The Stanley Foundation’s
Thirty-Sixth United Nations
of the Next Decade
Conference
Using “Any Means Necessary” for
Humanitarian Crisis Response
Landgoed Lauswolt
Beetsterzwaag, Netherlands
June 17-22, 2001
Executive Summary
T
intervention, exhausting other options,
national interests, Security Council
authorization, the role of regional organizations, and resources and capacities.
he Stanley Foundation held its
36th annual United Nations of the
Next Decade Conference in June
2001, bringing together policy experts
who have been wrestling with the political, legal, and practical challenges the
international community faces when
intrastate conflicts escalate into waves of
massive violence—the topic marking a
return to the subject of the previous
year’s conference.
Justifying Intervention
The first question on the agenda was
whether the very concept of state
sovereignty should and can be updated
to provide for forcible intervention when
warranted by gross atrocities. A highlevel panel, the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, is undertaking a yearlong
investigation on how to resolve the tension between sovereignty and the need
to protect people against gross violations
of human rights.
The international debate over humanitarian intervention is still in its early
stages, with many of its terms and considerations not yet fully formed; the conference discussion reflected this and
showed the need for discussion of the
evolving international norms for intervention. Meanwhile, however, the group
did agree that the United Nations’ capability must be strengthened so that the
organization can consider, decide, and
respond to humanitarian emergencies in
cases where there is broad international
support for action. With a view toward
ultimately formulating new global norms
and practices, the Stanley Foundation
divided the issue of humanitarian intervention into several topics: justifying
The commission has been exploring a
concept of state sovereignty under which
a government’s sovereign prerogatives
are contingent on its abiding by fundamental standards of conduct—a concept
the commission calls the “responsibility
to protect” people’s basic rights. Under
this notion, states have a fundamental
duty to protect people within their borders. But if the government of a state
fails in this duty, the responsibility shifts
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Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
to the international community. Other
states at that point have the right to take
action that would otherwise violate the
offending government’s sovereignty.
solid enough information to convince deci...forceful
sion makers that the
intervention should
time has come to act,
be reserved for
using either preventive
noncoercive measures
only egregious
or forceful ones. The
offenses....
current system of information collection and
analysis at the international level was
seen as weak and ineffective.
Some participants argued that such a
concept is already part and parcel of
governments’ obligations under key
human rights and other international
treaties, including the United Nations
Charter. While there was broad receptivity to this idea in principle, there was
also some resistance on practical
grounds. As with other discussions of
the subject convened by the foundation,
there was a consensus view that forceful
intervention should be reserved for only
egregious offenses such as mass killing
or displacement.
But the best information in the world
will not automatically lead to the right
decisions. Competing evidence and contradictory information exist in every situation and must be carefully weighed.
Participants offered a number of questions that should be considered before
military intervention is contemplated.
Who is calling for intervention and what
is their motive? Is massive killing occurring, or is it about to occur? Is the international community being manipulated
to act by internal or related outside
groups, hoping that intervention will
result in independence? Will forceful
intervention be effective in stopping the
killings, or will it add to the death and
destruction? Have all options, short of
force, been intelligently considered? Are
there other options that should still be
tried or given a chance to work?
Exhausting Other Options
There was a rich discussion of the relationship between forceful intervention
and less aggressive means of applying
pressure. In other words, how do we
know when less forceful means have
been given a chance to work? The group
agreed that information, both factually
accurate and analytically sound, must
underpin any collective decision to intervene. They highlighted a crucial distinction between a vague early warning that
“bad things are going to happen” and
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United Nations of the Next Decade
On the last question, participants challenged whether a requirement to exhaust
all alternatives is realistic when a crisis
might be escalating faster than the world
community is responding. An alternative
guideline was proposed under which all
nonforceful means have been considered
in the context of the unfolding situation
rather than that they have all actually
been tried.
borders, secure allies, access to oil, etc.
(usually referred to as strategic or vital
interests), there are general global interests shared by most UN member states. In
other words, governments and nations
have identifiable interests in the peace
and well-being of people even in the
remotest corner of the globe, interests perhaps rooted in nothing more (and nothing less) than the values that nation sees
itself as representing.
National Interests
Security Council Authorization
It is easy to forget—in a discussion of
international reaction to crises—that
most key decisions about how to
respond trace their roots back to national
governments, where the domestic political context is inevitably an important
consideration. Participants agreed that
governments act from a varying blend of
national interest, moral imperative, and
historical experience.
...authorization by
the UN Security
Council for
any forceful
intervention is
strongly preferred.
As in earlier discussions of the subject,
there was consensus that authorization
by the UN Security Council for any
forceful intervention is strongly preferred. Opinion was divided, however,
on what options should be available in
the absence of Security Council authorization. Participants split into roughly
three identifiable viewpoints:
1. No use of force should take place without Security Council authorization.
A number of conference
participants stressed
that the national interests of most troop contributors actually
encompass a wider
range of considerations
than is usually accounted for. Beyond the core
interests in peaceful
2. Military intervention without council
authorization should take place rarely
and with great reluctance and only in
cases where the Security Council is
unwilling or unable to act.
3. In emergencies where urgent action is
needed, collective action by regional
4
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
or subregional organizations is an
acceptable surrogate. The Security
Council should be notified and kept
informed, and ex post facto approval
may be sought.
sitional administration
capacity in areas such
as police and security
training, judicial
reform, election organization, and the
strengthening of civil
society.
The Role of Regional Organizations
Some regional organizations have
already taken the lead in addressing
mass killing in their regions, such as
NATO’s actions in the Balkans and the
Economic Community of West African
States. It is unclear whether and how far
this trend will continue, but a number of
questions have emerged.
...global
mechanisms should
be found for
financial support
of regional
humanitarian
intervention....
In the meantime, there
were suggestions for
how the United
Nations and regional organizations
could coordinate more closely, via liaison offices as well as through nonpermanent members on the Security
Council. It was also felt that global
mechanisms should be found for financial support of regional humanitarian
intervention; such actions (as in East
Timor) can be said to be on behalf of
international peace and the world at
large.
For instance, how can uneven resources
and capacities be addressed? The capacity lies in the United States and Western
Europe but, other than the Balkans, the
problems lie elsewhere. Africa is developing an organizational capacity, but
has no resources; Asia has resources,
but not the organizational capacity. It
was suggested that a global division of
labor could be arranged whereby the
region provides the troops—preferably
with a mandate from the UN Security
Council and augmented by some of the
special communications and transport
capabilities of major powers such as the
United States—and the United Nations
musters the funding and provides tran-
Resources and Capacities
Discussion on the prospects for marshaling the “necessary means” when the crisis strikes split participants into an
optimistic and a pessimistic camp.
Optimists argued that troops could be
found and new countries could be
recruited to participate in both peace
operations and their financing. They
5
United Nations of the Next Decade
identified a number of countries that
currently are not contributing many
troops, but have a great deal to offer:
China, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala,
Greece, Israel, Vietnam, and Argentina.
The recommendations of a high-level
UN panel in 2000 (the Brahimi Report), if
implemented, would be a great step forward in systemizing and professionalizing the United Nations’ capacity. And
financial support will follow success,
optimists argued.
The pessimists said that money would
always be a problem. Even NATO members were having difficulty getting reimbursed for their work in the Balkans. The
secretary-general has also had increasing
difficulty in obtaining contributions of
troops for peace operations from UN
member governments. And, it should be
mentioned, any increases in capacity for
peacekeeping will not necessarily boost
the international community’s ability to
mount forceful interventions, which are
necessarily more politically sensitive and
controversial.
—David Shorr prepared the Executive Summary.
