Erkenn
DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9703-0
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-Bare Proper Names
Ora Matushansky
Received: 31 October 2014 / Accepted: 31 October 2014
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract In this paper I provide novel arguments for the predicative approach to
proper names, which claims that argument proper names are definite descriptions
containing a naming predicate (the individual called X). I first argue that modified
proper names, such as the incomparable Maria Callas or the other Francis Bacon
cannot be handled on the hypothesis that argument proper names have no internal
structure and uniformly denote entities. I then discuss cases like every Adolf, which
would normally be interpreted as every individual named Adolf and show that the
predicative approach to proper names can straightforwardly account for the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper names. Finally, I address the
issue of proper names used as common nouns (such as a Rembrandt or the new
Madonna) and plural proper names (e.g., the Beatles) and demonstrate that they do
not form a homogenous group yet can be clearly distinguished on both syntactic and
semantic grounds from proper names involving a detectable naming component.
1 Introduction
It is usually assumed that a proper name, while definite, is a syntactic and semantic
atom with no internal structure: a non-branching DP (Abney 1987), just like
pronouns. Unlike pronouns, a proper name is a constant, rather than a variable,
contributing to the semantic representation only its referent [see Kripke (1980),
Soames (2002), among many others]:
O. Matushansky (&)
SFL (CNRS/Université Paris-8), Paris, France
e-mail: [email protected]
URL: http://www.let.uu.nl/~Ora.Matushansky/personal/
O. Matushansky ·
UiL OTS/Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
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O. Matushansky
(1)
DP
D°
John/I
proper name as a simple constant
The simplistic view is challenged by modified proper names, exemplified in (2)–
(3). Indeed, if proper names were projected in the syntactic structure in (1), what would
the modifiers combine with? And where would the definite article come from?
(2) a. The first Leslie was probably a man.
non-rigid,
restrictive
restrictive
b. The more famous Francis Bacon was also more
interesting.
c. The incomparable Maria Callas moved the audience to non-restrictive
tears.
(3) a. The renowned Victorian author Wilkie Collins is nearly
unknown today.
b. The Agatha that I know is a blonde.
The alternative view of proper names originating with Sloat (1969) and Burge
(1973), and most recently revived by Geurts (1997), Thomsen (1997), Elbourne
(2002), Matushansky (2005, 2006a, b, 2008) and Fara (2011, to appear), suggests
that proper names should be analyzed as definite descriptions consisting of a null
definite article and a restriction that is a naming predicate:
In this paper I will argue that non-bare proper names, as in (2)–(3), provide strong
evidence for the hypothesis that proper names are syntactically and semantically
complex entities constructed on the basis of naming predicates. In Sect. 2 I will
present primary evidence for the naming-predicational approach to proper names
from the syntax of naming constructions from Matushansky (2008) and show how
the particular semantics proposed there accounts for the distribution of proper
names that explicitly invoke the property of being named, as in (2a). I will then
examine how the simple-constant view can deal with the same data (Sect. 2.4) and
argue that while it crucially requires a way of deriving naming predicates from bare
proper names, none of the proposed accounts of such a derivation succeeds. Finally,
I will address non-literal, or derived, uses of proper names (Sect. 4) in order to
demonstrate that they do not stand in the same relation to bare proper names as
naming predicates do and so cannot be viewed as the model upon which naming
predicates are built. I conclude therefore that the predicational view of proper names
has wider empirical coverage than the simple-constant view in that not only can it
derive the syntax and compositional semantics of non-bare proper names, but also
successfully account for the previously unnoticed empirical generalizations about
the distribution of the explicit naming component in such proper names.
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The Other Francis Bacon
2 The Predicational View of Proper Names
The hypothesis that proper names are lexically predicates establishing a naming
relation (“IS CALLED” in (4)) between their external argument and a phonological
string1 correctly predicts a number of similarities between proper names and
common nouns. As noted by Sloat (1969), proper names can appear with articles,
quantifiers, numerals and modifiers:
(5)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
* Some/✓sóme Smith/man stopped by.
Some/sóme Smiths/men stopped by.
Smiths/men must breathe.
The clever Smith/man stopped by.
The Smith/man who is clever stopped by.
A clever Smith/man stopped by.
The Smiths/men stopped by.
The *Smith/✓man stopped by.
Smith/*man stopped by.
Sloat (1969)
Under the predicational approach, naming predicates are predicted to be able to
combine with a modifier, with the meaning of the resulting NP compositionally
derived by Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) rule of Predicate Modification, as in (6a, b),
where the modifier in question is intersective, or by Function Application, as in (6c),
where it is intensional. As a result, the syntax of proper names becomes identical to
that of NPs headed by a common noun (cf. Thomsen 1997):2
ε
The “IS CALLED” naming relation is generally assumed to be a semantic primitive.
In the next subsection I will present the evidence from Matushansky (2008) for a
1
I leave open the question of whether factors other than phonology (and in particular, spelling) should
also be taken into consideration in the encoding of proper names (or indeed, common noun homophones,
such as lie and lye), i.e., whether, for instance, Catherine and Katherine are the same name (cf. Izumi
2012:40).
2
Following Matushansky (2008), complex proper names are interpreted by Predicate Modification and
no distinction is made between first names and surnames. While this is an obvious simplification, given
that last names introduce, besides their metalinguistic content, the presupposition that there exist (or can
exist) other individuals bearing that surname and belonging to the same family, pursuing the proper
analysis would take us too far afield here. I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to the
need to clarify this point.
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O. Matushansky
more complex analysis from the cross-linguistic syntax of naming verbs, such as
call, name, baptize, etc., and argue in Sect. 2.2 that the postulated additional
argument slot of the naming relation involved can be used to account for the
distribution of the explicit naming component in proper names.
2.1 The Syntax of Proper Names in the Naming Construction
As demonstrated by Matushansky (2008), in a number of typologically diverse
languages examples like (7) do not, as has been generally assumed, involve
“mention” rather than “use” of proper names, but rather require an analysis where
the proper name functions as a bona fide predicate.
(7) a. Call me Al.
b. In the end of the twentieth century the city was renamed St. Petersburg.
c. The St. Olga of the Orthodox church was actually baptized Helen.
Evidence for this comes from the syntax of proper names in the naming
construction, which turns out to closely match that of predicates appearing with the
verbs seem, believe, make, become, etc. These verbs have been independently
argued to combine with a constituent dubbed a small clause and consisting of a
subject (NP1 in (8)) and a predicate (NP2). The subject of a small clause functions as
the subject (for raising verbs) or the direct object (for ECM verbs) of the main verb:
(8)
VP
V0
become/make
ECM/raising simplified
SC = small clause
NP1
Arthur
NP2
the king
Thus, in Modern Greek, Catalan, Pima and a number of dialects of German,
proper names in argument positions obligatorily appear preceded by an article.
However, when appearing as NP2 with naming verbs, unmodified proper names
disallow an overt article, patterning in this with predicates of ECM/raising verbs:
(9)
a.
b.
(10) a.
b.
