FROM THE PERIPHERY TO POWER
Explanations for the government participation of niche parties in
West European parliamentary democracies
Sarah L. de Lange
European University Institute*
ABSTRACT
Niche parties have joined government coalitions in many West European
parliamentary democracies in recent years. This paper investigates the rise
to power of these parties using a new dataset that includes information about
niche parties in fourteen countries and concludes that the factors that explain
the recent government participation of niche parties are almost identical to
those that explain the government participation of mainstream parties. Like
mainstream parties, niche parties assume office when the formateur party
are small, when they are located in close proximity of this party, and when
they are politically experienced, both in parliament and in government.
These factors also can account for the fact that it has taken niche parties
some time to make the transition from opposition to government, that this
transition has not (yet) occurred in all countries in which these parties have
been represented, and that they remain less likely to govern than mainstream
parties.
KEY WORDS: niche parties; coalition governments; coalition membership
theories.
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon,
14-19 April 2009
*
Jean Monet Fellow, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Via delle
Fontanelle 19, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, email: [email protected]. I would like to thank the
participants of the Colloquium on Political Behaviour at the European University Institute for their valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to Catherine de Vries, Marcel van Egmond and Tom van
der Meer for their statistical advice.
Introduction
Niche parties have become powerful electoral contestants in post-war Western Europe. In the
1980s and 1990s green, radical right, and regionalist parties emerged as successful electoral
forces in most West European countries, but for many years these parties have been unable to
transform their electoral success into governmental power. Only in recent years a limited
number of niche parties have been invited to join government coalitions, with the
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria and die Grünen in Germany as the prime
examples. Other successful niche parties, like the Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium and
GroenLinks (GL) in the Netherlands, remain part of the opposition.
This observation raises many questions. First and most importantly, what explains the
government participation of niche parties, and what explains the national and temporal
situation of this phenomenon? This paper addresses this question on the basis of an analysis of
the determinants of the coalition membership of niche parties. Second, how does the
government participation compare to that of mainstream parties? To answer this question the
paper compares niche parties to mainstream parties and establishes whether niche parties are
less likely to participate in government coalitions than mainstream parties. It also examines
whether the determinants of coalition membership of niche parties are different from those of
mainstream parties. Finally, it addresses the more general question whether niche parties are
less attractive coalition parties than mainstream parties.
None of these questions has been answered yet on the basis of a systematic
investigation of the government participation of niche parties.2 This paper seeks to fill this
void. It addresses the listed questions on the basis of a new dataset that includes information
about niche and mainstream parties in fourteen West European parliamentary democracies.
Focusing on parties that have been represented in West European parliamentary democracies
between 1981 and 2008, the paper explores potential explanations for the (lack of)
government participation of niche parties.
Through studying the composition of coalition governments, and changes therein, the
motives that guide parties’ behaviour in the coalition process can be uncovered. More
specifically, it helps identify the circumstances under which mainstream parties are willing to
change coalition practices and niche parties are willing to assume government responsibility.
As such, the paper directly addresses the consequences of the emergence of niche parties in
2
Traditionally, the government participation of niche parties has been studied on the basis of (collections of)
case studies, but see Dumont and Bäck (2006) on the government participation of green parties and De Lange
(2008) on the government participation of radical right parties.
1
West European parliamentary democracies by focusing on their impact on patterns of
coalition formation, and hence their broader impact on party systems. Moreover, the paper
touches upon a series of questions that have important normative implications. How long does
it take niche parties to make the transition from pariah to power? Are niche parties
deliberately kept out of office by mainstream parties that have formed cartels?
This paper consists of four parts. First, the recent government participation of niche
parties is investigated in more detail. Second, potential explanations for the government
participation of these parties are presented and hypotheses about the government participation
of niche parties formulated. Third, the research design, data, and method used to test these
hypotheses are presented and particular methodological issues that come up when studying
niche parties are addressed. Fourth, the hypotheses are tested and the implications of the
results of these tests explored.
Niche parties in government
Niche parties have benefited from increasing scholarly attention in recent years. Meguid
(2008: 4-5) argues that niche parties have three defining characteristics. They “reject the
traditional class-based orientation of politics”, raise issues that are novel and “do not coincide
with the existing left-right lines of political division”, and differentiate themselves from
mainstream parties by limiting their issue appeals to one issue only. According to Meguid
(2008: 4), the group of niche parties, in which she includes green parties, radical right parties,
and regionalist parties, consists of “a set of political actors quite unlike those seen before”.3
Until recently, most studies that focus on niche parties have primarily been concerned
with the behaviour of these parties in the electoral arena. Scholars have investigated whether
niche parties react differently to changes in public opinion than mainstream parties (Adams et
al. 2006), whether they benefit electorally from policy radicalization (Ezrow 2008), and how
mainstream parties react to or attempt to counter the electoral success of niche parties (Greene
2008; Meguid 2005). These studies univocally conclude that niche parties are different from
mainstream parties, in the sense that they face different political trade-offs and hence make
different strategic decisions than mainstream parties. Scholars have not fully come to terms
with the implications these findings have for the study of party behaviour outside of the
3
Other scholars take a “'big tent’ approach” (Bale and Dunphy forthcoming: 4) and also include communist and
other radical left parties in the group of niche parties. Adams et al. (2006: 513) see niche parties as “members of
party families who present either an extreme ideology (such as Communist and extreme nationalist parties) or a
noncentrist “niche” ideology (i.e., the Greens)”. Thus, for these scholars it is not essential that niche parties reject
traditional conceptions of left and right, as long as they are sufficiently different from mainstream parties.
2
electoral arena. If niche parties behave differently from mainstream parties in the electoral
arena, they are also likely to behave differently in the parliamentary and governmental arenas.
After all, there are strong linkages between the three arenas (Narud 1996; Strom 1990).
Moreover, the studies of Meguid show that mainstream parties interact differently with niche
parties than with other mainstream parties, which has profound implications for the way in
which these parties cooperate in parliament and government. Hence, it is imperative to also
examine the interaction between mainstream and niche parties in other arenas than the
electoral. This paper therefore investigates the government participation, or absence thereof,
of niche parties.
On the basis of a quick count Meguid (2008: 5) estimates that almost 12 per cent of
niche parties have at some point in time participated in government coalitions, and half of
these parties were crucial to the formation of a majority government. Table 1 provides a more
systematic overview of the West European niche parties that have participated in government
coalitions. It lists the niche parties that have been fortunate enough to join a government
coalition, identifies the party families to which these parties belong, the periods during which
they have been in government, and details whether these parties were fully fledged cabinet
members, or served merely as government support parties. The overview demonstrates that
sixteen niche parties became junior coalition members during the period under investigation
and that most niche parties that crossed the threshold of government representation have been
in office more than once.4 Moreover, it also shows that in most West European parliamentary
democracies niche parties have only joined government coalitions in recent years and in many
countries more than one niche party has been able to penetrate the coalitional market.
The Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ), for example, rose to power in 2000 and
despite the controversy the government participation of the radical right party created, it
continued in office after the 2002 elections. In Belgium the Flemish and Walloon green
parties, Anders Gaan Leven (AGALEV) and ECOLO, and the Flemish regionalist parties, the
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and Volksunie (VU), have been junior coalition members in
1999, 2007, and 1987 respectively. Danish niche parties have been unable to become junior
coalition members, but the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) has supported several minority
governments. In Finland the green Vihreä Liitto (VIHR) joined the government coalition that
was formed after the 1995 elections and returned to government in 2007. Moreover, Finnish
governments have always included the Svenska Folkepartiet i Finland (SFP), an
4
Niche parties have never managed to secure formateur status in coalition negotiations or succeeded in obtaining
the prime ministership.
3
ethnonationalist party that promotes the interests of the Swedish minority that lives in Finland.
In France Les Verts (VERTS), the French green party, participated in the government
coalition formed by the Parti Socialiste (PS) in 1997, while in Germany the greens, or die
Grünen (GRÜNE), joined a government coalition led by the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD) in 1998. The latter coalition was reformed in 2002 when the two parties
managed to maintain their parliamentary majority. In Ireland the Green Party (GP) was
invited to join Fianna Fáil (FF) in government after the most recent elections, which took
place in 2007. Given the complexity and fluidity of the Italian party system it should come as
no surprise that many niche parties have assumed office in this country. The Alleanza
Nazionale (AN), Lega Nord (LN), Movimento per l’Autonomia (MPA), and the Federazione
dei Verdi (VERDI) each have participated in one or more coalition government. In the
Netherlands the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) has been a junior coalition member in 2002, whereas
the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FRP), a radical right party that has been around for several
decades, never made it into government but did support the minority government that
assumed in 2001. Finally, in Sweden niche parties have never been cabinet members, but
several of these parties (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, or MP) has acted as government support party
as well. In Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain the coalitional market has been
completely closed for niche parties. Parties like Íslandshreyfingin – Lifandi Land (IH) and
Vinstrihreyfingin – Grænt framboð (VG) in Iceland, Déi Gréng (GRÉNG) in Luxembourg
and the Partito Ecologista Os Verdes (PEV) in Portugal have never been in government and
have not acted as government support parties either.
<<Table 1 about here>>
The overview presented in Table 1 suggests that there are two important patterns of
variation in the government participation of niche parties, the first cross-national, the second
cross-temporal. Table 2 contains details about the pattern of cross-national variation and
demonstrates that niche parties are more likely to participate in government coalitions in some
countries than in others. In Austria (15.8 per cent), Finland (71.4 per cent), France (16.7 per
cent), Germany (28.6 per cent), and Italy (22.9 per cent) the government participation of niche
parties has been above average, while in the other West European countries it has been below
average. Especially the case of Finland stands out here, because the SFP, the party that
represents the Swedish minority in Finland, has been part of nearly every single cabinet that
has been formed since 1956.
4
<<Table 2 about here>>
In addition to a clear pattern of cross-national variation one can also observe a clear
pattern of temporal variation, of which the details are presented in Table 3. The government
participation of niche parties clearly increases over time, most notably since the early 1990s.
During the 1980s the percentage of niche parties that is a junior coalition member remains
below 10.0 per cent, to rise to 11.9 per cent for the period 1991-1995 and 22.2 per cent for the
period 1996-2000. From 2001 to 2005 this figure diminishes to 15.0 per cent, to climb to 18.9
per cent again for the period 2006-2008.
<< Table 3 about here>>
In sum, Tables 2 and 3 reveal that niche parties have participated in government
coalitions in roughly half of the countries in which they have been represented, mostly during
the 1990s and the 21st century. The tables also show that the percentage of niche parties that
has been in government is significantly lower than that of mainstream parties. Of the 173
junior coalition members that participated in West European government coalitions between
1981 and 2008, 143 were mainstream parties and 30 niche parties. Although the number of
niche parties that has been represented in West European parliaments during this period is
significantly lower than the number of mainstream parties, the difference is nevertheless
noteworthy. Of the 518 mainstream parties 27.6 per cent has been a junior coalition member,
while this has only been the case for 14.4 per cent of the 208 niche parties. These figures
indicate that niche parties are less likely than mainstream parties to become junior coalition
members.
Of course, the cross-national and cross-temporal patterns of variation in the
government participation of niche parties should be compared to those of the government
participation of mainstream parties as well. This comparison of that especially in Austria
(difference 38.7 per cent) and Belgium (difference 43.5 per cent), and to a lesser extent in
Denmark (24.6 per cent), Iceland (difference 28.6 per cent), Luxembourg (difference 29.4 per
cent), and Norway (difference also 29.4 per cent), government coalitions are dominated by
mainstream parties. A comparison of the patterns of cross-temporal variation demonstrates
that the difference between the government participation of niche parties and mainstream
parties varies over time, with small differences in the early 1980s and from 1996 onwards,
5
and larger differences between 1986 and 1995. Especially during the period 1996-2000 the
government participation of niche parties is almost equal to that of mainstream parties, but
surprisingly differences have become larger again in recent years.
Potential explanations for niche parties’ government participation
In recent years scholars have become increasingly concerned with explaining why some
parties join government coalitions, while others (are forced to) stay in opposition, and have
developed coalition membership theories, which focus on “the factors influencing the chances
of individual parties joining the government” (Mattila and Raunio 2002: 263, italics in
original). According to coalition membership theories, the coalition formation process
consists of two distinct phases: (1) the selection of the prime minister party; and (2) the
selection of junior coalition members (e.g. Mattila and Raunio 2002; Bäck and Dumont 2006;
Glasgow et al. 2007; Grofman et al. 1987; Baron 1991). When the election results are in,
parties do not randomly start to bargain about the composition of the government coalition.
Rather, the coalition negotiations are lead by a formateur, which normally belongs to the party
that is most likely to obtain the prime ministership. The formateur invites other parties to join
the coalition negotiations and, if the coalition negotiations are successful, the government
coalition. Given this set-up “the party whose leader officially forms the government and
assumes the leadership role clearly enjoys a more central role than is exercised by the other
party or parties in the coalition” (Warwick 1996: 473). This party selects the parties with
which it wants to govern. In other words, “in concentrated party systems ‘junior” parties are
usually invited to join a coalition” by the prime minister party (Bolleyer 2007: 131 emphasis
added). As a result the coalition preferences of the prime minister party play an important role
in the selection of junior coalition members.5
This is clearly reflected by the factors that influence parties’ chances to become junior
coalition members. Previous studies have found that junior coalition members are mainly
selected on the basis of “(1) their previous experience in government, including whether they
were in the previous government and how long it has been since they were last in government;
5
Of course prospective junior coalition members are not hapless victims at the mercy of the coalition
preferences of the prime minister party. They can refuse to take part in the coalition negotiations altogether or
put conditions on their entry in the prospective government coalition. As Warwick (1996: 487-488) notes “the
term ‘selection’ should not be taken to imply that the formateur (or anyone else) acts as selector”. The prime
minister party nevertheless has the opportunity to “bias government composition in line with its preference”
(Bäck and Dumont 2006: 1). It is not completely in control of the composition of the eventual government
coalition, but its coalition preferences will have a substantial impact on the composition of the government
coalition.
