School of Politics and
International Studies
Understanding Tradition in British
Politics and Beyond
Stuart McAnulla
POLIS Working Paper No. 24
March 2007
1
Understanding Tradition in British Politics and Beyond
Stuart McAnulla
University of Leeds
Please do not cite without permission
The concept of ‘tradition’ is used in a range of different ways within studies of
British politics. Despite this there have been only a few attempts to theorise
notions of tradition within British political science. Furthermore the different
concepts of tradition forwarded by conservatives, interpretivists and realists
have each been contested. This paper examines wider social science
literature to reflect upon the character and content of tradition. It is argued that
there is an ongoing tension between authors who emphasise the nonreflective, habitual and practical content of tradition as against those who
stress the rational, reflective and even intellectual qualities of surviving
traditions. It is suggested that an adequate theory of tradition might involve
making a distinction between practical knowledge and discursive knowledge.
Introduction
Like many academic terms ‘tradition’ is at once both a common-sense and a
scientific concept (Handler and Linnekin, 1984). In political studies concepts
of tradition are often used in a descriptive way, whilst sometimes being called
upon to generate explanatory accounts of events or historical influences. In
studies of British politics there are many general uses of the term but
relatively few attempts to reflect theoretically upon what is meant by tradition
and what its key qualities might be. Amongst others, Conservatives,
interpretivists and realists have each forwarded influential and contrasting
perspectives on the role of tradition in British politics. However, each of these
versions of tradition has been contested. In order to facilitate further
discussion on the role of tradition within British politics this paper turns to
examine wider social science literature. In particular, it draws on the work of
authors such as McIntyre (1984), Popper (1989), Giddens (1994), and Shils
(1971, 1981) to examine the possible character of tradition and its place within
social science explanation.
This paper begins by offering a brief review of some of the most influential
conceptualisations of tradition within the study of British politics. This review is
used to formulate questions for subsequent study. The bulk of the paper
reviews the different ways in which tradition has been theorised within broader
social science literature. It examines the different ways in which tradition has
been defined as well rival positions concerning the content of tradition. This
review highlights key tensions between influential perspectives and important
differences concerning the role of tradition within processes of continuity and
change. The final section of the paper argues that a more effective theory of
tradition might differentiate between the types of knowledge that comprise
tradition.
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SECTION ONE: Key concepts of tradition in British political studies: a
brief overview
a) Conservatism and tradition
Of course, concepts of tradition are important to many strands of conservative
political thought. The case for conserving institutions and ideas from the past
has often been justified with reference to the alleged centrality of tradition to
social life. Tradition is considered by conservatives to consist of the
accumulated wisdom that supposedly emerges organically from years of
experience and trial and error (Burke, 1789). The merits of tradition (e.g. a
deferential culture, loyalty to the Monarch) are upheld against the rationalistic
schemes (reforming or revolutionary) of liberals, socialists and others. Within
social science, trends towards rationalism and positivism were opposed by
authors such as Oakeshott (see discussion below). It was argued that history
could only be understood with analysis of the traditions drawn on by actors.
More generally, many accounts of British politics were constructed upon small
‘c’ conservative, assumptions. The British political system, usually presented
as the ‘Westminster model’ was explained with reference to the survival and
protection of traditions (e.g. ministerial accountability). The unwritten
constitution was celebrated as enabling tradition and convention to develop
and persist, whilst also leaving space for pragmatic adaptation in reaction to
circumstances. The maintenance of traditions or patterns of continuity were
often seen as ‘natural’ British characteristics (Tant, 1993: 57), somehow built
in to the national psyche.
The Burkean conception of tradition has of course been strongly criticised.
Liberal and radical scholars often argue that in revering ‘tradition’,
conservatives are in fact conjuring up an ideology with which to defend the
status quo. The supposed longevity of practices (itself often more rhetorical
than real) are used to legitimise inequality and hierarchy within society.
Relatedy, some scholars attack conservatives for pushing a concept of
tradition that seeks to naturalise particular social practices (Bevir, 2000).
