WHEN PERPETUITY DOESN’T
MEAN FOREVER: THE
APPROACHING DEMISE OF
NORAD
Bernard J. Brister
The renewal of the NORAD Agreement in perpetuity in May 2006 seemed to lend
new strength to what had appeared to be a weakening binational military security
relationship. Notwithstanding this impression, however, both the Canadian and
American publics and their governments are more inclined to revert to the
bilateral roots of the relationship in terms of developments in the structure and
mechanisms that are to address evolving threats to the North American continent.
They appear content to allow the former centrepiece of the military security
relationship to wither on the vine or simply occupy a minor role in the security
infrastructure. This role, in addition to being minor, is likely to be one that is
subservient to organizations just recently developed or indeed still in the process
of development.
Le renouvellement de l’Accord du NORAD intervenu en mai 2006 a semblé
redonner vie à une relation binationale de sécurité militaire en voie
d’affaiblissement. Mais au-delà de cette impression, les populations canadienne et
américaine et leur gouvernement respectif semblent plus enclins à revenir aux
racines bilatérales de cette relation pour ce qui est des développements structurels
et des mécanismes servant à combattre les menaces qui visent le continent nordaméricain. Tous semblent accepter que l’élément central de la relation se désagrège
ou ne joue plus qu’un rôle mineur dans l’infrastructure de sécurité. Mais en plus
d’être mineur, ce role risque d’être secondaire, derrière des organisations
récemment mises sur pied ou en voie de développement.
T
he latest renewal of the North American Aerospace
Defense (NORAD) Agreement took place on May 12,
2006. It was a landmark event in that the US and Canada
agreed this renewal, rather than being valid for the standard five
years, would be valid in perpetuity, with a provision for review
every four years.
Although the renewal was touted as an important component of North American security and an enduring symbol
of the long-term quality and strength of the Canada-United
States security partnership, noticeably absent from the
announcement was any specific detail or commitment to
the place of NORAD in the overall continental security
framework of the future. Indeed, the NORAD leadership
itself admitted that how NORAD would accomplish its new
mission and/or work with its partner commands (CANADACOM, NORTHCOM and US STRATCOM, among others) had
yet to be determined, negotiated or agreed upon.
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With the renewal of the agreement in perpetuity but
with the provision for a four-year review scheduled for
2010, it would seem in this case, as Joel Sokolsky observed,
that “in perpetuity” clearly does not mean forever. If this is
true, then, what rationale would validate the use of this
curious and apparently contradictory phraseology?
Desire for renewal in perpetuity came primarily from the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade and the US Department of State. Their objective may
well have been to avoid the exposure to political risk every
five years, where issues that could be central to national
security are subjected to the whims of short-term public sentiments and political power struggles. But what of the other
major players in this scenario? What were and are their motivations for participating in and supporting this curious evolution in the NORAD saga? To answer these questions I will
address each of the Canadian and American political/mili-
When perpetuity doesn’t mean forever: the approaching demise of NORAD
tion of NORAD’s influence as a tool of
continental and US national security.
It is clear that from the American
operational perspective, USNORTHCOM is intended to be the linchpin of
the contribution to homeland security
made by the US military, with NORAD
at best acting as a subset of that equation — possibly as the air force component of that command.
This conclusion is supported by a
number of statements that are used to
as a subtask in the list of responsibilities for the commander of USNORTHCOM in addition to his primary one of
commander of a combatant command. Taken together, these subtle
indicators present a perspective and a
frame of the American mind that clearly places NORAD as a subordinate of
lthough the final structure of the
USNORTHCOM in the homeland secuevolving Canada-US defence relarity infrastructure and therefore in the
tionship is still undetermined and the
continental one as well.
rhetoric on both sides of the border is
Not nearly as subtle was the
supportive of continuing an “imporappointment in November
2004 of US Navy Admiral
It is clear that from the American operational perspective,
Timothy J. Keating. As a
USNORTHCOM is intended to be the linchpin of the
naval aviator, Admiral
contribution to homeland security made by the US military,
Keating was well acquaintwith NORAD at best acting as a subset of that equation —
ed with the aerospace environment as a battle space,
possibly as the air force component of that command.
yet the absence of any expeamplify the USNORTHCOM role and
rience with continental aerospace secutant,” “key” or “central” role for
mission. One example is the statement
rity in general or with NORAD
NORAD, there are a number of actions
delineating the USNORTHCOM area of
operations in particular effectively
and events that can serve as benchresponsibility (AOR), which includes
removes any possible bias or strategic
mark indicators of the American stratthe NORAD AOR, as but a subset of the
understanding that would favour or
egy and objectives for shaping the
larger USNORTHCOM AOR.
support a preference toward the use of
future of the relationship.