6
(2) their smallness, except where responsiveness to electoral success is called for; (3) their
ideological distance from the centre of the left-right dimension as well as from the formateur;
and (4) the need to curtail the number of coalition partners, particularly in fragmented
parliaments” (Warwick 1996: 497; see also Bäck 2003; Isaksson 2005; Mattila and Raunio
2002; Mattila and Raunio 2004; Warwick 1998). Since these findings are the point of
departure for the analyses in this paper, it is useful to discuss them in more detail.
Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members when they have experience
in national executives. According to Warwick (1996: 488) “government experience in general
and, more particularly, membership in the outgoing government increase the odds of a place
in government, while a lengthy absence from government lowers those odds”. This shows that
parties are “neither amnesiac nor myopic” (Strom 1990: 569) and previous coalition
experiences inspire new ones for two reasons: familiarity and inertia. Familiarity refers to the
fact that “in any coalition–forming situation a coalition will form containing that set of
partners most familiar with working together” (Franklin and Mackie 1983: 277). In other
words, parties with government experience have an advantage in the coalition formation
process and parties that have governed together are especially likely to govern together again.
Familiarity makes that government outcomes can be explained “precisely by the
predisposition of parties to continue coalitions fund practicable before” (Daalder 1983: 15).
The reasons for the occurrence of the familiarity effect are that (1) parties that have governed
together have created trust and channels to communicate and co-operate; (2) parties that have
governed together are more certain about each others preferences and future actions; (3)
government parties can get a reputation as good coalition partners; and (4) parties with
government experience know the ins and outs of the government formation process (Franklin
and Mackie 1983; Warwick 1996). Government coalitions that contain parties without prior
government experience lack these advantages. The members of these government coalitions
are faced with higher transaction costs (Lupia and Strom 2008); that is, higher levels of
uncertainty about the future behaviour of their coalition partners and hence the durability of
the government coalition. A special form of the familiarity effect is the incumbency effect,
which entails that incumbent governments have a high propensity to govern again when they
maintain their majority in the elections. In addition to the reasons that produce the familiarity
effect, the incumbency effect is also caused by the fact that incumbent governments form the
reversion point in the event of breakdown of the coalition negotiations (Strom et al. 1994;
Martin and Stevenson 2001; De Winter et al. 2002). The incumbency effect creates high
levels of inertia in the government formation process (Franklin and Mackie 1983).
7
The likelihood that a party becomes a junior coalition member also increases when the
size of the party decreases, or inversely “the larger the party, the less likely it is to take a seat
at the cabinet table” (Warwick 1996: 488). Small parties are attractive junior coalition
members, because they are easy to dominate and can enable formateur parties to form bare
majority government coalitions in which they reap most of the office benefits. It therefore also
matters how large the formateur party is. A larger formateur party has a less need for junior
coalition members and/or needs smaller junior coalition members than smaller one. The
largest party in the system is especially unlikely to join a government coalition as junior
coalition member, because it would threaten the position of the formateur party (Isaksson
2005: 341). Additionally, winning the elections that preceded the government formation
process increases a party’s odds to join the government coalition. Warwick asserts that this
indicates that the government formation process contains an element of electoral
responsiveness. Follow-up studies demonstrate, however, that there is no linear relationship
between a party’s electoral fortunes and the likelihood that it becomes a junior coalition
member. Mattila and Raunio (2002: 276; 2004: 218) observe that “winning elections does not
help parties becoming a coalition government member” and that “if a party wants a place in
the government it is more important to avoid losing seats in the elections than to be an actual
winner” (see also Isaksson 2005: 341). Moreover, they conclude that electoral success is not
as important as a party’s size or experience when explaining the selection of junior coalition
members.
A third cluster of factors that affects the odds that parties becomes a junior coalition
members is policy-related. Parties that are centrally located are more likely to become junior
coalition members than parties that are located towards the fringes of the political space. The
reason for this is that centrally located parties have more coalition opportunities than parties
that are located towards the extremes of the left-right dimension, that is, they can for coalition
with parties on their left and right. In addition to the centrality of the position of the party, the
distance of the party to the formateur party also matters. Formateurs generally have a
preference for forming coalitions with their ideological neighbors, or other parties that take
positions that are in close proximity of their own, because it is less costly to make policy
compromises with these parties. With proximal parties formateurs can conclude policy
agreements that are close to their ideal positions, which pleases their members and voters.
Finally, the size of the government coalition also matters. The larger the government
coalition, the more parties are needed to form it, especially in highly fragmented party
systems. Hence, parties are more likely to become junior coalition members in countries
8
traditionally governed by majority coalitions than in countries where minority governments
are the rule. Other party system features matter as well. High levels of party system
polarization and large relative distances between parties make it less likely that parties
participate in government coalitions as junior coalition members, because they increase the
chances that minority governments are formed. For the same reason the size and centrality of
the formateur play an additional role, because it can make it possible for formateur parties to
survive in office without constructing a majority government coalition (Warwick 1998: 333336).
Niche parties and coalition membership theories
Most coalition membership theories suggest that niche parties have a disadvantageous
position in coalition negotiations. Niche parties usually lack parliamentary and governmental
experience and are located on the fringes of the political space, two factors that normally
significantly decrease parties’ chances to join government coalitions. Niche parties have
gradually entered West European parliaments since 1945. The parliamentary representation of
green and radical right parties often dates back to the 1980s, but in some countries these
parties have only emerged in the 1990s or even more recently. Table 3 already demonstrated
that, despite having been represented for one, two, or even three decades, most niche parties
have only started to participate in government coalitions in recent years. Consequentially, it is
unlikely that they can benefit from any previous experiences in government.
Niche parties also have the major disadvantage that they often can only make
overtures towards the centre of the political space. According to Smith (1997: 36), most niche
parties “are situated at the outer extremes of the mainstream left and right. Even though their
relative size may be significant, their coalition potential is limited since normally they can
make overtures only to a single large party that has an affinity with them in some respects,
and that party will usually not wish to estrange itself from its more moderate neighbours.”
