M.Phil. in
Technology Policy
2007/2008
Facilitating International Cooperation in an Arctic Transformed by Global
Warming
Grant Michael Kopec
Dr. William J. Nutall
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable assistance in
completing this study.
Dr. Paul Berkman, for giving the necessary guidance, background, and
structure to this thesis.
Lt. Cmdr. John Ash, Royal Navy [Ret.], for providing many of the ideas and
resources regarding the technical feasibility of Arctic Ocean governance.
Dr. William J. Nutall, for advising and providing useful insights on scenario
analysis.
Sally Daultrey, for her work in coordinating the support for this project.
Dr. David Reiner, for general advising.
Blake Driscoll, Satya Dash, Sarah Lovell, and the rest of the Technology Policy
cohort for providing both critical insights and hours of distraction in the
Judge Business School Computer Lab.
3
Abstract
The environmental state change now occurring in the Arctic Ocean as a result
of global climate change has precipitated increased human access to and
utility in that region. As a result, long dormant questions of Arctic Ocean
governance have been brought to the forefront of international consciousness.
The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention determines the geopolitical
division of the Arctic Ocean in theory. However, the formation of a stable
governance arrangement in practice will depend upon the balance of the
economic interests of the stakeholders in the Arctic Ocean and the ability to
govern and regulate those interests in a sustainable manner.
The opportunities and ability to exploit Arctic Ocean resources and the
capability of governance policies to regulate such activity combine in order to
create a scenario framework that can be used to analyse the potential long
term impacts of Arctic governance polices. In turn, this scenario framework
can be used to formulate policies that result in a sustainable system of
governance in the Arctic Ocean.
4
Facilitating International Cooperation in an Arctic
Transformed by Global Warming
Table of Contents
Declaration.....................................................................................................................2
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................3
Abstract ..........................................................................................................................4
Table of Contents..........................................................................................................5
Table of Figures.............................................................................................................7
Table of Tables..............................................................................................................7
Chapter 1:
Arctic Ocean Governance through a Technology and Policy
Framework .....................................................................................................................8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................8
The Geopolitical Donut in the Arctic Ocean .........................................................................9
Chapter 2: The Arctic Ocean State Change ............................................................. 13
The Environmental State Change........................................................................................ 13
Projected Future Environmental State Changes................................................................. 15
Economic Opportunities and Security Threats................................................................... 16
Chapter 3: Economic Activity and Regulation in the Arctic Ocean .................... 17
The Current Arctic Fervour ................................................................................................. 17
Hydrocarbon Resources....................................................................................................... 18
Metallic Mineral Resources.................................................................................................. 22
Biological Resources............................................................................................................. 23
Shipping Lanes and Tourism............................................................................................... 25
Conclusions on the Economic Exploitation of the Arctic Ocean ....................................... 27
Chapter 4: Governance in the Arctic Ocean ............................................................ 27
The Common Heritage of Mankind .................................................................................... 27
5
Arctic Governance Parallels with the Antarctic Treaty System......................................... 28
National Claims to the Arctic Commons under UNCLOS III ........................................... 31
UNCLOS III as a Test ........................................................................................................... 33
Governance Scenarios Coupled with the Environmental State Change........................... 35
The Svalbard Treaty as a Precedent for Practical Implementation of Arctic Ocean
Governance ........................................................................................................................... 35
Chapter 5: Arctic Governance Scenarios ................................................................. 38
The Arctic Ocean from a Global Perspective ...................................................................... 38
A Governance vs. Economic Exploitation Scenario............................................................ 39
Scenario Analysis.................................................................................................................. 41
Wild Cards ............................................................................................................................ 46
Chapter 6: Conclusions.............................................................................................. 47
Towards an International Governance Regime under UNCLOS III ................................. 47
Future Work.......................................................................................................................... 48
Definitions ................................................................................................................... 50
Abbreviations and Nomenclature............................................................................. 50
References .................................................................................................................... 51
6
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1: THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN, AS
DIVIDED BY UNCLOS III. THE LIGHT BLUE AREA REPRESENTS THE EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONES (200 NM LIMIT) OF THE CLAIMANT NATIONS. THE DARK BLUE
AREA IN THE CENTRE REPRESENTS THE ZONE BEYOND CLAIMANT NATIONS’ 200
NM LIMIT BUT WHICH COULD FALL UNDER NATIONAL JURISDICTION UNDER A
CLAIMED EXTENSION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. THE WHITE AREAS
REPRESENT PARTS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN WHERE NO NATIONAL CLAIMS TO
SOVEREIGNTY COULD LIKELY BE MADE (MACNAB 2007, P. 3). TAKEN TOGETHER,
THE DARK BLUE AND WHITE AREAS OF THE MAP REPRESENT THE ARCTIC OCEAN
COMMONS............................................................................................................................ 10
FIGURE 2: HISTORICAL AND MODELLED FUTURE PREDICTION OF ARCTIC OCEAN SEA
ICE EXTENT (AHLENIUS 2007)........................................................................................... 14
FIGURE 3: PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE ARCTIC SEA ICE EXTENT FROM MULTIPLE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH MODELS (HOLLAND 2006)..... 15
FIGURE 4: MAP SHOWING CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE RESOURCE
EXPLOITATION IN THE ARCTIC REGION (REKACEWICZ 2005).................................... 20
FIGURE 5: PLOT OF THE NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM VS. TIME (BERKMAN 2002, P. 72). ...................................................... 30
FIGURE 6: MAP OF SUSPECTED OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS OVERLAID WITH THE CURRENT
TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN NORWAY AND RUSSIA IN THE BARENTS SEA
REGION (REKACEWICZ 1998). ........................................................................................... 37
FIGURE 7: SCENARIO FROM THE GLOBAL BUSINESS NETWORK AND THE ARCTIC
COUNCIL’S PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT WORKING
GROUP (GLOBAL 2008). ...................................................................................................... 39
FIGURE 8: SCENARIO SPACE DESCRIBING FOUR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS BASED ON A
COMBINATION OF THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF NATIONAL AND EXTRANATIONAL BODIES TO GOVERN THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND THE TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY TO EXTRACT ARCTIC OCEAN RESOURCES. INSPIRATION FOR THIS
SCENARIO WAS DERIVED FROM THE GLOBAL BUSINESS NETWORK REPORT
TITLED THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC MARINE NAVIGATION IN MID-CENTURY
(GLOBAL 2008). .................................................................................................................... 43
Table of Tables
TABLE 1: ARCTIC OCEAN CLAIMS MADE TO THE UN COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF................................................................................................ 11
7
Chapter 1:
Arctic Ocean Governance through a
Technology and Policy Framework
Introduction
Governance of the Arctic Ocean has long been an unresolved issue that
mattered little because the extensive sea ice coverage prevented significant
economic activity beyond the immediate costal areas of the Arctic Ocean
claimant states of Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark1, and Norway.
However, because of the continuing reduction of the Arctic Ocean sea ice due
to global climate change, the Arctic Ocean is becoming more accessible to
human economic activity. As a result, the problem of peaceful governance of
an Arctic Ocean has been brought to the forefront of international
consciousness. While the resolution of governance in the Arctic Ocean is
ultimately a political question, the technological viability of future economic
activity in the Arctic Ocean and the technology and policies put in place to
regulate that activity will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the Arctic
Ocean governance framework.
Such issues will play a pivotal role in
determining whether governance under a framework provided by the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS III) can be successfully
implemented in the Arctic Ocean.
