‘Guardian of the International Order’? NATO’s Contested Identity and the Discourses
of Secretaries General after the Ukraine Crisis
Florian Böller
***draft paper: please do not cite or distribute ***
Abstract
This article examines the discourses of NATO’s secretaries general within the transatlantic
alliance in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Drawing on a social constructivist perspective, the comparative discourse analysis offers important insights regarding the role of a nongovernmental actor in transatlantic relations. So far, research on transatlantic relations rarely
investigated the discourses of NATO’s secretaries general. Despite increased attention toward
collective defense, both secretaries general argued for an alliance which is actively engaged
not only in regional but also global affairs. As other member states, especially Poland and the
Baltic States, embrace divisive notions of NATO’s self and perceived threats, the security
community’s collective identity remains contested.
Author Contact:
Dr. Florian Böller
Fulbright Visiting Scholar
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies
Harvard University
27 Kirkland Street at Cabot Way
02138 Cambridge, Mass. (USA)
Heimatuniversität: Technische Universität Kaiserslautern
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Tel.: +1(617) 998-5403
1
1. Introduction
The transatlantic alliance is currently facing several internal and external challenges: Russia’s
occupation of the Crimea peninsula and the expansion of the crisis toward Eastern Ukraine
led to a major disruption of the relations between Moscow and the West. The conflict in
Ukraine also challenges the alliance’s internal cohesion. Opinion polls show that public majorities in Eastern European NATO member states feel threatened by Russia’s renewed power
politics and doubt the security commitments of their allies.1 Under the Obama administration,
NATO’s traditional lead nation, the United States, sought to refocus attention to the AsiaPacific region and to rebalance against China’s military built-up. Initial statements by President Trump casted further doubt on the importance of transatlantic relations for the U.S.2
Meanwhile major European powers, such as France, Great Britain, and Germany, struggled to
overcome the debt crisis and gave little priority to the provision of common defense. In addition to the situation in Ukraine, the civil war in Syria, the rise of ‘ISIS,’ and the fragile status
of Afghanistan also pose significant security risks for NATO members. Here, the transatlantic
partners debate whether to continue their ‘out of area’ engagement in times of fiscal austerity
and instability in Europe’s security architecture. These challenges affect several vital aspects
of the Western alliance regarding its tasks (collective security vs. collective defense) and
threat perception (especially concerning Russia). In this context, European and North American partners struggle to re-define the collective identity of the transatlantic ‘security community.’3
The notion of a ‘security community’ highlights that transatlantic relations span wider than
common security interests and economic interdependences. Rather, social constructivists
hold, that the partnership is contingent on shared ideas, values and principles which form the
core of a transatlantic identity. This identity is not only determined by governments, but also
shaped by non-executive actors, such as national parliaments, political elites, and the public.4
Despite the increased scholarly attention to non-executive players, one important actor of the
security community has been largely ignored by International Relations research so far:
NATO’s secretary general (SecGen). Although he lacks formal powers, the SecGen can influence transatlantic discourses and contributes to the construction of a transatlantic collective
identity.
Drawing on a constructivist approach to transatlantic relations, this article investigates the role
of NATO’s secretaries general in shaping transatlantic discourses in the aftermath of the
2
Ukraine crisis. The article starts by describing the formal and informal resources of the
SecGen and the institutional position inside NATO’s organization. Section 3 provides an
overview of the literature on secretaries general within international organizations. Existing
research on secretaries general was largely unrelated to constructivist perspectives on transatlantic relations. Therefore, section 4 sets out a theoretical framework to grasp the role of
NATO’s SecGen as a discourse entrepreneur within the security community. The empirical
part of the article analyzes Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s and Jens Stoltenberg’s public rhetoric
and compares their discourses in view of the positions of selected member states.
The study offers insights for current debates on transatlantic relations. It shows that NATO’s
secretaries general reacted to the Ukraine crisis with an attempt to renew purpose and egodefinition in contrast to the perceived aggression posed by Russia. While both Rasmussen and
Stoltenberg argued for an alliance which is actively engaged not only on a regional but also
on a global scale, they differed considerably in terms of threat perception. However, as several NATO members, especially Poland and the Baltic states, embrace divisive notions of the
alliance’s self and threats, the security community’s identity remains contested.
2. Neither a Secretary nor a General:
Institutional and Political Roles of NATO’s Secretary General
The founding document of NATO, the treaty of Washington, did neither envision a centralized organization nor a supranational agency such as a secretary generalship for the transatlantic alliance. The North Atlantic Council constituted the only institutional body provided by
the treaty (Article 9, North Atlantic Treaty). The treaty’s vague formulation of proposing to
strengthen peaceful relations as well as economic ties (Article 2) left considerable room for
future debates about purpose and depth of the cooperation between NATO’s sovereign members. The experience of the Korean War led to the agreement that further military integration
between the member states was necessary to counter the perceived threat posed by the Soviet
Union.5 During the 1950s, European and North American partners intensified their cooperation with common defense planning, integrated command structures and the establishment of
a Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).6
At the Lisbon Summit in 1952, the allies decided to create the position of a secretary general.
At first, the SecGen’s tasks primarily included the buildup of the international staff at
3
NATO’s headquarters.7 The highly adversarial international environment and persisting national interests during the Cold War promoted the idea that military cooperation should be
supplemented by procedures of political consultation.8 Especially the Suez Crisis of 1956
forged the consensus to strengthen NATO’s institutions. Following the report of the ‘Three
Wise Men’―a commission led by the secretaries of state of Canada, Italy, and Norway―NATO’s Council decided to enhance the SecGen’s position.9 Since December 1956 the
tasks of the SecGen include three main areas:10
(1) The SecGen chairs the North Atlantic Council as well as several other high level committees such as the Nuclear Planning Group, the NATO-Russia Council or the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. While the SecGen has no formal authority within these bodies―only
member states and their representatives have voting rights and usually unanimity is required―the chairperson is responsible for the organization and agenda of the meetings. Secretaries general can thus use this institutional role to discuss specific topics or introduce new
ideas and projects. The position is also designed to facilitate cooperation and build consensus
in cases of disagreement among members.11
(2) In his efforts to foster cooperation and consultation among NATO members, the SecGen
acts not only within diplomatic circles or the organization’s committees. The SecGen is also
the alliance’s primary spokesperson and represents the organization in the media. In recent
years there has been a significant increase in efforts to highlight the institution’s media profile
and to wield its public diplomacy tools.12 As NATO’s public representative, the SecGen enjoys relative independence in issuing policy statements and initiatives without prior authorization of the North Atlantic Council.
(3) Finally, secretaries general serve as the principal of NATO’s international staff which includes the political body of the international organization but excludes its military arm.
