DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union STUDY
Abstract
The study presents a qualitative analysis of the linkages between
Organised Crime (OC) and terrorism with specific reference to the
European Union. A conceptual basis of the links between OC and
terrorism is outlined, and systematically used to identify how these two
phenomena come together in the European theatre. The study also
considers developments regarding the relationship between OC and
terrorism in regions outside the E.U., that have a direct impact on how
the nexus is evolving in E.U. member-states. It reveals that certain
linkages between OC and terrorism exist in the E.U. Trends suggest that
these linkages will continue to develop. The study concludes by
assessing the impact of OC-terrorism linkages on the E.U., and providing
recommendations on how to address it. It points out that the effective
fight against OC and terrorism depends on an integrated approach that
involves all stakeholders at both national and E.U. levels.
PE 462.503
EN This document was requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs.
AUTHOR
West Sands Advisory LLP
Project lead: Dr. Tamara Makarenko
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR
Mr. Andreas Hartmann
Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs
European Parliament
B-1047 Brussels
Email: [email protected]
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to:
[email protected]
Manuscript completed in October 2012.
© European Parliament, Brussels, 2012.
This document is available on the Internet at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
5
LIST OF FIGURES
7
LIST OF TABLES
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
8
1
2
3
4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
14
1.1 The Current OC/Terrorism Threat Environment
14 1.2 Identifying Linkages between OC & Terrorism: A Primer
15 1.2.1
Modelling the Nexus
16 1.2.2
Regional Idiosyncrasies
17
1.2.3
The Nexus in Europe – A Model Based on Terrorist Typologies?
19 CASE STUDY: ALLIANCES
20
2.1 Defining Characteristics
21
2.2 Background
21 2.3 Current Situation: Illustrative Case Studies
24 2.3.1
Internal E.U. Dynamics
24 2.3.2
The Balkan Theatre
25
2.3.3
Caucasian OC as a Terrorist Facilitator
25 2.3.4
AQIM & Other Militant Islamist European Operations
26 2.3.5
Single-Issue Terrorism
27
2.3.6
Current status in Europe
28 2.4 Greece – a new staging ground?
29 CASE STUDY: APPROPRIATION / INTEGRATION
30
3.1 Defining Characteristics
30
3.2 Background
30 3.3 Current Situation: Illustrative Case Studies
31 3.3.1
Terrorist Use of OC: Ethno-Nationalist Groups
31 3.3.2
Terrorist Use of OC: E.U.-based Militant Islamist Groups
32 3.3.3
Terrorist Use of OC: Externally-based Militant Islamist Groups
33 3.3.4
Criminal use of Terror Tactics
34 CASE STUDY: HYBRIDS
36
4.1 Defining Characteristics & Background
36 4.2 Indicative Case Studies
37 4.2.1
Criminal-terrorist Hybrids
37
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4.2.2
5
6
Terrorist-criminal Hybrids
37
CASE STUDY: TRANSFORMATIONS
38
5.1 Defining Characteristics
38
5.2 Illustrative Case Studies
38 IMPACT ON THE E.U. & RECOMMENDATIONS
40
6.1 Evolving ‘Nexus’ Capabilities
40 6.2 Impact on the Legal Economy & Financial Systems
41 6.3 Impact on Public Administration
42 6.4 Recommendations
43 ANNEX A: MILITANT ISLAMIST NEXUS PROFILES
45
ANNEX B: CASE STUDY – ALBANIAN OC
47
ANNEX C: CASE STUDY - PKK
50
ANNEX D: TERRORIST USE OF OC (INDICATIVE GLOBAL EXAMPLES)
53
ANNEX E: OC LINKAGES TO TERRORISM
57
ANNEX F: THE NEXUS AND E.U. THREATS
58
BIBLIOGRAPHY
59
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AfPak Afghanistan and Pakistan ALF Animal Liberation Front AQ Al-Qaeda AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb BH Bosnia Herzegovina CoE Council of Europe CRS Congressional Research Service ELF Environmental Liberation Front E.U. European Union ETA Euzkadi ta Askatasuna
DHKP-C Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/ Cephesi
FARC Fuerzas Armada Revolucionaries de Colombia
FLNC Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GIA Groupe Islamique Armé GICM Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour le Combat
INLA Irish National Liberation Army
IRA Irish Republican Army
K&R Kidnap and Ransom KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KYC Know Your Client
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LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LVG Loyalist Volunteer Force MEK Mujahideen-e-Khalq N17 Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri NIPR Nuclei di Iniziativa Proletaria Rivoluzionaria
OC Organised Crime OCG Organised Crime Group
OCTA Organised Crime Threat Assessment PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SCDEA Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency
SHAC Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty
SIT Single-issue Terrorism
TE-SAT Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TNP Turkish National Police
U.K. United Kingdom
UCPMB Liberation Army of Presevo, Medcedja, and Bujanovac
UDA Ulster Defence Association
UVF Ulster Volunteer Force
RAF Red Army Faction
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Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The Original Crime-Terror Nexus Model
16 Figure 2: Refined Nexus Model
17 Figure 3: Geographic Proclivities of the Nexus
18 Figure 4: The E.U. Nexus by Terrorist Typology
20 LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Nexus Alliances in Europe, 2000-2010
22 Table 2: Terrorist use of Crime
31 Table 3: Criminal use of Terror Tactics
35 Table 4: Hybrid Entities
36 Table 5: Transformations
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
The 2011 European Parliament report on organised crime in the European Union, Europol’s
EU Terrorism and Trend Report (TE-SAT 2012) and the Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(OCTA) highlight that organised crime (OC) and terrorist groups, and the threats they pose,
are diverse in nature. Furthermore, these reports acknowledge these phenomena as
complex, and more often than not, multinational.
These reports also specifically refer to linkages between organised crime and terrorism, but
the nature or extent of these ties is not addressed. Despite drawing conclusions such as:
“connections between terrorist, violent extremist and organised crime networks may
become more blurred… In some cases the individuals who are engaged in terrorism or
violent extremism are also involved in organised crime activities” (TE-SAT) and more
specific conclusions such as there are “possible links between cocaine trafficking and
terrorist activity” and there is a possibility that “channels for illegal immigration will be used
increasingly by those seeking to engage in terrorist activity in the E.U.” (OCTA), these
assessments do not identify definitive trends regarding links between organised crime and
terrorism.
This analytical shortfall provokes two possible inferences. The first is that the links between
these two phenomena is relatively insignificant, and thus undeserving of any greater
evaluation. Second, due to the compartmentalised nature of anti-crime and counter­
terrorism strategies by nation-states, linkages have been overlooked or unreported. Based
on on-going assessments of observed and perceived linkages between OC and terrorism
over the last decade, the later inference appears to be the more accurate.
There is ample global evidence that ties between OC and terrorism - referred to in this
briefing as the crime-terror nexus - exist. Annex D outlines the jurisdictions in which such
ties have been historically present. What is apparent from this table, however, is that
linkages between OC and terrorism predominantly operate and thrive in areas of instability.
To argue that the nexus operates on a variety of levels in countries such as Afghanistan,
Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone is not the greatest revelation. The same can
be concluded in jurisdictions (once) located along Europe’s periphery, where instability in
regions such as the Balkans and the Caucasus has witnessed a blurring between criminal
and terrorist operations.
Given the relative political stability that dominates throughout the European Union (E.U.), a
suggestion that a nexus operates within E.U. member states has provoked a degree of
academic scepticism. This scepticism generally promotes the argument that it would run
against the interests of established organised crime groups (OCGs) to cooperate with
terrorist entities because the core motivation of terrorism is to disrupt and significantly
alter the very environment in which European-based OCGs know how to operate.
Furthermore, any linkages between OC and terrorism would significantly increase the
vulnerability of OCGs to the authorities.
Although the premise behind this scepticism is logical, evidence that has come to the fore
over the last decade indicates that the E.U. is no longer unaffected by linkages between OC
and terrorism. In fact, both OCG and terrorist groups have learned to adapt their
operations to limit their vulnerability to the detection of law enforcement and security
services, whilst benefiting from a variety of organisational and operational linkages.
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Although open source case studies are hard to pinpoint, a number of indicative examples
have been ascertained from field research and discussions with the security services and
law enforcement of various countries – both within the E.U. and on Europe’s periphery.
Asking whether a crime-terror nexus operates in the E.U. is an important question.
However, after establishing that a nexus does exist, a potentially more significant question
is what form these linkages take, and how various crime-terror ‘configurations’ impact the
security and stability of E.U. member states.
Aim
The aim of the present study is to provide a concise qualitative analysis of the linkages
between OC and terrorist groups with specific reference to the E.U. Conclusions drawn aim
to provide clarity to the debate over whether a nexus operates within the borders of
Europe, and what the associated risks of these operations and related developments are.
Ultimately, this briefing note is designed to provide recommendations and policy-relevant
advice to decision-makers formulating E.U. strategies for combating OC and terrorism. To
facilitate this aim, this study is divided into five main sections:


Theoretical basis of the links between OC and terrorism;
Indicative European case studies of the links between OC and terrorism;

Assessment of the threat trajectory;

The impact of a nexus on the E.U.’s legal economy, public administration and
financial system; and,

Recommendations to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.
Methodology
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used to compile this briefing
note.
The baseline assessments were made possible by drawing on a proprietary data set
compiled and maintained by the briefing author. This data incorporates information on
linkages between OC and terrorism worldwide, which were compiled from open sources and
field research conducted by the author and associates in Europe, Africa, the former Soviet
Union, South America, and South Asia.
More current data was obtained through unstructured discussions with law enforcement
and security service personnel with recent direct analytical or operational involvement in
OC and terrorism cases. Sources in the private sector with responsibility for monitoring
money laundering and terrorist financing trends were also approached to share their
experiences and insight.
Findings were analysed by a working group of experts, including individuals who have
specific experience conducting assessments on the linkages between OC and terrorism, and
individuals with specific experience and knowledge pertaining to OC and terrorist trends in
the E.U.
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Note on Definitions
For the sake of clarity, OC and terrorism have been ascribed the following working
definitions.
Organised Crime
The definition of organised crime that emerged from the Expert Group on Organised Crime
of the Council of Europe (1997) was used as the baseline definition for this study.
To be considered an organised criminal group, a group must fulfil four mandatory criteria,
and at least two of seven optional criteria. The mandatory criteria are that an OCG must (a)
consist of a collaboration of at least three people (b) that are gathered for a prolonged or
indefinite period of time; (c) be suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal
offences; and, (d) have as their objective the pursuit of profit and/or power.
Optional criteria include: a specific division of labour; using some form of internal discipline
and control; exerting influence on the public and private sectors; using commercial or
business-like structures; engaging in money-laundering; and operating on an international
level.
Terrorism
The following list of characteristics is deemed essential for differentiating terrorism from
other forms of criminality or political violence. Thus these five points are used as a working
definition:





Terrorism is the conduct of premeditated violent acts or the threat of
violence that is perpetrated by members of an organised group.
Terrorism is designed to create fear in an adversary or specific segment of
society; fear is therefore the intended result of terrorism, not a by-product.
Terrorism is a tool of intimidation and coercion.
Terrorism is used to achieve a predetermined political objective, normally an
attempt to influence political behaviour.
Because terrorism is political in nature, it is often discretionary. As a result,
terrorists will often choose their targets carefully to maximise symbolic and
operational effect.
Although the ultimate goal of terrorism may be to destroy the group’s
opposition, terrorism is primarily concerned with breaking the will of its
‘enemy’ and forcing it to submit to the group’s demands.
KEY FINDINGS 
The contemporary international security environment creates opportunities for
linkages between OC and terrorism to develop. Although many such linkages
predominantly originate and exist in unstable environments outside of the E.U., they
impact security developments in the E.U. and have thus contributed to creating
European vulnerabilities to the nexus.

Most publicly available analytical work on the nexus is dated and focused on historic
case studies, many of which do not focus on developments relevant to the E.U.

Existing models of the nexus take a holistic international view that is not directly
relevant to how linkages between OC and terrorism emerge in the E.U. As such, the
nexus is portrayed as a sophisticated phenomenon that operates on 3 levels – one
operational, one conceptual and one evolutionary.
10 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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
Although operational linkages are of primary relevance to the E.U., there is evidence
of conceptual linkages which ultimately result in certain groups falling below the
radar of both anti-crime and counter-terrorism agencies.

If the nexus is not understood in a methodical and region-specific manner, there
may be a danger of conflating OC and terrorism into a single issue, or lumping OC
and terrorism activities and connections together. However, by considering the
peculiarities of the nexus as it has specifically developed within the E.U., it is
possible to isolate two sets of linkages between OC and terrorism: linkages between
entities, and activities. Understanding this subtlety has an impact on anti-crime and
counter-terrorism strategies.

The linkages between OC and militant Islamist cells are a growing concern for E.U.
member-states. Their operational capacity varies depending on whether these
relationships exist within E.U. borders, in particular states on the periphery, or
outside the E.U. These types of relationships pose a threat to member-states in
terms of potential terrorist attacks on E.U. territory, or the growth and sustainability
of criminality within communities.

Within the E.U. there is ample evidence of what many intelligence and law
enforcement officials have referred to as a marriage of convenience between OC and
terrorist groups.

The OC - terrorism alliances that exist in the Balkans and its geographic location on
the periphery of the E.U. create the impetus for drugs and human smuggling.

The greatest threat emanating from the presence of Caucasian OC in Europe
emerges from the fact that these groups are known to have few limitations on
whom they cooperate with, or the types of activities they are prepared to engage in.

Militant Islamist groups are utilising criminal networks throughout Europe and its
periphery for logistical support.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
participates in the heroin trade through West Africa en route to Europe by means of
providing security, which may affect E.U. members in terms of criminal activity, and
potential terrorist attacks.

As a transit country between Turkey and the Balkans, Greece is becoming
increasingly important for OC and presents potential opportunities for a convergence
between criminal and terrorist activities.

Although there is no hard evidence of a convergence between Single Issue
Terrorism (SIT) groups and OCGs, an assessment of the recent evolution of SIT
groups indicates that these groups have both a certain level of flexibility to their
operations, a tendency to cooperate with a wide range of groups, and a complexity
in their organisational structure following the pattern of independent militant
Islamist cell financing.

Although ethno-nationalist groups have predominantly ceased their operations and
do not pose an immediate terrorist threat, several continue their involvement in OC.

Militant Islamist terrorists are also increasingly securing ways to become directly
involved in criminality as a source of financing and logistical support. These
cells/groups are driven by the need for self-finance, and a requirement to organise
operations independently.

North African or Pakistani terrorist cells indigenous to the E.U. are increasingly
engaged in criminal activity to fund terrorist operations while externally based
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terrorist cells, such as AQIM, pose a two-fold threat: targeting European citizens in
its kidnap-for-ransom operations and using Europe for their drug trafficking
operations.

Despite historical evidence of criminal-terrorist hybrids operating in Europe, the
relatively stable political and socio-economic environment that persists in E.U.
member-states is largely responsible for the fact that these types of groups do not
currently exist.

On the other hand, there are cases in which terrorist–criminal hybrids retain their
ideological agenda for public support despite shifting their operational focus to OC.

It is notable to highlight that there have been no E.U.-based case studies of militant
Islamist groups/cells evolving into hybrid entities.

There is no contemporary evidence that suggests an OCG or terrorist group is
currently exhibiting a transformation from terrorist activity to OC, or vice versa.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a starting point, it is imperative to determine how the crime-terror nexus exists /
develops within specific E.U. member-states.

Few individuals have expertise regarding the nexus and how it can be
operationalized. This inherently limits acknowledgement of the nexus as an
emerging issue that demands unique solutions. It is therefore essential that analysts
in both anti-crime and counter-terrorism agencies are trained in how to identify
existing and emerging linkages between OC and terrorism.

A joint-task force should be established at both national and E.U. level, as well as
within the E.U., which can exert leverage over the convergence of crime and
terrorist groups by continuously monitoring new developments and trends, and
sharing these with member-states. The European Parliament should ensure that at
E.U. level, Europol would be tasked to carry out the relevant monitoring.

As any targeted work on the connection between OC and terrorism is hindered by
political and diplomatic considerations, it is essential for the E.U. to take the lead in
establishing a unified approach towards external states regarding the crime-terror
nexus. The European Parliament should ask the European Council and the European
Commission to launch the necessary initiatives.

Given the continuous challenges that European enlargement poses on border
control, it is essential to develop increased co-operation amongst all the national
border control agencies. Particular priority must be given to what are considered as
porous areas within the security structure. As a senior European Government
Minister noted, “The enlargement process will lead to new challenges as far as
organised crime is concerned. With some of the radical Islamic groups in southern
Caucasus - such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - having a social
support base in Eastern Europe, it will be necessary to coordinate more closely on
the European and international level.” Therefore, the European Parliament should
ensure that FRONTEX is tasked to coordinate the appropriate initiatives.

