JPART 18:441–463
Nonprofit Organizations in Environmental
Management: A Comparative Analysis of
Government Impacts
Sara J. S. Nikolic
Futurewise, Seattle
Tomas M. Koontz
Ohio State University
ABSTRACT
Across a range of issue areas, governments are increasingly collaborating with nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) to achieve policy goals. In the environmental arena, growing concerns
over nonpoint source pollution1 have led governments to work through NPOs rather
than rely on traditional regulatory approaches. But past studies suggest that government
assistance to NPOs can diminish their autonomy, flexibility, and responsiveness—the very
qualities that make them attractive to policymakers. Prior research on government-NPO
interactions has emphasized government funding, and it has focused largely on NPO managers and boards of directors. In this article, we examine a broader range of factors through
which government assistance impacts NPOs. A comparative, longitudinal case study of
collaborative watershed partnerships participating in Ohio’s state grant program indicates
the varied pathways through which government institutions and actors can affect NPOs.
Results suggest how government involvement impacts resources, issue definition, and
organizational structure and decision processes for environmental management.
Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have been part of the institutional fabric of the United
States throughout its history. However, the government and nonprofit sectors have become
increasingly intertwined and interdependent in recent years. Governments have come to
depend on the nonprofit sector as a community-based vehicle through which they can
provide expanding services (Hall 2000), whereas NPOs often rely on the government
for access to resources such as funding and networks (Smith 1999, 2004). Relationships
between the two sectors can range from obligatory partners to fierce competitors or a
combination of the two (Gronbjerg 1993; Salamon 1987; Young 1999). The increasing
We thank Maria Conroy, Robert Vertrees, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. We thank our study
participants for sharing their knowledge and insights. Address correspondence to the author at [email protected].
Nonpoint source pollution encompasses all sources of water quality impairment that cannot be traced to a single
source, for example, fertilizers or pesticides that run off lawns or fields, eventually making their way into a water body.
Because a single source cannot be pinpointed, nonpoint source pollution has been very difficult to regulate.
1
doi:10.1093/jopart/mum022
Advance Access publication on September 10, 2007
ª The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]
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role of nonprofit and other nongovernmental organizations in public policy has been described as a fundamental feature of modern government (Salamon 2002).
One arena that is experiencing this increasing interaction of the government and
nonprofit sectors is environmental management. NPOs, often in the form of collaborative
partnerships, have taken on a larger role in addressing environmental problems. For example, in a study of ecosystem management projects across the United States, Yaffee et al.
(1996) found that NPOs comanaged 77% of the projects, only slightly less than those
projects involving state agencies (86%) or federal agencies (88%). Over the past decade,
federal and state agencies increasingly have looked to community-based efforts—many in
the form of NPOs—to assume responsibility for developing and implementing environmental management plans (e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
1997, 2002).2
What are the consequences of extending responsibility for environmental management from government agencies to NPOs? Public administrators often find the nonprofit
sector an appealing venue because of its grassroots, bottom-up nature that is better able to
influence local social behavior (Boris 1999). Ironically, however, evidence suggests that
involvement with governmental funding programs can diminish the autonomy and flexibility of NPOs, damaging the very characteristics that administrators seek to promote
by funding them (Salamon 1987; Seyoum 1998; Smith 2004). Smith (2004, 8) notes, ‘‘The
opportunities for funding mean that many nonprofit agencies ‘adjust’ their behavior, including their organizational goals and mission, depending on the priorities of the government funding agencies.’’
Empirical studies have highlighted some of the ways that government funding can
impact NPOs. Such impacts are typically seen as negative as government funding comes
with fiscal and performance monitoring rules that reduce NPO flexibility, responsiveness,
and autonomy (Seyoum 1998). Gronbjerg (1993) highlights the powerful impact of government oversight as government funders seek to control NPO activities to meet legislative mandates. The additional bureaucracy that results from government funding may
drain NPO staff time and resources. Eventually, complying with government contracts
can become the ends rather than the means, absorbing substantial NPO energy (Froelich
1999).
Much of the research on government funding and NPOs has focused on NPO boards
of directors and managers. Survey research has found that greater government funding is
associated with a more corporate-style board of directors focused on financial matters and
comprised of businesspersons and professionals rather than community representatives, in
order to more effectively deal with the complexity of government contractual relations
(O’Regan and Oster 2002; Stone and Hager 2001). Similarly, in a longitudinal case study
of one NPO, Stone (1996) found that contractual arrangements led to substantial changes in
the organization’s board functions, composition, and relationships with managers. In times
of government funding cuts, nonprofit managers have been found to shift efforts toward
2
Of course, public involvement in administrative policy making is not new. The Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 set a minimum standard for public involvement in federal agency decisions, and in 1970, National Environmental
Policy Act provided opportunities for citizens to appeal and litigate federal actions. Additional statutes such as the
National Forest Management Act and Clean Water Act included specific provisions for public involvement in agency
environmental policy making. But these policies typically limited citizen involvement to public comment in writing or
at hearings, or to appealing policy decisions after the fact. It was not until the 1990s that citizen-driven, collaborative
efforts became widely used in environmental policy making (Koontz et al. 2004).
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the acquisition of funding, even at the expense of the provision of existing services
(Randall and Wilson 1989). Government funding has also been negatively associated
with managers’ practices to foster active board involvement (Hodge and Piccolo 2005)
and with technical expertise as professional administrators replace subject area experts
(Froelich 1999; Gronbjerg 1993).
Beyond the impacts on managers and boards of directors, government funding has
been linked to changes in broader organizational characteristics. Government funding can
cause goal displacement, including shifts in target clientele groups (Gronbjerg 1993; Kirk
and Kutchins 1992; Lipskey and Smith 1990). In addition, government funding has been
found to be positively associated with nonprofit size as larger organizations are in a better
position to increase their geographic and programmatic scope to match funding requirements (Rosenthal 1996; Stone and Hager 2001).
Although past studies often paint a negative picture of the impact of government
funding, it is important to recognize that government funding can be positive. It has proven
to be a relatively stable, reliable source of revenue for many NPOs, especially those in
social services (Froelich 1999). For policy makers, government assistance to NPOs can be
a viable strategy to achieve policy goals that are not amenable to direct regulation (Hall
2000). For policy makers hoping to achieve public aims by working through NPOs, and for
NPOs deciding whether to seek government assistance, it is important to understand the
likely impacts—both positive and negative—that such arrangements can bring in particular
contexts.
Government assistance does not affect all nonprofits the same. Different patterns of
interaction between government funders and NPOs across fields have been described by
Gronbjerg (1993). In particular, she argues that contextual factors that make up an NPO’s
operating environment impact the degree to which a particular funding stream is likely to
affect strategic management imperatives in the NPO. Greater interdependence between
NPOs and government funders is evident in social services fields than in community
development, civil rights, and environmental advocacy fields.