This assertion has been confirmed by several large-N studies. Isaksson (2005: 336), for
example, notes that “a party on the outskirts of a traditional left-right scale reasonable has a
less beneficial starting point in government negotiations. The probability of a right- or leftwing party being included in a coalition is, hence, smaller than that of a party in the
ideological centre”. Hence, left-wing niche parties are only attractive coalition partners to leftwing mainstream parties, while right-wing niche parties are only attractive coalition partners
to right-wing mainstream parties. Consequentially, niche parties are more likely to become
junior coalition members when formateur parties have a clear left- or right-wing signature.
9
When formateur parties take an unambiguous centre position, such as most ChristianDemocratic parties, niche parties are less likely to become junior coalition members. Of
course a lot of variation exists within the group of niche parties when it comes to party
positions on the left-right dimension. Even within particular party families substantial
differences in party positions exist, and niche parties sometimes change positions over time
(Adams et al. 2006). This can make that some niche parties are more attractive coalition
partners than others. Much depends on the positions of formateur parties as well, because
those, together with the positions of niche parties, determine the policy distance between the
two and hence the grounds for cooperation.
The only thing niche parties seem to have going for themselves is that fact that they
are usually small to comparative standards and electorally successful. The first factor would
make that niche parties can easily complement formateur parties and make coalitions winning,
the second factor would make that formateur parties are inclined to include niche parties in
their coalitions because the election results suggest they deserve a position in government.
Dumont and Back (2006) argue, however, that “for parties that remain small by comparative
standards […] the larger they become the greater their chance of getting into government”.6
The rationale behind their argument is the observation that small parties can simply be too
small to contribute to any government coalition in a significant way, especially when the
formateur party is not very big. It is therefore unlikely that small parties are invited by
formateur parties to join government coalitions. The logic developed by Dumont and Back
could explain why niche parties have been especially successful at entering government
coalitions in recent years. During the 1980s they were probably simply too small to impose
themselves during coalition negotiations and contribute in a significant way to the formation
of majority coalitions.
In short, coalition membership theories thus suggest by-and-large that niche parties are
unattractive coalition partners, which could explain why they have participated less frequently
in government coalitions than mainstream parties. Moreover, most theories also offer clues as
to why niche parties become more attractive coalition partners in recent years. Niche parties
have become more experienced at the parliamentary game and have experimented with
executive power at the local and regional level. They have also realized important victories in
elections and increased their representation in West European parliaments. Moreover, there is
some evidence that niche parties have moderated their stances to prepare for government
6
Dumont and Bäck essentially suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between a party’s size and the
likelihood it becomes a junior coalition member.
10
participation. Some scholars even argue that they have deliberately pursued office-seeking
strategies and attempted to make themselves more attractive on the coalitional market by
moving in the direction of mainstream parties. At the same time there are indications that
mainstream parties have moved closer to niche parties to counter the electoral success of these
parties (Meguid 2005). These two dynamics could have created a fertile ground for executive
cooperation between mainstream and niche parties.
Hypotheses
On the basis of these considerations the following eleven hypotheses are formulated regarding
potential determinants of junior coalition membership. With regard to certain hypotheses it is
expected that the predicted effects are either stronger or weaker for niche parties. The first
four hypotheses pertain to the role party size plays in the coalition formation process. It is
hypothesized that parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the larger their
seat share, the larger the increases in their seat share, and the smaller the formateur party. It is
also hypothesized that the effect of party size and changes therein have a greater effect on the
likelihood that niche parties become junior coalition members than on the likelihood that
mainstream parties take up this position. It is plausible that the government participation of
niche parties is first and foremost related to the electoral and parliamentary pressure these
parties exert. By governing with niche parties formateur parties might seek to incorporate
these parties in existing structures and take away their electoral appeal as opposition parties
(De Lange 2008: 105-106).
H1: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the larger their parliamentary seat share. This
effect is expected to be stronger for niche parties.
H2: Parties are less likely to become junior coalition members when they are the largest party in parliament.
H3: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the larger their gains at the elections. This effect
is expected to be stronger for niche parties.
H4: Parties are more likely to participate in government coalitions the smaller the size of the formateur party.
The effect for niche parties is expected to be the same as that for mainstream parties.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses concern the relationship between party positions and distances
between those positions, on the one, and the likelihood that a party becomes a junior coalition
11
member, on the other hand. For reasons of simplicity the hypotheses only cover positions and
distances on the left-right dimension. Since niche parties compete primarily on issues that are
not part of this dimension, it is expected that the distance to the formateur party on the leftright dimension is not as good a predictor of junior coalition membership for niche parties as
it is for mainstream parties.
H5: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the smaller the distance to the formateur party
on the left-right dimension. This effect is expected to be weaker for niche parties.
H6: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the closer they are located to the centre of the
left-right dimension/the less extreme their position. The effect of the distance to the centre is expected to be
weaker for niche parties.
The seventh and eighth hypotheses predict that a party’s experience in parliament and
government will also influence the likelihood that it becomes a junior coalition member. It is
hypothesized that parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the greater their
parliamentary experience, and when they have incumbency status. Most mainstream parties
have been represented in West European party system since 1945. Differences in
parliamentary experience between mainstream parties are therefore negligible. Niche parties
are generally far less experienced than mainstream parties and differences in experience
between niche parties are more substantial. Hence, it is expected that parliamentary
experience will have a stronger effect on the likelihood that niche parties become junior
coalition members than the likelihood than niche parties become junior coalition members.
Recent studies have demonstrated that niche parties tend to incur serious electoral losses when
they have participated in government (Buelens and Hino 2007). This could imply that they are
less likely to benefit from an incumbency bonus in the coalition formation process than
mainstream parties. It is therefore expected that incumbency status will have a weaker effect
on the likelihood that niche parties become junior coalition members than the likelihood than
niche parties become junior coalition members.
H7: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the greater their parliamentary experience/the
longer they have been represented in parliament. This effect is expected to be stronger for niche parties.
H8: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members when they have incumbency status. This effect is
expected to be weaker for niche parties.
12
Party system characteristics are also hypothesized to influence the likelihood that parties
become junior coalition members. It is hypothesized that the effective number of parties and
the level of polarization will have an impact on parties’ chances to assume office and that
parties are less likely to become junior coalition members in countries that are ruled by
minority governments. These effects are expected not to be conditional on the type of party
under investigation.
H9: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the higher the effective number of parliamentary
parties.
H10: Parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the lower the level of polarization.
H11: Niche parties are less likely to become junior coalition members in countries ruled by minority
governments.
Research design, data, and method
To test these eleven hypotheses a new dataset has been constructed that contains information
about the government coalitions that assumed office in West European parliamentary
democracies between 1981 and 2008, and that documents which parties participated in these
government coalitions. The dataset covers seventeen countries and 110 government coalitions,
in which a total of 172 junior coalition members have participated.7 The dataset is novel in
several respects. First, it includes countries that are often excluded from comparative analyses,
such as Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. Second, the time span covered by
the dataset is relatively large. More importantly, government coalitions that have been formed
in recent years have also been included in the dataset. For the study of the government
participation of niche parties this is essential, because these parties have only entered
government coalitions in recent years.
