Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals
Author(s): Donald R. Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 235-258
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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WhoWinsonAppeal?Upperdogs
and Underdogs
inthe
UnitedStatesCourtsofAppeals*
DonaldR. Songer,University
ofSouthCarolina
ReginaldS. Sheehan,University
ofNorthTexas
The centralfocusof thisinvestigation
is theeffectof litigation
resourceson thesuccessof
appellantsappearingbeforetheUnitedStatesCourtsof Appeals.The analysisparallelstheearlier
are thatlitigation
studyby Wheeleret al. (1987) of whowinsin statesupremecourts.The findings
resourcesare muchmorestrongly
relatedto appellantsuccessin thecourtsof appealsthanin either
winmuchmorefrequently
theUnitedStatesor statesupremecourts.Upperdoglitigants
inthecourts
of appealsin bothpublishedand unpublished
decisionsof thecourtsof appealsevenaftercontrols
are introduced
forpartisanandregionaleffects
andthedifferences
amongtypesofcases.
"Who getswhat?"hastraditionally
beenviewedas one ofthecentralquestionsin thestudyof politics.In theUnitedStates,thecourtsare widelyviewed
of a wide spectrum
of conflicts
as keyinstitutions
forthelegitimate
settlement
forthedistribetweenindividualsand groupsthathaveimportant
implications
butionof materialand symbolicgoods. Therefore,
who winsin
understanding
of "theauthoritative
of a fullappreciation
thecourtsis an essentialcomponent
allocationof values" in society(Easton 1953). In thispaperwe are concerned
withtherelationship
betweentherelativestrength
of directparties(theirlitigain theUnitedStatesCourtsofAppealsand
tionresources)appearingas litigants
theirratesof successin thatforum.
Severalstudiesoftrialcourtshaveconcludedthatthe"haves" tendtocome
outaheadin litigation
it
(Galanter1974;Owen 1971;Wanner1975). Generally,
havebeenmoresuccessfulin litigation
has beendiscoveredthatgovernments
at
andthatorganizations
thetriallevelthanhavebusinessesor otherorganizations
have been moresuccessfulthanindividuallitigants.
Galanter(1974) suggests
thatthe"haves" will winmorefrequently
bothbecausetheyare likelyto have
of advantagesaccrueto them
superiormaterialresourcesandbecausea number
as a resultof their"repeatplayer"status.Superiorresourcesallowthe"haves"
andto incurtheexpensesofextento hirethebestavailablelegalrepresentation
whichmayincreasethechances
sive discovery,
expertwitnesses,and so forth,
of
of successat trial.In addition,as repeatplayers,theywill reapthebenefits
andtheabilitytodevelopand
greater
litigation
experience,
case-selecting
ability,
thatmayincludeforumshopping,
a comprehensive
implement
litigation
strategy
* This material
is baseduponworksupported
undergrant
bytheNationalScienceFoundation
no. SES-8712053. Whiletheauthorsappreciatethissupportwhichmadetheresearchreportedin
thispaperpossible,all findings
andconclusions
arethoseoftheauthors
anddo notnecessarily
reflect
theviewsoftheNationalScienceFoundation.
American
Journal
ofPolitcalScience,Vol. 36, No. 1, February1992,Pp. 235-58
ofTexas Press,P.O. Box 7819, Austin,TX 78713
X 1992bytheUniversity
236
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
of theirchancesto winat trialor appeal,andthecapability
informed
judgments
whentheprospectsforvictoryat
settlements
to acceptmoderatelossesthrough
trialor on appealaresmall.
that
At theappellatelevel,less supporthas beenfoundfortheproposition
the"haves" comeoutahead. SheehanandSonger(1989) examinedthesuccess
of 10 categoriesof partiesin theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtovera 36-year
resourceshad a
periodand concludedthattherewas littleevidencethatlitigant
classes
majorimpacton successin thatforum.Instead,thesuccessof different
of the
of litigantswas closelyrelatedto thechangingideologicalcomposition
betterin liberal
Court(e.g., unionsand poor individualsfaredsubstantially
in conservative
courts).
was mostsuccessful
courts,andstategovernment
In a studyof 16 statesupremecourtsfrom1870 to 1970, Wheeleret al.
analysisto examinetherelaofGalanter's
(1987) appliedthegeneralframework
Initiallytheyadvance
tivesuccesson appealof fivegeneralclassesof litigants.
partyto come out ahead and
threereasonswhyone mightexpectthestronger
patalso considerseveralbases forassumingthatthereshouldbe no systematic
' One mightexpectthestronger
ternofsuccessthatfavoredanyclass oflitigants.
becausetheremightbe a normative
partytocomeoutahead,theyspeculate,first
interests
(e.g., in a marketeconomythelaw
tiltof thelaw towardthestronger
and thelaw maybe designedto
maybe designedto protectbusinessinterests,
of democratically
Second,thejudges
electedgovernment).
protect
theauthority
party
themselves
party.Finally,thestronger
maybe biasedtowardthestronger
resources(bothmorefinancialremay be expectedto have greaterlitigation
sourcesand greaterexperiencederivedfrombeinga repeatplayer).Alternain success ratesattributable
to party
tively,one mightexpectno difference
arerationalactorstrying
becauselawyersandthepartiestheyrepresent
strength
aboutwhatthecourtswilldo, takingintoaccount
to makesensiblepredictions
and theeffects
of superiorreall thefactorsofjudicialbias, legal philosophy,
sources. Thus, appeals will be undertaken
only when thereis a substantial
chanceof winning.
basedon thesespeculato testhypotheses
WhenWheeleret al. attempted
thatsuggestedthatthe "haves" come out
tions,theyfounda generalpattern
resourceswas
litigation
ahead,buttherelativeadvantageofpartieswithsuperior
forthegreater
successofthepresumedstronger
parmodest.Theirexplanation
withthatoffered
ties is consistent
by Galanter.Theysuggestthat"the greater
conferadvantagesbeyondhiring
resourcesof the stronger
partiespresumably
betterlawyerson appeal. Largerorganizations
maybe moreexperiencedand
theirbehaviorto theletterof thelaw or to builda
thusbetterable to conform
on whichwe haveno evidence.Experienceand
bettertrialcourtrecord,matters
wealthalso implythecapacityto be moreselectivein decidingwhichcases to
IWheeleretal. also discussedseveralreasonsthatmightbe advancedtojustifytheexpectation
forthesespeculations
thattheweakerpartieswouldcomeoutahead,butno supportwas discovered
in theempiricaldata.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
237
appealordefendwhenthelowercourtloserappeals"(Wheeleretal. 1987,441).
Since Wheeleret al. had neitherdirectdata on judges' attitudes
noreven
of thosevalues,theywereunableto determine
indicators
anyindirect
systematicallywhether
thesuccessofstronger
partieswas due tojudicialbias. However,
theyspeculatedthatthegreater
successoflargeunitsofgovernment
versussmall
unitsof government
and thegreatersuccessof big businessagainstsmallbusinessmadesuchan interpretation
iftherewas a tiltinthelaw
unlikely.
Similarly,
towardeithergovernment
or business,it was not likelya tiltthatselectively
favoredonlylargegovernment
orbigbusiness.Thus,greater
litigation
resources
was themostlikelyexplanation
oftheempirical
results.
Nevertheless,
Wheeleret al. appearto be somewhatambivalent
aboutthe
significance
of theadvantageenjoyedby stronger
parties.In mostof thecombetweenstronger
and weakerpartieswere
parisonsexamined,thedifferences
of thedisadvantage
Yetthemagnitude
of weakerparties
statistically
significant.
was notoverwhelming.
Mostnotablewasthatthenetdisadvantage
ofindividuals
was less than5% or 6% on mostmeasures.This relatively
strongshowingby
individuals
led themto speculatethatperhaps"thereoftenwas a 'pro-underdog'
bias in thenormative
courtjudgesthattended
systemor inthemindsofsupreme
to offset,at leastin part,individualparties'relativedisadvantage
in litigational
one mightconclude(alexperienceand capacity"(1987, 442). Alternatively,
thisexplanation)
thattheseresultslendat least
thoughWheeleretal. do notoffer
someplausibility
to therationalactormodel.