6
Chairman’s Observations
T
Participants generally accepted the
idea that sovereignty is not and should
not be absolute and unlimited. The
concept of “duty to protect,” being
refined by the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, found a good deal of resonance. A state that fails to protect its
citizens from significant humanitarian
violations cannot claim impunity. It
and its leaders should be accountable
for such failure. The current war
crimes tribunals and the nascent
International Criminal Court are significant steps toward individual
accountability for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The principles of duty and accountability are gaining adherents.
hinking on humanitarian crisis
response is developing and progressing. This subject was
explored at the Stanley Foundation’s
United Nations of the Next Decade
Conference in Vail last year, and again
this year in Beetsterzwaag. Thinking has
advanced over the course of the year.
Those who participated in both conferences confirmed that there is growing
agreement that intervention policy and
process require serious thought and
discussion. Mere position-taking is
unacceptable.
In 2000 participants found wide agreement on four main points. These points,
enumerated in this year’s Opening
Remarks, were affirmed and refined in
Beetsterzwaag. Specifically:
• “The ‘bar’ for intervention must be
kept high. Military action should be
taken only after all other means have
been exhausted.”
• “There are circumstances where the
international community should forcefully intervene to mitigate egregious
humanitarian crises in spite of claims
of national sovereignty.”
Beetsterzwaag participants confirmed
that forceful intervention should be
undertaken only when it was the
“least bad” course of action. They recognized that other, less forceful, means
This year’s conference report includes
highlights of a rich discussion of
national sovereignty and its limits.
7
United Nations of the Next Decade
are preferable so long as they hold
promise of success. However, they
made a useful distinction between last
resort, suggesting a chronology in which
everything else must actually be tried
before using force, and ultimate resort,
requiring only that all other means must
be seriously considered before deciding
that force is necessary. This distinction
increases the possibility of timely
response in rapidly deteriorating
situations.
act. Although opinions were divided,
there was considerably more readiness
this year to endorse the idea that
regional organizations should have
authority to intervene within their
own regions.
• “The United Nations should develop
and improve its capacity to contribute to the broad spectrum of
international activity in support of
peace and security.”
Participants also tested their judgement
on four scenarios of varying degrees of
humanitarian violation, ranging from
mass killing to the overthrow of democratically elected governments. As
described in the report, participants
required a high threshold of violation to
warrant forceful intervention. It should
never be undertaken lightly.
The report contains a number of constructive suggestions on how this
should be accomplished. For example,
the conference noted that the Brahimi
Report maps a course toward more
effective peacekeeping, including
many actions that would also increase
the United Nations’ capacity for
humanitarian crisis response.
Additional areas include rationalizing
the relationship between the United
Nations and regional organizations
and expanding the number of troopcontributing countries. These and
other ideas merit further consideration.
• “The UN Security Council is the preferred authorizing body for humanitarian intervention
operations.”
...sovereignty is not
and should not be
absolute and
unlimited.
Affirming this, participants explored options
for situations where the
Security Council was
unable or unwilling to
There is reason to believe that advances
in thinking on humanitarian intervention will continue. It is encouraging that
8
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
more work on the subject is being done
and a growing number of nations,
groups, and organizations are involved.
Informal discussions within the United
Nations continue. An increasing number
of nations have expressed interest in this
difficult subject and are sponsoring and
encouraging its exploration. Among
other organizations, the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the Fund for Peace, and the
International Peace Academy are contributing programming and ideas.
This attention and energy should be
encouraged. This issue is difficult and
some aspects of it remain contentious.
Yet I dare to believe that the world is
inching toward a new international
norm—a norm requiring that nationstates adhere to minimum citizen protection standards as a condition of holding
the right to govern—and that national
and state leaders be accountable for their
stewardship of this responsibility.
Such a norm, consistently followed,
would go far toward improving the
security and peace of aggrieved people
in many parts of the world.
9
United Nations of the Next Decade
Participants
Chair
Paul Heinbecker, Permanent Representative
of Canada to the United Nations
Richard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley
Foundation
Renee Jones-Bos, Ambassador-at-Large for
Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Netherlands
Rapporteur
Mary E. Locke, Program Director,
Humanitarian Intervention, Regional
Responses to Internal War, The Fund for
Peace
Lorelei E. Kelly, Senior Associate, Special
Projects in Congress, The Henry L. Stimson
Center
Participants
Pauline H. Baker, President, The Fund for
Peace
Dumisani S. Kumalo, Permanent
Representative of the Republic of South
Africa to the United Nations
Melvin Humphah Chalobah, Ambassador
Designate of Sierra Leone to Ethiopia and
the Organization of African Unity; Chief
Technical Adviser, United Nations
Development Programme, Ethiopia
Edward C. Luck, Executive Director, Center
for the Study of International Organization,
New York University School of Law
Simon P. R. Lunn, Secretary General, NATO
Parliamentary Assembly
Carlos dos Santos, Permanent
Representative of the Republic of
Mozambique to the United Nations
David M. Malone, President, International
Peace Academy
Gareth Evans, President and Chief
Executive, International Crisis Group,
Belgium
Charles William Maynes, President, The
Eurasia Foundation
Istvan Gyarmati, Senior Vice President,
EastWest Institute
William L. Nash, Senior Fellow and
Director, Center for Preventive Action,
Council on Foreign Relations
Hasmy Bin Agam, Permanent
Representative of Malaysia to the United
Nations
10
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
Gert Rosenthal, Permanent Representative
of Guatemala to the United Nations
Penelope Anne Wensley, Permanent
Representative of Australia to the United
Nations
John G. Ruggie, Kirkpatrick Professor of
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University
The Stanley Foundation Staff
Betty J. Anders, Support Services Manager
James S. Henderson, Program Officer
Kristin McHugh, Producer, Common Ground
Susan R. Moore, Conference Management
Associate
David Shorr, Program Officer
Eric Paul Schwartz, Public Policy Scholar,
The Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
Kamalesh Sharma, Permanent
Representative of India to the United
Nations
Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.
Participants attended as individuals rather than as
representatives of their governments or organizations.
Vladimir V. Shustov, Ambassador-at-Large
for All-European Cooperation, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
Ramesh Thakur, Vice-Rector, Peace and
Governance Programme, United Nations
University, Japan
Karin von Hippel, Senior Research Fellow,
Center for Defence Studies, King’s College
London
Thomas G. Weiss, Director, Ralph Bunche
Institute for International Studies, and
Presidential Professor, The Graduate Center,
The City University of New York
11
Opening Remarks
three informal working luncheons in
New York in the intervening months.
This subject is complex and difficult, yet
it is of pivotal importance to people who
are victims of the worst forms of abuse
in many conflict situations.
Broadly speaking, our goal is to establish
and reinforce global norms that the role
of government is to safeguard and protect all within its jurisdiction, and that
the international community will intercede, forcefully if necessary, when
national governments fail to do this and
egregious humanitarian crises result. A
most significant role of the United
Nations has been its many contributions
to the development of norms—norms
that improve lives and are gradually
inching us toward the UN Charter vision
of a world where there is a secure peace
with freedom and justice.
Richard H. Stanley
President, The Stanley Foundation
W
elcome to the Stanley
Foundation’s 36th United
Nations of the Next Decade
Conference. Our topic is “Using ‘Any
Means Necessary’ for Humanitarian
Crisis Response.” We return to the subject of humanitarian intervention, which
we discussed last year in Vail and at
The secretary-general’s September 1999
General Assembly speech challenged all
of us who are involved in these issues.
He said:
The choice must not be between
[Security] Council unity and inaction
12
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
in the face of genocide—as in the
case of Rwanda, on the one hand,
and Council division and regional
action—as in the case of Kosovo, on
the other.
regional differences that
influence how the inter- In a very real sense,
vention question arises
Kofi Annan’s 1999
and the nature of the
speech is a
response to it. Here
with us are Pauline
mandate for
Baker, the Fund’s presiour work....
dent, who is leading
that project; General
Bill Nash (who has unusual breadth of
experience in this field), who chairs the
project’s advisory board; and Mary
Locke, who is the project manager at the
Fund and rapporteur for this conference.
