Bypassing Parliament: Voting directly for the prime
minister in parliamentary elections
Mattan Sharkansky∗
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
[email protected]
Draft prepared for the 2014 MPSA Annual Conference.
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections, and
empirically assesses the theory. I suggest that voters in proportional systems have
an incentive to direct their vote at the most influential policymaker in the system
– the prime minister. This vote allows citizens to vote prospectively for policy,
a vote that is generally considered harder under proportional rules compared to
majoritarian ones. In support of this theory I find that in elections voters tend to
vote for two large parties. I find this tendency across different levels of electoral
permissiveness and ethnic heterogeneity. Examination of election studies suggests
this tendency is the result of non-proximal voting. A further examination of the
SF-ratio concludes with further support for the theory.
∗
I thank Bing Powell, Bonnie Meguid, and Tasos Kalandrakis for providing helpful comments and
advice on previous versions of this paper. I also appreciate comments and suggestions made by Kevin
Clarke, Noam Gidron, and Ira Sharkansky. All errors that remain are, of course, my own.
1
Elections allow citizens to affect policy through different mechanisms. Powell (2000)
suggests that majoritarian democracies allow a stronger accountability – the power of the
voters to identify the rascals and throw them out, and electoral mandates – the ability
voters have to choose a future government and policy. On the other hand, the proportional
design allows greater citizen representation. This representation allows voters to choose
delegates or trustees that accurately represent their interests in policy negotiations.
While proportional rules decrease clarity of responsibility and hinder accountability
and electoral mandates, these mechanisms are not completely disabled. Duch and Stevenson (2008) show that economic voting, i.e., voters holding the government accountable
for economic policy, exists even under proportional rules. In these regimes voters tend to
attribute most accountability for economic policy to the prime minister (PM). If voters
hold the PM accountable for her past policy, they might also use the complementary
prospective mechanism Powell suggests, and use their vote with the intention of putting
a particular PM in office.
This paper begins to examine this possibility. PMs influence policy directly – through
the work and decision-making process of the government, and indirectly – through their
almost certain position of government formateurs before beginning their tenure heading
the executive. Therefore, voters who intend to influence future policy might do well to
direct their vote at the single most influential policymaker. Voters may prefer to vote for
a party further away from them, which is a viable PM party, if they think that increasing
its chances of heading the government will bring policy closer to them than increasing the
electoral power of a closer party, expected to be a minor partner in the future coalition
or opposition. Alternatively, voters may prefer to vote for a viable PM party, which is
further away from them, if they do not trust that the party close to them (expected to
be small) would let the large party head the government.
2
Voters who take into account the consideration suggested here are electing, to a large
extent, in a majoritarian competition. If enough voters behave this way, we should expect
some convergence to two large parties, even under proportional rules. I present a crossnational examination of election results according to the number of “top-tier” parties,
and conclude that across many electoral rules, and different levels of social heterogeneity,
there is often a convergence of voters to two top-tier parties. This convergence does not
seem to be a result of proximity voting, as expected if this is a result of PM voting.
I also find support for the theory by examining the SF-ratio, the ratio of vote-shares
between the third and second largest parties. These ratios turn out to be statistically distinguishable from other vote-share ratios between consecutive parties, and are correlated
with the competitiveness of the largest party, as theory would expect.
Background
This is not a first attempt to examine prospective voting in proportional representation (PR) systems. Downs (1957) suggests that coalitions, frequently established after
elections in these settings, turn prospective voting in PR systems to a complicated task
compared to prospective voting in majoritarian systems. The information and calculation requirements imposed by these systems “put continuous pressure on voters to be
irrational, i.e., to cease regarding elections as direct government-selection mechanisms”
(Downs, 1957, p. 154). Voters, therefore, vote for the party most proximate to them,
implying they use elections as instruments to create representative government (Powell,
2000). Armstrong and Duch (2010), however, suggest that a small number of prime ministerial parties over time, a relatively small number of parties participating in coalitions,
and relatively stable coalition compositions over time, allow voters to anticipate which
coalitions are probable and vote according to the coalitions they prefer.
3
Gschwend (2007) and Shikano, Herrmann and Thurner (2009) provide evidence from
the German context in which voters voted for a smaller, less preferred, potential coalition
partner to increase its chances of passing the electoral threshold (coined as the coalition/threshold insurance strategy). Bargsted and Kedar (2009) examine Israeli data and
suggest that voters tend to choose the party they prefer the most in the coalition they
expect will prevail. Meffert and Gschwend (2010) also find evidence that electoral expectations and coalition preferences play a role in individual decision using the Austrian
2006 election study. Duch, May and Armstrong (2010) suggest that voters consider all
the coalitions each party might join, and minimize the expected distance between their
ideological position and the policy position of these coalitions.
Kedar (2005) points to a different distinctions between majoritarian and power-sharing
systems. The author suggests that in cases where voters expect power-sharing institutions, like coalition governments, will prevail, they anticipate party ideology would be
watered-down by these institutions, and therefore vote for a party more extreme than
they are. Cho (2012) suggests that voters anticipate compromises parties will have to
make when negotiating policy. Relatively moderate voters can therefore vote for an extreme party, if these extreme party’s compromised policy position is ideologically closer
to them than their first choice party.
The incentives to vote directly for PM
While PR systems, and the large number of parties they tend to create provide a good
reason to believe more voters will vote proximally, or to their most preferred party, when
compared to majoritarian systems, Abramson et al. (2010) and Kedar (2012) present evidence contradicting this expectation. Given the complexity involved in coalition-directed
voting, the secondary consideration it may constitute, and therefore the small number
of voters that are estimated to take part in this kind of voting, I suggest there might be
4
some other explanation for why many voters deviate from the party most proximate to
them. This consideration has to be simple enough for voters to follow, and influential
enough on policy outcomes to make it worthwhile to deviate from the ideologically most
preferred party. This consideration, I suggest, is which party will construct and head the
next government.
A vote directed at the PM seems simpler than coalition-directed theories. It saves
the voter from considering all possible coalitions, which might entail a large number of
coalitions, even under the assumption that the coalition is expected to consist an effective
number of coalition parties between 3-4, as found by Armstrong and Duch (2010). The
partisan composition of the coalition is also not the only variable influencing the eventual
policy outcome. The distribution of portfolios and control of parliamentary committees
between coalition members, and the voting discipline enforced in the coalition when voting
on the different policies in parliament might significantly change the policy outcome as
well.
The PM’s influence on policy is done both directly and indirectly. Directly, it is often
found by expert surveys, or simply assumed, that the PM is by far the most influential
policy-maker in the government (e.g., Warwick and Druckman, 2001; Druckman and
Warwick, 2005; Ansolabehere et al., 2005).
Indirectly, the future PM almost always leads the coalition-formation negotiations as
the formateur (Diermeier and Merlo, 2004; Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2011). She is
largely responsible for the partisan composition, and for the distribution of policy-making
responsibilities between the parties in the coalition, and therefore, is largely responsible
for the construction of the structure determining policy outcomes. Furthermore, voters
seem to be aware of the large influence PMs have on policy-outcomes and attribute
responsibility accordingly (Duch and Stevenson, 2008).
5
If voters indeed try to influence who the PM will be they must have some idea how
their vote influences the selection of the PM. Next, I examine the selection process of
PMs and analyze how a voter would try to influence who the PM is going to be.