In thispaperwe applya framework
similarto thatemployedby Galanter
(1974), Sheehanand Songer(1989), and Wheeleret al. (1987) in an attempt
to
determine
theextentto whichlitigation
resources(bothfinancial
resourcesand
litigation
experience)have an effecton thechancesforsuccess in the United
StatesCourtsof Appeals. Since thepositionof thecourtsof appeals is more
similarto thatof statesupremecourtsthanit is to eithertheUnitedStatesSuthenatureoftheanalypremeCourtorto thetrialcourtsexaminedbyGalanter,
sis employedis designedto parallelas closelyas possible2theWheeleret al.
analysis.
Data forAnalysis
In orderto examinethe successof stronger
and weakerpartiesin cases
decidedby the UnitedStatesCourtsof Appeals,we coded the natureof the
theissue,thepartyof thejudgeson each panel,the
appellantand respondent,
of all cases termioutcome,and theopinionstatus(publishedor unpublished)
natedbyjudicialactionin calendaryear1986in theFourth,Seventh,and Eleventhcircuits.The numberof cases coded was 4,281 (2,828 unpublished
decisionsand 1,453cases withpublishedopinions).
Each of thecases was codedbyone oftheauthors
or bya carefully
trained
2Thedataemployedin thisanalysiswereoriginally
collectedfora different
project,and as a
resultthecategoriesofpartiesare notidenticaltothoseusedbyWheeleret al.
238
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
researchassistant.In orderto assess thereliability
of thecoding,a sampleof
500 cases was independently
coded a secondtime.The resultsof thisanalysis,
in theAppendix,suggestthatthecodingwas highlyreliable.
presented
Mostpreviousanalysesof thecourtsof appealshaverestricted
theiranalyses to thepublishedopinionsofthecourts.ButSonger(1988) has demonstrated
thatsuch an analysiscan produceresultsthatmaybe seriouslydistorted
and
Songer,Smith,and Sheehan(1989) have shownthatat least in the Eleventh
Circuitthereare significant
in theratesof participation
of different
differences
classes of appellantsin publishedversusunpublished
decisions.Therefore,
it
was concludedthatanyanalysisofthesuccessoflitigants
inthecourtsofappeals
mustbe based on all decisionsof thecourtsratherthanjust themorereadily
availablepublisheddecisions.Unfortunately,
collectionof data on theunpublisheddecisionsis veryexpensive.Therefore,
resourcelimitations
necessitated
therestriction
of theanalysistojustthreecircuits.
As Wheeleret al. pointout,specificinformation
aboutthewealthof particularpartiesin a givencase ortherelativelitigation
ofthoseparties
experience
is oftennotavailableincourtopinions.Sincethedataforthisstudy,likethedata
fortheWheeleret al. study,werederivedfromcourtopinions,we usuallydid
nothave enoughinformation
to unambiguously
classifyone of thepartiesas
havinggreaterlitigation
resourcesthanitsadversary.
Consequently,
we adopted
the Wheeleret al. strategy
of assigninglitigants
to generalclasses and then
aboutwhichclass was usuallythestronger
makingassumptions
party.
Fortheinitialanalysis,each appellantandrespondent
was classifiedas belongingto one of fivemajorclasses: individuallitigants,
businesses,stateand
or other.The "other"catelocal governments,
theUnitedStatesgovernment,
goryincludedunions;nonprofit
organizations;
private,nonprofit
schools;social,
whocould
and fraternal
charitable,
organizations;
politicalparties;and litigants
included2.3% ofthe
notbe unambiguously
categorized.This "other"category
appellantsand 2.5% of therespondents.
Theywereexcludedfromanalysisbeintermsofrelative
cause itwas thought
thattheycouldnotbe safelycategorized
resourcescomparedto theotherfourclassesof litigants.If theparty
litigation
buttheperson'sinlistedin thecase citationwas a specific,namedindividual,
in thesuitwas due directly
ofa government
volvement
totheirroleas an official
orownerofa business,theywerecodedaccordagencyor as an officer,
partner,
and notas an individual.For example,if
affiliation
ing to theirorganizational
forrape,the
thepresident
of an insurance
companywas appealinga conviction
was the
appellantwas coded as an individual.However,if thecountysheriff
subjectof a 1983 suitfordamagesbecauseof an allegedbeatingof a prisoner,
wouldbe classifiedin thelocal government
thenthe defendant
category.All
ofthechiefexecutive,
government
agencies,eventhosethatare "independent"
and government
werecategorizedin the appropriate
corporations
government
class (e.g., theFederalCommunication
Commissionand theTennesseeValley
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
239
class). Like Wheeleret al.
wereclassifiedin thefederalgovernment
Authority
usuallyhavefewerresourcesthaneitherbusinesses
we assumethatindividuals
partiescontend,we
Whenbusinessand government
or unitsof governments.3
becauseevenwhenthefinanwillusuallybe stronger
assumethatgovernments
thanthoseof thebusiness,thegovareno greater
cial resourcesof government
repeat
ernment
agencyis morelikelyto be a repeatplayer(or a morefrequent
issueareainvolvedin thesuit).
playerin theparticular
In a secondwaveof analysis,Wheeleret al. "tookfourtypesof business
partiesthatseem especiallylikelyto be repeatplayersand to have substantial
financialand legal resourcesat theirdisposal:railroads,banks,manufacturing
companies"(1987, 413). Thesebusinesseswereconcompanies,and insurance
and other
likelyto be "haves" relativeto individuals
sideredto be particularly
assessedsepabusinesses.The successof these"big businesses"was therefore
rately.Followingthislogic, we createda big businesscategoryforuse in a
to theinitialanalysisbasedon theoriginalfourcategories.In thisbig
follow-up
businesscategory,
we placedeach of thefourtypesof businessincludedin the
Whilethisbig busiWheeleret al. studyandaddedairlinesandoil companies.4
omitssome of theverylargestcompanies(or some
ness categoryundoubtedly
repeatplayers),our readingof the
of thosewho are amongthemostfrequent
alwayspartiesthat
cases convincesus thatthosethatareincludedwerevirtually
thatin a highproportion
resources.Thus,we areconfident
had verysubstantial
or a businessin the
a "big business"againsteitheran individual
of cases pitting
thebig businesscouldbe assumedto havesuperiorresources
residualcategory,
available.
WhileWheeleret al. did notsubdividetheirindividualcategory,we believedthatitwouldbe usefultodo so forthesecondwaveofanalysis.Therefore,
we createda categoryof "underdogindividuals"thatincludedthe poor and
These litigants
wereassumedto be weakeron averagethan
racialminorities.5
Sincecourtopinionsoftenhave
in theresidualcategory.
eventhoseindividuals
we
inregardtotheraceorwealthofindividual
litigants,
information
incomplete
or
fromor weresponsoredbyorganizations
3Whether
receivedsubstantial
support
individuals
notavailablein theopinions.It should
is generally
groupswas notcoded becausethatinformation
theWheeleret al. northeSheehanandSongerstudiescodedsuchinformation.
be notedthatneither
that
confident
To do so wouldtakea minicase studyof each decision.However,we are relatively
of individualsin our samplewho rsceivedsuchgroupsupportis quitesmall. One
thepercentage
is thelow rateof amicusparticipation.
of thelackof groupinvolvement
Only 1.9% ofthe
indicator
do notappearto
and mostof thoseparticipations
cases in oursamplehad anyamicusparticipation,
be in supportof individuals.
Wheeleret al. do notdiscusswhytheydid notincludethesecategoriesin their
4Although
study,we speculatethatitmayhavebeenbecauseairlinesandoil companieswerenotlargecompathe 100-yearperiodstudied.It shouldbe notedthattheoil companycategorydoes
niesthroughout
notincluderetailservicestations.
werenotincludedin thisunderdog
5Businesses,evenifownedbyminorities,
category.