Although the majority of actions taken by member states has concentrated solely on
terrorist financing, it is essential for law enforcement agencies to widen their
parameters of investigation in order to detect other links beyond the obvious
criminal connections. At the moment, most E.U. member-states suffer from a
12 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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fragmented view of OC and terrorism. For example, one senior German intelligence
official stated that: “This does not mean that the German authorities are blind if
these groups use criminal means on German territory, such as extortion, scams to
enforce protection, or money laundering. However, these actions are then defined
not as part of a terrorism agenda but as ordinary crimes. It all comes down to the
classification of a particular group.” However, as the Merah case study highlights
(Annex A), the problem with this attitude is that both anti-crime and counter­
terrorist officers overlook a petty criminal who holds the key to a terrorist cell or
plot.

The tendency of current anti-crime and counter-terrorism efforts solely to
concentrate on Islamist groups also limits the spectrum in which the crime-terror
nexus is perceived. Member states need to allow for structural changes within their
security communities that will re-focus their strategies and allow them to
understand how ethno-nationalist groups and SIT groups engage, or could engage,
with the nexus.

Given the nature of the nexus and the fact that the nexus impacts the E.U. both as
it develops within member-states and as it develops in peripheral regions, any
strategy to address linkages between OC and terrorism must incorporate the whole
range of law enforcement, including security services, military and diplomatic
efforts. Significantly more buy-in and cooperation from the private sector will also
be essential. It is paramount to understand that any effective fight against OC and
terrorism depends on an integrated approach involving all stakeholders at a national
and E.U. level.

Despite gaps in intelligence and research regarding the prevalence and future trends
of OC and terrorism linkages, denying or ignoring linkages that clearly exist
threatens the efficacy of counter-terrorism and anti-crime activities / policies.

Intelligence sharing between E.U. member-state agencies is a key component in
combating the linkages between OC and terrorism. At an operational level memberstates must ensure that anti-crime and counter-terrorism units engage one another
in order to identify and monitor linkages between OC and terrorism.

It is paramount to understand that the effective fight against OC and terrorism
depends on an integrated approach involving all stakeholders on a national and E.U.
level.

The private sector, particularly the financial industry, plays a crucial role in
combating OC and terrorist financing by identifying and reporting cases of fraud,
money laundering, and other suspicious transactions. The financial sector must work
more closely with government agencies to identify gaps in current regulations and
implement innovative techniques to address these issues.
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1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
KEY FINDINGS 
The contemporary international security environment creates opportunities for
linkages between OC and terrorism to develop. Although many such linkages
predominantly originate and exist in unstable environments outside of the E.U., they
impact security developments in the E.U. and have thus contributed to creating
European vulnerabilities to the nexus.

Most publicly available analytical work on the nexus is dated and focused on historic
case studies, many of which do not focus on developments relevant to the E.U.

Existing models of the nexus take a holistic international view that is not directly
relevant to how linkages between OC and terrorism emerge in the E.U. As such, the
nexus is portrayed as a sophisticated phenomenon that operates on 3 levels – one
operational, one conceptual and one evolutionary.

Although operational linkages are of primary relevance to the E.U., there is evidence
of conceptual linkages which ultimately result in certain groups falling below the
radar of both anti-crime and counter-terrorism agencies.

If the nexus is not understood in a methodical and region-specific manner, there
may be a danger of conflating OC and terrorism into a single issue, or lumping OC
and terrorism activities and connections together. However, by considering the
peculiarities of the nexus as it has specifically developed within the E.U., it is
possible to isolate two sets of linkages between OC and terrorism: linkages between
entities, and activities. Understanding this subtlety has an impact on anti-crime and
counter-terrorism strategies.
1.1
The Current OC/Terrorism Threat Environment
Current security concerns in the E.U. are fundamentally shaped by the following dynamics:

The continued blurring between public/private and legal/illegal is creating an
environment in which the operations of illicit networks are becoming increasingly
difficult to identify and monitor. This has enabled OC and terrorist groups to engage
in financing that either remains opaque, or sufficiently ‘licit’ so as not to attract
suspicion.

Most E.U. member-states treat militant Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to
security. This is reinforced by evidence that associated terrorist cells / networks
operate in most European countries. Although independent terrorist cells have been
responsible for most plots uncovered this past decade, the most serious terrorist
plots were organised by cells that maintained operational connections to larger
networks based outside the E.U.

According to OCTA, “The Balkan axis, comprising the Western Balkans and South
East Europe, will assume an even more prominent role in the trafficking of illicit
commodities to E.U. markets.” This infers that OCGs from the Balkans continue to
play an important role in the operation and expansion of illicit markets within the
E.U. Furthermore, this feeds into concerns highlighted by TE-SAT, that “various
religiously-inspired elements have attempted to establish connections with Eastern
14 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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European OCGs involved in the trafficking of human beings and the production of
forged documents.”

New immigration patterns are creating additional links between diaspora
communities and ‘home jurisdictions’ that facilitate the introduction of new illicit
networks and new opportunities for linkages between OC and terrorism to emerge.
Political and security developments in North Africa and South Asia are, for example,
contributing to shifting immigration patterns, with E.U. member-states such as
Greece becoming increasingly attractive to criminal and extremist entities.

Coalition successes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) arena, as well as in Iraq,
have made these areas less hospitable training environments for potential terrorist
recruits originating from E.U. member states. This has several implications. First,
‘home grown’ groups are increasingly self-sufficient, and do not necessarily have
previous operational experience. Second, new training grounds are emerging (i.e.
northern Mali, Somalia, Yemen). As with the AfPak arena, northern Mali is an area
that combines criminal trafficking with a terrorist presence. The implications for
Europe are notable – with European ex-patriots targeted in kidnap for ransom
operations, and European recruits (e.g. from France and the United Kingdom (U.K.))
traveling to the region for operational training.

Terrorism should be viewed as a complex, multi-layered brick wall – every
associated activity has several criminal components such as false document
procurement (incorporating counterfeiters, networks, access to primary materials,
etc.), weapons and explosives (procurement, concealment, transfers), training, and
travel (border crossing, smuggling in a third country, etc.). These activities have
become increasingly regulated / controlled by states, thus pushing terrorist groups
towards engagement with OC - as long as the parameters of the relationship are
strictly defined. Research has highlighted that most operational requirements of
terrorist groups have benefited from a connection to OC; so long as there is money
to pay for OC services, connections could be established at every level.

As a result of evolving security dynamics in the countries and regions along the E.U.
periphery, there is evidence of a generational crossover between European-based
criminal and terrorist operatives. For example, there are indications that this is
occurring both in the Balkan and Pakistani diaspora communities – with third
generation youth finding justification to engage in militant Islamist ideology and
criminal behaviour simultaneously.
What is evident in the current international security environment, and how this
environment is reflected within the E.U., is that OC and terrorist groups have consistently
shown an ability to match tactics to operational needs. This has ensured that, despite anti­
crime and counter-terror efforts, both OC and terrorism continue to capitalise on new
opportunities and present a continuously evolving challenge to national security and law
enforcement agencies.
1.2
Identifying Linkages between OC & Terrorism: A Primer
In the immediate post-Cold War era, long-standing perceptions regarding OC and terrorism
were being challenged. More specifically, a small body of literature began to contest the
‘silo’ approach to security threats, arguing that the boundaries between issues were
increasingly blurred. This was predominantly evidenced in studies conducted within the
context of what became known as the ‘greed-grievance’ debate, pertaining specifically to
motivations of non-state actors in armed conflict.
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Conflict in territories including Angola, the Balkans, Chechnya, Colombia, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone revealed how the decline of the state, combined with the rise of globalisation
and networked structures, drove violent entities with political agendas (e.g. terrorist and
paramilitary groups) to pursue wider economic programmes and networks (e.g. via criminal
activities). Thus in addition to pursuing sustained campaigns of violence, entities such as
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were discovered to
operate relatively sophisticated trafficking networks that moved a variety of illicit and illegal
commodities.
Following 9/11, there were signs that the connections between OC and terrorism were
becoming more intricate. This was in part due to enhanced national counter-terrorism
efforts; greater concentration on the operations of terrorist groups led to the realisation by
law enforcement and security services of many countries that ties between OC and terrorist
groups did exist. These linkages usually led to the outsourcing of specific operational
requirements, for example, terrorist groups engaging an OCG to provide fraudulent
documentation or access to an established human trafficking route.
The nexus, however, remains a relatively ill-understood and ill-defined phenomenon that is
approached from very specific perspectives instead of from the required holistic viewpoint.
There is no doubt that the nexus is inherently focused on the angle that terrorist groups
engage in criminal activities as a source of financing. However, the nexus is about more
than terrorist financing, it encompasses access to specialised skill-sets and operational
tactics that could help an illicit group (be it criminal or terrorist) to reach their political or
financial objectives more efficiently and effectively.
1.2.1
Modelling the Nexus
In the years immediately following 9/11, research conducted primarily in unstable
geographic pockets of regions in Central Asia, South America, South and Southeast Asia
revealed that linkages between OC and terrorism had evolved far more significantly than
previously envisioned. With hundreds of cases reviewed worldwide, a basic linear model
categorising different forms of the crime-terror nexus was first published in 2003 in Jane’s
Intelligence Review (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Original Crime-Terror Nexus Model
In this original model of the nexus, four primary linkages between OC and terrorism were
identified. The first linkage was the straightforward alliance between an OC and terrorist
group, wherein two distinct groups would cooperate for mutual operational benefit (e.g. a
terrorist group would pay on OCG for counterfeit documentation). Second was the
appropriation of the tactics of the other; thus OC would use terror tactics to further their
aims, and terrorist groups would engage in criminal activities predominantly as a means of
financing. The third linkage accounted for motivational transformations within a group. This
would either be a terrorist group evolving to the point where their operations were
primarily focused on profit maximisation (e.g. Fuerzas Armada Revolucionaries de Colombia
(FARC)), or a criminal group evolving a political agenda that would dominate its financial
interests (e.g. Dawood Ibrahim Company (D-Company)).
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This basic model of the nexus was redeveloped by Makarenko in 2009 to highlight a more
sophisticated phenomenon that was seen to operate along a series of planes: one
operational, one organisational and one evolutionary (Figure 2). This model sought to
account for all the variations of linkages between OC and terrorism as they have emerged
and evolved in a number of different regions / operational environments throughout the
world.
Figure 2: Refined Nexus Model
Operationally, the nexus is understood in relation to entities, and can take one of two
forms. First is the adoption of the tactics of the ‘other’ (e.g. a criminal network using terror
tactics). For example, criminal groups in Italy, the Balkans and the Caucasus have adopted
terrorist tactics; and terrorist groups throughout the world have learned to integrate
criminal capabilities into their logistical and support structures. Second is the functional
merging of a criminal and terrorist group. This merger can materialize as an ad hoc
alliance, or it can involve the integration of one group into the other.
Conceptually, crime and terrorism are treated as clearly defined actions. As such, a nexus
occurs when both activities occupy the same space and time. In this context of
‘convergence’, a hybrid entity emerges and simultaneously displays ideological and
economic motivations by perpetrating acts of politically motivated terrorism and engaging
in OC for profit maximisation. The group can clearly be defined as criminal or terrorist, and
as such, has the greatest potential of being overlooked by both anti-crime and counter­
terrorism agencies. Cases discussed in Section 9 highlight this vulnerability in the context
of the E.U.
Evolutionally, the nexus refers to the transformation of the tactics and motivations of one
entity into another. For example, a terrorist group may evolve into a criminal network or
vice-versa. Although this is the most difficult type of linkage between OC and terrorism to
identify, the ongoing monitoring of group dynamics - particularly operations, leadership
changes, and altered recruitment base – provide a solid grounding from which conclusions
about the driving motivations of a specific group can be drawn.
1.2.2
Regional Idiosyncrasies
The depth of the relationship between OC and terrorism is often dependent on the nature
of the geographic region in which any specific nexus operates. Figure 3 (Makarenko, 2007)
illustrates the geographic characteristics associated with linkages between OC and
terrorism.
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Figure 3: Geographic Proclivities of the Nexus
The nexus in Western democracies is largely isolated to the operational plane - focused on
terrorist groups engaging in crime as a source of funding. Here, the nexus is comparatively
opaque, with generally unpredictable repercussions, which can thus be seen as presenting
a high security threat. As noted in Section 8, cases of E.U.-based criminal groups
appropriating terrorist tactics are limited. This is, for the most part, due to the relative
economic and political stability enjoyed by E.U. member-states. International cases of
OCGs using terror tactics to progress their aims (Annex D) are most commonly found in
states experiencing political transformation, instability or limited political control –
producing an environment in which OCGs understand the utility of using terror tactics to
further their economic control by entrenching their political influence.
In transitional states, the nexus includes the operational and conceptual plane, with
evidence of convergent motivations dominating groups operating in regions such as the
Balkans. Historically, poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials
and established smuggling networks have facilitated the emergence of hybrid groups that
simultaneously sought political aims and profit maximisation. This was epitomised by the
Albanian mafia and the KLA through the mid-1990s, each benefiting from an
interchangeable membership and recruitment base.
Finally, the nexus is at its most interactive and developed in (post) conflict territory,
combining each plane of interaction. Places such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Pakistan,
Thailand, northern Mali, Somalia, where government control is fragmented and extremely
weak – if existent at all – foster the nefarious collaboration between OC and terrorism.
Given the predominant environment where conflict and political instability dominate,
neither OC nor terrorist groups have an innate loyalty to the state. As such, risk
calculations made to cross the criminal-terrorist divide are based more on fulfilling
immediate benefits rather than assessing long-term repercussions.
Although the nexus in transitional and (post) conflict states appears not to have a direct
impact on the security of Western Democracies, such as the E.U., trends and case studies
have proven the contrary. For example, how the nexus operates in the transitional states of
18 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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Central Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, are of relevance to the E.U. vis-à-vis shared
borders and ease of access into E.U. member-states. As noted in Section 7.3.2, security
developments in the Balkan tri-border area of Albania-Kosovo-Macedonia [identified in
Annex F] are directly tied to operational developments of militant Islamist cells in the U.K.
Furthermore, as described in Sections 7.3.4, and 8.3.3, the rise of northern Mali as a
training hub for AQIM has two E.U.-specific consequences. First, there are indications that
French and British recruits are being trained in this area – most probably to conduct
operations back on their ‘home’ territory. Second, expanded terrorist operations in this
area have merged with specific OC capabilities (i.e. Kidnap & Ransom (K&R) and
contraband smuggling). K&R operations directly impact E.U. member states when European
citizens are kidnapped, and when a specific member state agrees to pay a ransom for the
release of the victim. This payment directly feeds the treasury of AQIM.
Thus in assessing the linkages between OC and terrorism that impact the E.U., there are
two predominant regional trends. First, direct linkages that emerge and operate within E.U.
member-states; and second, indirect threats that emerge from linkages that primarily exist
outside the E.U., but impact the threat trajectory of the nexus within the E.U.
1.2.3
The Nexus in Europe – A Model Based on Terrorist Typologies?
Research and analysis conducted throughout the course of this project has identified that
linkages between OC and terrorism in the E.U. are potentially best modelled by terrorist
typologies (Figure 4). The linkages that exist between certain terrorist groups and OC are
based on historical and current case studies, and are highlighted in Section 7 to 10.
Generally, however, findings point to some key differences in terms of how militant Islamist
groups, ethno-nationalist groups, and single-issue terrorist groups engage with the nexus.
Linkages between ethno-nationalist groups and OC are the most varied, often developing
away from alliances to encompass appropriation of tactics, and the creation of hybrid
entities. Militant Islamist groups, on the other hand, very seldom (within the E.U. theatre)
exhibit organisational or motivational linkages. In fact, common trends suggest that
militant Islamist groups engage in alliances with OCGs, and in some cases directly
participate in criminal activities, but are not commonly known to evolve into a hybrid group
or lose their a priori motivation.
On the opposite end of the spectrum of OC-terrorism linkages are OCGs. Although OCGs
obviously engage in ad hoc relations with terrorist groups, there are limited cases of E.U.­
based OCGs appropriating and using terror tactics to further their primary goal of profit­
maximisation and/or maintaining a monopoly over a certain section of the market.
The European theatre naturally presents different variations of the nexus that do not
necessarily follow the trends established in the stereotypical environments - dominated by
political instability, periods of sustained conflict, embedded insurgents, and criminal activity
that simultaneously fuels and feeds cycles of violence - of countries like Afghanistan and
Colombia. Relative political stability and social cohesion mean that the operating
environment in most E.U. member-states is rather more complex than that which exists in
transitional and (post) conflict states. However, this reality has not hindered the emergence
of linkages between OC and terrorism; on the contrary, it has resulted in the careful
development of operational and organisational linkages that are used to increase the
effectiveness of both types of activities and organisations within the European context.
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Figure 4: The E.U. Nexus by Terrorist Typology
2 CASE STUDY: ALLIANCES KEY FINDINGS 
The linkages between OC and militant Islamist cells are a growing concern for E.U.
member-states. Their operational capacity varies depending on whether these
relationships exist within E.U. borders, in particular states on the periphery, or
outside the E.U. These types of relationships pose a threat to member-states in
terms of potential terrorist attacks on E.U. territory, or the growth and sustainability
of criminality within communities.

