Title
Resistant to Change? An Analysis of the European Commission’s Response to External
Challenge and Criticism of its Expert Group System
Author
John. R. Moodie – ARENA Centre for EU Studies (University of Oslo)
Abstract
The role of experts is deeply ingrained within the institutional and policymaking structure of
the EU; however, concerns surrounding recent technological controversies and the 2008
financial crisis have served to undermine public confidence in expertise. These concerns
have given impetus to the ongoing debate surrounding the technocratic nature of EU
policymaking and the democratic deficit. The European Commission’s expert group system,
in particular, is perceived as closed, elitist and dominated by vested interest and has
become the subject of increasing criticism from the European Parliament and lobbying
groups who are demanding a more open, transparent and democratic process. In an
attempt to put pressure on the Commission to ‘democratize’ their system, the European
Parliament withheld funding for Commission expert groups in 2011/12. This paper examines
how the Commission responded to this pressure and poses the question: has there been
significant reform of their expert group system or is the Commission resistant to change?
Organizational action theory informs us that institutions will respond to external pressure in
different ways: full adaptation, evasion, institutional decoupling and reinterpretation. The
paper assesses which of these approaches has the most resonance in relation to the
Commission’s actions to diffuse the criticism by examining four key themes that have
underpinned the Commission’s response: openness, transparency, epistemic diversity and
effectiveness. The empirical research is based on an examination of information from the
Commission’s Online Register of Expert Groups, interviews with Commission Officials and an
analysis of official Commission documents outlining Commission policy on expert groups.
The paper finds that the Commission has embarked upon a process of reform aimed at
diffusing the criticism while seeking to maintain the culture and norms integral to the
1
Community Method with its emphasis on consulting the best available knowledge and
expertise to ensure an effective policymaking process.
Introduction
The accelerating speed and complexity of scientific and technological change has served to
transform society and has placed knowledge and expertise at the epicenter of
contemporary policy and decision making processes. One of the consequences of these
changes and growing societal complexity is the generation of an uneven distribution of
knowledge between the expert and the generalist politician/administrator who lack the
background knowledge required to make decisions in technically sophisticated areas of
policy. This knowledge-gap is an increasing source of tension at all levels of governance as
an enhanced role for experts in policymaking challenges conventional democratic norms in
relation to accountability and legitimacy. These developments have stimulated a debate
about the need to ‘democratize’ expertise through the introduction of more open
participatory procedures and clearer mechanisms of transparency and accountability.
The tension surrounding the role of experts in policymaking has been particularly
pronounced at the EU level. From its genesis, expertise has been deeply ingrained within the
institutional and decision-making structures of the EU, with an independent, unelected High
Authority/Commission at the heart of agenda-setting and the policymaking process. The
knowledge-driven policy approach (Community Method), developed by Jean Monnet during
his period as President of the High Authority, placed emphasis on the need for wide-ranging
consultation and the use of the best available expertise in the development of policy
proposals. The Monnet approach placed much emphasis on knowledge as a source of
legitimacy and remains central to the modern day Community Method. This model of
policymaking has, however, become the subject of much scrutiny and concerns about its
technocratic characteristics and is at the epicenter of the present debate about the
democratic deficit in the EU. These concerns have been given further impetus by the
financial crisis and a number of recent scientific and technical controversies in areas such as
food safety, genetically modified crops, Stem cell research, environment/climate change
and renewable energies. These controversies have exposed the limitations and questioned
2
the value neutrality of expertise; somewhat paradoxically, however, despite increasing
concerns and reduced public confidence in experts their role remains undiminished and, if
anything, is increasing.
Lobbying groups such as Alter EU and Corporate Europe have criticized the Commission’s
expert group system on the grounds that it is closed, elitist and dominated by vested
business interests. In 2011/12, the European Parliament responded to concerns expressed
by MEPs and lobbying groups by placing a moratorium on funding for Commission expert
groups. These external challenges have formed part of a wider agenda to ‘democratize’ the
use of expertise in EU policymaking in an effort to enhance the openness and transparency
of the Commission expert group system.
The aim of this paper is to examine and assess how the European Commission has
responded to the external criticism of its expert group system and the political pressure it
faces to ‘democratize’ expertise. The Commission is vulnerable to criticism because it lacks a
democratic mandate. While its policy outputs are subject to democratic scrutiny and
accountability through the EU legislative process, policy formulation and the extensive use
of expert groups is seen by many critics as a closed and selective process that undermines
democratic norms. It is a criticism that the Commission cannot ignore because it raises key
questions about the technocratic nature of policymaking in the EU and fuels the democratic
deficit debate. In analyzing the Commission’s response to this criticism the paper analyzes,
how the Commission responded to this external criticism and poses the question: has it
been resistant to change in the way expertise is used in policy formulation?
Academic analysis in the area of organizational action theory informs us that how an
organization responds to external political pressure is dependent on a number of key
factors: their dependence on external resources; the strength of an organizations internal
ideology and, how they seek to derive external legitimacy (Boswell 2008). Boswell (2008)
notes that different combinations of these organizational characteristics are likely to yield
four possible alternative responses to an external challenge: full adaptation, evasion,
institutional decoupling and reinterpretation. The paper assesses which of these responses
is most applicable through an examination of the Commission’s response to external
3
criticism by examining four key themes they have developed in their attempt to address the
criticism; the need for: openness, transparency, epistemic diversity and effectiveness.
The first section of the paper provides a brief overview of the historical evolution of the
European Commission’s expert group system and examines the external challenges and
criticism the system has faced. The second section provides a theoretical overview of
organizational action theory outlining the four main organizational responses to external
pressure outlined above and examining how different organizational characteristics will
impact on the nature of the response selected. A methodology section is followed by an
empirical examination of how the Commission has responded to external pressure in
relation to the four key themes discussed above. The final section draws together the main
findings from the empirical research and elaborates on what these findings tell us about
how the Commission reacts to external challenges, how it perceives the role of expertise
and what are the broader implications of these findings for EU policymaking.