Explaining variations in impacts requires a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms, or pathways, through which government assistance is likely to affect NPOs. This
is especially important because government-NPO interactions are reciprocal and evolve
over time. Investigating the pathways of impact allows inclusion of a wider range of
variables than has traditionally been examined. It also broadens analysis to include government assistance other than funding, which is critical as governments increasingly seek
to assist nongovernmental organizations through programs that provide training, information, networking, and other help (Collins et al. 1998; Ryan and Klug 2005; Steelman and
Carmin 2002).
The present study investigates government-nonprofit relationships in the arena of
collaborative environmental management to address the following question: How does
government assistance affect nonprofit environmental management organizations over
time? To address this question, we employ a comparative case analysis of two nonprofit,
citizen-driven watershed organizations participating in the Ohio Watershed Coordinator
Grant Program, a collaborative 6-year grant program funded by the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency (OEPA) and managed by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources
(ODNR). The cases explore the complex interactions of government institutions and actors
with these efforts, as well as the impacts that program involvement had on environmental
and social outcomes and on the organization itself.
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The article proceeds as follows: First, we present a theoretical framework for analyzing governmental impacts on collaborative environmental management efforts. Next the
research methods are described. The subsequent sections present results from each case,
followed by a comparative case analysis. The article continues with a discussion of key
findings and closes with a summary and description of theoretical and policy implications.
FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING GOVERNMENTAL IMPACTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
Numerous frameworks are applicable to understanding environmental management and
collaboration, including Alternative Dispute Resolution (Gray 1989), the Institutional
Analysis and Development framework (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994), the Advocacy Coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and the framework for
organizational power and performance developed by Clarke and McCool (1997). However, these approaches do not emphasize the interaction of government and nongovernmental organizations. In contrast, the Governmental Impacts framework developed by
Koontz et al. (2004) focuses on the role of governments in collaborative partnerships
(see figure 1).
The Governmental Impacts framework emerged from a cross-case study of six collaborative environmental management efforts, including habitat conservation, watershed
protection, river cleanup, estuary restoration, forest management, and farmland preservation (Koontz et al. 2004). The framework built on the results from prior studies of collaborative environmental management processes and outcomes (Beierle 1999; Cortner and
Moote 1999; Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002; Steelman and Carmin 2002; Thomas 1999;
Weber 1998; Yaffee et al. 1996), as well as insights from institutional analysis, suggesting
sets of variables likely to affect human-environment interactions in light of the biophysical,
cultural, and institutional context (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). By using the
framework as a guide for inquiry, we seek to identify which factors most impact government interactions with NPOs.
The Governmental Impacts framework identifies three pathways through which governmental institutions (e.g., agencies, programs, policies) and actors (e.g., agency personnel and elected officials) typically influence the environmental and social outcomes of
collaborative environmental management partnerships. These three pathways are issue
definition, resources, and group structure and decision processes. Issue definition captures
the characteristics of a group’s identity, including the biophysical scale3 of its work and
manner in which the group frames issues and solutions. Resources are those assets necessary for an organization to effectively collaborate for environmental management, including human (i.e., paid and volunteer staff), financial (i.e., program and operating funds), and
technical resources (i.e., access to, and ability to understand, information about environmental and social conditions). Finally, structure and decision-making processes involve
the formal and informal composition and organization of the group as well as the manner
by which the group arrives at operational and programmatic decisions.
Issue definition, resources, and group structure and decision-making processes together lead to social and environmental outcomes. Social outcomes include effects on
social capital and civic engagement that result from the collaboration experience.
3
Biophysical scale denotes the geographic size and biological and physical characteristics of the landscape.
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Figure 1
Framework for Analyzing Governmental Impacts on Collaborative Environmental Management.
Source: Koontz et al. (2004).
issue definition
biophysical scale
issue framing
governmental
actors
resources for collaboration
human
technical
financia
governmental
institutions
outcomes
environmental
social
structure and decision
processes
group structure
decision-making processes
Environmental outcomes can be problematic to measure because of the long-time horizon
needed to realize the ecological impacts of actions (Koontz and Thomas 2006). Koontz
et al. (2004) address this challenge by recognizing as environmental outcomes the tangible
policies and activities that promote environmental amelioration, including development of
new management plans or policies as well as site-specific cleanup and restoration efforts.
METHODS
This study examines two nonprofit (501(c)3) citizen-driven watershed management organizations, the Ellery Creek Project (ECP) and the Baret River Coalition (BRC),4 that received funding in the initial funding cycle, in 2000, of the Ohio Watershed Coordinator
Grant Program. This program was a collaborative 6-year grant program funded and managed by the OEPA and ODNR. The program, whose primary objective was to improve
surface water quality through community-based watershed planning and management,
provided funds to hire full-time watershed coordinators, offered training and technical
assistance, and undertook monitoring and evaluation to measure attainment of program
goals and objectives. Grant recipients could request 100% of personnel expenses (up to
$40,000) for the first year. Each subsequent year, the state would cover 10% less of the
personnel expenses, until at the sixth year, the state would only cover 50% of those costs.
At the seventh year, the state funding ended. The recipient organization or agency was
expected to provide a match for operating and support costs, as well as for the increasing
portion of the personnel expenses no longer funded by the state each year.
Longitudinal case studies were developed for the two NPOs by describing their
experiences that led to their application to the state program and then during the first
2 years of their involvement, from January 2001 until December 2002. Follow-up information from March 2005 is also provided for each organization.
4
The names of the watershed organizations have been changed to protect confidentiality.
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The two cases were selected from among the 20 watershed organizations funded in
the initial 2000 cycle of the state program. Three of those organizations were identified as
citizen-driven NPOs,5 meaning that their members and leaders were primarily citizens and
that participants who worked for government agencies were not representing their agency
(see Moore and Koontz 2003). One of the three was a project of a parent NPO, rather than
a stand-alone organization. The other two organizations were independent nonprofit organizations, which had dissimilar histories and approaches to resource management, but
had comparable geographic locations, faced similar issues, and shared many of the same
stakeholders. Based on these characteristics, and considering the dissimilarities of the third
organization, the two independent nonprofits were selected for comparative analysis.
Multiple interviews with 10 key informants provided primary data for development
of the case studies. Following Silverman (2000), this number was reached by interviewing key informants until the point of saturation, where little additional information was
obtained from subsequent interviews. Assurances of confidentiality encouraged open
and honest discussions, as evidenced by interviewees’ willingness to express a range of
positive and negative experiences with the program.
