Organized Interests
(16:790:573:01)
Rutgers University, Fall 2016, Wednesdays 12-2:40 p.m.
Professor: Beth Leech
Office: 501 Hickman Hall
E-mail: [email protected]
Office hours: 3-5 p.m. Tuesdays, 11 a.m. -1 p.m. Thursdays, and by appointment
Course website: https://sakai.Rutgers.edu.
Two themes run throughout this class – and throughout the interest group literature. The first is the
theme of collective action and how it is that groups form and individuals succeed in working
together for collective goals. The second theme is that of power: the extent of interest group and
social movement influence on political decisionmaking.
Collective action – and the problems and puzzles it poses – is at the center of virtually every
political act, from the formation of the state to voting in an election. Collective action is present in
the consolidation of oligarchic power as well as in the uprisings of grassroots peace movements.
Collective action is integral to agenda formation and policymaking as well as to riots and genocide.
In this class most of our focus will be the application of collective action theory to interest groups
and social movements (and mostly in the American case), but I hope that the broader implications
also become clear.
Power and influence are notoriously difficult to study and measure, and scholars of interest groups
and social movements have struggled (only occasionally successfully) to do so. While popular news
accounts and mass-market books decry the extraordinary power of “special interests,” efforts to
document such influence systematically have come to mixed conclusions. The theme of interest
group influence also has implications that reach far into other subfields. Understanding how interest
groups affect policy helps us understand the policymaking process more generally.
My goal for this class is not only that you become familiar with the topics listed in the syllabus, but
that you learn generally how to evaluate a body of literature and the evidence on which it rests, and
become able to propose your own ideas about how knowledge in a particular area could be
advanced. For more advanced graduate students, I hope the class provides a platform from which to
conduct original research.
Readings
Required:
Drutman, Lee. 2015. The business of America is lobbying: How corporations became politicized
and politics became more corporate. Oxford.
Goss, Kristin A. 2006. Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America. Princeton.
Mahoney, Christine. 2008. Brussels vs. the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the
European Union. Georgetown University Press.
Provided by instructor:
Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David Kimball, and Beth L. Leech.
2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago.
Recommended but not required:
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in
Politics and Political Science. Princeton.
Burstein, Paul. 2014. American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress. Cambridge.
Chong, Dennis. 1991. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago.
Moosbrugger, Lorelei. 2012. The Vulnerability Thesis: Interest Group Influence and Institutional
Design. Yale University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
All other chapters and articles will be available on the Sakai website: https://sakai.rutgers.edu/
Requirements
Your grade will be based on your participation in class, a week spent as discussion leader, six
reaction papers, and a research paper. Notice that you cannot get an A in this class if you do not
participate in discussions. This is a seminar, and interaction among the participants is crucial.
Grades will be calculated based on the following formula:
10 %
10
30
50
100 %
Class participation
Discussion leader
Reaction papers
Research paper
Discussion leader
This is a chance for you to try your hand at graduate teaching. Each student will pick one week
from the semester to serve as a discussion leader. Discussion leaders should read one of the optional
readings from that week and give a 10-minute presentation on the most important aspects of that
reading to the rest of the class. After the presentation, the discussion leader also is responsible for
posing discussion questions to the class about the required readings.
Reaction papers
Each week I will distribute discussion questions to help you prepare for the following week’s class.
During the semester you must write three reaction papers (of approximately 3-5 pages each) based
on one of the discussion questions. Reaction papers are due by midnight on Tuesday before class,
uploaded to Sakai. Students are expected to be prepared to discuss all of the required readings each
week, regardless of whether they wrote a reaction paper.
Reaction papers are not meant to be simple summaries of the week’s readings, but rather analytical
critiques of the readings. These should help you prepare for comprehensive exams as well as
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helping you think through some of the issues raised by the readings. Your papers should show that
you have done all of the readings, but need not spend equal time on each of the readings.
Research paper
Each student will write a research paper on a topic related to some aspect of interest groups. There
are three general alternatives: an analytical literature review, a research design, or an original
research paper. All three papers will of course include a review of the literature, but that review
would be most extensive in the first alternative and least extensive in the research paper.
Literature review papers should cover all of the major pieces of published work on the topic,
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the research, summarize the state of knowledge in the
area, and make suggestions for what future research might be most fruitful. Research design papers
do the same thing, except spend a large chunk of the paper laying out the specifics of how that
future research should be done.
For students who choose to write an original research paper, there are several existing data sets that
might be useful, including my data from the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Reports, the quantitative
data (not interviews) from my collaborative lobbying project, and Jack Walker’s surveys of
associations. Data on lobbying expenditures from either the Senate website or the Center for
Responsive Politics, PAC contributions from the FEC or the CRP, and nonprofit expenditures from
the IRS are also readily available. A student may also choose to undertake the pilot version of some
original data collection project, using web pages, press releases, news coverage, transcripts of
congressional hearings or other available primary sources. Students who are interested in writing
original research papers should be sure to talk with me early in the semester so that data availability
can be worked out.
Case studies of interest group involvement in a particular policy area or on a particular policy issue
are another option, based in part on a literature review and in part on original research from a
variety of sources, such as congressional testimony, organizational documents, lobbying disclosure
forms, information from the IRS and FEC, and news reports. (The Kennedy School at Harvard has
many such case studies, written by its graduate students, available for purchase; these would serve
as a good model.)
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Weekly topics and reading assignments
Week 1. Sept. 7. Introduction to Interest Groups and the Class
We will not meet this week.
Students with no undergraduate background in interest groups may find it helpful to read through
one of the following undergraduate textbooks:
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American
Democracy. Harper Collins. (This is both a piece of original research AND a
textbook. A classic. Although it is out of print, there are used copies available
from Amazon for about $5)
Berry, Jeffrey M., and Clyde Wilcox. 2008. The Interest Group Society. Longman, 5th ed.
