Discussion Paper 60
ON THE ROAD TO A PEACEFUL TRANSITION: THE CCP
STRIVES FOR AN “INSTITUTIONALIZED” SUCCESSION
Dominik MIERZEJEWSKI
April 2010
China Policy Institute
School of Contemporary Chinese Studies
International House
The University of Nottingham
Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Road, Nottingham
NG8 1BB, UK
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.chinapolicyinstitute.org
The China Policy Institute, part of the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at The University of Nottingham,
was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help
expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build
a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business
strategies.
On the road to a peaceful transition: The CCP strives for an “institutionalized”
succession
Dominik Mierzejewski （梅德明）
Abstract
The central argument of this paper is that the Communist Party of China, based on its
historical experiences -- mainly the Cultural Revolution and ‘Tiananmen affair’ -- has
promoted a new model of power transition at the central level. Adopting a comparative
approach, the author sets apart the following variables: independent – one-party system;
dependent - the type of power transition (peaceful vs. tumultuous), intervening
vulnerability understood as social society, political culture and a model of economic
development. For the author, the variable essential for understanding the changes in
power transition is political culture. In this respect, uncontrolled factionalism has been the
major reason for an unstable succession. For the purpose of this article, the term “political
culture” has been narrowed down to mean guanxi – an informal, political inter-relationship
– which plays a pivotal role in shaping the future of power transition inside the Chinese
Communist Party. Three cases of power transition inside the Communist Party of China
are presented and discussed in the article, namely: Lin Biao’s downfall, Hu Yaobang’s
unsuccessful succession and the peaceful transition of Hu Jintao. Through the comparative
approach, the author seeks historical generalizations and general conclusions, based on
concrete but rather simplified knowledge about specific cases.

[email protected]; University of Lodz, Faculty of International and Political Studies,
Department of East Asian Studies www.wsmip.uni.lodz.pl.
2
On the road to a peaceful transition: The CCP strives for an “institutionalized”
succession
Dominik Mierzejewski （梅德明）
Introduction
Power transition plays an important role in shaping the political landscape of a state. In
any policy-making structure, leaders and politicians strive for a proper formula of power
transition and personal succession. While in democratic systems, public opinion plays a
major role, in other political systems different factors function as a substitute for direct
elections.
In fact, until the Cultural Revolution, two major periods marking changes in the power
structure within the Communist Party of China may be distinguished. The first period can
be dated from the beginning of establishing the party in 1921 up to the Zunyi Conference
in 1935, when the Party was shaken by power struggles at the national level, which
brought about frequent changes of leaders and party apparatus. After the Long March up
to the end of the Great Leap Forward, the power structure remained relatively stable.
After the experiences of the Great Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution, the
struggle for the future succession became “the zero sum game.” In the late 1970s and
mid 1980s, the power transition problem remained unresolved and it entailed a variety of
challenging tasks. In fact, understanding of the Tiananmen mistake and embracing the
world’s economy led to a more peaceful leadership change.
The article aims mainly to discuss the critical factors of power transition within the
Chinese Communist Party framework since the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China. The major objective of the paper is to show when and how the changes in
leadership came about. The issues are: what kind of internal and international
determinants have played a crucial role in a tumultuous or peaceful succession? How have
historical experiences such as the Tiananmen crisis, further opening-up in 1992 or
economic performance affected political transition in Mainland China? From this
perspective, the debates over China’s future leadership are important because of a variety
of reasons. On the one hand, the top leader shapes the political, economic and social
3
landscapes of the country, on the other, he or she also has a significant say on basic,
ideological questions.
In order to understand the process of power transition, the author observed and
compared selected cases. The main differences between three cases of power transition
inside the Communist Party of China are presented and discussed in the article, namely:
Lin Biao’s downfall, Hu Yaobang’s unsuccessful succession and the peaceful transition of
Hu Jintao. Through the comparative approach, the author seeks historical generalizations
and general conclusions, based on concrete but rather simplified knowledge about specific
cases (Burnham, Gilland Lutz, Grand, Layton-Henry, 2008, p. 71-74). Adopting a
comparative approach, the author sets apart the following variables: independent – oneparty system; dependent - the type of power transition (peaceful vs. vulnerable),
intervening vulnerability understood as social society, political culture and a model of
economic development. For the author, the variable essential for understanding the
changes in power transition is political culture. In this respect, uncontrolled factionalism
has been the major reason for an unstable succession. For the purpose of this article, the
term “political culture” has been narrowed down to mean guanxi – an informal, political
inter-relationship plays a pivotal role in shaping the future of power transition inside the
Chinese Communist Party. For the sake of this analysis, factionalism will be understood
as: “characterized by two symbolic phenomena: informal groups linked by personal ties
compete for dominance within their parent organization, and informal personal influences
prevail over the formal due process in decision making.” (Jin Hong, 2002, p. 42).
With regards to the Communist Party of China, factionalism occurs when the problem of
future succession arises. It causes splits within the party or any other formal organization,
involving factional groups and their struggle over power. In order to win, one of the two or
three groups needs to take the political initiative through political campaigns e.g. for the
whole nation to learn from the army (quan guo xue jiefang jun) or to persist with progress
(bao xianjing xun). Taking the initiative leads to a redistribution of power and
consequently the removal of one or more factions. Finally, the winners purge the losers
and dominate the party apparatus with the result of internal turbulence and the loss of
international influence. Having taken the path of reforms, Chinese authorities needed to
create a peaceful environment at the national level to pull the country out of the crisis
after the Cultural Revolution. According to Goldstein (1991), political outcomes are
essentially determined by the structure of the political system. This system makes an
4
attempt to institutionalize the leadership transition possible. In a one-party system, the
personal consensus and the institutionalized succession are based on negative experiences
from history, which has been a principle factor behind the increasing level of stability
among the central echelons.