Structured interviews with the watershed coordinator shed light on experiences with
the state program and the progress that each organization was making toward environmental and social goals. Initial interviews were conducted with the watershed coordinator
in January and February 2002 and lasted approximately 2 hours each. Follow-up e-mail
correspondence and telephone conversations were used to clarify as needed and to capture
the coordinators’ experiences over time, at multiple points during 2002.
In addition, interviews with two board members from each organization, including the
board president, in 2002 gave additional perspectives on organizational characteristics,
interpersonal relationships, and experiences with the state program. Subsequently, to enhance longitudinal perspective, these same board members were again interviewed in
2005.
Interviews were also conducted with four state agency employees involved in managing the state program. These interviews focused on their interactions with the two case
watershed organizations as well as their perspectives on the challenges and successes of
each group. Follow-up e-mail correspondence and telephone conversations were used after
each interview to clarify as needed.
Document analysis augmented the interviews and provided background information
about each organization. Documents included grant-related items, such as original grant
applications, progress reports, and work plans, as well as organization literature, such as
newsletters, brochures, and Web sites. Over 100 pages of documents were reviewed and
analyzed from the organizations.
Additional state agency documents were also reviewed. These included general information on the state program, such as program descriptions, requests for proposals,
training documents, press releases, internal evaluations, and progress reports. Documents
regarding interactions between the agencies and specific organizations, such as contracts,
formal, and informal written correspondence and internal memoranda, were also analyzed.
Over 100 pages of documents were reviewed and analyzed from the state agencies.
5
The remaining 17 organizations were agency-driven or hybrid agency–citizen groups, many of which were not
incorporated as NPOs, and all of which exhibited a far greater management role for local and state governmental
agencies than the three citizen-driven NPO cases.
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Data were compiled to construct descriptive case studies detailing the experiences of
each organization during the first 2 years of the state program, January 2001 to December
2002, from the perspectives of both the organization and the state agencies. This approach
followed Yin’s (1994) embedded, multiple case study design that examines several subunits embedded within a case, to describe and explain the activities and relationships that
make up the experience of an organization. Qualitative analysis followed standard methods
of summarizing, coding, and pattern searching (Miles and Huberman 1994). Follow-up
data from interviews and document analysis in 2005 were used to draw links between the
relationships and events illustrated in the 2001–2002 descriptive case studies and eventual
programmatic and organizational outcomes. Each case was then analyzed using the Governmental Impacts framework to examine patterns of state agency influence on the inputs,
processes, and outcomes of each organization. An overview of each case is described
below, followed by analysis of results.
CASE 1: ECP
The Ellery Creek watershed covers an area of over 100 square miles in two counties in
Ohio. The land use pattern ranges from high-density urban to low-density suburban, with
a few remaining pockets of agriculture and open space. The major sources of water quality
impairment were municipal point sources, urban run-off and storm sewers, and channelization6 from development.
In 1997, the OEPA issued a request for proposals for $15,000 grants through the Clean
Water Act Section 319 program. The purpose of the grants was to assist with the start-up of
new watershed organizations using OEPA’s newly published ‘‘A Guide to Developing
Local Watershed Plans in Ohio’’ (OEPA 1997). After reading an article in the local
newspaper about the grant program, a resident of the Ellery watershed, who recently
had completed graduate work in water resources management, contacted OEPA. She
reached an OEPA employee who was also a resident of the watershed. They quickly
brainstormed a list of key stakeholders—mostly other agency personnel—and made plans
for a first meeting of interested citizens in the watershed. When the meeting turn-out
surpassed the group’s expectations, they quickly set about choosing a name, forming
a board, applying for 501(c)3 status and developing articles of incorporation.
Within 6 months, the ECP had formed. The core group of citizens, who would become
the first board of directors and four out of six of whom worked for county or state agencies
(but were not acting in any official capacity or representing their agencies), decided early
on that they would not be an advocacy group. They envisioned their role as one of
education and outreach or as the founding member and president of the board expressed,
‘‘We wanted to be a resource to anyone who had a question or concern about the river. We
didn’t want to take sides.’’
In June 1998, ECP received the $15,000 OEPA grant, allowing them to hire the
founding member as a part-time watershed coordinator. By this time, the group was
holding monthly public meetings and sponsoring regular events and workshops, such as
river clean-ups, tree plantings, and water quality monitoring training. In 2000, when
the OEPA and ODNR announced the request for proposals for the 6-year Watershed
6
Channelization is the artificial modification of a river’s banks in order to control the direction of the flow. The
process can have detrimental environmental impacts, including damage to streamside habitat and acceleration of flood
events.
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Coordinator Grant Program, ECP, with its part-time staff, active board of directors, and
over 150 members, was in a good position to apply.
Meanwhile, another citizen group had formed in the adjacent watershed. The Whiting
River Protection Association (WRPA)7 spent 1998 and 1999 defining itself as an advocacy
group, developing short- and long-term goals, drafting bylaws, and establishing an organizational structure. Toward the end of 1999, members elected their first board of directors, which
included an employee of ODNR who was involved with the Watershed Coordinator Grant
Program selection committee in 2000. Recognizing that ECP was better established with
a stronger structure and more members, WRPA chose not to apply to the program. However,
the WRPA board member who was an ODNR employee exerted influence on the selection
process when, responding to an inquiry from ECP about applying for the program, he encouraged them to include the Whiting watershed in their proposal. Describing the situation, the
part-time ECP watershed coordinator who wrote the grant proposal said:
We were told that we would have a much better chance of getting the money if we included
the [Whiting]. It was a nightmare. We were an urban watershed. We didn’t have the expertise
up there [in the Whiting watershed], we didn’t know the stakeholders, none of us lived up
there. We just didn’t fit in . . . but we felt that we had no choice.
Including the Whiting in the proposal increased ECP’s geographic area nearly sixfold,
in four additional counties. The predominantly agricultural Whiting watershed also introduced a new set of stakeholders and new sources of water quality impairment. Furthermore, the presence of WRPA, whose members viewed the watershed as their territory, set
the stage for tension between the two organizations.
ECP was accepted into the grant program with the condition that part of the watershed
coordinator’s time be devoted to work in the Whiting, under the supervision of WRPA.
ECP hired a new full-time watershed coordinator, although the position was technically 75%
time for ECP and 25% for WRPA. Therefore, WRPA received a part-time staff person from
the grant, but the administration of the grant, including fundraising for the cash match,
remained ECP’s responsibility. One year into the program, the new watershed coordinator
expressed frustration at the situation: ‘‘WRPA was too new to be able to provide any cash
match. It is frustrating because ECP already dealt with all that early organization stuff, and
now we are ready to get work done. But WRPA is still trying to figure out who they are.’’