The International Peace Academy has
held a number of meetings on the subject, and we’re glad to see David Malone
again. It is worth noting that the government of the Netherlands has tasked its
leading international affairs institutes to
inquire into the issue of intervention,
and we’ll hear more about this shortly.
Other national governments are also
focusing attention on humanitarian crisis
response. A majority of our participants
at this conference have been with us previously, at last year’s conference or at a
working lunch. Robust and varied activity in this area is encouraging, and any
attempt to list it comprehensively will be
woefully incomplete. Suffice it to say
that a distinguished and capable group
of participants is assembled here to
In a very real sense, Kofi Annan’s 1999
speech is a mandate for our work,
including our discussions here in
Beetsterzwaag. It has also stimulated
other work on these issues. Indeed, let
me take a moment to acknowledge some
of these important initiatives, a number
of which are represented here at this
conference.
I think we are all aware of the
International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, and
we are fortunate to have with us one of
its cochairs, Gareth Evans; another commission member, Ramesh Thakur; and
its research director, Tom Weiss. The
commission has been conducting an
exhausting set of consultations around
the world. We are grateful that they have
included us in their schedule. We look
forward to hearing about their preliminary findings.
The Fund for Peace is undertaking an
initiative, in which the foundation is a
project partner, which will examine
13
United Nations of the Next Decade
address a timely and important topic.
Thank you for being with us.
Before talking about our agenda, let me
review some areas of consensus that
emerged from our previous meetings. At
last year’s United Nations of the Next
Decade Conference, four main points
enjoyed wide agreement:
I hope that we will have a very rich discussion here this week, bringing together
a number of streams of collective investigation and helping to clarify some of the
concerns and considerations that have
made the topic so complex and controversial. Its importance demands the collective best efforts of us all. Constructive
exchange of thinking will help advance
us toward our goal of new norms and
practices.
• There are circumstances where the
international community should forcefully intervene to mitigate egregious
humanitarian crises in spite of claims
of national sovereignty.
• The “bar” for intervention must be
kept high. Military action should be
taken only after all other means have
been exhausted.
I encourage you to think of this week as
a “predebate.” Our goal should be that
when we next face an unfolding tragedy,
the debate in the
Security Council and
What should
General Assembly will
happen when gross focus on what is happening on the ground,
rights abusers
string the world and the discussion will
not be dominated by
community along posturing around wellby pretending to known problems. To
put it another way, I
cooperate with the think
we all would preother tools?
fer that there be no
need for another apologetic report from the secretary-general
like the ones for Rwanda and Srebrenica.
• The UN Security Council is the preferred authorizing body for humanitarian intervention operations.
• The United Nations should develop and
improve its capacity to contribute to the
broad spectrum of international activity
in support of peace and security.
These are the core assumptions of our
discussion, and they provide a solid
foundation. In the months since, through
the working lunches and by following
the work of others, we have identified a
number of areas requiring more
14
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
development. Six of these comprise the
agenda for this week.
Intervention is considered a last resort,
to be used when other options have
failed. This raises our second question:
how will we know when less aggressive
means have run their course? Is there a
checklist of options? Are steps needed to
make these tools more effective? What
should happen when gross rights
abusers string the world community
along by pretending to cooperate with
the other tools?
First is the question of state sovereignty.
Our international system is composed of
sovereign states, and the United Nations
Charter (Article 2.7) enjoins it from
interfering in matters which are essentially within their “domestic jurisdiction,” except when done in application
of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. What principle or principles can
serve as the basis for the right or duty to
intervene? The International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty is exploring the concept of a
“responsibility to protect” citizens and
their rights. States, in other words, are
duty bound to protect their citizens and
residents. If sovereignty is contingent on
providing this protection, then a failure
to protect results in a surrender of a government’s sovereign prerogative and
invites outside intervention. Will such an
idea garner broad acceptance among
governments? Are there alternatives?
One working lunch participant spoke of
the “limits to impunity” for governments. This captures a sense that governments have constraints and the worst
crimes must be halted. It picks up some
of the rationale used to justify the new
International Criminal Court.
The prevention of conflict escalation is,
of course, an entire field of study and
debate unto itself, and we should not
devote much of our time here to delving
into it. Focusing only on prevention
ignores the fact that prevention sometimes fails, and the human suffering
caused by the conflict or repression continues. But there is a close link between
prevention and intervention because
forceful intervention will not receive the
support of governments until other
options have been sufficiently exhausted. Two questions will shape this part of
the agenda. What are the “other measures” that need to be exhausted? What
should the United Nations do to ensure
that these options are available when
needed and, more important, will be
used in a timely manner?
15
United Nations of the Next Decade
Our third topic is the link between intervention and the national interests of
governments who are being asked to
approve or support intervention. This is
often mentioned, but rarely discussed in
any depth. We understand that any decision to intervene will be a political one,
reflecting the thinking and interests of
those making the decision. But how narrowly and with what time dimension are
these interests defined? Will national
interests always tend to point governments “away” from intervention—to
encourage them to ignore a crisis—or are
national interests actually served when
gross abuses are halted? To what extent
should and do national interests include
global concerns such as preventing and
checking the worst forms of persecution,
regardless of where they occur? What
political strategies would help national
and world leaders rally
citizen support for such
...there is a
general interests?
widely shared
sensitivity...that
powerful countries
will be exempt
from facing any
intervention.
ment that a Security Council resolution
is preferred as the authorization for any
forceful intervention. But what happens
if sufficient support to authorize such
action cannot be found in the Security
Council? Some believe that the Security
Council is the only proper legitimizing
body, and others argue that regional or
other groups should be able to step into
the breach if an intervention is needed.
As an example of this divergence, there
is a widely shared sensitivity, particularly in the G-77, that powerful countries
will be exempt from facing any intervention. To some, this entire matter looks
like a device for imposing the will of the
powerful. We need to explore this contentious area.
Our fifth agenda item, the role of regional organizations, is closely related. Before
relying too heavily on the OAU, OAS,
OSCE, or NATO, we should examine the
interests and power relationships that
are at play in these bodies. How can the
self-interests of regional actors who are
providing military or political support to
one side or another be avoided or mitigated? Tanzania and Vietnam certainly
had mixed motives in intervening in
Uganda and Cambodia in the 1970s, but
on balance they are credited with stopping atrocities. Sometimes regions are
The next agenda item is
the role of the Security
Council. This was the
focus of Kofi Annan’s
1999 speech as well as a
point of consensus from
our earlier meetings.
There is strong agree-
16
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
very willing to act—as in Sierra Leone
and East Timor. However, this cannot be
assumed. At one of the working lunches,
we were reminded that the OAS provided no leadership in response to the 1990s
crisis in Haiti.
United States) be
brought to bear, while
the bulk of ground
forces come from the
developing world? Can
such division of labor be
implemented?
The sixth agenda topic is a difficult one.
Even when there is adequate international support for a forceful intervention to
halt atrocities, whose troops (whose sons
and daughters, if you will) will be sent to
do the intervening? One prominent
theme of the Brahimi Report, which
focused on the separate but related area
of peacekeeping, is that the Security
Council often passes resolutions that are
not accompanied by sufficient resources,
particularly the personnel, to carry them
out. Support for intervention doesn’t
mean very much without the operational
means to do the job. Even though the
Brahimi Commission focused on traditional peacekeeping and not forceful
intervention, are there lessons that can
be gleaned from their findings?
...there is a great
deal of difficult
work left to be
done even after an
intervention has
stabilized the
security situation.