NATO’s international staff currently counts 1,200 employees from 28 member states. While
this office primarily entails the bureaucratic steering of the organization, secretaries general
also possess some discretion with potential political implications such as the introduction of
reforms of NATO’s internal working structure.13
Even without formal voting powers, secretaries general hold a position which enables them to
impact transatlantic relations internally as well as externally. Within the alliance, secretaries
general can facilitate compromise between member states, set the agenda and launch new
policy initiatives. They can also articulate these ideas outside the organization using their
4
competences as NATO’s prime spokespersons. A highly developed security community entails several channels of communication through which various actors can interact and consult
with each other. The SecGen’s institutional position shows that these transatlantic interactions
are not confined to the actions of nation states and their respective executives, but also entail
an internationalized level.14
3. Leadership, Agency, and Norms:
The Secretary General and Transatlantic Relations Research
During most of the Cold War era, the bipolar confrontation between the Soviet Union and
Western democracies led to a military focus of the transatlantic alliance. In this context, it was
primarily NATO’s SACEUR which played a key role as the representative of Western security cooperation. The fact that a U.S. general―and thus a representative of the alliance’s lead
nation―traditionally served as SACEUR contributed to the perception of the military’s supreme weight within the organization.15
The end of the Cold War led to a redefinition of NATO’s mission. Within this transformation
from a collective defense organization to a regional security provider, NATO’s secretaries
general became increasingly visible and active. While Cold War secretaries general tended to
focus on diplomatic efforts of intra-alliance conflict-management, post-Cold War secretaries
general developed distinct political profiles.16 The diversification of NATO’s tasks and missions enabled secretaries general to pursue a political agenda beyond conducting diplomacy
behind the scenes. Most notably, secretaries Manfred Wörner (1988-1994), Javier Solana
(1995-1999), and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2009-2014) have been described as active policymakers.17 Wörner urged the member states to engage militarily in the evolving Balkan conflict during the 1990s and thus he contributed to NATO’s first ‘out of area’ intervention.
Likewise, studies highlight Solana’s role during the decision-making process prior to NATO’s
air campaign against Serbia.18 In the case of Rasmussen, some observers even consider the
Danish SecGen as a ‘supranational actor.’19 This assessment is based on Rasmussen’s policy
initiatives which have been criticized as uncoordinated with member states, for example regarding Rasmussen’s involvement in the Middle-East peace process or his actions prior to the
Libya intervention 2011.
5
Taking into account the few theory-informed accounts on NATO’s secretary generalship,
most notably the in-depth studies by Ryan Hendrickson,20 and the wider literature on international organization’s executives, it is possible to distinguish between three research perspectives.
(1) The high profile in media and public awareness of secretaries general suggests that individual factors shape the ability of policy-makers to wield influence within international organizations. Among the first studies on the topic of secretaries general, Michael Schechter applied approaches of organizational theory to examine specific leadership styles. Schechter
(1987: 213) analyzed how the personality of executives interacts with organizational and systemic factors within institutions such as the World Bank, UNESCO and the United Nations
Development Programme.21 Kent Kille and Roger Scully updated Schechter’s framework to
compare the leadership roles of NATO and United Nations secretaries general. Based on interviews, their results hinted at cognitive dispositions affecting the behavior of executives
within international organizations. Secretaries general with highly ‘expansionist’ personal
traits―such as the need for power or the belief of having control over events―were likely to
push for an increased role of their organization.22
(2) A different strand of the literature on international organizations relies on a rationalist perspective to model the relationship between nation states and non-governmental executives.
This principal-agent perspective highlights that not individual but structural factors shape the
role of secretaries general within their institutions. Informational advantages, lack of accountability, and bureaucratic ‘slack’ might lead to increased independence of the agent.23 However, principal-agent approaches hold that the autonomy of secretaries general to implement
independent policy ideas is rather restricted because the interests of nation states are exogenous and not subject to specific changes that might originate from the actions of nongovernmental actors.24
(3) A third approach uses a constructivist perspective to analyze the role of secretaries general. From this point of view, heads of international organizations are understood as ‘norm
entrepreneurs’25 rather than rational agents or individual leaders. Examining the role of
Boutros Boutros-Ghali during the Cold War, Simon Rushton for example showed how the
United Nations SecGen implemented the norm of democracy promotion within the discourse
of his organization.26 The constructivist perspective argues that even without material re-
6
sources or formal discretion, immaterial factors such as moral authority or the communality of
societal norms and ideas empower secretaries general.27
The leadership perspective and principal-agent-analyses focus on the abilities and power of
the actor. Applied to the NATO context, both approaches would only allow for a narrow understanding of the SecGen’s role within the transatlantic alliance. In view of current crises
such as the Ukraine conflict, there exists a permanent struggle to (re)define the terms of the
transatlantic partnership. As secretaries general are part of this intra-alliance conflictmanagement, it is promising to conceptionalize the role of secretaries general in broader terms
to gain a more comprehensive understanding of their contribution to the ongoing deliberations.
Therefore, the constructivist approach to non-governmental heads of international organizations offers a more fruitful connection to the rich constructivist literature on transatlantic relations. By linking both fields it is also possible to fill a research gap, as the only theoretically
informed NATO SecGen studies have relied on the leadership framework so far.28
4. The Security Community Concept:
A Constructivist Framework to Analyze NATO’s SecGen as a Discourse Agent
Drawing on a constructivist framework, NATO’s secretaries general produce transatlantic
discourses regarding the security community’s shared identity.29 Through social interaction
with other actors of the alliance, secretaries general might respond to national experiences
(forwarded by member states and their societies) and collective norms as well as proposing
new ideas independently. It is not the aim of the analysis to assign causality to the SecGen’s
contribution to the formation of transatlantic identity.30 Rather it should be expected that the
ideational frames of member states and the SecGen influence each other and constitute the
security community’s core layers.
4.1 Elements of the Transatlantic Security Community’s Identity
The relevance of an investigation of the alliance’s identity lies in its constitutive function.
Collective identity can be understood as the self-description of a group in relation to others
based on shared values, historical experiences and ideas.31 Processes of identity construction
7
fundamentally rest on defining the group’s self, including its scope, values and missions, and
the contrasting foil of the alter-perception of the community, which entails the sensitivity toward threats, challenges and risks.32 As NATO consists of a very diverse group of states with
distinct national experiences, members contribute specific ideas to the identity formation as
well as concerning the actions of the alliance. Those ideas and values can be congruent or
they might collide. Interactions thus might lead to a contested collective identity which remains incongruent with existing national identities, resulting in a permanent struggle to redefine the alliance’s ideational core.
a) Self-definition: The first element of identity establishes how members of the alliance understand themselves and how belonging to the community is defined (outside formal requirements of membership). The retention of pluralistic security communities depends on the
‘compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making,’ as Karl Deutsch put it.33
In its preamble, the Washington Treaty of 1949 mentioned that the community is ‘founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ and acknowledged the
United Nations Charter, thus codifying normative core of the transatlantic partnership. In addition to values, the self-description of the alliance also includes a definition of its purpose.
Here, the central provision of the treaty is enshrined in Article 5 which stipulates that any attack on one member is considered as an attack against all. Article 5 therefore defines a system
of collective defense as the alliance’s central purpose. This norm of reciprocity ensures that
members of the community share ‘mutually successful predictions of behavior.’34
During the Cold War era, collective defense remained the cornerstone of the security community’s self-description. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the
alliance lost its primary reference point for the collective defense purpose. As other parts of
the identity remained stable, members of the security community were able to forge a new
consensus to broaden the purpose of the alliance from collective defense to collective security.35 Relying on core liberal values, proponents of collective security justified ‘out of area’missions as part of the security community’s purpose. Military interventions in the Balkan
conflicts during the 1990s could be seen as stabilizing European security, but also promoting
democratic values and defending human rights.36
The alliance’s Strategic Concepts of 1999 and 2010 affirmed NATO’s intention to enlarge its
traditional purpose of collective defense by also engaging in crisis management operations
and cooperative security.37 While Strategic Concepts provide a framework and orientation for
8
the security community, the balance between collective defense and collective security within
NATO’s identity remained ambiguous and contested. After the admission of former Warsaw
Pact states, the new Eastern European members demanded a higher prioritization of collective
defense than their partners in Western Europe and North America. And although Article 5
was invoked for the first time after the attacks on Washington and New York on September
11, 2001, the subsequent collective security efforts in Afghanistan led to a disillusion with the
prospects of success for democracy promotion abroad.38
The divergent positions within the transatlantic security community on the question of how
important the elements of collective defense and collective security are, became visible again
during the Ukraine crisis. Here, Eastern European members called for efforts to strengthen the
original purpose of the alliance (see under 5.3).