Transition in Mao’s party
In Mao’s China, the problem of succession was unresolved. Any attempt to introduce
formal or informal procedures failed. This fact could be illustrated by the rise and fall of
Lin Biao. After the Great Leap Forward that turned out to be a total political and economic
failure related to Mao Zedong’s idea of “achieving greater, faster and more results,” the
Chairman was forced into the background. Liu Shaoqi took advantage of these mistakes.
He was eventually nominated for the position of Chairman and became the predominant
leader of the People’s Republic of China. “The policy of readjustment” that, for example,
enabled people in rural areas to formulate a market economy, was considered by Mao
Zedong as a deterioration of collectivism and egalitarianism. Mao Zedong believed that the
whole situation was an attack of capitalism on socialism. To his mind, Liu Shaoqi’s
objective entailed “combating and preventing revisionism” (fan xiu fang xiu). The major
intention was the removal of those from power who were taking the capitalist road
(Barnouin & Yu, 1993, p.23).
The differences within the leadership intensified during the rural socialist education
movement. While Liu Shaoqi promoted stabilization in the rural areas, Mao Zedong strived
for a “permanent revolution and class struggle.” In this respect, Mao Zedong needed to
organize his allies and started a political campaign that allowed him to take the initiative
in the Communist Party of China and, eventually, purge his political opponents. Having
had a dominating leader, the Party was exposed to the danger of “patronage
factionalism.” In a situation where everybody was dependent on the individual,
tremendous internal turbulences were inevitable. Being the minister for defense, Lin Biao
became increasingly politically active. Lin became a major vanguard of Chairman Mao’s
personality cult. He initiated a campaign “Marxism-Leninism in its present form is our
Chairman Mao’s Thought” in the People’s Liberation Army. When, in 1964, the “little red
book” was published, this campaign spread through the whole of Chinese society.
5
The second group that enabled him to take the political initiative consisted of Jiang Qing
and other leftist intellectuals like Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao. They launched a
political campaign in the cultural field. In November 1965, the Shanghai Daily “Wenhui
Bao” published an article by Yao Wenyuan on Wu Han’s play “Hai Rui Dismissed from the
Office.” Soon after, the “Beijing Daily,” the “Liberation Army Daily” and “People’s Daily”
re-printed the article. Given the fact that only the “Liberation Army Daily” categorically
stated in its editorial note that Wu Han’s play “is an anti-party, anti-socialist and anti-Mao
Zedong’s Thought poisonous weed which should be criticized,” Lin Biao gained an
important political position (Barnouin & Yu, 1993, p. 59). Furthermore, as a close ally of
Mao, he played an important role in the purge within the People’s Liberation Army. Taking
Mao Zedong’s “people’s war” concept as a political basis, he increased the role of the
People’s Liberation Army in the political system of China, and transformed the army into
the revolutionary instrument that allowed Mao to attack and defeat his political enemies
(Barnouin & Yu, 1993, p. 199).
The critical personal decision was taken during the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central
Committee, when Lin Biao was upgraded to the second rank while Liu Shaoqi’s position
deteriorated from second to eighth rank. This transformation replaced the Mao-Liu system
with the Mao-Lin system of leadership and terminated the division between the first and
the second fronts (Cheng, 1971, p. 943 – 958).
The personnel changes played a critical role in ongoing actions. Having the political
powerbase, Mao Zedong was able to launch further campaigns. Criticism of the
reactionary Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping line began to spread throughout society. The
radical groups (zaofan) and red guards (hong weibing) accused Party members at various
levels of having followed the Liu-Deng line (Bennett, 1971, p. 5). During the February
Adverse Course, most of the military staff stepped down. In June 1967, while Mao Zedong
toured the South with Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin and Li Zuopeng, Zhou Enlai suggested that
Lin Biao should appoint an ad hoc committee to run the military during Yang Chengwu’s
absence (Brugger, 1981, p. 86-89).
Nevertheless, the Lin-Jiang coalition had a fragile base. Tensions between the armed
forces and the Cultural Revolution Group increased as the 9th Congress approached. The
crisis was deepened by the fact that Chen Boda moved from the leftist group closer to Lin
Biao and became his assistant in preparing the draft of the 9th Congress Report (Jiu Qin,
6
1999, p. 127). Finally, in April 1969, the new Party Constitution approved of Lin Biao as
chairman and as Mao’s “best student and successor.” The Communiqué of the 9th
Congress declared: “Comrade Lin Biao has consistently held high the great banner of Mao
Zedong Thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Comrade
Mao Zedong’s proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Biao is Comrade Mao Zedong’s
close comrade-in-arms and successor.” (Barnouin, & Yu, 1993, p. 199-200).
Along with “the helicopter speed” nomination, Lin Biao consolidated power inside the high
organs of the CCP and marginalized the role of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The
Politburo, dominated by Lin’s allies, was again an important political body. Due to the reappointment of Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian as director and deputy director of the
administration group respectively in the Military Commission, Lin Biao was able to
consolidate his power within the army structure.
Although Lin Biao became the successor, conflict with Mao Zedong was unavoidable, as in
the past. The major confrontation between the chosen successor and the current
paramount leader took place in August 1970. Mao Zedong wanted to restore the
supremacy of the Party over the army in order to avoid the failures of the Guomindang.
However, he encountered a major obstacle -- Lin Biao’s supremacy in the army structures.
The second major issue that erupted before the Plenum concerned Lin Biao’s suggestion
that Mao Zedong should occupy the position of chairman. In fact, Mao had rejected this
post thrice. Lin Biao prepared a long passage about Mao as a “genius” and “great leader”
(si ge weida – great teacher, leader, commander and helmsman) (Feng Xianzhi & Jin
Chongji, 2003, p. 1581). Later, this issue became the major point of discussion during the
2nd Plenum in August 1970. Mao Zedong perceived this as a disruption of the earlier plans
he had made for the Lushan conference. The first attack on the Lin Biao group was not
directed against Lin Biao himself, but against a member of his group - Chen Boda. He was
accused of having “wild ambitions” and resorting to “a surprise attack” in an attempt to
“raze Lushan to the ground and stop the earth from the revolution.” (Joseph , 1984, p.