To these questions, I
would like to add one
more, either for discussion or as background
when intervention is considered. As we
all know, there is a great deal of difficult
work left to be done even after an intervention has stabilized the security situation. What are we learning about the key
ingredients and best practices of postconflict peace-building? And what do
these lessons suggest for our standards
of success or failure? These are important questions, and yet they are sometimes invoked as a harsh judgment on
operations whose outcomes are ambiguous. Once again I quote a working lunch
participant who made the point that
even though Haiti remains in some turmoil, it is much better than it would
have been had the de facto government
been left in place. The subject of postconflict stabilization is often used as an
unfair measuring stick, where the best or
the ideal is the enemy of the good and is
used to make the “good” look worse.
The industrialized states have greatly
reduced their contributions of personnel
to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
How can the gap they leave behind be
filled? Can the special capabilities of the
world’s leading militaries (particularly the
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United Nations of the Next Decade
Of course, at the end of the conference,
we will explore how to carry forward the
work in this area. Our working lunches
in New York were a direct continuation
of last year’s conference, undertaken at
the urging of several of our participants.
Many of us will continue to work on
these issues in initiatives such as those I
mentioned earlier. But are there any
particular follow-on activities that should
flow from our discussions here at
Landgoed Lauswolt? Are other initiatives
needed?
to hear your reservations and will take
them seriously. Let us confront directly
and frankly the stumbling blocks and
alternatives to intervention. If we can
strike a balance between the urgency of
an unfolding tragedy and the practical
realities of decision making and action—
if we can hold these two in tension—we
will have a very productive discussion
indeed. And we will contribute toward
improving the norms and practices of
our shrinking planet.
Genocide and gross human rights abuses
are tragedies, not only for the world
community, but also for each of us individually. Regardless of our respective
roles, we all have an obligation to use
what influence we have to uphold the
ideals of the United Nations Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Let us confront
directly and frankly
the stumbling
blocks and
alternatives to
intervention.
Our agenda includes a
presumption that some
situations (though only
the particularly egregious ones) will call for
forceful intervention.
For those who are particularly wary of taking
this step, we are eager
18
Conference Report
T
developing countries from regions of
relative stability as well as those that
have the potential for crisis. Furthermore,
all came from professional backgrounds
that give them personal insights into the
full range of problems and possible
solutions. Many of the participants had
gathered in previous conferences and
meetings sponsored by the Stanley
Foundation and were, therefore, familiar
both with the issue and with one another.
The combination of recognized leaders
from the legal, academic, military, and
diplomatic professions made for an
especially rich discussion.
he massive astrocities committed
in many of today’s internal wars
pose difficult choices for the
major international powers. The ferocious bloodletting that accompanies
civil wars and collapsing governments,
ethnic and religious rivalries, and struggles for power and control over
resources are an almost constant feature
of history over the ages. What distinguishes the present era is that much of
the world now looks on from confortable living rooms. And victims’ cries for
help have compelled leaders in countries that enjoy such stability and comfort to search for ways to unite to stop
mass killing and genocide.
Throughout the conference, the memory
of Rwanda’s experience lay as a heavy
backdrop—sometimes mentioned openly, but more often alluded to indirectly.
In 1994 an estimated 800,000 Rwandans
were killed over a period of twelve
weeks in a spasm of ethnic violence that
has since metastasized to neighboring
countries. The international community
proved helpless to prevent, mitigate, or
stop the Rwandan holocaust. A number
of other contemporary crises—in East
Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Central
African Republic, Haiti, Cambodia,
The Stanley Foundation has tracked the
international debate surrounding this
complex and difficult issue. In its 36th
annual conference on the United Nations
of the Next Decade, the foundation
brought together policy experts who
have been wrestling with the political,
legal, and practical challenges the international community faces when
intrastate conflicts escalate into waves of
massive violence. The 24 conference participants represented developed and
19
United Nations of the Next Decade
Sierra Leone, Liberia, to cite a few—
served as touchstones which conference
participants continuously revisited,
seeking lessons learned and wisdom for
the future.
successful in the few cases where it
would still be necessary.
In their discussions, however, participants raised real world complications
that have prevented such an ideal from
emerging. For example, three major
powers, including two UN permanent
members, face brewing secessionist
movements or aggrieved minorities who
might be driven to violent action to
achieve their goals or be tempted to provoke harsh government suppression to
trigger international intervention. For
Russia, China, and India, an effective
humanitarian intervention regime is
seen as a potential spur to domestic
unrest and, even worse, as an invitation
to the international community to interfere in their internal affairs. So all three
have resisted new interpretations of state
sovereignty, the bedrock of relations
among nations since the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648.
Participants shared a clear sense of what
would constitute the ideal state of
affairs. The international community
would be, in such a utopia, so solidly
united in its pursuit of peace and freedom that its resolve to halt genocide and
punish its perpetrators, with force if necessary, would serve as a major deterrent
to mass killing. In cases where prevention and deterrence failed, guidelines
and procedures would be clear, means
would be available, and action would be
swift. The United Nations, with its universal membership,
Europeans talk would derive authority
from its Charter and
about intervening other related instrubut have
ments of international
law. And all member
insufficient
states would participate
capacity...while the willingly in providing
United States has the capability and
the capacity but resources that would
address the underlying
doesn’t even like to causes of violent outbreaks and make forcetalk about it.
ful intervention
The rapporteur prepared this
report text following the confer ence. It contains her interpretation
of the proceedings and is not
merely a descriptive, chronological
account. Participants neither
reviewed nor approved the report.
Therefore, it should not be
assumed that every participant
subscribes to all recommendations,
Rapporteur Mary E. Locke. observations, and conclusions.
20
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
In the United States and Western Europe,
ambivalence toward intervention in
internal wars has a different cast. As one
participant put it, Europeans talk about
intervening but have insufficient capacity to deploy forces to the world’s remote
corners, while the United States has the
capacity but doesn’t even like to talk
about it. In the developing world, many
countries approach a problem from
historical experiences with colonialism
or hegemonism or from serving as proxy
Cold War battlegrounds.
Even accounting for these real world
complications, the conference participants agreed, with only one or two
exceptions, that governments that either
commit mass murder or prove unwilling
or unable to protect their citizens from
2001 United Nations of the Next Decade Participants
Front Row: (left to right) Hasmy Bin Agam, Carlos dos Santos, David M. Malone, Gert Rosenthal, Dumisani S. Kumalo,
Karin von Hippel, David Shorr, Istvan Gyarmati, James S. Henderson, Lorelei E. Kelly, Richard H. Stanley, Pauline H. Baker
Second Row: (left to right) Paul Heinbecker, John G. Ruggie, Eric Paul Schwartz, Edward C. Luck, Thomas G. Weiss, William L.
Nash, Gareth Evans, Vladimir V. Shustov, Kamalesh Sharma, Charles William Maynes, Mary E. Locke, Simon P. R. Lunn,
Penelope Anne Wensley, Melvin Humphah Chalobah, Ramesh Thakur
Not pictured: Renee Jones-Bos
21
United Nations of the Next Decade
genocide cannot expect the international
community to respect their right to state
sovereignty. The majority of participants
appeared to agree with the view that, in
such cases, the international community
has a right and even a “responsibility to
protect”civilians from atrocities and,
therefore, should take action.
discussion of regional organizations took
on added salience. In some ongoing and
urgent situations, today mainly in Africa,
waiting for further progress at the international level is a luxury that some participants did not feel they could afford.
Participants discussed the role and
capacities of regional organizations, the
potential problems with regional solutions, and possible ways to link such
regional activities to the United Nations.
But there was less consensus on the
obvious follow-on considerations.