The voters’ possible influence on PM selection
The coalition construction process is similar in most parliamentary democracies. An
appointer (usually, the head of state) initiates the process by designating a formateur.1
Before appointing a formateur, the appointer sometimes consults with the heads of the
parties (Bäck and Dumont, 2008), or appoints an informateur – usually a senior politician
with no direct stake in the government formation process, who identifies among the parties
an individual who is most likely to form a government successfully (Laver and Shepsle,
1996).
The appointer may have varying degrees of discretion in the formateur appointment
process. Laws, as exist in Greece for example, may dictate that the first formateur would
come from the largest legislative party (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Bäck and Dumont,
2008). Even in the absence of such a law, previous analyses suggest that larger parties
have a higher probability of heading the government, and that the largest party has a
particularly higher probability of heading the government (Warwick, 1996; Kang, 2009;
Mattila and Raunio, 2004; Isaksson, 2005; Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2011). It is
often assumed that the head of state does not make the formateur appointment based
on partisan politics (especially in cases where the appointer is a monarch or appoints an
informatuer).2
1
In Western Europe a notable exception is Sweden, where the Speaker of Parliament nominates the
formateur (De Winter, 1995).
2
A notable exception is Kang (2009), who finds that in some cases, European presidents have induced
their preferred governments.
6
Voters might try to influence who the PM will be both when a strong norm or a rule
dictate that the largest party receives the first formateurship, and when the formateurship
is a result of negotiations between the parties and between the appointer. In the first case,
voters have a strong incentive to support a party they suspect has a higher probability of
being largest, even if that party is not closest to them. Imagine the situation presented
in Figure 1. The figure shows a left-wing voter (v), her four neighboring (A − D) parties,
and each party’s expected vote-share. Close to her left is Party A, a relatively small
party, that though might participate in the coalition, the voter does not believe will have
a large seat-share, and will probably have a low probability of becoming PM. Further to
her right, Party B, an expected large party that is expected to be in close competition
with Party C, further yet to the voter’s right, over the status of the largest legislative
party.
A
5%
v
B
30%
C
30%
D
5%
Figure 1: A voter and some of the parties in the party-system, accompanied by expected
vote-shares
The voter expects the largest party will lead the future coalition government. Voting
for Party A, the voter expects, will increase its legislative power. If the party enters
the coalition it might secure a more influential ministry than it would have otherwise.
Alternatively, voting for Party B might increase its probability of being the largest party,
and therefore it might very well head the next government. As mentioned, Party B
heading the next government instead of Party C may benefit this voter in two senses.
It might increase the probability Party A would even be part of the coalition, and it is
preferred since the PM, a prominent policy-maker, would then represent a party which
is closer to this voter’s ideal position.
7
Voters have an incentive to vote for a party they think has a higher probability of
leading the government even if they are aware of the negotiation nuances of government
construction. In this second scenario the voter is aware of negotiations that are held
between the head of state, appointing the formateur, and between the heads of the parties
regarding who the appointer should ask to form the government. Given the expected small
size of Party A, and the fact it is more extreme than the two large parties, the voter does
not expect it to form the next government. On the one hand, the voter can have her cake
and eat it too. If she votes for Party A, and Party A recommends that Party B forms the
government, the voter can both increase Party A’s electoral power and not necessarily
decrease Party B’s probability of heading the government. The voter is playing a risky
strategy, however. There is a chance that Party A might not recommend that Party B
forms the government. It might use this opportunity for position-taking and differentiate
itself from Party B, arguing Party B is too moderate, and prefer to recommend itself to
the appointer, a third party, or none of the parties.
A third scenario is also possible. The voter might expect that regardless of who
heads the coalition, parties A, B, and C are all expected to participate in it. She might
expect, however, that due to a strong norm or law, or as a result of negotiations, the
larger party between B and C would head the government. The voter then considers two
possible actions and the counterfactuals. By voting for Party A the voter, as mentioned,
expects to increase its electoral power, which might assist it to secure a more influential
ministry than it would have otherwise. By voting for Party B, however, the voter might
increase its electoral power and increase its probability of heading the government. These
two possible actions, however, contribute a different amount to each party’s influence on
policy. Voting for Party A might increase its influence on policy less than voting for Party
B would increase its influence on policy. Even though the voter is “paying a price” for
voting for a party that is further away from her than Party A is, she might consider this
8
choice better since the expected policy outcome might be closer when voting for Party B
rather than Party A, because of this increased influence on policy.
Identification strategy
If some voters vote with the PM selection in mind, a majoritarian competition underlies
the proportional rules of the electoral system. This underlying majoritarian competition
incentivizes the voters to vote for parties they expect have a higher probability of heading
the government. As mentioned, the largest party has a higher probability of heading
the government. Therefore, if voters vote with the intention to influence PM selection,
a plurality competition over an indivisible good arises. This competition is similar in
nature to the election of MP’s under a first-past-the-post system.
First-past-the-post elections attract much attention from the strategic voting literature. Duverger (1963) suggests what has been coined by Riker (1982) as Duverger’s law
and hypothesis: the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system,
whereas the simple-majority system with second ballot and PR favor multi-partyism.
Both regularities have been based on the fact that voters and political entrepreneurs
would avoid wasting their resources on sure winners and sure losers, and have been examined thoroughly, theoretically and empirically (e.g., Duverger, 1963; Rae, 1967; Sartori,
1976; Lijphart, 1995; Riker, 1982; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Palfrey, 1989; Cox, 1994,
1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder,
2006).
The same logic that underlies Duverger’s law applies to this situation also. If all
voters voted only with the intention to influence who the PM will be, and all voters assumed that the party receiving most votes will head the government, voters and political
entrepreneurs would avoid wasting their resources on sure winners and sure losers. Successful coordination of political entrepreneurs and voters will lead to two viable parties.
9
Of course, different voters have different intentions. In a PR system, where multiple
parties are expected to enter a governing coalition, and where opposition parties get a
voice in policymaking through parliament, voters are not all expected to vote in order
to influence which party will head the government. Moreover, as opposed to electing an
MP using a first-past-the-post election, PMs are not always members of the largest party
in the legislature. The expectation, therefore, should be relaxed. Instead of two viable
parties in which all voters are expected to concentrate, the expectation should be that
two large parties arise in most elections, and that these two parties attract considerably
more votes than the other parties.
The number of top-tier parties
For this purpose the effective number of parties, the measure used in most literature examining Duverger’s law and hypothesis, will not fit. Table 1 provides several hypothetical
vote-distributions and their corresponding effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)
index, which exemplify where this measure might mislead.
Profile
a
b
c
d
e
f
Division of
50 50
70 5 5
40 30 8
45 40 2
30 28 26
25 23 10
votes between parties (%)
5 5 5 5
5 5 5 3 3 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
8 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
ENEP
2.00
1.98
3.76
2.74
4.18
6.81
Table 1: Values of ENPP for several hypothetical cases
There are different ways to divide the profiles in Table 1. Previous typologies (e.g.,
Duverger, 1963; Dahl, 1990; Blondel, 1968; Rokkan, 1968; Sartori, 1976; Siaroff, 2000)
suggest that Profile a is a two-party system, Profile b is a predominant party system, and
10
Profiles c-f are multiparty systems to different extents (moderate multiparty systems,
extreme multiparty systems, two-and-a-half party systems, etc.). I suggest grouping these
profiles by the number of strongest parties which are relatively close in their electoral
power – the number of “top-tier” parties. Profiles a, c, d, and f might be all considered
profiles where there are two top-tier parties; in Profile b, a single top-tier party seems to
emerge; and in Profile e, there seem to be three top-tier parties.