Another example is the assignNORAD as a model for continental
These indicators include but are
ment to the commander of USNORTHdefence and security.
not restricted to the nature of organiCOM (and to all other commanders of
As one senior Canadian officer
zational changes, the selection of officombatant commands) of responsibiliexplained, with Admiral Keating you
cers for key leadership positions and
ty for theatre security cooperation
have a USNORTHCOM commander
the nature of the responsibilities
(TSC) with the nations within his AOR.
wondering what to do with NORAD. If
assigned to those positions, and the
In the USNORTHCOM case, these
tradition in the appointment of
rhetoric and behaviour of senior leadnations are Mexico and Canada. The
NORAD commanders had been folers who are “two-hatted” and have
TSC relationships between combatant
lowed and a United States Air Force
responsibilities in both NORAD and
commanders and the nations within
NORAD veteran had been assigned the
USNORTHCOM.
their geographic areas of responsibility
command, you would have had a
Since it was established on October
are bilateral or multilateral ones, and
NORAD commander wondering what
1, 2002, as a combatant command
are not at the binational or nation-toto do with USNORTHCOM.
under the unified command plan, the
nation level with all of the strategic
One of several indicators of Admiral
USNORTHCOM mission has been to
relationship implications that such
Keating’s position on the NORAD issue,
defend the American homeland, and in
agreements carry. Thus, with the estabwhich occurred shortly after his appointdoing so protect the American people,
lishment of USNORTHCOM and its
ment to USNORTHCOM, was that he
their national power and their freedom
apparent dominance in American operopenly questioned the value of a NORAD
of action. If the last two objectives are
ational thought, Canada is faced with a
binational structure when the issue of
taken literally, and there are no qualidegradation of the strategic relationMexican participation in continental
fiers to these objectives made anyship with the United States that had
security must ultimately be addressed.
where in the mission statement, one of
previously existed and that had been
This and several other examples conthe purposes of USNORTHCOM is thus
epitomized by the NORAD Agreement.
tained in congressional testimony clearly
to reduce and thereafter minimize the
indicate the low esteem in which a numextent to which NORAD, as a binationber of the key strategic thinkers in the
al command, influences or limits
et a third indicator of American
American security infrastructure hold the
American options in the defence of the
intentions to establish USNORTHutility of NORAD. By appointing Admiral
homeland. By extension, therefore,
COM as the dominant Canada-US
Keating to command both USNORTHone of the “implied” tasks of the
defence relationship mechanism is the
COM and NORAD, former secretary of
USNORTHCOM mission is the reducmention of the command of NORAD
tary strategies separately and in some
detail. I will begin with an analysis of
the American position, as a clear
understanding of the Canadian strategy hinges upon a number of factors
embedded in the American one.
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Bernard J. Brister
defence Donald Rumsfeld clearly wanted
the focus on the maximization of
American flexibility to address the most
vital of American interests, the security of
their homeland.
Yet another fact supporting the contention that USNORTHCOM is intended
to be the defence centrepiece of the US
military homeland security effort is the
ship approach to continental security
and toward a unilateral one, or a lopsided partnership with Canada
assuming a subordinate position on
par with any other country in the
world that has an influence on
American security concerns, instead
of the special one shaped by our geography and the terms of the NORAD
land security objectives. This decision
may have been made all the easier by
Canada’s rebuff of American overtures
shortly after 9/11 for a closer military-tomilitary relationship to protect the North
American continent.
E
ven if the UCP structure was
selected in haste, however, the
American
leadership
This trend appears to ignore the fact that, uniquely, the
showed no inclination to
security relationship with the partner nation, Canada, directly alter the structure in the
years that followed, or to
influences the most vital of the American security interests,
it to address any of
the security of the American homeland. Thus the template for tailor
the unique security characthe Canada-US defence and security relationship under the
teristics of a relationship
with a country with which
UCP will be the same as that used to manage the one for
they share their longest
New Zealand, Thailand or Morocco.
border. It is thus more likeAgreement. This trend appears to
ly that the structure was specifically
use of the unified command plan (UCP)
ignore the fact that, uniquely, the
selected with the intention of moving
template for the combatant command to
security relationship with the partner
away from a bi-national approach with
define the structure and responsibilities
nation, Canada, directly influences
an ally whose reliability they had been
of USNORTHCOM. As mentioned previthe most vital of the American securiquestioning (as they were questioning
ously, the UCP “cookie- cutter” template
ty interests, the security of the
the reliability of all of their friends and
for combatant commands places interacAmerican homeland. Thus the temallies at the time), toward a more flextion with the nations included in a parplate for the Canada-US defence and
ible bi-lateral relationship.
