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How Holy Wars End: Exploring the
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With
Religious Dimensions in Asia
a
Isak Svensson & Emily Harding
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National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of
Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
Available online: 09 Mar 2011
To cite this article: Isak Svensson & Emily Harding (2011): How Holy Wars End: Exploring the
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions in Asia, Terrorism and Political Violence,
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Terrorism and Political Violence, 23:133–149, 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2010.516210
How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination
Patterns of Conflicts With Religious
Dimensions in Asia
ISAK SVENSSON AND EMILY HARDING
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National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago,
Dunedin, New Zealand
Conventional wisdom suggests that armed conflicts with religious dimensions are
inherently difficult to end. Religious appeals seem to make conflict issues indivisible.
Yet, religious conflicts do end. In order to understand this puzzle, there is a need to
examine the empirical records of the termination process of these types of armed
conflicts. In this study, we argue that there is a potential for conflict resolution of
religious conflicts without necessarily requiring concessions on the core beliefs and
aspirations. We explore this proposition by examining the empirical pattern of Asian
armed conflicts with explicit religious dimensions as stated incompatible positions and
scrutinize how they are ended. Our empirical analysis reveals that none of the parties
raising religious demands has made concessions on those demands. Yet, in about half of
the cases, there are accommodations that do not imply concessions on the religious
goals. Based on these findings, the study draws out the potential implications for the
debate about the role of religion, armed conflicts, and peaceful resolution.
Keywords armed conflicts, conflict resolution, religion, war, war endings
Introduction
The relationship between religion and conflict has become very topical in both
political discourse and academic debates in recent years. Religious dimensions can
be important for peacemaking, but religion can also play a less benevolent role.
Conventional wisdom suggests that once conflicting parties raise religious demands
concerning the contested issue, then the possibilities for solutions wane. Religious
appeals seem to make conflicts drag on for longer and seem to make them more
difficult to settle than other types of conflicts.1
Yet, conflicts do end. Even armed conflicts with religious dimensions are sometimes brought to an end. In fact, 30 out of the 37 armed conflicts in Asia since 1946
Isak Svensson is an assistant professor at Uppsala University in Sweden, and a postdoctoral fellow at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Emily Harding is a research
fellow and a research assistant at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies and a
graduate of the University of Otago.
This research is done within the East Asian peace program (supported by the
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Sweden).
Address correspondence to Isak Svensson, National Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies, University of Otago, 117 Albany Street, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
E-mail: [email protected]
133
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I. Svensson and E. Harding
with religious dimensions as stated incompatible positions have ended at least in the
short term. This is a neglected empirical fact that motivates this study and draws our
attention to this puzzle: How is it that religious conflicts end, even though (at least)
one side has raised religious demands that are by their nature impossible to back
down from? Studying the end-dynamics of empirical cases can help to shed light
on how to handle the intractable, indivisible nature of religious demands in the
context of armed conflicts.
We argue that there is a possibility for conflict resolution that does not require
concessions on core beliefs and aspirations. Religious aspirations, we contend, are
primarily associated with conflicting parties’ ultimate goals, and less concerned with
the particular means of achieving such goals. They are also not the sole aspirations
of parties: conflicting actors can have territorial, structural, economic or other
ambitions as well. This opens up space for two conflict resolution mechanisms that
can be applied in religious armed conflicts. First, drawing on the distinction between
means and ends in regard to religious demands, there is a theoretical possibility for
enabling political procedures to replace the fighting. Second, by disentangling
religious demands from other non-religious demands, horse-trading procedures
can be utilized in order to reach agreement without requiring concessions on the
religious dimensions.
This study explores the empirical pattern of Asian armed conflicts with explicit
religious dimensions as stated incompatible positions and scrutinizes the processes
through which they are ended. Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Project and an
updated version of Svensson’s study on religious dimensions of armed conflicts,
we have identified eight rebel-movements with explicit demands relating to the
religious sphere which have ended since 1989. Comparing the termination patterns
of these Asian cases, we find that more than half of them (five conflicts) were settled
through some sort of accommodation from the government side. In the other four
cases, the rebel-movements were defeated and crushed, yet although these particular
manifestations were subdued, the issues, demands, and sometimes the conflict behaviour spread to other regions. In all of the cases that are explored in this study, there is
no instance of concessions on the religious demands, indicating support for the
robustness of religious demands. The analysis also shows that in the majority of
cases, the end of the conflict seems to be driven by material factors, such as the loss
of income, fractionalization of groups, shifts in external support, as well as governments’ counter-insurgency strategies (military action and policing), rather than
ideological shifts.
The study of the termination dynamics of conflicts with religious dimensions is
pivotal for conflict resolution theory. It contributes to the general debate on how
religion influences armed conflict, and a particular debate on the indivisibility of
conflicting issues. It is also important from a policy perspective. Policy-makers,
commonly formed in a secular education setting, are sometimes perplexed when it
comes to the management of religious disputes, controversies, and violence. The role
of religion in the public sphere is an extremely acute policy issue in many societies
around the world. This study contributes to this debate with empirical evidence that
can inform both the academic and the policy debates and by introducing more
nuanced conceptual distinctions.
This study will proceed in the following manner. First, the theoretical debate on
religion, conflict, and conflict resolution will be outlined and our theoretical argument situated in the larger intellectual setting. Second, the paper will discuss how
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
135
we have selected the cases for our empirical analysis, and explain what exactly is
referred to when a conflict is seen as ‘‘religious’’ in this study. Third, the analysis
of the end-dynamics of the religious conflicts will be conducted where each case is
briefly described through an empirical narrative. In the fourth and last section of this
study, the argument, empirical analysis, and the implications will be discussed.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we will discuss the previous debate on religion and conflict, an area of
study that is gaining increased attention. We will also develop our theoretical
argument regarding how religious dimensions of armed conflicts can be negotiated.