Overall, the security community’s self-description oscillates between the narrower depiction
of collective defense and the broader definition of an alliance that actively promotes security
in the name of liberal values.
b) Alter-perception: Identity conceptions not only describe a ‘self’ but also set boundaries in
relation to others. In international relations, this outside can be considered as dangerous and
threatening in contrast to the expectation of ‘mutual sympathy and loyalties’39 among the
members of the community. Upon the founding of the transatlantic alliance, the Soviet Union
provided NATO a suitable enemy image. When the Cold War heated up in the 1950s and
1960s, the perceived threat by the Soviet empire helped drawing a sharp line between the
West and East.
Similar to other parts of the collective identity, the construction of an ‘alter’ entails several
distinct and potentially divergent components. Some members of the alliance will perceive the
threat posed by Russia in the 21st century as highly dangerous, while other partners will not
consider Moscow as an imminent security risk. Threat perceptions by member states are informed by historical experiences and other factors such as geographical distance. According
to a recent survey, 60 percent of respondents in Poland considered Russia a major threat to its
neighboring countries, while a majority in Germany (48% of respondents) thought of Russia
as only a minor threat.40
Whether certain events or actors outside the alliance are considered dangerous needs to be
interpreted by the group. Members of the community will deliberate which international con9
flicts and challenges pose vital threats to its existence. In this process of threat perception,
national as well as transnational ideas will influence the alliance’s depiction of the ‘other.’
According to this ideal-typed conception of self-definition and alter-perception, a twodimensional identity landscape of the security community unfolds (see figure 1): On the dimension of defining NATO’s self, the globally-oriented discourse is in contrast to an alliance
which perceives itself primarily within a regional scope. This narrower identity construction
advocates a NATO which focuses on collective defense instead of resource-intensive ‘out of
area missions’ to manage international crises, build partnerships outside the Washington Treaty and provide collective security.
The alter-perception of potential enemies and threats leads to confrontation or cooperation as
preferred strategic preferences. If actors perceive only limited security threats directed at the
member states and advocate to deal with security challenges preferably through diplomatic
measures, they opt for cooperation. In contrast to a cooperation-oriented approach, high levels
of threat perception generate the need for confrontational strategies to manage the security
risks directed at vital aspects of the alliance.
Figure 1: Dimensions of NATO’s Collective Identity
Confrontational
Alter-perception
Regional
Cooperative
Global
Self-definition
4.2 Method of Discourse Analysis
The following analysis will investigate the discourses of NATO’s secretaries general. With
discourses actors “make sense of the material world.”41 Discourses can be understood as
10
communicative processes which constitute societal debates, introduce value-based arguments
and construct social reality.42 Applied to the case of NATO’s secretary generalship, the focus
lies on the formation of the security community’s identity within the discourse. On the one
hand, the ideas produced by the speakers take place within the institutional context of the alliance―as mentioned above, secretaries general perform a specific institutional role within
NATO. On the other hand, secretaries general are also able to influence how members of
NATO think about its values, purposes and the challenges the alliance faces. Thus, as Vivien
Schmidt notes, ‘discursive abilities are essential to explaining institutional change, because
they refer to peoples’ ability (...) to deliberate about them, to persuade themselves as well as
others to change their minds about their institutions, and then to take action (...).’43 Accordingly, by looking at how secretaries general communicate, one will be able to grasp their contribution to a process of making sense of the institution of NATO and its policies of adapting
towards new developments such as the Ukraine crisis.
Discourses consist of several discursive frames. Speakers use specific frames to legitimize
their political position vis-à-vis existing normative settings. The discourse analysis aims at
identifying frames which the speakers use to describe NATO’s self as well as the depiction of
others, including threats, challenges and obstacles. The coding proceeded in two steps. First,
the text corpus was inductively screened to identify recurrent themes and items relevant to
self-description and ‘othering.’ Second, using the resulting coding scheme (see table 1), the
corpus was analyzed by filtering typical and significant elements within the discourse relevant
to the research focus. This qualitative assessment entails at heuristic approach to the structure
and content of the text.44 The resulting codings will be contextualized in section 5 in terms of
their meaning for the identity construction and the political context of the Ukraine crisis. The
comparative setting of two NATO secretaries general requires interpreting patterns not only
within but also between the speakers.
The research period spans from February 28, 2014, which marked the beginning of the crisis
in Ukraine, to February 12, 2015, when the Minsk II accord was reached. This time frame
allows for a comparison of both NATO secretaries general in office during the Ukraine crisis.
The text corpus for the analysis included all major political statements by the SecGen, excluding procedural remarks or short greeting addresses prior to political meetings as retrieved via
NATO’s official media database. This selection of 86 speeches (43 for each SecGen) aimed at
a representative sample of significant discursive contributions by the two speakers. However,
11
it only captures public records and excludes other potential sources of the secretaries general’s
speech acts, for example closed door meetings.
Based on this data corpus, the analysis identified 229 codings related to the question of identity from the two speakers. All coded arguments can be found in an appendix available for
download.45 Table 1 summarizes the quantity of the codings. Both speakers emphasized collective security as one of NATO’s main purposes in addition to the traditional task of collective defense. Rasmussen’s discourse mentioned the transatlantic bond between Europe and the
U.S. as well as universal values more frequently than Stoltenberg. The Danish SecGen also
referred more often to Russia directly while Stoltenberg described challenges to European
security several times in more general terms. In addition, Rasmussen’s discourse featured the
recurrent theme of an interdependency of threats, and Stoltenberg pointed to the threat of terrorism more frequently. As the emphasis of this research design rests on a qualitative interpretation of the speeches, table 1 only provides only a first impression on the results which need
to be contextualized in the next chapter.
Table 1: Coding Scheme and Quantity of Codings of Discourse Analysis
Code
Sub code
Quantity of codings
Alter-perception
Self-description
Purposes (in general)
Collective defense
Collective security
Values
Rule-based system, international
order
Transatlantic bond
Universal values (democracy,
freedom)
Loci
Challenges to European Security
in general
Asia-Pacific as a challenge
Russia as a challenge/threat
Issues
Cyber security as a challenge
Terrorism as a challenge/threat
Global dimension / interdependence of challenges / threats
Total number of codings
12
Sum
n
6
25
35
8
in %
2,6
10,9
15,3
3,5
Rasmussen
n in %
3
2,3
12
9,4
19 14,8
4
3,1
Stoltenberg
n
in %
3
3,0
13
12,9
16
15,8
4
4,0
17
24
7,4
10,5
11
17
8,6
13,3
6
7
5,9
6,9
9
3,9
1
0,8
8
7,9
1
59
2
20
23
0,4
25,8
0,9
8,7
10,0
1
38
1
6
15
0,8
29,7
0,8
4,7
11,7
0
21
1
14
8
0,0
20,8
1,0
13,9
7,9
229
100,0
128 100,0
101
100,0
5. Common Values, Divergent Threat Perceptions:
Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s and Jens Stoltenberg’s Discourses in the Wake of the
Ukraine Crisis
The Ukraine crisis provides the immediate political context of the discourses by Rasmussen
and Stoltenberg. The annexation of the Crimea peninsula and the conflict in the Donbas region have been on top of NATO’s agenda since the start of the crisis in February 2014. Prior
to Russia’s intervention, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych was removed from office in
the wake of the ‘Euromaidan’ protests. In a commentary entitled ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is
the West’s Fault,’ John Mearsheimer argued that Russia’s actions were aimed at preventing a
further expansion of NATO on Ukraine’s territory. 46 To be sure, the crisis of NATO-Russia
relations predates this immediate prelude in Ukraine. The West’s relationship to Moscow witnessed several significant strains since the end of the Cold War: NATO’s first ‘out of area’
missions in the Balkan Wars during the 1990s brought the Western alliance at odds with Moscow. Russia perceived the policy of active international engagement and enlargement of the
transatlantic alliance as a challenge to its spheres of interest. Especially, attempts by NATO
and the European Union to intensify their cooperation with Ukraine as well as Georgia have
been met with increased distrust by Russia. Since the colored revolution between 2003 and
2005, Moscow sees its historically close ties with both countries fading. This became already
visible at the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, when Russia sought to ensure its
power position by military force.47 Compared to the situation of 2008 however, the Ukraine
conflict clearly marked a new level of confrontation between Russia and the West since the
break-up of the Soviet Union. For the first time after 1991, Western countries not only dismissed Moscow’s actions in harsh diplomatic reactions but also issued economic sanctions
against Russia, suspended the NATO-Russia Council and excluded Moscow from participating in the G8 summits. The supposedly ‘strong and constructive partnership,’ which the 2010
Strategic Concept envisioned for NATO-Russia relations was visibly disrupted.48 How the
speakers, Rasmussen and Stoltenberg, used this crisis to construct elements of NATO’s self in
relation to others will be examined in the following sections. Their discourses will then be
compared to the identity landscape of the security community.