Within the E.U. there is ample evidence of what many intelligence and law
enforcement officials have referred to as a marriage of convenience between OC and
terrorist groups.

The OC - terrorism alliances that exist in the Balkans and its geographic location on
the periphery of the E.U. create the impetus for drugs and human smuggling.

The greatest threat emanating from the presence of Caucasian OC in Europe
emerges from the fact that these groups are known to have few limitations on
whom they cooperate with, or the types of activities they are prepared to engage in.

Militant Islamist groups are utilising criminal networks throughout Europe and its
periphery for logistical support. AQIM participates in the heroin trade through West
Africa en route to Europe by means of providing security, which may affect E.U.
members in terms of criminal activity, and potential terrorist attacks.

As a transit country between Turkey and the Balkans, Greece is becoming
increasingly important for OC and presents potential opportunities for a convergence
between criminal and terrorist activities.
20 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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
2.1
Although there is no hard evidence of a convergence between SIT groups and OCGs,
the evolution of SIT groups indicates that these groups have both a certain level of
flexibility to their operations, a tendency to cooperate with a wide range of groups,
and a complexity in their organisational structure following the example of
independent militant Islamist cell financing.
Defining Characteristics
Alliances are the most common type of linkage between OC and terrorism in the E.U. The
nature of alliances varies, and includes one-off, short-term and long-term relationships.
Alliances fulfil a number of requirements, such as:

Access to specialised knowledge (e.g. money laundering),

Access to specialised services (e.g. counterfeiting),

Operational support (e.g. access to human smuggling networks), and

Financial support (e.g. collusion in bringing illicit products to market, such as
narcotics).
The argument that OC and terrorism make ‘strange bedfellows’ is erroneous in the current
environment. Although terrorism does not fundamentally seek to change the prevailing way
of life, it has been established that many OCGs have little restraint in engaging in certain
types of cooperation / support. Furthermore, it appears as though terrorist groups do not
engage in crime for the sake of disruption. This is primarily out of fear (although not
necessarily a cognisant decision as such) that any perceived competition could pit terrorist
groups against OCGs who control illicit markets and want to maintain the degree of stability
and market predictability that they are accustomed to.
Importantly, there is ample evidence to conclude that in an environment defined by the
need for self-financing, terrorist cells / networks have accepted the overall operational
benefits of either engaging with OCGs, or establishing direct involvement in criminal
activities (Section 8). Although the cost of a terrorist attack is not necessarily high in itself,
all the surrounding logistical and support requirements increase costs at least four-fold. For
example, the UN has reported that the cost of the 2004 Madrid attack was circa €8,000.
However, incorporating logistical and other support requirements would place the cost of
the Madrid attack at an estimated €40,000 to €50,000. Access to weapons, discreet travel,
other attack components – including equipment no longer readily accessible on the licit
market – all fall into the remit and skill sets of OC. Alliances are thus a feasible and
necessary arrangement.
2.2
Background
Alliances between OC and terrorist groups in Europe can be traced back at least to the
1990’s. Many of these cases, as highlighted in Table 1, involved ethno-nationalist terrorist
groups (incorporating both left and right wing). The post 9/11 environment, however, saw
alliances expand to specifically include relations between OC and militant Islamist networks
and cells. In most cases, alliances between OC and terrorism operated along strict
parameters, and could be identified when assessing most operational requirements of
terrorist groups. In many cases, OC was the only obvious way through which access to
specialist services and established illicit networks could be secured.
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Table 1: Nexus Alliances in Europe, 2000-2010
Group
European
Operations
Abkhazia Rebels
Georgia
Abkhazia
Separatists
Georgia
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb
Al-Shabaab
Albania, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia,
France, FRY,
Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Turkey,
UK
Ghana, Mali,
Morocco, Algeria,
Spain, Algeria
Somalia, Yemen, UK,
Denmark, Norway,
Sweden
Camorra
Italy, Luxembourg,
US, UK, Montenegro
Corsican
organised crime
Italy, France
DHKP-C
Turkey
Dissident
Republican
Groups
United Kingdom,
Ireland, Colombia
N17
Greece
ETA
Spain, France, Italy,
Balkans, Colombia
FLNC
FARC
GIA
Iraultza
INLA
IMU/IJU
UCPMB
LVF
GICM
France
Colombia, Spain,
Italy, Balkans
Algeria, Belgium,
France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, Sudan,
Switzerland
Spain
Ireland, United
Kingdom
Afghanistan,
Germany, Iran,
Kazakhstan,
Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan,
Serbia and
Montenegro
United Kingdom
Afghanistan,
Belgium, Denmark,
Egypt, France,
Ties to OC or Terrorism
Chechen criminal groups
Cross-border trade
Smuggling (cigarettes, petroleum, mandarins, hazelnuts)
Trafficking in narcotics
Commodity smuggling (diamonds), depended on criminal
groups for the provision of arms; affiliated and independent
cells commonly engage in petty crime and credit card fraud
Drug trade
Likely connections to Balkan-based criminal groups,
Camorra, Ndrangheta
Drug trafficking, K&R
Katibat al-Mulathamine
FARC
Drug smuggling
Drug Trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking
Al-Qaeda
Albanian Criminal Groups
Gambling, money laundering, drugs trafficking,
racketeering, bank robberies
Alleged ties to terrorist cells in Italy
Armed robbery and extortion
Criminal activities, arms and drug trafficking, extortion,
racketeering, bomb-making for hire, robbery, cigarette
smuggling
Ties to organised crime in Balkans
Arms for drugs with FARC
Ties to Irish mob in U.S.
Bank robberies; ‘Sardanapalos’ faction involved in
smuggling drugs, arms, people
Bank robbery, K&R, extortion
Ties to Italian mafia (drugs for weapons)
Arms trafficking with OC in Balkans (arms trafficking)
Arms for cocaine with FARC
IRA
Bank robbery, extortion, counterfeiting, embezzlement
Extortion, kidnapping, revolutionary taxes, drug trade, arms
trade
Ties to Chechen groups
Al-Qaeda , and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Islamic Salvation Front
Takfir wa Hijra
Unified Unit of Jihad
Criminal activities
Criminal activities
Drug trafficking
Opium trade in Central Asia
Al-Qaeda
Islamic Jihad Group
Taliban
Drug trafficking
Criminal activities including drug trafficking
Forgery, gun running, drug trafficking, credit card fraud
22 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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Morocco, Spain,
Turkey, United
Kingdom
France, Iran, Iraq,
US
MEK
Oil smuggling
Peykar
Smuggling (arms, cigarettes, people, narcotics), narcotics
production laboratories
Drug Trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking
Al-Qaeda
Albanian Criminal Groups
ETA
FARC
IRA
Colombian paramilitary groups
Bulgarian OC (drug trafficking)
Ties to organised crime
Extortion, robbery, arms smuggling; human and drug
trafficking
National
Liberation Army
FYROM
‘Ndrangheta
Italy, Luxembourg,
US, UK
NIPR
Italy
PKK
Turkey
Sacra Corona
Unita
Italy, Luxembourg,
US, UK, Montenegro
Drug Trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking
White Legions and
Forest Brothers
Georgia
Racketeering and contraband smuggling
Monitoring relationships between OC and terrorism is a difficult task given the current
organisation of most national anti-crime and counter-terrorism agencies (i.e. generally
working independently of one another with limited intelligence sharing and operational
collaboration). This bureaucratic reality is unfortunately common throughout most E.U.
member-states; greater collaboration has not evolved despite the record of alliances that
have been forged between OC and terrorism over the decades. Indicative of these alliances
are the following examples:

During the 1980s there were functional relationships between Camorra families in
Italy and the Italian Red Brigades, and between the Sicilian Mafia / Neapolitan
Camorra and Fascist terrorist groups.

1990s relationship between the IRA and the ‘Ndrangheta, where the ‘Ndrangheta
acted as a go between and ‘guarantor’ for the passage of arms from Lebanon to
Belfast.

One of the most recognisable alliances was the relationship that developed between
the Albanian mafia and the KLA during the Kosovo conflict. These two groups
successfully established a heroin smuggling operation, the profits of which
simultaneously fed into the criminal and political aims of each entity at the time.
For more details on how the Albanian mafia and KLA exhibit several nexus
tendencies, refer to Annex B.

In the early 2000s the Camorra are believed to have provided Euzkadi ta
Askatasuna (ETA) with services and goods, including arms and false documents.

In 2002 the Italian authorities noted that criminal and terrorist cells were engaged
in a relationship where Italian OCGs smuggle arms to Palestinian and North Africanbased terrorist groups, who reciprocated by supporting Italian narcotics smuggling
networks.

In 2002 allegations regarding cooperation between the ‘Ndrangheta and militant
Islamist cells based in Italy emerged.

In 2004, Italian authorities noted a concern regarding Neapolitan mafia converts
establishing arms-for-drugs networks on behalf of Italian based terrorist cells.
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
The Camorra was known to have provided false documents to the Madrid cell in
2004.
Historical alliances between OC and terrorism in the E.U. were unlikely to have been based
on profit-maximisation or a desire to secure an unstable operating environment. Many of
the connections that are documented reveal a more complex equation, combining factors
such as loyalties to a specific ethnic or religious community, or the emergence of
sympathetic feelings – ultimately reflected in cases involving converts.
2.3
Current Situation: Illustrative Case Studies
According to a range of law enforcement and security service sources throughout Europe,
the most pressing concern faced by E.U. member-states is the threat that is specifically tied
to linkages between OC and militant Islamist cells. Although there remain remnants of
ethno-nationalist and single-issue terrorist groups operating within the E.U. theatre, these
groups appear to have predominantly integrated criminal capabilities within their
operational structure. In addition, it is apparent that militant Islamist cells operating
independently of any central support structure engage directly in petty crime, and are not
commonly seen to engage directly with OCGs. Integrated criminal structures, even in the
less sophisticated cases of independent cells directly engaging in petty crime, are covered
in Section 8. Relevant to this section are the more centralised Islamist terrorist networks
with cell structures in E.U. member-states who are known to engage with OCGs.
There are two types of alliances that impact E.U. member states. First, alliances that are
established within E.U. borders have a direct security impact, both in terms of contributing
to the potential operationalization of a terrorist attack, and in terms of contributing to the
growth of criminality within communities. Second, alliances established outside the E.U. /
on the periphery of Europe, also have the potential to exacerbate the internal threat posed
to member-states.
2.3.1
Internal E.U. Dynamics
Within the E.U. there is ample evidence of what many intelligence and law enforcement
officials have referred to as a marriage of convenience between OC and terrorist groups.
This functional alliance is predominantly based on the straightforward exchange of goods
and services. In a large number of cases reviewed in this briefing, in exchange for services
such as the supply of false documentation, terrorist cells/groups support the narcotics and
arms trafficking networks of the OCG. Evidence of this exchange has been most obvious in
Italy and Spain.
Illustrative cases are as follows:

In 2012 it was discovered that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was laundering
money on behalf of the ‘Ndrangheta in Northern Ireland. The ‘Ndrangheta, at the
time, were known to have been seeking facilitators/enablers who could launder their
money through relatively sophisticated channels.

Italian militant Islamist cells are believed to use connections to Balkan OCGs to
transport arms and explosives via the Italian port of Gioia Tuaro in Calabria. This
port is specifically used to tranship most of Europe’s cocaine consumption.

Numerous militant Islamists operating in the E.U. have had personal relationships to
criminal networks. Profiles of some militant Islamists whose backgrounds are
illustrative of an emerging trend within Europe are included in Annex A.
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What these profiles highlight is that individual militant Islamists with a dual
criminal/terrorist profile can be extremely difficult to identify. Yet, these types of individuals
exist and operate throughout the E.U.
2.3.2
The Balkan Theatre
Europol’s most recent EU Terrorism and Trend Report (TE-SAT 2012), the Organised Crime
Threat Assessment (OCTA), and the 2012 Annual Risk Analysis of the Western Balkans
published by FRONTEX, all highlight concerns regarding the Balkan security environment
and its impact on E.U. security. Read together, it is evident that there are a number of
issues related to the creation of OC-terrorism alliances, which emerge from the Balkans.
Annex F illustrates where OC and terrorist actors have been known to overlap
geographically. Several sources from the intelligence community have noted that the region
has recently been used as a hub by British militant Islamists (e.g. Pakistani Wahhabists
from Birmingham) to engage in what was referred to as ‘serious criminal smuggling
operations’.
Operationally, several spots in the Balkans act as major transhipment points of illicit
trafficking networks. This is facilitated by high flows of regional road traffic, which enables
movements of illicit consignments to be transported undetected. Tied into this are
increased irregular migration flows. This is especially the case along the Greek-Turkish
border, the Serbian border with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the
Serbian border with Romania. According to the 2012 FRONTEX Balkan risk analysis, there
are a growing number of Afghan and Pakistani nationals involved in border crossings in the
region. Although this may not, in itself, directly create greater insecurity, there is evidence
that militant Islamists use these routes. The key vulnerability here is that, once militants
are able to enter the Schengen area from either Croatia or Serbia, they are open to the rest
of the E.U. Albania has, for example, specifically voiced concerns that terrorists are using
the Western Balkan route – via established criminal smuggling networks - to enter the E.U.
Further discussions with law enforcement sources have indicated that militants using the
Balkan route primarily come from the AfPak arena, and more recently, from Syria.
In addition to the geographic attraction of the Balkans to OC and terrorist groups – thus
creating natural synergies for cooperation - the region raises another concern in relation to
the crime-terror nexus. This relates to a current trend – more specifically witnessed in
Germany, Austria and Switzerland - of 3rd generation Balkan diaspora youth becoming
involved in radical Islamism. Given that the previous generation were involved in
criminality, law enforcement officers in some European states have expressed their
concerns over the potential for natural ties to develop between family/community members
with both criminal connections and those who have adopted a militant Islamist agenda.
Although there is no hard evidence that this trend is being operationalized as described
above, the concern is that the elements exist for a similar relationship to emerge between
Balkan criminal and terrorist elements as emerged between Lebanese OCGs and Hezbollah
in the 1980s. This is a potential development that needs to be closely watched.
2.3.3
Caucasian OC as a Terrorist Facilitator
Due to a number of factors, OCGs from the Caucasus expanded and migrated their
operations into Europe in the mid-1990s. In this migration were groups specifically from
Georgia, Armenia and the Russian North Caucasus (especially Chechnya). Over the years
they have mainly established operations in Belgium, Spain, France, Germany, and Austria
and to a lesser extent, the U.K. and Finland. Activities generally include anything from
money laundering, drug smuggling, hired killings, down to organised robberies.
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Given the recent political history of the Caucasus, and the rise of regional terrorist groups
in these territories over the years, indigenous OCGs and militants have a common past,
including cooperation. Intelligence and law enforcement sources in France and Georgia
have noted that several OC members in France were in fact found to be former Chechen
militants and were believed to have maintained connections to Chechen terrorists.
The greatest threat emanating from the presence of Caucasian OC in Europe arises because
these groups are known to have few qualms about whom they cooperate with, or the types
of activities they are prepared to engage in. For example, there have been several
documented cases of OCGs attempting to sell a variety of military weapons, including highgrade weapons materials. One of the latest incidents that received media attention was the
arrest of Artur Solomonyan in the U.S. in 2005 as a result of an FBI ‘sting’. Solomonyan
was sentenced to 22 years for plotting to smuggle shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles,
rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons. Solomonyan also boasted that he could
acquire enough enriched uranium to bomb the New York subways.
Flexibility, the capacity to access and transport illegal goods, the capacity to use violence
and corruption, and functional links with other OCGs, make Caucasian OCGs ideal
candidates for delivering services to terrorist groups. Although there is no hard proof to
back this suggestion, there is some evidence that raises suspicion.

Ricin discovered in a foiled terrorist plot in the U.K. in 2003 was produced in
Georgia.