Certain practices are unjustifiably privileged as ‘naturally occurring’ traditions,
when in fact they are a contingent product of political struggles and social
interactions.
b) Interpretivism and Tradition
Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003, 2006, Bevir, 2005) new interpretive approach to
political analysis uses a quite different concept of tradition. At the core of their
interpretivism 1 lies a particular conception of the relationship between context
and conduct or between tradition and agency. Tradition in this sense ‘evokes
a social structure in which individuals are born and which then acts as the
backdrop to their (agents) beliefs and actions’ (2005: 25). Traditions are
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viewed as the webs of beliefs that people necessarily inherit and that
influence how they then understand the world. Yet they do not determine or
place limits upon the beliefs and actions in which actors subsequently
engage. For actors possess powers of reasoning which they deploy in
response to issues or dilemmas. Traditions, or webs of beliefs may be
modified by actors as a consequence of the circumstances they confront.
Therefore the past influences the present but does not determine it, agents
can resist or reformulate the ideas they inherit. Unlike conservatives, Bevir
and Rhodes do not naturalise particular traditions. Their commitment to postfoundationalism means that they reject attempts to assert privileged or ‘core’
sets of experiences. For Rhodes and Bevir, traditions do not have clear
boundaries and are not simply given. Indeed, how and in what way we may
pick out as a tradition to analyse is considered to depend on our research
purposes. Typically it may involve scholars invoking a notion of tradition
where s/he finds ‘family likeness’ between sets of ideas or beliefs on a topic of
interest.
Bevir and Rhodes conception of tradition has received some criticism. Some
have argued that it may over-emphasise the ease with which individuals can
modify their inherited context (McAnulla, 2006; Marsh and Hall, 2006). This is
because Rhodes and Bevir believe that tradition (defined as a background
web of beliefs), is not, of itself, viewed as a constraint upon subsequent belief
or action. For critics this conception of tradition does insufficient justice to the
‘weight’ which the past brings to bear on the present. In addition, some of
Bevir’s writing on tradition has been criticised for appearing to offer an overly
intellectual understanding of the term 2 . In Frohnen’s view traditions do not
have the malleability Bevir (allegedly) implies, but rather are ‘concrete social
realities….habits – both intellectual and practical – that go qualitatively
beyond any background understanding’ (Frohnen, 2001: 109). He contends
that Bevir is unable to sufficiently acknowledge the habitual qualities of
tradition and its importance in everyday practice. Consequently Frohnen
worries that ‘ Unchallenged, Bevir’s reading of tradition would further reduce
the already narrow focus of most academics on the relationship between
individuals and abstract, ideological categories…’ (ibid. 108).
c) Realism and the British political tradition
A range of realist and critical realist authors have emphasised the role of a
dominant political tradition within British politics (Marsh 1980: Tant 1993:
Marsh et al 2003, 2001, Richards and Smith, 2002: McAnulla, 2006). Marsh
argues that the British political tradition consists of a top-down view of
democracy which draws upon a liberal notion of representation and a
2
It should be noted that this criticism was made within the journal Humanitas, in response to an essay
by Bevir (2000) entitled ‘On tradition’. Thus the critique was not of Bevir’s interpretive approach to
political analysis, but rather the specific views he forwarded regarding tradition within this essay.
However, the concept of tradition defended in the essay appears wholly consistent (at least my
estimation) with that subsequently used in Bevir’s and Bevir and Rhodes later publications within
political science
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conservative notion of responsibility (Marsh, 1980). This explains the enduring
commitment to the idea of strong government in Britain, sustained in postwar
period by majority party control of Westminster. The basic belief is that a
strong executive needs to have the power to take decisions to ensure that
government operates efficiently. Joined with this is the view that too much
accountability to parliament or the people will prevent government taking the
difficult decisions it must to act responsibly. The above authors draw on
Birch’s argument that the British political tradition consists of a hierarchy of:
First, consistency, prudence and leadership, second, accountability to Parliament and
the electorate and third, responsiveness to public opinions and demands… It is this
tradition….that explains the system of disciplined party government that the country
now enjoys.’ (Birch, 1964: 245)
The above authors are keen to stress that the ideas and practices of the
British political tradition have been resistant to radical challenge. For example,
Tant (1993) highlights the ultimate failure of efforts by many in the Labour
party to foster pursue a participatory approach to government. Tant argues
that despite Labour party initially being a threat to the traditional system of
government in Britain they became ‘one of its major guarantors’ (Tant, 1993:
191).