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Previous Research on Religion, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution
There is a growing field of research that explores the religious dimensions of conflicts. Three major important academic debates have been ongoing in this field.
The first discussion focuses on the dual role of religion as both inspiring war and
peace efforts and how this duality can be understood and explained. It has been suggested in this line of research that religious sentiments, structures, and belief-systems
can propel violence and group hatred, but that religion can also play a more benevolent role. Examples of the latter include faith-based peacemaking, ‘‘people power’’
uprisings in which religious actors take a major role, and faith-based development
initiatives. This field of research highlights and explores this dual face of religion
and discusses some of the conditions under which religion takes constructive or
destructive functions in societies.2
The second large debate within the field of religion and conflict is the discussion
focusing on the notion of a ‘‘clash of civilizations.’’3 Following Huntington’s controversial prophecy, the idea that global conflict tensions would, following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of the ideological strife of the Cold War, follow
religious (or ‘‘civilizational’’) lines, has been scrutinized through a set of empirical
studies. Most of these studies show that there is little support for Huntington’s proposition when exploring empirical trends and data.
The third significant academic debate has focused on the notion of fundamentalism, that is, more or less militant or rigid versions of religious interpretations existing
in all major religious traditions. In particular, there has been a great deal of discussion on whether or not Islam stands out in terms of fundamentalism, religious
violence, and armed conflicts.4
One thing that these three debates have in common is the notion of the nature of
religious demands and beliefs as being non-negotiable and indivisible. Appeals and
demands anchored in a religious belief system are seen as more robust, and generally
more unchangeable and rigid in comparison with other political or economic preferences. The implications of this for the resolution of conflicts have also been discussed
in the field. Hassner develops the definitions of indivisibility and argues that when
the components of indivisibility are present, such as in cases of sacred spaces, then
there are severe difficulties in making compromises.5 Building on his definition,
Svensson suggests that this would have implications for how conflicts over the role
of religion in the state can be settled.6 He finds support for this, in that religious conflicts are significantly more difficult to settle through negotiated settlement than
conflicts without an explicit religious demand in the basic incompatibility. Toft
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I. Svensson and E. Harding
argues that the extended time-horizons of conflicts with religious undertones can
account for their long duration and resilience against resolution attempts.7 Horowitz
suggests that religious motivations increased the longevity of the Crusades, beyond
what could be accounted for by material factors.8
The overall picture that emerges from this field of research is that the inflexibility
of religious demands implies that actors pursuing them will not back down but
continue to pursue them. That calls for a deeper understanding of the religious
components of the demands, and how these components can be handled.
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Preferences, Means, and Ends
The starting point for our argument is in line with previous thinking in this area:
religious demands carry a certain degree of non-negotiability to them. Yet, we question the notion that this would imply that possibilities for compromises and accommodation should necessarily be lacking. Rather, we posit that there is a possibility
for conflict resolution by taking into account the nature of religious aspirations.
Two important aspects should be underlined. First, religious demands could be
thought of as relating to ultimate demands and goals, such as the basic structure
of a society or a state. How these demands are to be settled, however, is related more
to the means and strategies. Even if religious demands are difficult to resolve and
back down from, they could be mitigated if room is created for peaceful political
procedures and channels through which such goals can be striven for, and reached.
Building on this means–ends distinction can therefore help to identify room for
accommodation even with religious demands. Second, armed conflicts are seldom
one-dimensional. Rather, when a conflict has reached the stage of organised violence
and armed confrontation, there will be many different conflicting issues that the
parties need to sort out. Moreover, parties will have different preferences over these
conflicting aspirations. Given multiple issues, of which religious goals are one, and
different preferences over the issues, there is a theoretical possibility for ‘‘horsetrading’’ or ‘‘logrolling’’ between the conflicting parties.9 Religious demands could
then be fully met, in exchange for achievements in non-religious areas. Accommodation could then be possible by ‘‘trading’’ the fulfilment of religious demands with
concessions on other dimensions. This solution assumes that there are several, not
only one, demands on the table, and that the parties rank them differently.10
We have now identified theoretical possibilities for conflict resolution of religious
dimensions, which builds on the assumption that religious aspirations can be difficult
to back down from. This study will now examine the termination patterns in order to
explore these theoretical possibilities and their empirical applicability.
Selection of Cases
This study concerns the termination patterns of armed conflicts with religious
incompatibilities. In order to study this empirically, there is a need to decide on a
definition of religious conflicts. Following previous research, a conflict has a
religious incompatibility when one of the conflict parties makes in their stated goals
a specifically religious demand that involves the nature of the state. Such demands
can have to do with concern, for example, about the religious characteristics of
the state. The demands could have to do with concern that the state, or part of
the state, should give certain preferences to one particular religion, such as Sri
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Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
137
Lanka’s constitution, in which Buddhism is given the foremost place. Another
example is demands that state policies should abide by Islamic law. This study takes
a dyad focus; therefore it could be the government that raises a religious demand,
such as in the case of Nepal, where the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M)
demanded a secular state.
In this study we have chosen to focus on the Asian region between 1989 and 2008.
We have done so for three reasons. First, Asia represents a region that has the highest
number of cases of religious armed conflict in the world. Second, Asia represents a
region with a variation in different types of religions being involved in religious conflicts, making it particularly interesting to study since the focus here is on the general
question of how to end religious conflicts. Third, the post-Cold War era has seen
more armed conflicts with religious dimensions than the time-periods before. With
such a geographical and spatial focus, the study will have a limited set of cases in
order to make an explorative, comparative study, and with reasonable variation over
religious traditions. Our cases are selected from south, central, and south east Asia.11
We have included only intrastate conflicts, as we are interested in conflicts where
there are contested incompatibilities over the nature of the state.
What we are interested in here is the termination of conflicts with religious
dimensions. Termination is an empirical phenomenon that is difficult to measure.