13
5.1 NATO’s Definition of Self
The disruption of East-West relations in the wake of the Ukraine crisis seemed to give way to
a renewal of NATO’s original purpose: collective defense. Indeed, in every major speech
since the beginning of the crisis both Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that the principle of collective self-defense remains the cornerstone of NATO. Stoltenberg even used the uncommon rhetorical figure of personalization in order to underline the
importance of this purpose:
As a child in Norway during the Cold War, I didn’t know much about Article 5 or
the Washington Treaty. But I did know that NATO was there to protect us. I felt
safe, because of NATO. Later as a young conscript in the Norwegian Army, we
were trained to hold out. In the secure knowledge that our Allies would quickly
come to our rescue.49
It is interesting to note, that Stoltenberg repeatedly used the terms ‘we’ and ‘us’ to connect to
the idea of collective defense, thus constructing elements of identity ranging from a personal
‘I’ to a ‘national’ (Norwegian) and finally a ‘transnational’ group definition. In Rasmussen’s
discourse, comparable identity-related frames can be found. In a speech at the University of
Tallinn, Estonia in May 2014, Rasmussen aligned the aspect of collective defense with the
question of what defines NATO as an alliance:
First, what we do in NATO. It is to safeguard every one of our 28 Allied countries. That commitment is enshrined in Article 5, the collective defence clause of
our founding treaty. It is central to what we are as an Alliance, and to what we do
together as Allies.50
Speaking in front of an Estonian audience, Rasmussen’s rhetoric sought to identify a mutual
understanding of the allies based on the idea of collective defense. In view of Estonia’s historical experience with Russia, Rasmussen’s discourse also tried to reassure the Baltic member
states of NATO’s commitment to territorial defense.
Yet, both secretaries general refrained from a narrow definition of common purposes as a
consequence of the Ukraine crisis. At the same event in Tallinn, Rasmussen defined that ‘being a NATO member’ means more than territorial defense. The identity construction of Rasmussen thereby included the purpose of collective security:
14
Because being a NATO member is not only a privilege. It’s also a duty. (...) Part of
that collective responsibility is to be ready to respond to all the different risks and
threats that we face today. And this includes not only Russia’s current behaviour. (...) In order to deal with this wide range of challenges, our Strategic Concept
identifies three core tasks for NATO. Collective defence, crisis management and
cooperative security. And all three tasks remain valid.51
In his remarks at Carnegie Europe in Brussels in September 2014, Rasmussen also highlighted NATO’s international commitment: (...) as we approach the end of over a decade of combat operations in Afghanistan, we see pressures to turn inward. (...) Challenges will not go
away just because we look away. So now of all times, we must keep a global perspective.’52
The scope of Rasmussen’s identity construction here entailed a global and not only Western
dimension. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2015, Stoltenberg showed a similar perspective in describing NATO’s self and the global role it should play: ‘NATO has been
a resolute guardian of the international order. That order is being challenged. And we must do
our utmost to protect it.’53 While both secretaries general acknowledged the need to strengthen NATO’s defensive capabilities despite fiscal constraints, Rasmussen and Stoltenberg did
not want to turn back time to a Cold War alliance whose primary raison d’être had been collective defense. On the contrary, the Scandinavian secretaries general depicted NATO as an
organization that should contribute to stability in the world and not only within the transatlantic region.
The broad scope of Rasmussen’s and Stoltenberg’s identity constructions was also connected
to a value-based self-description. NATO’s strength would result from the fact that the security
community consists of democratic member states. Stoltenberg for example held, ‘that only a
transatlantic Alliance of democracies could provide’54 a high level of security for its member
states. And vice versa, the provision of security is also a necessary condition for democracies: ‘Security is the foundation for our freedom and our open societies; for our prosperity;
and for our ability to address other great challenges of our time – such as poverty and climate
change.’55
Besides the internal function of providing security for NATO’s societies, the discourses of the
two secretaries general also depicted the image of an alliance which acts externally as a global
force for democratic values. These democratic values would contribute to stability and peace
outside the borders of the Washington treaty, as Stoltenberg put it:
15
In the longer run, we must help our eastern neighbours to stay on the path of democracy and reform. To fight corruption, open up their economies and build efficient institutions. This is good for them. And it is good for us.56
On the one hand, the immediate context of Stoltenberg’s argument was the Ukraine crisis and
NATO’s partnership programs with Georgia and Ukraine. On the other hand, the SecGen
hinted at a traditional argument of Democratic Peace Theory, whereas democracies make the
world safer. This narration was also observable in Rasmussen’s discourse on the values of the
transatlantic community: ‘For decades, the world has profited from a liberal international order, a cooperative order of states observing common rules and norms, embracing freedom,
market economy and democracy, and renouncing territorial conquest.’57 This credo of democratic principles is all but new. However, at a time when active international engagement for
liberal values is met with increased skepticism in Western societies, it seemed important for
the secretaries general to reaffirm this commitment and use the Ukraine crisis to highlight the
relevance of liberal values. In the discourses of Rasmussen and Stoltenberg, Russia’s actions
in Ukraine were contrasted with NATO’s own principles based on democracy and international law. The anti-foil of Russia thus served to reinforce NATO’s identity. Rasmussen’s
speech in Tallinn featured this process of differentiation:
We are driven by a desire to protect our values as much as our territory and our
people. Freedom. Democracy. The rule of international law. The inviolability of
borders. And the right of nations to decide their own security arrangements. These
values and these norms are essential for our way of life. (…) But now, Russia is
violating these very values.58
Especially in Rasmussen’s discursive frames, affirming NATO’s values not only served to
portray a stark contrast towards Russia. The Danish SecGen also pointed to liberal values in
order to highlight the link between Europe and North America. According to Rasmussen’s
argument, ‘North America and Europe have been the inspiration and the driving force of that
(liberal) order. To uphold it now, we must continue to stand together.’59 The transatlantic
bond here seems to represent an essential part of the alliance’s collective identity legitimized
by liberal values and bound by global responsibility.