The dependent variable, Junior Coalition membership, is dichotomous and measures
whether parties have been a junior coalition member in a particular government coalition, or
not. To test the hypotheses twelve independent variables have been measured. The key
independent variable in this study is a dummy, which measure whether a party is a niche
party. Niche parties are identified on the basis of their party family affiliation reported in the
7
The dataset only includes information about government coalitions that have been formed after new elections
have been held. Government coalitions that have formed mid-term are not party of the dataset. Moreover, it only
contains entries for elections that produced a minority situation, that is, elections that did not leave a single party
with a majority of seats in parliament, a situation which necessitates the formation of a government coalition.
13
Parliamentary Data Archive. Parties that are labelled as green parties, as extreme right-wing
parties, or as regional, separatist, or ethno-nationalist are coded as niche parties, while all
other parties have been coded as mainstream parties.
The other eleven independent variables have been taken from previous coalition
membership studies. The focus is first and foremost on those variables that have proven to
have a significant effect on the likelihood that a party becomes a junior coalition member.
These variables can be divided in four main groups. The first group of variables measure size
characteristics of parties. The variable Size measures the proportion of seats controlled by a
party at the time of the formation of the government coalition. The variable Largest party
measures whether the party controlled the largest proportion of seats of the parties represented
in parliament in the year the government coalition was formed. The variable Size formateur
measures the proportion of seats controlled by the formateur in the same year. The variable
Change size measures what proportion of votes the party has won or lost at the elections that
preceded the formation of the government coalition.
The second group of variables measures policy characteristics of parties. The variable
Distance to formateur measures the policy distance between the party and the formateur party
on the left-right dimension, while the variable Distance to centre measures how far this
position is from the centre of this dimension. To avoid that the two variables are highly
correlated, the latter variable does not reflect a party’s distance to the weighted mean or
median, but to absolute mid-point of the left-right dimension. The two variables are both
included in the analysis, because the first tell us whether a policy rationale is likely to exist
between prospective coalition partners, whereas the second informs us about the centrality of
a party’s position. Both are deemed relevant in the literature on junior coalition membership.
The third group of variables measures how experienced parties in parliament and
government. The variable Experience measures the number of years a party has been
represented in parliament, counted from the first year a party has entered parliament. The
variable Incumbency measures whether a party was part of the outgoing government coalition
and thus has incumbency status.
The fourth group of variables measures party system characteristics. The variable
ENPP measures the effective number of parliamentary parties, using the Laakso and
Taagepera index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The variable Polarization measures the level
of polarization in the party system by looking at the range of positions taken by parties in this
system. This measure is preferred over more sophisticated measures of polarization, because
these are likely to be highly correlated with other independent variables and thus create
14
multicollinearity problems. The variable Minority government is a dummy variable that
measures whether countries are predominantly ruled by minority governments (Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden) or majority governments.
The size and experience variables are measured on the basis of authorative sources that
report election results, most notably The International Almanac of Electoral History (Rose
and Mackie 1991), the Political Data Yearbook published by the European Journal of
Political Research, and the website www.parties-and-elections.de. The combination of
sources assures the completeness of information, especially for those countries in which the
composition of parliamentary groups is rather fluid (e.g. France and Italy). On the basis of
these sources, and the Parliamentary Data Archive, Müller and Strøm (2000) and
Woldendorp et al. (2000) information was also collected about the composition of
government coalitions and the identity of formateur parties.8 The policy variables, including
the level of polarization, are measured on the basis of party positional data collected through
five expert surveys (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver and Hunt 1992;
Lubbers 2000; Benoit and Laver 2006).9 Extensive discussions of the most appropriate way to
estimate parties’ positions are widely available (e.g. Budge et al. 2001; Keman 2007; Laver
2001). The estimation of the party positions of niche parties is more difficult than that of other
party families. Expert surveys provide the most reliable and valid estimates of niche parties’
positions (De Lange 2008) and are thus used in the analyses presented in this paper. The
results of the analyses are cross-validated by running the same analyses using the Franzmann
and Kaiser estimates of party positions (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006).10
The hypotheses are tested by means of logistic regression analysis, because the
dependent variable is dichotomous and the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables consequentially non-linear (Berry 1993). Logistic regression is essentially
a form of OLS regression in which a logarithmic transformation is included to approximate
the linearity assumed in OLS regression (Berry and Feldman 1985). OLS regression and
logistic regression are thus in many respects equivalent procedures developed for different
kinds of dependent variables. To ensure that the results of the logistic regression analyses are
not affected by multicollinearity, the variables Size formateur, Distance to formateur,
Distance to centre, ENPP, and Polarization have been centred around their means.
8
Note that formateur parties are in most cases identical to the prime minister parties. Hence, prime minister
status has been taken as a proxy for formateur status.
9
The left-right scores of parties reported in these surveys have been standardized (see Carter 2005) and have
been attributed to five-year periods (e.g. the scores from Castles and Mair to the period 1981-1995).
10
The Franzmann and Kaiser estimates have been calculated using the data collected by the Comparative
Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2007).
15
The determinants of the government participation of niche parties
The logistic regression analyses identify the determinants of the junior coalition membership
of niche parties in three steps. In a first step the independent variables that have been found
significant in previous studies of junior coalition membership are introduced to establish
which have a significant effect on the likelihood that a party becomes a junior coalition
member and which do not. In this study the most important determinants of junior coalition
membership are 1) the size of the formateur party, 2) the distance to the formateur party, 3)
experience in parliament, 4) incumbency status, and 5) the existence of a tradition of minority
or majority government (see Model 1 in Table 4 and Table 5).11 The effects are in the
expected directions, as parties are more likely to become junior coalition members the smaller
the formateur party, the smaller the policy distance to this party, and the greater their
experience in parliament. They are also more likely to become junior coalition members when
they have incumbency status and when majority coalitions are the norm. Interestingly, parties
are not more likely to become junior coalition members the larger their share of seats12, the
larger their electoral gains, the closer they are located to the centre of the left-right dimension,
the higher the effective number of parties, and the higher the level of polarization. Moreover,
parties that are the largest in parliament are not significantly less likely to become junior
coalition members.13 The results of he logistic regression analysis thus provide support for the
first part of the hypotheses 4, 5, 7, 8, and 11, while the hypotheses 1, 2, 3 ,6, 9, and 10 are not
supported.