When can we say that an armed conflict is over? Several potential strategies are possible: when fighting stops, when issues are resolved, when the relationship is restored,
when the parties are no longer armed, etc. We employ a minimalistic definition here:
a two-year period of absence of fighting, fully recognizing that it is only one of the
ways of measuring the end of a conflict. That is, in order for a conflict to be considered terminated, battle-related deaths must number fewer than 25 per year, for
at least two years. This is also in line with some previous literature in the field.12
We utilize the Uppsala conflict databases’ definition of conflict.
This yields a set of eight conflict cases in six countries to study.13 (See Table 1).
Their background and their religious dimension will be briefly described here.
Government of Indonesia Versus the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
The conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian government is a conflict over
territory, which stems from religious and economic injustice experienced by the
Acehnese people. At the centre of the conflict was Indonesia’s promise to give Aceh
special status in return for their support of Indonesian independence in 1949.
Table 1. Selection of cases of terminated religious armed conflicts
Country
The Philippines
Indonesia
Uzbekistan
India
Nepal
Tajikistan
Incompatibility
Rebel-side
Religious dimension
Territory: Mindanao
Territory: Aceh
Government
Territory: Punjab
Government
Government
MNLF
GAM
IMU; JIG
Sikh Insurgents
CPN-M
UTO
Islamic State in Mindanao
Islamic State in Aceh
Islamic State
Sikh State in the Punjab
Secular State
Islamic State
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I. Svensson and E. Harding
However, the government almost immediately reneged on this promise.14 The desire
to preserve the Acehnese ethnic and religious identity clashed with President
Sukarno’s policies of secular nation building, and Suharto’s drive towards a centralized state.15 An important aspect of the desire for independence concerns the control
of resources. Aceh is rich in natural resources, particularly oil and gas, but little
income from these resources returns to the province and one third of the people live
below the poverty line.16 The religious aspect of the incompatibility in Aceh is the
demand for an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law.
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Government of the Philippines Versus Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
The MNLF was formed in the late 1960s as a popular revolutionary movement; they
fought for an independent Mindanao for the Moro population. The incompatibility
is based on the historical claim that Mindanao has never been a part of the
Philippines or under the control of previous colonial powers. In particular the
MNLF opposed increasing numbers of Christian settlers who were arriving at over
1,000 per week in the 1960s. This created social conflicts; in response, governmentbacked Christian militias attacked Muslim communities as part of pacification
campaigns.17 In the 1960s, 25% of Mindanao was Muslim as compared to 75%
in 1900; in 1990 they were a mere 18%.18 Furthermore, the MNLF was against
the centralising control of the government; they also resented government mining
and logging activities in Mindanao, which resulted in significant export earnings.19
The religious dimension of the conflict is that the MNLF sought an Islamic state
in Mindanao.20 This should be viewed in the context of a centralised Christian
Philippine state.
Government of Nepal Versus the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M)
Until May 2006 Nepal was formally a Hindu state. The Maoists launched an insurgency in 1996; their aim was to overthrow the constitutional monarchy and to install
a communist regime. The context behind this was Nepal’s transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy with a multiparty democracy. However,
the ruling elites were unhappy about the sharing of political and economic power
that this entailed and, consequently, the new political system was unstable and failed
to fulfil its promises. There was widespread popular disillusionment as corruption
and unemployment grew.21 The CPN-M’s goal was to get rid of what they saw as
bourgeois democracy and the feudal monarchy and to establish a people’s republic
in Nepal.22 The primary Maoist demands related to the form of government and
distribution of land. However, the demand for a secular state was central to Maoist
ideology.23
India and the Sikh Insurgents
Sikh insurgents sought an independent Sikh state. The basis of the conflict was a
power struggle between the central government who wanted to maintain control
of the Punjab’s resources and local and regional elites who represented the Sikh
population. The Sikh demand for an independent state turned violent in the
1980s due to the culmination of a number of issues. In the 1970s, there was a perception of economic deprivation by Sikhs in the Punjab, which was one of India’s
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
139
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more prosperous states. At the same time the central government failed to
respond to demands for greater devolution of power to the regional level.
Religious revivalism was popular, and the government manipulated religious identities.24 Government repression followed the storming of the Sikh Golden Temple
at Amritsar. The assassination of Indira Gandhi by a Sikh led to the widespread
massacring of Sikhs across northern India, where authorities were implicated but
failed to be prosecuted afterwards.25 The Sikh insurgents that emerged were
diverse groups, united by their claim to be fighting for an independent Sikh homeland. In particular, the Sikh insurgents sought an independent homeland based on
the Sikh religious identity, or more religious and political autonomy. The demand
for an independent state was put forward in religious terms, in the call for an
independent Khalistan.
Government of Tajikistan Versus the United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
Tajikistan declared independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991. Despite Soviet relocations earlier in the century, Tajikistan has strong
regional identities. These regional divisions became the basis for political factions.26 Civil war broke out in 1992 after several demonstrations brought to power
a coalition of liberal Islamic pro-democracy groups from the eastern part of the
country; this coalition was forced out later that year by armed groups from the
south.27 While parties were organized around nationalist identities, the war was
essentially a struggle by powerful clans for power over the emerging state. The
Islamic Renaissance Party, which later joined other groups to become the UTO,
wanted Tajikistan to be formed around an Islamic religious and cultural identity.28
The IRP emerged out of an Islamic revival that began in the 1970s among Soviet
Muslims.