Though there might be two top-tier parties in Profiles a, c, d, and f , the ENEP for
these profiles ranges between 2.00 and 6.81. Moreover, there is no way to tell by the
ENEP measure in what way Profile b (one top-tier parties) differs from Profile a (two
top-tier parties). There is also no obvious way to identify that in Profile e three parties
share very similar electoral strength, as opposed to Profiles d, and f , in which only two
parties are distinct from the rest in their electoral share. In order to count the number
of top-tier parties there is a need for a different measure.
Operationalizing the number of top-tier parties
To operationalize this idea, imagine parties 1, . . . , n are sorted in descending order according to their vote-share, and let Vi be the vote-share of party i, therefore Vi−1 ≥ Vi for
all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The ranking of parties by vote-share implies that 0 ≤
Vi
Vi−1
≤ 1.
Vi
Vi−1
will be
close to 1 if party i does not fall far behind party i−1 in their respective vote-shares. The
same fraction will be close to 0 if party i falls far behind party i − 1 in their respective
vote-shares.
Since the parties are ordered by size, and the tiers divide parties by their size, a
certain tier of parties will necessarily include consecutive parties. One tier would end,
and a new one would begin once
Vi
Vi−1
is relatively small, and therefore parties i and i − 1
are relatively dissimilar in their electoral strength. Therefore, when parties 1, . . . , n are
sorted in decreasing electoral strength, the top tier would end and the second one would
11
begin for the minimal i such that
Vi
Vi−1
is relatively small. What “relatively small” means
in this context is based on our expectations regarding the dissimilarity between parties
that are members of separate tiers, and can be defined as any ratio that is less than, or
equal to, a certain cutoff point – r.
Choosing an appropriate value for r
Setting r close to 1 implies that small differences in electoral power between two consecutive parties would entail separating the parties into different tiers. Therefore, if r
is set to a number that is “too large,” the danger is that it will separate into different
tiers parties that are actually relatively similar. Setting r close to 0 implies that only
big differences in electoral power between two consecutive parties would entail separating
the parties into different tiers. Therefore, if r is set to a number that is “too small,” the
danger is that the separation into tiers will not be fine enough, and a tier might include
parties that are very dissimilar in their electoral strength.
Table 2 offers examples of how different levels of r translate to the minimal difference
in electoral strength of two consecutive parties which are separated into two different
tiers. For r = 0.7, for example, a party winning 20% of the votes will be in a lower tier
if the larger party closest to it in vote-share won at least 28.6% of the votes.
12
r
Vi (%)
5.0
9.0
10.0
20.0
28.5
33.3
37.5
41.1
42.8
44.4
47.3
0.1
0.4
50.0
90.0
12.5
22.5
25.0
50.0
71.3
0.5
0.6 0.7
Vi−1 (%)
10.0 8.3 7.1
18.0 15.0 12.9
20.0 16.7 14.3
40.0 33.3 28.6
57.0 47.5 40.7
66.6 55.5 47.6
62.5 53.6
58.7
0.8
0.9
6.3
11.3
12.5
25.0
35.6
41.6
46.9
51.4
53.5
55.5
5.6
10.0
11.1
22.2
31.7
37.0
41.7
45.7
47.6
49.3
52.6
Table 2: Examples of most similar pairs of parties which are still in two separate tiers,
as a function of different threshold levels
By examining Table 2 it seems that some levels of r are not suitable for this purpose.
r = 0.1 and r = 0.4 would imply that consecutive parties have to be very dissimilar in
electoral strength before being considered in two separate tiers. If parties have to be at
least as dissimilar as the 10% and 25%, or as the 20% and the 50% pairs exemplify, we
might miss smaller differences in electoral power that would be interesting to examine.
r = 0.9, on the other hand, would imply that two consecutive parties of 33.3% and 37%,
or 20% and 22.2% would be separated to two different tiers. These pairs seem to be too
similar in electoral strength, and this separation into electoral tiers seems to be somewhat
artificial.
Table 3 exemplifies how different levels of r influence the number of top-tier parties
of the theoretical electoral profiles presented in Table 1. As expected, r = 0.1 fits the
intuitive meaning of top-tier only in very particular distributions where the parties’ electoral strength in the two tiers is very dissimilar (namely, Profiles a, b, and d). r = 0.4
identifies the smaller dissimilarities in Profiles c and e, but is not fine enough for the
smaller dissimilarities of Profile f , which is identified by r = 0.5.
13
Profile
a
b
c
d
e
f
Division of
50 50
70 5 5
40 30 8
45 40 2
30 28 26
25 23 10
votes between parties (%)
5 5 5 5
5 5 5 3 3 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
8 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
0.1 0.4 0.5
2
2
2
1
1
1
9
2
2
2
2
2
11
3
3
11 11
2
r
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
Table 3: Number of top-tier parties in electoral strength distributions of Table 1
Higher values of r, on the other hand, sometimes identify changes in party tiers where
intuition might suggest the differences are too small. r = 0.9 suggests that Profile d has
a single top-tier party though intuition might group the first two parties in the same tier,
and even the lower level of r = 0.8 suggests a break in the tiers between the two top
parties of Profile c. It therefore seems that while choosing r is somewhat arbitrary, wide
ranges of the possible values for r can be ignored as making little sense in this context
and with the motivations presented above. In order to increase our sense of security in
the findings, I suggest here to examine a relatively wide range of values for r, between
0.5 and 0.8.
The number of top-tier parties in election results
Using this definition to determine the number of top-tier parties, I examine parliamentary
elections data from the ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow, 2010).3 The ParlGov
database includes all EU member states and most of the OECD members, and at least
all elections in the post-war period. All parties that have won seats in parliament in the
3
I use the latest stable version of the dataset, downloaded on July 7, 2013. The vote-share of the
CDU and CSU parties in Germany was combined for the purposes of this analysis since these parties
regularly cooperate once in parliament, and do not compete in the same electoral districts. The results
presented also mostly hold when I combine the electoral power of pre-electoral coalitions, as coded by
Golder (2006). Though the prominence of elections resulting in two parties in the top-tier are less
pronounced, the main conclusions hold.
14
election have been coded, and in some countries and most recent elections, all parties
that have won more than 1.0% of the votes were included in the data. The 546 elections
included in this analysis are listed in Appendix A.
Figure 2 describes the distribution of the number of top-tier parties in all elections
examined as a function of r, the standard chosen to distinguish between two tiers of
parties. I code an election as having 0 top-tier parties if none of the
Vi
Vi−1
ratios in a
particular election is less than or equal to r.4 The distributions show that from the
elections examined, at least 55% have either one or two top-tier parties. As expected,
lower values of r require a greater distinction between parties, and therefore have a greater
number of elections with no top-tier parties (coded as 0). Greater values of r, on the
other hand, require a smaller distinction between two consecutive parties, and therefore
have a higher number of elections with a single top-tier party. As expected, for most
levels of r examined, the number of elections resulting in two top-tier parties exceeds the
number of elections resulting in a single top-tier party and is the modal category. This
last finding stands out against the general tendency of fewer cases the larger the number
of top-tier parties becomes.