125-126). The offensive during the Plenum resulted in Chen Boda’s removal from power
and constituted the first phase of Lin Biao’s downfall. In November 1970, the Party Central
Committee issued a document “The Directives of Relaying Chen Boda’s Anti-Party
Activities,” which initiated the movement called “Criticizing Chen and Rectifying the Party”
(pi Chen zhengfeng) (Qiu Jin, 1999, p. 131).
7
In fact, the problem was far less serious. In the power struggle confrontation between Lin
Biao and Jiang Qing at Lushan, Mao, who intended to counter Lin’s influences, arbitrated
in favor of Jiang Qing. At the end of February, the Party center informed all Party
members and the general public about the campaign to criticize Chen Boda (Barnouin &
Yu, 1993, p. 224) . Soon after, Mao Zedong took administrative measures to counter Lin
Biao’s influence forcing Lin Biao’s generals into self-criticism and introducing his followers,
Ji Dengkui and Zhang Caiqian, into the military commission. Moreover, Mao Zedong
reorganized the Beijing military region.
According to some readings, Lin Biao had interfered with Mao’s foreign policy tactics to
improve Sino-American relations. Lin Biao considered this move as an abandonment of
“proletarian internationalism.” More to the point, the mass campaign against Chen Boda
and politicians from Lin Biao’s closest circle was taken up, along with an initiative towards
a rapprochement with the United States. In April, the American table-tennis team was
invited to visit China; in July, Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou
Enlai unofficially and, after the meeting, Richard Nixon announced his visit to the People’s
Republic of China (Hu Sheng & all 1994, p. 684-685).
Finally, in August 1971, Mao left Beijing for an inspection of Central China. During his
meetings with party officials, he called the Lushan Plenum a “struggles of line.”
Furthermore, two incidents in post-Lushan period became landmarks of Lin Biao’s political
future. During Edgar Snow’s visit to China, he refused to receive the “American friend”
and in May 1971, Lin Biao was late in appearing at Tiananmen for the celebration (Teiwes
& Sun, 1996, p. 157).
While being isolated, Lin Biao started to demonstrate his power ability. According to the
official version of the events, he prepared the coup d’etat in order to gain power in China.
After his plot against Mao Zedong had been discovered, Lin Biao decided to escape to
Moscow. (Yao Ming-le, 1983, p. 165-178) . He was killed on 12/13 September 1971. As a
consequence, the Party issued an order to remove all of Lin Biao’s allies, namely: Huang
Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo, from their posts. (Barnouin & Yu,
1993, p. 234).
8
Transition under Deng Xiaoping
The situation gradually changed after Chairman Mao’s death. For the first time in the
history of the Party, the high ranking officials faced the situation without a predominant
leader. Deng Xiaoping and his group competed with the chosen successor Hua Guofeng.
While Deng Xiaoping started to organize his own coalition, the first ideological problem
arose when, in February 1977, Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing launched a new political
campaign under the “two whatevers” (liang ge fanshi) slogan : “we will resolutely support
whatever decision Chairman Mao made we will obey whatever instruction Chairman Mao
issued.” (Jie Chen & Peng Deng , 1995, p. 44). Deng Xiaoping was strong enough to
launch a counterattack: he opened a formal discussion and, later, criticized the theory. In
May, 1977, speaking to Hu Yaobang and others, he stressed that the “two whatevers”
were not good. To his mind, using Mao Zedong thoughts to resolve contemporary
problems was not a good solution and following any of Mao’s decisions was not suitable for
China’s future development. This was the first political battle when Deng used his
supporters to counter Hu Guofeng’s group. The first attempt was made in August 1977,
when, at the Eleventh Congress of the CCP, Deng’s confident, Hu Yaobang, was elected to
the Central Committee (Yang, 1991, p.234) . Moreover, he was appointed vice-president
of the Central Committee's Central Party School and became responsible for the day-today running of the school (Yang, 1997, p. 128-130).
In connection with Deng Xiaoping’s increasing influence in the central apparatus, the
heads of all the party apparatus had expressed their support for the idea that “practice is
the only criterion for the test of truth.” (shishi qiu shi). As a consequence, Hua Guofeng
was forced to express self-criticism and stop promoting “the two whatevers.” The next
step was to promote Hu Yaobang as the director of the Organization Department, which is
one of the most important bodies within the party structure (Hu Deping, 2008). In
addition to his position on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Hu Yaobang became
the secretary-general of the Central Committee (Yan, 1999, p. 45-47). The major
outcome of building up Deng’s group led to an unofficial evaluation of Mao’s period,
discussion on the economic performance of Hua Guofeng and the problem of his
resignation. Finally, at the third session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National
People's Congress, a reformer, Zhao Ziyang, was made premier (Harding, 1984, p. 5459).
9
The situation inside the Communist Party of China was restored to normality. At the
beginning of 1980, the decision to reestablish the Secretariat of the Central Committee
was finally approved. More importantly, after the 3rd Plenum a “Resolution on Certain
Questions in the History of our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China”
was passed. This settling of accounts with the past and the trial of the Gang of Four
played a pivotal role in shaping China’s reform:
“[T]he basic point to broaden further reforms was the deideologization of Mao as a
revolutionary hero then led to to detheologization of Mao’s thoughts. In fact the
reforms based on critics of Mao’s ‘ultra-left’ ideas of class struggles and permanent
revolution.” (Jie Chen & Peng Deng, p. 46)
For the purposes of deepening reforms in the mid 1980s, Deng Xiaoping encouraged Hu
Yaobang to work with intellectuals such as Liu Binyang, Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, Su
Shaoshi, Guo Luoji or Ruan Ming to “liberate people’s minds” (jiefang sixiang). In October
1983, when they started to cooperate closely and the situation in China became stable,
yet another Cultural Revolution-style campaign swept through China, called “spiritual
pollution.” The movement was set up by Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo.
