultimately
dismisses such models of control. Her response appears to be
based more on her own beliefs about the relative capabilities of
the rulers and the ruled than on theoretical weaknesses in public service models of bureaucracy? While she ackno wlcdgcs
that willingness to support bureaucratic autonomy is tied to
beliefs about the relative capabilities of burcaucra k, ci tizcns,
and elected officials; that the problcm is more difficult in
regard to bureaucracyj and that citizens are not always
capable of wise decision making, hcr own preferences are
e4dent in her argument that only elected officials are capable
of wisdom
Thus, she argues (p. 41 ), I f leadership, leisure, and
distance from the daily wants of the populace are the
requisites for effectivdand responsibie decision makin& thcn
elected leaden should be hv&bly equipped," whilc "&c
narrow, specialized view of the bureaucrat is a liability." By
assuming that bureaucrats are at bat narrow, specialized
experts aTnd by disregarding the possibility that the struclure,
deign, or motivational incentives of the bureaucracy might
provide for more objective assessment of the public interest
than is likely to be evident among those motivated primarily
by concern for reelection, Gruber rules out the possibility of
bureaucratic wisdom In so doing, she rejects a long-standing
tradition in public administration theory that focuses upon thc
unique role of bureaucracy and on the unique capabilities of
bureaucrats in the decision-making process.' She is then faced
with the difficult problem of explaining why so many of her
interview subjects adopt such an "undemocratic" public servicc
d e l in defikng the& own roles in the
systcm.
Where Gruber shows a clear preference for controls by
atizens and elected officials, Gormley shows a clcarer preference for significant amounts of bureaucratic discretion, couplcc
with direct citizen involvement in bureaucracy. Though
Gormley provides an insightful analysis of a1terna tive controls,
his arguments are much less theoretical than are Grubef s and
his personal preferences, clear in the terminology and sub
Stance of his arguments, more strongly in.fhen~t?his analysis.
Thus, for example, he asserts that citizen controls are
78/J-PART, January 1992
Bureaucratic Rnponsivmcsr
"catalytic" to bureaucracy, while controls from political officials
are "cwrave" and that "muscles" (controls exerted by elected
officials) may promote accountability, but "prayers [controls
exerted by citizens] are normally superior to muscles" (p. 16).
In contrast to Gruber, Cormley invariably comes down on
the side of bureaucratic autonomy whenever the valucs and
perspectives of elected officials aonflict with those of a skillcd
bureaucracy. For example, he argws most strongly against the
use of muscles when bumaucatic skill and policy complexity
are high M u s e the bureaucmq's masten may not know
what they are doing" (p. 23, and notes that legislators and
judges demonsha te "considerable hubris" in "addressing
complex issues" (p. 271.
Similarly, he argues (p. 230)that we are loo accepting of
"the legitimacy of political control without asking hard qucstions about the represmtativeness of individual legislators" or
y
judges but he seems to feel that prayers i n w ~ b l "promote
democracy" (p. 231) and that a skilled bureaucracy enpying
high support can always be trusted to "do the right thing"
including determining for itself which prayers are legitimate
(p. 24). Yet again, then, one finds an analysis of issues of
control or mponsiveness to be slanted by the author's prcfcrences for some d e l or models of responsiveness over the
alternatives.
-
'Cormlcy (1989) ddrthis
quertim in lin~rfngmtrol~ v l t h
burcawrtic =pert=,
but u p the
-la
haviJ~#withoutdid
reti* ruppo* in laver
matic donurune. CNber, on the othcr
hand. b unwilling to a m p mere
arnavrmcc mtrd,r h i n g to
r h w m p a u l v a ~ to
a m a n anythLng
the
process, she mrku r number of
&idand Lrooruistent arguments
rs to whetha a~ncumnce
a n cwr
(=.
demaub.te
.
. fm e u m d e ..
pp. I3 and 24).