240
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
forassigningindividuals
adopteda conservative
strategy
to theunderdogcategory.A litigant
wasplacedintheunderdog
category
onlyiftheopinionexplicitly
labeledthemas poor,black,andso on, or iftherewas an explicitindication
that
ofpeoplewhocouldsafelybe presumed
theywerepartof a category
to be poor
(e.g., welfarerecipientsor criminaldefendants
represented
by a public detherewerecertainly
somelitigants
whowerein factpooror
fender).Therefore,
blackwho wereplacedin theresidualindividualcategoryinsteadof theunderdog category,but we are confident
thatall who wereplaced in the underdog
categorydo in factbelongto thatcategory.
FollowingtheapproachofWheeleret al., we defined
winners
andlosersby
lookingat "who wontheappealin itsmostimmediate
sense,without
attempting
to view theappeal in some largercontext"(1987, 415). Thus,forexample,if
thedecisionof thedistrict
courtor theadministrative
agencywas "reversed,"
"reversedandremanded,""vacated,"or "vacatedandremanded,"
theappellant
theopinionannounceda doctrine
was coded as winningregardless
of whether
thatwas broador narrowandregardless
of whether
thatdoctrinemightbe supfuture
"haves" or "havenots."Also likeWheeleret
posedin generalto benefit
al., we excludedfromanalysisall cases withambiguousresults(e.g., thosein
in partandreversed
whichthecourtaffirmed
in part).
Finally,it shouldbe emphasizedthatlike Wheeleret al. our focusis on
whether
anyrelativeadvantageaccruesto thoseclassesof partieswithsuperior
resources.Even if thenormative
ideal of blindjusticeperfectly
delitigation
scribedtherealityof appealscourtdecisionmaking,one wouldnotnecessarily
wouldwin 50% of theappellatecases in
expectthatall categoriesof litigants
whichtheyparticipated.
Appealsarebrought
bytrialcourtlosersafterdecision
makers(judge andjury)at thetrialwho are also normatively
presumedto be
haveengagedin factfinding
andmadeinitialinterpretations
impartial
ofthelaw.
evenifappellatejusticeis blindandlitigation
Therefore,
resources
areirrelevant,
one wouldexpectthatrespondents
wouldprevailagainstthemajority
ofappeals.
And in fact,it is well knownthatthecourtsof appealsusuallyaffirm
(Howard
1981;Davis andSonger1988). In thedatautilizedinthepresent
study,thecourts
of appealsaffirmed
84% of thedecisionsappealedto them.Therefore,
in order
to assess whether
thehypothesized
relativeadvantageof partieswithsuperior
resourcesexists,it is notenoughto knowwhether
the"haves" won morefrequentlyin an absolutesense.Instead,we mustalso explorewhether
they"were
betterable thanotherpartiesto buckthebasic tendency
of appellatecourtsto
affirm"
(Wheeleret al. 1987,407). As a measureof thisaspectof relativeadvantage,Wheeleret al. computedan "indexof netadvantage."This indexis
computedforeach typeof litigant
by firsttakingtheirsuccessratewhenthey
theiropponents'success
appearas theappellantandfromthatfigure
subtracting
ratein thosecases in whichthelitigant
of interest
as respondent.
participates
This indexof advantageis independent
of therelativefrequency
thatdifferent
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
241
classesoflitigants
appearas appellants
versusrespondents.
In addition,itis also
independent
of therelativepropensity
of different
courtsto affirm
and is thereforea bettermeasureto use forthecomparison
oftheanalysisof appealscourts
and statesupremecourtsthana simplemeasureof theproportion
of decisions
wonbya givenclass of litigants
wouldbe.
AppellantSuccessand NetAdvantage
The beginning
pointof analysiswas to examinetheappellantsuccessrate
foreach of the fourbasic categoriesof litigants.The data are presentedin
Table 1. In dramatic
contrast
to thesuccessratesreported
byWheeleret al. for
statesupremecourts,therewerewidedisparities
intherelativesuccessofdifferentclassesof appellantsin thecourtsof appeals.In spiteofthegeneralpropensityof thecourtsof appealsto affirm,
thefederalgovernment
was successfulon
58.2% of its appeals. At theotherend of thespectrum
of assumedlitigation
wononly12.5% of theirappeals.Moreover,
resources,individuals
therankorderof thesuccessratewas exactlytheorderthatwouldbe predicted
fromthe
hypothesis
thatthelitigation
resourcesof appellantssignificantly
contributed
to
theirsuccess. Individualshad thelowestrateof success,followedin orderby
and thefederalgovernment.
business,stateand local government,
Expressed
theUnitedStateswas 4.66 timesas successfulan appellant
slightly
differently,
Wheeler
as individuals
and 2.58 timesas successfulas businesses.In contrast,
et al. foundthatthemostsuccessfulappellantin statesupremecourtswas only
1.25 timesas successfulas theleastsuccessfulappellant.
Whenspecificmatch-ups
areexamined,conclusions
drawnfromtheoverall
Table1. Appellant
SuccessRatesagainstDifferent
Respondents
Appellant
Individual
Business
State& local
government
United
States
government
Respondent
State&
United
Local
States
Individual Business Government
Government Total
(N)
18.0%
(150)
(N)
16.6%
10.2%
(518)
(1,327)
57.9
0
25.2
(111)
22.2
(324)
(49)
62.5
(64)
(19)
46.8
(47)
40.8
(N)
34.4
(32)
(1)
77.8
(9)
(N)
12.5%
(1,403)
17.9
(117)
25.0
(16)
50.0
(2)
(N)
12.5%
(3,398)
22.6
(584)
41.2
(85)
58.2
(122)
242
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
successratesof appellantsreceivegeneralconfirmation.
Individualshave low
ofrespondents,
ratesofsuccessagainstall othercategories
whilethesuccessrate
oftheUnitedStatesas appellantremainshighagainstall otherparties.
Table 2 displaysthenetadvantageof each typeof litigant
alongwiththe
combinedrateof successas bothrespondent
and appellantforeach typeof litigant.The netadvantageindexmaybe a better
indicator
oflitigation
successthan
therawrateof successbecauseit is unaffected
thata
by therelativefrequency
givenclass of litigant
appearsas an appellantrather
thanas a respondent.
Thus,
ifthereis a propensity
in thecourtsof appeals,thispropensity
to affirm
willnot
affect
theindexof netadvantage.
The thesisthatthe stronger
partyshouldprevailreceivesstrongsupport
fromthedatain Table 2. The rankordering
of thepartiesaccordingto theirnet
advantageis consistentwiththe presumedorderingof partiesaccordingto
of litigation
resources.The federalgovernment,
whichwon 58.2% of
strength
thecases theyhad appealedheldtheiradversaries
to onlya 13.1% successrate
in thecases theyhad appealed(i.e., thefederalgovernment
won 86.9% of the
cases in whichtheyappearedas respondent),
givingthe UnitedStatesa net
whichhad
advantageof 45. 1%. Nexthighestwerestateand local governments
a netadvantageof 29.9% and businesseswitha netadvantageof 1.6%. At the
bottomwereindividualswhosenetadvantagewas - 18.2%, reflecting
thefact
thatthosewho filedappeals againstindividualswon morethantwiceas fredid whentheyappealed.
quentlythanindividuals
of partyandsuccessreflected
in Table 2
The relationship
betweenstrength
in a similaranalysisofstatesupremecourt
is muchstronger
thanthatdiscovered
litigants
byWheeleret al. (1987). The netadvantageforstateandlocal governmentsnotedabove is morethantwiceas greatas thatfoundin statesupreme
faredmuchworseinthecourtsofappeals.
courts.6
Atthesametime,individuals
betweenthenetadvantageof stateand local governAs a result,thedifference
is 48. 1% forthecourtsofappealscomparedto 13.3% for
mentsandindividuals
The totalrange,fromthehighest
to thelowestnetadvanstatesupremecourts.7
tageindex,is 63.3% forthepresentstudycomparedto 17.2% forthestatesupremecourtdatareported
byWheeleret al.
in Table 1 and the indexof net
Both the marginaldistributions
reported
advantagereportedin Table 2 includecases in whicha litigantfacedanother
partyin thesame category.To further
exploretheadvantagethatthestronger
of stateand local government
in thepresentstudyis notidenticalto thatem6Thedefinition
ployedbyWheeleretal., sincetheyexcludesmalltownswhilewe do not.Butas a result,theaverage
shouldbe greaterthanthe
litigation
resourcesof thosetheyclassifyas cityand stategovernment
thehigherrateof success
Therefore,
resourcesof partieswe classifyas stateand local government.
to differences
in operational
definitions.
in thepresentstudycannotbe attributed
in statecourtsis computed
7Thedifference
betweenindividuals
andstateandcitygovernments
fromTable 2 in Wheeleret al. 1987,418.