Some authors worry that such a concept of tradition might place too much
emphasis on continuity. Rhodes and Bevir argue it is misguided to see British
politics in terms of unchanging core ideas (even clashing core ideas), rather
ideas and traditions themselves change over time (Rhodes and Bevir, 2003).
It is argued that a better approach is to unpack the rival, contending traditions
that have been important in British politics and traces their development and
change over time. Yet authors such as Marsh et al (2003), argue that if we are
to properly explain the persistence of top-down government and asymmetries
of power in British politics then the concept of a dominant British political
tradition has explanatory power.
This brief review is indicative of some of the differing ways scholars of British
politics have deployed the concept of tradition. Whilst conservatives stress a
habitual, practically embedded notion of tradition, interpretivists conceive of
tradition as a background of inherited beliefs, which may, but may not, shape
belief and action. Conservatives are criticised for treating traditions as
ingrained ‘natural’ phenomena, whilst interpretivists are attacked for treating
traditions as malleable intellectual material. Realists forward the idea of a
dominant British political tradition that has managed to persist over many
decades, surviving numerous challenges. Yet critics question whether this
conception of tradition overplays continuity in British politics. As we will we
see below, similar themes and debates concerning the role of tradition have
arisen in wider social science. However, the aim of the paper is to help
facilitate further debate on the role of tradition within British political studies by
attempting to gleam ideas and insights from literature outside our own
discipline.
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The above review of key perspectives in British politics indicates a number of
general questions for consideration, including:
•
To what extent should we view traditions as habitual, perhaps nonreflective patterns of behaviour that persist over time?
•
Alternatively, can we treat traditions more as changing schemes of thought
that are open to intellectual reflection and analysis?
•
How can we account for traditions both as a source of continuity and
change?
It is with such questions in mind that we now turn to consider how tradition
has been conceptualised within broader social science.
SECTION TWO: Key concepts of tradition in wider social science: a
review
a) The neglected study of tradition
If academic reflection on the nature of tradition is weak within political science,
it is scarcely bettered in other social science disciplines. Whilst there are
innumerable studies of particular traditions and traditional behaviours,
attempts to theorise about tradition are few and far between. Halpin, Power
and Fitz (1997: 3)) argue that the concept has had little attention in social and
cultural studies, whilst Boyer (1990; vii) suggests that there is no such thing
as a theory of tradition within anthropology. Williams (1997: 115) states that
the concept of tradition has been ‘radically neglected’ within Marxist cultural
thought. Giddens (1994: 48) contends that despite being closely tied with
conservative thought, even conservative authors have offered surprisingly
little reflection on the nature of tradition. Shils (1981: 2) laments traditions
‘long exile’ from intellectual discourse across the social sciences as a whole.
But how might we explain this general neglect?
Popper (1989: 120) argues that scholars within the rationalist tradition have
tended to deliberately ignore tradition and its influence, concerning
themselves instead with ideas and concepts that might facilitate progressive
social change. For such authors tradition is by definition an irrational
inheritance, a residue of the obsolete practices and an impediment to
progress. Relatedly, Shils suggests academics have oversubscribed to the
view that in modern society tradition is less important than the influences of
‘interests’ and ‘power’ (1981: 9). He argues:
If we read an analysis by a contemporary social scientist of what happened in a given
situation, we see that the pecuniary ‘interests’ of the participants are mentioned; their
irrational fears are mentioned; internal solidarity of the group is accounted for by
irrational identifications or by interests; the strategies of the leaders of the constituent
groups are mentioned; tradition is seldom mentioned as having anything to do with
important things. Realistic social scientists do not mention tradition. (1981: 7)
6
However, the above authors argue that the progressive/rationalist neglect of
tradition is mistaken. Williams (1977: 115) argues that tradition ‘is in practice
the most evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and
limits’ and hence worthy of Marxist analysis and critique. More generally,
authors emphasise the everyday, inescapable role of tradition. They argue
that even those who think of themselves as implacably opposed to tradition
tend to be traditionalist in particular ways. Popper (1989: 122) uses the
example of an individual who chooses to wear a watch on their left wrist. He
contends that when they do so they are accepting, at some level, a form of
tradition. Eagleton (1996: 4) argues that radical thinkers are traditionalists, just
as conservatives are, the only difference being the particular ideas and
practices being adhered to (quoted in Halpin, Power and Fitz, 1997: 3). Such
authors paint a picture of a social science which has been dazzled by the
emergence of modernity and misled by its normative commitments to neglect
the enduring centrality of tradition to social life.