The original watershed coordinator, who remained a board member, expressed the
differences between ECP and WRPA in different terms: ‘‘Working with WRPA was
difficult. They wanted more of an advocacy role, but the work ECP could do with them
could not be advocacy.’’
ECP grudgingly accepted the challenge of working in both watersheds and created
a 6-year work plan that included, in sequential order, creation of a comprehensive inventory and action plan for the Ellery watershed, followed by an inventory and plan for the
Whiting watershed. Speaking on the challenge of leading both efforts, the watershed coordinator said: ‘‘Trying to be the director of two groups is just not possible. I am supposed
to spend 10 hours a week with [the Whiting group]. That is not enough time to do a plan.’’
Nonetheless, ECP made considerable progress, completing the Ellery Watershed Inventory
on schedule by March 2002.
7
The name of the watershed organization has been changed to protect confidentiality.
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In May 2002, ECP held a formal kick-off event for the development of a watershed
action plan for the Ellery watershed. Over forty stakeholders attended the afternoon event
and committed to a 10-month process to create a watershed plan based on input from six
subcommittees—a new ECP structure resulting from suggested organizational guidelines
received at the grant program training. Stakeholders (including board members) signed up
for subcommittees, appointed chairs, and set up a schedule for regular monthly meetings.
The groups were highly productive and autonomous, allowing the watershed coordinator
to attend subcommittee meetings while delegating the meeting facilitation and administration to others.
In Fall 2002, a university in the area received funding for an extensive research
project in the Whiting watershed that included working with stakeholders to develop
a watershed action plan. A student was assigned a 2-year appointment to work with WRPA
for 20 hours per week to create an inventory and plan. In response, the state program
administrators decided to absolve ECP of any further responsibility in the Whiting watershed, returning ECP’s jurisdiction to its original geographic boundaries. The decision was
met with great celebration by ECP. And so by the end of 2002, ECP’s structure and scale
had returned to its pregrant state. The organization was over halfway through its 10-month
planning process, and on schedule to produce a draft watershed action plan by the end of
March 2003, per the state program workplan.
Follow-up interviews in March 2005, after the fifth year of the state program, yielded
information about the long-term consequences of state program involvement. ECP has
produced a lengthy watershed action plan that required nearly 2 years of edits and revisions
to receive full endorsement from the state. The plan endorsement process raised questions
about the consistency between the goals of ECP and the state. Although ECP members saw
their organization as primarily educational, the state ultimately wanted an enforceable plan
with concrete recommendations to improve water quality—recommendations that went
beyond education about the watershed. The endorsement process led to considerable
conflict. Turnover on ECP’s board further distanced the organization’s relationship with
the state agencies. One board member said, ‘‘We only have one more year on the grant.
After that, we need to carefully consider future government programs and whether or not
they are consistent with our mission.’’ Overall, however, ECP maintained a good rapport
with the state agencies. According to one state program administrator, ‘‘ECP is a model of
how this [program] can work for nonprofits.’’
CASE 2: BRC
The Baret River watershed covers an area of over 600 square miles in nine counties of
Ohio. The predominant land use in the watershed is agricultural, although the watershed is
home to several small cities and the lower stretches of the river extend into the suburbs
of a large municipality. The primary sources of water quality impairment are runoff from
agricultural sources and on-site septic tanks as well as channelization from agriculture and
development. One of the five subwatersheds is impacted by septic tanks and sewage
overflows and has been under a ‘‘Dermal Contact Advisory’’ due to severe contamination.
In 1991, the nearby large municipality proposed to build a reservoir on the Baret River
to provide drinking water for the region’s growing population. The reservoir would have
flooded thousands of acres of farmland in the watershed. Concerned citizens, some with
homes that would be engulfed by the proposed reservoir, united in opposition to the dam.
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Through a citizen-led lobbying effort that included grassroots mobilization and media
outreach, this citizen group, the BRC, was successful at stopping the proposed reservoir.
Throughout the 1990s, BRC established itself as a volunteer-run, watchdog organization for the watershed, working toward the mission to ‘‘preserve and protect the Baret
River for future generations.’’ Members conducted their own stream water quality monitoring program, with over 20 sites actively monitored on the main stem and tributaries. The
organization promoted local watershed education through grants and awards to students
and teachers involved in water quality projects. BRC brought watershed citizens together
through regular community events such as informational meetings, river clean-ups, and
canoe floats. By 1999, BRC included over 100 dues-paying members, with public events
and publications that reached hundreds more in the watershed. Throughout this time, the
organization remained true to its advocacy roots, regularly voicing opposition to actions,
private, or public, that would have an adverse impact on the river, such as channelization
projects and run-off from large livestock facilities.
In the mid-1990s, the OEPA received over $100,000 from a fine for an illegal dumping incident in the watershed and directed the monies to BRC to develop a River Steward
program. The funding allowed BRC to hire one part-time River Steward and a series of
interns. The money also provided a source of local match for the newly announced Ohio
Watershed Coordinator Grant Program, which was accepting applications for its first
funding round in the summer of 2000. In its grant application, written by a volunteer board
member, BRC described plans to hire a ‘‘Riverkeeper’’ to serve as an ‘‘ombudsman for the
Baret River.’’
The state agency personnel who comprised the program selection board based their
decisions on several criteria, including degree of water quality impairment in the watershed
and demonstrated ability to collaborate with diverse partners in the watershed. On this
latter criterion, BRC fell short; they were an advocacy group with a history of hostility
toward local agencies who would be key partners in any watershed management effort. In
fact, one county Soil and Water Conservation District explicitly expressed opposition to the
BRC grant request. In the end, BRC ranked number 21 for a program that would allow 20
grants. When one higher ranked organization turned down the grant, the money went to BRC.
Throughout the 1990s, BRC had existed with a very loose structure. The board roles
were not clearly defined, and participation of board members fluctuated greatly. Said one
former board member: ‘‘I didn’t think of us as a board. We were just a group of people who
got together to protect the river.’’ However, the state program expected the organization to
have a board of directors to provide guidance and supervision to the new watershed coordinator. BRC decided to contract with a for-profit natural resources consulting firm
owned by a board member to provide office space, supplies, health insurance, and supervision of the watershed coordinator. However, the board, not the consulting firm, remained
the administrator of the grant, and the state held the board of directors responsible for
meeting the grant expectations.
BRC hired a watershed coordinator who had served as head of a sportsman’s group
that had been very active in lobbying for protection of water resources in Ohio. With little
formal education or professional background in natural resource management, the watershed coordinator reported great benefit from the training provided by the state program.
Despite the training, BRC still felt at a disadvantage to other organizations. As the coordinator explained, ‘‘When you have been an advocacy group, you have to deal with cities
and agencies, and sometimes you get blacklisted.’’