123
Ich habe den
Karl gesehen.
German (some dialects), Matushansky 2008
I have the-ACC Karl seen
I have seen Karl.
Ich habe
ihn
(*den) Karl genannt.
I have
him-ACC the-ACC Karl called
I called him Karl.
Rose wurde 2004 (*die) Vizepräsidentin.
Rose became 2004 the-ACC vice.president.F
Rose became vice president in 2004.
Er ist (der) Präsident.
he is the president
He is (the) president.
German (all dialects)
Stowell 1991
The Other Francis Bacon
Furthermore, proper names in the naming construction, unlike uncontroversial
instances of mention, can be assigned case. Their surface case-marking is usually the
same as that of small-clause predicates and may differ from that of the direct object
(theme) of ditransitives: accusative in Classical Arabic (11)–(12), but instrumental in
Russian, translative in Estonian and Finnish, and dative in Hungarian. In languages
where the small-clause predicate surfaces in the same case as its subject, as in
Icelandic (13)–(14) or Latin, proper names in the naming construction show the same
case as the theme argument. Finally, in languages such as Welsh or Korean, where
non-verbal predicates require a copular particle, this copular particle is obligatory
with naming verbs [see Matushansky (2008) for details]:
(11) a.
b.
(12) a.
b.
(13) a.
b.
(14) a.
b.
salma laqqabat
walad-a-ha
aliy-an.
salma nickname.CAUS-PRF child-ACC-her Ali-ACC
Salma nicknamed her child Ali.
Arabic, Matushansky 2008
walad-u-ha
luqqiba
aliy-an.
child-NOM-her nickname.PASS-PRF Ali-ACC
Her child was nicknamed Ali.
salma ayyanat
walad-a-ha
wazir-an.
salma nominate.CAUS-PRF child-ACC-her minister-ACC
Salma nominated her child to be a minister.
walad-u-ha
uyina
wazir-an.
child-NOM-her nominate.PASS-PRF minister-ACC
Her child was nominated to be a minister.
Ég skírði
dóttur
mína
Herborgu. Icelandic, Matushansky 2008
I baptized daughter-ACC 1SG.POSS-ACC Herborg-ACC
I baptized my daughter Herborg.
Yngri
dóttir
mín
var skírð
Vigdís.
younger daughter-NOM 1SG.POSS-NOM was babtized Vigdís-NOM
My younger daughter was baptized Vigdis.
Maling and Sprouse 1995:168
Hún er kennari/*kennara.
he is teacher-NOM/ACC
He is a teacher.
Ég taldi
hana/*hun
vera kennara/*kennari. Maling and Sprouse 1995:170
I believed her-ACC/NOM to-be teacher-ACC/NOM
I believed her to be a teacher.
Prior linguistic analyses of proper names as naming predicates (Geurts 1997;
Thomsen 1997) assume the simplex view in (4), which cannot compositionally
derive the interpretation of the naming construction, where it is the naming verb that
determines the precise relation between the name bearer and the proper name
(nicknaming, calling, baptism, etc.). To account for it, Matushansky (2008) proposes
that besides the type e external argument slot, proper names also have an argument
slot for the naming convention R [a notion introduced by Recanati (1997)]:3
3
Izumi (2012:41) asserts without discussion that there is only one bearing relation, which is a semantic
primitive. Since he does not address the interaction of proper name predicates with naming verbs, I can
only speculate as to how he proposes to handle the compositional semantics of the naming construction.
While it is distinctly possible that rather than saturating an argument slot in the proper name predicate,
such verbs modify the bearing relation in question (along the same lines as those used in the neoDavidsonian treatment of thematic roles), this solution would still require the bearing relation to be
syntactically accessible, which is also the conclusion that the distribution of a detectable naming
component, discussed below, will suggest.
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O. Matushansky
(15) [[Alice]]=
where n is a sort of the type e (a phonological string or some other PF output representation)
To account for the rigidity of bare proper names in argument positions, they are
assumed to have their internal argument slot saturated by the contextually available
naming convention R0 that the speaker presupposes to be in force between the
speaker and the hearer and that is introduced syntactically as a free variable:
(16) [[the Alice]]=
the speaker and the hearer
where R0 is the naming convention in force between
Modification is therefore straightforward:
(17)
DP
D°
the
NP
AP
NP
famous/younger
Further evidence provided by Matushansky (2008) for the predicational view of
proper names comes from examples like (18), showing that proper names can
appear with change-of-state verbs and as depictives, just like other predicates. Since
such structures have independently been argued to contain small clauses (indicated
by bracketing below), the proper names in such examples can only function as
predicates:
(18) a. Renowned Victorian author Lewis Carroll was born [PRO Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson].
b. Her uncle’s death had made [her Lady Anne] and [her father Lord
Holbrook].
(19) a. He was born [PRO rich/millionaire].
b. Her uncle’s death had made her rich/a millionaire.
It can be objected that examples like (18) should be distinguished from bare
proper names, because they are not interpreted the same: the occurrence of Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson in (18a) implies the property of bearing the name Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson (i.e., the proper name detectably functions as a naming
predicate). This interpretation (though not the logical inference itself) is absent for
bare proper names in argument positions. However, as I will presently show, the
distribution of the two interpretations is non-random and follows from the theory
outlined above.
2.2 On the Detectability of the Naming Component
The visibly naming-predicational interpretation of proper names in (18) is clearly
not limited to predicate positions, since the very same interpretation (implying the
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The Other Francis Bacon
property of being so-named) is also available NP-internally when the proper name is
not bare, as in (20), though not all non-bare proper names give rise to it, as shown by
(21):4
(20) a. She is the former Lady Caroline Acheson.
≈ the person who formerly bore the title/name of Lady Caroline Acheson
b. I was introduced to a very drunk Jerris Johnson.
≈ a person named Jerris Johnson who was very drunk
(21) a. And who can resist the adorable Jane and Michael Banks?
b. I came across this little clip of the great Maria Callas on youtube.
Since proper names are systematically ambiguous between the naming-predicational reading (which clearly has an explicit naming component) and the “simpleconstant” one (which does not), the question arises which reading is used when. I
will argue that there is no ambiguity in the proper name itself, which always
functions as a naming predicate, and that the apparent interpretational difference
arises in function of how the internal argument slot of the proper name (that of the
naming convention) is saturated. More precisely, I will argue that it is the nondefault saturation of the internal argument slot of the proper name that is responsible
for making the naming component in the interpretation of argument and predicate
proper names accessible to consciousness.
As the first approximation, proper names heading indefinite and quantified NPs,
modified or not, are interpreted as involving the property of bearing that proper
name (22)–(24), while in proper names heading singular definite NPs in (25) this
component is not at all prominent (though still present, as a logical inference), just
like in bare argument proper names:5
4
In addition to the interpretation indicated above, the proper name in (20b) also has another one, which
can be paraphrased as “Jerris Johnson when he was very drunk”. We set aside here these coerced uses of
proper names, where the outcome denotes a spatial–temporal slice or an aspect of the entity bearing the
proper name, as in (i):
(i)
a.
b.
c.
the young Mozart, a younger Mozart
the upper Rhine, the French Haiti
a chastised Peter, the Chomsky that we know
stage
spatial part
aspect
For more discussion see Gärtner (2004), Gary-Prieur (1991), von Heusinger and Wespel (2007),
Jonasson (2005), Paul (1994), Thomsen (1997). Other derived uses of proper names will be discussed in
Sect. 4.