b) Tradition – core definitions
Etymologically, the term ‘tradition’ comes from the latin verb tradere, which
meant to ‘hand over’, though the related meaning ’hand down’ became the
dominant one (Young, 1988: 95). Many definitions conceive of tradition
primarily as that which remains from the past e.g. ‘the surviving past’
(Williams, 1977: 115); ‘lodges in the passage of time, crystallisations of the
past which remain in the present’ (Young, 1988: 142); ‘the living faith of the
dead’ (Pelikkan, quoted in Berman: 2003: 2). Other definitions view tradition
more as the active re-enactment of associations with the past e.g. ‘customs
and ceremonials by means of which the past speaks to the present (Halpin,
Power and Fitz 1997: 1); ‘interaction which results in repetition of certain
communicative events’ (Boyer, 1990: 23). Tradition often overlaps with
concepts such as custom and habit and is sometimes thought to be
indistiguisable from these notions. However, Young suggests that habit is
should be thought of as a personal quality, while custom, though referring to
repeated social behaviour lacks the ‘extra measure of inertia’ which the term
tradition implies (1988: 96). Though there is much similarity in the broad
definitions of tradition, this consensus breaks down when scholars turn to
debate the substantive content of tradition itself.
c) The substance of tradition
i) Tradition as tacit knowledge
Discussions of tradition often begin with some reference to conservative
perspectives, particularly that of Oakeshott (1962). It is important to note that
for Oakeshott the idea of tradition is not a useful academic abstraction, rather
7
traditions are concrete social realities. Traditions are embodied in behaviours
and practices. Oakeshott and others were of course particularly concerned to
highlight the distinction between traditions and ideologies. They argue that
whilst ideologies are doctrines purporting to be rational, traditions refer to
established practices which may not be capable of being rationalised. In
others words tradition cannot simply be converted into a set of principles or
assumptions. For Oakeshott, tradition is bound up with tacit knowledge, it
cannot be verbalised as it is essentially practical. He argues:
‘(A tradition of behaviour) is neither fixed nor finished. It has no changeless centre to
which understanding can anchor itself….there is no model to be copied, idea to be
realised, or rule to be followed.’ (92)
Oakeshott argues that rationalist authors are deluded to believe that
knowledge of a chosen ideology can somehow take the place of
understanding a tradition of political behaviour. In his view, if we accept the
centrality of tradition to political life then we ought to consider politics as ‘the
pursuit of intimations’. We should draw on the intimations of traditional
practices, a process with is less precise and more elusive than following
principles of abstract logic. Thus politics is ‘a conversation, not an argument’
(92). This conservative understanding of tradition has been influential in the
wider literature. Many perspectives stress the role of tacit knowledge in
tradition, knowledge which is not teachable by articulated assertions (Shils,
1981: 22). Moreover there is a stress on traditions as creating predispositions
for continuity and the need to maintain intimate connections between past and
present.
ii) Tradition as argument
However, Alisdair McIntyre (1984: 221) argues that we are likely to be misled
by the ideological uses to which the concept of tradition has been put by
conservative thinkers. For one thing we may too easily accept the
conservative’s counterposing of tradition and reason, to believe that traditions
persist through habit and custom rather that rational thought. Equally we
might also falsely believe that rational and/or progressive political projects will
not have any kind of traditional character. McIntyre points out that many types
of belief and practice take place in some tradition of thought, whether ‘rational’
(e.g. modern physics) or otherwise (medivalism) (ibid. 222). Moreover,
traditions of all types are always partially constituted by an argument
regarding its points and purposes. For McIntyre a tradition will involve an
argument concerning some sort of desired social or political goods, a position
on how things are and how they ought to be. Thus a long-lasting tradition is
‘an historically extended argument…through many generations’ (ibid. 222).