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In one incident during the first year of the program, the watershed coordinator attempted to establish support for a Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) for
the watershed. He submitted letters of support from county Soil and Water Conservation
Districts and Farm Bureau chapters but could not get a response from the state CREP
administrators: ‘‘I felt like I kept getting blown off; no one would return my calls.’’ When
one of the county Districts called on behalf of the watershed, however, the call was
returned and an information session was scheduled. The watershed coordinator explained,
‘‘The county [District] was able to make it happen. They have the political clout. They’re
a part of that good-old-boy network.’’
In a second telling incident in Fall 2001, a county agency channelized a tributary,
cutting off a natural bend in the sensitive headwater stream. Assuming their traditional role
of watchdog, BRC issued a press release opposing the channelization project. The local
government agency responsible for the project voiced anger to the state that BRC, which
was receiving state funding, would oppose a local government project. Although there was
no formal retribution for the incident, the watershed coordinator alleged that state officials
disparaged BRC’s actions to other stakeholders. The incident led to increased interpersonal
tensions between BRC leaders and the state program administrators and called into question whether the state program expectations and guidelines were in conflict with those of
BRC. The watershed coordinator said, ‘‘I was looking out for the river; that is what I was
hired to do.’’ One state administrator later remarked:
[BRC] was right to oppose the project. It was the last remaining oxbow on that stream. It was
the way they went about it that was wrong. They should have sat down to talk with the
[agency]. You can’t upset your stakeholders like that and then expect them to be willing to
work with you later.
By early 2002, BRC had formed a steering committee to lead the planning process,
had held three public stakeholder meetings in the watershed, and had begun work toward
a draft inventory of the watershed. The watershed coordinator, however, experienced
difficulty in completing tasks, in part due to a board of directors that was ‘‘inactive when
it came to decisions.’’ The watershed coordinator went on to say, ‘‘Sometimes I had to
make decisions when I could not find any board members.’’ The state echoed this concern
at the April functional review, a day-long meeting at which the state program administrators met with BRC staff and board members to discuss the group’s progress on the grant
requirements. It became clear that the watershed coordinator was not making the amount of
progress that the state expected. In an internal memo describing the situation, a state
program administrator expressed ‘‘serious questions of program progress associated with
this project, in large part due to what [the agency administrators] perceive as a lack of
direction and oversight by the BRC.’’
In May 2002, the state notified BRC that the organization was under ‘‘administrative
intervention’’ and would lose its grant if it did not meet all future expectations and
requests in the time frame provided. The letter stated that the ‘‘BRC board [of directors]
control over the management of the watershed coordinator is essential in order for this
project to succeed.’’ An August 2002 letter, a follow-up to the April review, reiterated
the importance of board involvement and structure to the success of the grant and
requested the reconstruction of BRC’s organizational chart to reflect that the watershed
coordinator was ‘‘aligned directly under the supervision of the chair of the BRC [board of
directors].’’
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During this time, the watershed coordinator experienced a series of interpersonal
conflicts with both board members and the state agency personnel. One state program
administrator said, ‘‘There was a lot of hostility going on there, and we certainly felt a lot
[of hostility] directed at us.’’ In September, the board of BRC decided to terminate the
watershed coordinator for what was described by one board member as ‘‘personal reasons.’’ The watershed coordinator responded with a lawsuit for wrongful dismissal that was
eventually dropped.
The BRC board took the opportunity to reassess its role in the state program and
ultimately decided to withdraw from it. Board members looked for another local organization or agency to assume the grant responsibilities and eventually struck an agreement
with a county Soil and Water Conservation District—ironically, the very district that had
opposed the BRC receiving the grant in the first place. In December 2002, a memorandum
of agreement was signed to pass custodial responsibility of the grant from BRC to the
District. BRC helped the District interview and select a new watershed coordinator for the
program. The group also kept a prominent role as a stakeholder in the District-led watershed planning process by maintaining representation at all regular planning meetings and
events. BRC remained an active community-based watchdog organization in the watershed, continuing regular meetings and events as it had before the state program.
Follow-up interviews in 2005 indicated that BRC still exists with the same structure and
mission to which they returned after exiting the state program. Without any paid staff, the
loosely structured volunteer board holds meetings and events in the watershed, conducts
water quality monitoring, and blows the whistle when they discover threats to the watershed.
One former BRC board member explained, ‘‘BRC still serves the same purpose as it was
organized to do and will continue to serve that role in the community.’’ Moreover, BRC
board members still attend the regular planning meetings held by the local agency that
assumed responsibility for the state grant. As a stakeholder in that planning process, BRC
has maintained the amicable relationship with the local agency that was forged by collaboration while BRC was in the state program. Overall, BRC exhibits a level of organizational
robustness. Involvement in the state program may have strayed BRC from their original
purpose, but the organization returned to those roots while still retaining some of the benefits
gained from program participation, such as the improved relationship with the local agency.
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMPACTS
Examining these cases using the Governmental Impacts framework highlights complex
interactions between the governmental institutions of ODNR, OEPA, and the joint Watershed Coordinator Grant Program; the program administrative personnel; and the collaborative watershed group members participating in the program. These interactions played
out in issue definition, group resources, and group structure and decision processes.
Notably, the interactions often affected the two organizations in different ways.
Issue Definition
Involvement in the Watershed Coordinator Grant Program had considerable impacts on the
issue definition of both ECP and BRC but in very different ways (see table 1). The actions
of a particular agency employee redefined the biophysical scale of ECP’s efforts,
increasing its jurisdiction sixfold and introducing a host of unwelcome new management
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Table 1
Government Impacts on Issue Definition
Biophysical Scale
Government
Government
Case Institutions
Actors
ECP No impact
BRC No impact
Issue Framing
Government
Institutions
Government
Actors
No impact initially,
Initially, agency employee No impact
but later during
who served on board of
watershed plan
NPO from adjacent
endorsement process,
watershed pushed to get
state actors pushed
that watershed included
for different
at start. But later,
approaches to
second watershed was
addressing the issue.
dropped and
biophysical scale
returned to original.
No impact
Program required grantees Agency staff acted
in role of enforcer;
to act as cooperator
resulting in conflict
rather than watchdog.
between group
This caused friction
personnel/members and
that later led to group
agency staff.
withdrawing from
program and retaining
its original issue
framing.
Source: Interviews and documents.
concerns, including the need to partner with new stakeholders and grapple with very
different watershed issues.
Although ECP experienced tremendous impact on biophysical scale, the state program did not immediately impact their issue framing. From its inception, ECP was determined to be a nonadvocacy group that focused on education. The approach was
consistent with the state program and its administrators, and accordingly, ECP maintained
this focus throughout much of its time in the program. But in later years, when ECP sought
endorsement for their completed watershed action plan, tensions arose over appropriate
solutions. Whereas ECP had framed the issue in terms of educational solutions, state
administrators wanted the watershed action plan to include enforceable recommendations,
beyond education, to improve water quality.