Government of Uzbekistan Versus the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and
the Islamic Jihad Group (JIG)
The goals of the IMU were to fight government oppression in Uzbekistan, oust
Uzbek dictator President Karimov, and install an Islamic state.29 Following a
government crackdown on Islamic militants in the Fergana Valley in 1992, many
Islamic activists fled to Afghanistan and Tajikistan and formed alliances with the
UTO. Following peace negotiations in Tajikistan in 1997, groups of Ferghana
Salafis formed the IMU and began launching attacks and taking hostages, mostly
in Uzbekistan. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Salafis had begun organizing in the Ferghana Valley, calling for the adoption of Sharia law and the creation of
an Islamic state.30
The JIG or ‘‘Jamaat’’ goal was the same as that of the IMU: to overthrow the
secular Uzbek government and install Islamic rule. Breakaway fighters from the
IMU formed the JIG, which in 2005 changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU). Following attacks in Afghanistan in 2001, the IMU lost key leaders and
was severely weakened. The new leader, Yuldashev, joined the Global Jihad Movement; however, others in the IMU wanted to continue focusing on Uzbekistan. In
2002, the IMU Shura Council agreed not to resume activities in Uzbekistan until
a later date; others disagreed, breaking away to form the JIG.31
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I. Svensson and E. Harding
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we will briefly describe the contested religious incompatibility of each
case, with our main focus being to describe the end-dynamics of the cases with
religious incompatibility. Finally, we will summarize our results.
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Government of Indonesia Versus the GAM: Termination Pattern
The Indonesian government and the GAM signed a peace agreement in August 2005,
which marked the end of the conflict. Following the 2004 Tsunami that devastated
Aceh, the GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire. The Tsunami changed the dynamics
of the conflict and led to the Helsinki peace talks. Both the GAM and the Indonesian
Government were under pressure from international donors who promised largescale reconstruction relief that would not be provided without security and stability.32
However, the Tsunami provided impetus to a process that was already well underway.
Circumstances had changed since the failed peace agreement of 2003 and the
instigation of martial law in Aceh. By 2004, the Indonesian National Armed Forces
(TNI) were unable to defeat the GAM through military operations in Aceh. However, the GAM was significantly weakened by sustained attacks against it, its civilian
support structure had collapsed, and it had lost considerable financial and logistical
support.33 The GAM was at risk of marginalisation, especially given the further
weakening effects the Tsunami had on the GAM. However, entering into negotiations with the Indonesian Government put the GAM back at the centre of both
the peace process and reconstruction efforts.
By 2004, Indonesian government officials led by Vice-President Kalla were
already secretly reaching out to local GAM leaders and to the Swedish-based leadership to explore economic and political options for ending the conflict.34 It was at
this point that the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) led by former Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari was brought into negotiations.35 The CMI was critical
in breaking deadlocks and reaching consensus at key points in the negotiations.36
Critically, they operated from the premise that ‘‘nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed.’’37 This meant that the incorporation of a political settlement was a central
aspect of the peace accords, in contrast to the step-by-step process of the previous
mediators. The Government of Indonesia granted Aceh the right to implement
Sharia law in 1999, but conflict over issues of independence continued.
Government of the Philippines Versus MNLF: Termination Pattern
The conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government of the Philippines dropped beneath 25 battle-related deaths in 1989 for two
years before escalating. What most likely accounts for this drop in battle-related
deaths is that armed struggle by the MNLF was occurring on a much smaller scale.
MNLF power and influence was waning.38 By the end of the 1970s the MNLF was
in decline; they were active politically, but military troops were in disarray.39
In 1992, numbers of battle-related deaths dropped again and have remained
under 25 since then. Negotiations between the MNLF and the Ramos government
began in 1992. This and the declining influence of the MNLF can account for the
drop in battle-related deaths from 1992 onwards. Negotiations culminated in the
signing of a peace agreement in 1996.
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Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
141
Negotiations and the consequent peace agreement were possible because of
changed political conditions within the Philippine government, the influence of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) on the negotiations, and the continued
weakening of the MNLF itself. By the 1990s democracy in the Philippines was
stabilizing, and the government had cemented its control over the army.40 This
increased trust between the two parties. The OIC, and Libya and Indonesia in particular played important roles as mediators. Whilst the OIC had supported the Moro
cause since the 1970s, their interest was in some kind of settlement with the
Philippine government. Consequently, they played a key role, keeping the parties
at the negotiating table when talks broke down and bargaining separately with parties over contentious issues. The OIC convinced the MNLF to drop their demand for
independence and accept autonomy.41
The agreement did not lead to a full peaceful settlement of the conflicts. When
the MNLF signed the 1996 peace agreement, another group, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) was not involved in the negotiations, but declared that
it would not stand in the way of peace. Whilst symptomatic of similar issues and
problems, the MNLF and the MILF are essentially different conflicts and it would
be a mistake to view one as the continuation of the other. Both groups have used
similar platforms such as Islam, nationalism, and independence to gain support
for their causes.42 The MILF has since declared that it will continue to fight for
an ‘‘independent Islamic state.’’43 Importantly, the division between the two groups
follows ethnic lines. The MNLF gets the majority of its support from the Tausug
Muslims, in western Mindanao in the areas populated by Bangsamoro people such
as Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Norte to Zamboanga, Basilan, and Palawan.
