Claremont McKenna College Poland`s Law and Justice Party: The

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Claremont McKenna College
Poland’s Law and Justice Party: The European Union and Its Swing to
the Right
Margaux Arntson
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European
Union
7 April 2016
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Table of Contents
Title Page ………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………………. 2
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Chapter I: A Brief Introduction ………………………………………………………… 4
Chapter II: The Current Situation .……………………………………………………. 5
Chapter III: Causes ……………………………………………………………….….….…. 8
Chapter IV: Future of Poland and Its Role in the EU ….….….….….….….… 12
References ……………………………………………………………………………………. 15
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Abstract
The following paper presents an in-depth analysis of the effects of Poland’s recent
election of the Law and Justice Party, and its effects on Poland’s role in the European
Union. Why are we seeing the emergence of right-wing governments in the former
Soviet Bloc? On October 26th, 2015, Poland’s opposition Law and Justice party (PiS)
won with 37.6% of the vote, marking the first time that a single party has won enough
seats to govern alone since democracy was restored in 1989. PiS has strong support in
poorer, rural areas where people feel left out of post-communist economic success.
That being said, the party is already under fire for some of the parliamentary
maneuvers they promise to enact, like tighter control of the state-run media and the
reversal of Poland’s promise to accept Middle Eastern refugees. What does this election
mean for Poland’s role in the European Union? Many of the party’s actions seem to
contradict the democracy that the EU has worked so hard to foster, yet it was
democratically elected by the public. I will attempt to analyze the EU intuitions and
policies that allow for such a contradictory government party to be elected by one of
their members using a mix of empirical evidence and theory. This analysis will be used
to come to a greater conclusion about the election’s implications for the rise of
nationalist movements across Europe and the future of a united European Union.
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Chapter I: A Brief Introduction
Unlike any other coalition in the world, the European Union (EU) has achieved
the unlikely goal of unifying and buoying twenty-eight European countries under a
canopy of supranational rules and regulations. Its very conception is exceptional:
emerging from the horrors of war, a group of founding six countries agreed to
cooperate economically and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was
born. With economic prosperity and social peace on their minds, soon other countries
aimed at gaining membership. Ever since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and its
official inauguration in 1993, the European Union has endured as a shining star
amongst the fog of anarchy that so often pervades the international stage. Today, it is
widely considered to be the most developed political union as well as the biggest single
world market. The EU has successfully set important standards of democracy and
human rights, standards which every country must meet and that set a precedent for a
more prosperous international community (2016). In return, member states receive
unparalleled economic and societal benefits.
With these qualities in mind, a perplexing and puzzling turn of events has
occurred across the EU in recent years. Ever since the global financial crisis of 2008,
an increasing number of EU voters seem to be shifting their ruling parties to be more
right-leaning. In other words, governments in many EU nations are becoming overall
less democratic and more conservative and protectionist. This shift is disconcerting
considering it is coming from countries whose populaces have democratically agreed
to further the EU’s mission of “promot[ing] and protect[ing] democracy and universal
rights in Europe and around the world (European Commission, 2015).” Instead, the
majority of these elected governments, like the Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland,
are “likely to spell a return to social Conservatism and authoritative populism
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(EuroNews, 2015).” What mechanisms have allowed this breakdown of EU ideals to
occur? Why are we seeing the emergence of right-wing governments, especially in the
former Soviet Bloc?
The following paper presents an in-depth analysis of the effects of Poland’s
recent election of the Law and Justice Party, and its effects on Poland’s role in the
European Union. On October 26th, 2015, Poland’s opposition Law and Justice party
(PiS) won the vote, marking the first time that a single party has won enough seats to
govern alone since democracy was restored in 1989. PiS has strong support in poorer,
rural areas where people feel left out of post-communist economic success. That being
said, the party is already under fire for some of the parliamentary maneuvers they
promise to enact, like tighter control of the state-run media and the reversal of Poland’s
promise to accept Middle Eastern refugees. Many of the party’s actions seem to
contradict the democracy that the EU has worked so hard to foster, yet it was
democratically elected by the public. I will attempt to analyze the EU intuitions and
policies that allow for such a contradictory government party to be elected by one of
their members using a mix of empirical evidence and theory. What does this election
mean for Poland’s role in the European Union? The analysis will be used to come to a
greater conclusion about the election’s implications for the rise of nationalist
movements across Europe and the future of a united European Union.
