WORLD
W h a t I f. . .
WAR II
…Britain Had Made Peace With Hitler?
By Mark Grimsley
I
Great Britain would consider any serious
n May 1940, Leopold Amery, a promimonth only Dunkirk remains out of
proposal “that gave promise of the estabnent Conservative member of the
German hands. It is estimated that, at best,
lishment of a secure and peaceful Europe.”
House of Commons, rose to castigate
only forty-five thousand British soldiers
Though some—particularly Churchill,
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain for
can be evacuated, and even then virtually
who remains in the British Cabinet—
his failures as a wartime leader—particuall equipment will have to be left behind.
adamantly insist on fighting on, Halifax
larly for the recent British fiasco in
Facing the worst crisis in the history of the
believes Great Britain has no other choice,
Norway. Echoing Oliver Cromwell, he
British Empire, Halifax believes that in
particularly since Operation Dynamo, the
faced Chamberlain and declaimed, “You
order to preserve that empire, Britain must
desperate evacuation of Dunkirk, has
have sat here too long for any good you
seek a negotiated peace with Germany.
extracted a bare seventeen thousand men
have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us
To open talks directly with Hitler would
as of May 28. The following
have done with you. In the
day Halifax persuades the
name of God, go!”
cabinet to make a deal with
Amery’s rebuke helped to
Hitler to end the war.
trigger a vote of no confiThe above account is far
dence, and Chamberlain was
closer to what actually hapforced to step down on May 8.
pened than one might think.
What if the following then
Halifax really was the first
happened?
choice to succeed ChamberBecause the Conservatives
lain. His exchange with Bastiretain a majority, the new
anini really did take place.
prime minister must come
Roosevelt did indicate to
from their ranks. Some sugMussolini his willingness to
gest Winston Churchill, first
act as intermediary in Britishlord of the Admiralty, who
Italian talks. Only seventeen
had recognized the reality of
thousand British troops had
the Nazi threat years before.
been evacuated from DunBut many find his judgment
kirk by May 28. And from
erratic and vividly recall his
May 25 to May 28, the British
authorship of the Gallipoli
Cabinet
did seriously condisaster in 1915. Chamber- A taste of what might have come? A cinema in the British channel
sider peace negotiations, using
lain, who continues as leader island of Guernsey, which was occupied by Germany during the war.
Mussolini as intermediary,
of the Conservatives, prefers
with Halifax being the main proponent
be fatal; an intermediary must be found.
Lord Halifax, former viceroy of India and
of such a course.
The obvious choice is Benito Mussolini—
current foreign secretary. While he has no
These events are ably re-created in hishis Fascist Italy is allied to Germany but
formal say in the matter, King George VI
torian Ian Kershaw’s new book, Fateful
as yet remains officially neutral. Halifax
is known to favor Halifax too. Initially
approaches American president Franklin
Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the
reluctant to accept the post, which obliges
Roosevelt,
who
offers
his
assistance
D.
World, 1940–1941. The first of those fatehim to step down from the House of
in persuading Mussolini to accept negotiful choices was the British decision not to
Lords, Halifax yields, and on May 10 the
ations, and on May 26 Halifax meets
seek negotiations.
king asks him to form a government.
with Italian ambassador Count Giuseppe
Halifax in fact rejected the offer to
That same day, the Wehrmacht launches
Bastianini. Although Bastianini opens the
become prime minister, so the job went to
a massive offensive against the Low
discussion by merely expressing a desire to
Churchill, although Halifax remained as
Countries and France. German panzer
explore ways of keeping Italy out of war, he
foreign secretary. But Churchill lacked the
divisions reach the English Channel within
mentions that Mussolini favors a general
firm grip on power that he would later
a week, cutting off France’s best forces
settlement
that
would
“protect
European
possess. He could not peremptorily reject
along with virtually the entire British
peace for a century.” Halifax replies that
negotiations; he had to make his case by
Expeditionary Force. By the end of the
TOPHAM/THE IMAGE WORKS
NOVEMBER 2007
85
W h a t I f. . .
persuasion. Ultimately he succeeded—
with firm support, surprisingly enough,
from Chamberlain, who along with Halifax had been the key architect of Britain’s
“appeasement” of Hitler in 1938.
Halifax might not have prevailed even
had he been prime minister; indeed, he
might have changed his mind about the
wisdom of negotiations. Yet he certainly
enjoyed greater prestige than Churchill.
And Chamberlain, who effectively held
the balance of power, might conceivably
have felt he had to support Halifax as the
new prime minister and thrown his influence in favor of negotiations.
Once begun, the peace overtures would
likely have gained momentum, particularly after the capitulation of France on
June 22, 1940. The “general peace settlement” broached by Halifax and Bastianini
might well have become reality.
What would such a settlement have
looked like? The cabinet assumed that in
exchange for not entering the war and for
86
WORLD WAR II
mediating the negotiations between Britain
and Germany, Mussolini would want concessions in the Mediterranean. Churchill
estimated that Italy would seek the neutralization of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the
demilitarization of Malta, and restrictions
on the number of British warships in the
Mediterranean. While Churchill considered these concessions unacceptable, they
were hardly onerous when balanced against
the preservation of the British Empire.
Hitler, who in July 1940 would assure
Great Britain that he did not desire the
destruction of the British Empire, might
have accepted an armistice predicated on
British assurances to play no further role in
the European conflict. From Hitler’s perspective, such a solution would have freed
him to turn all of his military might against
the Soviet Union. But to ensure that the
British would not renege on the deal,
Kershaw believes that Hitler would have
insisted upon the return of the colonies
stripped from Germany after World War I,
as well as concessions designed to hobble
the Royal Navy, without which Great
Britain had no chance for further intervention on the Continent.
In the short term, a negotiated settlement might have indeed preserved the
British Empire. But it would have enfeebled Britain and extinguished Roosevelt’s
interest in providing the country with
support. He would have quite reasonably
turned full attention to the defense of
North America. And in the long term—
especially given a Nazi triumph over the
Soviet Union—it is unlikely that Great
Britain would have retained its empire or
even escaped eventual invasion.
Of course, no settlement occurred. In its
“finest hour,” Great Britain fought on,
creating a Grand Alliance with the United
States and the Soviet Union, suffering
450,000 military and civilian deaths, and
losing its empire and status as a world
power anyway.
But gloriously, not cravenly. O