Whichever form of governance eventually holds jurisdiction in the Arctic
Ocean commons, it is uncontroversial to state that that form of governance
should be sustainable 2 from an environmental, economic, and geo-political
1
Denmark’s Arctic Ocean claim stems from its sovereignty over the province of Greenland.
2
The Brundtland definition of sustainability accepted by the United Nations is used in this
paper. This definition states that: “Sustainable Development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs” (Brundtland 2005).
8
perspective. However, the precedent set by the history of overexploitation of
resources in other marine areas, combined with the unique environment of
the Arctic Ocean, presents a unique set of challenges for sustainable
governance in the Arctic Ocean. It remains to be seen whether the economic
interests of many stakeholders can be balanced with the ability to implement
sustainable governance for all.
Though these questions cannot be definitively answered at the moment, a
scenario framework can be constructed where the technical feasibility of
economic activity and the effectiveness of governance and regulation in the
Arctic Ocean can be examined in combination. From this framework, a better
understanding of the range of possibilities for the future of the Arctic Ocean
and the important determinants for that future can be derived.
The Geopolitical Donut in the Arctic Ocean
Despite the historical longitudinal Arctic claims that traditionally divided the
Arctic Ocean into slices 3 , the current geopolitical status of the Arctic is
ostensibly determined by UNCLOS III. As seen in Figure 1, applying the
standard 200 nautical mile (nm) wide Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) set
forth in UNCLOS III results in an Arctic Ocean divided like a donut, with an
outer ring consisting of the EEZs of the five claimant nations. Although there
are minor territorial disputes in this outer ring (CIA 2008), these should not be
considered to be particularly intractable, though the substance of those
arguments informs the debate over the whole Arctic Ocean.4
3
Historically, Canada’s claims extended between 60OW and 141OW, Russia’s between 30OE
and 169OW, Norway’s between 5OE and 35OE, Denmark’s between 60OW and 10OW, and the
United States’ between 170OW and 141OW (Gould 1948).
4
The current terrestrial territorial disputes within the Arctic Circle include Hans Island
(between Canada and Greenland), the Bering Strait (between the U.S. and Russia), the
9
Figure 1: The current geopolitical situation in the Arctic Ocean, as divided by
UNCLOS III. The light blue area represents the Exclusive Economic Zones
(200 nm limit) of the claimant nations. The dark blue area in the centre
represents the zone beyond claimant nations’ 200 nm limit but which could
fall under national jurisdiction under a claimed extension of the continental
shelf. The white areas represent parts of the Arctic Ocean where no national
claims to sovereignty could likely be made (Macnab 2007, p. 3).
Taken
together, the dark blue and white areas of the map represent the Arctic Ocean
commons.
The hole in the middle of the donut, called the Arctic Ocean commons, is in
dispute because Russia, Norway, Canada, and Denmark have all submitted
claims to UNCLOS III based upon naturally occurring extensions of their
continental shelves (Borgerson 2008, p. 63). The current claims can be seen in
Svalbard Archipelago EEZ (between Norway and Russia), and the Beaufort Sea (between the
U.S. and Canada), (CIA Factbook, 2008).
10
Table 1. Whether or not these claims are granted will determine if the Arctic
Ocean commons are preserved for the peaceful use of all mankind, as
stipulated in the text of UNCLOS III, or whether the Arctic Ocean will be
substantially sectored into national jurisdictions.
Table 1: Arctic Ocean claims made to the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf.5
Date
Country
Claim
Submitted To
Result
Source
Russia
460,000 sq.
miles in the
Barents Sea,
Norwegian
Sea, and
Arctic Ocean
The UN
Commission On
the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
Request for
additional
information
from the
CLCS
(United
Nations,
2008)
2006
Norway
Barents Sea,
Norwegian
Sea, and
Arctic Ocean
The UN
Commission On
the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
Pending
(United
Nations,
2008)
Pending
Canada
None
N/A
Pending
Denmark
None
N/A
2001
None
specified
None
Specified
(Borgerson,
2008)
(Borgerson,
2008)
Since the current EEZs of the five arctic claimant nations are governed by
their respective national regulations, the question of international governance
obviously does not extend to these regions. However, these regions along the
outer edge of the Arctic Ocean are where the effects of a reduction in summer
sea ice will first be felt (Overland 2008 p. 177). This, combined with the
concentration of recoverable resources there means that a strong governance
and regulatory regime will be necessary to ensure the sustainable
5
The United States has also adopted a position that the Chukchi Plateau off of Alaska’s north
coast is a natural extension of the continental shelf, though this claim is not being prepared
for submission to the CLCS since the United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS III (Benitah,
2007).
11
development of the EEZs. Given that the environmental health of the Arctic
Ocean does not obey national boundaries, it is in the interests of the Arctic
claimant nations to acquiesce to international standards and practices when
forming their own governance regimes in their respective EEZs.
The Arctic claimant nations have recognised this in the Ilulissat Declaration of
28 May 2008. The declaration, drafted by a conference of the representatives
of the governments of all of the Arctic claimant nations, declares that, with
respect to UNCLOS III,
We remain committed to this legal framework and to the
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims. This
framework provides a solid foundation for responsible
management by the five coastal States and other users of this
Ocean through national implementation and application of
relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a
new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the
Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat 2008).
However, it is noteworthy that the declaration does not surrender the
continental shelf extension claims seen in Figure 1 and Table 1
(Ilulissat 2008).
Thus, although the declaration acquiesces to the
authority of UNCLOS III, the majority of the Arctic Ocean could still
be divided into national jurisdictions depending on the findings of
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS).
12
Chapter 2: The Arctic Ocean State Change
The Environmental State Change
The state change process now occurring in the Arctic Ocean must be viewed
on two levels. At its most basic, the progression global climate change is
forcing an environmental state change in the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Council
2005, p. 2). However, this environmental state change will in turn drive a
geopolitical state change state change that encompasses economic, security,
and environmental concerns.
The effects of global climate change on the Arctic Ocean are too numerous
and complex to be presented in depth here. 6 For the purposes of examining
the intersection between the economic and geopolitical effects of climate
change on the Arctic Ocean, the changes in sea ice coverage and thickness and
the ocean surface water temperature are relevant indicators of the state
change.
Figure 2 shows the historical sea ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean, as well as
one prediction of future ice coverage. The observed data suggests that the
Arctic will experience a steady decrease in summer sea ice coverage due to
anthropogenic global warming. The 2007 summer sea ice coverage was found
to be 40% below the minimum sea ice coverage from the 1980s (Overland 2008,
p. 177). Moreover, the connection between the sea ice reduction and global
warming is becoming more certain every year. It is now estimated that the
chance of current trends in northern hemisphere sea ice reduction occurring
because of natural climate variability is less than 2% (Vinnikov 1999, p. 1936).
6
For a complete overview of the effects of climate change on the Arctic Ocean environmental
system, see the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Arctic Council 2005).
13
Figure 2: Historical and modelled future prediction of Arctic Ocean sea ice
extent (Ahlenius 2007).
Though for obvious reasons the sea ice reduction is less extensive in other
seasons than in summer, both sea ice coverage and thickness are reduced year
round (Wadham 1995, p. 315). The thickness of the winter sea ice in both the
Northwest and Northeast passages, for example, could be reduced from 2.5 m
to 1.8 m within this century due to climate change (Wadham 1995, p. 315). In
addition, both the air and water surface temperature in the Arctic Ocean are
expected to increase by an average of 2 – 3 oC by 2050 (Arctic Council 2005, p.
470).