European Commission Expert Groups and their Critics
In a complex and scientifically advanced post-industrial society, knowledge and expertise
have become the terrain of policymaking (Fischer 1990; Radaelli 1999). It is within this
context that the European Commission has become increasingly reliant on experts to help
them cope with the technical demands of the modern knowledge-based economy (Schaefer
2002). The Commission lacks the in-house expertise and has, therefore, become resource
dependent on the knowledge and advice provided by external experts to assist in the
formulation and implementation of policy (Metz 2013). This recourse to experts is
highlighted by the Commission’s development of a growing number of expertise-driven
committees, agencies and expert groups.
A central role for experts and external stakeholders in EU policymaking is not a new
phenomenon however, and has been a defining characteristic of EU Treaty’s and
governance since its inception (Treaty of Paris/Rome 1951/57). Expertise is deeply
entrenched within the institutional structure of the EU, with an unelected and independent
Commission at the epicenter of the policymaking process. Because the Commission lacks a
direct electoral mandate in which a policy manifesto has been endorsed by the electorate,
its main source of policy legitimacy is knowledge and expertise.
4
The central feature of the Community Method of policymaking is expert-driven, evidencebased approach underpinned by wide-ranging consultation (Moodie 2011; Ross 1995). The
Commission is required by Treaty definition to act independently of all interests, including
national interest, and to ‘consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever
appropriate, publish consultation documents.’ (Amsterdam Treaty 1997) The Commission’s
lack of a direct democratic mandate and its accountability to the Council of Ministers,
European Parliament and the day-to-day monitoring by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives means its policy proposals are subject to intense scrutiny. This intense
scrutiny acts as an important constraint on the Commission and puts pressure on it to
ensure that policy formulation is based on the best available knowledge and that policies
are not biased or influenced by vested interests.
The proliferation of expert groups at the supranational level has stimulated a large body of
academic literature examining their composition and role in EU governance and
policymaking (Pedler & Schaefer 1996; Joegres & Neyer 1997; Vos 1997; Christiansen &
Kricher 2000; Rhinhard 2002; Schaefer 2002; Larsson 2003; Christiansen & Larsson 2007).
Expert groups come under various guises, including, committees, working parties, working
groups, sub-groups, ad hoc groups, permanent groups, umbrella groups, steering groups
and high level groups (Larsson 2003). However, they are formally defined by the
Commission as ‘consultative entities set up by the EU Commission or its services, comprising
at least six public and/or private-sector members, which are foreseen to meet more than
once.’ (European Commission 2010) Experts groups are designed to assist the Commission
with a range of tasks from policy formulation to implementation. They are sectorally
organized across DGs covering many policy areas and can be temporary or permanent,
formal or informal and are made up of a range of stakeholders including national
administrators and public authority officials, industrialists, business leaders, scientists,
academics, trade unionists, NGO and societal group representatives (Moodie & Holst 2013).
As Larsson and Trondal (2006) note, not even the Commission has an accurate knowledge of
the size and scale of its expert group activities. However, the introduction of the official
Commission register of expert groups in 2005, developed in response to some of the
criticism, has improved this situation immeasurably providing more up-to-date data on
expert group numbers. Academic studies point to a steady rise in the number of expert
5
groups from the 537 groups that were reported in 1975, the number had risen to 602
groups in 1990 (Wessels 1998), 851 groups in 2003 (Larsson 2003) and by 2007 the number
of expert groups had reached 1237 (Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2008). There are 889 expert
groups recorded in the EPISTO database. The decrease in numbers from 2007 can be
attributed to a number of factors including the Commission responding to expert group
criticism by streamlining groups covering similar policy issues and closing down groups that
are no longer active.
The increasing reliance on expertise in a growing number of complex policy areas challenges
conventional democratic norms and has become an increasing source of tension in modern
governance (Moodie & Holst 2013). This tension has served to exacerbate the widely held
perception of the technocratic nature of policymaking in the EU (Featherstone 1994;
Harcourt &Radaelli 1999; Tsakatika 2002; Wallace & Smith 1995; R Fischer 2008. There has
been considerable academic criticism of expert groups; they have been described as being
secretive and opaque (Schaefer 2002), failing to strike a balance between democracy and
efficiency, favouring the latter over the former (Dahl 1994; Rhinard 2002; Presson 2007) and
being closed and exclusive (Sandholtz&Zysman 1989; Green-Cowles 1995; Eising 2007).
Academics working in the field of science and technology studies argue that the focus of
expertise in the EU is too technical and needs to be opened up to embrace different types of
knowledge, including societal practical, moral and ethical considerations (Beck 1992;
Giddens 1992; Irwin 1995; Irwin & Wynne 1996; Jasanoff 2005).
As a result of this tension, the Commission is constantly under pressure to defend its use of
experts within the context of democratic norms. The Commission’s expert group system has
faced similar intense criticism from MEPs and lobbying groups on the grounds that the
system is closed, elitist and dominated by sectoral stakeholders, in particular, business/
industry (Alter EU/Corporate Europe). There is a growing concern that many experts
represent vested interests and their role gives them privileged access to the Commission.
The most recent manifestation of this has been external pressure from the European
Parliament and lobbying groups for the Commission to ‘democratize’ their expert group
system making it more open and transparent (Alter EU 2008; Corporate Europe 2013).The
seriousness of these concerns became apparent when the European Parliament, in 2011/12,
withheld funding for Commission expert groups on the grounds that there needs to be
6
greater
transparency
in
expert
group
activities
(EU
Observer
http://euobserver.com/institutional/117633).
The Commission has responded to this criticism and has gone to the lengths of producing a
number of official documents providing a framework and guidelines for the use of expertise
and expert groups in EU policymaking (European Commission 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b
2005, 2010a, 2010b). One of the most interesting features of these documents is the way
that the Commission has adopted the lexicon of their critics by adopting key terms such as:
democratization, openness, transparency and epistemic plurality. It is important to note,
however, that the Commission uses these terms within the context of the need to maintain
an efficient, effective and streamlined policy process. Within this documentation, the
Commission defines these key terms in the following way:

Openness: ensuring that a broad range of experts, stakeholders and related interests
are involved in the activities of expert groups and that there is equality of access.