4
The figure includes cases with 0-8 top tier parties. None of the other categories include more than
1% of the cases.
15
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
50%
% of observations
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 2: The number of top-tier parties in all elections examined as a function of r. (N
= 546)
Country level analysis
Next, I repeat this analysis for the separate countries. Appendix B presents four sets of
distributions of the number of top-tier parties by country by the four different values of r
examined here.5 Table 4 summarizes these results by presenting the number of countries
(and their percent of the 35 countries) in which, of the elections examined, there is a
majority of cases in the top two categories, i.e., the number of countries in which more
than 50% of the elections had either one- or two top-tier parties. The table also presents
5
The distributions include cases with 0-8 top-tier parties.
16
the number of countries in which the number of elections with two top-tier parties exceeds
the number of elections with a single top-tier party.
r
Countries with majority of elections with
one or two top-tier parties
Countries with more elections of two
top-tier parties than one top-tier party
0.5
22
(63%)
23
(66%)
0.6
28
(80%)
22
(63%)
0.7
32
(91%)
19
(54%)
0.8
34
(97%)
13
(37%)
Table 4: Summary of country-level analysis of the number of top-tier parties, as a function
of r.
This analysis provides evidence for two basic claims. First, a majority of the elections
across a big majority of the countries (and across the different values of r examined),
result in either a single, or two top-tier parties. Though, as expected, increasing r results
in more elections with fewer top-tier parties, and therefore with more countries with a
majority of elections with a single or two top-tier parties, even for the lowest levels of r
in the range examined here there is a majority of countries where these two categories
are prominent. Second, and at least as interestingly, in many countries the number of
elections with two top-tier parties exceeds the number of elections with a single top-tier
party. Though this result is more prominent for lower levels of r, even for r = 0.8 in
more than a third of the countries there are more elections with two top-tier parties
than elections with a single top-tier party. These two findings suggest that across many
countries, voters tend to concentrate in a small number of parties (often in two).
17
The influence of the strength of the electoral system, and social
diversity
To test whether voters possibly converge to two top-tier parties as a result of PM voting
I need to focus on polities with a weak electoral system and a heterogeneous social background. Polities with strong electoral system or homogeneous societies provide other incentives to converge to fewer parties. Though these incentives have been mostly grounded
in the electoral district, whereas the analysis here is nation-wide, Chhibber and Kollman
(1998, 2004) provide conditions under which Duverger’s law and hypothesis could apply
in the national level also.
I use the Bormann and Golder (2013) and the Clark and Golder (2006) data to code
several parameters regarding the electoral system, and I use the ethnic fragmentation
variable Clark and Golder (2006) use, taken from Fearon (2003), to code ethnic heterogeneity. Figure 3 examines the distribution of the number of top-tier parties in vote-share
as a function of the electoral system as Bormann and Golder (2013) code it, and as a
function of r.
18
Majoritarian
Mixed
Proportional
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 3: The number of top-tier parties by electoral system, as a function of r
The figure shows that even in the subsets of elections conducted under mixed or
proportional rules many elections result with one or two top-tier parties. Moreover, the
number of elections resulting in two top-tier parties exceeds the number of elections
resulting in a single top-tier party across the three lower levels of r, and across the three
types of electoral systems. Though elections resulting with two top-tier parties are less
frequent under proportional rules compared to mixed and majoritarian rules, they still
constitute a modal category in all levels of r in which they constitute a modal category
under mixed and majoritarian rules.
19
In a similar vein, I examine the elections according to the average district magnitude
in the lowest tier, and according to the existence of an upper tier.6 Larger average district
magnitudes, and the existence of an upper tier of seats allow for a weaker electoral system,
and less strategic voting aimed at the distribution of seats in parliament, as opposed to
strategic voting aimed at the nomination of the PM. Figure 4 plots the distributions by
district magnitude, and Figure 5 plots the distributions by the existence of an upper tier
of seats.
DM = 1
1 < DM <= 6.6
6.6 < DM <= 10.66
DM > 10.66
80%
60%
0.5
40%
20%
0%
80%
60%
0.6
% of observations
40%
20%
0%
80%
60%
0.7
40%
20%
0%
80%
60%
0.8
40%
20%
0%
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 4: The number of top-tier parties by district magnitude and as a function of r
6
To enable this sort of analysis, I examine the average district magnitude of the lowest tier according
to four groups, defined by the distribution of cases, as follows: DM = 1; 1 < DM ≤ 6.6; 6.6 < DM ≤
10.66; and DM > 10.66, where DM is the average district magnitude in the lowest tier.
20
No seats distributed in upper tier
Seats distributed in upper tier
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 5: The number of top-tier parties by the existence of an upper tier, and as a
function of r
The distributions show that consistently across most district magnitudes, across systems that distribute seats in an upper-tier and systems that do not, and across most
values of r, the top two categories – elections resulting in a single top-tier party, and
elections resulting with two top-tier parties – are the dominant categories. Moreover, for
the two lower values of r, elections resulting in two top-tier parties are more common
than elections resulting in a single top-tier party across all categories of electoral systems
examined.
21
To examine the effects of ethnic diversity, I examine the ethnic fragmentation variable
from Fearon (2003), as provided by Clark and Golder (2006).7 Figure 6 shows that ethnic
diversity does not provide much further information.
ENEG <= 1.108
1.108 < ENEG <= 1.206
1.206 < ENEG <= 1.510
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENEG > 1.510
60%
0.5
40%
20%
0%
60%
% of observations
0.6
40%
20%
0%
60%
0.7
40%
20%
0%
60%
0.8
40%
20%
0%
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 6: The number of top-tier parties by ethnic fragmentation
Even across very heterogeneous societies, across the four levels of r there is a majority
of elections resulting with either a single or two top-tier parties. Additionally, in the two
lower values of r elections with two top-tier parties are more prominent than elections
with a single top-tier party, throughout the four ethnic fragmentation categories.
7
Again, to enable this sort of analysis, I examine the average district magnitude according to four
groups, defined by the distribution of cases, as follows: ENEG ≤ 1.108; 1.108 < ENEG ≤ 1.206;
1.206 < ENEG ≤ 1.510; and ENEG > 1.510, where ENEG is the effective number of ethnic groups in
the country at the time of the election.
22
Next, I examine the interaction of ethnic diversity and the strength of the electoral
systems. Since the previous literature examining this interaction has largely determined
that fragmentation of the party-system increases when both the electoral system is weak
enough and ethnic diversity is large enough (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and
Golder, 2006), I examine this interaction by dividing the population into two groups. In
the first group, proportional systems with the most ethnic diversity (ENEG > 1.510),
and in second group, the mixed and majoritarian systems, or elections held in less diverse
societies (ENEG ≤ 1.510). Figure 7 describes the results of these subpopulations and
shows that the number of top-tier parties in elections conducted under proportional and
socially diverse settings is usually at most three, and that two is the modal category for
two of the four levels of r. This prominence of elections resulting in two top-tier parties
only grows with the inclusion of the mixed systems with the proportional ones, as Figure
8 shows.