5
I set plural proper names aside here, since the presence and the choice of a determiner with them, as
well as the ensuing interpretation, depends on the source of their plurality (e.g., the West Indies, which
cannot appear either bare or in the singular form, vs. the Kennedys, which can). Illuminating discussions
of plural proper names can be found in Van Langendonck (2007) and Jeshion (to appear)-a.
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O. Matushansky
(22) a. There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.
Burge
(1973)
b.
c.
(23) a.
b.
c.
(24) a.
b.
(25) a.
b.
An Alfred Russell joined the club today.
Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.
A Mr. Smith to see you, sir.
I know at least one Francis Bacon in the city.
Every Adolf hates his name.
What Arthur hasn’t dreamt of becoming a king?
Most Josephs can also be called Joe.
That Rover of yours has overturned the garbage again!
I will tell you about the English Francis Bacon if you tell me
about the Irish one.
c. I will write about my Francis Bacon, and you will write about
yours.
d. Which Francis Bacon are you talking about—the painter or
the philosopher?
I contend that the explicitness of the naming component in the interpretation of
proper names in examples like (22)–(24) as opposed to (25) is directly related to
how the internal argument of the proper name is treated. In particular, in examples
like (25) the internal argument slot of the proper name is saturated by the naming
convention in force between the speaker and the hearer (26a). In (22)–(24), on the
other hand, it is existentially quantified over (26b):
(26) a.
b.
[[my Francis Bacon]]=
[[an Alfred Russell]]
Given that the argument proper names in (22)–(24) all imply the property of
being so-named, our hypothesis leads us to conclude that they cannot involve the
naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer. The natural
question therefore arises why such should be the case: why is (27) not a possible
interpretation of (22b)?
(27) [[an Alfred Russell]] = λf〈e, t〉 . ∃x : f(x) & ∃R . [ R0(x)(/'ælfrəd/) & R0(x)(/'rʌsl/)
I propose to derive this fact from the pragmatics of naming conventions: the default
naming convention R0 can a link a name and its bearer only if the bearer is familiar to
the speaker (though perhaps not to the hearer) under that name. As a result, in order for
the use of R0 to be felicitous, the proper name in question has to be specific. In the
particular examples (22)–(24) specific readings of the relevant (mostly indefinite)
proper names are not supported, but once this issue is controlled for, the expected
outcome ensues: a specific indefinite, as in (28), which uses the same determiner one as
the non-specific (23b), can fail to make the naming component explicit:
(28) Painters know about one Francis Bacon, and philosophers, about the other.
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The Other Francis Bacon
The interpretational contrast between the nonspecific indefinite proper name in
(23b), which invokes the property of being called Francis Bacon, and the specific
one in (28), which does not, clearly shows that the distribution of the explicit
naming component is not conditioned only by the presence or by the choice of the
determiner. The hypothesis that specific proper names combine with R0, as in (27),
correctly predict this distribution.6
Further support for the purported connection between specificity and availability of
R0 as the naming convention comes from the interaction of proper names with
intensional predicates. As well-known since at least Donnellan (1966), definite
descriptions also can be either specific (referential, in Donnellan’s terms) or nonspecific (attributive). Modifiers yielding singleton sets, such as ordinals, superlatives
and order adjectives like last or next, lend themselves easily to truth-conditionally
distinguishing the two interpretations in modal contexts. Thus in the context of (29a)
the definite proper name in (29) must be non-specific (attributive), as the speaker does
not have a particular individual in mind, and is interpreted as ‘the individual named
Leslie’. In the context of (29b), on the other hand, the definite proper name is specific
(referential), as it is anaphoric to the previous use of the same name, and is interpreted
as ‘the first of the two individuals mentioned’ (who happen to be both named Leslie).
Predictably, indefinite proper names give rise to the same effect, as shown by (30),
where the contexts also allow us to distinguish lack of specificity from wide scope:
(29) The first Leslie was probably a man.
a. Lots of feminine names started out as masculine. For instance,…
b. My best friends online were Leslie Smith and Leslie Jones. I’m not sure, but…
(30) What if every judge of the contest “Three Best Leslies” voted for one Leslie?
a. specific: namely, for Leslie Smith.
b. wide-scope, non-specific: we won’t have three Leslies then.
c. narrow-scope: they are not obliged to select three each.
The analysis proposed above correlates the independently detectable specific
reading of the modified proper name with the saturation of the naming convention
argument slot by R0, as in (29b) and (30a); in all other scenarios this argument slot
is locally existentially quantified over.7 However, specificity alone is not enough,
6
For the interpretation of indefinite specific proper names introduced by one of versus certain, see
Hintikka (1986).
7
While the determiner no seems to be compatible with both the presence and the absence of a detectable
naming component, the latter interpretation arguably results from coercion along the same lines as
examples in footnote 4. Thus no Catherine can be analyzed as “no spatiotemporal slice of Catherine” (the
“simple-constant” reading compounded with coercion), while no John Smith means only “no individual
named John Smith” (the naming-predicational reading), as expected for a non-specific indefinite:
(i)
a.
b.
No John Smith was employed there.
…but no Catherine could I detect, far or near.
Emily Brontë, Wuthering Heights
123
O. Matushansky
since specific definite proper names can also invoke the property of being so-named,
as shown by (6c). While the definite proper name in question (the former Norma
Jean Baker) denotes a specific individual that can very well be known to the speaker
(either as Marilyn Monroe, or under both names), the naming relation only holds at
some time prior to utterance time and therefore, cannot be R0 and thus cannot be
expected to be undetectable.
A prediction made by this analysis is that non-restrictive modification, as well as
contrastive restrictive modification in definite NPs, will never give rise to an explicit
naming component. As the following examples show, this prediction appears to be
correct: restrictively modified definite proper names, as demonstrated above, may
but do not have to invoke the property of being so-named, while the nonrestrictively modified proper name in (31a) may only qualify the already known
Maria Callas (though the property of being named Maria Callas is clearly present as
a logical inference). Likewise, (31b) distinguishes between the two already known
individuals (who happen to be named Francis Bacon) rather than between the two
bearers of that proper name:
(31)
a.
b.
the incomparable Maria Callas
the CONTEMPORARY Francis Bacon
non-restrictive
contrastive
The hypothesized link between an undetectable naming component and R0
correctly predicts that non-restrictively and contrastively modified proper names
pattern together. Indeed, non-restrictive modification always provides additional
qualification for a proper name bearer that the speaker and the hearer are already
aware of, so the naming convention involved cannot fail to be R0. The same holds
for contrastive modification in definite proper names, since what is not in focus (the
proper name itself) forms part of the presupposition, hence part of the background
knowledge of the speaker and the hearer, and as a result, the naming convention in
question once again has to be R0.