14
Projected Future Environmental State Changes
While modelled changes in the Arctic Ocean summer sea ice extent vary
widely, current models suggest that the Arctic Ocean could be ice free in the
summer by the year 2030 (Overland 2008, p. 177).
More conservative
estimates place the incidence of an ice free summer in the Arctic Ocean
sometime between 2040 and 2100 (Vinnikov 1999, p. 1936). The National
Centre for Atmospheric Research has compiled a number of Arctic Ocean sea
ice models. Their predictions are shown in Figure 3 and vary between 2040
and 2100 for the year of a virtually ice free Arctic Ocean in the summer.
Regardless of the exact date for the complete disappearance of summer sea ice,
the Arctic Ocean will become proportionally more open to exploitation as the
sea ice progressively recedes.
Figure 3: Projections of future arctic sea ice extent from multiple National
Center for Atmospheric Research models (Holland 2006).
15
Economic Opportunities and Security Threats
Besides many detrimental changes to the Arctic Ocean ecosystem, the
aforementioned environmental state change will incur several other
important effects of concern to human activity and governance. First, both
the sea ice reduction and sea ice thinning will open the Arctic to new
opportunities for economic exploitation, including not only mineral and
biological resource extraction but transportation routes and tourism (Kohn
2007, p. 25). In addition, the warming ocean waters will have an as yet
unkown effect on the production of fisheries in the Arctic Ocean (Arctic
Council 2005, p. 507).
Consequently, a more economically accessible Arctic Ocean will pose new
security challenges. The water underneath the arctic ice cap has long been an
area inhabited by nuclear submarines from the United States, Russia, and
other nations. In fact, much of the best data on arctic ice thickness and its
relevance to climate change has come from these missions (National Security
2007, p. 23). In preparation for a future of increased human activity in the
Arctic Ocean, the United States military has released a study indicating that it
is preparing for an increased Arctic Ocean presence in anticipation of
increased economic activity and geopolitical confrontation (National Security
2007, p. 35). It is known that the other arctic claimant nations have similar
plans.7
The opportunities for resource exploitation made possible by the reduction in
Arctic Ocean sea ice will likely drive national interest in that area. In turn,
these interests should be leveraged to create a model of sustainable
7
Canada recently ordered the commissioning of eight new arctic patrol vessels; while
Russia’s arctic naval capability continues to be substantial (Byers 2007).
16
governance in the Arctic Ocean commons that responsibly exercises
sovereignty over both economic activity and the natural environment. Since
both the environment of the Arctic Ocean and the future human activity there
are interconnected, the need for governance includes both the EEZs under
national jurisdiction and the Arctic Ocean commons.
Chapter 3: Economic Activity and Regulation in the
Arctic Ocean
The Current Arctic Fervour
From reading both the mainstream news and even some scholarly
publications, one could easily form the impression that the Arctic Circle
represents the last great frontier on the planet, a sort of ‘wild west’ that will
draw wildcatters towards the North Pole in search of many different
resources, including oil, natural gas, metals, biological materials, and
transportation routes (Graff 2007). This impression of the Arctic Ocean and
the subsequent attention that it has drawn northward is a mixture of truths,
half truths, and ‘best case’ scenario analysis. In reality, the Arctic Ocean,
while containing valuable resources, will only slowly open up to exploration
and exploitation due to the timescale of the environmental state change
occurring there. Additionally, though hydrocarbon resources are drawing the
most attention today, other resources, including metallic minerals, biological
material, and tourism, could turn out to be equally important.
The difficult environmental conditions in the Arctic Ocean logically make
resource extraction more difficult than in more temperate climates.
Two
limiting factors in resource extraction activities thus become even more
relevant in such a difficult environment.
First, the capital investment
required to obtain the technology necessary for extraction may be too high to
17
economically extract the resource (Upson 2006, p. 15). Related to this, the rate
at which resources can be extracted with available technology, rather than the
absolute quantity of resources that exist, will ultimately determine the
viability of that enterprise (Ash 1994, p. 21). To take one example that has
parallels for resource extraction in the Arctic, the coal reserves of Antarctica
are thought to be well in excess of 100 billion metric tons (Berkman 2002, p.
190). However, the technology to extract those enormous coal reserves in that
harsh environment at a rate fast enough to justify the capital expenditure
required does not yet exist (Kearney 1992).
With that caveat in mind, the current excitement surrounding the economic
potential there has drawn valuable attention to important environmental,
political, and security concerns in the Arctic Ocean. With a desire for Arctic
Ocean governance under UNCLOS III is established in theory, the question
then turns to whether the Arctic Ocean can be managed in practice. The
current interest in the resources of the Arctic Ocean can be leveraged to force
various stakeholders, be they nation-states, NGOs, or commercial entities, to
construct a practical governance arrangement regarding the sustainable use of
the Arctic Ocean. To a large extent, this will depend on the availability of
resources there, the ability to economically exploit them, and the capability of
governments to regulate that exploitation so that it occurs in a sustainable
manner.
Hydrocarbon Resources
Given the current links between hydrocarbon resources, global warming, and
energy security, the prospect of finding huge reserves of oil and natural gas in
the Arctic Ocean has been the subject of intense speculation and controversy.
Of the many oil companies that have expressed interest in Arctic Ocean
hydrocarbon resources, the Arctic Oil and Gas Corporation appears to be the
18
farthest ahead in considering such issues. The company, incorporated in the
United States, filed a highly controversial claim on 9 May, 2006 for the
exclusive rights to develop fossil fuel resources in the Arctic Ocean commons
area with the United Nations and the five Arctic claimant nations (Arctic
2008).
The United States Geologic Survey (USGS) is currently completing work on a
comprehensive, though broad, resource assessment of potential fossil fuel
deposits north of the Arctic Circle. However, numerous news sources have
already quoted a figure, purportedly from the USGS, that 25% of the
remaining undiscovered reserves of hydrocarbons may be in the Arctic Ocean
(Struck 2007). However, this attribution has turned out to be false and has
only added to the build-up surrounding mineral resources in the Arctic
Ocean. According to a USGS spokesperson, this figure has never been quoted
by the USGS and includes large areas surrounding the Arctic Ocean but not in
it (Bailey). Likewise, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources claims that
the Russian claimed areas of the Arctic that were submitted to the CLCS may
contain up to 586 billion barrels of oil (Borgerson 2008). Once again, these
claims are unproven but have contributed to the excitement and general
sentiment that the Arctic Ocean is a rich prise to be claimed as quickly as
possible. The misquotes by the USGS and unproven speculation have been
quoted as true by the Arctic Oil and Gas Corporation in their required public
filings, further bolstering the false sense of enormous hydrocarbon resources
lying under the Arctic Ocean commons (Arctic…Potential Resources 2008).
While it is true that there are large proven reserves of these resources in the
Arctic Ocean, the majority of these are located in the continental shelves
(EEZs) of the five Arctic claimant nations, as noted in Figure 4. While there
may be substantial hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic Ocean commons, this
19
has not yet been proven (Arctic Ocean 2006). Furthermore, the reduction in
sea ice that is occurring does not necessarily make the extraction of any of the
aforementioned resources easier. In some cases, a summer sea ice reduction
in the Arctic Ocean will actually make the extraction of these resources more
technically challenging since there will not be a solid foundation of ice to
build structures on, which is the preferred method for drilling in such places
(Ekelund 1980, p. 169).
Figure 4: Map showing current and potential future resource exploitation in
the arctic region (Rekacewicz 2005).