Chapter II: The Current Situation
Not only does the EU provide a more peaceful and co-operative Europe, but its
creation has led to a multitude of economic, environmental, and social benefits for the
countries that meet the requirements and joined. The EU was even awarded the Nobel
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Peace Prize in 2012 for helping to promote peace and international co-operation
(Economics, 2014). It is no coincidence that EU member nations are amongst the
highest positions in the Human Development Index, a summary measure of the
average dimensions of human development, one that is widely considered more
accurate in measuring a nation’s prosperity than gross domestic product (GDP)
(United Nations, 2016). That being said, the EU accounts for 23 percent of the nominal
global GDP and has boosted the European economy by not only embracing free trade,
but by eliminating non-tariff barriers and other protectionist measures. In addition,
the EU has attracted greater inward investment, increasing it from €23 billion in 1992
to €159 billion in 2005. Studies show that the free movement of labor and capital that
the EU provides boosts member states’ economies to new levels. Along with these
successes, member states have achieved the goal of reducing CO2 emissions from 8.4
metric tons per capita in 1996 to 7.1 metric tons per capita in 2011, a trend that still
continues today (World Bank, 2016).
Clearly the EU has played a positive role on the nations that join its ranks. With
this being said, one would assume that the benefits would naturally attract a growing
number of states vying for membership. In reality, the merits of an EU membership
have been consistently losing momentum over the years while member countries are
meeting their limits for playing by the rules. An increasing number of European states,
many of them members of the EU, have shifted decidedly rightward in recent years, a
shift of events that puzzles and concerns many observers. In a speech, Hungarian
prime minister Viktor Orban declared that he “wants to abandon liberal democracy in
favour of an ‘illiberal state’” (Synon, 2014). In France, the xenophobic, right-wing
National Front has surged in popularity recently though it failed to secure a major
victory in recent regional elections (Stern, 2015). Germany is following suit as the
Pegida movement is sounds alarms against Muslim immigrants. Finally, Poland’s
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recent election of the Law and Justice Party mas many questioning whether or not it is
going to meet the same fate and fall into a trap of increased nationalism and
illiberalism (Connolly, 2014). What separates Poland from the other EU countries is
that unlike the majority of the member nations, it was able to avoid recession after the
2008 financial crisis and remains one of Europe’s fastest growing economies (Nardelli,
2015). In addition, the unemployment rate in Poland has dropped from 14.2 percent
in 2013 to 9.8 percent in 2015 (Central Statistical Office of Poland, 2016); GDP per
inhabitant has risen from €48,000 to €68,000 in 2003 and 2014 respectively (Central
Statistical Office of Poland, 2016). Overall, Poland is well capitalized and has seen
stable growth in many important economic and social areas. Political science theory
suggests that favorable economic conditions ought to benefit incumbents and make
backsliding from democracy highly unlikely (Tworzecki, 2015). Despite this
remarkable performance, the country is not safe from the right-wing heat that is
making its way through the EU.
In 2015, the conservative and Eurosceptic Law and Justice party (PiS) won
parliamentary elections by 37.6% of the vote (Tworzecki, 2015). Led by Jaroslaw
Kaczynski, the party replaced the Civic Platform, a pro-market party that had governed
for last eight years. The Law and Justice Party promised a larger role for the state in
the economy as well as a lowering of the retirement age (EuroNews, 2015). These
proposed reforms appealed to those living in poorer, rural areas; Nearly 36 percent of
Poles live in poor or very poor conditions (Borgen, 2014). This election marks the first
time since the introduction of liberal democracy in 1989 that a party won an absolute
majority in parliament. Since its installation, the party has already enacted concerning
policies and are coming under fire for acting like dictators (Stern, 2015). They are a
member of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists, a parliament
grouping that is known for being highly Eurocentric. AECR touts that it is “committed
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to individual liberty, national sovereignty, parliamentary democracy (alliance of
European Conservatives and Reformists, 2014)”. Among other things, the Law and
Justice party has tightened control of state-run media, reneged on Poland’s promise to
accept Middle Eastern refugees, and pursued Catholic-inspired social policies such as
opposing same-sex marriage and abortion (Stern, 2015). In addition, the prime
minister Beata Szydło has removed European Union flags from her official
appearances, opting instead solely for Poland’s white-and-red banner (Stern, 2015).
This change in sentiments, not only regarding Poland’s domestic ideals but also its
place in the European Union, is concerning for many onlookers. How can you explain
the juxtaposition of Poland’s economic success and their rise of a radical populist
formation like the Law and Justice party? If a country with a strong economy and
seemingly satisfied population can democratically accept and allow the rule of a party
with sentiments that so starkly contradict those of the European Union, what does this
mean for the legitimacy of the EU’s goals of promoting democracy as well as the power
of the alliance as a whole?
Chapter IV: Causes
In order to better understand Poland’s election of the Law and Justice Party, it
is important to explain and evaluate the various potential causes of this recent election.
The causes behind the election of a right-wing party from a democratic country such
as Poland can be broken down into two categories: domestic and international. To
begin, domestic causes will be considered.