Suggestions for the “when” and “how”
to use coercive means to stem violence
were offered, but only one clear answer
emerged: “It depends.” The tug and pull
among conference participants on these
questions demonstrated the need for discussion of the evolving international
norms for intervention. Meanwhile,
however, the group did agree that the
United Nations’ capability must be strength...governments that ened so that the
organization can concommit mass
murder...cannot sider, decide, and
respond to humanitariexpect the
an emergencies in cases
when there is broad
international
international support
community to
for action.
respect their right
to state sovereignty.
With a view toward ultimately formulating new global norms and practices, the
Stanley Foundation divided the issue of
humanitarian intervention into several
topics: justifying intervention, exhausting other options, national interests,
Security Council authorization, the role
of regional organizations, and resources
and capacities.
When and Why Do Matters Cease
to Be “Domestic Jurisdiction?”
The United Nations Charter precludes
the organization’s intervention in “matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Article 2.7). Yet
neither the Charter nor current prevailing international opinion views this
sovereignty as absolute. Can the very
concept of sovereignty be updated to
provide for forcible intervention when
With global norms and
procedures still elusive,
22
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
warranted by gross atrocities? A highlevel panel of eminent persons, the
International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), is undertaking a yearlong investigation on how to resolve the tension
between sovereignty and the need to
protect people against gross violations of
human rights. The commission’s consultations have included a strenuous round
of visits to international capitals, and its
findings will be available in early 2002.
might no longer be a
legitimate defense against
outside intervention:
• If a sovereign state cannot or will not protect
its citizens from—or is
itself carrying out or
supporting—genocidal
or non-genocidal mass
killing.
...several
expressed the
view that force
should be used
only where mass
killing or
displacement is
taking place.
• In the event of mass
displacement under pressure of violence (including rape) or other forms
of coercion.
The commission has developed a concept of state sovereignty under which a
government’s sovereign prerogatives are
contingent on its abiding by fundamental standards of conduct. The commission highlights the “responsibility to
protect” people’s basic rights. Under
such a notion, states have a fundamental
duty to protect people within their borders, but if authorities in a state fail in
this duty (through either active persecution or failure to maintain order), the
responsibility shifts to the international
community, which then has both the
right and the responsibility to take
action, even if it violates the sovereignty
of the offending government.
• Where there are systematic violations
of group human rights, as in the case
of apartheid.
• When democratically elected governments have been overthrown by force.
Participants were, for the most part,
willing to accept the first case as cause
for forceful intervention, and possibly
the second case as well, but several
expressed the view that force should be
used only where mass killing or displacement is taking place. Political and
economic measures such as sanctions
and other targeted punitive actions
Four scenarios were outlined in which
the traditional rubric of sovereignty
23
United Nations of the Next Decade
against leaders were seen as more
appropriate for the latter two situations.
This view is consistent with the consensus at the previous year’s United
Nations of the Next Decade Conference,
where participants stressed the importance of a high threshold for what might
warrant intervention.
The argument was made that such a concept is already part and parcel of governments’ obligations under key human
rights and other international treaties,
including the United Nations Charter,
and is, therefore, a core requirement of
citizenship in the world community. The
binding together of sovereignty and
standards of responsible state behavior
resonated with a number of participants,
with some claiming that an international
norm is beginning to coalesce that could
ultimately evolve into customary international law. Precedents were cited in
which domestic jurisdiction was superseded in state practice such as NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo, the enforcement
of “no-fly zones” in Iraq, and the intervention of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and the
Economic Community Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. Clearly, the linkage between a
responsibility to protect and the justification (or duty) for forceful intervention
does not yet carry the weight of customary international law, but one participant
described a clear trend in this direction
whereby “something is happening out
there both in thinking and in practice.”
In its consultation sessions, the ICISS has
discussed the implications of shifting the
terms of the humanitarian intervention
debate to the rubric of a responsibility to
protect. A contrast was drawn with the
idea of a right or duty to intervene (droit
d’ingèrence), which—by placing the stress
on the imperative of intervening—might
seem overeager. The ICISS idea, on the
other hand, focuses on the condition of
the local population. Reports from the
commission’s consultations indicate so far that
The binding
such a focus on the protogether of
tection of people’s most
sovereignty and basic rights1 (e.g., life
and shelter ) encounters
standards of
less reflexive resistance
responsible state than earlier terms of the
intervenbehavior resonated humanitarian
tion debate; it “tends to
with a number of get them out of the
participants.... trenches,” one participant reported.
1
It was suggested that the basis for intervention is
best described as a humanitarian emergency rather
than violations of human rights, which is a broader
category.
24
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
Participants examined the role of the
United Nations when military
intervention is contemplated or used
in humanitarian crises. Justifying
intervention, exhausting other
options, and clarifying the roles of
the Security Council and regional
organizations were discussed.
25
United Nations of the Next Decade
Even so, the reaction of conference participants to a new international norm
based on “responsibility to protect” was
not all positive. “Political leaders have a
constitutional responsibility to their
own citizens. There is no automatic
assumption that people have to rush to
the aid of people in other states. The
‘responsibility to protect’ has to be limited,” one participant offered.
and the South have problems, and both
have been intervened in. It is not helpful
in trying to find solutions to see it that
way.” Still another participant added:
“The most recent intervention [in
Kosovo] was in the North. The problem
really is not too much intervention by a
rampaging West, but reluctance—too little, too late. Africans keep asking why
they haven’t received the same intervention as in the Balkans.”
Another participant saw the commission’s approach as reflecting the desire
of rich and powerful Northern
Hemisphere states to impose themselves and their values on the poorer
states in the Southern Hemisphere.
“The biggest challenge for governments
is to manage grievances and diversity.
The perspective from the South is that
nations from the North are trying to
take away their rights.” Another participant agreed. “It will not be Northern
states that are intervened in,” he said.
Preventive
measures...are
always preferable
to waiting until
forceful action is
needed.
But the majority of the participants
seemed to accept the commission’s pursuit of the “responsibility to protect”
concept as a helpful contribution to the
debate. It is particularly useful as an
alternative to the refrain in Security
Council discussions that every crisis constitutes a threat to international peace
and security, a rubric that is regularly
invoked because it is the only basis specified in the UN Charter for action under
Chapter VII.
Even those who perceived a nascent
norm, however, acknowledged the force
and vitality of the principle of sovereignty and its legal basis in the Charter. Some
pointed out its value as an underlying
tenet of international order and respect
between nations and argued that it
should not be violated except in the most
That drew a sharp
rebuke from a participant from a developed
nation who denied that
the debate is mainly a
split between North and
South: “Both the North
26
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
extreme cases. One participant suggested
that a concept of “suspended sovereignty” should be developed by the United
Nations and implemented by either the
Security Council or the General
Assembly in egregious cases of human
rights violations, with sovereignty reinstated at an appropriate time. “Anarchy
is one danger,” the participant said. “But
the other risk is paralysis.”
Information, both factually accurate and
analytically sound, must underpin any
collective decision to intervene. The
group highlighted a crucial distinction
between a vague early warning that
“bad things are going to happen” and
information solid enough to convince
decision makers that the time has come
to act, using either preventive noncoercive measures or forceful action.
Participants agreed that the current system of information collection and analysis at the international level is weak and
needs to be strengthened.
How Do We Know When Less
Forceful Means Have Been
Given a Chance?
Preventive measures such as strong
international support for sustainable
economic development and good governance—two essential keys to addressing the underlying causes of internal
war—are always preferable to waiting
until forceful action is needed. While
participants stressed the importance of
such efforts, they agreed this should
not divert attention from the need for
the international community to develop
the operational ability to deal with
mass violence when it breaks out. They
also talked about how to strike the
right balance between giving political
and economic leverage a chance to
work and resorting to force when it
proves necessary.
One suggestion was that the international community should have an independent tracking capability with
agreed-upon indicators so that potentially troubling trends can be monitored
and the community can be warned
when danger zones are being reached.