Transparency: communicating openly with the expert group target audience
including the general public and ensuring ease of access to relevant and up-to-date
information about the current status and activities of expert groups.

Epistemic Diversity: ensuring that ‘expertise’ is expanded to include a range of
knowledge that extends beyond the scientific and technical. The Commission points
out that ‘expertise can take many forms, including both scientific knowledge and
that derived from practical experience’. The Commission argues that the role of
expertise and expert groups is ‘to deliver knowledge for decision-making that is
multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral and ‘socially robust’.

Effectiveness: a more efficient, coordinated and streamlined process that avoids
duplication, improves dialogue and ensures quality of policy output.
The empirical analysis seeks to examine whether external pressure and criticism of its
expert group system has altered Commission thinking in relation to these key themes or
whether they have remained resistant to a change in outlook. Much has been written about
7
the role of knowledge and expert groups in the EU (Radaelli 1995, 1999, Boswell 2008;
Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2008, 2010; Bohling 2013; Metz 2013; Rimkute&Haverland 2013).
While this literature has made a useful contribution to our understanding of the functions of
knowledge in EU policymaking, it neglects the vitally important role the European
Commission plays in framing the role of experts in policymaking. As Metz (2013) points out,
more recent studies (Heard-Laureote 2010; Robert 2010) have neglected the central role of
the Commission in establishing expert groups and defining their scope for action.
Furthermore, this literature neglects to assess how the Commission has responded to
external challenges of its use of expertise. This paper readdresses this imbalance by
explaining the Commission’s perception of the role of expert groups and examining what
impact external challenge has had on this position.
Organizational Responses to External Challenge and Criticism
The recent ‘public administrative turn’ in EU studies (Egeberg 2004; Tondal 2006) has made
a welcome contribution to our understanding of the internal socialization that can occur
within EU institutions. The European Commission, in particular, has been characterized as a
technocracy due to its wide ranging consultation with experts and specific focus on
regulatory rather than redistributive policy (Majone 1996; Radaelli 1999). This approach has
recently been challenged on the grounds that it overstates the administrative process at the
expense of the political dimension (Egberg 2014). Many scholars have also stressed the
need to analyze the Commission as a multi-organization, rather than a monolith, noting that
each Directorate General (DG) has different organizational ideologies, cultures and styles
(Cram 1994; Cini 1995; Morth 2000). While this is undoubtedly the case, there is also
widespread academic recognition of the overriding influence of the ‘Community Method’ in
the way the Commission formulates policy.
The Community Method represents a deeply entrenched ethos within the Commission’s
bureaucratic and policymaking structures. This links strongly with both historical and
sociological institutional approaches which emphasize that well established norms, rules
and cultures become internalized leading to a path dependent approach which acts as a
structural constraint to reforms, but can also become a source of legitimacy over time
(March & Olsen 1989; Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Bulmer 1994; Hall & Taylor 1996; Aspinwall &
8
Schneider 2000). The essence of the Community Method is an emphasis on wide-ranging
consultation with stakeholders and experts and ensuring policy proposals are based on the
best available evidence-based knowledge (Ross 1995; Moodie 2011). Some critics argue that
this approach creates an important structural bias that favours a few privileged stakeholders
and excludes others. Furthermore, as Bulmer (1994) notes, ‘political struggles are mediated
by prevailing institutional arrangements’; indeed, the community method has become
deeply ingrained in the Commission’s culture and will undoubtedly effect how the
Commission will respond to external pressure for the democratization of its expert group
system.
Recent academic contributions based on a neo-institutional approach tend to neglect the
role and impact external pressure and criticism can have on internal policy change and
organizational culture and norms (Boswell 2008). Organizations working in a political arena
must continually adapt their internal structures and procedures to changing contexts and
the external challenges and pressures posed by the rapidly changing global knowledgebased economy. Indeed, organizational theorists have argued that organizations must be
responsive to external demands, rules and norms in order to survive and enhance legitimacy
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). In responding to external pressure,
however, organizations must not only manage the sourcing and allocation of technical
information as stressed by resource dependence theorists, but also the impact of external
pressure on institutional norms and cultural identities (Meyer & Scott 1983; Scott 2004). In
other words, each organization possesses distinctive internal cultures and norms which will
help define and determine how they respond to external pressure, and the European
Commission is no exception.
Organizations, when faced with this type of external critique, come under pressure to find
solutions that will satisfy their critics without seriously undermining the coherence of their
organizational tasks and activities (Boswell 2008). This conflict between the internal
coherence of an organizations structure and activities and societal expectations in terms of
norms and culture has been the focus of much academic literature in the field of the
Sociology of Organizations. The way in which organizations respond to external pressure
has been broadly influenced by two main competing schools of thought; firstly, the
Weberian rational choice model where organizations will internalize external pressure and
9
change practices if it will help them realize their mandated goals without undermining their
credibility (Weber 1978). Secondly, the Foucauldian approach whereby organizations will
utilize external pressure and knowledge if it will help them expand their own power base
(Foucault 1994). Both these approaches fail to fully capture how organizations operate and
react to external pressure. Indeed, organizational action cannot be explained solely on a
narrow focus on the need to realize mandated goals or the expansion of power (Boswell
2008).
An organization such as the Commission, that lacks a direct democratic mandate, cannot
afford to ignore criticism from key stakeholders within their environment and may need to
respond directly to external challenges and the dilemmas which arise from them. As Boswell
(2008) notes:
‘Some organizations are quite aggressively geared towards securing
legitimacy from their political environment. They are keen to show that they
are responding to the demands of politics, in order to shore up support and
consolidate legitimacy and resources. This is especially likely to be the case
for organizations working in highly politicized areas. By contrast, other
organizations might be less interested in, or adept at, reading their
environment. Instead, they will be more preoccupied with the need to
retain internal coherence and credibility vis-à-vis members. In this case,
signals from politics may be only very patchily grasped and internalized, as
the organization continues to pursue a highly self-referential course in
terms of its goals and action.’