One of the domestic explanations for this election may lie purely in the
sentiments and misgivings of the Poles. Before the election of the Law and Justice
Party, the much more right-centered Civic Platform had lost steam during its last years
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in office. The party was tainted by scandals and out of new ideas during the election
season (Cienski, 2015). The perception was that the Civil Platform had lost touch with
voters outside Poland’s rocker western regions (Jefferson, 2015). Even more
surprising, about 60 percent of voters between the ages of 18 and 29 supported the
opposition party, a group that had overwhelmingly voted for the incumbent Bronislaw
Komorowski previously (Lyman, 2015). The intersect of religion and politics also
played a role in the failure of rightist parties to win the majority vote. According to
Paweł Zalewski, a former Civic Platform MEP, “Our turn to the left led to a
confrontation with the Church, which mobilized the country’s traditional electorate
against us.” Many political analysts argue that this trend reflects the idea that these
disenchanted Poles are simply rejecting whatever happens to be the current political
order, regardless of whether its left or right (Lyman, 2015). The Polish people crave
change over anything else, and the election of the Law and Justice party represents a
protest vote, a rejection of the ruling party that failed to keep its promises.
In addition, it is important to note that 87.5 percent of Poles are Roman Catholic
(Tworzecki, 2015). In addition, 96.9 percent of poles identify as Polish (CIA, 2016).
These statistics show that the country has not had to confront the challenges of
multiculturalism. The influx of refugees from war-torn countries like Syria has the
effect of greatly upsetting the balance of the Polish people; conditions are ripe for
xenophobic appeals, appeals that the Law and Justice party embraces more than its
rightist opposition. Though the Civil Platform, the previously right-centered Polish
party, guided Poland through economic growth during a recession, the events in
Poland show that parties with a strong message for change will prevail, especially when
voters are unhappy.
In addition to voter sentiments, the political nature of Poland is prime for the
rise of rightist parties. This is referring to the combination of “leftist” socio-economic
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agenda with “rightist” cultural and political agenda (Porter-Szücs, 2015). For example,
the Law and Justice Party, though considered “far-right” by many political scientists
and experts, is hard to define with a straight-forward ideological label. On one hand,
the party calls for an increase in social spending, higher taxes on the wealthy, and renationalization of key sectors of the economy. These are all more liberal pursuits. In
contrast, the party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, also expressed that the Law and Justice
party was opposed to immigrants, gays, feminists, liberals, and most foreigners. In
addition, he has expressed that his goal is to create a Poland in which there lives only
one Polish nation, and not diverse nations. He has admitted that his goal has been to
remain in power f0r life (Porter-Szücs, 2015). This combination of liberal and
conservative sentiments can be seen in other European countries, like Hungary for
example. According to the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, “the era of liberal
democracy is over” (Porter-Szücs, 2015). Simultaneously, he has worked to increase
taxes of larger businesses and establish price controls on electricity. The parallels
between these two regimes are striking, and they show that a specific set of
characteristics help facilitate the rise of the right, especially in post-communist
countries.
In addition to domestic contributors, aspects of the international stage have also
contributed to the rise of the rightist Law and Justice party in Poland. This category of
issues is more complex, as it involves neighboring countries and other members of the
European Union. What is most fascinating is that the EU, a body which touts a set of
conditions for all of its member nations that are cemented in democratic gains, is
actually acting as a hindrance to the development of Poland as a democracy that
ensures basic liberties and the oversight of government. Over time, the reputation of
the EU as as powerhouse of democracy and strong socioeconomic gains for its member
states has greatly diminished. It has been tarnished by the failure of member countries
POLAND AND THE EU
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to manage conflicts, like the influx of refugees recently (Cook, 2016). The more than
one million people arriving in Europe in 2015 easily overwhelmed border authorities
and reception centers, highlighting the EU’s inability to enact quick and tactically
efficient responses as a conglomeration. It successfully went from being a wealthy,
admirable group of states to one of the weakest in the world, especially compared to
Jordan or Lebanon, countries that currently house more than two million refugees
(Cook, 2016). Donald Tusk, the European Council President, is in agreement. In
October of 2015 he warned “Europe is subject to an increasingly more scathing
criticism, and our internal disagreements and mutual recrimination only help our
opponents” (De La Baume, 2015). Other examples, like the debt crisis, have also eaten
away at the EU’s once strong and foundational global reputation (Globe Scan. 20115).
This tarnished reputation holds moral consequences as well. As nations like Poland
feel that their membership is not worth the costs of sovereignty, they increasingly lean
towards domestic and autonomous decisions. Not only has the EU’s infrastructure
crumbled, but its moral standings and expectations for member states have as well.