Historically, these were mostly followers and territories of the Sulu Sultanate.44
Whereas the MILF gets support from the Maguindanao in the Maguindanao province, the Maranao and Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and Zamboanga provinces,
historically the territories of the Maguindanao Sultanate.45
It is important to note that according to this analysis, the reaction against the
peace agreement was not against its way of regulating religious issues, but due to
other reasons. Bertrand outlines some weakness with the 1996 peace agreement,
which are instructive of this issue:
First the traditional structures of autonomy have failed to provide a good
test for future autonomous institutions because of mismanagement and
corruption. Nur Misuari and the MNLF leadership failed to show that
their control of autonomous institutions could benefit all Muslims and
non-Muslims in a new autonomous region. Second, and partly as a result
of the first reason, these structures received little support from groups
other than the MNLF because of the mainly Tausug base of the MNLF
and the failure to involve non-Muslims of Mindanao in the peace negotiations. As a result, the current autonomy proposal is not perceived to be
an adequate solution for all groups, including non-Tausug Muslims supporting the rival Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).46
Government of Nepal Versus the CPN-M: Termination Patterns
On November 21 2006, Prime Minister Koirala signed a peace agreement with the
CPN-M. Whilst the Government and the CPN-M held peace negotiations in 2001
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I. Svensson and E. Harding
and 2003, these both failed. By 2003, the conflict was moving towards a violent
stalemate.47 Early in the conflict, the Nepalese government was able to capitalise
on international anti-terrorism sentiment to garner international support. The
UK, India, and the USA provided significant military support, often framed as part
of the ‘‘global war on terror.’’48 However, on February 1 2005, the King dissolved
parliament and imposed direct rule, which was met with international condemnation,49 and led the USA and India to withdraw military aid.50 Following the imposition of direct rule, the CPN-M formed an alliance with other opposition political
parties, culminating in the signing of a twelve-point agreement on November 19
between the CPN-M and the Seven Party Alliance.51
On April 5, 2006, a general strike was called, feeding on widespread civilian and
political opposition to the increasingly authoritarian government, along with
CPN-M blockades. Consequently, on April 24, 2006, the King of Nepal relinquished
power in the face of protests and reinstated the House of Representatives. Power was
handed over to a multiparty government in April and the new Prime Minister
Koirala was sworn in. After declaring a three-month unilateral truce, talks began
in June between the Maoists, Koirala, and the Seven Party Alliance. An eight-point
agreement was signed and on November 21 representatives from both sides signed a
peace agreement.52
India and the Sikh Insurgents: Termination Patterns
Battle-related deaths for the conflict between the Indian Government and Sikh insurgents in the Punjab dropped beneath 25 in 1994. The significant drop in numbers of
battle deaths is the result of police, paramilitary, and Indian army successes against
Sikh militants53 as well as the loss or toning down of support for the Sikh militants
by civilians and Pakistan.
The Punjab Police and paramilitary forces, backed by the Indian army, were
involved in a brutal campaign of state terror and counter-insurgency directed primarily against Sikh militants, but inevitably targeting the so-called civilian support
base. Government security forces were granted extraordinary discretionary powers.54
The amendment of the constitution in 1988 essentially allowed for the suspension of
civil liberties.55 Police acted with impunity, lacking any legal or democratic accountability.56 Government strategy was characterised by extra-judicial killings, torture,
and anonymous arrests.57 Violence continued to escalate towards the end of the
1980s and peaked in late 1990 with over 4000 dead.58
By the late 1980s the Sikh insurgent movement was very active, but was also
fractured and disorganised. Insurgents had lost their ideological coherence beyond
separation with India, and many militant groups had degenerated into little more
than criminal gangs. Public support for the militants hit an all-time low by 1991,
as militants and criminal gangs targeted civilians.59 This resulted in an increase in
the flow of intelligence to police, which in turn facilitated the infiltration of militant
groups by police.60 Between July and September 1992 the police took apart the entire
militant structure and killed nearly all the militant leaders.61
By 1993, the majority of the Sikh militant leadership was either dead or had fled
to Pakistan. Whilst many militant leaders did survive the 1992 crackdown and had
the capacity to pose a viable threat, increased international pressure and growing
problems at home meant Pakistan had reined in its material and logistical support
for the militants.62
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
143
Government of Tajikistan Versus the UTO: Termination Patterns
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A peace agreement was signed between the Tajik government and the UTO in 1997
after three years of UN-negotiated peace talks. During this time, fighting was
ongoing between the two sides until late 1996.63 A number of factors pushed both
parties towards negotiations. In 1995 the Tajik economy collapsed, at a time when
the government was dependent on Russian aid.64 However, Russian policy shifted
from unconditional support of the government to pushing for talks with the UTO.
The Kazak and Uzbek governments shifted their policy towards Rakhmonov in a
similar direction. There were also internal challenges to the Kulobi clan’s dominance
from non-UTO forces.65 By 1996 a stalemate was developing as both realized neither
was strong enough to defeat the other.66
Government of Uzbekistan Versus the IMU and the JIG: Termination Patterns
The IMU was responsible for the 1999 series of bombings in Tashkent. From their
bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan the IMU had launched other attacks in 2000
and 2001,67 mainly focusing on the Fergana Valley, parts of which belong to Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan respectively. Analysts suggest that the rise of the IMU as
one of the most powerful groups in Central Asia and consequent violence should be
seen in direct relation to the repressive polices of the Karimov government, whose
repressive response to Islamic fundamentalists has seen the arrest of hundreds of civilians, the closure of mosques, and the introduction of laws particularly targeting the
organization of Muslim groups. The IMU has forged close links with the Taliban
and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.68 However, the U.S.-led military campaign in
Afghanistan in 2001 allegedly destroyed IMU infrastructure and capacity.69 Allegedly,
following this series of events many IMU fighters joined the Taliban and are fighting in
Afghanistan.70
Former IMU members founded the JIG. The JIG launched a series of attacks in
Tashkent, in late March 2004. On March 29 they launched two attacks, one against
police checkpoints and in the other, two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the
compound of the Chorsu Bazaar.71 On March 30, additional attacks took place: JIG
members were stopped from entering Tashkent, and one JIG member blew his=
herself up and the others engaged in a shoot-out with security forces. In the following days a bus was blown up and another suicide bomber blew himself up. In total
about 47 people were killed including 33 JIG fighters and ten police. It is thought the
JIG leader, along with three civilians, was killed. Fifteen JIG members were arrested.
On April 3 JIG claimed responsibility for the attacks via the internet.72 Following
the crackdown, the JIG appears to have been defeated73 as there have been no
further attacks. Security forces, presumably police, are responsible for their defeat.
Because there have been no further attacks the conflict is considered terminated.
However there are suggestions the JIG have changed their name to the Islamic Jihad
Union (IJU) and are operating out of Pakistan.74
Ending Holy Wars: Summarizing the Results
In three of the cases, conflict actors achieved their religious goals. (See Table 2). In
Indonesia the GAM was granted significant concessions regarding the religious
aspect of the conflict. As early as 2001, Aceh had been granted ‘‘special autonomy.’’