243
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
Table2. SuccessRatesbyNatureofPartyintheCourtsofAppeals
(In Percentages)
Typeof Party
Individual
Business
SuccessRate
as Appellant
(N)
-
12.5
-
(3,398)
-
State& local
22.6
(584)
41.2
-
UnitedStates
58.2
-
government
government
(85)
(122)
When
Respondent,
Opponents'
SuccessRate
Net
(N)
=
30.7
=
21.0
(908)
11.3
13.1
(374)
(1,368)
(1,538)
Combined
Success
Rateas
Respondent
and
Advantage Appellant
18.2
18.0
=
1.6
56.9
=
29.9
85.9
=
45.1
84.8
-
followed
partyappearstohaveincases beforethecourtsofappeals,we therefore
the lead of Wheeleret al. and selectedonlythosecases in whichpartiesin
each other.These comparisons
different
are presented
in
categoriesconfronted
Table 3.
FromTable 3 it can easilybe seen thatin everymatch-up,
thepartypresumedto be stronger
netadvantage.For example,in the
enjoyeda substantial
518 cases in whichindividuals
wereappellants
againstbusinesses,theindividuals won 16.6% ofthetime.Inthe111cases inwhichbusinessesappealedagainst
individuals,businesseswon25.2% of thetimefora netadvantageof business
overindividuals
of 8.6%. In all othercomparisons,
thestronger
partyenjoyeda
over
netadvantage
itsweakeropponent
thatwas morethantwoanda halftimes
thantheadvantageofbusinessoverindividuals.
greater
Overall,thestronger
partyenjoyeda netadvantageof 28.6%, a difference
at the .001 level.8In contrast,
Wheeleret al. (1987, 420) foundan
significant
overallnet advantageforthe stronger
partythatwas only 5.2%. Moreover,
Wheeleret al. notethatalthoughindividuals
lostagainstall othertypesof parties,mostoftheirlosseswereunder3% (andthelargestwas only8.4%). Butin
thecourtsofappeals,individuals
lostby8.6%, 30.6%, and50.0%, respectively,
andthefederalgovernment.
To
againstbusinesses,stateandlocal governments,
thispointintheanalysisthen,the"haves" appeartoenjoya considerably
greater
advantagein thecourtsof appealsthantheydidin statesupremecourts.
chi squarescomputed
8Inall of theindividualmatch-ups,
forthetwo-by-two
tablesweresignificant
at leastat the.05 level.
244
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
Table3. NetAdvantage
forDifferent
Combinations
ofParties
Combination
ofParties
Individuals v. business
Individuals v. state& local
government
Individuals v. United
States
government
Business v. state& local
government
Business v. United
States
government
State& local v. United
States
government government
NetAdvantage
Business by8.6%
State& local by30.6%
government
United
Statesby50.0%
government
State& local by23.5%
government
United
Statesby28.9%
government
United
Statesby52.8%
government
Appellantsuccessrateforstronger
party= 41.2% (N = 354)
Appellantsuccessrateforweakerparty = 12.6% (N = 3,558)
Netadvantage
forstronger
party
= 28.6%
Note:Forthetwo-by-two
thetotalsuccessrate:
tablethatsummarizes
chi square = 203.43, witha two-tailedprobability
P < .001, gamma
.659.
The Fate ofBig Businessand UnderdogIndividuals
To obtaina morerefinedassessmentof the significance
of litigation
resourcesforappellatesuccess,theinitialcategoriesof businessand individuals
wereeach subdivided.
We first
examineda subcategory
ofbusinesslitigants
who
wereassumedon averageto represent
rather
largenationalcorporate
enterprises
thanlocallybasedbusinesses.The successratesforthesebig businessesis displayedin Table4.
The analysisof the successof big businessesin thecourtsof appeals is
ambiguousjustas itwas in statesupremecourts.In bothforums,
bigbusinesses
of businessesbuthelda
enjoyeda decidedadvantageovertheresidualcategory
verymodestadvantageoverindividuals.
Overall,thenetadvantageof bigbusiness was 5.9% comparedto the 1.6% netadvantageforthetotalbusinesscategorynotedin Table2.
Next,theanalysisfocusedon thesuccessofa subcategory
oftheindividual
litigantcategorythatwe have labeled"underdogindividuals."Underdogsare
definedas thosethattheopinionofthecourtindicates
areeitherbelowthefederal
of
line
or
members
racial
minorities
on average
poverty
(whomaybe presumed
to be less wealthythantheresidualcategoryof individuals).The successrates
fortheseunderdogs
aredisplayedinTable5.
Table 4. Success Rates forBig BusinessesversusOtherParties
(PercentageofCases Won by Appellant)
Big Business
Opponent
As Appellant As Respondent NetAdvantage
forBig Business
(N)
(N)
20.4
(191)
13.6
(88)
22.0
(41)
42.1
(38)
Individuals
Otherbusinesses
State& local
government
UnitedStates
government
Totalb
1.6
28.5
a
a
25.2
(139)
19.3
(332)
5.9
comparisons.
aToofewcasesformeaningful
andthe
other
stateandlocalgovernment,
bigbusinesses,
bIncludessuccessagainst
Statesgovernment.
United
Table 5. Success Rates forUnderdogIndividualsversusOtherParties
(Percentageof Cases Won by Appellant)
UnderdogIndividuals
Opponent
Otherindividuals
Business
State& local
government
UnitedStates
government
Total
As Appellant
(N)
As Respondent NetAdvantagefor
Underdogs
(N)
3.6
(55)
10.3
(87)
7.1
(857)
9.1
(374)
25.0
(8)
25.0
(8)
85.0
(20)
7.7
(1,373)
57.9
(38)
aToo fewcases formeaningful
comparisons.
a
- 14.7
- 17.9
- 75.9
- 50.2
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
246
As predicted
fromthethesisthatthestronger
partyshouldcomeoutahead
in theappellatecourts,underdog
individuals
hadlow ratesof successagainstall
othercategoriesof litigants.Theirrateof successas appellantswas verylow:
under11% againsteveryothercategory;and was lowerthantheappellantsuccess rateforthe totalcategoryof individualsagainsteach of the otherthree
categories.Whilethesmallnumberof cases in whichtheyappearedas responof theirindexfornet
dentssuggeststheneed forcautionin theinterpretation
advantageversusmostspecificothercategories,theiroverallnetadvantageof
- 50.2 is striking
testimony
to theirlackofsuccessinthecourtsof appeals.
of litigant
on successin thecourtsof
As thefinaltestof theeffect
strength
ofcontrolvariablestotheanalysis,we examined
appealsbeforetheintroduction
the overallrate of appellantsuccess fora summarymeasureof the relative
of theparties.Appellantsand respondents
wereeach classifiedon a
strength
= 7, stategovernment
= 6, local
scale withthefederalgovernment
seven-point
= 5, big business= 4, otherbusiness= 3, theresidualcategory
government
ofindividuals= 2, andunderdog
individuals= 1. Wethencomputed
a measure
of litigants
foreach case withtheformula:
of relativestrength
relativestrength
Thiscomputation
equals appellantminusrespondent.
producesan indexof relaversusunderdog
tivestrength
thatrangesfrom+ 6 (federalgovernment
appellant
If litigaindividual)to - 6 (underdogappellantand UnitedStatesrespondent).
tionresourcessignificantly
affect
outcomes,itshouldbe expectedthattherewill
be a linearrelationship
betweentheindexandtherateofappellantsuccess.