Various European law enforcement officers have stated that Caucasian criminals and
terrorists have established extensive links in European prisons. An officer in
Belgium, for example, noted that in 2005/6 Georgian criminals were recruited by
militants to provide forged documentation.

In May 2011, a group of militant Islamists were arrested in the Czech Republic for
involvement in arms smuggling, counterfeiting legal documents, and planning
terrorist attacks.

In August 2011 a group of Chechens and a Turkish accomplice were arrested for
planning a terrorist attack in Spain. Sources have speculated that the Chechens
were also connected to Chechen OC.

There are documented cases coming from the former Soviet Union of militants
engaging OCGs to move people via human smuggling routes that they operate.
2.3.4
AQIM & Other Militant Islamist European Operations
In 2006, the Groupe Salafiste pour le Combat (GSPC) formally joined al-Qaeda (AQ),
changing its name the following year to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM
(Sahel) units generally comprise individuals from Algeria, Burkino-Faso, Libya, Mali,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Although most cadres remain Algerian, Arabs
from Mali appear to be playing an increasingly significant role. The main areas of operation
remain in Africa, specifically Mali, Mauritania and Niger; however, it has extensive
connections to Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
To date, no known Europeans have been recruited directly into AQIM, but individuals within
the organisation have connections / have travelled to France and the U.K., and have
established operations in other European states. As of 2011, the Intelligence Service of the
Spanish Civil Guard considered AQIM to be the most serious threat to Spain.
Although not part of the E.U., Switzerland was the base of one Algerian AQIM operation
that drew together OC and a terrorist cell. According to law enforcement sources, a small
unit of militant Islamists organised a ring of approximately 30 petty thieves who were
26 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
charged with stealing money, computers and mobile telephones. The average ‘daily steal’
brought in an estimated €5,000.
Other notable developments regarding the relationship between OC and militant Islamist
groups that have an impact on E.U. security include the following:

AIM has been involved in providing route security (in exchange for monetary
payment) for OCGs smuggling illicit commodities from Nigeria to Morocco, and
presumably onwards into the E.U.

A number of security sources have commented on the emergence of connections
between al-Shabaab and OCGs engaged in the illicit trafficking of qat. This is
especially an issue amongst the E.U.-based Somali diaspora.

In general, the drug trade originating in the Sahel involves a number of OC and
terrorist groups moving shipments to the European borders. Although it is known
that Latin American groups, Hezbollah, AQIM and various regional national liberation
forces are involved, the identity of associated OCGs remain unnamed.

There is an established ‘trade’ in Western kidnap victims in unstable geographies. In
places like AfPak and Iraq, OCGs are paid by terrorist groups to kidnap Westerners.
According to a report published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, entitled
‘International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and
Considerations for Congress’, the governments of France, Germany and Italy paid
an estimated $45 million for the release of their foreign nationals. The exact
distribution of this money between OC and terrorist groups is unknown.

The UN has identified West Africa as a hub where Latin American drug traffickers are
collaborating with AQIM to smuggle cocaine to Europe. Details of these operations
are elusive, but there is reason to believe that OCGs, including the Corsican mafia,
facilitate the movement of the cocaine into Europe. Although it is unlikely that AQIM
is directly involved in drug trafficking, it is believed that they provide intermediary
services (i.e. protection).

European security officials have also confirmed that smuggling routes between North
Africa and the E.U. are vital to militant Islamists. The unanswered question is how
they are moved into Europe once illicit commodities reach the European borders. It
is speculated that this is done through the help of OCGs entrenched in southern
Europe.

Since 2005, investigations in Belgium and France have consistently revealed ties
between terrorist cells and OCGs. Specific connections, for example, have been
made between militant Islamists and Albanian OC and the ‘Ndrangheta.

Italian authorities have identified connections between certain terrorist cells
operating in Italy and OCGs with operations (i.e. arms and drugs trafficking) in Italy,
Spain, Switzerland and Montenegro.
2.3.5
Single-Issue Terrorism
According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Services report on single-issue terrorism
published in 1998, single-issue terrorism (SIT) is defined as ‘extremist militancy of groups
or individuals protesting grievance or wrong that are usually attributed to government
action or inaction’. Prominent issues covered under this typology are: animal rights, radical
environmentalism, anti-globalisation, anarchism, and anti-abortion. The most common
groups include the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) and
Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC).
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By 2009, SIT embraced many leftist terrorist groups, including the Red Brigades and the
French arm of Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) (both of which had linkages
to OC). The a priori motivation of SIT groups is to radically force a social re-think of how
these issues are dealt with, and to attain radical change, SIT groups have resorted to
extremist militancy – thus creating a terrorist threat.
While there is no question that violent actions of SIT groups harm society, terrorism
analysts have questioned whether the damage they inflict — primarily financial and
structural — should be considered terrorism. This is one of the main reasons why SIT
groups have been on the periphery of terrorism typology. However, others (including E.U.
institutions) argue that SIT groups use terrorism as a rational calculated strategy of
deliberate or intentional use of violence - even though loss of life may not be the result.
Overall, the small-scale nature of SIT activities has led many law enforcement agencies
worldwide to consider them as a small threat to collective security, with most incidents
being unreported and simply treated as isolated events.
SIT groups use more aggressive tactics including arson, property destruction and malicious
communication. Anti-abortion group attacks against individuals have been noticeable and
have included kidnappings, assaults and attempted murder. Operationally, SIT groups are
domestically focused, but can have an international scope. They are primarily structured in
autonomous cells with strong links between country representatives. They are highly
dependent on electronic communications and widely user social networks to organise and
facilitate their operations, recruit new members, and establish and maintain links with
other extremist/terrorist groups.
The membership of most SIT groups combine well-educated professionals who are aware of
these issues and want to implement radical change along with more disadvantaged youth
coming from deprived backgrounds and with basic (if any) education. Both sides fulfil a role
within the operations of the SIT group – educated professionals become the organisers and
the leaders, with others representing the physical force behind the protests.
2.3.6
Current status in Europe
There has been a merger of left- and right-wing extremist SIT groups in Europe. What
may, at first glance, appear unlikely alliances, are becoming the norm. This coincides with
a resurgence of activism throughout Europe – since 2009 there has been a slow but steady
rise in pan-European incidents, targeting commercial interests and representatives. SIT
groups have been particularly active in the U.K., Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy,
Ireland and, most recently, in Greece.
Notably a recent alliance appears to be developing between SIT and right-wing extremism.
The driving force behind this has been the prevailing economic situation, and associated
grievances about social inequality – all tied in with the anti-globalisation agenda. Rightwing groups have allegedly provided radical environmentalist group’s access to paramilitary
training in E.U. member-states (a phenomenon that has already been taking place in the
U.S.).
According to sources, although SIT groups have previously been known to engage in
impulsive / ad-hoc actions, they are now increasingly viewed as being well organised and
taking greater care in preparing operations. The ‘leaderless resistance’ is being replaced by
a more complex operational structure.
Although there is no hard evidence of a convergence between SIT groups and OCGs, the
current evolutionary trajectory of SIT groups indicates that they have both a degree of
flexibility to their operations, and a habit of cooperating with a wide range of other actors.
Recent allegations have connected Italian anarchist groups to OCGs, and there are rumours
28 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
that the Revolutionary Struggle and Conspiracy Cells of Fire (Greece) purchased weapons
from Albanian OCGs.
Thus as each SIT is becoming more organised and complex, and with the convergence of so
many different types of members – including petty criminals - the use of criminal activities
for the funding of various activities is likely to increase. This would follow the evolutionary
path noted for independent militant Islamist cell financing.
2.4
Greece – a new staging ground?
Greece is considered a dark analytical hole that requires greater attention in terms of how
OC and terrorism are currently evolving. Over the past several years, Greece has been
seen to be a jurisdiction tied to numerous illicit networks operating throughout the E.U. For
example, one law enforcement source described a case involving two Belgian terrorist
networks; arrests were made in Italy, but the suspects were traveling from Greece. This
case in particular involved the smuggling of several people from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Other similar cases were uncovered, suggesting that Greece is in fact becoming the ‘new
Spain’ (i.e. a smuggling crossroads for criminals and militants).
Open sources have also alluded to these developments occurring in Greece. For example,
there are indications that Pakistani groups are becoming established in Greece and are
involved in smuggling immigrants. A related concern is that militant Islamist groups from
South Asia are using this criminal route. Although Greece is not known to host a significant
Islamic community, it is interesting to learn that a rising number of unofficial mosques are
being erected in the country, and the use of hawala is being raised as a money laundering
issue.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Pakistani and Syrian diaspora communities
have spearheaded a forged travel document industry in Greece. In February 2011, for
example, a police raid uncovered 500 fake travel documents, and several ‘stolen’ official
stamps – illustrating an associated concern regarding the level of public corruption in the
country. Combined with continuing political and social instability in North Africa and the
Middle East there is an intensifying demand for (illegal) migration to Europe. As a result,
the trade in fraudulent documentation is also on the rise. It can be concluded that, in
Greece, OC and terrorism have found common cause through human trafficking operations.
It is equally important to note that Greece is, according to various open sources,
experiencing a steep increase in OC. This is clearly exacerbated by the on-going economic
situation, and public concerns regarding the austerity measures that Greece must take. In
fact, experts on OC in Greece – such as Panos Kostakos - decisively note in articles and
interviews that Greece has one of the largest black markets in Europe, the highest
corruption levels, and a strong political culture based on patron-client relations. Combined
with its geographic proximity to countries that export terrorism, illegal migration, social
unrest and a growing alienated Muslim community, Greece is highly susceptible to an
emerging convergence between OC and terrorism – even if at present only short-lived
marriages of convenience that supply forged documentation, weapons, and/or access to
various smuggling routes. Furthermore, access to illicit communities in France, Italy and
the U.K. have the potential to turn Greece into a staging ground for both criminal and
terrorist activities.
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3 CASE STUDY: APPROPRIATION / INTEGRATION
KEY FINDINGS 
Although ethno-nationalist groups have predominantly ceased their operations and
do not pose an immediate terrorist threat, several continue their involvement in OC.

Militant Islamist terrorists are also increasingly securing ways to become directly
involved in criminality as a source of financing and logistical support. These
cells/groups are driven by the need for self-finance, and a requirement to organise
operations independently.

North African and Pakistani terrorist cells indigenous to the E.U. are increasingly
engaged in criminal activity to fund terrorist operations. Externally based terrorist
cells, such as AQIM, pose a two-fold threat: targeting European citizens in its
kidnap-for-ransom operations and using Europe for their drug trafficking operations.
3.1
Defining Characteristics
The appropriation or integration of tactics is the second key linkage that exists between OC
and terrorism. Appropriation refers to a criminal or terrorist group acquiring or developing
in-house capabilities – i.e. a criminal group learning how to conduct terrorist operations to
progress its own agenda, and terrorist groups learning how to directly conduct criminal
activities to finance or support their operations. Integration, on the other hand, occurs
when an OCG or terrorist group integrates with a group of terrorists or criminals,
respectively, as a way of acquiring that tactic.
In this type of nexus, terrorist groups appropriate or integrate criminal operations; and
OCGs appropriate terror tactics as part of their operational strategy. Most cases of
appropriation are found within the context of terrorism, especially within the E.U. theatre of
operations. This is primarily because most terrorist cells and groups have been forced to
self-finance their operations, and crime has thus become an integral operational
component. Usually, appropriation does not have a significant impact on group motivation.
Appropriation and/or integration are theoretically a development from alliances. Logically,
this is because securing in-house capabilities increases operational and organisational
security. This eliminates the inherent problems associated with alliances, namely
differences over priorities and strategies, distrust, danger of defections and betrayal, and
the threat that alliances could create competitors.
3.2
Background
As noted above, the vast majority of E.U. cases of appropriation or integration deal with
terrorist groups directly engaging in OC activities as a source of financing. Historical
examples are plenty, with the following groups known to have engaged in OC activities:
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF), ETA, KLA, Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), Red Army Faction
(RAF), AQIM. The appropriation of OC tactics into terrorist groups has a two-fold logic: first,
profits are used for operational financing; and, second, familiarity with criminal activities
provides logistical support (e.g. transporting militants through smuggling networks).
Terrorist groups have been involved in a wide-range of criminal activities; however, there
are notable differences in the types of crime different types of terrorist groups have been
willing – at least historically – to be directly involved in. For the most part, ethno­
30 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
nationalist (including both left and right wing) groups have imposed the least stringent
parameters. As such, they have been involved in everything from petty crimes to
kidnappings, and drugs and human trafficking. Militant Islamist groups, on the other hand,
appear to have limited their criminal engagement to petty crime. There are many reasons
for this, some ideological, but some practical in that independent cells would naturally find
it difficult to engage in larger scale illicit networks for fear that it could increase their
vulnerability to detection.
There is, however, a difference between militant Islamist cells seeking financing for a oneoff operation; and those seeking financing for longer term logistical support. Furthermore,
there is a marked difference between militant Islamist cells engaged in crime in the E.U.,
and those who are able to leverage less stable environments and gain greater financial
benefit from more sophisticated OC activities.
3.3
Current Situation: Illustrative Case Studies
Weakening ties with the ‘central command’ of terrorist groups has been the driving force
behind European-based cell engagement in criminality. The need for self-finance, combined
with the requirement to organise operations independently, has led some cells to move
away from alliances and directly appropriate or integrate criminal capabilities.
Terrorist use of crime has evolved since the 1980s in terms of methods and motives. Table
2 highlights key developments in this evolution, and identifies some of the most prominent
case studies in the European theatre of operations.
Table 2: Terrorist use of Crime
1980’s
Material and
logistical support
1990’s
Replacement of
state sponsorship –
financial necessity
From 2001
Recruit criminal
expertise
Profit maximisation
Methods
Extortion, petty
crime
Add: smuggling,
trade in counterfeit
goods, illegal trade
of commodities
Add: money
laundering
Case Studies
Not noted in Europe
Al Qaeda,
IRA offshoots, ETA
Chechen groups
Predominantly
militant Islamist
groups
Motives
3.3.1
Terrorist Use of OC: Ethno-Nationalist Groups
In the current environment there are few operationally active ethno-nationalist terrorist
groups operating in the E.U. Two groups, however, provide indicative case studies of how
ethno-nationalist groups use OC – i.e. ETA (indigenous to the E.U.), and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (with origins external to the E.U. but with European
operations).
Although ETA declared a new ceasefire in 2010, and announced a ‘definitive cessation’ of
armed activity in 2011, it has not handed over its arms, nor has it definitively stopped
engaging in OC activities. Responsible for killing hundreds and injuring thousands since it
began its campaign for an independent Basque country, the group has embraced extortion,
robbery and to some degree, arms trafficking, in order to meet its estimated annual €2
million budgetary needs (Spanish police figures).
The greatest current threat associated with ETA is that elements of the group have shifted
their focus towards OC activities – similar to what developed with IRA factions in the 2000s
(Section 10).
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As with ETA, the terrorist threat posed by the LTTE in Europe and elsewhere has been
limited by the defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan Military in 2009 (notably, the group was
re-listed as a terrorist organisation in July 2011). Although the group is severely limited in
the types of operations it can conduct in Sri Lanka, it has left a significant legacy in terms
of how a terrorist group can develop a sophisticated criminal arm. Since its inception in the
1970s, the LTTE established the following types of criminal operations: arms and people
smuggling, extortion, money laundering, counterfeit documents, drug trafficking, and
various types of fraud. These activities, however, were not limited to South Asia, but were
facilitated through access to the Tamil diaspora community throughout the world, including
Europe.
In fact, the case of the LTTE provides a solid example of how diaspora communities in the
E.U. can be vulnerable to terrorist groups originating on unstable ‘home’ soil. The use of
intimidation was a key method through which the LTTE ran extortion rackets and other
criminal networks with the support of the diaspora – i.e. they knew that the European
diaspora would not report their activities for fear of retribution against family members still
living in Sri Lanka. Clearly a similar predicament could occur in other diaspora communities
which could become vulnerable to the activities of terrorist organisations in their countries
of origin. In fact, there are indications that this has been the case within the Somali
communities, and the Pakistani, Albanian, Algerian and Kurdish diasporas in the E.U.
3.3.2
Terrorist Use of OC: E.U.-based Militant Islamist Groups
There are several concerns related to militant Islamist groups who either have indigenous
operations in Europe, or whose operations abroad have an impact on E.U. member-states ­
either through a diaspora community or through the trafficking networks they operate.
Within the E.U., very few militant Islamist cells have direct links to the AQ or AQ- affiliated
(e.g. AQIM) core. As a result, they are not in a position to benefit from any central funding
mechanism and are forced to find their own sources of financing. According to various law
enforcement and security sources throughout the E.U., the following appears to be a
common cell profile:

Predominantly composed of North African or Pakistani radicals / militants with no
clear societal ties.