The technology needed to extract hydrocarbons from ice covered deep seabed
areas, utilising ice breaking marine vessels and platform drilling equipment,
is already in development through Arctic Oil and Gas (Arctic…Expects, 2008).
20
In addition, the oil majors have begun investing in such technology and have
been bidding for drilling rights, such as the recent Shell Oil bid for
exploration rights in the Chukchi area off the coast of Alaska (Bailey 2008).
However, significant technical obstacles still exist and it remains to be seen
whether deep-ocean drilling in an ice covered environment will be technically
possible or economically viable.
One can reasonable infer from a survey of current drilling technology that any
prospecting for hydrocarbons in ice covered waters, whether on the
continental shelf or in the deep seabed, will require at least semi-permanent
installations (Ekelund 1980, p. 169).
Considering this feature of the
hydrocarbon extraction industry, governance and regulation is likely to
require fewer resources than extractive industries such as fishing or polymetallic nodule mining that utilise moving installations. For the hydrocarbon
industry, regulation is likely to focus on the application permits for
exploration blocks and the various geopolitical factors that accompany this.
In addition, regulation of pollution during operation will be facilitated by the
relative ease of installing inspectors and on site monitoring equipment on
fixed as opposed to moving platforms.
However, the technology available to detect and contain hydrocarbon spills
once they occur in sea ice is not yet mature. Although improved methods for
these activities are currently being actively researched, they are not yet
mature technologies (U.S. Army 2006). In general, mitigation and clean-up of
spills is far more challenging in the cold Arctic Ocean waters due to the low
rate of evaporation and the difficulty of ignition (Dickins 1999, p. 176). Such
activities are even more difficult in areas of broken ice, as opposed to stretches
of open water or solid pack ice (Dickins 1999, p. 187).
21
Metallic Mineral Resources
While significant investment has been made by both national governments
and international mining consortia (Lodge 2001, p. 8), the mining of metallic
resources from the sea-bed has not been consistently commercially profitable
(International 2004, p. 71) and is expected to remain that way until at least
2025 (Ravikumar 2000, p. 41). However, marine mineral resources can be
brought to commercial viability in the future from both a combination of
commodity price increases and technological advances to make once marginal
resources viable (Antrim 2005, p. 1).
Although there remains much speculation and comparatively little data as to
the extent of these resources in the Arctic Ocean, both the deep ocean seabed
and mid-ocean ridges are likely places to find such resources (Murton 2000, p.
281 – 306). Thus, both the EEZs of claimant nations and the Arctic Ocean
commons, which includes both abyssal plains and ridges such as the currently
disputed Lomonosov Ridge (Cochrane 2006), will be areas of potential
mineral prospectivity as the sea ice retreats.
Such mining would be done with mobile marine vessels, making such activity
more difficult to regulate than hydrocarbon extraction.
However, such
vessels are likely to be relatively large and slow. The Glomar Explorer, one of
the only deep seabed mining ships to have been built, has an estimated
maximum speed of ten knots, making such regulatory measures as detection,
pursuit, and inspection relatively easy when compared to smaller and faster
fishing vessels that would be more difficult to regulate (Pike 2006). Thus, like
the hydrocarbon extraction industry, the primary governance issues for the
poly-metallic minerals industry will be the geopolitical division of promising
areas and the regulation of the environmental impacts of extraction.
22
Biological Resources
While oil, natural gas, and metallic minerals draw much of the attention to the
Arctic, the biological resources present there may actually prove to be one of
the most economically viable and valuable resources in the Arctic Ocean,
especially as climbing world demand for marine protein combined with
overfishing of the oceans increases the importance of food security (Pauly
2005, p. 5).8 The restrictions on fish catches imposed by the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement in order to sustainably manage those marine resources may
further increase interest in polar fisheries (Ash 1994, p. 18).
Historic data on the size of Arctic Ocean fish catches is incomplete, with data
from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation missing or
exhibiting
only
partial
coverage
from
1954
through 2008
(FIGIS).
Nevertheless, reasonable conclusions can be drawn based on a combination of
data from similar environments and the primary biologic productivity of the
Arctic Ocean.
Unlike marine mineral resources, biological resource extraction has a long
history in both the Arctic Ocean margins and the Southern Ocean. Thus,
appropriate parallels can be drawn.
The history of both of these areas
suggests that significant biological reserves exist.
While Southern Ocean
fisheries have proved productive in the past, their economic viability has
traditionally suffered due to their great distance from world population
centres (Ash 1994, p. 19). Nevertheless, the Southern Ocean remains a small
8
Most of the growth in demand for biological resources has come from developing nations,
notably China, which accounts for 71% of the recent growth in demand (World Review 2004,
p. 6). This trend underlies the potential importance of Arctic Ocean economic activity for
nations other than the Arctic claimant nations.
23
but economically important fishery, with 129,000 tons of marine life harvested
there in 2006 (FISIS). 9
However, the Arctic Ocean, which has similar
environmental conditions to the Southern Ocean, is considerably closer than
the Southern Ocean to the population centres of Europe, North, American,
and China, making its marine life resources far more economically valuable.
In order to estimate the future production of Arctic Ocean fisheries, data on
the primary production of marine life can be used.10 For the Arctic Ocean,
primary production is generally low (11 g C/m2) due to the attenuating effect
of sea ice on sunlight (Arctic Council 2005, p. 493). However, the Arctic
Ocean margins contain areas of primary production that match those of more
temperate oceans (greater than 200 g C/m2) (Arctic Council 2005, p. 493).
Both the future productivity and composition of Arctic Ocean fisheries are
likely to change due to a reduction in both the mean water temperature and
the sea ice extent. While the effects of these changes on the marine biota in
the Arctic Ocean are currently unclear, it is reasonable to assume that as the
physical oceanography changes the biological oceanography will change as
well.
These changes are likely to occur due to increased pressure from
invasive species as well as the increased availability of nutrients and light as
the sea ice coverage is reduced. It can be reasonably inferred that the increase
in areas of open water will increase the primary production and hence the
levels of commercially harvestable marine species (Arctic Council 2005, p.
770). However, the overall effects of climate change on the constituents of the
9
For comparison purposes, approximately 2,000,000 tons of marine life was harvested from
the Meditarranean Sea in 2006 (FISIS).
10
Primary production refers to the fixing of carbon by marine life (primarily plankton) and is
measured in [g Carbon/m2] (Arctic Council 2005, p. 493).
24
Arctic Ocean ecosystem due to changes in the niche environment and
invasive species are as yet unknown (Gradinger 1995, p. 283).
The thesis The Policing of Biomarine Resources in the Southern Ocean provides an
excellent overview of the balance between technology for extraction and
regulation (Ash 1994). In general, the fisherman possesses many ways to
circumvent policies designed to regulate his activity, while the technologies
needed for enforcement are imperfect and expensive (Ash 1994, p. 75).
Current problems in the Barents Sea foreshadow the magnitude of the
problem facing Arctic Ocean governance, as Norway estimates that more than
100,000 tons of cod11 was illegally fished from the Barents sea in 2005 (Illegal
2008).
Shipping Lanes and Tourism
Unlike mineral and biological resources, transportation links and tourism are
a resource whose benefits can more easily be shared among all of mankind
without the need for an elaborate international framework. The existence of a
viable shipping lane through the Northwest Passage could result in
significant economic benefits by reducing the voyage from Asia to ports on
the Atlantic Ocean by 1600 – 3500 nm, with similar benefits derived from the
Northeast Passage (Somanathan 2006, p. 1579).12
The prospects for Arctic Ocean tourism are also increasing; ironically because
climate change has made the region more accessible while at the same time
increasing the incentive for tourists to see the unique Arctic environment
before it is changed forever. Last year, 1.5 million tourists visited the Arctic
11
This illegal catch was worth $360 million (Illegal 2008).