Such a capability would strengthen
both the use and monitoring of preventive measures, which everyone in the
group agreed were clearly preferable to
forceful intervention. As a caveat,
though, one participant warned that the
organizational culture of the United
Nations does not support or reward
candor and independent thinking.
27
United Nations of the Next Decade
Another suggestion was to resort more
regularly to the appointment of special
representatives of the secretary-general
to both assess situations and make recommendations for potential action.
Likewise, it was seen as highly useful
that the Security Council itself is increasingly going out into the field. One conference participant credited the council’s
mission to East Timor with contributing
to the successful way in which
Indonesia was persuaded to accept
international intervention. Another participant agreed: “The instant expert phenomenon is less dangerous than a state
of ignorance. It can result in better information to the council.”
The standard for
the application of
peaceful means...is
not that they all
should have been
tried, but rather
that they all
should have been
considered....
regardless of political considerations.
Moreover, a skeptic pointed out, the
individuals in these in-country offices
might not be capable of providing political, security, or humanitarian analysis.
But the best information in the world
will not automatically lead to the right
decisions. Several participants warned
that judgment—as much as facts—must
enter into the equation, and any consideration of intervention must be tempered by extreme caution “because it
may cost lives, damage infrastructure,
and incur huge expense.” Competing
evidence and contradictory information
exist in every situation and must be
carefully weighed. In addition, while
rejecting a rigid checklist, participants
offered other questions that should be
considered before military intervention
is contemplated:
UN outposts such as
the UNDP resident representative’s office, the
UNHCR office, or the
UN Information Center
might be useful sources
of information on the
ground, it was suggested. In the case of
UNDP, however, this
might raise a conflict
with the agency’s mandate to work with governments on economic
development often
• Who is calling for intervention, and
what is their motive?
• Is massive killing occurring, or is it
about to occur?
• Is the international community being
manipulated to act by internal or related outside groups, hoping that intervention will result in independence?
28
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
• Will forceful intervention be effective
in stopping the killing, or will it add to
the death and destruction?
having important practical consequences.
...success in halting
Even though there was
genocide and
consensus that forceful
massive killing
intervention may be
needed in extreme
will depend on
cases, there were two
the international
distinct views of the
community’s
relationship of intervention to the wider range
solidarity...
of options. The group
political will.
disagreed whether the
use of force should be
seen as standing apart from or firmly
within the spectrum of noncoercive and
coercive actions designed to halt massive
violence.
• Have all options, short of force, been
intelligently considered? Are there
other options that should still be tried
or given a chance to work?
The last of these questions is often
framed as the exhaustion of alternatives
to the use of force, though participants
challenged whether this formulation is
really on the mark. Clearly, a rigid
checklist of diplomatic actions cannot
be applied in the face of atrocities that
are unfolding in real-time. In other
words, a crisis that warrants forceful
intervention may erupt or escalate
before many instruments have been
applied. The standard for the application of peaceful means, therefore, is not
that they all should have been tried, but
rather that they all should have been
considered in the context of the unfolding situation. One participant proposed
that the use of force not be considered a
“last resort,” in the sense of a chronological sequence of options, but rather
the “ultimate resort,” connoting the
most serious step that can be taken.
On one side were those who believed
that the United Nations’ character as a
peace organization, rather than a fighting organization, requires that all remedies must be exhausted—or exhaustively
considered—before force is weighed,
much less used, by the international
community. As a corollary, the international community must develop socalled “smart sanctions” that apply
pressure directly to leaders and political
elites rather than ordinary people.
A number of other participants, though,
argued that prevention and enforcement
measures were part of a whole. Force
This issue, which might seem at first to
be a theoretical discussion, emerged as
29
United Nations of the Next Decade
should be considered “the continuation
of diplomacy by other means,” as one
participant put it. Otherwise, the international community loses the deterrent
value of force, will find it difficult to
muster the means to support force, and
will not be organized and ready to use
force effectively if it does become necessary. One participant, an expert on the
history of the United Nations, pointed
out that the organization was originally
intended to have military capability, but
Cold War competition within the United
Nations prevented its development.
governments act from a varying blend of
national interest, moral imperative, and
historical experience.
Geographic location, it was agreed, is
perhaps the most prevalent and consistent factor. If the emergency is in a country’s “backyard” and threatens to spill
over, there is clearly a direct threat to
security. When it is friends or allies who
are threatened, the threat to security
interests is also compelling.
History, too, often plays a role. The
American experience in Vietnam, for
example, has made the United States—
and particularly its military—wary of
becoming too deeply involved in countries of marginal interest to the United
States where commitment to following
through might waver. This concern on
the part of the American military that
political support can be fragile and is
prone to crumble was reinforced by the
debacle in Somalia in 1993. In contrast,
the British and French colonial histories
and ongoing strong ties in Africa have
made their governments more willing to
become involved on that continent,
although their involvement in NATO
peacekeeping in the Balkans has left
them with little capacity to spare for
other UN peace operations.
Even with the best information, wise
judgment, and the threat and use of force
as genuine options in the United Nations’
tool kit, participants agreed that success
in halting genocide and massive killing
will depend on the international community’s solidarity and that crucial but
unpredictable ingredient, political will.
How Do National Government
Decisions and National Interests
Affect the Debate?
It is easy to forget—in discussions of
international reaction to crises—that
most key decisions about how to
respond trace back to national governments, where the domestic political context is inevitably an important
consideration. Participants agreed that
30
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
A number of conference participants
stressed that the national interests of
most troop contributors actually encompass a wider range of considerations
than the traditional conception of the
national interest. Beyond the core interests in peaceful borders, secure allies,
access to oil, etc. (usually referred to as
strategic or vital interests), there are general global interests shared by UN member states. Industrialized countries such
as the United States benefit from a rulesbased order, a participant pointed out,
especially in the conduct of trade relations. The United States, in particular,
also derives its role as a world leader in
part from its support for—and hand in
shaping—the international norms at the
heart of the United Nations and other
emerging sources of global governance.
broad category of
national “interests.”
...governments and
nations have
identifiable
interests in the
human security of
people even in the
remotest corner of
the globe....
For some participants,
though, the categories
of values and interests
are separate and distinct from one another;
values should be
weighed along with
interests when governments deliberate over
their course of action,
but they are of a different character.
Another participant, while accepting
that values can be seen as interests,
observed that when Washington is confronted with a humanitarian crisis, the
pure moral argument is often more persuasive to policymakers (both
Republican and Democratic) than the
interest-based one.
But the broader point is that governments and nations have identifiable
interests in the human security of people
even in the remotest corner of the globe,
interests perhaps rooted in nothing more
(and nothing less) than the values that
nation sees itself as representing. The
participant who made this point conceded that such interests do not trigger the
same level of response as do strategic or
vital interests, but that it was important
for them to be considered in the same
Seeking to delve more deeply into motivations and attitudes toward intervention, conference participants drew on
their experiences and observations to try
to explain the considerations that go into
decision making.
For some, the desire to work multilaterally is a motivational factor—especially
the desire to demonstrate solidarity with
31
United Nations of the Next Decade
another country struggling with its
nation-building efforts. Others acknowledged that national interests do play a
part in the decisions, but so does recognition of capacity—some countries know
the terrain of the area in crisis and have
the capacity to undertake and conduct a
quick and efficient operation. In
addition, states become involved as a
result of strategic alliances. Allies may
work together out of a common desire to
demonstrate the strength of their alliance
and to reciprocate for past assistance. A
strong example of this is NATO’s actions
in the Balkans and US assistance to
Australia’s action in East Timor in the
form of intelligence and communications
support. Training foreign troops can also
be in the national interest since it promotes and sustains strong military relationships with countries
like Nigeria and India.