23
Majoritarian or mixed or homogenous
Proportional and diverse
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 7: The number of top-tier parties by electoral system and ethnic fragmentation
24
Majoritarian or homogenous
Proportional/mixed and diverse
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 8: The number of top-tier parties by electoral system and ethnic fragmentation
Though elections with two top-tier parties occur more frequently under a strong electoral system, within homogeneous societies, or when r, the standard chosen to distinguish
between two tiers of parties, is relatively low, even under weak electoral systems, within
heterogeneous societies, and higher levels of r elections generally result with few toptier parties, at most three. Moreover, it seems that two top-tier parties appear as a
modal category under proportional and heterogeneous systems as frequently as it does
under majoritarian or homogeneous systems. Next, I turn to a competing explanation
for the distribution of elections across different values of top-tier parties: the ideological
distribution of voters and parties.
25
The ideological distribution of parties and voters
One possible explanation for the concentration of voters in relatively few parties, with
many elections resulting in two top-tier parties, has nothing to do with PM voting. This
explanation involves the ideological distribution of voters and parties. Voters might be
voting completely proximally, but the distribution of their preferences and the ideological
distribution of parties might often match with the observed pattern – few parties that are
proximate to many of the voters. Theoretically, this explanation might be problematic.
If voters do not all share the exact ideological location of the few parties in the top-tier,
and if voters are willing to change their political allegiances from one election to another,
then under proximal voting some politicians and parties would benefit from creating
new parties that are closer to some of the voters, thus decreasing the prominence of a
previously large parties.
Empirically, I assess how plausible this explanation is by examining data from the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The three CSES waves contain election
studies from 91 elections in democratic settings, as identified by Bormann and Golder
(2013), where the voters were asked their ideological position on a left-right scale, and
their vote intention to the lower house of the parliament. First, I use a left-right placement
provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). An advantage of using the CMP
placements of the parties is that they are strictly exogenous, while other methods (e.g.,
placement by the voter) might be endogenous to the vote choice. Using the CMP data
leaves me with 72 election studies, enumerated in Appendix C. To map between the
0-10 scale provided by the CSES studies, and the (-100)-100 scale provided by the CMP
mapping, I apply the multilevel model suggested by Duch, May and Armstrong (2010).
For this mapping, the authors calculate the mean self placement of the voters for party i
in election t, selfit , and find the CMP placement for the same party in the same election,
manit . The authors then estimate the following model:
26
selfit = αi + βi manit + it
αi = δ00 + νi1
βi = δ10 + νi2
where the νi are bivariate normal.
By applying the linear transformation, the estimated ideological party placements,
produced by the fitted values, are a linear transformation of the original party placements,
thus preserving the relative distance between the parties in each election. The additional
ν error terms, however, allow for a varying intercept and slope between the parties,
acknowledging that different parties might map differently to their electorate.
I examine the expected vote-share, determined by the distribution of vote-intentions,
across the parties. This expected vote-share is then compared to the proximal vote-share,
determined by the vote-share each party would have received had all voters voted for the
party closest to them on the left-right scale.8
Across the 72 election studies examined here, only some 35.8% of the respondents,
on average, reported they intend to vote for the party most proximate to them. When I
compare the expected vote-shares parties received with the hypothetical proximal voteshare they would have received, it turns out that across all parties the mean change in
vote-share is 12.1% of the votes. The distribution in this change in vote-share is provided
in Figure 9.
8
Ties between two parties equally proximal to a voter, if existed, were broken at random.
27
120
Number of observations
90
60
30
0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Difference in vote−share
Figure 9: Absolute difference in vote-share between expected vote and proximal vote
Next, I compare two distributions of the number of top-tier parties: the number of
top-tier parties created by the expected vote-share of each party in each election-study,
and the number of top-tier parties created by the proximal vote-share of each party in
each election study. Figure 10 presents these distributions across the different levels of r
examined here. The figure shows that the percentage of election-studies in which there
is no separation of parties into tiers (i.e., the number of top-tier parties is coded as zero)
is larger under proximal voting compared to the expected vote. In other words, under
proximal voting the number of election-studies in which all parties participating in the
election receive a similar vote-share is larger. This increase is, averaged across the four
levels of r, of 5.6% of the election-studies examined.
28
Expected
Proximal
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 10: The number of top-tier parties under the expected vote-share, and under the
vote-share created by proximal voting, as a function of r.
Moreover, the number of top-tier parties is clearly greater under proximal voting than
under the expected vote-share the parties achieved. I calculate the average number of
top-tier parties under proximal voting and under the expected vote.9 Across all levels of
r examined here there is an increase in this number, as presented in Table 5.
Lastly, the prominence of elections with two top-tier parties that is observed under
the expected vote-share completely vanishes in the proximal vote-share. If anything,
there seems to be a slight prominence of elections with three top-tier parties under prox9
For this analysis the number of elections with zero top-tier parties was omitted.
29
imal voting, a result that was found only occasionally in the examination of real-world
elections.
Elections
All election
studies coded as
“democratic”
Election studies
held under
proportional
rules
r
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Average number of top-tier parties in:
Proximal vote-share Expected vote-share
4.2
2.4
3.7
2.4
2.8
1.8
1.9
1.5
4.3
2.6
3.8
2.5
2.7
1.9
1.8
1.5
Difference in averages
1.8
1.3
1.0
0.4
1.7
1.3
0.8
0.3
Table 5: Average number of top-tier parties under expected voting, and under proximal
voting.
When I restrict the analysis to the 50 election studies in systems coded by Bormann
and Golder (2013) as proportional, some 34.1% of the respondents, on average across
election studies, end up voting for the party coded most proximate to them. This statistic
corroborates previous studies showing that non-proximal voting is as common in weak
electoral systems as it is in strong ones (Abramson et al., 2010; Kedar, 2012). The mean
change in the parties’ vote-share between expected vote-share and proximal vote-share
stands at 11.5% of the vote. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the number of top-tier
parties across these elections under both the expected vote-share, and the proximal-vote
share. Again, any sign of the prominence of elections with two top-tier parties that
presents under the expected voting distribution disappears under proximal voting. As
the second panel in Table 5 shows, the number of top-tier parties, on average, is larger
under proximal voting when compared to the expected vote, also in election studies held
under proportional rules.
30
Expected
Proximal
60%
40%
0.5
20%
0%
60%
40%
% of observations
0.6
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.7
20%
0%
60%
40%
0.8
20%
0%
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 11: The number of top-tier parties under the expected vote-share, and under the
vote-share created by proximal voting, as a function of r, for election-studies held under
proportional rules.
These results are robust to the method by which the ideological placements of the
parties are determined. Examining a larger set of election studies (99 studies conducted
under democratic elections, and 61 studies conducted under democratic elections and
proportional rules), I examine the subjective ideological placements of the parties by
each of the respondents. Then, I repeat the process of examining the distribution of
the number of top-tier parties according to the expected vote-shares the parties receive,
and according to the proximal vote-shares the parties would have received had everyone
voted to the party most proximate to them (according to their own placement of the
parties). Both when examining all election studies held under democratic rule, and when
31
examining only the election studies where voting was held under proportional rules, the
number of top-tier parties generally increases under proximal voting when compared to
the expected vote-share. This finding is supported by the larger number of elections with
no division into tiers (coded as 0 top-tier parties) under proximal voting, by the smaller
number of elections resulting in two top-tier parties under proximal voting, and by the
larger average number of top-tier parties under proximal voting.