The European Commission is geared towards securing its legitimacy from their political and
external environment. This is manifested in the Commission’s commitment to consulting
widely in the formulation of policy and the emphasis they place on knowledge and the
quality of their policy outputs as a source of legitimacy. However, the potential for the
Commission to act self-referentially still exists given the strong internal logic of the
Community Method.
A number of theories have been developed about the way organizations adopt formal
structures and facades to ensure they conform to external cultural and democratic norms
10
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) “decoupling”
approach involves a process whereby an organization establishes a protective shield that
insulates its internal techniques and processes while establishing a façade of compliance
with the cultural and societal expectations inherent in the criticism. Whereas, Nils Brunsson
(2002) has developed the concept of “organized hypocrisy” which argues that under
conditions where organizations face conflicting material and normative pressure they will
respond to this pressure through symbolic rhetoric while maintaining the organizations
status quo; it is this inconsistency between rhetoric and action that is referred to as
“organized hypocrisy”. In other words, symbolic adjustments to organizational rhetoric
works to maintain levels of external support and legitimacy, while existing methods and
structures remain unchanged and continue as before. Smooth talk and rhetoric can,
therefore, satisfy normative demands for change without making any structural or
methodological reforms in practice. In doing so, the effective use of organized hypocrisy can
enable an organization to continue to act effectively while simultaneously satisfying
normative pressures and external conflict.
Boswell (2008) indicates that there are three key factors which will influence and shape the
nature of an organizations response to external pressure. Firstly, the extent to which an
organization is sensitive to signals from its environment. The Commission has been
extremely sensitive to recent criticism of its expert group system. This sensitivity is
generated by concerns that the expert group system merely serves to enhance the
technocratic nature of decision making and further fuels the democratic deficit debate.
Furthermore, the withholding of funding for expert groups in 2011/2012 and the threat of a
further funding ban in 2014 was regarded as a direct threat by Commission officials who
recognized that the failure to make a positive response could have profound consequences
(Interview 2013). The second key factor is the strength of an organizations internal ideology.
The Community Method is a pervading ethos within the Commission with its commitment
to knowledge as a key resource in policy formulation and could act as a restraint in the
Commission’s response to their expert group critics. The third key factor is how an
organization typically seeks to derive external legitimacy. Some organizations seek
legitimacy through the quality of their output with others seeking legitimacy through
symbolic adjustments to their structure and rhetoric. Knowledge and expertise have
11
traditionally been an important source of legitimacy for the Commission in the production
of effective policy output and they have also been consummate in adopting the lexicon of
their critics in trying to appease external challenges.
Different combinations of these key factors will determine the nature of an organizations
response. Influenced by the sociology of organizations and organizational pluralism
literature (Oliver 1991), Boswell (2008) identifies four main possible types of organizational
response to external challenges, including:

Full adaptation: an organization fully internalizes and implements the
programme being advocated by external critics. This is most likely to occur in
organizations that are politically responsive but have weak internal cultures and
ideologies.

Evasion: an organization ignores external pressure and makes minimal effort to
respond. This is most likely to occur in an organization with extremely strong
ideological norms and practices.

Institutional Decoupling: an organization responds to external pressure by
reforming its external structures rather than its internal practices in a symbolic
response to external criticism.

Reinterpretation: an organization internalizes external demands on their own
terms and adapts those demands to fit their internal system.This is likely to occur
in organizations that have strong identities and practices but are politically astute
enough to recognize change is required.
This typology provides a framework for analyzing how the Commission has responded to
pressure and criticism to democratize their use of expertise. Given the Commission’s
sensitivity to this issue, the idea that the Commission could ignore this pressure was
unrealistic. Equally so, full adaptation to outside pressure appears unlikely given the deeply
ingrained role of knowledge and expertise within the Community Method of policymaking.
The inherent tension between the normative external criticism and the Commission’s
12
expertise-driven policy process creates the circumstances in which the Commission might
engage in a process of institutional decoupling or reinterpretation in order to satisfy their
critics, whilst defending their internal ideology. The empirical section will analyze the
Commission’s response to external criticism in relation to four key themes, openness,
transparency, epistemic diversity and effectiveness in order to assess which of the above
responses is most applicable.
Methodological Approach
The methodological context for this paper is the ‘ideal type’ model developed by Max
Weber. The thought behind this approach is that an ideal type establishes a tool that is
designed to assist the researcher with comparative analysis. It is a construction of certain
elements of reality into a logically precise conception. For Weber, it was important to
establish a logically controlled and unambiguous concept which can then be used to
examine the way in which the ideal differs from what happens in reality. The four main
categorizations outlined above (Full Adaptation, Evasion, Institutional Decoupling and
Reinterpretation) are ideal types that may or may not be observable in their purest form;
indeed, an organization could display none or any number of combinations of these ideal
type responses (Boswell 2008). These categories are, therefore, designed merely to act as a
guide in the following empirical assessment to assist us in describing and explaining how the
Commission has responded to external pressure and criticism to reform their expert group
system.
The paper draws on three main methods of empirical analysis; the development of a
quantitative database, semi-structured qualitative interviews and desk-based research of
primary documentation. The paper will draw on information contained within a database
developed for the EPISTO project containing wide ranging information from the
Commission’s Online Register of Expert Groups. The Register was first developed in 2005 to
make the expert group system more accessible and transparent and includes key
information on expert groups, including; main policy area covered, DG affiliation, sectoral
membership, individual membership, whether the group is permanent/temporary or
formal/informal and the main tasks and functions of the group. The information within our
database only goes up until April 2013, so this information may have been subject to change
13
in the intervening time period as the Register is regularly updated by the Commission. The
data from the Register is supported by information gathered from semi-structured
interviews with Commission Officials conducted during 2013, and an analysis of official
Commission documents relating to the role of expertise and expert groups in EU
policymaking.