2.3 Further Elaboration of the Distribution of the Detectable Naming
Component
Having demonstrated that R0 renders the naming component of the proper name
undetectable, the question arises whether the lack of R0 necessarily entails a
detectable naming component. Cases like (32), modeled on those used by Geurts
(1997) and Elbourne (2002) to argue against the rigidity of proper names strongly
suggest that such is not the case, and I will argue that it is existential quantification
over R (rather than the lack of R0) that renders the property of being so-named
accessible to consciousness:
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The Other Francis Bacon
(32) a. If you call your children Bambi and Thumper, Thumper is not likely to
thank you.
b. A woman who has a cat named Patsy and a dog named Don Giovanni is
likely to scream Patsy’s name a lot more frequently than Don
Giovanni’s.
The second occurrences of the proper names in (32) are not perceived to imply
the property of being so-named, but it is not at all obvious that the naming
convention used here is R0. In fact, as argued by Matushansky (2008), such nonrigid proper names involve a naming relation anaphoric to that introduced by the
naming verb. Thus, here also the internal argument slot of the proper name is
saturated, though by a variable rather than by a constant. Since the proper name here
is non-referential, it can be argued that it is existence presupposition, rather than
specificity (reference to an individual), that makes the naming component
undetectable—but such a hypothesis still does not explain why this should be the
case. Our proposal, linking the detectability of the naming component to how the
internal argument slot of a proper name is saturated, can do so: in cases where the
naming component is detectable, neither R0 nor an anaphoric naming convention is
available. If local existential quantification over R, however it is achieved, is a
repair mechanism, its use can arguably be detectable.
The final environment to be addressed here is the predicate use of a proper name,
exemplified by the first occurrences of proper names in (32), but also predicate
proper names in examples (18), repeated below as (33), and (34):
(33) a. Renowned Victorian author Lewis Carroll was born [PRO Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson].
b. Her uncle’s death had made [her Lady Anne] and [her father Lord
Holbrook].
(34) a. This younger brotheri would later become [ti the famous Harun alRashid], known for his appearance in the Arabian Nights…
b. She stood in front of a mirror and removed the wigs, makeup, and outfits
that made [her Lady Gaga]…
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, Lady Anne and Lord Holbrook in (33) are interpreted
as ‘named so-and-so’, while the proper names in the predicate position in (34) are
not. The latter cases, however, presuppose the existence of the individual bearing
the relevant proper name, which means that the distribution of the detectable
naming component here need not pose a problem for our account. Instead, I
contend, the proper names in the predicate position in (34) are not naming
predicates at all, but rather predicates derived from the corresponding referential
proper name as a result of the IDENT type-shift (Bach and Partee 1980; Partee and
Bach 1984; Partee 1986) or the corresponding IDENT operator:
(35)
〚IDENT〛 = λx . λy . x = y
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O. Matushansky
While initially proposed in order to account for identity statements, IDENT can
also be used to account for the use of non-bare proper names as identity predicates:8
(36)
DP
DP
the
NP
AP
famous
NP
NP
IDENT
ι
NP
λx . x IS CALLED Harun al-Rashid
The assumption that a referential proper name can function as a predicate of identity
can also account for examples (37)–(39) from Heycock (1995). Though Heycock
(1995) proposes that the definite NPs in the subject position of remain and become and
in the direct object position of make in these examples are underlyingly predicates (i.e.,
starting out as NP2 in the structure in (8) that moves to its surface position as a result of
predicate inversion), it is more likely that they contain identity small clauses, as
proposed by Heycock and Kroch (1999). Since NP1 in (33)–(34) is no less referential
than NP2, treating these examples as predicate inversion does not solve the problem:
(37) a. The real problem remains what to do next.
b.
(38) a.
b.
(39) a.
b.
Heycock
(1995)
The best solution remains instant retreat.
At this point our real problem becomes John.
The critical problem now becomes how to set the parameters.
If Bill has an alibi for 6 pm, that makes the murderer John!
If that’s so, that would make the most likely cause of the
problem the pictures of Stalin.
That (33)–(34) are interpreted as equatives is confirmed by attested examples like
(40), where the small-clause predicate is modified by an appositive, which strongly
suggests that at some level of syntactic representation the proper name in question is
referential:
(40) This boy was to become the intrepid Richard the Lionheart, who was
rumored to not be afraid of anything.
I conclude that the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper
names provides a strong argument for the analysis of proper names as relational
nouns whose internal argument slot is a naming relation. I further hypothesize that
8
Note that the overt definite article is divorced in this representation from the iota operator. Given that
definite predicates, such as the winner, are possible [see Rapoport (1987:177) for an early discussion and
Fara (2001) for a recent one], such a separation is necessary anyway, making the definite article a marker
of definiteness rather than its source. In Sect. 2.4 I will discuss the potential use of IDENT for nonrestrictive
modification of proper names.
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The Other Francis Bacon
this argument slot is generally saturated by a free variable, which can be coindexed
with R0, interpreted anaphorically or, when these two options fail, be locally
existentially quantified over as a result of a repair mechanism, whose precise
workings will be left as a topic for future research.
2.4 Summary
In this section we have examined the distribution of a detectable naming component
in proper names. We have shown that the presence of modifiers and determiners is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a detectable naming component: on
the one hand, both definite and indefinite proper names may fail to explicitly
introduce the property of being so-named, and on the other hand, bare proper names
in the predicate position are generally interpreted as naming predicates (rather than
identity predicates, though this option is also available).
I have argued that the absence of a detectable naming component in argument
proper names is crucially conditioned by existence presupposition: all and only
those proper names that presuppose the existence of an entity that bears that proper
name fail to introduce a detectable naming component. I link this empirical
generalization to a specific theory (Matushansky 2008) of proper names as naming
predicates with an internal argument slot, that of the naming convention: a
detectable naming component appears if this argument slot is existentially
quantified over rather than saturated either by the default naming convention in
force between the speaker and the hearer R0 or by a local antecedent naming
convention introduced by a naming verb.
The distribution of the “simple-constant” and naming-predicational interpretations
of proper names cannot be easily accounted for by the hypothesis that proper names are
polysemous. If the two interpretations were independently available, a definite NP
headed by a proper name would be ambiguous between the two readings, which is not
the case, not even in contexts that would a priori be compatible with the two:
(41) Yesterday I was introduced to a Magrat Esmeralda Smith and a Hermione
Jenny Jones. Hermione was nice, but Magrat was clearly adversely
affected by her name.
If proper names were underlyingly polysemous (rather than coming from the
same source, as I propose), the second occurrences of the proper names in (41)
would be ambiguous between anaphora to the naming-predicational reading (clearly
absent) and anaphora to the unmarked simple-constant one. While this lack of
ambiguity is predicted by the predicational theory of proper names, it requires an
explanation in any other theory.