These militants are now primarily 3rd generation who have had no experience of
terrorist training camps or operational experience in the main theatres (i.e. AfPak).

The lack of experience gained abroad, combined with the 3rd generation profile,
means that militant Islamist cells in Europe have few qualms justifying their
engagement in crime with their ideological aims.

Increasingly they rely on criminal financing conducted, for example, by core groups
in AfPak and the Sahel. Thus direct engagement in K&R, extortion and various forms
of illicit smuggling by groups abroad - such as AQIM, Quetta Shura Taliban, and the
Haqqani network – provides legitimacy for ‘inspired’ independent cells based in the
E.U. to engage in criminal activities themselves. Crime has thus become
‘theologically’ justifiable so long as it is used for financing or operational needs.
There are several examples of E.U.-based cells engaging in criminal activities as a source of
funding for specific terrorist attacks. Some key cases/trends are noted below.

Jamal Ahmidan, a key figure responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombings, sold drugs
to pay for operational and logistical cell support. A known drug dealer and trafficker,
Ahmidan was radicalised in prison. Furthermore, Spanish investigators concluded
that several drug traffickers were in fact radicalised and integrated into the cell
32 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
responsible for the attack. Open sources reported that the police found €52,000 and
€1.5 million worth of narcotics in the flats of one of the accused.

In 2004, Spanish authorities arrested ten Pakistanis in Barcelona who were in
possession of false documents and heroin. It was discovered that they were part of
a radical Islamist support network, with evidence confirming that they sent money
to the accused mastermind of the Madrid train bombings, and to Ahmed Khalfan
Ghailani, linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In 2005, French authorities dismantled an illicit network that consisted of a group of
militants and common criminals operating within the same structure. The driver
behind this integration was not believed to be profit, but based more on a complex
mix of factors including loyalty to a specific ethnic or religious community, and/or
the emergence of sympathetic feelings.

Open sources have reported that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan have been involved in
exporting heroin to a number of global destinations, including Europe. The group
was responsible for a failed vehicle bomb attack in Time Square, New York in 2010.

Ahmet Manarbasi, the leader of Deutsche Taliban, was – according to various open
sources - a drug dealer from Lower Saxony. In fact, it is believed that a number of
militants in the group had petty criminal backgrounds. It is inferred that criminal
backgrounds of the jihadists facilitated the operations of Deutsche Taliban, although
it has not been confirmed whether or not the group itself was engaged in criminal
activities as a source of financing.

There has been a confirmed case in northern Europe of al-Shabaab involvement in
OC. European criminal operations of al-Shabaab are focused on money laundering
and qat trafficking. Although the group’s operations are concentrated in Somalia, it
is speculated that they have connections to some Somali hawalanders based in the
E.U. who have a reputation for money laundering. Notably al-Shabaab is currently
undergoing an internal split, in part because the involvement in drug trafficking of
part of the group has resulted in in-fighting.

In the mid-2000s, European investigators identified a common trend emerging from
networks of Pakistani militant Islamists. Ethnic Pakistani militants appeared to be
increasingly involved in OC activities, including drug trafficking, fraud and money
laundering. Several of these individuals were citizens of E.U. member-states,
including the U.K. and Belgium.

Between 2007 and 2010 there were several cases in the U.K. which including
militant Islamists who had engaged in criminal activity. One was Tariq Al-Daour who
helped fund website development for al-Qaeda in Iraq through fraudulent
transactions. Police found 37,000 credit card details on his computer, and identified
more than €2.5 million worth of fraudulent transactions.

Italian law enforcement sources have expressed a concern that first generation
Italian Algerians may simultaneously become involved in OC and terrorism based on
their profiles and the prevailing operating environment.

See Annex A for profiles of terrorists with a joint criminal / militant Islamist
background.
3.3.3
Terrorist Use of OC: Externally-based Militant Islamist Groups
As noted in Section 7.3.3, AQIM (Sahel) has engaged in alliances with OCGs. However, the
majority of its criminal capabilities have been appropriated or integrated into its structure.
A survey of various cases suggests that AQIM has engaged in various types of criminal
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
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activity, from moving money between Europe and the Sahel, to establishing smuggling
pipelines for illegal immigration and narcotics. In 2009, for example, three individuals
associated with AQIM were arrested in Ghana after allegedly agreeing to transport cocaine
through Africa to Europe. Thirty-four individuals were arrested in Morocco in 2010 in
connection with an international trafficking network smuggling cocaine and marijuana
originating from South America, to Africa and on to Europe.
The theatre in which AQIM (Sahel) primarily operates, i.e. northern Mali, is relevant to
understanding why the group appears to have no real inhibitions with direct engagement in
OC activities. Historically northern Mali has been under the control of nomadic Tuareg
tribes, who have long been involved in illicit smuggling and trafficking. The emergence of
militant Islamist groups in Mali and Niger successfully built on the cultural proclivities of the
area, adapting to the predominant mentality of the Tuareg people. In this context, this
meant adopting criminality as an acceptable way of life.
AQIM is thus known not only to operate several illicit smuggling operations, but also to
control networks that operate across the region. Kidnap for ransom and armoured car
robbery appear to be common, in addition to other types of smuggling.
Significantly, Mokhtar Belmokhtar – a key AQIM personality – was known as ‘Mr. Marlboro’
for his involvement in OC (e.g. for his involvement in smuggling operations). Investigations
conducted by European sources have confirmed that Belmokhtar is also associated to
Tuareg OCGs involved in the narcotics trade.
The threat that AQIM operations pose to the E.U. is two-fold:

First, AQIM has specifically targeted European citizens in its K&R operations. This is
important not only because E.U. citizens are potential victims, but also because E.U.
member-states have paid ransoms for their release, thus directly feeding into the
financial coffers of the group. According to open sources, between 2003 and 2011,
78 Europeans were kidnapped by AQIM. Ransoms paid have been estimated at
€60,000 per victim, with some suggestions that ransoms as high as €3.5 million
were paid.

Second, there is an indirect threat posed vis-à-vis AQIM’s drug trafficking operations
– predominantly aimed at transporting shipments to Europe.
3.3.4
Criminal use of Terror Tactics
As noted in the introduction to this section, OC appropriation of terror tactics is a limited
phenomenon in the E.U. This is largely due to the organised structure of the E.U. memberstates and the relative political stability that exists throughout the region. As with OC in
most developed states throughout the world, it is in the interest of OCGs not to directly
challenge the political structure. On the contrary, the relationship between OC and the
political realm is often most efficiently dealt with through corrupt relations.
Table 3 below provides a summary of how OC has directly employed terrorism over the
past three decades; and how the use of terror tactics has evolved over that period. What is
apparent is that the criminal use of terror tactics is most readily employed in unstable
environments as a way of acquiring territorial control in order to secure a criminal
environment. The only states in which OCGs have regularly used terror tactics since 2010
are Mexico (Mara Salvatrucha) and Brazil (prison gangs).
34 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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Table 3: Criminal use of Terror Tactics
1980’s
Eliminate
competition
Disrupt anti-crime
efforts
1990’s
Eviscerate legal /
political power
Challenge political
elite
+ 2001
Territorial control
Targets
Government
personnel
State symbols
Citizens / public
symbols
Indiscriminate
Methods
Assassinations,
targeted bombings
Indiscriminate
violence
Insurgent-like
operations
Case Studies
Italian mafia
Italian mafia
Balkan mafia
Chechen mafia
Not notably present
in Europe
Motives
The only recorded contemporary case of an OCG using terror tactics to secure their
operational environment in the E.U. is that of the Italian mafia. In the 1990s the mafia
used terror tactics to disrupt the successful anti-mafia drive, which was initiated to reduce
the influence and control that the mafia held over political, institutional and economic
powers in the state. As a result of these concerted judicial-led efforts, the mafia responded
with violence aimed to intimidate public opinion, perpetrating attacks that included
initiating a series of car bombs near historic sites in Florence and Rome in 1993.
In May 2012, a bomb exploded outside a school in Brindisi, Italy – named after the wife of
Giovanni Falcone, the anti-Mafia prosecutor who was killed by a Cosa Nostra bomb in 1992.
This 2012 attack killed one student and injured five. At the time, the Sacra Corono Unita
was noted as one of the possible perpetrators of the attack. Although a 68-year old man
claimed responsibility two months later, stating that he acted alone, Italy’s anti-mafia chief
publicly stated that the investigation was being organised by the anti-mafia division – with
speculation that the attack was in fact either linked to OC and/or extreme left-wing
terrorists.
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4 CASE STUDY: HYBRIDS
KEY FINDINGS 
Despite historical evidence of criminal-terrorist hybrids operating in Europe, the
relatively stable political and socio-economic environment that persists in E.U.
member-states indicates that these types of groups do not currently exist.

On the other hand, there are cases in which terrorist–criminal hybrids continue to
maintain their ideological agenda for public support despite shifting their operational
focus to OC.

There have been no E.U.-based case studies of militant Islamist groups/cells
evolving into hybrid entities.
4.1
Defining Characteristics & Background
Alliances and the appropriation of tactics are types of linkages between OC and terrorism
that are relatively straightforward to identify because they do not require analytical
judgements to be made on intangible characteristics such as group motivation and strategic
priorities. It is more difficult to draw decisive conclusions about hybrid entities – i.e. where
criminal and political motivations have converged within one group. Hybrid groups either
begin as OCGs that appropriate terror tactics and simultaneously seek to secure political
aims, or they begin as terrorist groups that appropriate criminal capabilities to the point
that they begin to use their political (ideological) rhetoric as a façade for perpetrating OC.
Table 4 provides examples of hybrid groups relevant to the E.U. that were, at one point or
another, simultaneously driven by the quest for profit and political change/power.
Table 4: Hybrid Entities
Entity
Criminal:
Russian
mafia
Albanian
mafia
Terrorist:
IRA
offshoots
Timeframe
Description
1990’s
Sought political and economic control, especially in the
Russian Far East
Sought political control – interchangeable membership
with the Kosovo Liberation Army
1990’s
1990’s
Rhetorical political stance, focus on criminal activities
The evolution of a criminal or terrorist group into a hybrid entity depends on several
factors, including: change in leadership structure, shift in membership base (often due to
new recruitment techniques), loss of centralised control due to the rise of independent
factions or internal fractures, and either no leadership or competition for leadership at the
ground level.
There are several case studies of hybrid entities developing in the European theatre of
operations. As with the section on appropriation and integration, however, there are few
cases of criminal-terrorist hybrids, but several cases of terrorist-criminal hybrids. This
would be for the same reasons noted in the previous section - i.e. that the relatively stable
socio-economic and political environment enjoyed by most E.U. member-states has given
little reason for OCGs to adopt a terrorist modus operandi in conjunction with their criminal
dealings.
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4.2
Indicative Case Studies
4.2.1
Criminal-terrorist Hybrids
The few cases where OC has engaged the political realm - beyond ‘corruption and collusion’
to secure political control via direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of
a state and/or to establish and maintain control over lucrative economic sectors of a state
via the use of terror tactics - have been limited to either Italy or to states on the E.U.’s
periphery.
In the early twentieth century the Italian mafia took military control through the use of
violence over territory in western Sicily, creating a system of power in direct confrontation
with the state. Not only did the mafia undermine state sovereignty by taking military and
judicial control over the area, but it also affected the ability of the state to provide for its
citizens (i.e. collect taxes, administer the law). Since this period, there has been no case of
an OCG simultaneously seeking a political agenda through the use of sustained violence.
The 1990s introduced a second case study that had an indirect impact on the E.U. This
specifically relates to the evolution of the Albanian mafia, which sought to build an
alternative/parallel government at a time of wider regional instability. The Albanian mafia
was inextricably tied to the KLA, and worked towards both a criminal and political agenda.
Details are provided in a separate case study attached as Annex B.
There are no indications of criminal-terrorist hybrids existing / operating in the E.U. at the
present time, nor are there any trends to suggest that any specific E.U. based OCG is
developing / integrating terrorist tendencies to the point that would classify them as a
hybrid.
4.2.2
Terrorist-criminal Hybrids
Terrorist-criminal hybrids, on the other hand, maintain an ideological stance whilst
refocusing their efforts on criminal enterprise. There are two main reasons driving terrorist
groups that are no longer driven by a clear political/ideological agenda to continue
engaging in terrorism, even as a façade. First is to keep the government and law
enforcement agencies focused on political agendas; in some situations the inference is that
political/religious dynamics become too sensitive to initiate criminal investigations. Second,
these groups continue to engage in terrorism as a way of asserting themselves amongst
rival criminal groups. Importantly, by continuing to portray a political component to the
public, these groups maintain access to their support network.
There are two illustrative historical case studies of terrorist-criminal hybrids operating
within Europe: Northern Ireland Loyalist paramilitaries (UDA, UVF), and the KLA.
Loyalist paramilitaries sought to maintain a sense of political instability because they were
unwilling to relinquish their criminal interests, or to endanger an operational environment
that had proven to be conducive to their criminal modus operandi. Loyalist terrorist groups
engaged in criminal activities as a source of revenue from the 1970s. Over the decades, OC
became an operational focus – this was particularly evident during ceasefire years. The
Organised Crime Task Force of the U.K. government in its annual threat assessments has
highlighted concerns that financing has become an end in itself.
The status of the KLA vis-à-vis its relationship to OC and terrorism is provided in Annex B
of this study.
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5 CASE STUDY: TRANSFORMATIONS
KEY FINDINGS 
5.1
There is no contemporary evidence that suggests an OCG or terrorist group is
currently exhibiting a transformation from terrorist activity or OC to the opposite
end of the spectrum.
Defining Characteristics
Transformations occur when the ultimate aim and motivation of an OCG or terrorist entity
drastically changes. For example, the group no longer retains the defining raison d’etre that
made them either political/ideological or criminal in the first place. In essence, it completely
changes its nature.
The transformation from a terrorist group to a criminal entity is often accompanied by
some key changes in the group’s dynamics and composition. These include:






Change in rationalisation from perpetrating violence to maximising profits;
Lower intensity associated with political demands, and a lowering of the groups
public profile;
Growing concern with avoiding harm to victims;
Reduction of attacks against ‘innocent’ civilian targets, unless those targets are
associated with profit making (e.g. piracy);
Political statements leading to an end of terrorist attacks, followed by an increase in
criminality; and,
An altered recruitment strategy.
Transformation from a criminal entity into a terrorist group is less common. As with the
transformation of a terrorist group, the transformation of a criminal entity is also
accompanied by some key changes in the group’s dynamics and composition. These
include:





5.2
The political rationalisation for criminal activities;
Donations made to political causes;
Systematic association between members and militants – reflected in an evolving
change in group composition and recruitment strategy;
Bartering illicit commodities for weapons instead of selling them for profit; and,
The adoption of political rhetoric as part of a growing public profile.
Illustrative Case Studies
Two examples of transformations are noted in Table 5, but these are tenuous examples
with limited evidence to substantiate any definitive conclusions about their motivations.
Furthermore, there are no contemporary indications suggesting that any European OCG is
embarking on a transformational process. The British Independent Monitoring Commission
has recently (2011) inferred that PIRA has increased its efforts and moved deeper into OC.
One case that feeds into this conclusion was made public in 2009. It involved the freezing
of the assets of Sean Gerard Hughes (commander of PIRA), and asserted that the frozen
assets were obtained from laundering the proceeds of mortgage fraud, tax evasion and
benefit fraud.
38 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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Analysis of ethno-nationalist groups who have used OC as a source of financing and have
shown a reluctance to cease terrorist rhetoric even after peace agreements and ceasefires
have been reached are potential candidates for the ‘transformation’ category of the nexus.
ETA and the PKK, for example, could be viewed as terrorist groups using the façade of
political motivations to hide criminal activity.
There are no convincing arguments that can be made of profit maximisation replacing the
radical Islamist ideology of militant Islamist groups. Thus within the European context, it is
evident that the other end of the transformation spectrum (terrorism into OC) is rare. For
cells/groups that fall within the al-Qaeda structure, motivation is still central – it does
matter. Unlike ethno-nationalist terrorist groups that have, on occasion, embraced OC in
lieu of their original political motivations, the militant Islamist profile continues to reflect a
clear belief system.
Table 5: Transformations
Entity
17 November
Description
Decreased political demands, replaced by growing involvement
in smuggling operations, extortion and fraud
Irish National
Liberation Army
Focused on criminal activities, ties to Irish mafia in U.S.; no
evidence to indicate involvement in operational planning of
terrorist events (acted as OC faction of IRA)
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6 IMPACT ON THE E.U. & RECOMMENDATIONS
KEY FINDINGS 
Despite gaps in intelligence and research regarding the prevalence and future trends
of OC and terrorism linkages, denying or ignoring linkages that clearly exist
threatens the efficacy of counter-terrorism and anti-crime activities / policies.