Therefore in contrast to positions stressing the non-rational character of
traditions or the ‘dead weight’ of traditional influence McIntyre argues that
living traditions will be embroiled in ongoing conflicts and argumentation. For
example institutional practices guided by tradition (e.g. university teaching)
will be engaged in both arguments as to how the goods envisioned in the
tradition can best be realised and in opposition to other traditions. Thus
traditions are vital in away not properly recognised in conservative thought.
8
Indeed McIntyre suggests that should a tradition become Burkean in
character then ‘it is always dying or dead’ (ibid).
Karl Popper also criticises the conservatives for suggesting that we cannot
treat traditions rationally, to argue that it is possible to make rational sense of
traditional beliefs and practices. However, as highlighted above, Popper is
equally scathing towards those rationalist authors who simply dismiss or
oppose tradition. He argues that without traditions of some sort people would
be ‘anxious, terrified and frustrated’ lacking the kinds of regularities that bring
some order and rational predictability to the world (1989: 131). For Popper
the importance of tradition does not compel us to stick to the status quo, there
are opportunities to either accept elements of tradition of disregard them and
make adjustments. He suggests we might theorise tradition as a form of
intermediary. In his view traditions are intermediaries between people and
institutions (1989: 133), with tradition supplying individuals with the
background and certainty of purpose needed to conduct themselves
effectively within institutions. It is for this reason, Popper suggests, that we
more readily speak of a ‘living tradition’ than a ‘living institution’. For Popper
the influence of tradition helps explain why institutions are not always beset by
pure instrumentalism or corrupt practices - inherited traditions supply people
with an appropriate moral purpose.
iii) Tradition as wisdom through repetition
Anthony Giddens also argues that Oakeshott’s emphasis on tacit knowledge
does not of itself offer an adequate definition of tradition. Yet, he also appears
to resist a more rationalist understanding of tradition. He argues:
The distinctive quality of a tradition, which separates it from custom or habit as well
as from technical or expert knowledge, is that it presumes and idea of ritual or
revealed truth- and this defining trait is also the source of its authority (1994: 46)
9
For Giddens the reverence for tradition is not explained by the inheritance of
the past but by the wisdom which the tradition is considered to incorporate.
Thus it is not the longevity of a practice that makes something traditional, but
rather that ‘certain ritual practices specify its truth’ (1994: 47). Giddens argues
that this traditional wisdom is always passed down in the form of
apprenticeship (from guardians or ‘elders’ of one kind or another).
Interestingly, he argues that this traditional wisdom need not be functionally
effective or ‘technically accurate’ as its truth is displayed in the repetition of
practical formulae. However, Giddens also contends that in the modern era
tradition is no longer an external framework which simply ‘takes’ decisions for
us. Rather, like Popper, he argues we now need to decide about tradition,
what to try and sustain and what to discard (1994: 48).
Many studies of tradition similarly emphasise the way in which tradition is
understood to carry wisdom through repetition (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1983: 2).
Halpin, Power and Fitz (1997 argue tradition indicates not only indicates what
‘is’ done but what ‘should’ and ‘ought’ to be done. They argue tradition can
help to render certain practices ‘timeless’ in that they are taken for granted
and subject to little conscious thought. Yet in other circumstances, against a
background of generalised doubt or chronic uncertainty ‘the inviolable
character of tradition is likely to be invoked directly’ (ibid.). In other words in
the face of new challenges or dilemmas traditions can be used to domesticate
crises and/or provide legitimacy for decisions.
iv) Tradition as source of change and continuity
A key aim of some writers has been to generate a theory that can account
both for the way in which tradition elicits continuities in practices as well as the
role tradition can serve to provoke change. Sztompka is keen to stress that
traditions are often retained not by conscious choice as such, but often by
sheer force of habit and inertia. As such they may constrain the actions of
current actors in appearing to offer ready-made solutions to what are new
problems that really demand new kinds of solution (1993: 65). In such ways
the past, however distorted, enters the present’ and as such tradition can help
us explain ‘the change in continuity and the continuity in change’ (1993: 59).
At the same time he avoids reifying traditions, insisting that traditions do not
independently self-reproduce or self-elaborate. Rather it is living desiring
beings that enact or modify traditions through their often-restless creativity
and interactions (61). For Sztompka the impact of tradition on the present is
transmitted via two different causal mechanisms, namely the material or
physical and the ideal or psychological.