BRC, on the other hand, experienced no change to its biophysical scale but was
greatly impacted in its issue framing, ultimately fueling conflict between the organization
and the state program and its administrators. The organization previously served the role of
watchdog, with a history of conflict with local and state agencies. The state program and
administrators, however, required collaboration, forcing BRC to cooperate with local
agency stakeholders with whom they had previously been hostile (see table 1).
Resources for Collaboration
Involvement in the state program had similar impacts on some of the resources available
to ECP and BRC (see table 2). The institutional arrangement of the state program offered
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Table 2
Government Impacts on Resources
Case
Human Resources
Government
Government
Institutions
Actors
Technical Resources
Government
Government
Institutions
Actors
Good rapport
ECP Program
Agency
Training
provided
personnel
increased staff
with agency
funding to
gave guidance
capacity to
employees,
to group,
understand
easy to get
hire full-time
acted as
data; program
assistance
watershed
made more
from
coordinator
‘‘partners’’
personnel
data available
Financial Resources
Government
Government
Institutions
Actors
Program gave
funding
to hire
full-time
watershed
coordinator
No impact
BRC Program
Agency
Training
Poorer rapport Program gave
No impact
provided
personnel
increased staff
with agency
funding to
funding to
placed
capacity to
employees,
hire full-time
hire full-time
restrictions on
understand
harder to get
watershed
watershed
group actions,
data; program
assistance
coordinator
coordinator
acted as
made more
from
‘‘enforcers’’
data available
personnel
Source: Interviews and documents.
6-year grants to fund full-time staff. Both ECP and BRC had part-time coordinators prior to
the state program, and both reported greatly increased capacity once full-time coordinators
were in place.
Through their involvement with the organizations, serving not only as grant administrators but also as stakeholders in each watershed, the state agency employees directly
impacted the human resources of each organization. Here the influence of these governmental actors differed between the two cases. With ECP, the state agency personnel
became partners, enjoying an overall positive relationship partially due to ECP’s nonadversarial stance via agencies and partially due to the fact several key state program
administrators lived in the watershed and had been involved in the formation of ECP.
BRC, on the other hand, had a more adversarial role with the state agencies, both before
and during the state program. Instead of becoming a partner, the state program administrators served in the role of enforcers, perpetuating resentment and tension between the
organization staff and members and the agency personnel.
The state program impacted technical resources by providing a mandatory 6-month
training program for all watershed coordinators. Although coordinators from both ECP and
BRC reported that the training was time consuming and frustrating at times, they both
agreed that the program increased their access to and understanding of technical data
about the watershed. The BRC watershed coordinator explained:
I feel handicapped sometimes because I work for a nonprofit, when it comes to finances,
technical information and networking. The [training program] without a doubt helped bring
information into focus [and] showed me where to find information that was out there.
The state agency personnel also provided technical assistance to the organizations.
Here the impacts of these government actors again differed between ECP and BRC.
Although ECP had a positive rapport with agency employees, making it easy to gain
assistance from the agencies, BRC had a more negative relationship. As a result, BRC
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resisted asking for assistance or involvement from the state. In a letter to the organization,
the state administrators emphasized, ‘‘It is important to maintain open communication with
State agencies, invite them to attend meetings or review progress as needed.’’ However, the
BRC watershed coordinator felt that the state was insincere in its offers.
Structure and Decision Processes
Involvement in the program also had consequences for the structure and decision-making
processes for both cases, albeit in different ways (see table 3). In the case of ECP, one
particular state agency employee who also served on the board of directors of the Whiting
group pressured ECP to include the Whiting watershed in the scope of their proposal. This
arrangement had significant impacts on the structure of ECP by requiring that ECP devote
staff time to another organization in the Whiting watershed, an arrangement that also gave
the second organization a decision-making role over ECP’s activities in the Whiting
watershed. The added responsibility created frustration and resentment for ECP, particularly toward the state agency employee who influenced the decision. When events removed
the Whiting watershed from ECP’s responsibility, ECP was relieved to return to its pregrant focus area.
The watershed coordinator training program also impacted the structure of ECP. After
completing the training program, which included modules on committee formation and
meeting facilitation, ECP leaders decided to restructure the group’s subcommittees in order
to better meet the goals spelled out in the state program contract, including the development of a watershed inventory and plan, and the securing of future funding to support the
watershed coordinator position. The state program did not impact the decision-making
processes for ECP as it aligned with what had already been ECP’s approach to decision
making: an inclusive consensus-based process that encouraged partnering with citizens and
organizations.
On the other hand, the state program influenced both the structure and decisionmaking processes for BRC. Although formally incorporated, BRC had always had a very
loose structure prior to the state program, functioning more like a coalition of friends who
gathered occasionally to rally around specific issues. The program forced the organization
to develop a stricter structure, with a formal role for board members in decision making
and supervision of the watershed coordinator. BRC decided to contract supervision of the
watershed coordinator to a for-profit consulting firm, an arrangement that was met with
disapproval by the state agencies. After BRC terminated the consulting contract and removed the contractor’s name from any grant responsibilities, the question of daily supervision of the watershed coordinator remained. Following their functional review, the state
program administrators told BRC to clearly define the supervisory and decision-making
roles of the board of directors. Ultimately, the increased role that the state program
expected of the BRC board of directors led to their decision to relinquish the grant.
The state program also impacted BRC’s decision processes. Prior to involvement in
the program, BRC typically made decisions on its own rather than by collaborating with
stakeholders outside the group. The state program, however, required BRC to engage
stakeholders in a consensus-based process. This new approach was in conflict with BRC’s
historical role and mission. For example, the decision to oppose the channelization project
was made by the watershed coordinator without consultation with other stakeholders in the
watershed. The state program administrator’s criticism of the incident was not based on
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Table 3
Government Impacts on Group Structure and Decision Processes
Structure
Case
Government
Institutions
ECP
Program training
encouraged ECP
to restructure
subcommittees
BRC
Initially no impact,
but after program
evaluation,
government sought
to reorganize BRC
board structure
Government
Actors
Initially, agency
employee influenced
inclusion of Whiting
watershed in grant;
required ECP to
devote staff time to
second organization.
No impact
Decision Processes
Government
Government
Institutions
Actors
Reinforced ECP’s
inclusive consensusbased approach
No impact
Program constrained
autonomous
decision-making;
expected consensus
approach with
stakeholders
No impact
Source: Interviews and documents.
disapproval of BRC’s stance but rather stemmed from the fact that BRC had failed to
engage the local agency responsible for the channelization.