Intelligence sharing between E.U. member-state agencies is a key component in
combating the linkages between OC and terrorism. At an operational level memberstates must ensure that anti-crime and counter-terrorism units engage one another
in order to identify and monitor linkages between OC and terrorism.

It is paramount to understand that the effective fight against OC and terrorism
depends on an integrated approach involving all stakeholders on a national and E.U.
level.

The private sector, particularly the financial industry, plays a crucial role in
combating OC and terrorist financing by identifying and reporting cases of fraud,
money laundering, and other suspicious transactions. The financial sector must work
more closely with government agencies to identify gaps in current regulations and
implement innovative techniques to address these issues.
6.1
Evolving ‘Nexus’ Capabilities
Although caution must accompany any assessment focused on identifying points of
interaction between OC and terrorism, it would be naïve – in the face of solid cases – to
conclude that it is neither in the interest of OC and terrorist groups to cooperate, nor is it in
the interest of OC and terrorist groups to appropriate/integrate the tactics of the other into
their own operations if it enables them to meet certain requirements.
There is, without doubt, a large gap in both intelligence and research regarding the
prevalence, threat and future trends associated with the linkages between OC and
terrorism. This has led some analysts to conclude that there is an absence of ‘proof’
regarding linkages between OC and terrorism. Unfortunately, part of the reason why we are
faced with gaps in our knowledge regarding the linkages between OC and terrorism is
because, at an operational level (i.e. anti-crime and counter-terrorism), few E.U. memberstates have found a way that ensures a natural ‘joining-up’ between agencies that deal with
OC and terrorism. Intelligence sharing is one component of this, but equally relevant is the
ability and desire of these agencies to cooperate on an operational level to identify and
monitor existing and potential linkages between the worlds of OC and terrorism.
From the analysis and case studies introduced in this report, there is very little doubt that
linkages between OC and terrorism do exist in the E.U., and that linkages that have
emerged outside of the E.U. impact Europe’s internal security. How these linkages will
evolve over coming years remains an important question. The greatest concern, in fact
expressed in a report published by the U.S. Library of Congress in 2010, is that expanded
links could increase our vulnerability to terrorist attacks by groups with enhanced criminal
capabilities and thus financial resources. Increased terrorist interest in directly conducting
OC activities has expanded the criminal environment present in each E.U. member-state –
thus exacerbating the many threats already presented by OC, and regularly catalogued in
annual state threat assessments.
40 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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6.2
Impact on the Legal Economy & Financial Systems
E.U. legal economies and the financial sectors have relatively basic compliance programmes
in place – in most cases, the stringency with which financial institutions screen clients or
conduct integrity due diligence investigations on partners and investments is highly
dependent on the institutional culture prevalent within a specific company.
Furthermore, private sector intelligence providers who are often tasked to conduct Know
Your Client (KYC) or reputational checks do not have the background or experience
required. They are unlikely to identify indicators that could highlight potential overlaps
between OC and terrorism, whether that be in the context of licit or illicit activities. Thus
although in theory one-way of combating the linkages between OC and terrorism is to
follow money trails, in reality it takes considerable resources to trace money flows. This is
further complicated by the number and jurisdictions of linked numbered accounts, money
changers, entities that cross OC and terrorist networks, and the use of informal value
transfer systems that are involved in these chains.
Although government bodies may regulate legal economies and the financial system,
interests from the private sector predominantly control them. As a result, the financial
sector is simultaneously a major source of intelligence, but also the front-line of
vulnerability. This is seen both in terms of large scale OC-perpetrated money-laundering
cases, and smaller scale frauds conducted by terrorist cells throughout the E.U.
It is accepted as common knowledge that OCGs launder millions of dollars through the
banking industry. Clearly efforts are made to try and detect such activity, yet these groups
are still able to use the banking system to fund their operations and launder money. The
efficacy of the financial sector’s regulations both on fraudulent activity and money
laundering is thus questionable. Clearly a large range of criminal activity either goes
undetected, or is treated as an acceptable / expected write-off.
Research has also revealed a number of instances where terrorist cells with only marginal
ties to larger organisations were able to successfully plan, fund and execute a terrorist
attack. As noted in this briefing, self-financing and petty crimes – including insurance and
credit card fraud – are occurring at a level that does not necessarily raise the suspicion of
large banks. If this trend continues toward smaller-scale, individual E.U-based cells funding
their operations through fraud, it would appear that more aggressive action would need to
be taken to address smaller incidents of fraud that are often over-looked by larger banks.
Of equal importance is the impact the nexus has on a global scale. OC-terrorist access to
the international financial system can be gained through conflict and post-conflict zones,
which have weaker systems of governance in place. Notably, this access is often facilitated
by corruption and kleptocracies; providing OC and terrorist groups with a veil of legitimacy
through the international financial system, and access to legitimate investment
opportunities – at times bringing illicit capital together with capital provided through
legitimate investment banks. This is a phenomenon that has been witnessed in the
Balkans, in the Caucasus, and in other emerging markets that attract European-based
investments.
Policy questions on the impact the nexus has on the E.U.’s legal economies and financial
system raises additional concerns regarding foreign policy. How the E.U. deals with issues such as border security policies, corruption and collusion of public officials that facilitate the
integration of OCGs and terrorist interests into the legal economy, migration patterns
impacted by instability in North Africa and Afghanistan, and instability in countries that
have ties to E.U. member-states - will contribute to how the nexus continues to develop in
coming years.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
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There is no doubt that illicit financing, regardless of its origin, undermines national
economies and financial systems. This is clear from figures regarding the estimated profits
OCGs make from smuggling and trafficking networks, and the amount of money believed to
be laundered through the Western financial system. Significant gaps remain despite efforts
to regulate the financial system. How these gaps are filled requires more creative thinking
and strategies than have been applied to date.
6.3
Impact on Public Administration
The case studies provided in this report highlight the deep and diversity of linkages
between OC and terrorism. OCGs and terrorist organisations enjoy the benefits of
manouverability – e.g. such as creating new alliances, shifting trafficking routes, or
adopting specific capabilities internally. This adaptability is a natural by-product of each
group’s goals and motives, and its ability to respond flexibly to their operating
environment. In the context of the E.U., linkages between OC and terrorism are primarily
based around fulfilling operational requirements, such as access to smuggling routes or
counterfeit documentation. Although both OC and terrorism have clearly recognized and
benefited from the added value of linkages which benefit their own cause, the government
agencies tasked with countering OC and terrorism in each E.U. member-state are still
responding – for the most part – from isolated positions.
Considering the development of the nexus since 9/11, and clear evidence of expanding
linkages between OC and terrorism, it could be argued that the lack of cross-agency
communication and cooperation may have contributed to the flourishing relationship
between OC and terrorism. This dangerously erodes trust in the ability of governments to
provide economic and social security for their citizens. For example, the nexus:
 Increases exposure to crime and violence,
 Contributes to a rise in illegal trade which further undermines economic
performance and legitimate business revenue, and
 Feeds into perceptions of community insecurity when cases of illegal trafficking in
women/children/drugs/arms are exposed.
While the structure of law enforcement agencies and security services within each E.U.
member states remain fragmented, and there is clear division between anti-crime and
counter-terrorism efforts, it will be almost impossible to monitor the actual impact of any
current and future activities of OCGs and terrorist groups within Europe.
In addition, the limitations that the current legal system is facing within each E.U. member
state, as well as at a European level, regarding the nexus has allowed for the evolution and
continuing growth of a strong bilateral relationship between OC and terrorist groups. It is
therefore imperative that more focused consideration should be given to the development
of a legal basis that will increase the ability of the relevant agencies to act.
The E.U finds itself at a critical stage where the symbiotic relationship that is developing
between OC and terrorism is gradually overpowering the formal structures of the legal and
security system. As some experts have commented during the course of this project, it is
the reluctance of government agencies to accept the linkages between OC and terrorism
that has weakened the development and enforcement of any viable plan of action to deter
criminal and terrorist activities.
6.4

Recommendations
As a starting point, it is imperative to determine how the crime-terror nexus exists /
develops within specific E.U. member-states.
42 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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
Few individuals have expertise regarding the nexus and how it can be
operationalized. This inherently limits acknowledgement of the nexus as an
emerging issue that demands unique solutions. It is therefore essential that analysts
in both anti-crime and counter-terrorism agencies are trained in how to identify
existing and emerging linkages between OC and terrorism.

A joint-task force should be established at both national and E.U. level, as well as
within the E.U., which can exert leverage over the convergence of crime and
terrorist groups by continuously monitoring new developments and trends, and
sharing these with member-states. The European Parliament should ensure that at
E.U. level, Europol would be tasked to carry out the relevant monitoring.

As any targeted work on the connection between OC and terrorism is hindered by
political and diplomatic considerations, it is essential for the E.U. to take the lead in
establishing a unified approach towards external states regarding the crime-terror
nexus. The European Parliament should ask the European Council and the European
Commission to launch the necessary initiatives.

Given the continuous challenges that European enlargement poses on border
control, it is essential to develop increased co-operation amongst all the national
border control agencies. Particular priority must be given to what are considered as
porous areas within the security structure. As a senior European Government
Minister noted, “The enlargement process will lead to new challenges as far as
organised crime is concerned. With some of the radical Islamic groups in southern
Caucasus - such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - having a social
support base in Eastern Europe, it will be necessary to coordinate more closely on
the European and international level.” Therefore, the European Parliament should
ensure that FRONTEX is tasked to coordinate the appropriate initiatives.

Although the majority of actions taken by member states has concentrated solely on
terrorist financing, it is essential for law enforcement agencies to widen their
parameters of investigation in order to detect other links beyond the obvious
criminal connections. At the moment, most E.U. member-states suffer from a
fragmented view of OC and terrorism. For example, one senior German intelligence
official stated that: “This does not mean that the German authorities are blind if
these groups use criminal means on German territory, such as extortion, scams to
enforce protection, or money laundering. However, these actions are then defined
not as part of a terrorism agenda but as ordinary crimes. It all comes down to the
classification of a particular group.” However, as the Merah case study highlights
(Annex A), the problem with this attitude is that both anti-crime and counter­
terrorist officers overlook a petty criminal who holds the key to a terrorist cell or
plot.

The tendency of current anti-crime and counter-terrorism efforts solely to
concentrate on Islamist groups also limits the spectrum in which the crime-terror
nexus is perceived. Member states need to allow for structural changes within their
security communities that will re-focus their strategies and allow them to
understand how ethno-nationalist groups and SIT groups engage, or could engage,
with the nexus.

Given the nature of the nexus and the fact that the nexus impacts the E.U. both as
it develops within member-states and as it develops in peripheral regions, any
strategy to address linkages between OC and terrorism must incorporate the whole
range of law enforcement, including security services, military and diplomatic
efforts. Significantly more buy-in and cooperation from the private sector will also
be essential. It is paramount to understand that any effective fight against OC and
terrorism depends on an integrated approach involving all stakeholders at a national
and E.U. level.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
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
Despite gaps in intelligence and research regarding the prevalence and future trends
of OC and terrorism linkages, denying or ignoring linkages that clearly exist
threatens the efficacy of counter-terrorism and anti-crime activities / policies.

Intelligence sharing between E.U. member-state agencies is a key component in
combating the linkages between OC and terrorism. At an operational level memberstates must ensure that anti-crime and counter-terrorism units engage one another
in order to identify and monitor linkages between OC and terrorism.

It is paramount to understand that the effective fight against OC and terrorism
depends on an integrated approach involving all stakeholders on a national and E.U.
level.