The main reason for establishing it was that the conservative politicians started to criticize
Deng Xiaoping’s liberal associates who “disturbed peoples’ minds” (ranlun renxin) and
“confused the matter of principles.” (Jie Chen, Peng Deng, p.60). In fact, Deng was not
strong enough to oppose them and he himself initiated the campaign calling for the
elimination of “spiritual pollution.” Contrary to “old comrades,” Hu Yaobang obliquely
questioned the theory of “pollution” held by those like Deng Liqun. His major argument
was that it created a serious crisis which undermined the reforms, affected the confidence
of the people and the party as well as considerably damaging China's international
reputation.
After the barbarous experiences of the Cultural Revolution and the failure to establish a
proper formula for future power transition, the problem arose again. The breaking point
referring the future transition of power was made on August 18, 1980, when, in his
speech “Reforming the Leadership Institutions of the Party and the State,” Deng Xiaoping
put the agenda of the party and the state relationship forward for the first time (Deng,
1984, p. 302-325).
10
His experiences from the Cultural Revolution led him to the conclusion that the overconcentration of power in the central party apparatus or in single individuals has been the
major source of political turbulence (Jie Chen, Peng Deng, p. 47). More to the point, in
1981, Chen Yun stated:
“Our cadre corps today have a serious problem, the gap between the young and
old. Nearly every day the death of another of the old veterans is reported. . . .
The fact that younger men must be promoted is a problem that was raised long
ago.” (Yang, 1997, p. 151)
After an ongoing discussion of this issue in September 1985, the Party Congress accepted
Hu Yaobang’s conception of an echelon structure. The new concept allowed young and
talented party members to be considered for the future leadership. The 12th Congress
elected the new members of the Central Committee. At the same time, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi,
Wu Xueqian, Li Peng, and Tian Jiyun became the third-echelon leaders appointed to the
Politburo. As a consequence, a group from the original Communist Youth League system
became an important force in positions from the central government down through the
local offices (Yang, 1997, p. 153). Similar to Lin Biao and his “military coalition,” Hu
Yaobang was supported by the “young and talented coalition.” Compared with the
previous case of Lin Biao, Hu was able to build a strong position inside the Party.
Furthermore, his new ideas met with public opinion support. On December 5, 1986, more
than a thousand students from the Chinese National University of Science and Technology
of Hefei in Anhui province held a demonstration opposing the method of “officially
appointed candidates” (Yang, 1997, p. 154). The whole situation, the fact that he had
been supported by the young leadership and society, created the opportunity for Hu
Yaobang to claim power.
This shaped the intra-party struggle over two different types of reforms. One was a
market-oriented economy with a relatively open political system, the other one, on the
contrary, was based on a planned economy with less political liberalization (Goodman,
1994, p. 105). Hu Yaobang supported the voice of democracy and opposed the students’
arrests. Furthermore, Zhao Ziyang reinforced these ideas by saying that the cadre system
failed to mean that every cadre should have been appointed by the party (Hsiao Pen,
1999, p. 158). Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, joined the conservatives like Chen Yun,
Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, as well as the old army leaders of the Red Area armed forces faction
11
e.g. Nie Rongzhen and Yang Shangkun. Starting from late December 1986, Peng Zhen, Bo
Yibo, and others held several meetings, criticizing Hu Yaobang for being “too rightist,”
“releasing a bourgeois liberal flood” and for being “responsible for the student movement
incident.” On 16 January 1987, with the help of these two groups, he persuaded Hu
Yaobang to resign (Gottschalk, 1987, p. 677). The senior officials decided to purge Hu
Yaobang in order to halt his political offensive. The situation clearly showed that they were
driven by the former situation inside the Party, when Mao allowed Lin to build an
exceptionally strong position which stimulated his political ambitions. In fact, the decision
makers were living in fear of the past. This, for the author, was the major factor that
brought about Hu Yaobang’s dismissal. A few months later, Deng Xiaoping introduced
Zhao Ziyang saying that: “we should not allow what happened last year to influence our
reform and openness. We should not only continue sticking to the reforms but hasten our
steps in carrying them out” (Goodman, 1994, p. 93).
Along with the problem of power transition, the CCP faced tremendous problems not only
with the national economy but also with ethnicity management. The most important
challenge originated from the pro-democracy campaign raised by intellectuals. A
consequence of losing ideological background, the party lost its influence and the public
sympathy went to the student and opposition movement. Having dismissed Hu Yaobang,
Chen Yun took over the control of the Central Advisory Commission – a committee
responsible for selecting the future leadership. The new nomination of Li Peng became a
reason for a further dispute between the conservatives and reformers. He was adopted by
Zhou Enlai and his wife in the 1940s. Later, he was recommended by Deng Yingchao and
entered the Politburo. The Party Congress in 1987 made the personal arrangement and
National People’s Congress announced them. Yang Shangkun became the president of the
PRC, Wan Li – the chairman of the NPC, Li Xiannian – the chairman of the Political
Consultative Conference and Li Peng - the premier of the State Council. However, after a
year, the conservative forces launched a counterattack on Zhao Ziyang as Hu Yaobang’s
ally. “Red Flag” accused him of being pro-Western, wearing Western-style suits etc., which
was contrary to the idea of the “combat against bourgeois liberalization.” (Spence, 1991,
p. 726). Li Xiannian openly suggested to Deng Xiaoping that Zhao Ziyang should express
self-criticism at the Fourth Plenum of 13th Congress. The worsening situation in the
national economy, inflation, lack of macro control and the rising intellectual movement put
Zhao Ziyang in an unfavorable light. Finally, he was labeled as being pro-rightist and
supporting violent attacks on the Party by Fang Lizhi, among others (Oksenberg et al.,
12
1990, p. 181-182). The next campaign launched by the conservative forces against the
“bourgeois liberalization” was aimed directly against the liberal group in the Communist
Party of China. (Fewsmith, 1994, p. 204-207). The public opinion, however, reacted to
the central squabbles by supporting the liberals. Mass student demonstrations swept
though the country. The sudden death of Hu Yaobang in April 1989 became the trigger.