3 Polysemy Approaches to Proper Names
The alternative, now standard view of proper names (Kripke 1980; Salmon 1986,
among many others] maintains that the only semantic value of a proper name is its
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O. Matushansky
referent, with no descriptive content (and thus with no information as to what the name
of that referent is). Under this view restrictive modification of proper names is not
expected and must somehow be accounted for. One possible way of doing so is to
appeal to accidental homophony, as is often done in order to account for the existence
of individuals bearing the same proper name (for instance, Francis Bacon): for each
proper name there are two lexical entries: the simple constant and the naming
predicate. The other is to allow proper names to be naming predicates, yet deny that
such predicational proper names are also used to form bare proper names in argument
positions. In this section I will demonstrate that both these approaches face non-trivial
problems with the syntax and the interpretation of modified proper names.9
3.1 IDENT Type-Shifting as the Source for Predicate Proper Names
As discussed above, the IDENT operator/type-shifting rule can turn a referential proper
name into a property of being identical to whatever entity that proper name denotes,
which makes it possible to add a modifier, which will perforce be non-restrictive. The
resulting definite NP, as in (6a), would therefore be interpreted as follows:
(42) 〚the incomparable Maria Callas〛 = ιx [x is incomparable & x = Maria
Callas]
This simplistic view is not enough to explain restrictive modification, as in (6b).
First of all, in order to handle the fact that two people can be called Francis Bacon it
is necessary to assume that the painter and the philosopher are victims of
homophony: there are actually two proper names with the same phonological form,
which we will note here as FB1 (the painter) and FB2 (the philosopher). (6b) can
then be assimilated to (6a):
(43) 〚the contemporary Francis Bacon〛 = ιx [x is contemporary &
x = FB1]
An obvious problem with this solution is that it incorrectly predicts that
restrictive and non-restrictive modification of proper names should have exactly the
same syntax. Setting aside the different intonation patterns of (6a) and (6b), we can
straightforwardly demonstrate that they do not have the same structure.
Our first piece of evidence comes from relative clauses. As demonstrated in (44),
restrictive relative clauses force the appearance of the definite article in front of the
proper name, while appositive relative clauses do not:10
9
As a reviewer notes, it is also possible to appeal to the distinction (Kaplan 1973, 1989, 1990; Sainsbury
2013) between specific/common currency proper names (which denote individuals) vs. generic proper
names (which is what is shared by the individuals bearing the same name). I will not address this
approach, since it also offers no insight as to how the systematic link between a specific proper name and
its generic counterpart is achieved—in other words, how the fact that David Kaplan is called David is
derived.
10
Similar generalizations hold for languages with two definite articles or with preproprial definite
articles: with a non-restrictive relative clause a weak or preproprial definite article can still be used, while
a restrictive relative clause forces the appearance of the strong or regular definite article, respectively.
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The Other Francis Bacon
(44) a. I studied with (*the) Noam Chomsky, who created generative
linguistics.
b. *(The) Sandy that I know lives in California.
The position of the attributive adjective in French provides another clear
argument against treating restrictive and non-restrictive modification alike. As
observed by Noailly (1991), if an adjective appears before the proper name, it is
interpreted non-restrictively, while restrictive interpretation is only possible after
the proper name—in other words, proper names behave like common nouns in this
respect (cf. Truswell 2005):
(45) a.
b.
l’ antique Pergame
the ancient Pergamon
Ancient Pergamon (the city has ceased to exist)
le Babylone antique
the Babylon ancient
the ancient Babylon (as opposed to the modern Babylon in Illinois)
nonrestrictive
restrictive
Further evidence against using the IDENT operator to derive restrictive
modification of proper names comes from the fact that applying IDENT to two
homophonous simple constants gives us two different predicates. Modified proper
names, however, crucially differ from accidental homophones in that accidental
homophony cannot be preserved under NP-pronominalization (Nunberg 1979), as
illustrated in (46a). Such is not the case for proper names, as shown by the fact that
(46b) is fully grammatical with two distinct referents bearing the same name
Francis Bacon:
(46) a. The key left the ugly lock, and the ship stayed in the beautiful one.
≠ The key was pulled out of the door and the ship stayed in the canal/
river lock.
b. I will tell you about the English Francis Bacon if you tell me about the
Irish one.
Yet another problem for the IDENT theory comes from ordinals, superlatives and
adjectives like other, previous, etc., none of which can be non-restrictive. Even if
they can somehow be made non-restrictive when combining with proper names, this
would still fail to account for the presupposition that another individual with the
same name exists:
(47)
a.
b.
Some people prefer the other Francis Bacon.
The first Pope John XXIII was born Baldassarre Cossa.
We conclude that it is with good reason that an appeal to the IDENT operator has
never been made to deal with restrictive modification of proper names. Furthermore,
the fact that in some contexts proper names invoke the property of being so-named
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O. Matushansky
(see Sect. 2.2) demonstrates that a naming-predicational interpretation of proper
names must be assumed to exist in any theory.
In the next sub-section we will consider the alternative way of salvaging the
simple-constant approach: the assumption that proper names are ambiguous
between simple constants and naming predicates. I will first show that such
systematic ambiguity may not be accidental and therefore one use has to be derived
from the other, and then proceed to argue that the naming-predicational
interpretation cannot be derived from the simple-constant one.
3.2 Deriving the Naming Predicate
In the approach defended here, proper names in argument positions are syntactically
complex constituents derived from lexical entries with a naming-predicational
interpretation, like in (15), repeated below for the sake of convenience.
(15) [[Alice]]=
where n is a sort of the type e (a phonological string)
However, it is possible that proper names combining with modifiers and
determiners have the interpretation in (15) while bare proper names are simple
constants. In other words, under this view proper names are held to be polysemous,
and the question arises how to account for the systematic logical connection
between the two interpretations:
(48)
a.
b.
Maureen likes chocolate.
An individual named Maureen (exists and) likes chocolate.
Since examples like (48a) systematically entail examples like (48b), the
purported ambiguity of any proper name between a simple-constant meaning and
a naming-predicational meaning cannot be accidental. However, it is not difficult to
show that the latter cannot be directly derived from the former: it seems reasonably
clear that the (obviously naming-predicational) proper name in (49) cannot be
derived from the corresponding rigid proper name, as that would have wrongly
committed the speaker of (49) to the existence of an individual named Johnette [see
Sawyer (2009) for further arguments against treating the simple-constant use as
basic]:11
(49) Ja lublju Lennona,
no moju
doč'
ne nazvali
Džonettoj.
I like Lennon-ACC but my-ACC daughter-ACC NEG call-PERF-PAST-PL Johnette-INS
I like Lennon, but my daughter was not called Johnette.
A potential way out is proposed by Leckie (2013), who blurs the line between use
and mention to derive the naming-predicational meaning by a pragmatic process
(the hypothesis that she ultimately rejects for proper names) or by a lexical rule. A
11
I used a Russian example to ensure that the proper name in question cannot be treated as a quotation;
see the discussion of the instrumental (predicative) versus nominative (quoted) proper names in the
complement of Russian verbs of naming in Matushansky (2008).