Examining the Commission’s Response to External Pressure and Criticism of Expert Groups
At the time of developing our EPISTO database, the European Commission’s expert group
system consisted of 889 expert groups made up of a wide range of actors and designed to
assist the Commission with the formulation and implementation of EU policy in a range of
different policy areas. Much of the criticism from the main lobby group protagonists such as
Alter-EU, Corporate European and Transparency International, is that expert groups are
dominated by vested interests from business and industry. These lobby groups have been
able to build on growing concerns in the European Parliament about the need for action to
monitor the development of the use of experts by the Commission. In particular, the need
to ensure the balanced composition of the groups through full transparency, including open
calls for expert group membership and ensuring that no lobbyists can become a member of
a group (Alter EU 2008, 2013).
Both lobby group representatives and EP policy advisors pointed out that the Commission
were slow to react to their expert group demands and only took a real interest when expert
group funding was withheld: ‘they did not take it seriously at first, but when the freeze
came in, money talks, and we saw real movement and a full review of expert groups.’
(Interviews 2013) The decision of the European Parliament to withhold funding was a
significant factor in ensuring the Commission took the matter seriously. As one Commission
official pointed out ‘it was of paramount importance that we responded in a way that
ensured the funding ban was lifted and that there would be no further bans in 2014.’
(Interview 2013).
It should be pointed out, however, that there is considerable evidence to show that the
Commission had already engaged in a dialogue with its critics as early as 2001. Furthermore,
it established the database in 2005, well in advance of the withholding of funds. The
evidence suggests that the Commission have made no attempt to evade or ignore the
14
criticism. Such a course of action would have been very risky in terms of their credibility
given growing concerns about undemocratic elites determining technology-driven policy
and the increasing debate about a democratic deficit. The fact is, the credibility of the
Commission is at stake if it fails to respond to criticism. Their sensitivity on this issue is
manifest in the numerous Commission communications, such as the White Paper on
Governance, outlining the need for greater openness and transparency, and documents that
provide guidelines for the use of expertise and widespread stakeholder consultation in EU
policymaking. These documents confirm the significance of knowledge and expertise as a
vital source of legitimacy for the Commission in the policy process and therefore ignoring
the criticism about the need to democratize the process was not a feasible option.
An analysis of the Commission’s documents reveals a concerted effort to acknowledge and
address the normative external criticisms they have been subjected to about the
undemocratic nature of their expertise system. Throughout the documents, the Commission
has adopted the democratic lexicon of their critics. They acknowledge the need to
‘democratize’ the process by widening participation and adopting a more open and
transparent approach, including equality of access. For example, the Commission White
Paper on Governance notes that ‘democracy depends on people being able to take part in
the public debate.’ (European Commission 2001a) This position is confirmed in Commission
consultation documents where it ‘wishes to stress that it will maintain an inclusive approach
in line with the principle of open governance: Every individual citizen, enterprise or
association will continue to be able to provide the Commission with input.’ (European
Commission 2002b) Openness should ‘encourage more involvement of interested parties
through a transparent consultation process, which will enhance the Commission’s
accountability.’ (European Commission 2002b) and ‘the quality of EU policy depends on
ensuring wide spread participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to
implementation.’ (European Commission 2001a)
The main criticism levied against the Commission’s expertise system is that it is an opaque,
closed and exclusive system dominated by vested interests and promotes technocratic
forms of policymaking (Schaefer 2002). This criticism is fully acknowledged by the
Commission, it notes that ‘the challenge of ensuring an adequate and equitable treatment
of participants in consultation should not be underestimated’. The Commission has
15
underlined, in particular, its attention to “reduce the risk of policy-makers just listening to
one side of the argument or of particular groups getting privileged access.”’ (European
Commission 2002b) ‘Democratization’ is framed in terms of a pluralistic approach to
policymaking aimed at broadening and enhancing participation and equality of access
(European Commission 2001a). The need for plurality, widespread participation and equality
of access is most clearly emphasized when the Commission notes that ‘all relevant interests
in society should have the opportunity to express their views.’ (COM 2002)
The Commission notes the importance of enhancing the role of civil society organizations
and the public in policymaking (European Commission 2002b). In response to this, they have
taken direct action to promote direct citizen involvement through the development of
participatory mechanisms such as consensus conferences, citizen juries and science shops
(European Commission 2000a, 2001b, 2002a) noting that that ‘ordinary members of the
public, once they have all the information in their possession, can conduct high-quality
dialogue with experts, put judicious questions to the experts, deliver balanced judgments
and reach a reasonable consensus.’ (European Commission 2000) Throughout the
documents, the Commission notes the importance of enhancing epistemic diversity in
policymaking, noting that ‘the final determinant of quality is pluralism. Wherever possible, a
diversity of viewpoints should be assembled.’ (European Commission 2002a) The need for
greater ‘knowledge plurality’ has become an essential component of the Commission
lexicon on expertise. It is not only designed to satisfy their critics, but can also be considered
a response to recent research from the academic community arguing that the relationship
between experts and society needs to be reassessed with a greater emphasis being placed
on enhancing public engagement in scientific debate and embracing more diverse types of
knowledge in policymaking (European Commission 2007). The Commission notes that
expertise should now be increasingly understood in a broader sense as new technologies
not only raise technical issues, but also have ethical and social implications (European
Commission 2001b):
‘The objective is to deliver knowledge for decision-making that is “socially
robust”. This implies a notion of expertise that embraces diverse forms of
knowledge (plurality). Expertise should be multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral
and should include input from academic experts, stakeholders, and civil
16
society. Procedures must be established to review expertise beyond the
traditional peer community, including, for example, scrutiny by those
possessing local or practical knowledge, or those with an understanding of
ethical aspects.’ (European Commission 2001b)
The Commission has performed important actions in relation to balancing expert groups
including developing open calls for the selection of members, balancing membership of
groups identified as imbalanced by lobbying groups and introducing minimum
requirements:
 When defining the composition of expert groups, the Commission and its
departments shall aim at ensuring a balanced representation of relevant areas of
expertise and areas of interest, as well as a balanced representation of gender and
geographical location.