12
The Northwest Passage links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Canadian Arctic Ocean
waters, whilst the Northeast Passage does the same via the Russian Arctic Ocean Waters.
25
region and visits to places like Svalbard have increased at a 6% annual rate
(Naik 2007).
As a contrast, the Antarctic region received approximately
15,000 tourist visits in 2002 (Berkman 2002, p. 186).
Similar to fishing
activities, the geographical proximity of the Arctic Ocean to population
centres increases its potential for tourism.
The technology to build ice strengthened ships and a number of rating
systems to grade ships on their ability to deal with such environmental
conditions have already been developed (Somanathan 2006). As a result,
both of these activities are likely to be among the first significant economic
activities to occur in the Arctic Ocean and thus must be considered first when
implementing a governance regime.
From a regulatory perspective, Arctic Ocean tourism and shipping present
similar problems. Such activities generally consist of extended voyages in
large vessels.
These activities present additional problems because
international shipping traffic has the right to transit across national EEZs
under UNCLOS III (United 1982). Indeed, this is likely to happen since the
national EEZs will be the first areas to open up to such activity (Somanathan
2006). As a result, the potential for international disputes with regards to
enforcement of regulations is high.
Three main concerns arise from these economic activities. The first is the
maintenance of navigation aids, ice patrols, and safety regulation
enforcement in order to provide safe passage for vessels.
The second
governance issue is the regulation of pollution arising from normal operation.
Third, the chance of a catastrophic accident and the subsequent need for
rescue operations and cleanup of discharged fuel oil and/or hazardous cargo
must be planned for, especially in ice covered waters.
26
Although some precedent exists for international cooperation in the form of
the North Atlantic Ice Patrol, which is run by the U.S. Coast Guard and
financed by other nations (Pritchett 1997), such activities are likely to be more
difficult in the Arctic Ocean environment.
Conclusions on the Economic Exploitation of the Arctic Ocean
Overall, the Arctic Ocean remains an area of great promise for future
economic exploitation.
However, it is imperative to note that the first
resources to become economically viable will be those in the EEZs of the
claimant nations, while any resources that are proven to exist in the Arctic
Ocean commons will take decades before they are accessible and
economically viable. The difficult Arctic environment will pose a challenge to
both the economic exploitation and the regulation of that exploitation.
Chapter 4: Governance in the Arctic Ocean
The Common Heritage of Mankind
Regardless of the veracity of the claims of vast oil, natural gas, and metallic
mineral resources under the Arctic Ocean ice, the concern that such resources
might exist can be leveraged to facilitate a peaceful international governance
solution under the auspices of UNCLOS III for the Arctic Ocean and
particularly the disputed Arctic Ocean commons.
Nations will have
motivation to implement practical international governance so as not to be left
out of any future economic, political, or security benefits emanating from the
Arctic Ocean commons.
Several excellent historical examples exist where nations were motivated to
sign an international agreement preserving an area of the earth for peaceful
purposes so as not to be left out of the potential future benefits of that area.
27
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), while initially signed in 1961, remained
an agreement between a few select nations until the oil embargo of 1973 and
the subsequent discovery of potential oil deposits in Antarctica caused a
massive influx of nations willing to sign the Antarctic Treaty in order to have
a voice in future issues on a continent that had suddenly become relevant
(Berkman 2002, p. 70). Likewise, and of direct relevance to the Arctic, the
motivation for the international community of nations to convene the
convention that ultimately resulted in UNCLOS III was provided in large part
by a speech by the Maltese Foreign Minister Arvid Pardo in 1967 concerning
the potential for deep seabed mining, as well as a growing fear that a few
technologically advanced nations would come to dominate the deep sea if no
international agreement was put into place (Charney 1982, p. 83).
Arctic Governance Parallels with the Antarctic Treaty System
One should be careful about drawing casual parallels between the ATS and
any potential Arctic Ocean treaty. The two polar regions of the earth differ in
fundamental ways, not least of which is that the Arctic consists of primarily of
open ocean while the Antarctic is largely terrestrial. The most important
difference between the two regions is that fact that the Arctic Ocean is
surrounded by developed countries with a large interest in the economic and
security implications of any potential arctic governance regime. In contrast,
the Antarctic Continent is relatively free from such considerations. From a
geopolitical standpoint, the Arctic Ocean more closely resembles the
Mediterranean Sea rather than the Antarctic continent.
With that caveat in mind, there are striking parallels between the renewed
interest in Antarctic resources in 1973 and the current focus on potential
Arctic Ocean resources in 2008. From 1961 – 1973, the membership in the ATS
increased at the rate of one nation every two years. However, the twin events
28
of the Arab oil embargo, which made nations much more cognizant of their
fragile fossil fuel security, and the discovery of potential petroleum deposits
in the Antarctic caused participation in the ATS to spike as nations feared that
they would be left out of any Antarctic resource extraction (Berkman 2002, p.
72).
Figure 5 shows this increase in the membership of the ATS as a result of these
events. The net effect of turning the ATS into a broad based multilateral
treaty was a drive to turn Antarctica into an area that would be preserved for
the ‘common heritage of mankind’. Eventually, this resulted in the signing of
the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources (CRAMRA)
that prohibited all exploitation of mineral resources in the Antarctic for 50
years in order to avoid confrontation between nations (Berkman 2002, p. 74,
193). This agreement was made possible in part by the fact that the mineral
resources of Antarctica will not be economically viable for the foreseeable
future (Kearney 1992).
As such, CRAMRA represents a precedent for
international agreement on the regulation of resources in the Arctic Ocean
commons that will not be viable until approximately 2050.
29
Figure 5: Plot of the number of nations that are parties to the Antarctic
Treaty System vs. time (Berkman 2002, p. 72).
A similar sequence of events to those that occurred after 1973 in the Antarctic
is now occurring in the Arctic Ocean.
As noted earlier, the furore
surrounding potential fossil fuel resources has been partially set off by both
intense speculation and a misquotation of a USGS report. The same sequence
of events also occurred in 1973-1974, when the Wall Street Journal
misinterpreted an internal USGS memo that said that the Antarctic could
potentially contain 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion feet of natural gas
(Spivak 1974). The Wall Street Journal’s article incorrectly stated that those
highly speculative figures represented the recoverable reserves to be found in
Antarctica (Berkman 2002, p. 190).
In addition, the high price of hydrocarbon fuels in 2008 mirrors the high
prices that occurred during the Arab oil embargo of 1973.13 If the price of
13
As of May 2008 oil prices have surpassed the previous inflation adjusted peak set in April
1980 of $103.76 per barrel in 2008 dollars (Moawad 2008).
30
hydrocarbon fuels remains high, this will only serve to increase international
interest in areas of the world that may have undiscovered deposits. The
Arctic Ocean commons have especially begun to draw attention because of
their current status as international space whose economic wealth could be
open for exploitation by a number of national interests.
The wild speculation about potential Antarctic resources helped foment
interest in the Antarctic Continent and thus to launch the ‘international
accommodation phase’ of the ATS shown in Figure 5. Likewise, the increased
interest in the Arctic Ocean commons for the above reasons will draw more
nations into the governance debate. Already, the European Union (EU) has
identified the Arctic Ocean as a key strategic region for its future ability to
secure trade and resources and has ordered the formation of an EU Arctic
policy in order to ensure that its interests are represented in the Arctic
(Climate 2008).