<<Tables 4 and 5 about here>>
In a second step the niche party dummy is added to the model to examine whether
niche parties are less likely to become junior coalition members than mainstream parties,
everything else being equal. The effect of this variable is in the expected direction, but not
statistically significant (see Model 2 in Table 4 and Table 5). In other words, niche parties are
not significantly less likely to become junior coalition members than mainstream parties, at
11
In Model 1 presented in Table 5 the variable Change Size also has a significant effect on the likelihood that a
party becomes a junior coalition member.
12
To test for non-linearity of the relationship between a party’s size and the likelihood that it becomes a junior
coalition member Model 1 has also been run with a squared size variable, but this does not improve the fit of the
model.
13
These determinants of junior coalition membership differ to some extent from those identified in previous
studies of junior coalition membership. The differences are the result of the focus on a different set of countries
and a different time period, as well as the inclusion of many smaller parties in the dataset.
16
least when one also takes the effect of other independent variables into consideration. The
introduction of the niche variable leaves the previously established effects of the independent
variables in tact. Direction, magnitude and significance of the effects of the independent
variables in Model 2 are identical to those in Model 1. Hence, the fact that niche parties are
less likely to participate in government coalitions is entirely attributable to their party
characteristics, as well as to the characteristics of formateur parties and party systems. Niche
parties are less likely to become junior coalition members than mainstream parties, because
they are usually located further away from formateur parties than mainstream parties, because
they usually have less parliamentary experience than mainstream parties, and because they
benefit less frequently from incumbency status than mainstream parties.
In a third step the independent variables are interacted with the niche party variable to
investigate whether the effects of the independent variables are similar for niche and
mainstream parties (see Models 3 to 12 in Table 4 and Table 5). Only three interaction terms
are statistically significant: the interaction term between the size of the formateur party and
niche party status, the interaction term between the level of polarization and niche party
status, and the interaction term between the tradition of either minority or majority
governments and niche party status.14 Surprisingly, none of these interaction effects were
hypothesized, while none of the hypothesized interaction effects is significant.
A closer look at the b-coefficients of the conditional effects of the variables Size
Formateur, Polarization, and Minority Government reveals how effects of the independent
variables differ between niche and mainstream parties. The b-coefficients for Size Formateur
are -.081 for mainstream parties and -.023 for niche parties, which indicates that, although
both types of parties less likely to become junior coalition members the larger the formateur
party, the effect is stronger for mainstream parties than for niche parties. The likelihood that
mainstream parties assume office as junior coalition members is thus more strongly dependent
on the size of the formateur party than the likelihood that niche parties achieve this.
The level of polarization interacts in a different way with the Niche Party variable.
The b-coefficients for the Polarization variable are .039 (not significant) and -.346
respectively. Thus, while the level of polarization does not affect the likelihood that
mainstream parties become junior coalition members, it does have a strong negative effect on
the likelihood that niche parties become junior coalition members. An increase in the level of
14
Table 5, estimated on the basis of the Franzmann and Kaiser data, does not include a model with an interaction
term between Minority Government and Niche Party, because this term would predict the absence from
government of niche parties perfectly.
17
polarization makes it less likely that niche parties become junior coalition members, which is
in line with Sartori’s (1976) description of the centripetal forces that characterize government
formation in polarized party systems.
An interaction effect also exists for the variable Minority Government. The bcoefficients for this variable are -.831 for mainstream parties and -.2686 for niche parties. The
coefficients indicate that, although niche and mainstream parties are each less likely to
become junior coalition members in countries ruled by minority government than in countries
ruled by majority governments, this effect is stronger for niche parties than for mainstream
parties. Thus, especially in countries where minority governments are common niche parties
are unlikely to become junior coalition members.
Concluding remarks
This paper set out to investigate the recent government participation of niche parties. Niche
parties, which compete on different issues than mainstream parties, have gradually gained a
more prominent position in West European party systems and have in recent years made the
transition from opposition to government. This paper therefore aimed to explain the
government participation of niche parties and pays attention to patterns of cross-national,
cross-temporal, and cross-party variation. The number of niche parties that have been in
government has, however, never been proportional to the number of niche parties represented
in West European parliaments. Although the frequency with which niche parties have
assumed office has increased in recent years, niche parties remain less likely to join
government coalitions than mainstream parties. For this reason this paper also sought to
contrast the government participation of niche parties to that of mainstream parties and
explain why niche parties are less likely to govern than mainstream parties.
The paper concludes that niche parties are less likely to join government coalitions
than mainstream parties, but that this is not a consequence of their ‘nicheness’. Like
mainstream parties, niche parties are less likely to govern the larger the formateur party and
the further they are located away from this particular party, the more they lack parliamentary
experience, when they are not part of the incumbent government, and when they compete for
government in countries where minority governments are common. Interestingly, some of
these effects are weaker for niche parties than for mainstream parties, while others are
stronger. Less than mainstream parties niche parties profit from the designation of a small
formateur party, and they suffer more from the existence of high levels of polarization.
18
Moreover, more than mainstream parties niche parties remain part of the opposition in
countries where minority governments are the norm.
This paper thus demonstrates that formateur parties apply by-and-large the same
criteria when they select niche and mainstream parties as junior coalition members. The invite
niche parties to join their government coalition when they are in need of (many) coalition
partners, when they perceive a clear policy rationale for cooperation and when they think
niche parties are sufficiently experienced to deal with the responsibilities that come with being
in government. The fact that niche parties are more likely to become junior coalition members
the longer their experience in parliament indicates that niche parties benefit from the
familiarity and inertia that characterizes coalition formation processes. By working with
mainstream parties in West European parliaments they become familiar with the rules of the
game, learn the tricks of the trade, and develop channels of communication with mainstream
parties. Once niche parties have entered government, they are more likely to remain in office,
because they profit from their status as incumbents. This is noteworthy, because it has been
demonstrated that niche parties are especially likely to suffer electorally from their
government participation. It appears that this does not prevent them from continuing in office
though.
The identified mechanisms also explain why niche parties have participated in
government coalitions in some countries, but not in others, and why their rise to power has
only really started in the 1990s. In the 1980s mainstream parties were still relatively strong
and niche parties relatively weak. Niche parties took up positions on the left-right dimension
that were close to the extremes, while mainstream parties had converged in the center of this
dimension. Moreover, niche parties where relatively new and inexperienced at the political
game. Over the course of the years this changed. Niche parties have become stronger and have
moderated their positions, while mainstream parties have become weaker and have moved
away from the center of the left-right dimension. Niche parties have familiarized themselves
with the political game, for example by taking up executive responsibility at the local and
regional level, and mainstream parties have become used to the presence of niche parties. This
has facilitated cooperation in national executives.
It seems that in many countries mainstream parties have also learned from the dealings
other mainstream parties have had with niche parties. The formation of government coalitions
between mainstream left and green parties that during the 1990s, for example, made
mainstream right parties realize that radical right parties can be attractive coalition partner
(Bale 2003). It is conceivable that this learning process also has taken place on a West
19
European level, with mainstream parties closely following the rise to power of niche parties in
neighboring countries. Thus, the government participation of niche parties has probably been
promoted by a process of diffusion.