After a private consultation with Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shankun denounced the
student movement in the “People’s Daily” as: “an antiparty and antisocialist rebellion
inspired and manipulated by a group of criminal elements.” (Yang, 1991, p. 246).
Hu Jintao’s first peaceful transition
Finally, after the Tiananmen crackdown, with the recommendation of Chen Yun and Li
Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping appointed the future leader: Jiang Zemin, a former party
secretary and mayor of Shanghai. Regarding the future of the leadership, the most
important nomination was made after the 14th Congress in 1992. Hu Jintao, the protégé of
Song Ping, was promoted to the Standing Committee. While Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiaoshi
and Li Ruihuan remained in it, the elderly Song Ping stepped down and Zhu Rongji, Liu
Huaqing, Zheng Zhan and the aforementioned Hu Jintao were added (Yang, 1991, p.
264).
Soon after, in Spring 1993, the new leaders of the state and government were named:
Jiang Zemin – the president of the PRC, Li Peng – the PM, Zhu Rongji as a senior deputy
prime minister of the State Council, Qiao Shi as the chairman of the National People’s
Congress and Li Ruihuan as the chairman of the Political Consultative Conference
(Fewsmith, 1994, p. 162-163).
The political career of Hu Jintao started in the mid 1980s, after Hu Yaobang’s call for
promoting talented, young cadres. Hu Jintao, working in Gansu province, was promoted
by Song Ping – the First Secretary. In 1982, Hu was nominated to the position in a
provincial branch of the Communist Youth League. It was only because of the strong
patronage that Hu Jintao was invited by the central authorities to study in the Central
Party School. Next, he was transferred to the Communist Youth League. The following
step in his political career was taken when he became a Party secretary in the two poorest
provinces: Guizhou and Tibet. While Hu Yabang promoted him to Guizhou, Song Ping, by
then a member of the Standing Committee, advocated Hu’s appointment to Tibet in order
13
to demonstrate his abilities. Unfortunately, just after his nomination the riots of Lhasa
started against the Chinese authorities. Hu Jintao was not prepared to handle the crisis
and after declaring
martial law the crisis was prevented. (Nathan, Gilley, 2002, p. 68-
69).
In 1992, to avoid future conflict over succession, Deng Xioping chose the forty-nine year
old Hu. Hu Jintao was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This type of
decision was the first in the history of Chinese communism. While his predecessor Jiang
Zemin was nominated soon after the crisis, Hu Jintao was announced as the future
successor ten years before he took his post. Moreover, he was promoted ahead of other
young party members: Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao and Li Chanchun. The strength of Hu
Jintao lied in his past and in the fact that he had served in the poorest places in China.
The elevation to the Standing Committee made him the successor to Jiang Zemin. Next,
Jiang appointed Hu vice-president, in 1998, and vice-chairman of the Central Military
Commission, in 1999. After his re-election to the Standing Committee, his position was
secure. In fact, Jiang Zemin never made Hu Jintao acting president while he was abroad.
The only time when Hu Jintao became more active than Jiang Zemin was during NATO’s
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, in May 1999. It was Hu who addressed the
presidential speech to the nation to call for calm after the incident. The other difficult task
Hu Jintao faced was when he was appointed by Jiang Zemin to prevent a conflict between
military and civilian leaders over the future overseas defense contracts empire. (Nathan,
Gilley, 2002, p. 71). That was a test of Hu Jintao’s character and abilities. However, since
1997, after Deng Xiaoping’s death and Song Ping’s retirement, Hu Jintao lost his political
background. (Wu, 1999, p. 18-19). This was an unquestionable precedent in the history of
the CCP. The future leadership was devoid of their powerbase. As it was analyzed, the
major objective to achieve was to minimalize the power ambitions of the future leaders.
At the first Plenum of 16th Congress, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as general
secretary. Next, in Spring 2003, after the 10th National People’s Congress, Hu Jintao
became president of the PRC (guojia zhuxi). The newly elected leader was well-educated
in the history of the CCP, had a strong technical background, became a member of the
communist party on the eve of the Cultural Revolution and, most importantly, had little
experience in military affairs. (Miller, 2003, p. 1-3). More to the point, an interesting step
was taken by Jiang Zemin: Although he retired from all party positions, he remained the
chairman of the Central Military Commission. In fact, he followed a precedent set by Deng
14
Xiaoping during the 13th Congress in 1987. Deng resigned from all his posts but took
command over the army structures. After three years of chairing the CMC, Jiang Zemin
stepped down (Yang, 2003, p. 27-28). Undoubtedly, this decision was based on Deng
Xiaoping’s experiences during the Tiananmen crisis in 1989. This Deng-Jiang case was
telling in terms of the importance of the army in China’s stability: “it is most important to
maintain the stability of the armed forces (…) Following pattern set up by Deng Xiaoping
Jiang’s continuing to serve as CMC chairman is conducive to stabilizing the morale of the
armed forces and a smooth transition from the old to the new generation.” (Yang, 2003,
p. 27-28).