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The Other Francis Bacon
clear advantage of her proposal is that the existence of such a derived proper name
need not entail the existence of an entity that bears that name.
Leckie’s starting point is the prevalence of systematic lexical meaning shift
processes, known as systematic polysemy and exemplified below (see Nunberg
1979, 1995; Pustejovsky 1995 et seq. for discussion). Some of these are
hypothesized to be lexical, which Leckie diagnoses by the existence of an overt
affix in some languages (e.g., poire ‘pear’/poirier ‘pear tree’ in French) or by their
failure to apply if a more specific suppletive term exists (e.g., pig/pork). Others are
assumed to be purely pragmatic and therefore to apply cross-linguistically without
overt morphological marking:
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
Animal/meat:
a.
Mary had a little lamb, its fleece was white as snow.
b.
Mary had a little lamb, and then she had a little more.
Fruit/tree:
a.
I like plums.
b.
Plums have beautiful blossoms.
Order/client:
a.
They ordered a ham sandwich and a Coke.
b.
The ham sandwich left without paying.
Container/contents:
a.
They broke a bottle of wine over the ship’s prow.
b.
They poured a bottle of wine down the drain.
lexical
lexical
pragmatic
pragmatic
The pragmatic meaning shift hypothesized by Leckie for proper names
presupposes that the naming-predicational use of proper names involves mention
rather than use, with subsequent application of the pragmatic lexical rule (54) (based
upon the hypothesis that the most salient relation that a name has to other things is
the being-called relationship). In other words, in the uses of proper names where
they appear with modifiers or determiners the proper name is not a constant, but is
used as a stand-in for its own mention.
(54) A mentioned proper name "N" is interpretable as the common noun "entity called N"
To explain the lack of quotation marks, as well as of the corresponding intonation
in naming-predicational use of proper names, Leckie advances the empirical
generalization in (55):
(55) The word X is often used (whether mistakenly or not) to mean "X" (i.e., as the name for
that word).
However, as is easy to see, in examples like (56), the proper name does not in
fact function as a stand-in for its own mention. The question therefore arises when
precisely the option in (55) is available and when it is not:
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O. Matushansky
(56) a.
b.
c.
I shouted "Lisa"/*Lisa at the top of my voice.
"Lisa"/*Lisa has two syllables.
The name "Lisa"/*Lisa is not uncommon.
In the absence of a theory detailing when a proper name can function as a standin for its own mention and when it cannot, the hypothesis that modified proper
names are constructed by Leckie’s pragmatic rule (54) is at best non-explanatory.
However, the alternative that she opts for, the lexical rule in (57), is also untenable:
(57) A proper name "N " is interpretable as the common noun "entity called N"
The problem with this lexical rule is that it uses as input not the semantics of the
lexical item to which it applies, but rather its phonological form. This move is
objectionable, since in all other cases of systematic polysemy it is the meanings that
are linked (to say nothing about the fact that in no language that I am aware of is
there an overt morpheme for distinguishing the naming-predicational uses and no
suppletion has ever been attested). The fact that systematic polysemy always
involves a relation between meanings removes any independent motivation for
deriving the naming-predicational meaning from the phonological form of the
putatively basic directly referring proper name by means of a lexical or pragmatic
rule.
Furthermore, I contend that any ambiguity approach will give rise to incorrect
predictions. To see this, consider the following narrative:
(58)
a.
b.
At the party I was introduced to a Sandy Jones and a Robin Smith.
(*The) Sandy was nice, but (*the) Robin turned out to be appalling.
Under any theory of proper names (58a) does not involve direct reference. The
proper names in (58b) are anaphoric to (58a) and the definite article is impossible.12
This latter fact cannot be explained on the assumption that the naming-predicational
meaning of proper names exists in addition to the simple-constant meaning without
being derived from it. Indeed, first of all, an anaphoric naming-predicational proper
name is expected to be possible in combination with a definite article, so the
ungrammaticality of *the Sandy, which should have been able to mean ‘the unique
(contextually salient) entity called Sandy’ comes as a surprise. Furthermore, even if
the ungrammaticality of the definite article there were argued to result from some
syntactic constraint, it would still be necessary to account for the fact that the instance
of Sandy in (58a) is not ambiguous (see also Sect. 2.2). Given that the namingpredicational meaning of proper names is indispensable for naming constructions
(Matushansky 2008), as well as for contexts where the naming component is
detectable, the only way of accounting for (58) is to assume that apparent simpleconstant uses of proper names are derived from the naming-predicational lexical
12
The definite article is possible in (58b) if (58a) means that I was introduced to one of the many Sandy
Joneses and one of the many Robin Smiths present at that particular party. I hypothesize that in this case
the definite article is akin to the strong definite article in Germanic (see Delisle 1988; Ebert 1971;
Hartmann 1982; Schwartz 2009), which appears with “pragmatic definites” (cf. Löbner 1985).
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The Other Francis Bacon
meaning. The lack of an overt definite article with most (though not all) proper names
in many (though not all) languages is then treated as a morphosyntactic phenomenon
[see Matushansky (2006b) for one formal account; Longobardi (1994) can provide
another].
4 Derived Uses of Proper Names
In the literature on proper names, nontrivial (consisting of more than one word) NPs
headed by a proper name instead of the common noun are often grouped together
under the heading of appellative uses (see, e.g., Davis 2005; Van Langendonck
2007). The non-bare proper names that we have been studying are frequently listed
as examples of such appellative uses, which are all taken to be derived from the
underlying simple-constant meaning [the proprial lemmas, or proper name lexemes,
in the terms of Van Langendonck (2007)]:
(59) a. The emperor Napoleon was defeated at
Waterloo.
b. You are talking about a different John.
c. He is becoming a second Napoleon.
Van Langendonck
(2007:11)
The same reasoning underlies a recent argument against the predicative view of
proper names due to Robin Jeshion (to appear). Objecting to treating non-bare
proper names as evidence for a predicate core of bare proper names, Jeshion
provides a large list of examples with definite, plural, quantified or indefinite NPs
that are headed by proprial lemmas and that cannot be accounted for by the
predicational approach. As Jeshion correctly points out, it has never been shown that
Sloat’s examples (5) should be singled out from a larger class of cases where a
proper name functions as a common noun.13
The first class of such cases, originally identified by Boër (1975), are dynasty/
family and blood names, exemplified in (60). The next set of examples involve proper
names used as stand-ins for the property of strongly resembling the name bearer. While
cases of physical resemblance (which may be close (61a) or minimal (61b)), as well as
of representations, copies, or images of the name bearer (61c) are known in the
linguistic literature as proxy readings (Jackendoff 1992; Lidz 2001; Reuland 2001), it
seems likely that other instances of resemblance, such as (61d), should be treated along
the same lines. Conversely, proper names used to denote a set of individuals that share
some salient characteristics associated with a typical name bearer (62) will be argued
to result from a different meaning shift process. Finally, the fourth group consists of
entities created by the name bearer (63) and perhaps other objects (64)):14
13
See also Gouet (1976), Jonasson (1992, 1994, 2005), Wee (2006) and De Clercq (2008).