144
I. Svensson and E. Harding
Table 2. Outcomes of conflicts with religious dimensions
Conflict termination
patterns
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Indonesia, GAM
Philippines, MNLF (2)
India, Sikhs
Nepal, CPN-M
Tajikistan, UTO
Uzbekistan, IMU
Uzbekistan, JIG
Were religious Horse Political Rebel Government
goals achieved? trading process victory
victory
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Though not without serious flaws, an important aspect of ‘‘special autonomy’’
authorized the implementation of Islamic Law. Despite this the conflict continued
over other issues. But the political process of negotiating an end to the conflict
required both the Indonesian Government and the GAM to make considerable political concessions. GAM relinquished its goal of independence and the Indonesian
government overruled both its parliament and military leaders who feared that a
settlement with the GAM would end in the separation of Aceh from Indonesia.75
In Mindanao, special autonomy was vague on important aspects of Islamic Law.
The agreement did not stipulate how Islamic law would be implemented, enforced, or
codified, or how civil law would operate in relation to it.76 However, according to the
1996 Peace Accord, in principle the MNLF did not compromise over their religious
demands. The new government would oversee its own regional security forces;
Islamic education would be included in the curriculum whilst Islamic schools would
be incorporated into other schools; and the government could set up Sharia courts.77
The MNLF did make concessions regarding their territorial demands. In the
1996 peace agreement, the Ramos government agreed in principle to a larger autonomous region in Mindanao. Based on the Tripoli agreement it would accept the
autonomy of the 14 provinces. The agreement laid out a clear process by which
the provinces could accede.78 Following active development of the areas, a Plebiscite
would be held in three years to see which provinces would like to join an enlarged
autonomous region for Muslims.79 A new government over these areas would have
representation in national government, including the Security Council and cabinet.80
Consequently, many of the MNLF leadership were incorporated into the government, or became elected local government officials.81
Overall the CPN-N modified its stance but did not compromise on its religious
demands. The alliance between the seven parties and the CPN-M was only possible
because the Maoists changed=modified their goals. The Maoists had revised their ideological framework in the late 1990s and moved towards a more moderate, pragmatic,
and compromising position.82 Interestingly, however, they did not compromise on
religious aspects, such as abolishing the monarchy. When the Seven Party Alliance
gained power in May 2006 (which was acceded to them by the King after mass protests
in April), they declared Nepal a secular state. This, amongst other moves, helped pave
the way for the negotiations and eventual peace agreement in November.
The Sikhs, the IMU, and the JIG did not compromise over their religious
demands, however nor did they achieve their goals. None of these groups entered
Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
145
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into any significant political process with their respective governments, instead opting for violent conflict in an attempt to achieve their demands. In the case of the
Sikhs, they did not achieve a ‘‘Sikh’’ state and were instead defeated by police action.
In the cases of the IMU and the JIG neither party achieved an Islamic state or
Caliphate, and both are considered defeated and have not since reached the level
of 25 battle-related deaths.
The UTO entered into negotiations with the Tajik government which resulted
in a peace agreement. While the UTO has not achieved its goal of establishing an
Islamic Caliphate, it has not given up this goal. The UTO has compromised over
the means of achieving its goals; instead of trying to impose an Islamic state through
force, it is pursuing this through political processes. An important step towards
this is that the UTO has fought successfully to have Islamic parties legalized in
Tajikistan.
Concluding Discussion
This study has set out to explore the role of religion in peace and conflict processes.
In particular, it has tried to answer an empirical puzzle arising from the fact that
even though religious aspirations seem to make conflict unsolvable, there are many
religious conflicts that have, in fact, ended. Identifying religious conflicts as multidimensional and religious aspirations as goal-focused, the study has established a
space for conflict resolution that does not require concessions on core beliefs.
What is significant about the empirical findings is that in none of the cases did a
conflict group compromise over their stated religious goals. This matches conventional wisdom, which suggests that conflicts of a religious nature are more intractable and inflexible. Yet, this research has shown that while religious demands are
indivisible for the groups pursuing them, there are other aspects to the demands
of the conflict group which are up for negotiation. In four out of the five cases where
peace agreements were reached, parties compromised over other issues such as independence, political participation, etc. This suggests that religious demands can be
separated from other demands and consequently negotiated as one set of demands
amongst many.
Moreover, our research presents some interesting findings regarding the process
through which the conflicts were brought to an end. Political processes are by far the
most common way of ending religious conflicts. Our research has found that in five
of the eight cases, conflicts ended by political processes such as peace agreements. In
the other three cases, governments achieved victory through police action and
military action. There were no examples of rebel groups achieving an all- out victory
over the government.
One important finding in regard to the settlement of religious disputes is the role
of territory. The examples we have explored show that those who achieved their
religious goals did so in the context of special autonomy (Indonesia, Philippines)—
that these religious groups occupy a particular territory and that their populations
can theoretically be more easily separated from the rest of the country. What about
in cases where this is not possible? Several of these groups (IMU, JIG, UTO) want a
specifically religious state (which would include everyone). Essentially, giving in to
these particular religious demands would require parts of society (Indonesia,
Philippines) or society as a whole (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) to live by different
religious rules. This is not a situation where religious diversity is accepted under a
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146
I. Svensson and E. Harding
secular state. This is problematic for a state when a country contains significant
religious or other minority groups, basically because there is the danger of special
treatment=discrimination=exclusion of ‘‘different’’ groups by the state.
There is an interesting variation in our cases that may merit further exploration. The peace agreement in the Philippines was partial and did not bring
about a peaceful settlement of the conflict, whereas the agreement in Indonesia
did. One reason for this may be that agreements may be easier to reach in countries where both the government and the conflict parties belong to the same
religious group, such as the Indonesia GAM case, where the Indonesian state
and the GAM share the same religious tradition (Islam). Agreements may be
more difficult in cases like the Philippine MNLF case, where the Philippine
government is Christian-dominated and the MNLF is based in a predominately
Muslim area.83 Further research should explore the complexities of regulation
of religious issues in light of different minority-majority relationships.