16
5.2 Russia as NATO’s ‘Other’
The self-ascribed near-universal scope of NATO (‘guardian of the international order’) was
connected to a similar perception of challenges from outside. Both secretaries general
acknowledged security risks inside as well as outside of Europe. Looking back at 2014, Stoltenberg bemoaned at the 2015 Munich Security Conference that this was a ‘black year for our
security.’60 The former Norwegian prime minister elaborated on two central security challenges for NATO. On the one hand, the Ukraine crisis and on the other hand the development
of a ‘violent extremism’ in the global ‘south.’ Regarding the perception of ISIS as a threat to
the security of NATO, Stoltenberg’s discursive frames offered many similarities to his predecessor. Rasmussen repeatedly mentioned Islamist terrorism as an important source of global
instability. At the same time, the threat perception of both secretaries general showed the most
visible dissimilarities. It is only in regards to the dangers posed by extremist groups such as
ISIS that Stoltenberg spoke of a ‘threat’ for transatlantic security: ‘To the south, violent extremism is a growing threat. To counter this threat, we must reinforce our security at home.’61
In contrast to Stoltenberg, Rasmussen included Ukraine in his discourses on threats. The analysis of Stoltenberg’s discourse shows, that while condemning Russia’s behavior in the
Ukraine conflict as a breach of international law, he primarily considered this situation in
terms of the negative consequences for Russia’s target state and not for NATO’s security itself: ‘The causes are clear and cannot be denied. Russia continues to provide training, equipment, and forces in support of the separatists, and it continues to destabilise Ukraine in utter
disregard for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’62 Stoltenberg thus contained
the conflict’s space and refrained from using the incident to recast the alter-part of NATO’s
identity. This becomes clear by comparing Stoltenberg’s framing of the crisis to Rasmussen’s:
‘Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine are outrageous. They are irresponsible, they are illegal,
they are illegitimate.’63 Up to this sentence, Rasmussen’s language might be stronger, but the
factual depiction remained within Stoltenberg’s argument. In the second part of the discursive
frame, Rasmussen delimited the conflict:
But the crisis we face today is not only about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
By demonstrating a willingness to use force to intimidate and invade its neighbours, and by declaring a doctrine of protecting Russian speakers everywhere,
Russia has created uncertainty, instability and insecurity across our continent. And
across the whole Euro-Atlantic area.64
17
Rasmussen’s discourse portrayed a threat posed by Russia’s ‘aggression against Ukraine’ to
Europe’s security while highlighting that this would affect the safety of NATO’s core region
(‘our continent’).
Throughout the investigated time period, Stoltenberg described Russia as a challenge but not
as a threat. For example after meeting German Chancellor Angela Merkel in January 2015,
Stoltenberg summarized their conversation: ‘We also discussed the challenges we are facing
to the east. And we see that international law is violated, and that the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Ukraine is not respected.’65 Not only on this occasion Stoltenberg refrained from framing Russia’s behavior or the context of the crisis in Ukraine as an immediate
threat to the security of NATO and its member states. This contrast to Rasmussen became
obvious already after Stoltenberg’s assumption of office in September 2014. Responding to
the question of a U.S. journalist on whether he would see Russia as an adversary like Rasmussen did, Stoltenberg declared:
(...) Russia is in breach with its national obligation, and in breach with international law. And therefore, we underlined... (sic!) and I repeated today that we have
to see that Russia change its behaviour and its actions; and return to compliance
with international law and with its international obligations.66
Although Stoltenberg avoided to answer the question directly, he refused to portray an enemy
image of Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis. Rasmussen in comparison repeatedly
used the term of an ‘arc of crisis’ to describe his perception of the outside of the security
community.67 According to this threat perception, terrorism and the situation in Ukraine exist
on a similar level:
There is an arc of crisis and instability that stretches from East to South. And it
poses a threat to our populations. And our territory. We see challenges on a scale
we have not seen for over two decades. And they will endure for years to come.
We need to face this fact. To the East, there is Russia. We have tried long and
hard to build a partnership with Russia. In a way that respects Russia’s security
concerns, and based on international rules and norms.68
The quoted paragraph captures Rasmussen’s alter-ego construction: A hostile outside with
Russia as the source of threats to ‘our territory’ and the self-image of NATO’s rule and norm
based actions. In May 2014 in Tallinn, Rasmussen also developed an argument on how Russia
18
is to be perceived as a threat to NATO’s security. Referring the NATO-Russia act, the
SecGen explained that non-permanent troop deployments would be legitimate, ‘in the event of
defence against a threat of aggression.’69 This type of threat, Rasmussen continued, would be
posed by Russia’s behavior in the Ukraine:
That’s how we have stated it in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. And we clearly
see such a threat now. The fact is the security environment has changed dramatically. So NATO is taking legitimate defensive steps to deal with the instability
created by Russia’s illegitimate aggressive actions.70
Again, Rasmussen’s rhetoric not only condemned Russia’s behavior, it also constructed a
reality where the security of NATO itself is endangered by an enemy of the security community: Russia ‘(…) exports instability. It reduces the potential to cooperate and build trust. And,
ultimately it undermines our security.’71
As Rasmussen’s speech in Washington in March 2014 demonstrated, the NATO SecGen’s
denunciation of Russia’s sought to emphasize the difference between NATO as a club of democracies on the one hand and Russia on the other hand:
Russia pledged not to threaten or use force against Ukraine. By turning its back on
that agreement, Russia has called into question its credibility and reliability as an
international actor. (...) Because on its current course, Russia is choosing increased international isolation.72 There are no quick and easy ways to stand up to
global bullies. Because our democracies debate, deliberate, and consider the options before taking decisions. Because we value transparency and seek legitimacy
for our choices. And because we see force as the last, not the first, resort.73
In these remarks, Rasmussen combined the alter-construction of Russia’s questioned ‘credibility and reliability’ with the self-description of NATO’s respect for international law and
democratic decision-making. While not directly naming Russia a ‘global bully’, the textual
proximity underscores Rasmussen’s denunciation of Russia’s behavior.
The difference in the construction of the ‘other’ between Stoltenberg and Rasmussen also
informed the strategies that the actors recommended. While both secretaries general held that
NATO should respond to the Ukraine crisis by strengthening its defensive capabilities―Rasmussen and Stoltenberg repeatedly underlined the importance of the new Readiness
Action Plan74 approved at the 2014 Wales Summit―Stoltenberg highlighted opportunities for
19
cooperation with Russia. Rasmussen on the contrary rejected a return to ‘business as usual.’
Instead, he deliberated on ‘tough decisions,’ which NATO should take ‘in view of the longterm strategic impact of Russia’s aggression on our own security.’75 By stating that ‘NATO
does not seek confrontation with Russia,’76 Stoltenberg promoted a more cooperative strategy
in response to the situation in Ukraine―despite ongoing hostilities in Eastern Ukraine and the
instability of the conflict throughout the investigated time frame. Nonetheless, the more cooperative approach towards Russia visible in the discourse of Stoltenberg did not prevent the
SecGen’s assessment that Russia would need to be held responsible for ignoring international
law with its power politics in Ukraine: ‘To our East, Russia is trying to replace the rule of law
with the rule of force.’77
5.3 NATO’s Identity Landscape and the Contributions of Rasmussen and Stoltenberg
During the Ukraine crisis, the discourses of the two secretaries general reaffirmed NATO’s
responsibility to both collective defense and collective security. While it seems obvious that
NATO’s original purpose of territorial defense regained attention in the wake of Russia’s policies, NATO’s global scope cannot be seen as self evident. In terms of NATO’s selfdescription Rasmussen as well as Stoltenberg linked the alliance’s commitment to universal
values to its central tasks and missions. The self-image constructed within the discourses was
reinforced by the speakers by contrasting NATO vis-à-vis existing challenges and threats.78
Here, only Rasmussen clearly identified Russia as a threat. But both discourses can be understood as a process of differentiation in which Russia does not comply with a rule-based world
order, while ISIS contributes to global instability.79 According to the secretaries general,
NATO therefore must act as a ‘guardian of international order’ 80 (see the argumentative map
in figure 2).