...conference
Yet another participant
participants drew added that altruism can
be a motivating factor
on their
as when President
experiences...to George Bush in 1992
sent an intervention
explain the
to Somalia to save
considerations that force
starving people.
go into decision
making.
tary reasons. Some are pleased to see
their soldiers undertaking intervention
missions. Unfortunately, this has not
translated into a willingness to spend
more money on defense to support these
types of operations in the future. For
others it is an excellent way to keep soldiers employed and out of politics. One
participant noted the dearth of unemployed military personnel around the
world. They could be useful and effective for future intervention operations.
Finally, participants recognized that in
order to have a stable international system, it is necessary to provide assets and
capabilities for military intervention
operations.
One participant who lamented the focus
on national interest rather than international peace and stability caused another
to react strongly. “All 189 nations are
driven by national interest. Sometimes it
happens that motives are international
peace and stability, but national interest is
the bedrock,” the participant said.
The permanent members’ pursuit of
national interest in the Security Council
also drew a sharp exchange. The Chinese
decision to veto a renewal of the UN
peacekeeping mission in Macedonia
because that country had recognized
Yet other states support
intervention for mili-
32
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
Taiwan came in for special criticism.
While sharing in the general view that the
veto was used too often, one participant
pointed out, “The purpose of the UN was
to find harmony among national interests, not to pretend that they don’t exist. If
you take the UN away from the reality of
national interest, it becomes useless.” In
response, another participant argued “the
Charter gives the responsibility and privilege to Security Council members to act
for the community as a whole. Pursuing
national interest in the Security Council is
an abnegation of the right to that
privilege.”
authorization should
take place rarely—
with great reluctance—and only in
cases where the
Security Council is
unwilling or unable
to act.
...one participant
pointed out, “The
purpose of the UN
was to find
harmony among
national interests,
not to pretend that
they don’t exist.
3. In emergencies where
urgent action is needed, collective action
by regional or subregional organizations is an acceptable
surrogate. The Security Council should
be notified and kept informed, and ex
post facto approval may be sought.
Is Security Council Authorization
a Sine Qua Non of Humanitarian
Intervention?
One participant arguing for the strictest
limit on intervention, referred to the
post-World War II context in which the
UN Charter was drafted. Hitler’s move
into the Sudetanland, he pointed out,
had the ostensible aim of protecting ethnic Germans from ill treatment by the
Czechs—exactly the sort of unilateral
intervention the Charter’s drafters
sought to avoid by upholding the territorial integrity of member states.
As in earlier discussions of the subject,
there was consensus that authorization by
the UN Security Council for any forceful
intervention is strongly preferred.
Opinion was divided, however, on what
options should be available in the absence
of Security Council authorization.
Participants split into roughly three identifiable viewpoints:
1. No use of force should take place without Security Council authorization.
Drawing a contemporary parallel, another participant mentioned, “Neither the
Russian nor the Chinese diaspora are
2. Military intervention without council
33
United Nations of the Next Decade
particularly well treated today.” Still
another wondered whether the United
States might feel freer to move against
Cuba if the norms against military intervention were relaxed. Reinforcing the
importance for Australia of legitimization by the Security Council, a participant said, “in the case of East Timor,
Security Council authorization was the
paramount consideration for the
Australian public and a fundamental
condition for presentation to the
Indonesian government.”
breakdown and massive killing between
ethnic groups. But nobody in New York
wants to do anything about it in advance
and probably won’t even after it happens.” The United Nations’ lack of credibility has extended to its troops on the
ground, according to another participant. “Some have been seen as ineffective and, in some cases, laughable,” he
said. Sierra Leone would prefer to do
without them, said another.
Other participants recoiled from such
sweeping critiques. They defended UN
troops as having served nobly and effectively in many areas of the world. “And
without the Security Council, we will
have anarchy,” one argued. Another participant argued that the Security Council
ideally should have full responsibility for
international peace and security, but it
has been overwhelmed. “Ten years ago, it
met three times a week; now, it often
meets twice a day.”
Other participants, though, argued that
in reality the United Nations no longer
even plays the central role in international peace and security. “In Africa, we are
not getting quick support from the
Security Council, so we are organizing
ourselves to take action. Resources from
international organizations are the factor
in their influence.” “There has been a
decoupling in Europe,
...at a minimum, too, from the UN,”
added another.
notification of
non-UN approved
interventions ought
to be made to the
Security Council....
Yet others highlighted that a number of
past unilateral and multilateral interventions ultimately enjoyed wide approval:
India into East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in
1971, Tanzania into Uganda in 1978, and
Vietnam into Cambodia in l979. More
recently, NATO’s intervention in the
Balkans without Security Council autho-
One harshly skeptical
participant questioned
the Security Council’s
willingness to take
action in Burundi: “It is
a candidate for internal
34
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
What Is the
Role of Regional
Organizations and
Regional Actors?
rization has been termed illegal, but legitimate by the well-respected Independent
International Commission on Kosovo,
cochaired by Richard Goldstone of South
Africa and Carl Tham of Sweden. The
movement of ECOMOG into Liberia and
Sierra Leone in West Africa did not
receive Security Council authorization in
advance, but did receive ex post facto
approval when the Security Council
agreed to send in UN troops to bolster
the subregional forces.
Several
participants
expressed...alarm
at the prospect
that regional
organizations might
be taking the lead
on peace and
security issues.
One of the participants
introduced the topic by
pointing out that
regional solutions are
gaining prominence as
either a supplement or
alternative to global
solutions. In some
regions and subregions
of Africa, where there is
a sense of disengagement of the major
powers reflected in the Security Council,
a regional approach may indeed be the
only solution possible. Some regional
organizations have already taken the
lead in addressing mass killings in their
regions, the presenter said, offering the
examples of NATO in the Balkans and
ECOWAS in West Africa. One strength of
regional organizations is that they tap
into the proximity-is-everything dynamic of mobilizing collective political will to
take action. Often, though, an influential
country or leader must take the lead in
rallying the response; sometimes a
regional hegemon or hegemonic aspirant
will serve in this role.
Discussion of the Security Council
inevitably drifted into the area of council
reform, though few participants believed
the odds were very good for major
changes. All participants seemed to
agree that, at a minimum, notification of
non-UN approved interventions ought
to be made to the Security Council—if
not on legal grounds, at least on moral
grounds—and continuous efforts should
be made to keep the council informed.
One participant suggested that Security
Council unanimity might not be
required as authority to proceed. “Even
if you had one or two vetoes, but had the
support of the rest of the council, you
would still have a fairly solid majority
behind you, and that might provide
moral legitimacy,” he said.
35
United Nations of the Next Decade
The Fund for Peace (Washington, DC) is
conducting a study that will examine
regional views and capabilities and
analyze the following questions:
the role of regional organizations: the
right to collective self-defense for members of alliances (Article 51) and the provision for regional organizations under
Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54). In the case
of Kosovo, however, it was not a member state being defended, but rather a
neighboring state, which, a participant
averred, put it outside the bounds of
Article 51. The example of ECOMOG in
Sierra Leone was also discussed, though
this should not be seen as enforcement
because the regional force had the consent—even the invitation—of Sierra
Leone’s elected government.
• Do the changing norms of sovereignty
differ among regions?
• Are there criteria for intervention that
are region-specific or that can gain
consensus in one region, but would be
rejected in another region?
• How do regional organizations derive
legitimacy for intervention?
• How can uneven resources and capacities be addressed? The capacity lies in
the United States and Western Europe
but, other than the Balkans, the problems lie elsewhere. Africa is developing an organizational capacity, but has
no resources; Asia has resources, but
not the organizational capacity.
Several participants expressed varying
degrees of alarm at the prospect that
regional organizations might be taking
the lead on peace and security issues.