In sum, when I examine proximal voting the number of top-tier parties generally
seems to increase when compared to survey-based expected voting. It therefore seems
that the large number of elections in which there are few top-tier parties is not generally
explained by proximal voting and by the ideological distribution of voters and parties. In
other words, the analysis here suggests that the prominence of elections resulting with
few top-tier parties may be explained by voters who vote for parties that are not most
proximate to them.
Examination of the SF-ratio
To detect strategic voting in first-past-the-post systems, Cox (1997) examines the SFratio – the ratio between the vote-share of the second loser and the first loser. In simple
plurality rules, if certain informational assumptions hold within the electorate, Cox shows
there exist two equilibria classes. In Duvergerian equilibria voters are able to coordinate
on which two candidates they perceive as more prominent in the system, resulting in
only these two candidates receiving votes. In non-Duvergerian equilibria “two or more
runners-up, whose nearly identical expected vote totals prevent any being winnowed out
from the field of viable candidates” receive a positive number of votes (Cox, 1997, p. 75).
These two equilibria classes imply that if Vi is the vote-share received by party i, and
the parties are ordered in descending vote-share, then
32
V3
V2
should be either very close to
one, in the case of a non-Duvergerian equilibrium, or very close to zero, in the case of a
Duvergerian equilibrium.
Similarly, if voting for the head of government is prominent in an electorate, and if
voters behave as if the head of government is elected by plurality rules, the same two
classes of equilibria will exist when examining the nation-wide popular vote. If many
voters vote with the intention of influencing the head of government as discussed, and are
successful in coordinating who the prominent candidates are,
V3
V2
should be close to zero.
Alternatively, if voters do not coordinate successfully on the two prominent candidates,
V3
V2
should be close to one.
The incentive I suggest here, to vote for one of the two largest parties in order to
influence who the PM will be, is influenced by how competitive the position of the largest
party is. In elections in which voters have a strong sense that the largest party leads over
the other parties with a large margin the incentive to vote for the second largest party in
order to compete over the status of the largest party is small, since the voters know that
the largest party leads with a large margin. On the other hand, in elections in which the
two largest parties are in close competition, the incentive to vote for the second largest
party in order to influence this competition is much greater.
To operationalize and measure competitiveness I use the ratio of votes between the
second-ranked and first-ranked parties,
V2
.
V1
When this ratio is close to zero, the top two
parties are far apart, and voters should have little incentive to vote for the second-largest
party. Conversely, when the ratio is close to one, the top two parties are close together,
and the incentive to vote for the second largest party is greater.
To examine this possibility, I use all elections in the dataset which were coded by
Bormann and Golder (2013) as conducted under proportional and mixed rules, and in
parliamentary or semi-presidential regimes. Figure 12 compares SF-ratios to all other
ratios between two consecutive parties, as a function of the competitiveness over the
33
position of the largest party (i.e., as a function of
V2 10
).
V1
The top panels display histograms
of non-SF-ratios. These histograms do not change as a function of the competitiveness of
the system, and generally include a unimodal distribution with a mode close to one. In
other words, parties tend to be distributed close to one another in their vote-share. The
bottom panels, on the other hand, provide completely different distributions. Though
there seems to be no clear mode in the non-competitive elections (the bottom left panel),
a mode close to zero, and a lower prominent value, around 0.8-0.9 seem to come out in
the competitive elections.
0
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9
100%
75%
non−SF
50%
% of observations
25%
0%
100%
75%
SF
50%
25%
0%
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
Ratio
Figure 12: SF-ratio and non-SF-ratios in proportional and mixed systems, under semipresidential and parliamentary systems, as a function of the competitiveness of the first
party’s place.
10
not
“All other ratios” in this context relates to the other ratios between consecutive parties that are
the SF-ratio, or VV12 , which is used to determine the competitiveness of the election.
V3
V2 ,
34
Model 1
0.69∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.13∗∗∗
(0.01)
(Intercept)
SF-ratio
Model 2
0.69∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.20∗∗∗
(0.02)
SF-ratio × Comp
Comp
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
*** p
< 0.001,
** p
0.03
0.03
2378
0.05
0.05
2378
Model 3
0.71∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.30∗∗∗
(0.06)
−0.56∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.04
(0.03)
0.07
0.06
2037
< 0.01, * p < 0.05
Table 6: Regression analyses; dependent variable: size of ratio between consecutive parties’ vote shares
Table 6 presents the results of regression analyses of the same data. The first model
compares the means of the SF-ratio with the general average of all consecutive parties’
vote-share ratio. It shows that even when the competitiveness of the first party’s position
is not taken into account, the average of the SF-ratio is generally lower, as expected if we
assume that voters are generally successful in coordinating over the top two parties.11
Model 2 takes into account the competitiveness of the election and tests the assumption that under more competitive elections the SF-ratio is even smaller. The negative
coefficient on the interaction term between the SF-ratio and the competitiveness of the
elections provides evidence supporting this hypothesis: the more competitive the first
party’s position in an election, the lower the SF-ratio is compared to all other ratios
between consecutive parties. Competitive elections, in other words, generally increase
the separation between the third party’s vote-share and the second party’s vote-share in
that election, as expected in Duvergerian equilibria.
11
Fey (1997) finds that non-Duvergerian equilibria turn out to be unstable in the presence of opinion
polls, and therefore are not expected outcomes in most real-world elections in countries examined here.
35
Model 3 is given for completeness and includes also the competitiveness variable and
the SF-ratio dummy as linear terms in the regression. The estimates provided by this
model suggest that while low levels of competitiveness are associated with levels of SFratios that are higher than the average ratio between two consecutive parties, higher
levels of competitiveness are associated with levels of SF-ratios that are lower than the
average ratio between two consecutive parties. Figure 13 presents how SF-ratios compare
to non-SF-ratios, as a function of different levels of competitiveness, according to the
estimates provided by Model 3.
SF effect
0.2
0.0
−0.2
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Competitiveness
Figure 13: Difference between SF-ratio and non-SF-ratio, and 95% confidence interval,
as a function of competitiveness, as estimated by Model 3.
This figure shows that for low levels of competitiveness (empirically, the minimal value
of this variable is just over 0.1) SF-ratios are higher by up to 0.2 compared to non-SF-
36
ratios, and are therefore closer to 1. In these situations, the large difference between the
first and second largest parties reduces the incentive to try and influence which party will
be the largest. As a result, the difference between the second and third largest parties in
their vote-share reduces, creating a larger-than-average ratio.
On the other hand, when the competitiveness over the largest party is great, SF-ratios
are lower by more than 0.2 compared to non-SF-ratios, and are therefore closer to 0. In
these situations voters have a stronger incentive to coordinate on the two largest parties.
Successful coordination creates a comparatively large difference between the second and
third parties, which manifests as a smaller-than-average ratio.
This analysis, therefore, supports the idea that voters in PR systems have similar
incentives to those of voters in majoritarian systems. In both types of systems voters
are drawn to coordinate and concentrate on the two largest parties in situations where
these parties are expected to have similar electoral strength. In majoritarian systems
the incentive is to prevent a less-preferred party from winning the electoral district. In
PR systems the incentive might be to prevent a less-preferred party from heading the
government.
Conclusion
Voters in PR systems face a taxing problem when they want to vote for policy outcomes.