Environmental and Social Outcomes
At the end of 2002, both ECP and BRC reported several environmental outcomes, such as
specific management products aimed at environmental amelioration, and social outcomes,
such as improved rapport with other institutions and increased stakeholder involvement,
tied to involvement in the watershed coordinator grant program (see table 4). ECP had
completed a thorough biophysical assessment of the watershed in an inventory that would
be published in early 2003. The group was over halfway through an extensive watershed
planning process that included six subcommittees to study sources of water quality impairment and to make recommendations for remediation. Throughout the 2-year period,
ECP also hosted annual river days that included volunteer stream clean-up, nonnative
vegetation removal, and tree plantings. By 2005, ECP had completed its watershed action
plan and received full endorsement from the state.
ECP’s staff and board, as well as state agency personnel, reported evidence of increased social capital during the course of the study that resulted from the years of planning
activities and events. The watershed planning process gave occasion for the varied stakeholders to meet on a regular basis to discuss the watershed and led to relationships that
extended beyond the 10-month planning period. Reflecting on the experience in the state
program, the watershed coordinator noted, ‘‘It has reinforced our image in the watershed.
We are becoming more citizen-driven, getting more involvement in our monthly meetings
and on our subcommittees.’’
BRC achieved considerably fewer environmental outcomes during its 2 years in the
state program. Although it did complete a portion of a draft inventory of the watershed, the
group was not able to begin work on the planning document that the state program viewed
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Table 4
Government Impacts on Outcomes
Case
Environmental Outcomes
ECP
Fostered completion of watershed inventory
Spurred start of watershed planning process
Fostered completion of parts of draft
watershed inventory
BRC
Social Outcomes
Bolstered legitimacy
Increased networking, social capital
Gave new legitimacy to group
Created new partnerships
Improved some relationships; impaired others
Source: Interviews and documents.
as the ultimate vehicle for achieving environmental goals. BRC did continue to hold
regular river clean-up events, as they had done previously.
The state program had clearer impacts on the social outcomes of BRC. Involvement in
the program gave new legitimacy to the group in the eyes of many, as reported by both BRC
members and state agency personnel. The program created an opportunity for new partnerships and improved some relationships within the watershed. The watershed coordinator
explained this impact on their legitimacy: ‘‘The [watershed coordinator] position tells agencies and cities that we are someone to work with. It is a tough sell, but it is slowly working.
Also, having the grant gives us higher visibility to the public.’’ The watershed coordinator
also noted a positive impact on the group’s relationships with other agencies: ‘‘[One District]
opposed [us] getting the grant because they said we don’t play well with others. But I am
new, and they have a new coordinator there, and I think things are improving a bit.’’
Of course, the social impacts were not all positive. Although some relationships
improved, relationships between the organization and the state agencies, as well as some
of the intraorganizational relationships between the board members and the watershed
coordinator, sustained substantial damage during this time.
DISCUSSION
Analysis using the Governmental Impacts framework illustrates not only the diverse experiences of ECP and BRC with the state program but also the different points at which
government actors and institutions influenced their processes and outcomes. In each case,
governmental actors and institutions exerted influence on group processes and outcomes in
a variety of ways. In some instances, the governmental actors or institutions had separate
impacts on the organizations. For example, the state program administrators influenced
technical resources by offering technical assistance and access to data to the organizations,
whereas the institutional arrangement of the grant program directly impacted the human
resources of the organizations by providing the funding to hire full-time watershed
coordinators.
In other instances, however, government actors and institutions interacted to influence
each other in ways that had eventual impacts on the organizations. Because the Ohio
Watershed Coordinator Grant Program was new, many of the institutional parameters
of the program were not yet well established, allowing the state program administrators substantial latitude in carrying out the program. This arrangement permitted the
state administrators flexibility to respond differentially to unique situations that the
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organizations presented, such as the ability to extend deadlines and to schedule additional
evaluation meetings with BRC when the group’s review revealed delinquency on program
progress. Such flexibility counters the common criticism that the bureaucratic nature of
governmental programs is too rigid to be responsive to local project-specific needs (Yaffee
1996). However, the flexibility also fueled the perception that the state program administrators were behaving in unpredictable and inconsistent ways. The BRC watershed coordinator noted, in reference to a meeting that took place one year into the program, ‘‘It
seemed like the first time that ODNR and OEPA had talked to each other about what they
wanted from the program, let alone what they wanted from [the watershed coordinators].’’
This sentiment was echoed by the ECP coordinator, who said, ‘‘OEPA and ODNR change
the rules [of the program] all the time.’’
Roles for Government
These cases provide evidence that governments interacting with NPOs can play a mix of
roles. Some of these roles are more positive than others, depending not only on the unique
characteristics of each actor and situation but also on the reaction of the organization to the
government’s action. With ECP, an organization that was eager to collaborate with the
state, and whose mission was largely consistent with state program goals, the government
played predominantly positive roles as a participant and supporter of ECP’s process. Even
when the state program prescribed changes to ECP’s structure and issue definition, ECP
met the challenges with minimal conflict, allowing the collaboration to remain positive.
In the case of BRC, on the other hand, an organization that was hesitant to partner with
the government and whose members felt ‘‘blacklisted’’ by local governmental agencies, the
government played a more adversarial role as an enforcer of program requirements. When
BRC responded with resistance and mistrust, the collaboration became more negative.
Consequences for NPOs
Prior studies suggest that involvement in government-funded programs can constrain the
autonomy and innovation of NPOs, largely due to performance and evaluation expectations. The cases presented here lend some support to this argument. Both organizations
expressed concern over the heavy reporting and monitoring requirements of the state
program. The ECP watershed coordinator remarked:
[A state program administrator] sends me an e-mail asking me to list our accomplishments so
far, when those are already on the six-month reports that I have been sending them. Does
anyone read them? ODNR is used to dealing with [local agencies]. They don’t realize that it is
different with nonprofits. To us, this is just a grant. It’s not everything that we are.
Both watershed coordinators also articulated discomfort with some of the performance expectations of the state program. The BRC watershed coordinator remarked,
‘‘[The state agencies] want a consensus process. They think we can bring 40 different
people in a room to talk about contentious issues and then get everyone to hug at the end.
That isn’t how it works.’’
Beyond state performance expectations, other governmental constraints hindered the
autonomy of each organization to a greater degree. In the case of ECP, the organization’s
leaders believed they had no choice but to include the Whiting watershed in their grant
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proposal and agreement. In the case of BRC, involvement in the state program called into
question their very identity as an environmental advocacy group because BRC had to
collaborate with their historic opponents under the guidelines of the state program.