Given that the government participation of niche parties is determined by the same
factors as the government participation of mainstream parties, popular assertions that niche
parties are actively kept out of office by mainstream parties that have formed cartels should be
treated with caution. The results of this study suggest that mainstream parties have never
approached niche parties as a homogenous group and have always differentiated between
parties on the basis of simple party characteristics, such as age and position, and not on the
basis of their membership of a party cartel.
These conclusions have important implications for the way niche parties are
approached in studies of coalition formation and studies of party competition more generally.
Even though niche parties are different from mainstream parties, because they traditional
distinctions between left and right, introduce new political issues and focus primarily on these
issues, they are still in many respects similar to mainstream parties. The distinction between
niche and mainstream parties is thus analytically useful, but it should not distract from the fact
that niche parties are first and foremost parties. Consequentially, niche parties have many of
the same assets (and liabilities) in the coalition formation process as other parties. Their
bargaining power depends on several factors, which makes it difficult to predict when and
where niche parties will assume office in the future. Given that political experience is key to
assuming office they are, however, likely to become an integral part of West European party
systems and govern eventually as frequently as mainstream parties.
20
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23
Table 1
Niche parties in government
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Year of election
1983-1986; 2000-2003;
2003-2005
1999-2003
1999-2003
20071987-1991
2001-2005; 2005-2007; 20071983-1987; 1987-1991;
1991-1995; 1995-1999;
1999-2003; 2003-2007
1995-1999; 20071997-2002
1998-2002; 2002-2005
20071994-1995; 2001-2006; 2008161994-1995; 2001-2006; 200820081996-2001; 2006-2008
2002-2003
20062001-2005
1998-2006
Niche party
FPÖ
Type of niche party
RR
Position in coalition
Junior
AGALEV
ECOLO
N-VA
VU
DF
SFP
GP
GP
RP
RP
RR
RP
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Support15
Junior
GP
GP
GP
GP
RR
RR
RP
GP
RR
Other
RR
-
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Junior
Support
Support
VIHR
VERTS
GRÜNE
GP
AN
LN
MPA
VERDI
LPF
CU
FRP
MP
GP
15
Support parties have only been included in the list if a formal and public agreement between the government
parties and support party or parties existed (cf. Bale and Bergman 2006a; 2006b; Strøm 1990).
16
The AN integrated the Popolo della Libertà (PDL) in 2008, which is a part of the Berlusconi III government
that assumed office the same year.
24
Table 2
Mainstream and niche parties in government: a cross-national perspective
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Average
In government
Mainstream parties
Niche parties
6
3
54.5 %
15.8 %
25
4
54.3 %
10.8 %
14
0
24.6 %
0.0 %
10
10
27.8 %
71.4 %
8
1
24.2 %
16.7 %
10
2
38.5 %
28.6 %
3
50.0 %
8
0
28.6 %
0.0 %
7
1
21.2 %
12.5 %
20
8
34.5 %
22.9 %
5
0
29.4 %
0.0 %
12
1
18.5 %
7.7 %
10
0
29.4 %
0.0 %
2
11.1 %
0
0
0.0 %
0.0 %
3
0
8.1 %
0.0 %
143
30
27.6 %
14.4 %
Difference
38.7 %
43.5 %
24.6 %
43.6 %
7.5 %
9.9 %
-
28.6 %
8.7 %
11.6 %
29.4 %
10.8 %
29.4 %
0.0 %
8.1 %
13.2 %
25
Table 3
Mainstream and niche parties in government: a cross-temporal perspective
1981-1985
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
2001-2005
2006-2008
Average
In government
Mainstream parties
Niche parties
25
2
23.4 %
9.5 %
32
2
31.4 %
6.3 %
29
5
29.6 %
11.9 %
17
8
23.9 %
22.2 %
21
6
25.3 %
15.0 %
19
7
33.3 %
18.9 %
143
30
27.6 %
14.4 %
Difference
13.9 %
25.1 %
17.7 %
1.7 %
10.3 %
14.4 %
13.2 %
26
Table 4
Determinants of junior coalition membership (expert survey data)
Constant
Size
Largest party
Change size
Size fomateur
Distance to formateur
Distance to centre
Experience
Incumbency
ENPP
Polarization
Minority government
Niche party
Model 1
B
(SE)17
-.2117
(.455)
.007
(.024)
-1.471
(1.046)
.067
(.040)
-.063*
(.169)
-.472**
(.169)
-.096
(.107)
.023***
(.007)
1.314**
(.464)
-.205
(.116)
-.085
(.099)
-1.056***
(.201)
Model 2
B
(SE)
-1.665
(.484)
-.001
(.024)
-1.355
(.986)
.070
(.040)
-.061*
(.028)
-.466**
(.177)
.011
(.134)
.021***
(.006)
1.227**
(.462)
-.199
(.119)
-.094
(.106)
-1.122***
(.206)
-.618
(.447)
Size * Niche party
Model 3
B
(SE)
-1.521
(.521)
-.010
(.025)
-1.148
(1.020)
.064
(.038)
-.056*
(.028)
-.460**
(.176)
.001
(.136)
.021***
(.006)
1.214**
(.466)
-.186
(.119)
-.080
(.094)
-1.153***
(.201)
-1.030
(.625)
.054
(.036)
Size formateur * Niche party
Model 4
B
(SE)
-1.756
(.521)
.008
(.026)
-1.657
(1.076)
.068
(.038)
-.081**
(.031)
-.460**
(.169)
.016
(.145)
.019**
(.006)
1.203**
(.466)
-.188
(.126)
-.100
(.109)
-1.112***
(.220)
-488*
(.479)
Model 5
B
(SE)
-1.674
(.486)
.001
(.024)
-1.382
(1.003)
.091**
(.032)
-.063*
(.028)
-.464**
(.174)
.007
(.130)
.020***
(.006)
1.257**
(.458)
-.203
(.122)
-.099
(.108)
-1.107***
(.207)
-.563
(.450)
.058*
(.030)
Change size * Niche party
-.089
(.070)
Distance formateur * Niche party
Log Likelihood
-264.583
-262.483
-261.410
N
610
610
610
Note: Significant at * the .05 level, ** the .01 level, *** the .001 level
17
Model 6
B
(SE)
-1.604
(.449)
-.001
(.023)
-1.359
(.974)
.069
(.039)
-.062*
(.029)
-.463**
(.178)
.102
(.159)
.021***
(.006)
1.22**
(.456)
-.210
(.133)
-.081
(.097)
-1.107***
(.214)
-.619
(.428)
-261.531
610
-259.373
610
-.201
(.372)
-262.094
610
The standard errors have been clustered by country.