This research opens up new avenues for further research on the role of religion in
peace and conflict processes. This study has examined contemporary Asian cases.
Future research needs to expand the empirical domain, both temporal and spatial,
in order to get a broader picture of the end dynamics of religious dimensions.
Another important discussion is to explore the potential dilemma between settlement of religious conflicts and religious liberties. There is a risk that ending religious
conflicts by giving in to religious aspirations may create negative externalities, such
as for example decreased room for women’s human rights in a society. Moreover,
many states have a multitude of ethnic and religious diversity within them—so to
give in to religious demands could in some cases induce conflict. This may be a manifestation of the classical dilemma between justice and peace, played out in the
discussion about religion and conflict.
Notes
1. Michael C. Horowitz, ‘‘Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading,’’
International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 162–193. Monica Duffy Toft, ‘‘Issue Indivisibility and
Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War,’’ Security Studies 15, no. 1 (2006): 34–69.
Ron E. Hassner, ‘‘ ‘To Halve and to Hold’: Conflict over Sacred Space and the Problem of
Indivisibility,’’ Security Studies 12, no. 4 (2003): 1–33. Isak Svensson, ‘‘Fighting with Faith:
Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6
(2007): 930–949. Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion:
The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2003).
2. David Little, ‘‘Religious Militancy,’’ in Managing Global Chaos, eds. Chester
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1996). Marc Gopin, ‘‘Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution,’’ Peace &
Change 22, no. 1 (1997): 1–20. Luc Reychler, ‘‘Religion and Conflict,’’ The International Journal of Peace Studies 2, no. 1 (1997): 1–17. R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred:
Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). Marc Gopin,
Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, ‘‘Does
Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict,’’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–674. Almond,
Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (see note
1 above). Daniel Philpott, ‘‘Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion,’’ (2007). John
Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God Is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith Is Changing the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).
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Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
147
3. P. Samuel Huntington, ‘‘The Clash of Civilizations?’’ Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993):
22–49. P. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(Sydney: Free Press, 1996). P. Samuel Huntington, ‘‘Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal
& Cox,’’ Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 609–610. John R. Oneal and Bruce M.
Russett, ‘‘A Response to Huntington,’’ Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 611–
612. Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, ‘‘Clash of Civilisations, or
Realism and Liberalism Dèjà Vu? Some Evidence,’’ Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5
(2000): 583–608. Giacomo Chiozza, ‘‘Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946–97,’’ Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6
(2002): 711–734. Philip G. Roeder, ‘‘Clash of Civilisations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts,’’ Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 5 (2003): 509–540. Isak Svensson
and David Rangdrol, ‘‘Demos or Deus: Patterns of Religious Dimensions in Asian Armed
Conflicts, 1945–2005,’’ in The Democratization Project: Challenges and Opportunities, eds.
Ashok Swain, Joakim Öjendal, and Ramses Amer (London: Anthem Press, 2009), 67–86.
4. Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby, ‘‘Explaining Fundamentalisms,’’ in Fundamentalisms Comprehended, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 425–444. Mark Juergensmeyer,
‘‘The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism,’’ Journal of International Affairs 50, no. 1
(1996): 1–20. Jonathan Fox, ‘‘Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West,’’
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 4 (2001): 459–472. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?:
The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins,
2002). Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around
the World (see note 1 above). Jonathan Fox, ‘‘Are Some Religions More Conflict-Prone Than
Others?,’’ Jewish Political Studies Review 16 (2004): 1–2. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim
Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2004). Indra de Soysa and Ragnhild Nordås, ‘‘Islam’s Bloody Innards? Religion and Political
Terror, 1980–2000,’’ International Studies Quarterly 51 (2007): 927–943. Ted Robert Gurr,
‘‘Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century,’’ in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester
A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 131–160. Monica Duffy Toft, ‘‘Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case
of Islam and Civil War,’’ International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 97–131. Juan Ricardo Cole,
Engaging the Muslim World, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
5. Hassner, ‘‘ ‘To Halve and to Hold’: Conflict over Sacred Space and the Problem of
Indivisibility’’ (see note 1 above).
6. Svensson, ‘‘Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars’’ (see
note 1 above).
7. Toft, ‘‘Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War’’
(see note 1 above).
8. Horowitz, ‘‘Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading’’ (see note 1
above).
9. Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and
Settlement, Third Edition (Boston: McGrawHill, 2004). Peter Wallensteen, Understanding
Conflict Resolution, 2nd Edition (London: SAGE Publications, 2007).
10. Pruitt and Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, Third Edition
(see note 9 above).
11. These areas include the former Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan,
Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, China, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines.
12. Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate
Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
13. The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) demanded an independent
Christian state in the province of Tripura in India. However, the research surrounding the
termination of the conflict in 2006 is too vague to conduct a useful analysis.
14. K. E. Schulze, Between Conflict and Peace: Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction in Aceh
(London: London School of Economics, 2005), http://w.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/publications/
humansecurityreport/tsunami/aceh%20tsunami%20response.pdf
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148
I. Svensson and E. Harding
15. ICG, ‘‘Aceh Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?’’ ICG Asia Report 18 (2001): 1–30.
16. Ibid.: 5.
17. A. S. M. Lingga, Negotiating Peace in Mindanao (Cotabato, Philippines: Institute of
Bangsamoro Studies, 2007), 2.
18. NG Quimpo, ‘‘Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in
the Southern Philippines,’’ Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (2001): 271–289.
19. S. Schiavo-Campo and M. Judd, ‘‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots,
Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend,’’ Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction, Paper No. 24 (2005): 1.
20. Quimpo, ‘‘Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the
Southern Philippines,’’ 276 (see note 16 above).
21. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal (New Delhi: Adroit
Publishers, 2006), 26.
22. W. Gobyn, ‘‘From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’s Strategic and Ideological
Thinking,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 5 (2009): 420.
23. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal (New Delhi: Adroit
Publishers, 2006), 39.