The datadisplayedin Table6 providestrongadditional
supportforthetheresourcesaffectsuccessin thecourtsof appeals.The success
sis thatlitigation
increasewitheach incremental
increasein their
ratesof appellantsconsistently
of therespondent.
Whiletherelationship
is not
relativeto thestrength
strength
of
Table6. Appellant
SuccessRatesforRelativeStrength
Appellants
andRespondents
IndexofRelative
Strength
(Appellant- Respondent)
-6
-Sto-3
-2 to -1
0
+1 to +2
+3 to +5
+6
Wins
Appellant
%
9.1
(N)
(374)
12.1
(2,510)
46.0
(150)
16.2
23.2
32.2
85.0
(672)
(297)
(183)
(20)
Note:Fortheseven-by-two
tableforthefrequencies
usedto generate
the
tableabove:chi square= 260.17, df = 6, P < .001, gamma= .385.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
247
atthe.001 level.When
strongandis significant
perfectly
linear,itis moderately
is evenmarginally
positive,therateof appellant
theindexof relativestrength
negatwiceas greatas it is whentheindexis slightly
successis approximately
positiveindexscoresare morethan
tive.Appellantsuccessratesformoderately
negativescores,andat
threeand a halftimesas greatas theyareformoderately
theextremes
ofthescale theratiois morethannineto one.
ina Multivariate
Analysis
Appellant
Strength
aboveproducedreWhiletheanalysisof bivariaterelationships
presented
is significantly
rewiththethesisthatlitigant
strength
sultsthatare consistent
latedto ratesof appellantsuccess,thethesiscan be acceptedonlyprovisionally
ofpotential
variablesareexamined.For
of a number
intervening
untiltheeffects
successof thepresumptively
stronger
partiesmaybe due
example,theapparent
in largepartto thenumberof criminalappealsin thesample.Criminalappeals
againstsomelevelof
matchan individual
(especiallya poorindividual)
typically
Since manycriminalappealsappearto haveverylittlelegal merit,
government.
sincepartyandregionhavebeen
thegovernment
usuallywins.Or alternatively,
foundto be relatedto outcomesin thefederalcourts(Carp and Rowland1983;
maybe due to the
Goldman1975;Tate 1981),therelativesuccessof upperdogs
ofjudgeson thecourtsin 1986 wereRepublicansand the
factthatthemajority
circuits.
of cases in oursamplecamefromsouthern
majority
to accountfortheeffects
of a numberof variables
Wheeleret al. attempt
resourcesand appellantsucbetweenlitigant
thatmightmodifytherelationship
controlvariables(areasof law, natureof legal relationship
cess by introducing
betweenparties,and thenatureof counsel)one at a timein a seriesof crossof
oftheeffects
ofa variety
tabulations.
We believethata moreadequatepicture
logisticrevariablescan be obtainedfroma multivariate
potentially
significant
gressionmodel.
The dependent
variablein themodelis thesuccessof theappellant,coded
won. Thus,the
as one iftheappellantwonand codedas zeroiftherespondent
of an independent
variable,themorethat
largertheestimateforthecoefficient
variableleadsto successfortheappellant.
whenthedependent
variis inappropriate
Because leastsquaresregression
wereestiable is dichotomous
(as it is in thepresentanalysis),theparameters
matedby logit,a maximumlikelihoodestimation
technique.This methodproa
model's
variablesin terms
of
duces estimatesfortheparameters
independent
each
makes
to
the
that
the
variablefalls
ofthecontribution
dependent
probability
win
or
For
each
one
of
the
independent
lose).
into
designated
categories(e.g.,
itsstanis
with
along
likelihood
estimate
(MLE)
calculated
variable,a maximum
in
function
The
MLEs
the
the
that
error
dard
logistic
represent change
(SE).
variable.
resultsfroma one unitchangeintheindependent
scale of apvariablein themodelis theseven-point
The firstindependent
248
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
pellantstrength
describedabove. Since higherscale valuesindicateappellants
who are presumedto havegreaterlitigation
resourcesavailablethanappellants
withlowerscale scores,itis expectedthatthisvariablewillbe positively
related
scale is used forrespondents.
to thedependent
variable.The same seven-point
forrespondents
willbe negative.
Therefore,
itis expectedthatthecoefficient
Next,fourdummyvariableswerecreatedtointroduce
controlsfortheissue
in the case. Each issue variablewas coded as one if the issue was the most
no case was coded
important
issueinthecase andas zerootherwise.
Therefore,
as one on morethanone issue. The issuescoded werecriminal,civil liberties,
and laborrelations,and diversity
of citizenship.
For pubeconomicregulation
lisheddecisions,224 cases (19.4% of all publishedcases) werecoded zero on
all fourissue variables.For unpublished
decisions,1,074 cases (48.7% of all
unpublished
decisions)werecoded zero forall issue categories.These cases
wereprimarily
thosein whichthejudgesdisposedof theappeal on procedural
groundswithoutreachingthemerits(e.g., questionsof standing,
jurisdiction,
theimposition
of sancmootness,theallegationthattheappealwas nottimely,
forrehearing.
Also included
tions,or theawardof attorney's
fees)andpetitions
inthecases codedas zeroon all fourissuesvariablesweredueprocessquestions,
issuesthatcouldnotbe classified.
federalism
cases, andthoseinvolving
The partyeffectvariablewas designedto takeintoaccountthefindings
of
weremorelikely
earlierstudiesthatjudgesappointed
byDemocratic
presidents
thanjudges appointedby Republicansto supportliberaldecisions(Goldman
1975; Gottschall1986). To createthisvariable,each panel was firstcoded as
andthedecisionofthecourt
havingeithera Democraticor Republicanmajority
or administrative
agencybelow was coded as beingeitherliberalor conservathatpanelswithDemocraticmative.9Previousstudiesled to theexpectation
joritiesare mostlikelyto supporttheappellantwhenthedecisionbelow was
conservative
and panelswithRepublicanmajorities
are mostlikelyto support
in bothof these
theappellantwhenthedecisionbelowwas liberal.Therefore,
thepartyeffect
variablewas codedas a one. In theoppositesituations
situations,
(i.e., panel Democraticand decisionbelow liberal,or panel Republicanand
thepartyeffect
variablewas codedas zero. Ifthe
decisionbelowconservative),
ofpartiesin thecourtsofappealsfollowspreviously
identified
ideologicaleffect
relatedto thedependent
variable.
thisvariableshouldbe positively
patterns,
Since data fromonlythreecircuitswereincludedin theanalysis,onlya
describedby Goldman(1975). Acof liberaland conservative
9We followedthedefinitions
or
theliberalpositionis describedas (1) fortheclaimsof thedefendants
cordingto thisdefinition,
in racialdiscrimicases; (2) fortheclaimsof minorities
in criminaland prisoner
petition
prisoners
in
in othercivillibertiescases; (4) forthegovernment
nationcases; (3) fortheclaimsof plaintiffs
or unionsin disputeswithmanageof businessand taxcases; (5) forindividualworkers
regulation
inprivateeconomic
ment;(6) fortheinjuredpersonin tortcases; and(7) fortheeconomicunderdog
disputes.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
249
For cases decidedin
partialtestof theeffectof regioncould be incorporated.
theSouth(theFourthand Eleventhcircuits),theregionvariablewas coded as
zero. For decisionsof the SeventhCircuit(a midwestern
circuit),regionwas
codedas one.