The multiplicity of available parties does not only increase the number of comparisons the
voter needs to make when deciding which party to vote for, it often creates a multiplicity
of parties in parliament, and implies coalitions will govern. This additional power-sharing
mechanism can create policy outcomes which are hard to anticipate. Possible solutions
in the literature have usually entailed a complicated examination of all possible (or probable) coalitions, or a proximal vote, motivated by an interest in representation in the
negotiations over policy-outcomes.
37
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
I suggest in this paper some voters take an alternative path. By assuming the PM is
the most influential policy-maker in the system, both directly and indirectly as the coalition formateur, voters can focus their attention on parties that are viable candidates to
lead the government, and vote for the closest of those parties on an ideological continuum.
If it exists, this behavior implies that a majoritarian competition underlies even proportional rules in parliamentary systems. This majoritarian competition, in turn, would
suggest we should expect some convergence of voters to two large parties. To examine
this hypothesis, I develop a new characterization of election results – by the number of
top-tier parties. The examination of election results from different countries, applying
a variety of electoral systems, and with varying levels of social diversity, leads to the
conclusion that a majority of elections result in few top-tier parties. According to two of
the four versions of the measure I employ, elections resulting in two top-tier parties are
the modal category, a finding that reoccurs in nearly all subsets of the data I examine.
Proximity voting does not seem to explain away this phenomenon. If anything, there
is reason to believe that had all voters voted proximally, the number of top-tier parties
would generally increase. Lastly, when examining elections held under proportional rules,
the SF-ratio – the ratio of vote-share between the third largest and second largest parties
– is found to be statistically distinct from all other ratios between consecutive parties,
and decreases with the competitiveness of the largest party’s position, as expected.
A
Elections included in the analysis
• Australia: 1901-03-30; 1903-12-16; 1906-12-02; 1910-04-13; 1913-05-31; 1914-0905; 1917-05-05; 1919-12-13; 1922-12-16; 1925-11-14; 1928-11-17; 1929-10-12; 193112-19; 1934-09-15; 1937-10-23; 1940-09-21; 1943-08-21; 1946-09-28; 1949-12-10;
1951-04-28; 1954-05-29; 1955-12-10; 1958-11-22; 1961-12-09; 1963-11-30; 1966-1126; 1969-10-25; 1972-12-02; 1974-05-18; 1975-12-13; 1977-12-10; 1980-10-18; 198338
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
03-05; 1984-12-01; 1987-07-11; 1990-03-24; 1993-03-13; 1996-03-02; 1998-10-03;
2001-11-10; 2004-10-09; 2007-11-24; 2010-08-21;
• Austria: 1945-10-25; 1949-10-09; 1953-02-22; 1956-05-13; 1959-05-10; 1962-11-18;
1966-03-06; 1970-03-01; 1971-10-10; 1975-10-05; 1979-05-06; 1983-04-24; 1986-1123; 1990-10-07; 1994-10-09; 1995-12-17; 1999-10-03; 2002-11-24; 2006-10-01; 200809-28;
• Belgium: 1946-02-17; 1949-06-26; 1950-06-04; 1954-04-11; 1958-06-01; 1961-03-26;
1965-05-23; 1968-03-31; 1971-11-07; 1974-03-10; 1977-04-17; 1978-12-17; 1981-1108; 1985-10-13; 1987-12-13; 1991-11-24; 1995-05-21; 1999-06-13; 2003-05-18; 200706-10; 2010-06-13;
• Bulgaria: 1991-10-13; 1994-12-18; 1997-04-19; 2001-06-18; 2005-06-25; 2009-07-05;
• Canada: 1945-06-11; 1949-06-27; 1953-08-10; 1957-06-10; 1958-03-31; 1962-06-18;
1963-04-08; 1965-11-08; 1968-06-25; 1972-10-30; 1979-05-22; 1980-02-18; 1984-0904; 1988-11-21; 1993-10-25; 1997-06-02; 2000-11-27; 2004-06-28; 2006-01-23; 200810-14; 2011-05-02;
• Cyprus: 1976-09-05; 1981-05-24; 1985-12-08; 1991-05-19; 1996-05-26; 2001-05-27;
2006-05-21; 2011-05-22;
• Czech Republic: 1990-06-09; 1992-06-06; 1996-06-01; 1998-06-20; 2002-06-15;
2006-06-03; 2010-05-29;
• Denmark: 1945-10-30; 1947-10-28; 1950-09-05; 1953-04-21; 1953-09-22; 1957-0514; 1960-11-15; 1964-09-22; 1966-11-22; 1968-01-23; 1971-09-21; 1973-12-04; 197501-09; 1977-02-15; 1979-10-23; 1981-12-08; 1984-01-10; 1987-09-08; 1988-05-10;
1990-12-12; 1994-09-21; 1998-03-11; 2001-11-20; 2005-02-08; 2007-11-13; 2011-0915;
39
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
• Estonia: 1992-09-20; 1995-03-05; 1999-03-07; 2003-03-02; 2007-03-04; 2011-03-06;
• Finland: 1927-07-01; 1929-07-01; 1930-10-01; 1933-07-01; 1936-07-01; 1939-07-01;
1945-03-18; 1948-07-02; 1951-07-03; 1954-03-08; 1958-07-07; 1962-02-05; 1966-0321; 1970-03-16; 1972-01-03; 1975-09-22; 1979-03-13; 1983-03-21; 1987-03-16; 199103-17; 1995-03-19; 1999-03-21; 2003-03-16; 2007-03-18; 2011-04-17;
• France: 1945-10-21; 1946-06-02; 1946-11-10; 1951-06-17; 1956-01-02; 1958-11-23;
1962-11-18; 1967-03-05; 1968-06-23; 1973-03-04; 1978-03-12; 1981-06-14; 1986-0316; 1988-06-05; 1993-03-21; 1997-05-25; 2002-06-09; 2007-06-10; 2012-06-10;
• German Democratic Republic: 1990-03-18;
• Germany: 1949-08-14; 1953-09-06; 1957-09-15; 1961-09-17; 1965-09-19; 1969-0928; 1972-11-19; 1976-10-03; 1980-10-05; 1983-03-06; 1987-01-25; 1990-12-02; 199410-16; 1998-09-27; 2002-09-22; 2005-09-18; 2009-09-27;
• Greece: 1974-11-17; 1977-11-20; 1981-10-18; 1985-06-02; 1989-06-18; 1989-11-05;
1990-04-08; 1993-10-10; 1996-09-22; 2000-04-09; 2004-03-07; 2007-09-16; 2009-1004; 2012-05-06; 2012-06-17;
• Hungary: 1990-04-08; 1994-05-29; 1998-05-24; 2002-04-21; 2006-04-09; 2010-0425;
• Iceland: 1942-10-18; 1946-06-30; 1949-10-24; 1953-06-28; 1956-06-24; 1959-06-28;
1959-10-25; 1963-06-09; 1967-06-11; 1971-06-13; 1974-06-30; 1978-06-25; 1979-1202; 1983-04-23; 1987-04-25; 1991-04-20; 1995-04-08; 1999-05-08; 2003-05-10; 200705-12; 2009-04-25;