ticular command’s AOR as a task
security relationship under the UCP
Notwithstanding the weight of
subordinate to the main mission of that
will be the same as that used to manevidence supporting an American
command under the heading of “theatre
age the one for New Zealand,
emphasis to date on the development
security cooperation.” There is no menThailand or Morocco.
of the bilateral versus the binational
tion of partnership or sharing of responSome have argued that while the
aspects of the relationship, is this
sibilities in the execution of the
application of the UCP architecture as
emphasis likely to change with the
USNORTHCOM mission; rather it is a
the device to address the military aspects
new appointees to the positions of seccase of the USNORTHCOM commander
of American homeland security might
retary of defence and commander of
shaping relationships with the nations
fail to capture the subtleties and history
USNORTHCOM?
included in the geographical area of the
of the Canada-US security relationship,
A change of this nature is unlikely,
particular command to enable the
the structure was probably selected in
given the backgrounds and experiences
achievement of the command’s mission.
haste to establish some framework
of both individuals. The replacement for
The application of the cookie-cutter temaround which to quickly begin addressAdmiral Keating as USNORTHCOM
plate to the North American case denies
ing the issues of military homeland secucommander is Air Force General Victor
any special relationship or recognition of
rity. While this may be true, it is also true
E. Renuart Jr. General Renuart has no
a unique security case for America in the
that USNORTHCOM was not established
NORAD experience and in fact is
resolution of homeland security threats
until more than a year after 9/11, thus
steeped in both the UCP cookie-cutter
involving Canada.
providing the military planners with
and the bilateral approaches to defence
There is thus the inescapable conmore than a year in which to consider
relations, having been the joint force air
clusion that the American strategic
the optimal military structure for the
component commander for US Pacific
intent is to reshape the Canada-US
task. Those in the senior American leadCommand and a senior military adviser
security relationship from a binationership who were involved in the decision
to the secretary of defence and the joint
al one epitomized by NORAD into a
may or may not have been aware of or
chiefs of staff in previous assignments.
bi-lateral one that maximizes the freeeven interested in the specifics of the
Nor is it likely that the new
dom and scope of action for the
Canada-US relationship, but in any case
defence secretary, Robert M. Gates,
achievement of American security
they clearly believed that the UCP temwill change the emphasis on the
objectives, unfettered by restrictive
plate was the best alternative for the
development of the bilateral rather
commitments or obligations. This
attainment of American military homethan the binational aspects of the
trend is clearly away from a partner80
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When perpetuity doesn’t mean forever: the approaching demise of NORAD
DND photo
A CF-18 Hornet flies next to a Russian Bear bomber through a North American Air Defence Identification Zone in international airspace in
September. The planes returned to their bases without incident. What is the role of NORAD going forward, given the
emergence of the US Northern Command?
defence relationship. As a career intelligence officer with the CIA, rising
from entry-level employee to director,
Gates is a Bush appointee, having
served George W. Bush’s father, the
first President Bush, as CIA director. If
there is to be a change at all, it is likely to be in how the American bilateral
agenda is pursued.
Gates is expected to adopt a more
pragmatic and realistic approach that
focuses on stability and making relationships work rather than the idealistic neocon one of reshaping the world
in America’s image. Thus, to paraphrase Joel Sokolsky, the new
approach may be a case of bilateralism
“with a smile” instead of “with an attitude” as has been seen in the past.
The writing thus appears to be on
the American wall for NORAD to gradually assume a less prominent role in the
Canada-US defence relationship, with
the distinct probability that it will be
subordinated to USNORTHCOM in the
future. The time frame for this process
may be relatively short, notwithstanding
the direction of the chairman of the
joint chiefs of staff, General Peter Pace,
to “do no harm” to NORAD for the time
being. The period involved with “the
time being” may well be as little as three
years, as 2010 appears to be the critical
date that will serve as the nexus for several key events.
F
irst the 2010 Winter Olympics in
Vancouver, arguably the most critical test of the Canada-US security relationship since 9/11, will be over. Next,
2010 will mark the four-year review
date for the agreement, thus benchmarking an ideal time for a change in
the NORAD relationship. Last, 2010
marks the date by which all of the
ITWAA (integrated tactical warning
and attack assessment) systems and
capabilities resident in NORAD will
have been duplicated either in
USNORTHCOM or USSTRATCOM.
But what of the Canadian strategy? Is it running parallel and/or in
concert with the American one? Is it
diametrically opposed to it? Is there a
bump in the defence relationship
road that we must be prepared to contend with?