This moral authority of the institution is a major part of why members follow the rules.
A lack of it leaves more immoral and Eurosceptic parties to lead, as exemplified
through the Law and Justice party.
The lack of EU enforcement and stabilization is only exacerbating Poland’s
nature as a post-communist country. Though Poland was able to re-establish a firm
democracy following the fall of communism, many Poles still live with a deep mistrust
of political parties and coalitions, including the European Union. The lack of any
meaningful electoral competition meant that the Communist Party was a ubiquitous
and, more often than not, hated presence in the lives of most Polish people (Princeton,
2014). In addition, this means that ex-communist citizens “are less likely to engage in
a range of political actions… than citizens of established democracies” (Princeton,
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2014). Some also argue that citizens of former communist countries exhibit weaker
support for democratic values in the wake of the collapse of communism. This is due
to the fact that many communist regimes referred to themselves as “people’s
democracies,” whose democratic nature supposedly “derived from the fact that their
leaders governed in accordance with the interests of the majority of the people”
(Princeton, 2014). The fact that the EU touts policies and their positive influences on
member states, yet is unable to fulfill many promises or even come to simple
agreements, rings eerily similar to the rhetoric used by many communist authoritarian
regimes. This simple fact destabilizes the EU’s ability to be an effective player in the
international game, especially with respect to post-communist Eastern Bloc countries
like Poland.
Ch. IV: Future of Poland and Its Role in the EU
The analysis above paints an interesting picture about not only the nature of
Poland’s recent election of the Law and Justice party, but also the nature of postcommunist countries and the EU’s ability to reconcile the sentiments of the Eastern
Bloc with their own policy initiatives. Poland’s election, fueled by post-communist
sentiments and the inefficiency of the EU, reflects the greater trend of many European
nations. The election also highlights many systemic problems within Poland, as well as
within the EU. Respectable opinion in Europe has revolved around an illusory
consensus about the virtues of European values (Porter-Szücs, 2015). The emergence
of conflicts and crisis, like the ones mentioned above, have threatened these values as
nations look towards more nationalistic and protectionist policies for safety. The rise
of the Polish right represents a population that is not wealthy enough to feel secure and
do not identify with the rhetoric used by the Civic Platform and other left-leaning
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parties. There dissatisfaction has many important repercussions for the country, as
well as it’s role within the larger international community.
While Poland is by far not the only European country with these sentiments, it’s
election of an extremely rightist party is nonetheless creating fear in it’s European
partners. This rings especially true for those partners who wish to seek an increasing
level of European integration in the hopes of battling further crisis alongside strong
EU allies. Though Poland grew 23.8 percent between 2008 and 2014, this economic
development did not transition to the Polish people, whose average post-tax salary is
one third the level in Germany (Cienski, 2015). Statistics are only that. The events in
Poland show that strong economic success does not necessarily transition to strong
positive sentiments in a country. Though Poles believe that the election of the Law and
Justice party will bring a refreshing change domestically, including a lower retirement
age and a strong minimum wage, its election might hinder the country internationally
as countries shy away from a nation run by such a right-wing government. Poland’s
strong economic and diplomatic relationship with Germany will most likely suffer
(Adekoya, 2015). This may lead to a weakening of the Polish economy, an economy that
was so strong during the rule of the Civil Platform that is completely avoided the woes
of the 2008 economic recession. Domestically, this election could also mean the return
to social Conservatism and authoritative populism, further separating Poland from its
historic allies and supporters (EuroNews, 2015).
In addition, the election of the Law and Justice party will conclusively change
the nature of Poland’s role in international discussions. The party will be hard to work
with in Brussels, as it opposes many of the more liberal policies being deliberated
between EU member states. For one, it will be reluctant to take in migrants. It also
stridently defends Poland’s use of coal, which will complicate climate talks (Cienski,
2015). All of these sentiments represents additional roadblocks that will only hinder
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the already-slow pace of the EU and its decision-making abilities. In addition, the
outright majority of the Law and Justice party in both houses of parliament enables
the party to keep its spending habits. This means an increase in taxes for large banks,
making Poland more of a wildcard for foreign investors (Jefferson, 2015). This turn
may also decrease their profitability as a country. The election of the Law and Justice
Party represents real challenges for Poland and the rest of the international
community. Its rise to power marks a decisive change for the nation and Europe as a
whole, as well as an increasing number of roadblocks to come. Overall, though many
Polish voters believe that the election of the Law and Justice party will bring an
important change to the Poland’s domestic welfare, the parties election may mean the
end of the economic and social security that many in the country take as a regular part
of life. The country that so valiantly weathered the economic crisis very well might see
a decrease in social freedoms and a pushback from important international allies.
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