• Ireland: 1944-05-30; 1948-02-04; 1951-05-30; 1954-04-18; 1957-03-05; 1961-10-04;
1965-04-07; 1969-06-16; 1973-02-28; 1977-06-16; 1981-06-11; 1982-02-18; 1982-11-
40
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
24; 1987-02-17; 1989-06-15; 1992-11-25; 1997-06-06; 2002-05-15; 2007-05-24; 201102-25;
• Italy: 1946-06-02; 1948-04-18; 1953-06-07; 1958-05-25; 1963-04-28; 1968-05-19;
1972-05-07; 1976-06-20; 1979-06-03; 1983-06-26; 1987-06-14; 1992-04-05; 1994-0327; 1996-04-21; 2001-05-13; 2006-04-09; 2008-04-13;
• Japan: 1946-04-10; 1947-04-25; 1949-01-23; 1952-10-01; 1953-04-19; 1955-02-27;
1958-05-22; 1960-11-20; 1963-11-21; 1967-01-29; 1969-12-27; 1972-12-10; 1976-1205; 1979-10-07; 1980-06-22; 1983-12-18; 1986-07-06; 1990-02-18; 1993-07-18; 199610-20; 2000-06-25; 2003-11-09; 2005-09-11; 2009-08-30;
• Latvia: 1990-04-29; 1993-06-06; 1995-10-01; 1998-10-03; 2002-10-05; 2006-10-07;
2010-10-02; 2011-09-17;
• Lithuania: 1992-11-25; 1996-10-20; 2000-10-08; 2004-10-24; 2008-10-12;
• Luxembourg: 1945-10-21; 1948-06-06; 1951-06-03; 1954-05-30; 1959-02-01; 196406-07; 1968-12-15; 1974-05-26; 1979-06-10; 1984-06-17; 1989-06-18; 1994-06-12;
1999-06-13; 2004-06-13; 2009-06-07;
• Malta: 1945-03-12; 1947-10-27; 1950-09-04; 1951-05-06; 1953-12-14; 1955-02-28;
1962-02-19; 1966-03-28; 1971-06-14; 1976-09-18; 1981-12-12; 1987-05-09; 1992-0222; 1996-10-26; 1998-09-05; 2003-04-12; 2008-03-08;
• Netherlands: 1946-05-17; 1948-07-07; 1952-06-25; 1956-06-13; 1959-03-12; 196305-15; 1967-02-15; 1971-03-28; 1972-11-29; 1977-05-25; 1981-05-26; 1982-09-08;
1986-05-21; 1989-09-06; 1994-05-03; 1998-05-06; 2002-05-15; 2003-01-22; 2006-1122; 2010-06-09;
• New Zealand: 1943-09-25; 1946-11-27; 1949-11-30; 1951-09-01; 1954-11-13; 195711-30; 1960-11-26; 1963-11-30; 1966-11-26; 1969-11-29; 1972-11-25; 1975-11-29;
41
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
1978-11-25; 1981-11-28; 1984-07-14; 1987-08-15; 1990-10-27; 1993-11-06; 1996-1012; 1999-11-27; 2002-07-27; 2005-09-17; 2008-11-08; 2011-11-26;
• Norway: 1945-10-08; 1949-10-10; 1953-10-12; 1957-10-07; 1961-09-11; 1965-09-12;
1969-09-07; 1973-09-09; 1977-09-11; 1981-09-14; 1985-09-08; 1989-09-11; 1993-0913; 1997-09-16; 2001-09-10; 2005-09-12; 2009-09-24;
• Poland: 1991-10-27; 1993-09-19; 1997-09-21; 2001-09-23; 2005-09-25; 2007-10-19;
2011-10-09;
• Portugal: 1975-04-25; 1976-04-25; 1979-10-05; 1980-10-05; 1983-04-25; 1985-10-06;
1987-07-19; 1991-10-06; 1995-10-01; 1999-10-10; 2002-03-17; 2005-02-20; 2009-0927; 2011-06-05;
• Romania: 1990-05-20; 1992-09-27; 1996-11-03; 2000-11-26; 2004-11-28; 2008-1130;
• Slovakia: 1990-06-09; 1992-06-06; 1994-10-02; 1998-09-26; 2002-09-21; 2006-06-17;
2010-06-12; 2012-03-10;
• Slovenia: 1990-04-12; 1992-12-06; 1996-11-10; 2000-10-15; 2004-10-03; 2008-09-21;
2011-12-04;
• Spain: 1977-06-15; 1979-03-01; 1982-10-28; 1986-06-22; 1989-10-29; 1993-06-06;
1996-03-03; 2000-03-12; 2004-03-14; 2008-03-09; 2011-11-20;
• Sweden: 1944-09-17; 1948-09-19; 1952-09-21; 1956-09-26; 1958-06-01; 1960-09-18;
1964-09-20; 1968-09-15; 1970-09-20; 1973-09-16; 1976-09-19; 1979-09-16; 1982-0919; 1985-09-15; 1988-09-18; 1991-09-15; 1994-09-18; 1998-09-21; 2002-09-15; 200609-17; 2010-09-19;
42
A ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
• Switzerland: 1919-10-26; 1922-10-29; 1925-10-25; 1928-10-28; 1931-10-25; 193510-27; 1939-10-29; 1943-10-31; 1947-10-26; 1951-10-28; 1955-10-30; 1959-10-25;
1963-10-27; 1967-10-29; 1971-10-31; 1975-10-26; 1979-10-21; 1983-10-23; 1987-1018; 1991-10-20; 1995-10-22; 1999-10-24; 2003-10-19; 2007-10-21; 2011-10-23;
• United Kingdom: 1945-07-05; 1950-02-23; 1951-10-25; 1955-05-26; 1959-10-08;
1964-10-15; 1966-03-31; 1970-06-18; 1974-02-28; 1974-10-10; 1979-05-03; 1983-0609; 1987-06-11; 1992-04-09; 1997-05-01; 2001-06-07; 2005-05-05; 2010-05-06;
43
B
B
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
% of observations
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 14: Number of top-tier parties by country (r = 0.5)
44
B
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
% of observations
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 15: Number of top-tier parties by country (r = 0.6)
45
B
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
% of observations
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 16: Number of top-tier parties by country (r = 0.7)
46
B
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
% of observations
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of top−tier parties
Figure 17: Number of top-tier parties by country (r = 0.8)
47
C CSES ELECTION STUDIES WITH CMP DATA
C
CSES election studies with CMP data
• Australia: 1996, 2004, 2007
• Austria: 2008
• Belgium: 1999, 2003
• Bulgaria: 2001
• Canada: 1997, 2004
• Croatia: 2007
• Czech Republic: 1996, 2002, 2006
• Denmark: 1998, 2001, 2007
• Estonia: 2011
• Finland: 2003, 2007
• France: 2007
• Germany: 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009
• Hungary: 2002
• Iceland: 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009
• Ireland: 2002, 2007
• Israel: 1996
• Italy: 2006
• New Zealand: 1996, 2002, 2008
48
C CSES ELECTION STUDIES WITH CMP DATA
• Norway: 1997, 2001
• Netherlands: 1998, 2002, 2006
• Poland: 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007
• Portugal: 2005, 2009
• South Korea: 2000, 2004, 2008
• Romania: 1996, 2004
• Slovakia: 2010
• Slovenia: 1996, 2004, 2008
• Spain: 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008
• Sweden: 1998, 2002, 2006
• Switzerland: 1999, 2003
• United Kingdom: 1997, 2005
• United States: 1996, 2004
49
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