.
eump'el
(lm) and
y el d.(1963) I d at toplevcl
r~inltntm;
(1981) and
Muir
bok at S ~ M - I W C I
bwucrak
w
e
am
Gruber, Connley, those analysts focusing on congressional
dominance of the bureaucracy, and many others also fail to
explore' the complexities of conflicting views as to whom and
to what bureaucratic responsiveness is owed, as well as the
form rrsponsiveness should t a l e Even if the emphasis begins
with the question of control over bureaucracy, questions
inevitably arise as to who should control whom Positive
I
theorists and legislative dominance scholars now raise what
are old arguments in public administration as to whether the
president or Congress should dominate the bureaurrpcy, or
whether congressional control is exerted most appropriately by
cornmittxm or by Congress as a whole (see, for example, the
Wood and Cook exchange, 1989).
Analysts who choose to focus on opinion concurrence as
an indicator of responsiveness need to consider (but rarely do)
which values or obinions are to be considered, how variabons
in knowledge or ikensity are to be handled, and how much
value concurrence is necessary to demonstrate either responsiveness or control.'Some xholars have looked at the opinions
of toplevel administrators, while others have been concerned
with strtxt-level bureaucrat^'^ Dsagreement continues as to
whether those opinions should be linked to the opinions of
specific segments of the community, such as citizen activists; 10
general public opinion; or to the opinions of all or spedfic
subgroups of elected officials" Once again, it is unusual for
analysts exploring any spedfic linkage to acknowledge the
potential conflicts between one dyadic relationship and another
on the issue of democratic responsiveness/contro1.
AMlysts who focus on polides or impacts as indicators of
either control or responsiveness faoe even greater difficulties
conceptualizing and operationalizing variables. fist,
researchers encounter difficd ties in identifying a policy that
can be linked unambiguously to a group's or a population's
inkrests or wishes. This may not be a problem where survey
data indicate dear public support for a specific policy, but few
researchers are fortunate enough to obtain such data. Frequently, researchers are faced with the hazardous undertaking of
inferring a group interest as well as a policy to satisfy it
(Saltzstein 1979). In such cases, critics can always contend that
a different policy or even a different measure of the same
policy would indicate something entirely different in regard to
bureaucratic responsiveness. Moe (1987,4861, for example,
argues that the possible effectiveness of fire-alarm oversight, as
well as the motivations and incentives that lead to its use,
mean that it "may well be limited precisely to the short term,
superficial, and ad hoc"; in fact, it may well militate against
fundamental bureaucratic reforms (ia., rmaningful control or
responsiveness).
In addition, the output or impact selected by the
rwarcher must be something over which the bureaucracy
reasonably might be expected to haw some control. This difficulty has plagued research on d c e distribution from the
start, when the inclination was to use expenditures or deployment of capital facilities as indicators of bureaucratic policy.
Only recently has that tendency hen criticized on the grounds
that such measures may more accurately reflect legal and emnomic constraints dewloped over a considerable period of
time than current policies and decisions willfully adopted by
bureaucrats (Boyle and Jacobs1982; Koehler and Wrightson
1989).
rl. (1983) lodr at atizen
ad*;
Meier
Nigro 0976) at
genenl PMc
Opinion; Mann (Iw6)
at school boards; fioriru (1981) at
rpecific omgasional canmitt-; and
Bukc and ma (1982) at
dmd intent unbodied III f-d
"GnmIey et
Ncy.
Similarly, empirical tests of principal-agent notions have
hen criticized for relying on budget variables as indicators of
conpssiorral control, despite the fact that budget control is
shared by the president and Congress. Many other bureaucratic OUtpUts are ddermined by ekcted officials working with
bureaucrats and are not the exclusive domain of either actor.
Consequently, considerable disagreement may exist among
Bureaucratic Rtsponsivmrss
researchers as to whether a given situation provides evidencc
of bureaucratic responsiveness
In addition to the extensive operationalization problems
that lead to contradictory conclusions, there is also conflict
because analysts disagree about the appropriate level of
analysis. Most researchers in the areas mentioned previously
simply accept some particular level of "appropriate inclusion."
Those interested in opinion concurrence in school adrninistration examine citizen opinion within the school district, analysts
of service distribution look primarily at intradty distribution,
and studies of public encounters may examine the individual
agencfs responses to client request (Ziegler et al. 1983;
Hasenfeld and Steinmetz 1981). Critical analysts in virtually
every case contend that the level of analysis selected may mask
more pervasive system or societal unresponsiveness (Meier,
Stewart, and England 19!31).