National Claims to the Arctic Commons under UNCLOS III
Given the vast area of the Arctic Ocean beyond the EEZs that will potentially
be designated as the ‘common heritage of mankind’, the Ilulissat Declaration
of the Arctic claimant nations to govern the Arctic Ocean under UNCLOS III
takes on increased importance. The fact that the nations detailed in Table 1
have submitted seabed claims to UNCLOS III further strengthens the
legitimacy of the treaty and thus makes it more likely that any Arctic Ocean
governance framework will be based on those principles.
Considering these claims, the evolution of Arctic Ocean governance will
logically follow one of three scenarios. In the first scenario, some or all of the
aforementioned claims are accepted by UNCLOS III and the majority of the
Arctic Ocean commons will be placed under the national control of the
31
claimant nations.
In this scenario, the legitimacy of UNCLOS III will be
permanently weakened since the concept of ‘the common heritage of
mankind’ ingrained in UNCLOS III will have been shown to carry no
meaning in reality.
A second scenario could also form where the arctic claimant nations’ claims
are rejected by the CLCS, but the arctic claimants choose to ignore the ruling
and seize the claimed territory anyway.
If this comes to pass, some
combination of national governance or anarchy would be established for the
Arctic Commons. In all likelihood, UNCLOS III would completely fall apart
as an international agreement.
In the third scenario, the claims in Table 1 will be unanimously rejected and
the claimant nations will acquiesce to the principle of res communis espoused
for the areas of the sea that are the common heritage of mankind in Section XI
of UNCLOS III (United Nations 1982).
In this scenario, the principle of
international territory belonging to ‘the common heritage of mankind’ will be
strengthened and UNCLOS III will be legitimised.
The speed at which serious discussions about the Arctic Ocean commons
governance begin to take place between the Arctic claimant nations and the
U.N. will have an immense impact on the likelihood of instituting a peaceful
international governance regime.
Specifically, as Thomas Franck notes in
Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, any system of
governance originating from the principles of res communis and the fair
distribution of resources will have a much greater chance of success if the
resources in question have not already begun to have been exploited (Franck
1994, p. 397).
The ten year time limit that UNCLOS III places on the
submission of seabed claims provides a natural time frame for the start of a
32
framework for practical Arctic Ocean commons governance.
Indeed, the
deadline for many of the Arctic claimant nations to submit claims, excluding
the United States which has not yet signed UNCLOS III, is fast approaching.14
UNCLOS III as a Test
In theory, UNCLOS III represents a perfect starting point for a framework of
international governance in the Arctic Ocean. However, the results of global
climate change in the Arctic will also likely prove to be the first real test of
UNCLOS III, specifically the principles of res communis that are detailed in
Section XI (United Nations 1982).
All nations party to the UNCLOS III
agreement agreed in principle that:
The States Parties to this Convention…Desiring by this
Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution
2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General
Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia
that the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as
its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the
exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for
the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the
geographical location of States…(United Nations 1982)
Despite this lofty declaration, the coastal states managed to negotiate for
overly vague and large definitions of their EEZs. The EEZs of coastal states
extend at least 200 nm from the coast and any territorial islands, with the
14
Deadlines to submit claims to the CLCS (DD/MM/YYYY): Russia - 12/03/2007, Canada –
07/11/2013, Norway – 24/06/2006, Denmark – 16/11/2014 (United Nations…Status 2008)
33
possibility of an EEZ extending up to 350 nm or 100 nm past the 2500 meter
isobath if certain conditions on the geology of undersea features are judged to
be extensions of the continental shelf in question (United Nations 1982). At
the time, this framework placed all currently economically exploitable ocean
resources15 in the EEZs of nations with costal territory. This, plus a design for
a scheme that made it extremely unlikely to be commercially worthwhile to
develop resources in the ocean commons to benefit all of mankind, was a
concerted effort on the part of costal nations who saw a chance to turn the
UNCLOS III negotiations to their advantage (Franck 1994, p. 397).
However, it is likely that the resources in the Arctic Ocean were overlooked
during the UNCLOS III negotiations. Indeed, a search of the literature reveals
that the Arctic Ocean is not substantially mentioned in either the treaty text or
any of the documents or memoirs produced concerning the negotiations.
Since the negotiations took place from 1973 – 1982, the concept of global
climate change had not yet entered into policy makers calculations. Thus, the
reduction of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean that may yield significant exploitable
resources in the Arctic commons is a scenario that was likely never
envisioned by the UNCLOS III negotiators. The Arctic Ocean will be the first
test of both the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle that was enshrined in
UNCLOS III but has never been put into practice and the practical
implementation of such governance.
15
High seas ocean fisheries are the one exception to this but are dealt with in the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement (United Nations Status 2008).
34
Governance Scenarios Coupled with the Environmental State
Change
Somewhat paradoxically, the establishment of a robust international
governance regime depends on both a low demand for current Arctic
resources as well as anticipated high future demand for those same resources.
More specifically, the rate at which global climate change occurs will have a
considerable effect on the system of governance that is eventually formed in
the Arctic Ocean commons. If the Arctic Ocean sea ice is reduced enough to
allow significant economic activity before effective governance can be put into
place, then the chances of effective governance ever forming are greatly
reduced.
The May 2008 listing of the polar bear as a ‘threatened’ species illustrates both
the ability and the limits that environmental threats have to motivate
governmental action (U.S. Lists 2008). While the environmental degradation
in the Arctic was enough to convince the United States to take action to help
the polar bear, Dirk Kempthorne, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, explicitly
stated that the listing would do nothing to force action on climate change or
to harm the economy of the United States (U.S. Lists 2008). As this episode
illustrates, environmental degradation is much more likely to stimulate
corrective action on the part of governments when that degradation threatens
the economic interests of that government.
The Svalbard Treaty as a Precedent for Practical Implementation
of Arctic Ocean Governance
While UNCLOS III is the obvious starting point for developing a practical
international system of Arctic Ocean governance, the Spitsbergen treaty
system already in existence provides precedence and a solid foundation for
35
such a system, while also giving warning to the difficulties that may be
encountered upon implementation.
The Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 16 governs the Svalbard archipelago in the
Arctic Ocean. Under the treaty, Norway has sovereignty over the Svalbard
archipelago, but other nations have the right to conduct economic activity
there.
Norway also has the right to establish fair and non-prejudicial
regulations governing this economic activity. So far, 40 countries are party to
the Spitsbergen Treaty (Westing 1986, p. 211 – 215).
The right of any treaty member to conduct economic activity and to extract
resources from the Svalbard archipelago, while historically uncontroversial
when concerned with the land area of Svalbard, has caused arguably the first
significant Arctic Ocean territorial dispute. Figure 6 shows the territorial
dispute between Russia and Norway, overlaid with the suspected
hydrocarbon deposits that are at stake in the dispute. Even the U.S. and the
U.K., Norway’s close allies, are reserving the right to contest Norway’s claim
of sovereignty over their EEZ around Svalbard (Pedersen 2006, p. 339).
16
Also known as the Svalbard Treaty.
36
Figure 6: Map of suspected oil and gas deposits overlaid with the current
territorial dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea region
(Rekacewicz 1998).