“Only the United Nations has the
authority to authorize enforcement, and
it must work with a universal code of
conduct,” one Asian participant argued.
“UN members can be guided by regional groups, but organizations other than
the UN cannot take responsibility,”
added another Asian participant. “For
credibility, objectivity, and legitimacy,
the road always leads back to the
United Nations,” agreed a participant
from another region of the developing
world.
• Are there new processes or procedures that should link regional organizations and the United Nations so
that they are working together rather
than independently or, even worse, at
cross-purposes?
One participant highlighted the sections
of the UN Charter that seem pertinent to
36
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
But others saw the question as more
nuanced. “I cannot share concern
expressed about the danger of regional
action. This is not an either/or situation,” argued a different Asian participant. “The reality is that we are moving
in the regional direction, and we need to
encourage the political and financial
development of regional organizations.”
New York, and the
United Nations could
have liaison officers
at all the regional and
subregional organization headquarters.
An African
participant
[said]...“we are
beginning to see a
change in how the
international
community...is
going to handle
conflict.”
• Nonpermanent members on the Security
Council should also
serve as links
between the council
and the region from
which they come,
sharing perspectives and strategies for
any crises in their “neighborhood.”
An African participant saw the discussion as “turning on a little light in the
back of his head.” He went on, “What
we are beginning to see is a change in
how the international community and
the UN itself is going to handle conflict.
The Security Council may be the best
way to go, but people are going to force
us to do this ourselves. They won’t send
in troops and, if we don’t do it, they
won’t send in money either.” A Western
participant followed up stating, “If all
roads lead back to an unsatisfactory
organization, where do those countries
go who are facing conflicts?”
• A division of labor could be established whereby the region provides the
troops—preferably with a mandate
from the UN Security Council and
augmented by some of the special
communications and transport capabilities of major powers such as the
United States—and the United Nations
musters the funding and provides
transitional administration capacity in
areas such as police and security training, judicial reform, election organization, and the strengthening of civil
society.
On the question of how the United
Nations and regional organizations
could cooperate, a number of suggestions were put forward:
• Regional organizations could have liaison officers at the UN headquarters in
• The United Nations could take the
lead in finding a way to financially
37
United Nations of the Next Decade
support regional actors when they do
take action (support that could also
serve as a lever in shaping those
actions). In Australia’s case, for
instance, taxpayers have accepted an
“East Timor tax,” but the sense around
the conference table was that Australia
had performed an important service
not only for those living in East Timor
but also for the region and the international community, all of whom should
help bear the financial burden.
from its own parliament when it comes
to funding peacekeeping. “The politics
are important, and the story must be
compelling for the public anywhere to
consent to increasing their taxes,” one
participant argued.
In the United States, one of the best
arguments to make to the public is that
other countries are doing their share. “If
an effort is seen to be led by other
nations and the United States is helping
a region or nation help itself, the selling
job is easier,” one participant offered.
While the new US administration has
made clear its aversion to committing
troops except in cases where vital US
interests are threatened, it will find it difficult—as did previous administrations—to turn a deaf ear to requests from
allies and friends for support in providing airlift, communications and, in some
cases, intelligence to coalitions of the
willing. And if the United States were
merely to finally settle its arrears at the
United Nations, it would be a major
boost to international resources that
could be drawn on for peace operations,
as some participants noted.
How Will Resources and
Capacities Be Found?
With Western European governments
arguing that they are stretched thin by
their commitments in the Balkans, and
American reluctance to take on new
responsibilities beyond
“The politics are its ongoing global
responsibilities and
important, and the obligations to its allies,
two of the potentially
story must be
compelling for the largest contributors of
funds and capacity are
public anywhere keeping an arm’s
length from expanded
to consent to
peace operations. Even
increasing their the South African
taxes,” one
government, said one
participant argued. participant, has
encountered resistance
A number of participants highlighted
proposals for enhancing peacekeeping
and peacemaking that were recommend-
38
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
ed by the Brahimi panel in August 2000.
Peacekeeping is distinct from forceful
intervention, although the two are closely related. In some situations, peacekeeping operations serve as key preventive
measures to ward off renewed or intensified conflict. The state of health of the
United Nations’ peacekeeping capacity
can also be seen as a broad indicator of
the international community’s ability to
respond to security challenges.
are being drafted. It
was seen as crucially
important for governments putting their
military personnel on
the line to be much
more closely connected
to the decision-making
process.
The United
Nations’ central
role in the area of
international peace
and security is
being eroded....
Discussion on the prospects for mustering the “necessary means” to cope with
crises split participants into an optimistic
and a pessimistic camp. Optimists
argued that troops could be found and
new countries could be recruited to participate in both peacekeeping and its
financing. They identified a number of
countries that are not currently contributing many troops but have a great
deal to offer: China, Brazil, Mexico,
Guatemala, Greece, Israel, Vietnam, and
Argentina. The Brahimi Report, if implemented, would be a great step forward
in systemizing and professionalizing the
United Nations’ capacity. And financial
support will follow success, optimists
argued.
Participants thought the secretary-general should be encouraged to make
extensive use of special representatives,
especially in cases where violent escalation of conflict seems imminent. For
their part, member states must pay their
dues promptly and should be prepared
to make voluntary contributions to
peacekeeping, peace-building, and prevention when asked by the secretarygeneral.
One of the reasons that UN peacekeeping operations can be ineffective is that
their Security Council mandate is too
weak or changes midstream. Participants
said the council should, for each peace
operation, establish a committee comprised of countries that are contributing
troops and consult with that committee
when mandates and rules of engagement
The pessimists said that money would
always be a problem. Even NATO
members were having difficulty getting
reimbursed for their work in the
39
United Nations of the Next Decade
Balkans. At the United Nations, indefinite delays in reimbursement for peacekeeping are “like interest-free loans to
the United States which has not paid its
dues from the developing nations doing
the dirty work,” one participant complained. The secretary-general also has
had increasing difficulty in obtaining
contributions of troops for peace operations from UN member governments.
intervention does not entail a lengthy
“checklist” of measures that must be
tried; it is rather a requirement to consider those options in the context of
the unfolding situation.
• The United Nations’ central role in the
area of international peace and security is being eroded and will not recover
until it makes itself more indispensable as a mechanism for generating
personnel and the financial means necessary to address the whole range of
international responses to internal war.
Out of necessity rather than ambition,
regional organizations and actors are
already filling the vacuum caused by
intellectual and conceptual disagreements, bureaucratic inertia, and political gridlock at the United Nations.
Conclusion
Coaxed along by an ambitious agenda of
questions to be addressed, conference
participants were able to find substantial
areas of agreement and to define their
differences in other areas. By the end of
the conference, it became apparent that
at least three broad statements would
garner strong majority support:
• Sovereignty should not be permitted to
serve as a carte blanche for governments that inflict or threaten mass
violence on their own citizens or stand
aside while others do so. Indeed, as
this sentiment takes hold, it is prompting a reexamination of the very concept of sovereignty.
In sum, the conference laid out a number
of serious challenges for the United
Nations of the next decade. The United
Nations could potentially be the most
important actor in addressing the complex issue of internal wars that lead to
genocide. Its universal membership in
the General Assembly, the persuasiveness of the secretary-general, and the
authority of the Security Council could
all be brought to bear to prevent, deter
and, if necessary, stop mass killing. But
• The obligation of the international
community to try other forms of
pressure before resorting to forceful
40
Using “Any Means Necessary” for Humanitarian Crisis Response
consensus among its members must first
be reached that it is indeed seen as a job
that must be done and, second, steps
must be taken to do it. The conference
proceedings provided evidence to support the hopes of those who would like
to see more effective UN action, but they
also reflected the difficulty of reaching
consensus and the need to explore other
options when the United Nations will
not, or cannot, act.
41
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