Thus, critics of public choice service-delivery strategies
argue that increasing btrajurisdictional homogeneity may
indeed enhance responsiveness within that jurisdiction, but
only at the cost of decreased responsiveness across jurisdictions (Miller 1981). Similarly, Moe (1987,483) notes that thc
emphasis of congressional dominance theorists on the influence of single committees or subconunittees on an individual agency ignores the fact "that much of what committees
want and pursue is not embodied in congressional policy
enactments and often would not Ix ratified if the full body
were to vote." Just as bureaucratic responsiveness to fire alarm
oversight may impede responsiveness to broader concerns,
responsiveness to congressional committee preferences may
impede responsiveness to "larger collective goals of the legislature" (Moe 1987, 483). Yet analysts persist in assuming, often
with little theoretical justification, that whichever population
they choose to emphasize is the one that should control or
respond to control.
Critics also charge that the extent of bureaucratic responsiveness in any given community may be overestimated by
focusing only on the part played by the bureaucracy. If responsiveness is a function both of bureaucratic and political forces,
is it valid to assess bureaucratic responsiveness according to
the actions of the bureaucracy only, or should that assessment
addthe contributions of the bureaucracy to overall levels
of responsiveness?
For example, should one conclude that an agency that
provides prompt, thorough investigation of citizen complaints
is responsive, even if administrators know that no money is
81 /]-PART, January 1992
available to correct the problems and make no effort to obtain
additional funds (Mladenkil 1981; Bachelor 1983)t Or, as Sharp
(1981) asks in regard to accas responsiveness, "Does access
responsiveness mean that all elements of the local governmental system are working together to find out about citizen
concerns?"
This question takes us back once again to a mapr problem
with existing research on responsiveness: the lack of integration of alternative models of responsiveness. Even mearch that
addresses specifically the s u b j j of bureaucratic responsi v c
ners has minimized or ignored at least one of the possible
approaches to mponsiveztess. Thus, studies such as those by
Mann (19761, Tucker and Ziegler (19801, and Cormley et al.
(1983) all downplay the role of responsiveness to clectcd
offiaals. The urban service-distributior~literature ewplom
political influences almost entirely in terms of the links
between e l ~ t o r a votes
l
and bureaucratic outputs in a narrow
range of policy arenas, despite other research demonstrating
links between minority and female representation in elcctivc
office and bureaucratic outcomes (Eisinger 1982; Saltzstcin
1989; Browning et al. 1984; Meier and England 1984) or the
influence of overhead controls in other policy areas. k c n t
works on legislative dominance or principal-agent relationships .
are often Matant in their disregard for alternative modelssome omit entirely any consideration of alternative controllers
(e.g., Weingast and Moran 1983, while others treat one institution, typically the one the author understands the least (Bendor
19901, as a completely passive actor in the relationship. Such
analysts have been reluctant to acknowledge that bureaucracy
might be something other than an agent of elected officials,
that it might sometimes be an agent of the public or even, at
other times, a principal in its own right
CONCLUSIONS
The reality of bureaucratic life is that dl the models
discussed here are valid, theoretically defensible models of the
bureaucratic component of a democratic system. Each model
has been evident in varying degrees and fashion in the structure and design of public bureaucracics as they have evolved
over time; in administrative theory and research; and in the
haining and socialization of public administrators Individual 7
bureauuats, elected officials, and members of the public alikc
typically believe, at least impliatly, in at least one or another
of these models and act accordingly but must interact with
others who may accept alternative models. For example, conflicting views of how the bureaucracy is to meet its democratic
obligations for responsiveness can be compounded by
82/]-PART, January 1992
Bureaucratic Rtjpo~iocnrrr
contradictory views regarding the importance of responsiveness relative to other dernocratic values and by contradictory
views on questions of appropriate inclusion or the forms
responsiveness must take. The resulting pursuit of responsi v c
ness is likely to be rather chaotic, with some actors ignoring
the question entirely while advocates of one or another
approach argue past each other and accuse each other of bad
faith.
Researchers face a difficult task in making sense of the
multiple, simultaneous interactions between bureaucrats and
other actors. Isolating and identifying ideas, actions, or outcomes that might appropriately be considered "responsive" and
a w i n g degrees of responsiveness in bureaucracy are even
more difficult tasks. Yet that p b is even harder if one also
succumbs to the desire to enshrine a prefened model of a
democratic bureaucracy as the only appropriate d e l .