14
I have replaced Jeshion’s counterexamples with mine to allow for more natural minimal pairs that
require no special context to be understood. My grouping is closer to Fara’s (to appear) and is different
from Jeshion’s.
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O. Matushansky
(60) a. Chris Kennedy is not a Kennedy.
b. Elizabeth I was a Tudor.
(61) a. My daughter is such a perfect little Ora.
b. Two Osama bin Ladens came to the Halloween party.
c. Trafalgar Square is decorated by an 18 foot Nelson.
d. Putin is a veritable Stalin.
(62) The new principal is such a Jeremiah.
(63) a. A Frank Lloyd Wright is more durable than a Gehry.
b. Stellas are cheaper than any Picasso.
(64) She wants to do a Britney.
De Clercq (2008)
Jeshion (to appear)-a, b argues that the uses of proper names in (60)–(64) should
be grouped together with their naming-predicational uses by defining the following
rule:
(65) "N" is true of individuals that are R to N,
where "R" is a relation made salient in the context, and "N" refers to an individual, family with that
name, or the name itself.
The main problem with the generalization (65) is, to my mind, how the reference
of a proper name occurrence “N” is defined (in boldface). In order for (65) to work,
the lexical entry for a proper name N must be polysemous to begin with, as reflected
by the disjunction in (65): the proper name may refer to either an entity (an
individual or a family) or to the name itself (i.e., its mention). Since, as argued in
Sect. 3.2, the hypothesis that proper names are ambiguous between these two
readings is fraught with problems while deriving the naming-predicational meaning
from the simple-constant meaning is impossible, the apparent unification in (65)
fails to account for all non-bare uses of proper names.
In what follows I will argue that the proper NPs in (61)–(64) are derived from
the more basic naming-referential and simple-constant proper names, either by a
phonologically null suffix or as a result of a meaning shift (metonymy or
coercion). I will demonstrate that they do not have the same syntax and so cannot
be derived by one and the same process. Following Fara (to appear), I will
provide syntactic evidence for distinguishing the coercion process yielding proxy
readings of proper names from the morphological process yielding their creation
uses and show that both these processes target constituents of the semantic type e
(Sect. 4.1). In Sect. 4.2 I will demonstrate that a different coercion process,
typically attested in the context of a degree operator or a degree modifier, derives
examples like (62); this process targets predicates (semantic type he; ti). Finally,
Sect. 4.3 deals with Boër’s (1975) examples (60), arguing that such plural proper
names are names of groups or conglomerate entities and do not arise as a result of
coercion.
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The Other Francis Bacon
4.1 Proxy Readings and Creation Uses of Proper Names: Type e Input
It is obvious that proxy readings and creation uses of proper names can yield
common nouns, as further shown by the fact that for a number of eponyms the
original connection has been all but lost, leaving us with unambiguously common
nouns no longer distinguished by their orthography:15
(66)
a.
b.
quisling, dunce, argus
leotard, shrapnel, spencer
proxy
creation
Furthermore, in a response paper to Jeshion (to appear)-a Fara (to appear) argues
that proxy (in her terminology, resemblance) readings of proper names, as in (61),
and their creation uses, as in (63), both result from processes that also target noun
phrases headed by common nouns:16
(67)
(68)
a.
b.
c.
d.
a.
b.
My daughter is such a perfect little fox.
Two green witches came to the Halloween party.
Trafalgar Square is decorated by four 11 foot lions.
Putin is a veritable king.
An ink is more durable than a pencil.
Cubists are cheaper than any Impressionist.
proxy
creation
Fara separates proxy readings, as in (61) and (67), from creation uses [which she
classifies as deferred interpretation, following Nunberg (1995)], in (63), (64) and
(68), citing as evidence the behavior of gender in Belgian Dutch. As shown by De
Clercq (2008), in creation uses the gender of the resulting NP depends upon its
lexical-semantic class (for instance, paintings trigger masculine agreement),
showing that a lexical rule or a null suffix (rather than a simple meaning shift)
15
I follow Jeshion and Fara in not discussing measure unit eponyms, such as ohm, faraday, watt, etc.,
which have no semantic connection to the proper names that they are derived from. The fact that they do
not fit into any semantic class is straightforwardly explained by their wholly artificial origin.
16
Proxy readings have also recently been invoked by Partee (2003) in order to reduce privative
modification to an instance of coercion with subsective modification:
(i)
a.
b.
I don’t care whether that fur is fake or real.
A fake gun is not a gun.
It is crucial that in the latter case the coercion process occurs at the kind-level, targeting what is
syntactically an NP and semantically an entity (type e). It seems reasonable to extend this analysis to the
proxy readings of common nouns in (67), thus assimilating kind names to proper names (cf. Kripke
1980).
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O. Matushansky
must be involved. Proxy readings, on the other hand, retain the gender of the proper
name bearer:17
(69)
a.
Ze heeft ne/ *een/ *e Picasso gekocht.
she has a.m/a.f/a.n Picasso.m bought
She has bought a Picasso.
Ze heeft ne/ *een/ *e Kahlo gekocht.
she has a.m/a.f/a.n Kahlo.f bought
She has bought a Kahlo.
b.
De Clercq (2008)
Another reason for distinguishing creation uses and proxy readings of proper
names comes from the fact that the latter is also attested outside the realm of proper
names. As noted by an anonymous reviewer, while proxy readings can also involve
pronouns, this option does not seem to be available for creation uses:
(70)
(71)
a.
b.
c.
a.
b.
She is a little you… so adorable!
My sister’s daughter now is a perfect five-year-old me.
[At Mme. Tussaud] Ringo Starr was photographed next to himself.
??
A new me is hanging in this gallery. [said by a painter]
??
Two you’s came to the Halloween party. [reported to Elvis]
Finally, unlike creation uses definite singular proxy readings of proper names
appear without an article:
(72) All of a sudden […] John toppled over and fell on Ringo. Jackendoff
1992
17
An anonymous reviewer draws my attention to the behavior of gender in German painter-to-painter
proper name uses. While the nouns Gemälde ‘painting’, Werk ‘work’, Bild ‘picture’ are neuter and
Zeichnung ‘drawing’ is feminine, the following, naturally occurring creation use is masculine (like the
painter).
(i)
Im Januar will er dort einen
Monet versteigern.
in January wants he there a-M-ACC Monet auction.off
In January he wants to auction off a Monet there.
That the creation use of a proper name does not simply inherit the gender of the creator is shown by the
fact that creations of female artists behave differently: whereas for most speakers feminine is the only
(less-than-perfect) option, some also allow masculine and yet others, nothing at all. While the mechanism
of this gender conflict is unclear, what is obvious is that it would not be expected if the use of a proper
name to denote a creation of its bearer had involved a meaning shift rather than derivation. Further
support of this view comes from the fact that for music pieces, for instance, only mass nouns can be
formed in German (Berit Gehrke, p.c.)—in other words, the process is lexically restricted for both its
input and its output.