Ratherthanrunthemodeldescribedabove on all of thedecisionsof the
on thepublishedand theunpublished
courtsof appeals,it was runseparately
decisionsof the courts.Songer(1988) has shownthatratesof reversal(i.e.,
decisionsthantheyarein
appellantsuccess)aresubstantially
higherinpublished
decisionsof thecourt.In addition,theratesof appearanceof
theunpublished
andtheincidenceof mostof
mosttypesofpartiesas appellantsandrespondents
in published
variablesin the modelare quitedifferent
the otherindependent
versusunpublished
decisionsof thecourtsof appeals. Finally,thecriteriafor
whichimplythattheunpublished
decisionsof thecourtsshouldbe
publication,
thattheeffect
expectedto containmanyfrivolous
appeals,suggestthelikelihood
in publishedand unpubvariableswillbe different
of manyof ourindependent
of appellantstrength
in
lisheddecisions.Thus,theeffect
maybe quitedifferent
the two typesof decisions,and a combinedmodel mightmask important
10
differences.
decisionsperform
Overall,themodelsforbothpublishedandunpublished
adequately.The parameter
estimates,
exceptforthedummyvariablethatrepreofcitizenship
direcsentsthepresenceofthediversity
issue,areinthepredicted
forbothpublishedand unpublished
tion(and in thesame direction
decisions),
foreach
at the.001 level.11The coefficients
andtheoverallmodelis significant
variablearedisplayedinTables7 and8.
'Olna preliminary
analysis,themodeldescribedabovewas runwiththeadditionofa variable
statusof thedecision.The variableforpublication
thatindicatedthepublication
statushada coefficientof 1.155, thehighestof anyindependent
variableinthemodel,andwas significant
at the.001
of appellantwas also significant
at the.001 level.
level.The variablethatindicatedstrength
"ISinceno attempt
is madein thepresentanalysisto createa generalmodelthatwillexplain
all variancein appealsjudge voting,theoverallreduction
of errorof themodelis notof critical
The mainpurposeofthemodelis to assesstheeffect
of litigant
undercontrols
importance.
strength
forothervariablesbelievedtobe significantly
relatedtojudicialvotingchoice.Nevertheless,
thelow
in errormayproducesomeskepticism
reduction
aboutthesignificance
of theimpactof thelitigant
variables.We believe,however,
thattherather
extreme
skewofthedependent
variablemakesreductionin errordifficult.
As at leasta partialtestof thishunch,we reranouranalysison a sampleof
cases thatwould not have such a heavilyskeweddependentvariable.Specifically,
we createda
samplecomposedof all of thereversalsin theoriginalsampleplusa randomsampleof theaffirmancesin theoriginalsample(a 46% sampleof published
affirmances
anda 10.7% sampleof unpublishedaffirmances).
The resulting
variableof .493
sampleshad expectedvaluesforthedependent
Whenwe reranthemodelson thesenewsamples,thereduction
in errorwas
and .519, respectively.
28.5% forpublisheddecisionsand36.0% fortheunpublished
decisions.Although
theprecisevalues
in thesemodels,theywereall in thesamedirection
of thecoefficients
wereofcoursedifferent
as in
the modelspresentedin Tables 7 and 8, and therewereno changesin whichvariablesreached
statistical
significance.
Table 7. LogitEstimatesforAppellantSuccess in
PublishedDecisions
Independent
Variable
MLE
Intercept
Appellant
Respondent
Economic
Criminal
Civil liberty
Diversity
Partyeffect
Region
-0.815
0.223
-0.081
-0.217
-0.619
-0.456
0.207
0.432
-0.488
SE
.342
0.047
0.041
0.203
0.210
0.248
0.280
0.139
0.150
MLE/SE
-2.38
4.74***
- 1.98*
- 1.07
- 2.96**
- 1.84
0.74
3.11***
- 3.25***
= appellant
Note:Dependent
variable
mean= 0.297,model
success,
chisquare= 108.24,withdf= 8, P < .001,-2 LLR = 1,300.01.
N = 1,157.
Proportion
= 71.7%.
predicted
correctly
inerror= 4.9%.
Reduction
* significant
at.05;** significant
at .01;*** significant
at .001.
Table 8. LogitEstimatesforAppellantSuccess in
UnpublishedDecisions
Independent
Variable
Intercept
Appellant
Respondent
Economic
Criminal
Civil liberty
Diversity
Partyeffect
Region
MLE
-2.954
0.414
-0.034
-0.187
- 1.498
-0.711
-0.651
0.797
-0.312
SE
0.344
0.064
0.064
0.194
0.204
0.275
0.645
0.159
0.256
MLE/SE
- 8.587
6.47***
-0.69
-0.96
- 7.34*
-2.59**
- 1.01
5.05***
-1.21
Note:Dependent
variable= appellant
successwithmean= .097,
modelchi square= 153.95,withdf = 8, P < .001, -2 LLR
= 1,245.61.
N = 2,201.
= 90.3%.
Proportion
predicted
correctly
inerror= 0.
Reduction
*significant
at.05;** significant
at.01;*** significant
at.001.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
251
variablesarerelatedto appellantsucAs expected,mostoftheindependent
cess to a statistically
significant
degree.The presenceof a criminalissue was
associatedwitha decreasedprobability
of appellantsuccess in both
strongly
decisions.Forexample,withthevaluesof all other
publishedand unpublished
of appellantsucindependent
variablesset at theirmeanvalues,theprobability
noncriminal
cess estimated
bythemodeldroppedfrom45% forcases involving
issuestojust 16.5% forpublishedcriminaldecisions.'2The presenceof a civil
of appellantsuclibertiesissue was also associatedwitha decreasedprobability
ofassociationwas lessthanthatnotedforthecriminal
thestrength
cess, although
issue.'3These resultsprobablyindicatethata fairlylargeportionof appealsin
cases arefrivolous.
criminalandcivilliberties
The partyeffectvariable,whichassesses the likelihoodthatpanels with
to appealsfromconservative
different
partisanmajoritieswill reactdifferently
of appeland liberaldecisionsbelow,is also positively
relatedto theprobability
andis significant
atthe.001 levelinbothpublishedand
lantsuccessas predicted
aremostlikelyto supdecisions.PanelswithDemocratic
majorities
unpublished
decisionsbelow and Republicanmajoritiesare
portappeals fromconservative
mostlikelyto supportappealsfromliberaldecisions.The predicted
probability
ofappellantsuccessincreasesfrom23% to45% inpublisheddecisionsandfrom
decisionswhenthevalueofthepartyeffect
variable
13% to 48% inunpublished
increasesfromzero to one. Finally,appellantsuccess variesto a statistically
significant
degreebyregioninthepublisheddecisionsofthecourtsof appeals.14
thatthedependent
variablewillequal one fora specifiedvalueofa variable
'2Theprobability
of interest
maybe obtainedbytheformula:
theantilogof thesum(biXj +
I + antilogof thesum(biX, +
+ bjXj + Y)
+ bjXj + Y)
wherebito bj represents
theMLEs ofeach independent
variableexceptthevariableofinterest;
Xito
themeanvaluesof thosevariables;and Y represents
thespecified
valueof thevariable
Xjrepresents
of interest.
'3The coefficient
forthecivil libertiesissue was significant
at the .01 level in unpublished
for
above generally
acceptedstandards
decisions,butforpublisheddecisions,P = .064, slightly
statistical
significance.
'4Regionalvariationwas nota centralfocusof thisstudy.Regionwas added as a control
variableonlybecause existingstudiesindicatedsubstantial
regionalvariationin bothagendasand
a completeexplanation
for
trendsamongthecircuits.Thus,we arenotable tooffer
decision-making
theregionaleffects
thatare apparentin Table 7. The mostplausibleexplanation
appearsto be ideindicatesthatappellants(who tendmostoftento be individuals)
ology.The signof thecoefficient
in theSeventhCircuitthanin theSouth.Further
are supported
less frequently
analysis,notreported
individuals
do especiallypoorlyin theSeventhCircuit,
above, indicatesthatthepoorand minority
thatis mainlyReaganappointees.In contrast,
theEleventhCircuit
whichhas a Republicanmajority
betweentheSeventh
was stackedwithCarterappointeesin 1986 (theFourthCircuitis intermediate
and Eleventhcircuitsin the ratioof Reagan to Carterappointees),and we speculatethatjudges
theunderdogs.