•
Material (or physical) – operates through’ survival of object artefacts,
arrangements produced by activities of earlier generations, but
surrounding the actions taken by the present one’ (1993: 57)
•
Ideal (or psychological) – operates through human capacities of memory
and communication. people inherit past beliefs, knowledge, symbols and
also norms, values and rules’ (ibid.)
10
Thus for Sztompka traditions exist as material practices, objects and artefacts
that are produced by the activities of past actors, but condition present actors.
However, at the same time he argues traditions also exist as sets of ideas
inherited from past beliefs and embodied in the rules, norms and values
bequeathed to present actors. The two dimensions of traditions are taken to
uphold one another, for example the House of Commons would be just a
inherited set of bricks and mortar without the ideal dimension conferring
particular meanings on the objects in question. The two components are thus
‘mutually enhance’ themselves.
Sztompka’s discussion of tradition in terms of two components alerts us to the
possibilities that we might usefully unpack the ‘substance’ of tradition into
different elements. His material/ideal distinction implies that we can usefully
differentiate between elements that involve relations between subjects and
objects and elements that are purely inter-subjective. It will be argued below
that this is an insight well worth developing.
The most significant attempt to theorise tradition is probably found in the work
of Edward Shils (1971, 1981). Shils seeks to construct an account of tradition
that emphasise the importance of tradition to social life (against many
rationalist authors) yet at the same time to resist conservative interpretations.
Thus Shils emphasises the role of tradition in social change as well as in
facilitating continuity. Shils argues that the past can hold a grip over the
present for a number of reasons, including:
•
Attachment to the given – practices became considered the ‘natural way’
and are difficult to dissolve (e.g. prohibition in America) (1981: 210)
•
Convenience – if practices are convenient enough, then most will lack the
invention or perversity required to break significantly with those practices.
(1981: 202)
•
Accumulated experience – knowledge and wisdom inherited from the past
is not lightly discarded (1981: 204)
•
Reinstatement of the past – humans often look for connections to the past,
sometimes looking to reinstate a perceived past historical conditions (e.g.
forms of nationalism). (1981: 211-212)
However, Shils also seeks to explain change in traditions. A number of factors
provoke change, including:
•
Rationalisation and Correction – For Shils the very acceptance of a
tradition makes it possible to perceive ambiguities and contradictions
within it. This may generate the desire for greater clarity and hence the
use of imagination and reasoning to improve upon the tradition as it was
inherited. Thus the creativity of people can produce ‘enrichments of the
stock’ (1981: 214)
•
Changes in Content - a tradition of belief (e.g. liberalism) contains many
beliefs (e.g. the various roles of the state, church and family) which
11
practically never form a logically seamless whole. Events and moral
reflection may lead to a particular element of the tradition becoming more
salient or altered in character (e.g. liberalism’s changing conception of the
role of the state). (1981: 217-222)
Though Shils’ work is regarded as seminal it has also received criticism. A
number of critics argue that in spite of his emphasis on change his theory
endorses a form of essentialism. Shils contends that the
essential elements (of a tradition).persist in combination with other elements which
change, but what makes it a tradition is that what are thought to be the essential
elements are recognisable…as being approximately identical at successive steps
(1981: 14).
Unfortunately Shil’s offers few clues as to what might make a particular
element of a tradition ‘essential’ or otherwise. Nor does he suggest what
might make some elements impervious to change whilst others are open to
adaptation or removal. One is left guessing as to which sorts of elements
have some kind of insulation against social and political upheavals. This is
unfortunate, yet perhaps Shil’s comments on the ‘essential elements’ of
tradition reflect momentary slackness of thought rather than commitment to an
essentialist view of tradition as such. Certainly, Shil’s wider theory of tradition
could be read to suggest that in principle any particular element of a tradition
could be open to challenge.
d) Reflections on the literature
These tensions in Shil’s perspective focus us again upon the thorny question
of how traditions might simultaneously facilitate continuity and change. In
some ways they overlap with tensions in the literature between those who see
traditions as non-rationalised forces of inertia as against those who see
tradition as ongoing arguments which can provoke change. Some authors
stress traditions as involving unthinking habitual behaviour and the central
role of tacit knowledge. The role of ritual and repetition is viewed by many as
central in establishing the authority and wisdom of tradition. Other authors
emphasise the rational (or rationalisable) content of tradition and the
importance it holds in intellectual argument. Given that each of these
perspectives appears to tell us something recognisable about the role of
tradition, can anything be done to reconcile such contrasting views? It will be
suggested below that to do so might involve us reflecting on the different
types of knowledge which traditions possess.