20
Figure 2: Argumentative Map of the Identity Discourses by NATO’s Secretaries General
Setting Rasmussen’s and Stoltenberg’s contributions in perspective to the ongoing identity
debates among the members of the transatlantic security community, it is clear that the globally oriented approach favored by the secretaries general cannot count on unanimous support.
Especially Poland and the Baltic states used the Ukraine crisis to promote their long-favored
argument of strengthening NATO’s Article 5 and to refocus on regional security concerns of
the member states. Estonia’s president Thomas Ilves for example argued in March 2014 that
‘(t)he raison d’etre of NATO is to defend members of the Alliance (...). And so a refocus on
the original idea of NATO is what must come out of Wales.’81 These ‘regional defenders’
criticized collective security efforts such as promoting democracy and stability in regions that
are only remotely connected to vital security concerns of Eastern NATO members.82 Poland
and the Baltic states also demanded an increased presence of NATO troops on their territory.
And although the September 2014 Wales Summit Declaration laid out several measures to
strengthen the alliance’s defensive capacities, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda pushed for
21
the establishment of permanent bases in the East, thus emphasized the aspect of collective
defense.83
On the dimension of alter construction and enemy images, Poland and the Baltic member
states stressed their perception of Russia as a vital security threat. Then-President Bronislaw
Komorowski of Poland stated in June 2015, that ‘(t)hreats resulting from Russia’s aggression
on Ukraine have become a lasting phenomenon.’84 In addition, in a letter signed by 200 public
figures from the Baltic states, Russia was identified as a threat to the security community:
This conflict touches all of us, because Russian aggression against Ukraine is a
threat not just to that country. (… Russia) will undermine peace and prosperity in
all of Europe, because its goal is the return of the territories and spheres of influence once possessed by the Soviet Union.85
Unlike Poland and the Baltic member states, the United States, Great Britain and Canada traditionally favor a global approach as part of NATO’s self-definition.86 And President George
W. Bush’s maximalist vision of a ‘Global NATO’87 did not continue to guide U.S. NATO
policies, the Obama administration continued to favor a broad scope of the security community. The U.S. policy after the Ukraine crisis hereby aimed at two goals: Reassuring Eastern
member states by identifying common values and underscoring the indivisibility of alliance
security, and insisting on the need for an active alliance with a global scope.88 On the dimension of framing threats and risks to the security community, the United States also differed
considerably from the confrontational approach favored by Poland, the Baltic member states,
and Rasmussen. The Obama administration identified Russia as responsible for the conflict
and accused Moscow of breaking international law.89 However, Obama was careful not to
portray Russia as a threat to U.S. security. The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy mentioned Russia as a challenge and not as a threat while stressing that ‘we will keep the door
open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interests.’90
Regarding the preferred cooperative approach the U.S. joined other West European NATO
members such as Norway and Germany. In April 2014, Germany’s Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier noted unease with Rasmussen’s offensive rhetoric and
emphasized that all diplomatic channels must remain open.91 In the same vein, the Norwegian
Minister of Defense Ine Eriksen Søriede articulated the country’s perception of Russia: ‘To be
clear: We do not consider Russia to be a direct military threat to Norway or to Norwegian
interests in the current situation.’92
22
While the U.S. position resembled Germany’s and Norway’s approach by favoring a cooperative strategy, the two European allies were more hesitant to accept the global scope of NATO,
especially after the Ukraine crisis. Eriksen Søriede argued that ‘(t)he political situation in Europe requires attention and focus.’93 Steinmeier conceded that ‘after years of intense crisis
management on the Balkans and in Afghanistan, collective defense should be the focus of the
alliance.’94
While this overview cannot account for the variety of the security community’s identity landscape in every detail, it suffices the purpose of outlining key cleavages inside the alliance and
typical proponents of those positions (see table 2).
Table 2: NATO’s Identity Landscape
Self-definition
Alter-perception
Global
Regional
Confrontation
Cooperation
SecGen Rasmussen
SecGen Stoltenberg
U.S.A
Poland
Germany
Baltics
Norway
6. Conclusion
External crises can challenge the transatlantic alliance’s internal cohesion. Especially if national threat perceptions vary and if the member states value the importance of NATO’s tasks
and missions differently. The conflict in Ukraine posed such as challenge to the security
community. In times of crises, members of the alliance try to ‘make sense’ of the situation
and deliberate on the consequences for their partnership. This article analyzed the discourses
of NATO’s secretaries general within the ongoing debate over the alliance’s raison d’être and
perception of threats. As secretaries general shape the transatlantic alliance’s collective identity through their position as highly visible public figures and within the communicative structures of NATO, their discourses should not be overlooked—as international relations research
has mostly done.
23
Both Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Jens Stoltenberg sought to capitalize on the Ukraine crisis
by refocusing on the alliance’s original purpose: collective defense. The discourses of the two
secretaries general also aimed at striking a balance between collective defense and collective
security vis-à-vis the current crisis. Already NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 stipulated
that the alliance should not only provide security for its members, but also engage in crisis
management and cooperative security.95 Yet after NATO’s prime example of implementing
liberal goals through military force, the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan, produced dismal results, and in view of increased war weariness among European and U.S. publics, support for a
global orientation of the alliance remained fragile.96 In addition, Eastern European member
states called for increased collective defense efforts despite the 2014 Wales Summit decisions
to introduce new measures such as the Readiness Action Plan or bilateral commitments by the
U.S. (European Reassurance Initiative). It is therefore surprising that the ‘global guardian’
frames by Rasmussen and Stoltenberg still figured prominently within the discourse.
Beyond collective defense, the situation in Ukraine indeed served as an anchor point to emphasize the need for global engagement: The occupation of the Crimea peninsula in violation
of international law and the following territorial transgressions of Russia in Eastern Ukraine
produced an anti-foil of NATO’s self-assurance as a global force for good. NATO would actively promote international law and stand up against Russia’s actions―as well as combating
security risks worldwide. From this perspective, the discourses accent that Rasmussen and
Stoltenberg refrained from a narrow self-definition of NATO. Their promoted ambition remained global, not regional, in scope.
The analysis shows that the discourses of Rasmussen and Stoltenberg cannot be conceived as
neutral representation of member states’ views without formulating their own position on vital
issues. If this would be the case, there should have been no change in the SecGen’s discourses
after Stoltenberg succeeded Rasmussen. However, despite the agreement on the question of
collective security, Rasmussen’s and Stoltenberg’s discourses also revealed clear distinctions.
Especially the perceptions of Russia’s politics varied considerably between the two secretaries
general. Rasmussen’s assertive rhetoric and alarmist threat perception of Moscow provoked
critique, for example from the German administration. The change from Rasmussen to Stoltenberg, and from a confrontational to a cooperative strategic outlet, brought the secretary
generalship’s discourses in line with major powers inside the community (Germany and
USA), but away from Poland and the Baltic states. This finding underscores that secretaries
general enjoy considerable leeway at least in terms of their communicative actions within
24
NATO’s institution. It also illustrates that SecGen’s discourses can collide with national
frames (see table 2). Therefore, NATO’s collective identity cannot be seen as a static entity.