Furthermore, in order to achieve a political balance inside the CCP during the 16 th
Congress, Zeng Qinghong -- a close ally of Jiang Zemin -- was elected to the Standing
Committee and became the fifth highest ranked leader inside the Communist Party of
China. During the NPC session, he was elected as vice-president of the PRC. This situation
created a possibility for Zeng’s future succession over Hu Jintao. In fact, he took the same
positions as Hu Jintao before he took over power in China. The only post that Zeng
Qinghong had not yet taken was the vice-chairman of the CMC. But the only reason why
he failed to overpower Hu Jintao was the age-limit (Bi Jianhai, 2003, p. 12-14).
Having retired, Jiang Zemin promoted his associates in the central party apparatus. This
constituted a new situation for Hu Jintao who, after three years of holding power, had yet
to complete the process of consolidating it. Having problems countering Jiang’s faction, Hu
Jintao put forward a concept of “scientific development” (kexue fazhan guan) and
“harmonious society” (hexie shehui) and he launched a political -- “keep progress” (bao
xianjinxin) -- and a moral campaign -- “eight honors and eight disgraces” (ba rong, ba
chi). (Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 2007, p. 4-11).
The Jiang-Hu transition constituted a precedent which, perhaps, will be followed in the
future. The Chinese Communist Party has been facing a variety of unresolved internal
problems, and the struggle over power might lead to a collapse of the regime. After the
17th Party Congress in 2007, the “peaceful transition model” will likely be applied. Two
nominations to the Standing Committee, namely Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping, have
illustrated this approach. On the one hand, Li Keqiang, the party secretary of Liaoning
Province, has been considered as Hu Jintao’s protégé; Xi Jinping, the former Shanghai
party chief, on the other hand, is viewed as a compromise choice, acceptable not only to
15
Hu but also to Jiang Zemin. Xi Jinping, who graduated from the Qinhua University is the
son of Xi Zhongxun a leading guerrilla in the north of China. Moreover, Xi Zhongxun
suffered twice during Mao’s regime and was finally rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping. In the
late 1970s, Xi Zhongxun became a pivotal political figure of Guangdong province, where
he was in charge of establishing Special Economic Zones. Xi Jinping’s political career
started in Fujian province where he remained for seventeen years. After Hu Yaobang was
purged in 1987, Xi Zhongxun was also dismissed from all party positions. In spite of the
situation, Xi Jinping was promoted by the newly elected governor of Fujian province, the
former ally of Hu Yaobang – Wang Zhaoguo. In 1997, after Hu Jintao lost his backers, the
Organization Department prepared Xi Jinping to promote him to the central level. (A.
Nathan, B. Gilley, 2002, p. 125). In 2000, he was appointed the governor of Fujian
province, in 2002 he was transferred to Zhejiang province and, for a short period of time,
he became party secretary in Shanghai after Chen Liangyu’s scandal.
Still, as it was in the past, factionalism remains the major policy making factor inside the
Communist Party of China. There are three major factions inside the party: the party of
princelings, the Shanghai group and the Communist Youth League (CYL) group. (Bi Jinhai,
2008, p. 17). To avoid a personal crisis inside the CCP, the senior party officials might
introduce the following model of succession:
1. A current vice chairman (vice-president) would become the chairman;
2. He would serve for two terms (10 years);
3. During his second term, the party senior officials would select and appoint a new
vice chairman who would later become the chairman.
The logic of the future succession presented above has mainly been based on the
historical experiences of the Communist Party of China. According to the author’s
knowledge, the Chinese think-tanks have also analyzed the history of different communist
parties, for example, from
Eastern Europe. (Shambaugh, 2008, p. 45-53). These
comparative studies have provided the basis for the future model of power transition
inside the CCP.
Conclusion
Succession in Chinese politics is a very complex issue. The situations discussed above
show the changes and differences in the Mao-Lin, Deng-Hua and Jiang-Hu succession
16
cases. The major problem of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping was the culture of
subservience to authority, which was determined by the fact that paramount leaders were
the founders of the regimes. If Mao is considered as a revolutionary leader who
established the People’s Republic of China, then Deng Xiaoping is recognized as “the
father of Chinese modernization.” At first, Mao Zedong had decided that Liu Shaoqi was to
be his successor as Party Chairman. But he then struck him out and propelled Lin Biao to
the highest position. After Lin’s plot and death, Mao favoured Wang Hongwen, Deng
Xiaoping and, finally, Hua Guofeng. In fact, in Mao’s China, as John K. Fairbank observed,
the continuity of dynastic absolutism was replaced by party dictatorship and a “personality
cult.” (Fairbank, 1971, p. 406). Deng Xiaoping was a similar case. After consultations with
party elders, he had selected Hu Yaobang in 1980 and Zhao Ziyang in 1987. However, as
a matter of fact, the CCP system of peaceful succession collapsed. In fact, both Lin Biao
and Hu Yaobang were victims who could not escape the dominant leaders’ increasingly
unpredictable demands. They both were on “the front line.” When something went wrong,
Hu and Lin were blamed (Chang , 1989, p.131). Lin Biao and Hu Yaobang were used as
political tools to purge Liu Shaoqi and Hua Guofeng respectively. They both allowed the
leaders, Mao and Deng, to return to power. At the same time, however, they also took
their chances to build their own position within the party framework and, in fact, were
able to establish themselves at the center of the party apparatus. This caused the problem
of diarchy (dual power) - “two centers inside one party.” On the other hand, one could
state that Mao’s and Deng’s styles of leadership differed from each other. Mao, in
comparison to Deng, governed like an emperor while Deng was only one among “senior
comrades” (lao tong zhi men) inside the party-state apparatus. While Mao Zedong
developed a huge personality cult and an aura of sacred authority, Deng Xiaoping was a
man with a “reconstruction” mission. For the author, however, the two cases of Lin Biao
and Hu Yaobang differed only in the fact that Mao purged Lin after his position had upset
the balance inside the Party, while Deng used a pre-emptive attack on Hu Yaobang before
he consolidated his position to the full.