In addition, the fishing grounds around Svalbard, which Norway has
traditionally claimed and regulated but allowed other nations to use, have
been the scene of recent national disputes between Norway and both Iceland
and Russia (Pedersen 2006, p. 346). Icelandic fishing vessels have even fired
on Norwegian enforcement authorities, while the Russian Government
threatened to have Norwegian Coast Guard vessels destroyed if they
interfered in Russian fishing activities and backed up these claims by
deploying patrol vessels with their fishing fleet (Pedersen 2006, p. 346 – 347).
37
This regulatory clash has not yet spread to the valuable petroleum deposits
around Svalbard that are now becoming accessible, which due to their nonrenewable nature are likely to be even more contentious than fishing rights
(Pedersen 2006, p. 351). At the centre of the dispute are Norway’s sovereign
rights supposedly granted to it under both UNCLOS III and the Spitsbergen
Treaty. Svalbard thus serves as evidence that the success in implementing a
practical and sustainable governance regime for the Arctic Ocean under
UNCLOS III is by no means a foregone conclusion and will be determined
largely by considerations of economic exploitation and the policies
implemented to regulate that activity.
Chapter 5: Arctic Governance Scenarios
The Arctic Ocean from a Global Perspective
The scenario framework constructed by the Arctic Council and the Global
Business Network examines the permutations of demand for Arctic Ocean
resources and the governance structure there from a global perspective
(Global 2008). This scenario framework is show in Figure 7.
38
Figure 7:
Scenario from the Global Business Network and the Arctic
Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group
(Global 2008).
The scenario shown in Figure 7 attempts to determine how global events such
as the world economic outlook and the stability of national governments will
impact the Arctic.
A Governance vs. Economic Exploitation Scenario
In contrast, the scenario analysis conducted focuses more narrowly on the
ability to economically exploit the Arctic Ocean vs. the ability to regulate that
activity. In doing so, a narrower set of scenarios and scenario triggers can be
examined. This focus will also assist in developing specific policies to direct
the future of Arctic Ocean governance in the desired direction of a strong
international framework.
A future Arctic Ocean that is either found to contain negligible resources or
suffers drastically less warming than is currently predicted would be more
39
amenable to peaceful and sustainable governance simply because there would
be much less incentive to conduct economic activity there, regardless of the
ability to effectively govern or to extract resources. For the purposes of this
scenario, the current predictions about the effect of global climate change in
the Arctic Ocean, seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, are assumed to be accurate.
Additionally, the world demand for resources is assumed to remain high, as
is assumed in the ‘Arctic Race’ and ‘Arctic Saga’ scenario narratives of the
Global Business Network report seen in Figure 7 (Global 2008, p. 5).
Moreover, while the estimation of Arctic Ocean resources, especially
hydrocarbon resources, has likely been inflated by hyperbole, this scenario
analysis assumes that an Arctic Ocean transformed by global climate change
will contain significant economic opportunities in some form.
This scenario posits that Arctic Ocean governance and regulation will be
based on UNCLOS III.
UNCLOS III already allows for the creation and
enforcement of specific regulations for areas where
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major harm to or irreversible
disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment based on the best
available scientific evidence (UNCLOS 1982, p. 115 – 116).
However, international agreements tend to have weak enforcement
mechanisms and thus tend to rely upon the willingness of the members of
those agreements to practice self enforcement (Simmons 1998, p. 76). While it
40
may be in the long term interests of governments to comply with such
agreements, it is often in their short term interests not to (Pedersen 2006, p.
340). Taking the aforementioned assumptions into account, both the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement and UNCLOS III will need to be enforced in practice in
order to exercise effective governance.
Scenario Analysis
This study does not seek to determine whether or not sustainable Arctic
Ocean governance is possible. The issues to consider are far too complex and
uncertain for the scope of this work. Rather, the aim is to bring the issues of
the technological viability of economic exploitation and the effectiveness of
technology and governance policy to regulate that activity into consideration
when considering governance issues.
As already noted, the surveillance and policing of economic activity in the
open ocean is both difficult and expensive (Ash 1994). Due to their relatively
low cost, remote surveillance and information technology solutions tend to be
the first approaches attempted to enforcing regulatory regimes (Ash 1994, p.
76). Advances in these technologies are likely to continue into the future,
since the technology that can be used to regulate sparse human activity over a
large region such as the Arctic Ocean is also the technology that governments
are investing heavily in to combat newly emerging security threats that tend
to be both sporadic and diffuse. However, experience shows that governance
regimes that utilise only those methods have been largely ineffective due to
the ease with which such measures can be circumvented (Ash 1994 p. 76).
Thus, Arctic Ocean governance will require both new technologies and
effective policy implementation.
41
On the subject of resource extraction, new technologies will tend to make once
marginal resources economically viable over time, as has been demonstrated
in this study. The question remains as to the time frame that Arctic Ocean
resources, especially those that may exist on the deep seabed of the Arctic
Ocean commons, will ever be economically extractable.
A combination of the two factors discussed above produces a set of axes on
which to construct the scenario framework for the Arctic Ocean seen in Figure
8. The vertical axis measures the technical ability to economically exploit the
Arctic Ocean region.
The horizontal axis measures the capability of the
governance regime to enforce an effective regulatory policy.
Thus, the
horizontal axis measures both the technology available for enforcement and
the effectiveness of the policies put into place to utilise that technology.
42
Technical Ability for Economic
Exploitation
Innovation Arctic
HIGH
A high ability of national and
international governments to regulate
economic activity, combined with the
ability to extract significant resources,
leads to the exploitation of Arctic
Ocean mineral and biological
resources not unlike international
activity in the North Sea today.
Environmental damage is limited due
to high regulatory capabilities.
LOW
HIGH
Tourism Park Arctic
Wildlife Refuge Arctic
A low ability of national and
international governments to
regulate economic activity with
fewer economically viable
resources leads to an Arctic Ocean
dominated by tourism and shipping
concerns, combined with low
regulation of their environmental
harm.
A high ability of governments to
regulate economic activity, combined
with a relatively low prospect of
resource significant extraction, leads
to the preservation of the Arctic
Ocean on similar grounds to the
Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge.
Tourism and shipping exist but are
lightly regulated
Technical and
Policy Capability to
Govern
The inability of national and
international governments to
regulate economic activity,
combined with a high prospect of
extraction, leads to a scenario
where national and business
interests exercise de facto control
over large swaths of resources and
territory. Pollution and poaching of
resources is lightly policed.
Managed Arctic
LOW
Figure 8:
Scenario space describing four different scenarios based on a
combination of the technical capability of national and extra-national bodies
to govern the Arctic Ocean and the technical capability to extract Arctic
Ocean resources. Inspiration for this scenario was derived from the Global
Business Network report titled The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation in
Mid-Century (Global 2008).
The four scenarios are constructed by considering the future technical
capability for governance and regulation as either high or low. If the ability to
enforce those agreements in practice is high, then the Arctic Ocean can be
managed sustainably from environmental, economic, and geo-political
perspectives.
If the ability to manage economic activity is low, then the
human impact on the Arctic Ocean will be determined to a much greater
43
extent by the technical viability of the various resource extraction activities to
be conducted there.
Likewise, the future technical ability to economically exploit the Arctic Ocean
is either considered to be high or low. If the technical ability is low, than
future economic activity in the Arctic is likely to be dominated by tourism
and shipping concerns, since the technology to build ice-strengthened Arctic
class ships is already proven (Somanathan 2006).
Conversely, if the
technology for significant biological and mineral resource extraction proves to
be economically viable before the ability to govern that activity is developed,
then the Arctic Ocean will become an area of significant unregulated human
activity.