The ongoing struggles within the alliance demonstrate that the Ukraine crisis did not result in
a reboot of NATO’s original identity as a purely regionally oriented collective defense alliance. Instead, the security community’s collective identity remains contested.
Notes
1. Pew Research Center, ‘NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid’, June 10, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/
files/2015/06/Pew-Research-Center-Russia-Ukraine-Report-FINAL-June-10-2015.pdf
(accessed February 15, 2017).
2. See Michael R. Gordon and Niraj Chokshijan, ‘Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for
“Good Deals” With Russia, Jan 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/
world/europe/donald-trump-nato.html (accessed February 15, 2017).
3. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Univ. Press,
1957).
4. See Alexander Höse and Kai Oppermann, ‘Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation:
What Role for Public Opinion’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 5, no. 1 (2007): 4361; Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation’, Security Studies 8, no. 2-3 (1998): 198-234; Stephanie C. Hofmann and Andrew I. Yeo,
‘Business as Usual: The Role of Norms in Alliance Management’, European Journal
of International Relations 21, no: 2 (2015): 377-401.
5. Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington,
KT: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 9.
6. See Dieter Krüger, ‘Institutionalizing NATO’s Military Bureaucracy: The Making of
an Integrated Chain of Command’, in NATO’s Post-Cold War Policies: The Changing
Provision of Security, ed. Sebastian Meyer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014),
55.
7. See Sebastian Meyer, ‘Introduction: NATO as an Organization and Bureaucracy’, in
NATO’s Post-Cold War Policies: The Changing Provision of Security (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 17.
8. Robert S. Jordan and Parley W. Newman, ‘The Secretary-General of NATO and
Multinational Political Leadership’, International Journal 30, no. 4 (1975): 736;
Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold
War’, International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 713.
9. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The
Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 48.
10. NATO, ‘Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences between
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, December 11, 1956,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17482.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017); NATO, ‘The NATO Secretary General’, November 11,
2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50094.htm (accessed February 15,
2017).
25
11. Traditionally, the SecGen’s position is held by a European member state national, in
contrast to a U.S. general as SACEUR. The staff selection also reflects the expectation
that secretaries general bridge regional divides inside the organization if necessary.
12. Stefanie Babst, ‘Reinventing NATO’s Public Diplomacy’, NATO Defense College Research Paper, no. 41 (November 2008), 4.
13. See Hylke Dijkstra, ‘Functionalism, Multiple Principals and the Reform of the NATO
Secretariat after the Cold War’, Cooperation and Conflict 50, no. 1 (2015): 128-145.
14. Meyer, ‘Introduction’, 4.
15. Krüger, ‘Institutionalizing NATO’s Military Bureaucracy’, 56; John C. Ries, ‘NATO
Reorganization: A Critique and Analysis’, Western Political Quarterly 18, no. 1
(1965): 68. For the Cold War era, Jordan’s study provided the only analysis of
NATO’s secretary generalship. See Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A
Study in Multinational Diplomacy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).
16. Ryan C. Hendrickson, ‘The Changing Role of NATO’s Secretary General’, in NATO’s
Post-Cold War Policies: The Changing Provision of Security, ed. Sebastian Meyer
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 125.
17. See Hendrickson, ‘The Changing Role’, 128; Sebastian Meyer, ‘Embedded Politics,
Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External
Security’, Contemporary Security Policy 32, no. 2 (2011): 313.
18. Michael F. Harsch, The Power of Dependence: NATO-UN Cooperation in Crisis
Management (Oxford: University Press, 2015); Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and
War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 102.
19. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘More Flexible, Less Coherent: NATO after
Lisbon’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 1 (2012): 20-33.
20. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War; 2006; Kent J. Kille and Ryan C. Hendrickson,
‘Secretary-General Leadership Across the United Nations and NATO: Kofi Annan,
Javier Solana, and Operation Allied Force’, Global Governance 16, no. 4 (2010): 505523.
21. Michael G. Schechter, ‘Leadership in International Organizations: Systemic, Organizational and Personality Factors’, Review of International Studies 13, no. 3 (1987):
213.
22. Kent J Kille and Roger M. Scully, ‘Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European
Union’, Political Psychology 24, no. 1 (2003): 189; see also Kille and Hendrickson,
‘Secretary-General Leadership’.
23. See Darren G. Hawkins et al., eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 2006); Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, ‘Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform’, International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 241-276.
24. Likewise Dijkstra’s study, which provides a rare analysis of the role of NATO’s international staff, regards the influence of non-executive actors within international organizations as limited. See Dijkstra, ‘Functionalism, Multiple Principals’, 140.
25. Kirsten Haack and Kent J. Kille, ‘The UN Secretary General and Self-Directed Leadership: Development of the Democracy Agenda’, in International Organizations as
Self-Directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis, ed. Joel E. Oestreich (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 29-59.
26
26. Simon Rushton, ‘The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros
Boutros-Ghali and Democracy Promotion’, Global Governance 14, no. 1 (2008): 96.
27. See Ian Johnstone, ‘The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion
Based on Law’, Global Governance 9, no. 4 (2003): 452; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004), 5.
28. See Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War; Kille and Hendrickson, ‘Secretary-General
Leadership’.
29. Serena Simoni, ‘Transatlantic Relations: A Theoretical Framework’, in The Future of
Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice, ed. Andrew M. Dorman
and Joyce P. Kaufman (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 30.
30. See Vincent Pouliot, ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’, International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007): 367.
31. See Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 15; Veronica M. Kitchen, ‘Argument and
Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community’, Security Dialogue 40, no. 1
(2009): 100-101.
32. See Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity’, Millenium 29, no. 2 (2000): 357-387.
33. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 140.
34. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 129; see Koschut, ‘Emotional (Security) Communities’, 542.
35. See James Sperling and Mark Webber, ‘NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul’, International
Affairs 85, no. 3 (2009): 494.
36. See Andreas Behnke, NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing
the West (New York: Routledge, 2013), 139.
37. NATO, ‘Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation’, November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/
strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (accessed February 15, 2017).
38. See Neha Ansari, ‘An Unstable Afghanistan: The Potential Impact of NATO’s Departure on Pakistan’, Journal of European Studies 31, no. 2 (2015): 119.
39. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 129.
40. Pew, ‘NATO Publics Blame Russia’, 51.
41. Anna Holzscheiter, ‘Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations’, International Studies
Perspective 15, no. 2 (2014): 144.
42. See Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations. A Critique
of Research and Methods’, European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2
(1999): 229-231.
43. Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change
through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’, European
Political Science Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 16.
44. See Stefan Titscher, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak, and Eva Vetter, Methods of Text
and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning (London et al.: Sage), 7.
45. The appendix is available at: [address to be added, Referees please see attached file].
Each code is identified with a coding ID. Coded frames have varying lengths.
46. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,’ Foreign Affairs 39, no. 5 (2014): 77–89.
27
47. See Tom Sauer, ‘The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West,’ Global Policy 8, no. 1 (2017): 82-91.
48. See James Sperling and Mark Webber, ‘NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitisation,’ European Journal of International Security 2, no. 1 (2016): 32.
49. Code ‘Collective defense’, ID 135, Jens Stoltenberg, ‘NATO: A Unique Alliance with
a Clear Course: Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the German
Marshall Fund’, November 28, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_114179.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
50. Code ‘Collective defense’, ID 125, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Defending Allies, Sharing Responsibility, Upholding Values: Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh
Rasmussen
at
the
Tallinn
University’,
May
9,
2014,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_109757.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed
February 15, 2017); italics by the author.