SECTION THREE:
knowledge
Unpacking
tradition:
disaggregating
forms
of
a) Knowledge: practical and discursive
Most, if not all understandings of tradition stress the way in which knowledge
and beliefs are transmitted or transferred over time. However, as we have
seen, different perspectives place varying emphases on the types of
12
knowledge and belief being transferred. Some make practical and tacit
knowledge primary, others make rational and/or intellectual knowledge forms
of knowledge central. However, in principle there is no reason to assume that
both types of knowledge are not important to tradition. Yet to maintain this
necessitates examining to what extent these kind of knowledge are distinct
and/or compatible. It will be suggested below that we might gain a better
grasp of traditions by making a clear distinction between the different types of
knowledge they can transmit. Stompka’s unpacking of the objects of tradition
into material and ideal components is instructive here. For this draws our
attention to examine not just the relations between the different ideas within
traditions, but also the relations between people and the physical objects
relevant to a tradition. Drawing on realist social theory, I suggest drawing a
distinction between practical and discursive forms of knowledge 3 .
Practical knowledge
•
Centrally concerns subject-object relations e.g. someone’s skill in using a
bottle-opener
•
Primarily tacit in content, as it involves engaging with reality through
activity and dealings with artifacts (rather than manipulating symbols)
•
Cognitive content entails non-verbal theorising and development of skills
(rather than enunciation of propositions) (Archer, 2000: 166)
Practical knowledge emerges from our active engagement with the world of
objects. In this view pre-verbal practical action is the way in which infants
learn principles of logical reasoning. Learning these principles in a is
necessary and prior to discursive socialisation and the acquisition of
language. However, there is no reason to believe that such non-linguistic
forms of practical action cease following the learning of language (Archer,
2000: 153). Indeed the practical skills we develop often do not depend in a
direct way upon language e.g. our abilities to use a bottle opener, or to control
car gears through use of a clutch, are something we gain a ‘feel’ for. The best
kinds of car–user instruction manual do not of themselves help develop many
of the practical skills we need for driving. As such practical knowledge is
regulated by our relations with material culture i.e. the objects and artifacts we
encounter (ibid. 166) Practical knowledge is thus implicit and tacit, gained
through activity rather than through engaging with linguistic propositions or
discursive symbols. When practical knowledge is transmitted (e.g. in the form
of tradition) it is done so in the form of ‘apprenticeship’ where skilled individual
e.g. Mastercraftsmen or a Professional demonstrates good practice and offers
practical criticism and evaluation (ibid. 176) Once such skills are acquired, the
use of such practical knowledge often becomes ‘second nature’.
3
Though drawing on realism, the analytical distinction I am arguing for could well be of equal interest
to scholars working with other social science philosophies.
13
Discursive knowledge
•
Centrally concerns subject-subject relations and linguistic communication
•
Consists of theories, arguments, social norms and their propositional
formulation (Archer, 2000: 173-176)
•
Consist of linguistically generated meaning and symbols
Discursive knowledge is developed through our linguistic powers to
communicate meaningfully and to attribute meanings to our relations. Thus
discursive knowledge may consist of theories, arguments, social norms and
the kinds of propositions associated with them (e.g. ‘maximum liberty requires
a minimal state’). The ideas contained within discursive knowledge stand in
logical relationship to one another and can usually be represented in
propositional forms. It is through discursive knowledge that we develop and
maintain ideational commitments to particular doctrines, theories or worldviews (Archer, 2000: 173-176). Discursive knowledge can act to constrain
and/or enable our projects as actors in the world. In turn, this discursive
knowledge can be elaborated or transformed as a result of our socio-linguistic
interactions. Discursive knowledge is transmitted, or handed down (e.g. within
tradition) through ‘scholarship’, the teaching of linguistically encoded theories
and propositions.
b) The interaction between practical and discursive knowledge
If such a distinction between practical and discursive knowledge is accepted
then it is clear that traditions may vary in the extent to which they consist of
each type. For example, a tradition of British farming would clearly involve a
high element of practical knowledge. Conversely, an academic tradition, such
as ‘analytic’ philosophy, primarily consists of discursive knowledge. At the
same time many other traditions we might pick out, such as ‘British
Labourism’ may contain significant elements of both practical and discursive
knowledge.