Comparing the Cultural Revolution case of Lin Biao with the situation in the 1980s’, the
leadership succession and conflicts became much less intense and violent, and were no
longer a matter of life and death. In the 1980s, the rules of the game became more
civilized. The system of individual governance evolved into a complex “mixture of
oligarchy and gerontocracy.” The CCP leadership system was still based on the rule of
man (renzhi) in which politics was personalized and weakly institutionalized. Power was
17
still based more on who the person was and his guanxi (personal inter-relationship) than
on his position, ability or educational background. In fact, guanxi has secured common
political interests, provided a necessary political basis and revealed the strength of
leadership factional networks.
Along with the opening up and modernization policy, the nature of the Chinese leadership
has changed. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not pre-eminent leaders, each of them
could only be called primus inter pares. Unlike Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, their
legitimacy and power were based neither on the victory of the Chinese revolution nor the
success of the economic reforms and modernization respectively.
On the basis of the aforementioned facts, we can derive the conclusion that many nondemocratic political systems fail to have a fully institutionalized structure of power
transition. Furthermore, the one-party system provides pre-dominant conditions for the
development of factionalism. When the potential successor has limited authority within the
Party-state, the difficulties are considerable, and the new potential leader faces what has
been called the dilemma of the successor. (Bachman, 1996, p. 370-389). In order to
avoid internal turbulence in future successions, the Chinese central authorities have
promoted a new formula. Deng Xiaoping laid the basis for the new norm of stability in the
arrangement for succession. Moreover, the strengthening of institutional development in
the last 30 years has promoted a situation whereby politics is no longer a game in which
the winner takes all. Along with the rebuilding of the National People’s Congress system
and normalization of the situation in China, a peaceful transition of power is more than
likely (Tanner, 1999, p. 72-104). Moreover, the “Tiananmen effect” has had an impact on
constraining the system of succession. This situation since the late 1980s has resulted in
the fact that most of the Chinese leaders are well aware of limited public support and,
what is more important, of the negative consequences of military involvement. These two
factors make the policy process complicated and vulnerable. The situation drastically
changed when China approved of a decision to join the World Trade Organization. The PRC
became a responsible stakeholder in the economic field. Furthermore, the Chinese
government has been obliged to operate within international law. The problem of “good
governance” has become an important issue of political debates in China. In this context,
any failure with the leadership transition would expose China to losing its credibility. More
to the point, the Chinese central authorities would like to avoid a crisis in order to achieve
stability in society (wending xing) (Li, 2002, p. 173-175). Since the 1990s, social
18
instability has been a major problem for the central authorities. Along with tremendous
economic achievement, China also faces a variety of problems. Consequently, the next
generation of leaders will probably have to strengthen their political ability and power
through a peaceful power transition which would enable them to resolve increasing social
problems (Kai He, Huiyun Feng, 2008, p. 155-156).
In fact, the current leaders are not able to rely on ideology, they lack charisma or
revolutionary background and thus are in favor of peaceful transition. In this respect, the
political successor must be singled out by the previous paramount leadership and
supported by the current leaders. Otherwise, the future successor could be displaced from
his position of privilege. The logic of future succession has been based both on formal
position held by the leadership – vice chairman - and their personal skills and predispositions for governing. The author’s observations suggest that the future leadership
under the current leaders is unable to build its own functional group. The current leader
has an unlimited control over the political actions of the vice-president, vice-secretary and
vice-chairman political actions. Needless to say, his/her position must be in the shadow of
the ruling group. The major objective of the aforementioned logic of succession is to
prevent the elites from struggling for power.
At this stage of development, the CCP leadership promotes “intra-party democracy” (dang
nei min zhu) to reduce potential future conflicts among groups inside the one-party
system. The achievement of such stability at the central level is necessary for ensuring
the progress (xianjinxing) and further reforms without political turbulence (Kang
Xiaoguang, 2009). Institutionalization and the future redistribution of power have been
central issues of the core leadership. In fact, however, due to the halt in reforms in the
late 1980s, China is at the same stage in this field as it was before Tiananmen. Finally, it
is necessary to point out that this succession pattern has changed since Mao’s death. The
major issue now is how to transform the informal factionalism into, as Lowell Dittmer put
it, institutionalized personalism (2005, p. 11-37).
It is hard to escape the obvious conclusion that each generation of Chinese leadership has
been paralyzed by the fear of political destabilization. The central authorities, however,
have differed in terms of methods applied to maintain the political transition stability. To
the author, all of the above quoted arguments and facts favour a process of gradual
changes: from the dynastic and totalitarian model based on informal relationships, to a
19
peaceful and finally legitimate transition based on the selection of open-minded, welleducated, experienced people and good administrators to govern China.
20
References
1. Bachman D. (1996). Succession politics in China, Journal of International Affairs,
46, 370-389.
2. Barnouin B. & Yu Changgen (1993). Ten Years of Turbulence: the Chinese cultural
revolution, London, New York: Graduate Institute of International Studies.
3. Bennett G. A. (1970). China’s Continuing Revolution: Will it be Permanent?, Asian
Survey, 10, 5.
4. Bi Jianhai (2003). The Chinese leadership succession: does it complete or
continue? New Zealand International Review, 28, 2.
5. Bi Jianhai (2008). Political Transition in China, New Zealand International Review,
33, 17.
6. Brugger B. (1981). China: Radicalism to Revisionism 1962-1979, Totowa, New
Jersey: Barnes & Nobles.
7. Burnham P., Gilland Lutz K., Wyn Grand & Zig Layton-Henry (2008). Research
Methods in Politics, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.