Just as the consumer models for such a long time assumed
that bureaucratic responsiveness q u i d direct responses to
citizcn demands, political control models now often assume
that responsiveness requires respons to the preferences of
elected officials. Underlying normative preferences lead
analysts using either model to ignore the other model, as well
as public service models, and inevitably bias the research in
subtle and not+subtle ways.
The ~ e c e n temphasis on consumer models and neutral
executor models (e.g., political control models) of bureaucratic
responsiveness is especially troublesome because so many of
the assumptions of these models are poor fits for bureaucrats
who sx themselves as public servants with independent reprcsenta tional responsibilities. Analyses of political control of
bureaucracy have been hindered further by their lack of attention to earlier work on bureaucratic responsiveness. As a consequenm, researchers have had to stumble through many of
the same theoretical, conceptual, and operational problems
encountered in earlier research on bureaucratic responsiveness.
For example, analysts have had to acknowledge that many
of the assumptions of true principal-agent models (e.g., single
principals, precornmitment to rewards or sanctions, or agent
behavior based on self-interest) do not provide an accurate
depiction of principal-agent relations in our system and hence
often find little empirical support (Bendor 1990; Levinthal 1988;
March and Olsen 1989). Consequently, analysts have adopted
all sorts of variants on the model, many of which abuse the
approach or employ only the terminology of principal-agent
relationslijps. Extreme variants (such as the legislative
Bureaucratic Rnponr ivrncsr
dominance approach) have been subjected to extensive
&ticism, for example, for such faults as inadequately or
improperly conceptualizing control, overstating both the
desirability and reality of congressional control of bureaucracy
through radically underspecified models, and ignoring
relevant theory a d research on public bureaucracy (Moe 1987;
Cook and Wood 1989; Eisner and Meier 1990).
Scholars using formal models have been forced to try to
model alternative motivations in light of widespread adoption
by bureaucrats of political or public semce roles (Aberbach
and Rockman 1981; Fleischrnann and Pierannund 1990;
Schmidt and Posner 1986; Gruber 1987). Meanwhile, scholars
seeking to provide empirical tests of principal-agent relations
have been forced to debate old issues
involving bureauabout how to operationalize presidential or legislative will (scc
Moe 1987,48284; Cook and Woad 1989,968); how to recogn i z "responsive" bureauctatic behavior in the absence of an
explicit stimulus or otherwise; how to distinguish strategic
from sincere behavior; how to assess shared responsibilities
and action; how to account for both organizational and human
influences on outcomes (Harnmond 1986); and how to control
for rival explanations while maintaining some modicum of
simplicity and rigor.
In the process of dealing with these questions, sdrolars
have begun to show signs of acknowledging the complexity of
the theoretical issues at stake by adopting more sophisticated
models, sometimes involving nested games (e.g., Schlotz 19911,
and by demonstrating a heightened awareness and understanding of the differencesbetween institutions. Scholars also
n e d to give additional attention to questions of to what and to
whom bureaucrats respond, and under what circumstances.
Thus, much more could be done to examine the tradeoffs
that result from bureaucrats' attempts to respond to multiple
demands. What factors, internal and external to the agency, are
likely to stimulate response to one set of demands over
"We know, for eumple, that some
another? Under what circumstances are bureaucrats likely to
agmdes appear to attract individuals
wlth particular vicm on rcspolrsive- respond to any given set of demands or to o b j j v e needs?
How do various factors influencing bureaucratic responsive
ness and that particular
of
ness interact with one another?" Finally, what difference does
adopting particular approrches to
responsiveness in i k varied forms make in terms of citizen
adminisbation ( W i n 1969; Romzck satisfaction with or support for government? The utility of
and Hendriks 1982; Hendenon 1975);
r-arch
on such theoretically significant questions can only be
much more needs to be understood
enhanced
by increased awareness of the full range of models
about the interactive Influence of
community, organintion. and in&of bureaucratic democracy and by renewed attention to the
vidual burea ucra b on responsiveness. conceptual subtleties of responsiveness.
8 4 / ~ - P A R TJanuary
,
1992
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