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The Other Francis Bacon
The fact that proxy readings and creation uses of a proper name are connected to
the proper name bearer by a transparent semantic relation makes it possible for
Jeshion to suggest that the core examples of non-bare proper names are derived in
the same way and thus provide no evidence for treating bare proper names as
underlying predicates. It is therefore incumbent upon the predicational approach to
proper names to demonstrate that Sloat’s examples (5), as well as other examples
discussed in Sects. 1–3, are crucially different.
As discussed by Jeshion (to appear)-b, a clear syntactic diagnostic for singular
proper names is their ability to function as arguments without an overt article (while
giving rise to a definite interpretation). Applying this diagnostic to definites
anaphoric to proxy readings of proper names versus their creations yields
interestingly different results, neither of which behaves like the anaphoric reference
to a naming-predicational use of proper names in (58):18
(73) a. I own a Rembrandt and a Picasso. *(The) Picasso is hanging in my study.
b. I own two bikes: a Schwinn and a Gazelle. *(The) Gazelle is much
sturdier.
(74) There was an Elvis and a Cher at the Halloween party. (?The) Elvis was
perfect, but (?the) Cher wasn’t very good.
These contrasts also suggest that proxy readings and creation uses of proper
names should be treated differently from their naming-predicational use, and also
from each other. Further evidence for distinguishing naming-predicational uses
from all others comes from examples like (49): unlike all the derived uses discussed
so far, whose semantics necessarily involves a reference to a definite (existing and
identifiable) name bearer, proper names with a detectable naming component do
not. In other words, while the former are derived from the referential use of the
proper name, the latter are not and moreover, as I have argued in the previous
sections, cannot be.
4.2 Coerced Proper Name Predicates: Scalarity Coercion
A clear exception to the hypothesis that Jeshion’s examples are derived from the
referential use of the proper name, while predicate proper names are not, comes
from examples like the following, where the common noun derived from a proper
name does not refer to a particular name bearer:
18
I hypothesize that the presence of versus absence of the definite article correlates with the two options
available: anaphora to the coerced use in the first sentence requires the article (since it is essentially a
common noun), but a true proper name can also be used to refer to a proxy of its referent and then no
article is present. In other words, the optionality of the definite article in (74), but not in (73) depends on
whether the proper name can be used to refer to the entity that is introduced by its indefinite use. The fact
that the pattern is different for the naming-predicational antecedent in (58) suggests that the latter is not
derived.
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O. Matushansky
(75)
a. The new principal is such a Priscilla/an Orville.
b. Hookers have johns, ladies have abigails.
While the lowercase john and abigail have nothing to do with the proper names
that they are homophonous with from the point of view of their semantics, (75a) is
more complicated: as Jeshion (to appear)-a notes, the predicate is true of individuals
that have salient characteristics associated with the name itself (rather than with a
name bearer).
To handle such examples I follow Fara’s lead deriving them by a meaning shift
process that can be shown to also apply to common nouns. Crucially, this process
targets predicates rather than entities and applies to APs as well as to NPs:
(76)
a.
b.
The new principal is so French/more French than Napoleon.
The new principal is such a psychiatrist!
The shift from the property P to the property of having the stereotypical
properties associated with being P typically applies to non-scalar predicates in the
context of a degree operator or a degree modifier (Matushansky 2002a, b). The
applicability of this shift to proper names in (75a) is in fact expected once the
existence of naming predicates is established, yielding from the name Orville (λx. x
IS CALLED Orville) the derived predicate of having the stereotypical properties
associated with being an entity called Orville. The presupposition that entities in the
extension of the naming predicate that scalarity coercion applies to share properties
other than being called so is accommodated, leading to the inference that Priscillas
and Orvilles share some characteristics.
4.3 Proper Names of Pluralities
Apparent semantic content is what sets apart examples (60), where name bearers
belong to a particular family or dynasty. I propose to handle these examples by
arguing that they form part of a larger set of names of plural individuals, which can
have in their extension animate (77) or inanimate (78) entities:
(77) a. the Campbells, the Yorks
b. the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the
Monty Pythons
c. the Mets, the Mikes, the Tigers
(78) a.
b.
c.
d.
the
the
the
the
123
Alps, the Rockies
Hebrides, the Orkneys
Netherlands
Pleiades, the Hyades
familial or political clan
band, company
baseball or football team, Army
regiment
mountain chains
archipelagoes
conglomerate countries
constellations
The Other Francis Bacon
It seems unquestionable that the plural proper names in (78) denote pluralities,
since for most of them no singular form can be found, despite the fact that an
occasional Alp or a Hyade are attested online. On the other hand, animate (or
perhaps [+ human]) plural proper names, as in (77), generally allow back-formation
of a singular and therefore, of a bare plural:
(79) a.
b.
c.
(80) a.
b.
c.
(81) a.
b.
? an Alp, *a Rockie, *a Pyrenee
* two Hebrides, *many Orkneys
* the Netherland in question
If your surname is listed below, you can
claim to be a MacGregor.
A former Beatle has a new album coming
out.
How Ryan Braun almost became a Met.
The Kennedys usually win.
the Kennedy family
Kennedys usually win.
name bearers or members of
the Kennedy family
The hypothesis that the proper names in (77) and (78) denote pluralities explains
why they require an overt article in the definite singular, which is then constructed
on the basis of what is a common noun derived from the underlying the plural
proper name. I therefore disagree with both Fara (to appear), who calls them proper
nouns, and with Jeshion (to appear)-b, who proposes that they are derived from
proper names by processes analogous to those discussed in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2; if, as
no one would deny, the capitalized nouns in (78) are proper names, so are the
capitalized nouns in (77); it furthermore seems extremely unlikely that only
inanimate plural entities may have proper names, especially given that pluralia
tantum nouns may be animate (cf. German Leute ‘people’, Latin majores
‘ancestors’). The general failure of singular back-formation from inanimate plural
proper names still requires an explanation, but it is likely to be pragmatic or
cognitive rather than semantic or syntactic: given that pluralia tantum nouns
generally denote semi-individuated plural entities (Wierzbicka 1988), further
individuation required for the formation of the singular is far more likely for
animates (as also reflected in the relevance of animacy for various cases of
differential subject and object marking).
5 Conclusion
In this paper I argued that modified proper names provide conclusive evidence in
favor of the predicational approach to proper names, whereby a proper name
denotes a naming predicate. I showed that the hypothesis that proper names are
relational nouns whose internal argument is a naming relation can also straightforwardly account for the distribution of predicate proper names with and without a
123
O. Matushansky
detectable naming component in non-bare NPs headed by a proper name. Turning
then to the hypothesis that proper names are simple constants, I argued that it cannot
account for the same set of data because the naming-predicational interpretation of
proper names cannot be non-stipulatively derived from their simple-constant
interpretation. Finally, I examined other non-bare instances of proper names,
arguing that they are derived from naming-predicational and derived referential
proper names by the same meaning shift processes that target common NP
predicates and kinds.
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