A
lthough open sources are silent
on the specific reasons for
Canadian agreement to a four-year
review period, there are a number of
issues and concerns that indicate clear
Canadian support for this review time
frame, as opposed to the two-year period initially proposed by some
American military strategists.
Exactly what are these issues and
concerns? First there is the attitude of the
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Bernard J. Brister
Canadian public toward the current US
administration. This attitude is one of
distrust and in some cases animosity, as a
result of confrontational rhetoric from
both sides of the border as well as a number of events that have served to inflame
Canadian nationalist sentiments and
provide grist for the sovereignist mill. In
2010, when the first review is scheduled
to take place, there will be a new administration in the US that is, if not actively
supported and favoured by the Canadian
public, at the very least not saddled with
the negative political and emotional baggage of the current one.
would no longer be deemed essential
to the national interest. This is the
quintessential case of having your cake
and eating it too. This situation could
also turn out to be a perfect proof of
the axiom that the Americans solve
problems, the British finesse them and
the Canadians outlive them.
The last and possibly the most critical of the advantages to Canada of the
four-year waiting period is that it
would give the Conservatives time to
craft their own detailed Canadian security strategy, one with specific longterm policies, goals and objectives at
every level of political, civil and military activity. Whether the strategy dif-
influence the American agenda to our
advantage. Without such a vision,
however, and without a well-developed
strategy and a strong government to
renegotiate the relationship, the negotiations will be totally driven by the
American agenda and little attention
will be paid to Canadian interests.
N
otwithstanding the many advantages to Canada of the four-year
wait in negotiations, it has one major
disadvantage that may well cost Canada
dearly in terms of negotiating advantage
and position. The disadvantage is that
the American security juggernaut will
continue to develop with little or no
econd, the review four years hence,
Canadian influence and therein 2010, will take place in an
entirely different domestic politi- With a clear vision of our own needs fore little or no Canadian advantage other than that which
cal environment. The present
and interests, we can hope to
Conservative minority governinfluence the American agenda to would accrue naturally by virtue
of our geography. These benefits
ment, the author of the “in perour advantage. Without such a
(accruing through geography)
petuity for four years” agreement,
vision, however, and without a well are in themselves quite signifiis working toward achieving a
cant, but they are still smaller
stable and powerful majority govdeveloped strategy and a strong
than would have accrued if we
ernment by the time the renegogovernment to renegotiate the
had undertaken a Canadian
tiation takes place in 2010. This
relationship, the negotiations will be fine-tuning of the continental
situation, if it comes to pass, will
totally driven by the American
security strategy from active
provide with a broader range and
scope of action to negotiate a
agenda and little attention will be negotiation at an earlier point
than the targeted four-year time
security arrangement of the
paid to Canadian interests.
frame. The result is that the US
greatest possible benefit to
fers significantly from the broad and
will continue to develop its security
Canada, without having to dilute it with
general statements that constitute our
infrastructure without significant comconcessions to a number of other politipresent policy or simply provides some
mitment to Canadian interests through
cal constituencies — as is the case in the
much-needed detail and specifics, this
negotiations. Such negotiations can
current minority House — which might
waiting period would be in the best
only be in Canadians’ interest, as the
reduce its strength and effectiveness.
interests of all Canadians and arguably
Americans are clearly capable of accomis
a
prerequisite
to
dealing/negotiating
plishing the task of continental security
ext, in keeping with what many
effectively with our American allies.
on their own without any Canadian
consider to be a Canadian politiAt present the Americans have the
assistance or contribution.
cal tradition, the provision for renewal
negotiating advantage, with their
The consequence for Canada of this
in perpetuity with a four-year review
extensive and detailed security agenda
situation is that when the negotiations
provides the appearance to the
supported by their overwhelmingly
take place four years hence, the
Canadian public and our American
greater physical and financial contriAmerican security behemoth will be just
allies of progress without actually havbution to continental security. It is
that much more developed and
ing to make a decision or a commitonly with a well-developed and
entrenched along an American-centric
ment. Decisive action would be safely
defined national security strategy of
path from which it will be unwilling to
pushed to a future time and the credit
our own, supported by the power and
deviate. The result for Canada will be a
for those yet-to-be-made decisions
authority of a strong national governloss of opportunity to influence the folcould be reaped in the present. An
ment, that Canada will be in a position
lowing four years of security developattendant benefit is that in the interto negotiate the best security deal posment to the extent it might have
im, the global strategic political and
sible in the circumstances.
otherwise. Thus, as time goes on, the
security situation could change such
With a clear vision of our own
cost to Canada of fuller participation in
that a major renegotiation of the relaneeds and interests, we can hope to
continental security will increase. This is
tionship and commitment of funding
S
N
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When perpetuity doesn’t mean forever: the approaching demise of NORAD
that point and will have migrated to
purely US commands such as
USNORTHCOM or USSTRATCOM.