fortheliberalpositionof supporting
appointedbyCarterprovidemoresupport
252
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
In summary,
thecontrolvariablesthatpriorresearchhad suggestedmight
effoundto havetheirpredicted
be relatedto appellantsuccessweregenerally
of issue,party,andregion,the
fortheseeffects
fects.Butevenaftercontrolling
ofappellant
associatedwiththeprobability
is stillstrongly
natureofthelitigants
forstrength
of appellantare positive,moderately
success.'5 The coefficients
at the .001 level in themodelsforbothpublishedand
strong,and significant
forrespondents
are smaller,but are
unpublisheddecisions.The coefficients
decisions(but are
negative,as predicted,forbothpublishedand unpublished
forpublisheddecisions).This suggeststhatthenasignificant
onlystatistically
on theprobability
of appellantsuccessin both
has an effect
tureof thelitigants
ofthenatureoftheissue
decisionsthatis independent
publishedandunpublished
ofthejudges. Moreandthepolicypreferences
in thecase, regionalinfluences,
theresourcesofthe
over,whileWheeleret al. didnotexamineindepthwhether
of
the
themodelsfor
respondent,
appellantweremorecriticalthantheresources
that
while
bothmakea
decisionssuggest
boththepublishedand unpublished
resources
more
are
important.
appellant
contribution,
To illustrate
theimpactof thenatureof theappellanton appellantsuccess,
of appellantsuccessforeach value
probabilities
Table 9 presentstheestimated
of all otherindependent
variwith
the
values
of theindexof appellantstrength
For
the
of
mean
value.
appeldecisions,
probability
ables set at their
published
lantsuccessincreasessteadilyandnearlyevenlyforeachunitchangeintheindex
beFor unpublished
correlation
of appellantstrength.
decisions,therank-order
of appellantsuccessis
andtheprobability
tweentheindexof appellantstrength
also 1.0, buttheincreaseis notas nearlylinearas itis forpublisheddecisions.
it mightbe arguedthat
'5Knowingthatthecourtstendto ruleagainstcriminaldefendants,
thedefendant
or the stateis
or reversea givencase will dependon whether
whethertheyaffirm
thenwhethera given
appealingin criminalcases. Similarly,if the Southis moreconservative,
decisionis affirmed
or reversed
maydependinparton theregionfromwhichitis appealed.In order
we reranthemodelsinTables7 and8 withtwomultiplicative
termsadded.
totestthesespeculations,
was definedas theproductof thevariablescriminaland
The firstmultiplicative
term,crimtype,
of theinteraction
betweenthepresenceor absenceof
appellant,and was used to measuretheeffect
wasdefined
as theproduct
a criminalcase andthenatureoftheappellant.The secondterm,lowctreg,
oftheinteraction
of thevariableslowerctandregion,andwas usedto assesstheeffect
of regionand
of thedecisionbelow.Whenthesevariableswereaddedto themodelfor
theideologicaldirection
of dein Table 7, neither
was statistically
theproportion
significant,
publisheddecisionspresented
inthereduction
oferror
was notimproved,
andtherewas no improvement
cisionspredicted
correctly
decisionsdisplayedin Table 8,
producedby themodel.Whenaddedto themodelforunpublished
But eventhoughthismultiplicative
significance.
onlylowctregreachedthe .05 levelof statistical
of cases predicted
termwas significant,
theproportion
correctly
by therevisedmodelincreasedby
inthereduction
oferror.Weconcludedthattheinteraction
only0. 1%, andtherewas no improvement
of litigant
effectsproducedby thesetwo setsof variablesaddedlittleof use to ourunderstanding
termsin themodelspresented
in Tables
we did notincludethemultiplicative
and therefore
effects,
7 and 8.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
253
Table9. Estimated
Probabilities
forAppellant
SuccessforDifferent
TypesofAppellants
inPublished
andUnpublished
Decisions
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
AppellantCategory
Published
Decisions
SuccessRate
byModela
Underdogindividuals
Otherindividuals
Otherbusiness
Big business
Local government
Stategovernment
UnitedStates
government
Unpublished
Decisions
SuccessRate
byModel'
.237
.343
.468
.593
.708
.803
.363
.597
.794
.908
.962
.985
.872
.994
aPredicted
successwithvaluesof all otherindependent
variablesin thelogitmodel
setat theirmeanvalues.
Conclusions
In theirintroduction,
Wheeleret al. suggesta number
of reasonswhyone
mightpredictthattherewouldbe no difference
betweenthe success ratesof
in thisdiscussionwas a rationalactor
and weakerparties.Prominent
stronger
thatlitigants
wouldconsidercarefully
thatsuggested
whatever
biases
hypothesis
and advantagesexistedin thesystemand "moveaheadonlyin cases in which
bothparties,as advisedby counsel,feelthatthereis a substantial
of
possibility
above demonstrate
and
winning"(1987, 412). The findings
presented
clearly
thatsucha rationalactormodelhas littleor no explanatory
convincingly
power
fordecisionsofthecourtsof appeals.The partiesthatmaybe presumed
to have
resourcesconsistently
faredbetterthantheirweakeropposuperiorlitigation
nents,and the disparityin success rateswas greatestwhenthe disparityin
was greatest.Whiletherewas a strongpropensity
of thecourtsof apstrength
thegreater
successof stronger
to the
peals to affirm,
partieswas notattributable
of timestheyappearedas respondent
thanas appellant.
number
rather
notedaboveforthecourtsof appealsdescribewho
Of course,thefindings
won and who loston thecourtsof appealsin onlya singlerecentyear,while
thatpersisted
fora century.
Wheelerandassociatesexamineda pattern
Thus,the
two studiesare notcompletely
Wheeleret al. note
comparable.Nevertheless,
of
therehas beena similarmaintenance
onlymodestchangeovertime.Whether
the patterns
of winnersand losersin thecourtsof appeals mustawaitfuture
research.
254
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
Whileit is thusapparent
thatthe"haves" comeoutaheadin thecourtsof
moretentative
appealsto an impressive
answersmustbe sugdegree,somewhat
gestedforwhytheycome out ahead. Wheeleret al. consideredbuttentatively
rejectedthehypothesis
thatthe"haves" cameoutaheadbecauseof a normative
tiltin thelaw thatfavoredthem.If we followthelogicemployedby Wheeleret
al., we also cometo thetentative
conclusionthatthebias in thelaw argument
is
notthemostlikelyexplanation
forthesuccessof stronger
partiesin thecourts
of appeals. Like Wheeleret al., we speculatethatwhiletheremaybe a probusinessbias in thelaw, it wouldnotexplainwhybig businessdid so well in
cases in whichtheywerepittedagainstsmallerbusiness.Likewise,ifthereis a
progovernment
tiltin thelaw (i.e., law designedto protect
theauthority
ofgovernment
becauseit is democratically
presumedlegitimate
elected),itwouldnot
successofthefederalgovernment
explainthegreater
comparedto stateandlocal
government
againstmostotherpartiesnorthenetadvantagetheUnitedStates
enjoyedwhenpitteddirectlyagainststateand local governments.
Moreover,
whilethecrudenessoftheissuecategories
employedsuggeststheneedforsome
cautionin interpretation,
theindependence
of theappellantand respondent
effectsfromthearea of law at issuefoundin thelogisticregression
modelstends
to weakensupportfortheidea thatthesuccessof thestronger
partieswas due
to a tiltin thelaw in theirfavor.
primarily
The secondpossibility
investigated
by Wheeleret al. was thatthesuccess
of stronger
thatfavoredthem.Like
partiesmightbe due to judicial attitudes
Wheeleret al. we believethatthesuccessof bigbusinessrelativeto otherbusiness litigants,
thesuccessof thenationalgovernment
relativeto stateand local
ofindividuals
government,
andthesuccessoftheresidualcategory
comparedto
underdogsmakesthisinterpretation
unlikely.'6
Moreover,in theU.S. political
and statesversystemat large,supportforbusinessinterests
againstindividuals
sus thefederalgovernment
is usuallyrelatedtothedifferences
intheideological
centersofthetwomajorparties.Yeton thecourtsofappeals,thegreater
success
of thestronger
ofpartisan
effects.
partieswas independent
The mostprobableexplanation
forthesuccessofthe"haves" in thecourts
of appealstherefore
wouldappearto be theirsuperiorlitigation
resources.The
withwhichthepartiespresumed
to havegreater
resourcescameout
consistency
ahead whenpittedagainstpresumptively
weakerparties;thesteadilyincreasing
forthe"haves" as thedisparity
inresources
marginofvictory
increased;andthe
oftheindexofappellant
effects
inthelogistic
demonstrated
independent
strength
whencontrolswereaddedforissues,region,andpartisaneffects
regression
all
'6However,itis possiblethatjudgeson thecourtsofappealssharea morepositiveorientation
thantowardstateandlocal government.