24. Meredith Weiss, ‘‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’’ (New York: The Macmillan
Centre, Yale University 2002), 1.
25. AsiaWatch, Ensaaf, http://www.ensaaf.org/publications/other/HRW-Punjabin
Crisis.pdf
26. Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia, Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry and
Radical Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 42.
27. R. G. Smith, ‘‘Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,’’ Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2
(1999): 244.
28. D. Lynch, ‘‘The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,’’ Civil Wars 4, no. 4 (2001): 54.
29. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2002), 148.
30. Vitaly V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia, between Pen and Rifle (New York:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 38.
31. Ronald Sandee, ‘‘The Islamic Jihad Union (Iju),’’ NEFA Foundation, http://docs.
google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:2qrepvsxPPkJ:www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/
FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf+nefa+IJU&hl=en&gl=nz&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShA0r
NyQ-6cho0IsWz_f4hjcfT1pzbxMmvcMtUTIRTKmezRLjZI7DjRv2iSlOI5WDMeaHE5lD
62r5lYhHfNTYeQ_nDhRhwzvP0H8XhMMeubb75sF-9–VG4Soi5Bm7ICEDpBxrJ&sig=
AHIEtbSNxThpFNrRuuPea9IIPOFU_btDFw
32. ‘‘Aceh’s Peace Agreement,’’ Strategic Comments 11, no. 7 (2005): 2.
33. Schulze, ‘‘Between Conflict and Peace: Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction in Aceh,’’ 23
(see note 12 above).
34. Ibid.: 25.
35. International Crisis Group (ICG), Aceh: A New Chance for Peace (Conciliation
Resources, 2005), http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/aceh/journey.php
36. Ibid., 4. Konrad Huber, ‘‘Aceh’s Arduous Journey to Peace.’’
37. Huber, ‘‘Aceh’s Arduous Journey to Peace’’ (see note 34 above).
38. Schiavo-Campo and Judd, ‘‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs,
and Potential Peace Dividend,’’ 3 (see note 17 above).
39. J. Bertrand, ‘‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace
Agreement Is Fragile,’’ Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia 73, no. 1 (2000): 41.
40. Ibid.
41. Lingga, ‘‘Negotiating Peace in Mindanao,’’ 6 (see note 15 above).
42. Soliman M Santos Jr, Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front, (Human
Development Network Foundation, Inc. For the Philippine Human Development Report,
2005), http://www.hd.org.ph
43. Quimpo, ‘‘Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the
Southern Philippines’’ (see note 16 above).
44. Jamail A. Kamlian, ‘‘Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A
Discourse on Self-Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution,’’ in Islam
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Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions
149
and Human Rights Fellow Lecture (Atlanta, GA: Islam and Human Rights Project, School of
Law, Emory University 2003).
45. Ibid. Bertrand, ‘‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace
Agreement Is Fragile’’ (see note 37 above).
46. Bertrand, ‘‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace
Agreement Is Fragile’’ (see note 37 above).
47. Gobyn, ‘‘From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’s Strategic and Ideological
Thinking,’’ 428 (see note 20 above).
48. Ibid.: 424.
49. NepalNews.com, ‘‘Chronology of a Decade Long Conflict,’’ (2006).
50. Gobyn, ‘‘From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’s Strategic and Ideological
Thinking,’’ 431 (see note 20 above).
51. NepalNews.com, ‘‘Chronology of a Decade Long Conflict.’’
52. Ibid.
53. GlobalSecurity.org, ‘‘Sikhs in Punjab,’’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/sikh.htm
54. Weiss, ‘‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab,’’ 14 (see note 22 above).
55. Nirvikar Singh, Cultural Conflict in India: Punjab and Kashmir (Berkeley, CA: GAIA
Research Series, 1998), 331.
56. K. S. Dhillon, Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978–1993 (New Delhi:
Penguin Books, 2006), 345.
57. Weiss, ‘‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab,’’ 14 (see note 22 above).
58. Dhillon, Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978–1993, 338 (see note 54
above). AsiaWatch.
59. Weiss, ‘‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab,’’ 14 (see note 22 above).
60. Dhillon, Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978–1993, 344 (see note 54 above).
61. Ibid., 343.
62. Ibid., 344.
63. Smith, ‘‘Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,’’ 244 (see note 25 above).
64. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 104 (see note 27 above).
65. Lynch, ‘‘The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,’’ 59 (see note 26 above).
66. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 104 (see note 27 above).
67. Ibid., 8.
68. Ibid., 85.
69. International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘‘Central Asia: Islam and the State,’’ Asia Report
no. 59 (2003): 4.
70. S. R. Bowers, B. Musayev, and S. A. Samson, ‘‘The Islamic Threat to Eastern Central
Asia,’’ Journal of Social Political and Economic Studies 31, no. 4 (2006): 375–397.
71. Sandee, ‘‘The Islamic Jihad Union (Iju)’’ (see note 29 above).
72. Ibid.
73. L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions,
1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 626.
74. Sandee, ‘‘The Islamic Jihad Union (Iju)’’ (see note 29 above).
75. ‘‘ ‘Aceh’s Peace Agreement,’ Strategic Comments,’’ http://dx.org/10.1080/
1356788051174
76. International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘‘A Fragile Peace’’ (2003).
77. Bertrand, ‘‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace
Agreement Is Fragile,’’ 42 (see note 37 above).
78. Ibid.: 40.
79. S. Schiavo-Campo and M. Judd, ‘‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots,
Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend’’ (see note 17 above).
80. S. D. Russell et al., ‘‘The Mindanao Conflict and Prospects for Peace in the Southern
Philippines’’ (2004): 4.
81. Schiavo-Campo and Judd, ‘‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs,
and Potential Peace Dividend,’’ 3 (see note 17 above).
82. Gobyn, ‘‘From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’s Strategic and Ideological
Thinking,’’ 428 (see note 20 above).
83. We thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.