The private sector, particularly the financial industry, plays a crucial role in
combating OC and terrorist financing by identifying and reporting cases of fraud,
money laundering, and other suspicious transactions. The financial sector must work
more closely with government agencies to identify gaps in current regulations and
implement innovative techniques to address these issues.
44 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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ANNEX A: MILITANT ISLAMIST NEXUS PROFILES
Mohamed Merah
Mohamed Merah killed three soldiers and four members of the public in March 2012 before
being shot dead by police in Toulouse, France. Initially described as a ‘lone wolf’, it
subsequently became apparent that Merah was part of a larger network.
Documents and research have revealed that Merah lived on both sides of the nexus coin –
he was a petty thief turned militant and shaheed. Born the son of an absent Algerian
father, Merah lived in a typical French suburb – in France this equates to an immense
shantytown suburb built in the 1960s for people returning from the ‘lost Empire’ (i.e.
countries like Algeria).
Merah made himself known as a local gang member whose membership included
individuals with radical Islamist interests. His older brother Abdelkader played a major role
in Merah’s criminal and militant path. Abdelkader first joined the ranks of a local gang
before establishing a close relationship to several radical Islamists, including Olivier Correl
and Sabri Essid. Sabri, like Merah, also had the past of a common criminal.
Although Merah had become radicalized by 2007, he did not cut himself off from the
criminal gang that he was part of – in fact, he maintained his involvement in OC activities.
It is his engagement in crime that eventually resulted in his incarceration. Whilst in prison,
it is believed that Merah turned his radical Islamist interests towards full-scale militancy.
From thereon he sought to join forces with al-Qaeda.
According to law enforcement and intelligence sources, Merah made €40,000 by acting as a
drug courier between Spain and France. Other sources have noted that Merah also
participated in robberies in the Toulouse area, but this is speculative.
Merah began to travel to key operational theatres as a way to force potential meetings with
militant Islamists. He entered Iraq and Afghanistan; but it was not until September 2011
whilst in the AfPak tribal border area that he finally secured contact. After spending a
couple of months there, he returned to France and began planning his personal operation.
Thus although he benefited from the input of a network, Merah chose to engage in an
operation that would see him act as a ‘lone wolf’.
On his return to France, Merah re-connected with associates in both OC and militant
Islamist circles. He apparently used these connections to locate weapons that would be
used in his attack; and, once all his supplies were acquired, Merah shut down all
communications with both his OC and militant Islamist associates, including his brother.
Merah was always part of two worlds – one criminal and one terrorist. He had access to all
the weaponry he needed through his criminal connections and knew how to prepare himself
(i.e. security measures) because of his criminal background. Most importantly, he did not
raise the attention of the French police because they had assessed that he had too peculiar
of a profile to be a real danger. What the case of Merah, however, highlights is that an
individual militant Islamist with a dual criminal/terrorist profile is extremely difficult to
identify. Yet, individuals like Merah exist and operate throughout the E.U.
Rifa’i Bassam
Bassam was the leader of an organised group of approximately 30 petty thieves who
worked to finance the Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat in Switzerland
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
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between 2005 and 2008. His profile is interesting because it parallels that of Merah and
other militant Islamists known to various European authorities.
Algerian by birth, Bassam spent time in prison before joining forces with militant Islamists.
Although noted as intelligent, he did not have a solid education, but simultaneously
belonged to criminal and militant Islamist circles.
The group he organised in Zürich was able to operate throughout the country. He and his
two closest lieutenants were ‘true believers’, but the remainder of the OCG was not
extraordinarily religious. Despite this reality, Bassam’s influence meant that the majority of
the profits from the group’s activities were transferred to GSPC in Algeria – through his
relationship to the lead financier of the Second Region.
Garsallauoi Network
The Garsallaoui network spanned Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland, and had
connections to core al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan’s tribal region. Human smuggling played
an important role in the network’s ability to travel between Pakistan and Europe.
This network used criminal connections – notably to Turkish OCGs – to travel throughout
Europe, the Middle East and into Pakistan. However, it is also believed that the Garsallauoi
network later used their acquired knowledge of these routes to smuggle illegal immigrants
into Europe as a way of securing financing for their operations.
Of note is that Swiss and Italian authorities had uncovered connections between
Garsallauoi and Mohammed Akremi Gharsellaoui, the head of an OCG that was engaged in
illegal immigration, but also recruited radical Islamists. Akremi was based in Lombardy, but
his network was spread across France, Switzerland and Tunisia. This group was suspected
of having extensive links to drug trafficking and human smuggling of North African
immigrants.
46 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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ANNEX B: CASE STUDY – ALBANIAN OC Noted in the PKK study (Annex C), the Balkan route is one of the more prominent avenues
for drug trafficking into Europe. Evidence has shown that Turkish criminal groups affiliated
with the PKK do have access to this region. However, the primary networks for trafficking
and other illegal activity in the Balkans rest upon criminal organisations native to these
countries. Throughout the 1990s, criminal networks strived in the shadow economy under
the destabilising effects of the Yugoslav wars. The end of the wars did not halt criminal
activity; rather the past decade has seen an expansion in OC, often with tacit approval by
top government officials. Today, for example, some estimates show that the shadow
economy is at least 20% of GDP in Albania, though other estimates argue it is higher.1
Of these groups, the Albania mafia has, over the years, expanded their presence and
influence both in the region and internationally. The 2007 World Drug Report issued by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes noted for example, alliances between South
American drug traffickers and the Albanian mafia.2 Albanian criminal networks are also said
to have links with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, and Stidda, as well as British, Dutch,
Irish, Kurdish, Mexican, Nigerian, Polish, Russian, and Serbian criminal syndicates. These
relationships should be of concern to European authorities; not only in terms of the
complex criminal networks that exist within Europe and the outlying regions, but also the
various connections that these groups have established with terrorist organisations
operating in the same areas.3
Furthermore, Albanian criminal networks have maintained strong clan-like relations with
diaspora communities, which have allowed the group to tap these resources to increase
their criminal presence. According to the World Customs Organisation, Albanians made up
32% of all arrests for heroin trafficking in Italy between 2000 and 2008. 4 The Daily Record
reported this year that Scottish authorities identified at least 25 foreign gangs operating in
Scotland. Of those reported, Albanian groups posed the greatest threat as an “ultraviolent”
organisation. Former Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) official
Graeme Pearson, now a Labour MSP, said: "The Albanians are a challenge because they
have a military background and their criminal elements have a very violent history." 5
Albanian networks are also visible in Greece, Switzerland and many other E.U. countries. In
Hungary, the Albanian mafia is estimated to control 80% of the heroin market.6
According to Europol’s 2011 OCTA, the so called ‘Balkan axis’ will take on an increasingly
prominent role in trafficking illicit commodities to the E.U. market, especially following the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen zone. This may also become the
1
Agnes Lovasz, “Albania Plans to Sell Eurobonds Again Next Year to Build Roads, Repay Debt,” Bloomberg 12
November 2010. Accessed 20 September 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-11/albania-plans-to­
sell-eurobonds-again-next-year-to-build-roads-repay-debt.html. 2
Ioannis Michaletos, "Balkan Based Organised Crime Activities Gaining Ground,” World Security Network 8 September
2010.
Accessed
20
September
2012.
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18398.
3
Terrorist organisations include PKK, FARC, KLA, Eta, IRA and al Qaeda. 4
Tom Burghardt, “Kosovo: Europe’s Mafia State. Hub of the EU-NATO Drug Trail,” Global Research 22 December
2010. Accessed 20 September 2012. http://www.globalresearch.ca/kosovo-europe-s-mafia-state-hub-of-the-eu­
nato-drug-trail/
5
Peter Laing, Foreign Mobs Muscle in on Vice and Drugs; 'Ultra-Violent' Albania Mafia Hit Scotland,” Daily Record
16 January 2012.
6
Ioannis Michaletos, “Trends in Balkan Organised Crime Activities,” World Press 1 April 2011. Accessed 20
September 2012. http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3722.cfm.
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preferred route for illegal immigration, replacing the current Turkey-Greece passage.7 The
report goes on to note:
Albanian speaking organised crime is truly poly-drug and poly-criminal.
Within the E.U., Albanian-speaking groups are active in the fields of cocaine,
heroin, synthetic drug and cannabis trafficking. The financial resources of
these groups have enabled them to interact with criminal organisations in
source areas for illicit drugs, as well as to proactively identify new criminal
opportunities. Some of their proceeds are reportedly destined for support
organisations for the former Kosovo Liberation Army.8
The connection to the KLA should be noted as this represents the additional element in the
crime-terror nexus. Throughout the 1990s (and similar to the study on the PKK) the KLA
occupied both fields in terms of terrorist activity and OC. Scholars have noted that Albanian
criminal networks in Europe financed the KLA militia throughout the Kosovo conflict. 9
However since the end of the war and the formal disbandment of the KLA, former members
of the organisation - both in public office and private business - have taken the structure
used to sustain the group and continue to use their organisation and networks for illicit and
illegal activity. One expert analyst on security issues noted that the Pristina government
has always been "subject to the power of the Mafiosi who were the largest donors of the
KLA rebels and want to keep the region in their own sphere of influence."10 This symbiotic
relationship has allowed the group to make a clear transition from terrorist organisation to
OC.
A 2010 report by the Council of Europe (CoE) and on the on-going investigation into
alleged organ trafficking by the KLA during the 1990s has named a number of prominent
Kosovar individuals tied to criminal activity. In the CoE report, Prime Mintster Hashim Thaci
was identified as the 'big fish' in OC and has ‘key players’ in Kosovo’s mafia-like
structures.11 The report also included, for example, Xhavit Haliti - in a leaked NATO report
published by the Guardian in 2011, Haliti was described as having strong ties with the
Albanian mafia and Kosovo's secret service who is "highly involved in prostitution, weapons
and drugs smuggling".12
Another noted individual, Naser Kelmendi, was recently added to The U.S. Treasury
Department’s list of narcotics ‘kingpins’. A 2008 Interpol report said that Kelmendi headed
one of the best-organised criminal organisations in the region, which has been involved in
drugs and cigarette smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering and loan sharking.13
According to public records, Kelmendi has historical ties to businessman Ekrem Luka and a
former prime minister of the Kosovo government, Ramus Haradinaj - both former member
7
Europol, OCTA 2011EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment. (2011): 49. Accessed 20 September 2012.
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa_2011_1.pdf.
8
OCTA 2011EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 20.
9
According to Kaldor, the KLA used its’ links to Kosovars in Zurich responsible for drug trade which provided
money and arms. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Politiy Press:
1999,
158.
For
links
to
articles
highlighted
organised
crime
in
the
KLA
see
http://balkania.tripod.com/resources/terrorism/kla-drugs.html.
10
Ioannis Michaletos, “Kosovo’s Affairs and the "Narco-statehood", Serbianna 28 March 2008. Accessed 20
September 2012. http://www.serbianna.com/columns/michaletos/046.shtml.
11
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, “Inhuman treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human
Organs in Kosovo,” 12 December 2010. See also Paul Lewis, "Report Identifies Hashim Thaci as 'Big Fish' in Organised
Crime,”
The
Guardian
24
January
2011.
Accessed
20
September
2012.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/24/hashim-thaci-kosovo-organised-crime.
12
See released NATO Document, “Secret Rel USA KFOR and NATO,” 10 March 2004. Global Post 25 March 2011.
Accessed 24 September 2012. http://static.nzz.ch/files/7/8/9/kosovo+-+Haliti+Xhavit_1.9248789.pdf.
13
“Bosnian Intelligence Chief Announces Beginning of the End of Organised Crime,” Text of report by Bosnia-
Hercegovina Federation public TV, on 12 September. BBC Monitoring Europe 15 September 2012. Milos Teodorovic, “'Kingpin' Designation Points to Official Protection for Reputed Balkan Crime Boss,” RFE/RL 22 June
2012. Accessed 20 September 2012. http://www.rferl.org/content/us-designation-kingpin-balkan-businessman­
keljmendi/24623246.html.
48 Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
of the KLA.14 Public records have yet to reveal the extent of his ties to the KLA, however,
reports have shown his alleged links to government officials in Bosnia Herzegovina (BH)
and Montenegro, who may have tipped Kelmendi off to a recent raid in September.15
The criminal activity and the networks that operate in Albanian OC have deep roots in the
Balkans and many parts of the E.U. With these criminal syndicates in place, the question is
can this network act as a venue to fund terrorist activity? If previous trends are any
indication, when both organisations occupy the same territory, collaboration may well meet
each other’s needs. The continuing influence of OC in the region may have implications for
multiple terrorist organisations. For example, a Serbian news source quoted former KLA
leader, Dzezair Sakiri as planning to reactivate factions of the KLA because “only the
members of the [KLA], with the experience that they have from the war of Kosovo, in
Skopje and in southern Serbia, are able to resist against the Skopjan and Serbian secret
services”. 16 Additionally, Greek security forces have been monitoring a dozen Albanian
immigrants in connection to the UCC, an offshoot of the KLA, who have been involved in
smuggling light weaponry across the Greek border.17 Another issue raising some concern is
the spread of radical Islam in the region. Reports have shown that BH is increasingly
becoming the hub for Islamist terror groups in Europe. Of these groups, the so-called
"white" or "European" Al-Qaeda has been expanding its influence in the region.18 Although
donations from the Middle East have been its main source of financing, it is probable that
the organisation may turn to OCGs to boost its financing operations. Another unsettling
trend is the spread of Islamist radicalism in Macedonia, particularly recruitment of
Wahhabists, in Kosovo. This group, as noted by Nova Makedonija, represent the wealthy
class in the region and have links to OC.19
As these developments unfold and countries like Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM move
towards greater E.U. incorporation, the ease with which OC networks can operate in Europe
will only increase. As is evident in this study, the Albanian mafia play a fundamental role in
OC in terms of their influence in the Balkans and through tightly knit diaspora communities
across Europe. However, the potential and historical links to terrorist organisations should
not be underestimated. Terrorist groups that coordinate their efforts with criminal
syndicates are well aware of the routes available; the removal of these economic and
security barriers are likely to increase the flow of traffic through the Balkans. Due to the
challenges the E.U. faces from OC, terrorism and the nexus that exists between the two, an
integrated approach should play a fundamental role in the deterrence of OC and terrorism.
14
Valerie Hopkins, “US Blacklists Balkan Businessman Naser Kelmendi,” Organised Crime and Corruption
Reporting
Project
4
June
2012.
Accessed
19
September
2012.
https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-indepth/1539-us-blacklists-balkan­
businessman-naser-kelmendi.
15
“Bosnian Intelligence Chief Announces Beginning of the End of Organised Crime.” 16
“Albanski teroristi spremaju gerilski rat,” Vesti Online 5 May 2012. Accessed 20 September 2012. http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/222614/Albanski-teroristi-spremaju-gerilski-rat. 17
“Albanian Extremist Groups Cause Reaction in Greece,” Serbianna 2 September 2012. Accessed 20 September
2012. http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/1563.
18
Vesna Peric Zimonjic, “Balkans: Fearing the ‘White’ al-Qaeda,” Interpress Service 29 November 2011. Accessed
20 September 2012. http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/11/balkans-fearing-the-lsquowhite-al-qaedarsquo/. Ioannis Michaletos, “An Outlook of Radical Islamism in Bosnia,” World Security Network 1 November 2010. Accessed 20 September 2012. http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18441.
19
“Report Says Main Threat of "Wahhabism Expansion" in Macedonia Comes from Kosovo,” Excerpt from report by
Macedonian newspaper Nova Makedonija on 27 May. BBC Monitoring Europe 31 May 2012.
49
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_________________________________________________________________
ANNEX C: CASE STUDY - PKK
The PKK provides a notable example of a crime-terror link and simultaneously
demonstrates both how this interrelationship operates in Europe, and the profound social
and economic impact it has on European nations. Although most of its financing until the
late 1990s came from state sponsors (primarily Syria and Iran), the PKK’s criminal
involvement is not a new phenomenon. Scholars noted that the PKK has had some
involvement in OC as early as the 1980s.20 However, losing state sponsorship by 2002, the
PKK increasingly turned to OC for financial support. As a terrorist organisation, the PKK’s
chief targets are in Turkey; yet its’ criminal operations span across the Globe.21 According
to Europol, the PKK’s criminal activities in Europe include drug and human trafficking,
extortion and money laundering.22 The PKK has also been involved in cigarette and arms
smuggling, counterfeit stamps and banknotes, and trafficking in blood products.23
Drug trafficking has become the PKK’s most profitable vehicle for terrorist financing with
conservative estimates placing their annual income at €500 million. 24 According to
investigations by the Turkish National Police (TNP), the PKK has been ‘extensively involved’
in every stage of the drug trade including extorted taxes on drug traffickers and OC
syndicates, cannabis cultivation, coordinated drug trafficking along the Balkan Route,
distribution in European markets, and laundered proceeds of the drug trade.25 Additionally,
the organisation has been known to provide drug dealers with protection from security
forces in exchange for a percentage of their profits.26 Cannabis, as noted by the TNP, is not
only trafficked through the state, but also grown in the Kurdish regions of the country,
which are used to fund their terrorist operations. In August 2010, Turkish authorities
seized 65 kg of cannabis and 65 kg of explosives. Those arrested in the operation were
charged with “carrying an explosive substance belonging to a terrorist organisation” and
financing the PKK terror network.27 In November 2011, Turkish officials seized more than
44 tonnes of marijuana estimated at 28 million TL. 28 More recent drug raids in Turkey
revealed that the PKK has been using Colombian methods - laying mines and hand-made
20
For example, see Lyubov Mincheva and Gurr, T.R., “Unholy Alliances III: Communal Militants and Criminal
Networks in the Middle East, with a Case Study of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).” (2008). Paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association, San Francisco, 28 March 2008. Mitchel Roth and Sever M., “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organised Crime, A Case Study.” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 30 no.10 (2007): 901-920.
21
Other ties not mentioned in this case include the former Soviet Union and Cuba. According to anecdotal
evidence, in the past the PKK also supplied arms to the Tamil Tigers. The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics
Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organised Crime Networks in Western Europe. A Study Prepared by the
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States
Government.
December
2002.
Accessed
27
July
2012.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdffiles/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf.
22
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Responses to Information Requests,” 15 June 2012. Accessed 27
July 2012. http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=454036&l=e.
23
Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34