Howard(1981, 146) reports
towardthefederalgovernment
thatjudges fromall threeof thecircuitsexpressednationalratherthanregionalloyaltiesand saw
an obligationto maintain
thenationalsupremacy
theirjob as including
providedbytheConstitution
in thefaceof local pressures.
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
255
to enlendsupportto thisconclusion.Unfortunately,
thedataare notsufficient
able us to determine
whichof thespecificcharacteristics
of thestronger
parties
thatwe havecollectively
labeled"litigation
resources"are thekeyingredients
of success.Each ofthecategoriesof litigants
thatwe haveemployedon average
willhavegreater
buteach is also more
financial
resourcesto investin litigation,
likelyto reap the benefitsof repeatplayerstatusand experience.Therefore,
comparison
of suchcategoriesof litigants
does notshedmuchlighton whether
superior
financial
resources
(withthepresumably
better
lawyers,
etc.,thatresult)
thatmayaccrueto
or thesuperiorcase-selecting
abilityand litigation
strategy
The limitations
of data derivedfromcourt
repeatplayersis moreimportant.
opinionsaretherootofthisproblem.Suchopinionsdo notconsistently
provide
or on whether
on thefinancial
resourcesof thelitigants
muchinformation
they
are receivingassistancefroman interest
groupor someotheroutsidesourceof
on thelitigation
support,nordo theyprovidemuchinformation
experienceof
thelitigants.
of Wheeleret al. and to thoseof
Finally,whencomparedto thefindings
above are notableforthe
Sheehanand Songer(1989), the findings
presented
of theadvantageenjoyedbythe"haves." The advantageenjoyedby
magnitude
the"haves" in statesupremecourtswas modestenoughto lead Wheeleret al.
bias in thenormative
to speculatethattheremayhavebeena "pro-underdog"
offset
thedisadvantages
systemorinthemindsofthejudgesthatatleastpartially
therelative
of weakerpartiesin litigation
resources(1987, 442). In contrast,
foundto be severaltimesas greatin
advantagesof the"haves" weregenerally
thecourtsof appealsas theywerein statesupremecourts;and whena category
of litigants
who weremoreclearly"underdogs"thanthegeneralclass of individualsused in theWheeleret al. studywereexamined,theyturnedoutto have
thelowestratesof successofanylitigant
class. Similarly,
stronger
partiesinthe
courtsof appeals were decidedlymoresuccessfulthansimilarpartiesin the
the"haves" appeared
UnitedStatesSupremeCourt.In fact,inthelatterforum,
of ideologywerecontrolled
notto enjoyconsistent
advantagewhentheeffects
of appellantstrength
theeffects
were
(Sheehanand Songer1989). In contrast,
in thecourtsofappealsaftercontrolsfortheideologicalpreferences
maintained
of partisanmajorities
wereadded.
Whilethedatain thepresentstudydo notmakepossiblea definitive
explanationofthegreater
successofthe"haves" inthecourtsofappealsthanineither
in
stateor nationalsupremecourts,partoftheanswermaylie in thedifferences
docketcontrol.In thecourtsof appeals,whichhavetheleastcontroloverthe
cases theyhear,theadvantageof the"haves" is thegreatest.At theotherextremeis theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwithnearlycompletedocketcontrol
and virtually
no advantageforthe"haves." Statesupremecourtsare intermediate on bothcounts.
all cases
thecourtsofappealsmustruleon virtually
Lackingdocketcontrol,
256
Donald R. SongerandReginaldS. Sheehan
appealedtothem.The unsystematic
impression
oftheauthors
gleanedfromreadingtheappealscourtcases is thattherearemanyappealsbrought
byindividuals
17 Presumably,
thatarelegallyfrivolous.
mostsuchappealswouldnotbe accepted
forreviewbycourtsthatcouldcontroltheirdockets.Frivolousappealsby individualsinflate
thewinning
percentages
ofgovernments
andbusiness.In contrast,
repeatplayerswithsubstantial
resourcesare less likelyto bringappealsto any
courtif theyhave littlerealisticchanceof winning.In courtswithsubstantial
docketcontrol,thewinningpercentage
of individuals
is likelyto be higherthan
itis in thecourtsofappealsbecauseinsuchcourtsonlythosecases in whichthe
individualhad a legallymoremeritorious
claim thanthatpresentedin many
appeals courtcases wouldbe acceptedforreview.If, on theotherhand,the
SupremeCourtdecidedon themeritsof all of thecases in whichcertpetitions
werefiled,it is likelythattheadvantageof stronger
partieswouldappearto be
muchgreater.Whilethisinterpretation
is somewhatspeculative,
it is consistent
withtheobservations
thattherateofaffirmance
is highestinthecourtsofappeals
and lowestintheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,andwiththeknowledgethatthe
percentageof certpetitionsby individualswhichare deniedby the Supreme
Court(and especiallypetitions
is manytimeshigherthantheperby indigents)
fromthesolicitor
centageofpetitions
generalthataredenied.
Like mostresearch,theanswersprovidedbythefindings
in thisstudysuggest stillotherunanswered
questionsthatneed to be addressedby futureresearch.As notedabove,whileWheeleretal. providean analysisofchangeover
timein thesuccessof different
in statesupremecourts,we do
typesof litigants
notyethavea comparablepictureof longitudinal
changesin anyof thefederal
courts.If changeovertimeis discovered,it wouldbe important
to investigate
itscauses. At leastfourpotentialcauses of suchchangeneedto be examined:
(1) structural
changesthataffecttheease of access to thecourts(e.g., theprovisionof freelegalcounsel);(2) thechanging
partisan
of thelower
composition
courtsthatchangestheideologicalpredispositions
to supportthepositionsadvocatedbycertaincategoriesof litigants;
(3) changing
precedents
thatsystematicallyfavorcertaintypesoflitigants;
or(4) changesinthelargerpoliticalsystem
thataffecttheagendaof thecourts,theaccess of different
or
typesof litigants,
theperceivedlegitimacy
ofcertaintypesofclaims.
Thresholdeffects
also needto be investigated.
Noneoftheexistingstudies
of whether
the"haves" comeoutaheadhaveexaminedthreshold
effects
to determine
whether
resourcesmakea difference.
litigation
We speculatethatifone
startswithessentially
no resources(e.g., an indigent
individual
without
an attorI7Forexample,in severalSeventhCircuitcases, theappellant(an individual)arguedthathe
shouldnothaveto repaya loanfroma bankbecausehe receivedonlypapermoneyrather
thangold
(even thoughhe had successfully
spentthemoney).In anothercase, theappellantarguedthathis
criminalconvictionwas invalidbecause theintroduction
of eyewitness
accountsof thecrimeby
policeofficers
violatedhisMirandarights.
257
WHO WINS ON APPEAL?
experience),theadditionof resourcesinitiallywill
neyor any priorlitigation
Butwe suspectthatat somepoint,
increasethechancesof successsubstantially.
additionofresourceswillbecomeirrelevant.
thecontinued
Manuscript
received1 March1990
6 June1991
Final manuscript
submitted
APPENDIX
Reliabilityof Coding
FourthCircuit
(N = 200)
Variable
Circuit
Treatment
Appellant
Respondent
Issue
Agreement
Rate%
100
100
95.5
94.0
87.5
EleventhCircuit
(N = 200)
Pi
Agreement
Rate%
Pi
1.00
1.00
.93
.93
.86
100
99.5
87.0
84.0
84.0
1.00
.99
.83
.82
.82
SeventhCircuit
(N= 100)
Agreement
Rate%
100
100
90.0
89.0
84.0
Pi
1.00
1.00
.87
.88
.81
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