Canada would have a presence and
influence within these commands
based on its ultimate contribution to
the issues involved. It may well be on
a par with that of Australia and the
rom the Canadian perspective,
UK, and may even be at a lower level
therefore, the latest NORAD agreeof participation.
ment should be considered a military
The remaining role for NORAD, that
stopgap. The four-year review provision
of air defence, will remain a binational
of the agreement will provide the
one by virtue of the nature of the threat
Canadian defence community with a
and the short timelines required to react
period of restructuring and rejuvenation
effectively to it. But it will essentially be
to be conducted in concert with the
a combined air component
of the bilateral NORTHCOM
The future of NORAD is not a rosy one. It is likely that these
realities will unfold without fanfare or formal announcement. and CANADACOM structures, along the lines of a
There will be no declaration by governments or military
joint force air component in
leaders. NORAD will never be formally dissolved or publicly
the existing UCP structure.
The future of NORAD is
eviscerated. It will simply morph into a lesser being to fulfill its
not a rosy one. It is likely
limited operational function and to be trotted out periodically
that these realities will
by one or another nation as a symbol of the enduring
unfold without fanfare or
strength and quality of our military security relationship.
formal
announcement.
There will be no declaration
by governments or military leaders.
review is for nothing less than our
overall government security organizaNORAD will never be formally disnation’s future role in the security of
tion, before it is committed to what,
solved or publicly eviscerated. It will
our own homeland.
arguably, is one of the most fundamensimply morph into a lesser being to
So what is the most likely future for
tal renegotiations of the binational secufulfill its limited operational function
NORAD? Absent any substantive oppority relationship since its inception in
and to be trotted out periodically by
sition from Canada, and possibly even
the early 1930s. The negotiating camone or another nation as a symbol of
in spite of it, the place of NORAD in the
paign over the next four years will estabthe enduring strength and quality of
Canada-US security infrastructure will
lish the future of NORAD, the future of
our military security relationship.
continue to deteriorate. It is likely that
the binational security relationship and
The reality is, however, that
the primary defence and security mechthe extent to which Canada will be in a
NORAD is dying. The disease is termianism at the operational (continental)
position to influence its own homeland
nal and cannot be reversed or cured.
level will be between CANADACOM
security for the foreseeable future.
The only remaining task is to salvage in
and USNORTHCOM. At this level, both
Make no mistake, there is no real
the coming years what we can of those
commands would be in continuous
choice for Canada in this process —
functions that still have utility to the
communication through a web of techthere will be no going back to the halcyCanada-US security relationship. At
nological means and an extensive proon days of the Cold War when NORAD
this point in time those appear to be
gram of exchange and liaison officers.
was pre-eminent and the binational
the air defence role and its stellar repuThey would deal with the combined
defence relationship was apparently
tation as a model of binational cooper(bilateral state to state) and joint (intrasacrosanct. Those days are gone forever
ation. The rest appears destined for a
service; navy, army and air force) securiand will not return. The issue now is to
quiet demise, out of the public eye.
ty issues of the continent.
maximize Canadian influence in a secuSubordinate to the CANADArity infrastructure that has already
Bernard J. Brister, a major in the
COM-USNORTHCOM relationship at
begun to depart from the binational
Canadian Air Force, is an assistant prothe combined military level, NORAD
forum and will not go back.
fessor in the Department of Politics and
would function in the air defence
USNORTHCOM will not go away
Economics at Royal Military College of
role. The aerospace warning role that
any time soon, nor will American
Canada. The opinions expressed are his
used to be resident in NORAD as the
efforts to maximize American freedom
own. [email protected]
ITWAA will have been completed at
of action through an agenda whose
analogous to a business deal where the
longer a potential investor waits to commit funding to a project, the more the
investment will ultimately cost, the less
control she or he has over its development and the smaller the relative profit.
F
objective is deconstruction of the binational agreement and implementation
of a cooperative bilateral security system. The Canadian mission is not to
try to turn back the clock but to get
out in front of the American negotiating strategy and steer it such that the
end state is a strong Canadian presence in the security relationship —
physically, politically and in terms of
policy and strategy — that overarches
the bilateral mechanisms that are
already in place and/or will be put into
place in the future. The struggle over
the next four years until the NORAD
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