If we accept that our traditions may contain these distinct types of knowledge
a key question is, how do these distinct types of knowledge relate to one
another? To what extent do they interrelate or ‘translate’ into one another?
Pierre Bourdieu argues that the practical knowledge cannot be translated into
discursive knowledge (echoing certain of Oakeshott’s themes). For Bourdieu,
practical and tacit knowledge is simply incommensurable with discursive
knowledge (Archer, 2000: 151). He argues practice has a logic of immediacy,
urgency and pragmatic common sense which stands opposed to logic of the
logician. In Bourdieu's view it is ‘a logic of practice that flouts logical logic’
(Bourdieu, 1990: 86, quoted in Archer, 2000: 151)
In contrast, Archer believes that it is possible to have a significant (but
nowhere near exhaustive) degree of translation between practical and
discursive knowledge. Indeed, she suggests this is exactly what people are
doing in constructing discursive guides for practical action, such as maps and
sheet music. Thus tacit knowledge can be used and ‘converted’ to explicitly
14
codify practices over time. Often discursive knowledge (e.g. in the form of new
theory) is developed with the hope of modifying or improving practices. In
turn, changes in practices and development of new skills sometimes prompt
new discursive representations. However, such translation may not be easy,
or in some instances possible. New theories may not ‘work’ in practice and
some practices may defy clear discursive articulation. For example extensive
skills in reading music (discursive knowledge) will not improve the playing of
someone who lacks ‘feel’ for his or her instrument (practical knowledge).
Conclusion - Implications for change and continuity in traditions
This paper suggests that the tensions between concepts of tradition within
British political studies are reflected in overlapping debates between scholars
in broader social science. The analysis above indicates that academics have
frequently been ‘talking past’ one another when discussing tradition. For whilst
some have treat tradition as primarily tacit and practical in substance, others
treat it as primarily rational and discursive. To an extent, such authors are
actually discussing different (if often overlapping) types of knowledge, a fact
which might explain such incompatible conceptions of tradition. On other
occasions these different types of knowledge are conflated under the umbrella
of tradition, a conflation that makes the task of examining the particular
qualities of tradition more difficult. However, if we do make a distinction
between practical and discursive knowledge it suggests we can take a
generous attitude toward both sides of a somewhat polarised debate. For
example, we can agree with Oakeshott that elements of tradition may not be
open to articulation or direct rationalisation. Yet we can also agree with
McIntyre that traditions may also entail an ongoing, extended argument. Our
distinction helps account for the often quite varying character of different
traditions in that some may tend to consist primarily of practical or discursive
knowledge.
Drawing such a distinction between practical and discursive knowledge may
also offer some resources to reflect further on change and continuity within
traditions. As distinct forms of knowledge which do not wholly ‘translate’ it is
possible that as traditions change, that change will be experienced more in
terms of one form of knowledge than another. In other words practical and
discursive change need not be ‘in step’. For example, a medical tradition may
undergo significant elaboration in terms of discursive knowledge (e.g. a new
commitment to ‘customer-driven’ services). Yet this discursive change may
leave the practices within operating theatres largely unchanged. At the same
time, medical trainees development of new operational shills may have no
impact on discussions of practices within medical journals. Practical
knowledge, compromising primarily of subject-object relations is
constrained/enabled by material culture. Discursive knowledge, consisting
primarily
of
subject-subject
relations
is
subject
to
different
constraints/enablements (e.g. those implied by theories and concepts). Thus
patterns of change and continuity in traditions may sometimes be explained
by the fact that the different components (i.e. discursive and practical) can be
subject to differing tendencies to inertia or transformation.
It is hoped that this discussion may bring a little more clarity to some of the
debates concerning tradition in social and political science. Tentatively, it is
15
suggested that there is scope to reduce the extent to which scholars ‘talk past’
one another on the subject. Of course to do so risks disrupting a muchcherished academic tradition!
.
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