In the ‘Tourism Park Arctic’, the technology to economically extract resources
from the Arctic Ocean Environment does not exist. In addition, governance in
the Arctic is ineffective due to a combination of lack of resources, appropriate
technology, and intelligent policies. In this world, the main human presence
in the Arctic Ocean is due to tourism and shipping, along with some fishing.
This relative lack of economic activity would also reduce the incentives for
governments to invest heavily in effective governance.
With less human
activity in the Arctic Ocean, environmental damage will be limited, though
the extent to which tourism and shipping cause damage will depend on the
ability to regulate those activities.
Conversely, in the ‘Wildlife Refuge Arctic’, the governance of both the
national and international spaces of the Arctic Ocean is effective, while the
technology for resource extraction does not exist. Such a scenario could be
triggered by increased global awareness of environmental concerns, which
would put pressure on governments to responsibly manage the Arctic. In this
44
scenario, tourism, shipping, and fishing are once again the biggest economic
activities in the Arctic Ocean, but they are highly regulated under the
UNCLOS III provisions.
In the ‘Managed Arctic’ scenario, the technology to exploit Arctic Ocean
resources is developed in coincidence with the practical ability to govern the
Arctic Ocean. In this scenario, which might be viewed as the best of both
worlds, significant economic benefit is derived from Arctic Ocean minerals,
biological resources, shipping, and tourism, all effectively managed under
UNCLOS III. However, given the precedent set by the Svalbard disputes, this
scenario must be viewed as unlikely.
The ‘Innovation Arctic’ world postulates that the ability to economically
exploit the Arctic Ocean will be far ahead of the ability to regulate that
activity in the future. For international business concerns, this scenario would
likely represent a world of great opportunity in the Arctic without the
constraint of regulations. Other stakeholders, notably NGOs and government
organisations, would view this world as a ‘Wild West Arctic’, where
unregulated economic activity leads to devastating ecological damage. In this
state of affairs, security concerns will also become a factor as nations compete
over perceived violations of sovereignty. These violations of sovereignty will
include not only incursions into territory but also pollution effects from
economic activity.
Both the ‘Innovation Arctic’ and ‘Managed Arctic’ scenarios would likely be
triggered by rapid technological advancements in Arctic Ocean environment
extraction technology, with the difference between the two delineated by the
timescale of such advancement in comparison to the timescale of the
implementation of effective governance. With all four scenarios, the outcome
45
will likely be highly dependent on the timeline of events.
If a stable
governance regime is in place before significant economic activity, then the
chances of a sustainably governed Arctic Ocean increase.
Conversely, if
outstanding governance issues are not resolved before interest in economic
interest increases, as the Svalbard case, then the chance of implementing a
practical governance regime that is accepted by all stakeholders is decreased.
In all likelihood, the future of the Arctic Ocean will incorporate some
combination of the scenarios outlined here. If one takes the reasonable view
that the Arctic Ocean should be sustainably managed, then a scenario with
strong governance is preferable. Likewise, the known resources of the Arctic
Ocean and the pace of technological development make it likely that
economically viable resource extraction will occur to some degree. With this
in mind, the requirement to quickly form an effective governance regime in
the Arctic Ocean becomes even more imperative.
Wild Cards
It is also important to note that several ‘wild card’ events could have a drastic
impact on whether or not sustainable governance in the Arctic Ocean is to be
achieved.
The first, and most obvious, is a change in the magnitude of
warming in the Arctic Ocean. Logically, significantly faster warming than is
currently predicted would have the effect of increasing the rush to exploit the
resources there but may also increase the sense of responsibility that national
and international bodies have towards the global environment. Conversely,
much slower warming than is currently predicted would mean that the
current furore over economic exploitation and governance of the Arctic Ocean
leads nowhere.
46
As noted in the Global Business Network scenario report, global events
outside of the Arctic Ocean could also influence the economic interest in the
region. For example, a drastic reduction in international trade volumes or a
general world economic downturn could reduce national interest in the Arctic
Ocean (Global 2008, p. 6).
Likewise, in contravention to the Ilulissat
Agreement, an unexpected national agreement by the Arctic claimant nations
to ignore UNCLOS III and divide the Arctic Ocean into sectors would likely
serve to drastically increase international tension there.
Chapter 6: Conclusions
Towards an International Governance Regime under UNCLOS III
The Ilulissat Declaration of 28 May 2008 reaffirms the Arctic claimant nations’
commitment to the determination of sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean and the
subsequent regulation and governance there under the auspices of UNCLOS
III. However, the question remains as to whether the Arctic Ocean will be
largely divided up among the EEZs of the respective Arctic claimant nations
or whether the claims outlined in Table 1 will be rejected by the CLCS and a
large portion of the central Arctic Ocean will fall under the common heritage
of mankind as outlined in Section XI of UNCLOS III.
Despite this promising beginning for international governance, the
conventions outlined in UNCLOS III and related documents must be
implemented in practice before the effects due to global climate change
permit significant economic activity in the Arctic Ocean.
Sustainable
governance in the Arctic Ocean will depend heavily upon a well enforced
regulatory framework due to the fragile nature of that unique environment.
47
Additionally, the time frame of the development of suitable Arctic
environment technology to economically exploit the Arctic Ocean will play a
large role in determining both the interests of international business and
national governments in the region.
The race between the technology to
economically exploit the Arctic Ocean and the implementation of effective
governance will in large part determine the future of the Arctic Ocean.
Future Work
The implementation of the individual elements of governance in the Arctic
Ocean must be studied in depth in order to begin to formulate effective policy
for the region.
In particular, those issues that will require international
coordination, such as Arctic shipping regulations for safety and pollution,
must be examined with their international consequences in mind.
Additionally, an updated review of maritime regulation methods and
technologies with a focus on the Arctic Ocean environment would provide a
useful starting point
The debate about the availability of Arctic Ocean resources also suffers from
much speculation and a lack of reliable data.
When such data becomes
available, it must be combined with existing data sets to determine the size of
potential economic activities that global climate change will make possible in
the Arctic Ocean.
Additionally, a program to document state-of-the-art
technologies in development will aid in determining the time frame in which
Arctic Ocean resources will become economically viable. The completion of
both of these tasks will aid in ensuring that appropriate governance can be
implemented before such activity begins.
Furthermore, accurate mapping, both of the potential resources of the Arctic
Ocean, and of the assorted EEZ extension claims made by the Arctic claimant
48
nations will ensure that potential resource or jurisdictional disputes can be
addressed at the earliest possible stage.
49
Definitions
Arctic (Ocean) Commons – The area of the Arctic Ocean outside of the 200 nm
economic exclusion zones of the Arctic claimant nations.
Arctic Claimant Nations – Those nations having a possible claim to the Arctic
Ocean. Includes The United States, Denmark/Greenland, Russia, Norway,
and Canada.
Arctic Ocean – For the purposes of this study the Arctic Ocean is defined as the
collective EEZs of the five arctic claimant nations and the arctic commons area
in the middle of this ring. See Figure 1.
Mineral Resources – Resources that include all hydrocarbons as well as all
metallic materials.
Res Communis – When applied to UNCLOS III, the concept that those areas of
the sea that are not owned by states are owned by all of mankind.
Seabed – The area on the bottom of the ocean, but not including the above
water and air column.
Abbreviations and Nomenclature
ATS – Antarctic Treaty System
CLCS – Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CRAMRA - Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
EU – European Union
m – meter
nm – Nautical Mile
UNCLOS III – The United Nations Third Law of the Sea Treaty
USGS – United States Geologic Survey
50
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