51. Code ‘Purposes (in general)’, ID 115, Rasmussen, ‘Defending Allies’.
52. Code ‘Collective security’, ID 164, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘A Force for Freedom:
Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Carnegie Europe’,
September 15, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113063.htm?
selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
53. Code ‘Collective security’, ID 180, Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Speech by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference’, February 6, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117320.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed
February 15, 2017).
54. Code ‘Universal values (democracy, freedom)’, ID 224, Stoltenberg, ‘NATO: A
Unique Alliance’.
55. Ibid.
56. No code assigned, Stoltenberg, ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General’.
57. Code ‘Rule based system, international order’, ID 184, Rasmussen, ‘A Force for Freedom’.
58. Code ‘Universal values (democracy, freedom)’, ID 210, Rasmussen, ‘Defending Allies’.
59. Code ‘Transatlantic bond’, ID 194, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Remarks by NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the conference “'Strengthening the
Transatlantic Bond”’, June 10, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_
110916.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
60. Code ‘Challenges to European security in general’, ID 10, Stoltenberg, ‘Speech by
NATO Secretary General’.
61. Code ‘Terrorism as a challenge/threat’, ID 114, ibid.
62. Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 94, ibid.
63. Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 66, Rasmussen, ‘Defending Allies, Sharing
Responsibility’.
64. Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 66, ibid.
65. Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 91, Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Joint press point by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’,
January 14, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116503.htm?selected
Locale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
66. Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 81, Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Press conference by incoming NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’, October 1, 2014,
28
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113488.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed
February 15, 2017).
Code ‘Global dimension/interdependence of challenges / threats’, ID 22, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, ‘America, Europe and the Pacific Speech by NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Marines,’ July 9, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/opinions_111659.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017); ID 25,
Rasmussen, ‘A Force for Freedom,’
Code ‘Global dimension/interdependence of challenges / threats’, ID 25, ibid.
Rasmussen, ‘Defending Allies, Sharing Responsibility’.
Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 60, ibid.
Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 57, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Why NATO
Matters to America: Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at
the Brookings Institution, March 19, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_108087.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 57, ibid.
Code ‘Universal values (democracy, freedom)’, ID 207, ibid.
See Rasmussen, ‘A Force for Freedom’; Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Keynote Address by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the 60th Plenary Session of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly in The Hague’, November 24, 2014, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/opinions_115098.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 15, 2017).
Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 56, Rasmussen, ‘Why NATO Matters’. Here
again, the imminent threat posed by Russia to NATO’s ‘own security’ becomes visible
in Rasmussen’s rhetoric.
Stoltenberg, ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General’, no specific code assigned.
Code ‘Russia as a challenge/threat’, ID 84, Stoltenberg, ‘Keynote address’.
Lene Hansen’s study refers to ‘linking and differentiation’ as essential parts of collective identity building through discourses. Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 41.
Note that ISIS is not used to differentiate between NATO’s values and for example the
human rights violations of the terrorist group. ISIS is rather highlighted as a threat necessitating a specific response in terms of collective security and collective defense.
Code ‘Collective security’, ID 180, Stoltenberg, ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General’.
Toomas Ilves, ‘Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and President
Toomas Ilves of Estonia’, March 18, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/03/18/remarks-press-vice-president-joe-biden-and-presidenttoomas-ilves-estoni (accessed February 15, 2017).
See Toomas Ilves: ‘The old idea of NATO, which I remember from 20 years ago, out
of the area or out of business, predicated on a Europe that no longer has any threats.
That, unfortunately, has turned out, with the actions we've seen against Ukraine, no
longer to apply.’ Ilves, ‘Remarks to the Press’.
Andrzej Duda, ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Poland Mr Andrzej Duda
before the National Assembly’, August 6, 2015, http://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/
art,7,address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-poland-mr-andrzej-duda-before-thenational-assembly.html (accessed February 15, 2017).
President of the Republic of Poland, ‘President Meets NATO Secretary General’, June
18, 2015, http://www.prezydent.pl/en/president-komorowski/news/art,842,presidentmeets-nato-secretary-general.html (accessed February 15, 2017).
29
85. Estonian World, ‘200 Baltic Public Figures Ask for Permanent NATO Bases in an
Open Letter to Obama’, September 2, 2014, http://estonianworld.com/opinion/200baltic-public-figures-ask-permanent-nato-bases-open-letter-obama/ (accessed February
15, 2017).
86. See Tobias Bunde, ‘Transatlantic Collective Identity in a Nutshell: Debating Security
Policy at the Munich Security Conference (2002-2014)’, Transworld Working Paper,
no. 45 (2014), http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/?p=1675 (accessed February 15, 2017),
8.
87. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, ‘Global NATO’, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006):
105-113.
88. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry for example stated in March 2014: ‘Our challenge
today is to work toward a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace—and to use the
power of the planet’s strongest alliance to promote peace and security for people all
over the world.’ Atlantic Council, ‘Remarks at the Atlantic Council’s “Toward a Europe Whole and Free” Conference’, April 29, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
news/transcripts/remarks-by-vice-president-joe-biden-at-the-atlantic-council-s-towarda-europe-whole-and-free-conference (accessed February 15, 2017). Quoted in Magnus
Petersson, The US NATO Debate: From Libya to Ukraine (New York: Bloomsbury,
2015), 126; see also Ryan C. Hendrickson, ‘Congressional Views on NATO Enlargement: Limited Domestic Interest with Few Votes to Gain’, Croatian International Relations Review 21, no. 73 (2015): 6.
89. White House, ‘Statement by the President on Ukraine’, March 6, 2014,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/statementpresident-ukraine (accessed February 15, 2017).
90. White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, February 2015, Washington, D.C. When
U.S. General Joseph Dunford was referring to Russia as the ‘greatest threat to our national security’ during the nomination hearing as Joint Chief of Staff, the White House
was quick to distance itself from Dunford’s view. See Chicago Tribune, ‘Joint Chiefs
Nominee: Russia Biggest Threat to US Security’, 9 July 2015,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-joint-chiefs-russia-threat20150709-story.html (accessed February 15, 2017).
91. Spiegel, ‘Searching for Deterrence: Ukraine Crisis Exposes Gaps Between Berlin and
NATO’, April 7, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ukraine-crisisexposes-gaps-between-berlin-and-nato-a-962978.html (accessed February 15, 2017);
see also Henrik B. L. Larsen, ‘Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis: NATO,
EU and Russia After 2014’, DIIS Report, no. 18 (2014), 16.
92. Ministry of Defence, ‘Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide’s Speech at ACUS
conference “Charting NATO’s future”’, September 25, 2015, https://www.
regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/minister-of-defence-ine-eriksen-soreide-speech-at-acusconference-charting-natos-future/id2454050/ (accessed February 15, 2017).
93. Ministry of Defence, ‘Speech at ACUS conference’.
94. Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Rede von Außenminister Steinmeier zum 60. Jahrestag des
Beitritts Deutschlands zur NATO’, June 30, 2015, http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2015/150630_BM_NATO.html (accessed February 15, 2017), translated by the author. Germany’s critique of a global approach for
NATO predates the Ukraine crisis. See then Federal Minister of Defense Franz Josef
Jung’s statement at the 2007 Munich Security Conference: ‘NATO will never be able
30
to become a truly global alliance.’ Quoted in Bunde, ‘Transatlantic Collective Identity’, 9.
95. NATO, ‘Strategic Concept’.
96 See Alessandro Marrone, ‘The Equilibrium of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept’, International Spectator 46, no. 3 (2011): 96-97.
31