8. Chang D. W. (1984). Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the Chinese Leadership
Succession Crisis, Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America.
9. Chang P. H. (1989). The Changing Nature of Elite Conflict in Post-Mao China. In V.
C. Falkenstein (ed.) Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng, New York: Paragon House.
10. Cheng P. (1971). Liu Shao-chi and the Cultural Revolution. Asian Survey, 11, 943–
958.
11. China Leadership Completes Transition as President Hu Assumes Military
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-03/2005-03-13voa6.cfm?CFID=107289217&CFTOKEN=79366672&jsessionid=de303d5224f0c4ca1
e6e5e1cab6d4e1b6941 (accessed on 28 January, 2009)
12. Deng Xiaoping (1984). On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982), translated by the Bureau for the
Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing: Foreign Language
Press.
13. Dittmer L. (2003). Chinese Leadership Succession to the Fourth Generation. In Lin
Gang and Hu Xiaobo (eds.) China After Jiang, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
14. Fewsmith J. (1994). Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic
Debate, Armonk, New York, London: An East Gate Book.
21
15. Fewsmith J. (2001). China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
16. Fewsmith J. (2004). Promoting the Scientific Development Concept. China
Leadership Monitor, 11, http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm11_jf.pdf
(accessed on February 1, 2009)
17. Goldstein A. (1991). From Bandwagon to Balance-Of-Power Politics: Structural
Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
18. Goodman D. G. (1994). Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution, New York,
London: Routledge.
19. Gottschalk M. (1987), Political Reform in China. The Nation, 244, 677.
20. Harding H. (1987). China’s Second Revolution, Reform after Mao, Washington: The
Brooking Institution.
21. Hsiao Pen (1999). Separating the Party from the Government In: Carol Lee
Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao & A. Barnett Doak (eds.), Decision-Making in Deng's China:
Perspectives from Insiders, Armonk, New York, N.Y.: A East Gate Book.
22. Hu Deping (2008). Hu Yaobang tongzhi zai “zhenli biaozhi” dacun lun de qianqian
houhou, Caijing, 218, http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20080817/77313.shtml
(accessed on January 15, 2009)
23. Jing Huang (2000), Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
24. Joseph W. A. (1984), The Critique of Ultra-leftism in China, 1958-1981, Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
25. Jie Chen, Peng Deng (1995). China since the Cultural Revolution. From Totalitarism
to Authoritarism, London: Prager.
26. Kai He, Huiyun Feng (2008), A Path to Democracy: In Search of China’s
Democratization Model. Asian Perspective, 32, 155-156.
27. Kang Xiaoguang, Weilai 3-5 nian Zhongguo dalu zhengzhi wendingxing fenxi (An
Analysis of the future of the political stability in Mainland China) online:
http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=684 (accessed on February 6, 2009)
28. Li Wenling (2003). Zhongguo zhengfu zhineng chuanbian wenti baogao (China
Government Function Change Issue Report) Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan Chuban
She.
29. Mao Zedong Zhuan (The Biography of Mao Zedong), (2003), Feng Xianzhi, Jin
Chongji (eds.), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxuan Chubanshe.
22
30. Miller Lyman H. (2003). The 10th National People’s Congress and China Leadership
Transition. China Leadership Monitor, 7, 1-3.
31. Nathan A. & Gilley B. (2002). China’s New Rulers, The Secret Files, New York: New
York Review Books.
32. Nelson H. (1972). Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution. The China Quarterly,
51, 444 – 474.
33. Oksenberg M., Sullivan L. R., Lambert M., Qiao Li, Lan H. R. & Dennerline J.
(1990). Beijing Spring 1989, Confrontation and Conflict: the Basic Documents,
New York, London: An East Gate Book.
34. Qiu Jin (1999). The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural
Revolution, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
35. Schwartz B. I., (1970). The reign of virtue: Some broad perspectives on leader and
Party in the Cultural Revolution. In: Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in
China, J. W. Lewis (ed) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Shambaugh D. (2008). China’s Communist Party, Atrophy and Adaptation,
Woodrow Wilson Press Centre, Washington, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press.
37. Sheng H. (1994). A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, Party History
Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
38. Spence J. D. (1991), The Search for Modern China, New York, London.
39. Tang Tsou (1969). The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System. The
China Quarterly, 38, 63 – 91.
40. Tang Xiaoqing (2009). Dang nei minzhu yu Dang de xianjinxing shi hudong gong
jin guanxi (The intra-party democracy and party’s progress are interactive) online:
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49151/4388817.html (accessed on
February 5, 2009).
41. Tanner M. S. (1999). The Politics of Lawmaking In Post Mao China, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
42. Teiwes F. C., Sun Warren (1996). The Tragedy of Lin Biao, Riding the Tiger During
the Cultural Revolution 1966-1971, Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press.
43. Willy Wo-Lap Lam (2007). Chinks in the Armour of the Hu Jintao Administration.
China Perspective, 3, 4-11,
44. Wu Guoguang (1999). Legitimacy Crisis, Political Economy, and the Fifteenth Party
Congress. In: Andrew J. Nathan, Zhaohui Hong, Steven R. Smith, Lynne Rienner
23
(eds.), Dilemmas of Reform in Jiang Zemin's China, Boulder, London: Lynne
Rienner Publisher
45. Xi Jinping bio-sketch http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xi_Jinping|303
(accessed on February 1, 2009)
46. Yan Huai (1999). Organizational Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System. In:
Carol Hamrin Lee, Suisheng Zhao & A. Barnett Doak (eds.), Decision-Making in
Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders, Armonk, New York, N.Y.: A East Gate
Book.
47. Yang Benjamin (1997). Deng. A Political Biography, Armonk, New York: An East
Gate Book.
48. Yang D. L. (2003). Leadership Transition and the Political Economy of Governance.
Asian Survey, 43, 27-28.
24