Over time, the major constraints placed on each organization by the state program
dissipated, and each organization moved back toward its preprogram state. For BRC, this
was due to a deliberate choice to relinquish the grant, thereby removing all formal obligations to the state. Although the departure of the watershed coordinator provided a convenient opportunity to leave the state program, the decision was driven by recognition on
the part of the board of directors that involvement in the program was not consistent with
their mission or goals. In contrast, the return of ECP’s jurisdiction to its original boundaries
was a product of circumstance, not intentional choice by ECP. When the Whiting group
received funding from another source, ECP returned to its original geographic and issue
focus. However, during the endorsement process for their watershed action plan, ECP
members encountered conflicts and constraints as the state pushed them away from educational efforts to include enforceable recommendations to improve water quality.
CONCLUSION
Across an array of policy arenas, policy makers increasingly turn to nongovernmental
organizations, including NPOs, to achieve their aims. When public administrators work
through NPOs, they may be able to benefit from higher levels of autonomy, innovation, and
flexibility that characterize these organizations. Government resources can strengthen
capacity for NPOs to implement policy effectively. However, there is a risk that government involvement may diminish NPO strengths.
To gain a longitudinal perspective on how government-nonprofit interactions play out
in environmental management, data on two nonprofit, collaborative watershed partnerships
in Ohio were collected between 2000 and 2005. Analysis using the Governmental Impacts
framework revealed important differences in how government actors and institutions
affected the partnerships over time.
In the early stages of program participation, agency personnel and grant requirements
shifted the biophysical scale for one partnership and the issue framing for the other. These
changes took both groups, temporarily, away from their original mission and goals. Both
groups gained considerable human, financial, and technical resources through program
involvement. For ECP, positive rapport with agency employees made it easy to gain
technical assistance, but for BRC troubled relationships reduced the flow of information.
Finally, government involvement greatly impacted the structure and decision processes for
BRC, forcing the formalization of a board of directors to oversee the watershed coordinator
and pressuring the organization to make decisions in a more inclusive manner. The impact
on ECP’s structure and decision processes was less dramatic, with the program leading the
group to restructure its subcommittees to develop its watershed action plan.
Over time, one of the partnerships withdrew from the program, returning to its
original mission and goals, whereas the other continued to participate in the program,
eventually facing conflict over the contents of its watershed action plan. Program participation generated positive environmental and social outcomes. Both groups made progress
on watershed inventories, and ECP completed a watershed action plan that was subsequently endorsed by the state. Both groups also engaged in on-the-ground activities such as
river clean-up events. The social outcomes attributable to program participation included
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enhanced legitimacy and some improved relationships for BRC, as well as increased
stakeholder participation and deepening of member involvement for ECP.
Theoretically, these results add to our understanding of the pathways through which
governments can impact NPOs in the environmental arena. Government institutions and
actors can affect how NPOs frame issues and solutions, and they can augment financial,
human, and technical resources. Government programs and administrators can also impact
how a NPO is structured and makes decisions. Importantly, governmental impacts through
these pathways are not uniform across grant recipients; characteristics such as group mission, past strategies, and make-up of leadership (i.e., if group leaders are employed by
government agencies) play an important role. Also, the magnitude of these impacts
changes over time.
For public administrators, this study suggests that in order to achieve desired environmental improvements, it is important to consider carefully the existing mission and
goals of NPOs when making decisions about which groups to assist. Although the state
program was able to direct the activities of the organizations, in the end it was unable to
fundamentally change the mission of either organization. The inherent conflict of mission
reduced BRC’s willingness to develop a collaborative watershed plan, whereas a similar
conflict may impede ECP’s ability to implement theirs. Although previous studies have
suggested that participation in government programs often alters NPO goals, the present
cases suggest a different possibility. These environmental organizations were, ultimately,
able to resist mission shift even while participating in the government program. Thus
government’s ability to redirect NPO missions and goals through grant programs may
be limited, at least in the environmental arena.
Another key finding for public administrators is the multiple ways that a government
program might affect NPOs. Even for a grant program where the primary government
assistance is funding, it is evident that the program, and the personnel who implement it,
might affect the target NPOs through shaping issue definition and NPO structures and
decision processes. Identifying these pathways of impact can help to foster mutually
beneficial interactions between the government and nonprofit sectors. Although the Governmental Impacts framework was developed specifically for the environmental arena, the
pathways it highlights may be more broadly applicable to other policy arenas.
Although the focus of our attention in this study was the impact of government on
NPOs, one should not neglect the societal implications of reliance on grants to steer nongovernmental actors to perform public services such as environmental protection. For
example, accountability and transparency are key issues: if an NPO fails to produce and
implement a meaningful plan to improve water quality, the government funding agency
may escape blame for those needed environmental improvements. Although beyond the
scope of our study, the implications for government of indirect policy instruments have
been examined by scholars across a range of policy arenas, including environmental
management (Leach 2006; Salamon 2002; Smith and Ingram 2002; Weber 2003).
Although this research provides insight into nonprofit-government interactions, further research could add to our understanding of the consequences of government involvement in partnerships. For example, content analysis of the watershed action plans
mandated by the state program would indicate how organizational characteristics and
planning processes impacted plan development and recommendations. Such analysis
could also shed additional light on government-organizational interactions by examining
the extent to which the state program guidelines determined the plan content. Were these
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plans created by the community, and then endorsed by the state or were they essentially
created by the state, through strict program guidelines? In other words, when a communitybased effort becomes a part of a state-led program, to what degree can it remain
community-based, and how closely is such autonomy tied to the congruence between
government policy and the community-based organization’s mission?
More broadly, additional study is necessary to understand the intricacies of how
government assistance impacts collaborative management efforts. Our cases in this study
are examples from the environmental management arena, where funding cuts do not translate directly into cuts in services to a client population, and where organizations have
tapped into a diverse array of public and private funding opportunities. Thus environmental
NPOs may enjoy a greater level of independence from government funding than do those
in the social services or human health arenas. Comparisons of NPOs across a wide range of
policy arenas may be instructive in this regard.
The Governmental Impacts framework suggests that impacts can be experienced
differentially at various points in the collaboration process. But it is not known whether
impacts at particular points tend to have greater consequences (positive or negative) for the
organization. A related question is, what program considerations can be made to maximize
impacts that augment collaborative efforts, while minimizing those that diminish them?
In addition, which organizational characteristics are associated with resilience that
allows organizations to grow and strengthen under these impacts? And ultimately, do these
government-NPO arrangements yield positive environmental outcomes, and what consequences exist for the transparency and accountability of the resultant public policy?
Answers to these questions are important as scholars and administrators grapple
with the growing challenges of understanding and fostering effective governmentnongovernment interactions to solve pressing public problems.
FUNDING
The Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center Research Enhancement Competitive Grants Program.
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