 Where the Commission or its departments appoint the members of the expert
groups, they shall seek a balance between men and women; the medium term aim
shall be to have at least 40% of representatives of each gender in each expert group.
 When creating the expert group, the DG concerned shall describe the composition of
the group in general, indicating categories of experts forming part of it: national,
regional or local public authority represented, civil society organization represented,
interested parties, scientific or academic experts (European Commission 2005,
2010a, 2010b).
Throughout their documents on expertise the Commission has adopted the lexicon of their
critics outlining the need for greater democratization and epistemic diversity. This could be
viewed as an attempt at decoupling or organized hypocrisy by using cosmetic rhetoric
strategically to placate critics and defuse pressure. These two theories can be challenged on
the grounds that the Commission has responded by drafting new rules and guidelines on the
appointment of expert groups and has produced a minimum criteria on expert group
composition which provides a measurement on which their rhetoric can be monitored. In
addition, the data available in the Commission online register of expert groups allows us to
examine the composition of expert group membership. This is outlined in table one below:
17
Table 1: Percentage Breakdown of Member Type Across Expert Groups
Member Type
National
Administration
Individual Appointed
in Personal Capacity
NGO
Associations
IO
Third Country
Candidate Country
Individual Appointed
as Representative of
an Interest
Corporate
Trade Union
Academia
Research Institute
EU Body
Financial Institution
EU Agency
Number of Members % Breakdown
Member Type
14, 568
69.38
1518
7.23
913
890
751
560
475
311
4.35
4.24
3.58
2.67
2.26
1.48
309
293
148
114
66
43
37
Total = 20,996
1.47
1.40
0.70
0.54
0.32
0.20
0.18
of
The first important thing to note is that the majority of expert group members are made up
of officials appointed by the Member States. This challenges the image cultivated by
lobbying groups that Commission expert groups dominated by business and industry.
Commission officials interviewed regarded the dominance of national administrators as
something overlooked by critics, but an inevitable feature of the expertise system given the
significant role of the Member States in signing off on policy. As one Commission official put
it, ‘the member states are highly influential and we must align policy with their wishes’ and
‘member states are our foremost masters and clients. Policies are for the community as a
whole and member states should have a key role in determining those policies.’ (Interviews
2013)
The Commission register provides personal background information on expert group
members serving ‘in an individual capacity’ and ‘as representing an interest’. These
18
categories are made up of 1965 individual members of which 1313 (67%) are male and 651
(33%) are female. These figures show that the Commission is 7% short on their 40% gender
balance target. It should be noted however that this is based on statistics well below the
number of experts involved in the groups, but it is still a significant sample in opinion poll
terms and has a margin of error of 2-3%.
The Commission has gone beyond mere rhetoric and has taken significant action when it
comes to enhancing democratization and epistemic diversity. For example, the introduction
of Status Reports in which the Commission outlines the changes in composition they have
made to groups identified as being unbalanced by the European Parliament and lobbying
groups (European Commission 2012, 2013). The Commission has also introduced more a
more transparent open calls system for members outlining specific criteria on what they are
looking for. However, as the statistics above reveal, there is still some way to go before they
have met the targets outlined. One official pointed out, that one of the flaws of the open
calls system is that they can only select from the people that send applications and that
groups that they would like to participate often do not respond. The official argued that ‘we
can’t send an army to oblige people to participate…All calls have a list of very specific
criteria. If you do not meet the criteria, you will not be a member of the group.’ (Interview
2013)
Indeed, a role for the public in expert groups was questioned by most Commission Officials
interviewed with one noting that there is ‘not a role for the broader public in expert groups.
There are ways to involve the general public, for example, through NGOs, but it is the NGOs
responsibility. It takes too much time and resources to include them and there are other
more effective ways to include the public in the debate.’ (Interview 2013) This reflects a
view within the Commission that not everyone can be consulted and that it is necessary to
draw the line somewhere if an efficient, effective and streamlined policy process is to be
maintained. The prevailing view is that it is important that the focus is on the quality of
policy output and not on extensive consultation for its own sake. Key actors consulted must
be able to make a significant contribution to evidence-based analysis. This suggests that
while the Commission is keen to enhance democratization and epistemic diversity they will
not fully adapt to critics demands, but reinterpret them in accordance with their own
19
priorities and existing structures. This is one area where the Commission could be
challenged on the grounds that their references to public engagement are largely rhetoric
and the action they have taken is cosmetic. It is clear from references in their documents
and interviews with the Commission that they want to prioritize experts with specialist
knowledge who can bring significant added value to the debate.
The Commission has been active in introducing reforms to enhance the transparency of
their expertise system. First and foremost, they introduced the 2005 online register of
experts group which provided key information on the composition and role of each expert
group. In addition, when faced with greater external demands, the Commission has made
further transparency reforms including providing the names of individual experts and
reports and minutes from expert group meetings. The Commission is also considering the
possibility of providing more detailed background information on individual experts through
the possibility of uploading CV’s (Interviews 2013). On the issue of transparency, therefore,
the Commission has fully adapted to the demands of their external critics as issues of
transparency have little impact on the effectiveness of the Commission’s internal processes
and the quality of policy output.