no. 6 (2011): 468.
John T. Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence through an Examination of
Transnational Organised Crime and International Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 24 no. 2 (2012):
188.
24
Sedat Laciner, “Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism,” Turkish Weekly, International Strategic
Resource
Organisation.
30
October
2008.
Accessed
1
September
2012.
http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=70.
25
Turkish Report on Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime 2011. Accessed 15 September 2012.
http://www.turkishnationalpolice.gov.tr/publications.html.
26
Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 467.
27
Turkish Report on Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime 2011. 55.
28
“Turkish police seize 44 tonnes of marijuana in southeastern province, BBC Monitoring Europe 2 November
2011.
50
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_________________________________________________________________________
explosives on roads to produce ‘liberated crime zones’ - to protect drug fields. 29 These
methods may suggest that the PKK is simply learning the ‘tricks of the trade’; however,
this may also reveal criminal links to drug cartels operating in South America. These links
are highly likely (and have been noted in the past30); drug smugglers from South America
have had known links to other terrorist organisations including North African criminal and
terrorist networks, ETA and the IRA.
Furthermore, the PKK has historical links to
operatives in Hezbollah, which run operations in Europe, Lebanon, Panama and Colombia.
Like the cannabis trade, the PKK has large criminal interests in heroin with extensive ties in
trafficking from Afghanistan to the U.K. at nearly every stage. In October 2010 Turkish
authorities arrested 10 individuals and seized 142 kg of heroin before the shipment could
be transported to Europe. The investigation revealed that the PKK transported the narcotics
from Afghanistan via Iran. The drugs were then delivered to various organisations across
the Turkish border and then transported to Istanbul under the coordination of the PKK.
Money was collected from a jewellery store in Yüksekova County where drivers were paid
between 2,000 - 5,000 TL, and the remaining funds were given to the PKK. 31
From within Turkey, the PKK’s trafficking activities are interlinked with other Turkish OC
networks, many of them ethnic Kurds. In 2009 it was reported that 138 Turkish networks
controlled the heroin supply to Europe. 32 Trafficking operations in Turkey rely on clan
networks and family relations that have prompted one Turkish security officer to note, “the
cooperation between the PKK and Kurdish criminal clans has been similar to the
cooperation among Sicilian mafia families.”33 This analogy, however, should not only note
the relationship within OC elements, but also how criminal activity is tied to terrorist
financing and support of the PKK. Often, individuals play an overlapping role in terms of
organised crime and terrorist affiliations.
Turkey acts mainly as a conduit for the transport of narcotics moving to Europe and
therefore should not only be seen as an internal security threat but also, as Europol has
noted “a significant impact on the internal security of the European Union." 34 The PKK’s
transit operations incorporate criminal gangs throughout the Middle East, Balkans and
Europe. According to the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report published by
the U.S. Department of State, Turkey is at a cross roads of three main heroin drug
trafficking routes - the Balkan route, the northern (Black Sea) route and the eastern
Mediterranean route.35 In other words, the PKK is not a lone operator; the organisation has
multiple avenues and communication links with various other criminal networks. In July
2011 a joint U.S.-Romanian narco-terrorism undercover operation “identified Kurdish PKK
members that were selling heroin to support their terrorist organisation.”36 In February of
this year, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control designated three members of the PKK as
29
“PKK Using ‘Colombian’ Method in Protecting Drug Fields,” Hurriyet Daily News 21 July 2012. Accessed 27 July
2012.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pkk-using-colombian-method-in-protecting-drug-fields­
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=26019&NewsCatID=341.
30
Mincheva, “Unholy Alliances III,” 19.
31
Turkish Report on Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime 2011. 54.
32
“Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs Area of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union,” UK Parliament,August 2011. Accessed 1 September 2012.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/789/78904.htm.
33
Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone?” 188. Arda Bilgen “Drug Trafficking and Countermeasures in Turkey: A General
Assessment,” The European Strategist 16/11/2011 Accessed 28 July 2012.
http://www.europeanstrategist.eu/2011/11/drug-trafficking-and-countermeasures-in-turkey-a-general­
assessment-2/.
34
“Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs Area of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union”
35
Bilgen “Drug Trafficking and Countermeasures in Turkey.”
36
“Statement of Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism,” United Sattes Department of Justice 1 November 2011. Accessed 15 September 2012.
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2011/crm-testimony-111101.html.
51
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_________________________________________________________________
narcotics traffickers; all three have direct ties to Moldovan and Romanian-based OC.37 The
PKK’s active role in the drug trade (approximately 75% of heroin seized in Europe has a
Turkish and Kurdish connection 38 ) suggests that the terrorist group and its criminal
affiliates may have links to other criminal outlets along these routes, including but not
limited to, their Russia counterparts in Cyprus and the Italian mafia in the Mediterranean.
Turkish criminal organisations also have links throughout the Balkans, including Albania
and Bosnia Herzegovina. The eventual incorporation of these nations into the E.U. will
undoubtedly create easier access for drug trafficking into Europe; however, this also
provides the opportunity for a more concerted and coordinated effort to eliminate or deter
their criminal efforts.
According to Turkey’s E.U. Affairs Minister Egemen Bagıs, the PKK runs “the largest human
and illicit drug trafficking network in Europe.”39 It is estimated that the PKK is responsible
for nearly 80 - 90% of heroin in Europe. 40 Within the E.U., the PKK has an extensive and
sophisticated network to facilitate operations within the region. In 2010 French authorities
arrested three suspects engaged in drug trafficking to finance the PKK cells in France. The
investigation revealed that the three PKK militants were members of a large drug network
operating in Turkey, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Spain.41 In April 2011 the U.S. Treasury
Department Office of Public Affairs added five PKK leaders as narcotics traffickers under the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Of the five members, Remzi Kartal had
extensive fundraising capabilities in Germany, Belgium and France. 42 He had previously
been arrested in Europe in 2005 and 2010 but released shortly after. Finally, the PKK and
its affiliates have strong links to Germany and the U.K. According to one British official in
2006, "Turkish organised crime retains a tight control over the estimated 30 tons [of
heroin] a year that feed into the U.K.”43
Addressing the PKK threat as solely a military issue in Turkey is likely to fail given its
financial capabilities; “the organisation has shown considerable resilience over the past two
decades, not least owing to its varied and sophisticated sources of financing.”44 Turkey’s
success is highly dependent upon attacking the source of the PKK’s terrorist financing.
However, in order to cut off financing a concerted effort should be taken in the field of OC
and terrorism; it is simply counterproductive to view terrorism in one part of the world as
disconnected from OC in another. As this case study details, the PKK operate an extensive
criminal network throughout the E.U. and the outlying regions, and plays a pivotal role in
financing its’ terrorist capabilities.
Understanding the links between these two
organisations and incorporating this approach into police and military operations on an
international level can equip authorities with the tools necessary to combat OC and
terrorism simultaneously.
37
The PKK’s criminal activity in Romania is nothing new. In 2005, Romanian police broke up a human smuggling
ring affiliated with the PKK. See Roth, “The Kurdish Workers Party,” 909. Matthew Levitt, “An Anti-Crime Strategy
to
Combat
the
PKK”
Hurriyet
Daily
News
February
16,
2012.
Accessed
28
July
2012.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/an-anti-crime-strategy-to-combat-the-pkk. “USA deals blow to terrorist organisation PKK,” Cumhuriyet 28 August 2012. http://en.cumhuriyet.com/?hn=312586.
38
Bilgen “Drug Trafficking and Countermeasures in Turkey.”
39
“Turkey Urges Europe to Cooperate Against PKK Terrorism,” Today's Zaman 9 November 2011. Accessed 25
July 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=262168.
40
Bilgen “Drug Trafficking and Countermeasures in Turkey.”Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 467.
41
Turkish Report on Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime 2011. 55.
42
“US Designates Five PKK Leaders as Narcotics Traffickers.” Hurriyet Daily News 21 April 2011. Accessed 28 August 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=five-pkk-leaders-designated­
narcotics-traffickers-2011-04-21.
43
Ioannis Michaletos, “Turkish Organised Crime,” World Press 12 November 2007. Accessed 27 July 2012. http://worldpress.org/Europe/2987.cfm.
44
Michael Jonsson, “Kurds and Pay - Examining PKK Financing, Terrorism & Insurgency” Jane’s Intelligence13
March 2008. Accessed 1 September 2012. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Intelligence-Review­
2008/Kurds-and-pay--Examining-PKK-financing.html.
52
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX D: TERRORIST USE OF OC (INDICATIVE GLOBAL EXAMPLES)
Region
Group
Africa
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Africa
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Africa
Al Shabaab
Forces Pour la Defense de la
Democratic
Frente de Libertacao do Enclave de
Cabinda
Front for the Restoration of Unity and
Democracy
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
GIA
Africa
Interhamwe
Mouvement pour la Democratie et la
Justice au Chad
Africa
Base of
Operations
Criminal
Activity
Current Status
Smuggling and diamond theft
Remnants active; largely
inactive since 2005
Drug trafficking, K&R
Active
Drug smuggling
Active
Burundi
Revolutionary taxes; diamond and mineral smuggling
Active - political party
Angola
Kidnap for ransom; extortion and smuggling
Remnants
Djibouti
Cross border gun smuggling and smuggling of
contraband goods
Inactive
Ties to Chechen OC
Inactive
Various criminal activities
Extract donations from rebel strongholds engaged in
criminal activity, including cross border smuggling
Diamond, timber and rubber smuggling; drug
trafficking
Active / not operational
Diamond and mineral smuggling
Active
Diamond, timber and gold smuggling
-
Diamond, timber and gold smuggling
-
Diamond smuggling
Inactive
Inactive – formed core of
the SRRC
Uganda
Ghana, Mali, Morocco,
Algeria
Somalia + Yemen
Algeria + European
operations
Rwanda
Chad, Libya
Inactive
Africa
Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratic-Goma
Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratic-Nationale
Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratic-Movement de Liberation
Revolutionary United Front
Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia,
Libya
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Liberia
Africa
Somali National Alliance
Somalia
Extortion, drug smuggling
Africa
United Front for the Liberation and
United Front for the Liberation of
Liberia-Johnson
Liberia
Diamond, timber and rubber smuggling; drug
trafficking
-
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
Afghanistan, Belgium,
Denmark, Egypt, France,
Morocco, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom
Forgery, gun trafficking, drug trafficking, credit card
fraud
Non-operational; could
resume
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
53
Inactive
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Americas
Americas
Americas
Americas
Americas
Americas
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
Cinchonero Movimiento Popular de
Liberacion
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional
(National Liberation Army)
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion
(dissident faction)
Frente Ricardo Franco
Fuerzas Armada Revolucionaries de
Colombia
Colombia
Drug trade – smuggling predominantly
Remnants
Honduras
Kidnap and ransom; bank robbery
Inactive
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
Kidnap for ransom and extortion; revolutionary
taxes; regional commanders believed to be involved
in drug trade
Kidnap for ransom and extortion; regional
commanders involved in drug trade
Criminal activity
Extortion, kidnapping, revolutionary taxes, drug
trade
Drug trafficking and other small-scale criminal
activity
Kidnap and ransom, extortion, drug trafficking;
remnants primarily engaged in kidnapping
Robberies, kidnap and ransom, extortion, drug
trafficking
Robberies, kidnap and ransom, extortion, drug
trafficking
Remnants, sought
cooperation with FARC
Inactive; dissident
faction
Inactive
Active
Inactive
(1993)
Americas
Ejercito Guerrillero Tupac Katari
Bolivia
Americas
Movimento 19 de Abril
Colombia
Americas
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac
Amaru
Peru
Americas
Sendero Luminoso
Peru
Asia
Abu Sayyaf
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand Kidnap and ransom, extortion, marijuana trafficking
Active
Inactive
Inactive (~2001)
Inactive; smuggling
faction
Pakistan Drug trafficking and other minor crimes
Active
Asia
Asia
Asia
Baluch People’s Liberation Front;
Baluch Students’ Organisaton –
Awami; Popular Front for Armed
Resistance
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force
Bougainville Revolutionary Army
Ethnic Nepalese Rebels
Bhutan, India Papua New Guinea Bhutan Inactive
Inactive
Asia
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani
Thailand Asia
Haqiqi Muthida Qaumi Movement
Pakistan Asia
Haqqani Network
AfPak Asia
Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami
Bangladesh Protection rackets, extortion and illegal logging
Copper and marijuana smuggling
Various criminal activates
Assassins/saboteurs for hire; other criminal activity –
most likely to be smuggling various goods
Criminal activities – charged with being a criminal
group created by security forces
Various smuggling, kidnapping, extortion
Operation stronghold is major hub for illegal gun and
drug smuggling
Asia
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(Islamic Jihad Union)
Drug trafficking
Active
Asia
Islamic Renaissance Party
Asia
Jemaah Islamiya
Asia
Afghanistan, Germany,
Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Drug smuggling
54
Active
Active – political party
Active
Active
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Thailand
Asia
Jombesh-i-Milli
Afghanistan
Revolutionary/warlord taxes; involvement in drug
trade
Asia
Kachin Independence Army and Kachin
Democratic Army Myanmar
Drug Trafficking and general smuggling
Asia
Karen National Liberation Army Myanmar
Asia
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Sri Lanka
Asia
Asia
Asia
Asia
Malaita Eagles Forces
MEK
Moro Islamic Liberation Front Muthida Quami Movement
National Socialist Council Nagaland –
Isak Muivah Solomon Islands
Iran
Philippines
Pakistan
Asia
Pattani United Liberation Organisation
Malaysia, Thailand
Asia
Bangladesh
Myanmar Extortion, drug smuggling Active
Asia
Asia
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
Shan State Progress Army and Shan State Restoration council Sikh Separatists Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan
Revolutionary taxes, extortion, kidnap and ransom,
bank robbery; principle funding from narcotics trade
Extortion, smuggling (contraband, narcotics, weapons, people)
Smuggling (guns, drugs)
India
Pakistan Extortion, drug smuggling
Extortion Sporadic
Asia
Tajik People’s Front
Tajikistan
Racketeering, smuggling
2012 renamed as
People’s Front Without
Weapons
Asia
The United Front for the Independence
of Pattani or Barsatu Thailand
Racketeering, smuggling (contraband, narcotics,
weapons and people)
Limited since 2004
Asia
United Liberation Front of Assam India
Revolutionary taxes, extortion, drug trafficking
Asia
United Wa State Army Myanmar Drug production and trafficking
Europe
Abkhazia Rebels Georgia Cross-border trade
Europe
Abkhazia Separatists Georgia
Europe
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/ Cephesi Turkey
Europe
Dissident Republican Groups Asia
Asia
Europe
Europe
Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri (N17)
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) India
United Kingdom
Greece
Spain
Revolutionary taxes; parent KNU believed to be
involved in drug trafficking and other smuggling
Revolutionary taxes, extortion, smuggling – including
allegations of drug smuggling
Extortion, kidnap and ransom, robbery
Oil smuggling
Revolutionary taxes, extortion, kidnap and ransom
Smuggling (cigarettes, petroleum, mandarins,
hazelnuts)
Armed robbery and extortion
Criminal activities, arms and drug trafficking,
extortion, racketeering, bomb-making for hire,
robbery, cigarette smuggling
Bank robberies; ‘Sardanapalos’ faction involved in
smuggling drugs, arms, people
Bank robbery, kidnap and ransom, extortion, arms
55
Active
Active
Remnants active
Inactive
Active
Active – peace talks
Active
Known activity 2011
Inactive
Active
2011 tripartite
agreement signed
Sporadic
Sporadic –
predominantly criminal
Sporadic –
predominantly criminal
Active
Active
Inactive
Remnants active
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a
Corsica (FLNC)
Iraultza
Irish National Liberation Army
Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja
and Bujanovac
Spain
Ireland, United Kingdom
trafficking
Bank robbery, extortion, counterfeiting,
embezzlement
Criminal activities
Criminal activities
Serbia and Montenegro
Drug trafficking
Inactive
Criminal activities including drug trafficking
Active – primarily
criminal
France
Active
Inactive
Decommissioned 2010
Europe
Loyalist Volunteer Force
United Kingdom
Europe
National Liberation Army
FYROM
Europe
Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan
Turkey
Europe
White Legions and Forest Brothers
Georgia
Smuggling (arms, cigarettes, people, narcotics),
narcotics production laboratories
Extortion, robbery, arms smuggling; human and
drug trafficking
Racketeering and contraband smuggling
Al-Qaeda
Albania, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia, France,
FRY, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK
Core group believed to be involved in commodity
smuggling (diamonds), and has depended on
criminal groups for the provision of arms; affiliated
and independent cells commonly engage in petty
crime and credit card fraud
Active – evolved
Aden-Abyen Islamic Army
Yemen
Kidnapping operations
Inactive (2002)
Al-Gama’s al-Islamiya
Afghanistan, Egypt
Protection rackets, robbery, extortion; passport
fraud, counterfeiting
Operational as of 2005
Middle
East
Asbat al-Ansar (Band of Helpers, Band
of Partisans and League of the
Followers)
Lebanon
Robbery; involvement in narcotics trade
Active
Middle
East
Group Islamique Arme
Algeria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain,
Sudan, Switzerland
Revolutionary taxes, extortion rackets, drug trade,
counterfeiting, stolen goods trade
Inactive
Middle
East
Mujahideen-e-Khalq
France, Iran, Iraq, US
Oil smuggling
Operational as of 2005
Global
Middle
East
Middle
East
56
Disbanded in 2001
Active
Inactive
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX E: OC LINKAGES TO TERRORISM
Region
Group
Base of
Operations
Terrorist Linkages
Algeria, Mali, Niger, Morocco
AQ and cells
Africa
West African drug
trafficking networks
Somali Pirates
Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, Somalia
Al Shabaab
Americas
La Familia
Mexico
Americas
First Command of the
Capital
Brazil
Americas
Comando Vermelho
Brazil, Paraguay
Americas
Mara Salvatrucha
U.S. Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala
Americas
Mexican cartels
Asia
Pakistani Organised Crime
Asia
Afghan Drug mafia
Asia
Asia
Asia
Europe
Thai Organised Crime
Tamil diaspora gangs
Indian mafia
Camorra
Mexico, U.S.
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Greece,
U.K.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Thailand
U.K.
India
Italy, Lux., U.K., Montenegro
Europe
Ndrangheta
Italy, Luxembourg, U.S., U.K.
Europe
Sacra Corona Unita
Italy, Luxembourg, U.S., U.K.,
Montenegro
Europe
Albanian Mafia
Balkans, Italy, Romania, Hungary
KLA
Europe
Caucasian syndicates
Caucasus, Russia
AQ and cells
Europe
Russian OC
Russia, Ukraine, Cyprus
AQ and cells, FARC
Middle
East
Lebanese Organised Crime
Lebanon, global
Hezbollah
Africa
FARC
2004 – Rumoured to have met
with AQ leader Adnan
Shukrijumah in Honduras
FARC, Hizb’allah
Use of Terror Tactics:
Indicative Examples
2007+ Recruits follow strict moral code; state
purpose to do the “work of God” by bringing
order to state of Michocan
2001- Riots launched simultaneously at 24
prisons across Sao Paulo
2006 – riots at 18 prisons across Brazil
Indicative cases of terror tactics, including the
bombing of public buildings, subways and city
busses, to create panic among residents.
2004 – Intercity bus gunned down, 28 killed
2008 – Members accused of targeting member
of Canadian justice system
AQ, IMU
AQ, IMU
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
AQ / AQ-inspired cells
AQ, ETA, FARC, IRA, Colombian
paramilitary groups
2012 – possible suspect in school bombing
1990’s – Sought political control;
interchangeable membership with KLA
57
1990’s – Political and economic control,
especially in Russia far east
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union
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ANNEX F: THE NEXUS AND E.U. THREATS
58
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Journals
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