27
Constant
Size
Largest party
Change size
Size formateur
Distance to formateur
Distance to centre
Experience
Incumbency
ENPP
Polarization
Minority government
Niche party
Distance to centre * Niche party
Experience* Niche party
Incumbency * Niche party
Model 7
B
(SE)
-1.624
(.491)
-.004
(.023)
-1.36
(.963)
.071
(.039)
-.064*
(.028)
-.389*
(.182)
.019
(.132)
.022***
(.006)
1.240**
(.458)
-.217
(.117)
-.101
(.104)
-1.141***
(.210)
-.667
(.442)
-.184
(.158)
Model 8
B
(SE)
-1.701
(.481)
-.001
(.024)
-1.359
(.976)
.070
(.040)
-.061*
(.028)
-.465**
(.175)
.010
(.133)
.022**
(.009)
1.229**
(.461)
-.201
(.113)
-.095
(.106)
-1.128***
(.211)
-.537
(.527)
Model 9
B
(SE)
-1.630
(.464)
-.001
(.024)
-1.341
(.966)
.069
(.039)
-.061*
(.028)
-.470**
(.178)
.017
(.127)
.021***
(.007)
1.170*
(.523)
-.192
(.117)
-.087
(.097)
-1.120***
(.219)
-.692
(.457)
Model 10
B
(SE)
-1.669
(.493)
-.001
(.024)
-1.36
(.996)
.069
(.039)
-.061*
(.028)
-.466**
(.176)
.010
(.137)
.021***
(.006)
1.224**
(.456)
-.190
(.102)
-.095
(.107)
-1.118***
(.207)
-.606
(.463)
Model 11
B
(SE)
-1.605
(.464)
.001
(.024)
-1.338
(.933)
.065
(.039)
-.059*
(.028)
-.484**
(.175)
.060
(.122)
.021***
(.006)
1.162*
(.459)
-.191
(.125)
.039
(.108)
-1.136***
(.211)
-.713
(.174)
Model 12
B
(SE)
-1.740
(.490)
.003
(.024)
-1.445
(1.040)
.070
(.040)
-.061*
(.028)
-.476**
(.180)
.031
(.132)
.020***
(.006)
1.221**
(.449)
-.195
(.116)
-.105
(.108)
-.831***
(.203)
-.444
(.452)
-.003
(.013)
.322
(.708)
ENPP * Niche party
-.025
(.168)
Polarization * Niche party
-.403*
(.174)
Minority government * Niche party
Log Likelihood
-261.898
-262.460
-262.339
N
610
610
610
Note: Significant at * the .05 level, ** the .01 level, *** the .001 level
-262.466
610
-260.351
610
-1.855*
(.883)
-260.310
610
28
Table 5
Determinants of junior coalition membership (Franzmann and Kaiser data)
Constant
Size
Largest party
Change size
Size fomateur
Distance to formateur
Distance to centre
Experience
Incumbency
ENPP
Polarization
Minority government
Niche party
Size * Niche party
Model 1
B
(SE)
-1.355
.460
.004
.019
-1.404
.981
.072*
.036
-.069*
.034
-.464*
.202
-.036
.199
.026***
.008
1.432***
.394
-.269
.147
-.092
.074
-.772***
.209
Model 2
B
(SE)
-1.050
.493
-.003
.020
-1.354
.941
.072*
.035
-.068*
.034
-.473*
.215
.062
.211
.024***
.077
1.329***
.413
-.256
.147
-.096
.084
-.871***
.216
-.621
.493
Model 3
B
(SE)
-.961
.514
-.007
.023
-1.242
.972
.069*
.035
-.066*
.033
-.464*
.215
.062
.210
.023**
.007
1.328***
.414
-.246
.146
-.094
.082
-.882***
.222
-.907
.676
.032
.041
Change size * Niche party
Model 4
B
(SE)
-1.063
.491
-.002
.020
-1.371
.948
.090***
.026
-.070*
.034
-.467*
.215
.060
.212
.023**
.007
1.356***
.406
-.261
.148
-.098
.088
-.863***
.213
-.586
.413
Model 5
B
(SE)
-1.131
.537
.009
.023
-1.731
1.082
.074*
.035
-.094*
.038
-.481*
.203
.013
.213
.021**
.008
1.314**
.415
-.260
.151
-.100
.083
-.853***
.208
-.401
.427
-.071
.068
Size formateur * Niche party
.072*
.032
Distance to formateur * Niche party
Log Likelihood
-204.859
-203.00 -202.726
N
461
461
461
Note: Significant at * the .05 level, ** the .01 level, *** the .001 level
Model 6
B
(SE)
-1.077
.538
-.004
.019
-1.352
.939
.073*
.034
-.069
.035
-.450
.267
.067
.201
.024***
.007
1.335***
.409
-.260
.157
-.100
.084
-.880***
.221
-.523
.646
-202.409
461
-199.278
461
-.067
.276
-202.967
461
29
Constant
Size
Largest party
Change size
Size formateur
Distance to formateur
Distance to centre
Experience
Incumbency
ENPP
Polarization
Minority government
Niche party
Distance to centre * Niche party
Experience* Niche party
Incumbency * Niche party
Model 7
B
(SE)
-1.055
.577
-.004
.019
-1.353
.932
.072*
.035
-.068*
.034
-.473*
.213
.068
.233
.024***
.007
1.329***
.412
-.256
.148
-.097
.085
-.870***
.222
-.601
.780
-.013
.387
Model 8
B
(SE)
-1.015
.506
-.003
.020
-1.344
.924
.072*
.035
-.068*
.034
-.471*
.217
.063
.211
.023*
.010
1.326***
.409
-.255
.143
-.095
.084
-.872***
.218
-.709
.595
Model 9
B
(SE)
-1.021
.490
-.003
.020
-1.346
.926
.072*
.035
-.068*
.034
-.475*
.212
.064
.207
.023**
.007
1.284**
.446
-.255
.145
-.092
.085
-.861***
.217
-685
.409
Model 10
B
(SE)
-1.044
.495
-.002
.021
-1.373
.966
.072*
.035
-.068*
.034
-.475*
.211
.050
.217
.023**
.008
1.323***
.407
-.230
.124
-.097
.083
-.855***
.208
-.578
.449
Model 11
B
(SE)
-.932
.469
.002
.020
-1.412
.901
.069*
.035
-.069*
.034
-.503*
.211
.030
.215
1.265**
.393
-.249***
.146
.011
.105
-.841
.246
-.679***
.364
-.408
.209
.003
.016
.250
.648
ENPP * Niche party
-.080
.218
Polarization * Niche party
-.408
.209
Minority government * Niche party
Log Likelihood
-203.004 -202.989 -202.931
N
461
461
461
Note: Significant at * the .05 level, ** the .01 level, *** the .001 level
-202.875
461
-201.308
461
30