In view of the above it is difficult to support the view that the Commission has adopted a
‘business as usual’ tactic aimed at evading criticism. It is also difficult to sustain the
argument that their approach has been largely cosmetic and based on the clever use of
rhetoric or that they have adopted a process of decoupling. It is equally clear, however, that
they have not fully adapted to their critics demands. The evidence suggests that they have
adopted an approach that can best be described as reinterpretative in which they make
changes where appropriate while highlighting the potential problems and limitations in
adopting their critics wish for a fully democratized process. Indeed, a recurring theme within
Commission documents and in interviews is the need to maintain an effective policymaking
process and not to lose sight of the importance of ensuring quality control over policy
outputs. There is a concern that overemphasizing openness and epistemic plurality could
have a detrimental effect on effectiveness and lead to an inefficient policymaking process
which would impact on the quality of policy output.
20
The Commission notes that ‘as a condition for success, it is crucial that policy choices are
based and updated on the best available knowledge. This requires access to the right
expertise at the right time.’ (European Commission 2002a) The need for the ‘right expertise’
makes references to openness often appear cosmetic, especially when caveated with other
comments such as ‘there are circumstances when too much openness could be detrimental
to the quality of advice, or may damage the legitimate interest of those concerned with the
process. The level of openness should be tailored to the proportion to the task in hand.’
(European Commission 2002a) As one Official pointed out, ‘the public should use public
consultations. Expert groups are work groups and it is impossible to work with a lot of
people in the room. Expert groups are not the right place to include the public.’ (Interview
2013)
This indicates a clear trade-off between democracy and efficiency in which the quality and
type of expertise takes precedence over equality of access. For every reference to the need
for balanced representation, there are numerous references to the need for specialist
expertise; for example, references to ‘specialists with skills in the field’, ‘proven competence
and experience’, ‘professional competence and experience’ and ‘specialists with
competence’ are scattered throughout the documents (European Commission 2005, 2010a,
2010b). The Commission seeks to establish ‘a selection process that guarantees a high level
of expertise’ which raises the questions about the genuine openness of its expertise system.
This was confirmed during interviews as many officials pointed to the importance of experts
bringing added value to the discussion. One official noted that ‘the Commission does not
have any benchmarks in terms of formal qualifications, but they must be recognized in their
field with a strong track record’ (Interview 2013). Another pointed out that ‘we want
someone who is an expert in their field and can give us another perspective outside the
Commission…we try to have a well-balanced representation of people who know what is
happening in their field. We organize the call for people depending on the area and we
publish criteria of the experts we are looking for. If we work well in the beginning then the
groups are representative of the best experts in the field.’ (Interview 2013) This was
supported by another who noted that ‘qualified people are always the most important; they
must have expertise to give and know what they are talking about and prove it by showing
21
results. They must provide expertise and additional knowledge that will provide common
benefits and help deliver policies.’ (Interview 2013)
Implicit in the Commission documentation is the view that ‘consultation periods should
strike a balance between the need for adequate input and the need for swift decisionmaking.’(European Commission 2002b) This potential contradiction has been acknowledged
by the Commission who note that ‘the “democratization of expertise” entails some potential
trade-offs. One is the balance between legitimacy and efficiency.’ (European Commission
2001b) The Commission expresses a concern about the need to ‘ensure that an excessive
multiplication of expert groups is avoided’ (European Commission 2005). Furthermore, they
emphasize that ‘the number of members in the group should remain limited in order to
guarantee the effective operation of the group and ensure the quality of expertise.’
(European Commission 2005) This perspective was outlined by one Commission Official who
noted that ‘it is impossible to have a constructive meeting with more than 30 people…we
want the groups to be as small and as effective and as efficient as possible.’ Another noted
that ‘you always need to keep the primary objective in mind and primary objective of expert
groups is to provide expertise to advance policies. You can have an open discussion and
never get anywhere so streamlining and harmonization is very important at the European
level.’ (Interviews 2013)
The documents openly acknowledge the tension that exists between opening up the
process and the effect that this could have on efficiency and quality. The Commission notes
that ‘in light of the diversity of circumstances in which expert groups operate, the
Commission believes that it is not appropriate to draw up common criteria for the selection
of groups’ members; selection should continue to be done on a case by case basis.’
(European Commission 2012) The above statement clarifies that there should not be a one
size fits all approach to expert groups and member selection should be determined on the
issue being dealt with and is not prepared to trade off efficiency and effectiveness for a
more democratized process. As one Commission official pointed out, ‘you cannot have a
one-size fits all model, as different policy sectors and areas require different types of
expertise.’ (Interview 2013) This was supported by another Commission official who noted
that ‘there is a view that they (expert groups) are a unique model and that they do exactly
the same thing and should be structured in exactly the same ways, but this is not the case.
22
This is far from reality as they do many different things, focusing on narrow issues or much
wider issues. They have the label expert groups as they have common characteristics, but
they should not all be identical entities that do identical things.’ (Interview 2013)
The fact that the Commission has refused to develop a one size fits all model when it comes
to expert group composition and its views on citizen participation appear to be largely
rhetoric and lacking in substance, which provides evidence that the Commission has not
fully adopted the demands of their critics. Indeed, many Commission officials pointed out
that expert groups were not the best mechanism available for citizen participation. Another
argued that ‘it would be easier to do something mathematical, but it is artificial. We don’t
want expert groups for the sake of expert groups. They are not meant to be miniparliaments…If you do not have a good composition that are bringing added value then only
half of them participate. We do not want that. We do not want window dressing…It is not
always possible to have an ideal balanced group because DGs do not invite stakeholders
that do not bring added value around the table. They feel the purpose of experts is not to
have a blabla with general society. They are there to discuss some relatively specific.’
(Interview 2013)
The Commission’s response to external criticism is best captured by the reinterpretation
approach. Their response has not been guided by symbolic rhetoric alone as they have
actively engaged with the debate and implemented reforms consistent with their rhetoric.
Although they have used the democratic rhetoric of their critics with persuasive effect, they
have also been active in critically adapting and internalizing the criticism they have faced in
a way that is consistent with their own ideological approach. The Commission has,
therefore, showed a willingness to change its internal systems in order to retain legitimacy
from their external environment, but only insofar as these changes do not fundamentally
alter the community method approach built on knowledge and expertise legitimacy.
Conclusion
Max Weber identified the ‘ideal type’ of bureaucratic organization as follows: ‘precision,
speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict
subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs - these are raised to
the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration.’ (Gerth & Mills 1970) The
23
other key characteristics he noted were that a bureaucracy ‘has a rational character: rules,
means, ends and matter-of-factness dominates its bearing.’ (Gerth & Mills 1970) ‘When fully
developed,’ he argued, ‘bureaucracy also stands in a specific sense, under the principle of
sine ira ac studio’ (without scorn/anger or bias). The European Commission’s response to
critics of its expert group system aligns with some precision to Weber’s model.
The European Commission has sole responsibility for policy formulation and implementation
and is one of the most scrutinized institutions in the EU. It is also particularly sensitive to
criticism that its processes are elitist, technocratic and dominated by vested interests. The
idea that the Commission could, therefore, evade or ignore criticism from the European
Parliament and lobby groups with regard to their expert group system is not credible.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Commission has engaged in a comprehensive and
detailed dialogue with their critics. It is also important to note that this dialogue was not
generated by the European Parliament’s funding moratorium. It was a dialogue that started
in 2001 and is ongoing and has involved the publication of a range of discussion documents,
White Papers and documents establishing new rules, procedures and guidelines on the way
experts are selected and appointed to expert groups. These documents have been
supported by a range of activities aimed at improving openness and transparency.
While the evidence suggests that the Commission cannot be accused of evading its critics, it
is equally evident that they did not fully adapt to all their demands. External criticism of the
Commission’s expert groups has exposed the tension between the demand for an open and
transparent system and the need to ensure that this does not have a detrimental impact on
the efficiency and effectiveness. The Commission was open and frank about its concerns to
protect the Community Method and its well established internal processes. While
acknowledging the need for reform and ensuring the process was not dominated by vested
interests they were equally concerned about the potential impact of these reforms on the
quality of policy outputs. The need to find a balance between satisfying critics and
protecting their knowledge driven internal process, therefore, made institutional decoupling
or reinterpretation the most likely responses by the Commission.
A Commission attempt at institutional decoupling or organized hypocrisy is certainly worthy
of analysis, but does not stand up to detailed scrutiny. It is interesting to note that, from the
24
outset, the Commission adopted the lexicon of their critics in an attempt to defuse pressure
and acknowledged the need to democratize the process by adopting a more pluralist
agenda both in terms of access and knowledge diversity. It could also be argued that their
acknowledgement of the need to involve the general public in the process and the
introduction of citizen juries and consensus conferences was largely cosmetic. Indeed,
interviews with Commission officials made clear their concerns about how realistic it was to
involve the general public in the process and its potential impact on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the process. Both the use of democratic rhetoric and cosmetic responses to
citizen involvement could be perceived as a classic manoeuvre in relation to the theories of
institutional decoupling or organized hypocrisy. What makes it difficult to sustain this
argument is that the Commission has directly and openly addressed the need to ensure a
balanced approach in introducing democratic reforms and has emphasized the importance
of taking care that these reforms do not undermine the efficiency, effectiveness and quality
of policy outputs. Furthermore, the response has gone beyond mere rhetoric and has
involved implementing a range of significant reforms aimed at improving the system. It is
evident from the analysis that the Commission recognized very early that there was little to
be gained from obfuscating the debate through sophistry and that there was much more to
be gained by openly engaging in a dialogue with its critics about the implications of a more
democratized process.
The Commission has engaged in a process of reinterpretation in response to external
pressure and criticism of its expert group system. They have critically adapted the demands
of lobby groups and the European Parliament by introducing a range of measures aimed at
greater openness, epistemic diversity and transparency, while stressing the need to ensure
that these reforms do not come at the expense of an efficient knowledge-driven policy
process. The Commission has introduced tangible reforms including new rules and
guidelines aimed at improving the selection and appointment of experts and ensuring a
balanced membership of expert groups including the introduction of a more transparent
open call system for experts that makes clear the specific criteria they are looking for. In a
further attempt to improve transparency, they have introduced measures such as an online
register of expert groups (2005) which provides the details of individual members, the
composition of groups, the sectoral interest they represent and meeting minutes/reports. In
25
addition, the introduction of status reports in which the European Parliament and lobby
groups can identify expert groups they regard as unbalanced or dominated by vested
interests and the Commission is required to respond outlining any changes they have
carried out to rebalance the composition is a significant development
In introducing these reforms the Commission has been at pains to emphasize that the
quality of evidence-based policy analysis cannot be compromised. They emphasize the need
to ensure that the experts involved in the process have specialist knowledge and bring
significant added value. In reforming the system the Commission could have adopted a one
size fits all model for expert groups in terms of size and composition ensuring all interested
parties were involved. However, this was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that it
would be unwieldy and would not address the different needs of the various expert groups.
Instead they have adopted a bespoke model in which the selection of experts is based on
the nature and focus of the group’s activities.
The Commission has responded positively to external pressure and has implemented
changes that show it is not completely resistant to changing its internal expertise structures
and practices. The Commission’s approach reflects the complex dilemma of reconciling an
efficient and effective knowledge-driven policy process, in a rapidly changing research and
technology driven community, with conventional democratic norms. Through the
reinterpretation of external demands, the Commission is confronting this dilemma in a way
that can satisfy the normative democratic demands of their critics without wholly
compromising their existing internal processes whose legitimacy rests on the quality of
knowledge and expertise essential to the preparation of high quality policy outputs that will
withstand both legislative and public scrutiny. This approach, however, represents a delicate
and potentially fine balancing act for the Commission. They must be eternally vigilant in
ensuring that expert groups remain open and transparent and continue to embrace
epistemic diversity. It is also critical that they constantly monitor these groups to ensure
they do not become dominated by vested sectoral interests. Failure to do so will leave them
open to more external criticism and the potential threat of further moratoriums on the
funding of expert groups.
26
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