(Any of the earlier editions would be fine, too. This is a quick read and gives a
good overview of what interest groups actually do.)
Lowery, David, and Holly Brasher. 2003. Organized Interests and US Government.
McGraw-Hill. (This is has the best summary of the scholarly literature.)
Week 2. Sept. 14. What is the role of interest groups/social movements in politics?
Berry, Jeffrey. 1997. The Interest Group Society, 3rd ed. Longman. Ch. 1.
Beyers, Jan, Rainer Eising, and William Maloney. 2008. Researching Interest Group Politics in
Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know? West European Politics 31(6):
1103-28.
Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 2004. A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized
Interests. Political Research Quarterly. 57:163-175.
Mansbridge, Jane J. 1992. “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation.” In Mark P.
Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 32–57.
Mitchell, William and Michael C. Munger. 1991. Economic Models of Interest Groups: An
Introductory Survey. American Journal of Political Science 35: 512–46.
Recommended:
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of
Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton.
*Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lowery, David. 2007. Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context
Theory of Lobbying. Polity 39(1): 29-54.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton.
Madison, James. Federalist #10
McFarland, Andrew S. 2004. Neopluralism: The Evolution of Political Process Theory.
University of Kansas.
*Molina, Oscar, and Martin Rhodes. 2002. Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a
Concept. Annual Review of Political Science 5:305-31.
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Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997.
American Political Science Review 92 (1): 1-22.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, esp. Ch. 2.
*Skocpol, Theda. 2003. Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in
American Civic Life. Oklahoma University Press. Ch. 1, 4 & 6.
Truman, David B. 1993. [1951.] The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public
Opinion. 2nd Edition. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, Ch. 1.
Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1966. A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy. American Political
Science Review 60: 287–95, and response to Dahl on p. 391-2.
Dahl, Robert A. 1966. Further Reflections on “The Elitist Theory of Democracy.”
American Political Science Review 60: 296–305.
Week 3. Sept. 21. Olson and his critics.
*Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. (Selected chapters on the Sakai site.)
*Cronk, Lee, and Beth L. Leech. 2013. Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the Social and
Evolutionary Roots of Cooperation. Ch. 3-5.
Schlozman, Key Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Participation’s Not a Paradox:
The View from American Activists. British Journal of Political Science 25: 1–36.
Walsh, Edward J. and Rex H. Warland. 1983. Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a
Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area. American Sociological
Review 48: 764-80.
Recommended:
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baumgarter, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups
in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton. Chapter 4.
Brady, Henry E., Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 1999. Prospecting for
Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists.
American Political Science Review 93(1): 153-68.
*Clark, Peter B., and James Q. Wilson. 1961. Incentive Systems: A Theory of
Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 6: 129–66.
Dawes, Robyn M., John M. Orbell, Randy T. Simmons, and Alphons J.C. van de Kragt.
1986. Organizing Groups for Collective Action. APSR 80: 117-85.
Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
Lichbach, Mark I. 1994. What makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?: Dilemma,
Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action. World Politics 46(3): 383-418.
Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames. 1979. “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods.
I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free Rider Problem.” American Journal
of Sociology 84:1335–60.
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Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames. 1980. “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods.
II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experiences, and the Free Rider Problem.” American
Journal of Sociology 85:926–37.
*Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organization of Interests. Chicago.
*Moe, Terry M. 1980. A Calculus of Group Membership. American Journal of Political
Science 24: 593–632.
Moore, Will H. 1995. Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem. Political
Research Quarterly 48(2): 417-54.
Oliver, Pamela. 1984. If You Don’t Do It, Nobody Else Will: Active and Token
Contributors to Local Collective Action. American Sociological Review 49: 601-10.
Rothenberg, Lawrence S. 1988. Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision in
Groups. American Political Science Review 82: 1129–52.
*Salisbury, Robert H. 1969. “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.” Midwest Journal of
Political Science 13: 1–32.
Week 4. Sept. 28. Whom do groups represent?
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. “Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns
of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” Journal of Politics. 63:1191-1213.
Curtis, James E., Edward G. Grabb, and Douglas E. Baer. 1992. Voluntary Association Membership
in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis. American Sociological Review 57: 129–52.
Danielian, Lucig H., and Benjamin I. Page. 1994. The Heavenly Chorus: Interest Group Voices on
TV News. American Journal of Political Science 38: 1056–78.
Miller, Lisa L. 2007. “The Representational Biases of Federalism: Scope and Bias in the Political
Process, Revisited.” Perspectives on Politics 5(2): 305-21.
Strolovitch, Dara Z. 2006. “Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged? Advocacy at the
Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender.” The Journal of Politics. 68:894–910. (Erratum.
2007. Journal of Politics. 69:281.)
Recommended:
*Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jack L. Walker. 1988. “Survey Research and Membership in
Voluntary Associations.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 908–28 (and
response from Smith/response to Smith).
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups.
Washington: Brookings.
Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R.Wright. 1990. Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court:
Who Participates, When, and How Much? Journal of Politics 52: 782–806.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. The Unheavenly
Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy.
Princeton University Press.
*Salisbury, Robert H. 1984. “Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.”
American Political Science Review 78: 64–76.
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Week 5. Oct. 5. Tactics, strategies, and targets: What do groups do?
Drutman, Lee, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2013. “The Inside View: Using the Enron E-mail Archive to
Understand Corporate Political Attention.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 38(1): 5-30.
*Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” American
Political Science Review. 100:69-84.
*Kollman, Ken. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. (Ch 1 & 5)
Godwin, Ken, Scott A. Ainsworth, and Erik Godwin. 2012. Lobbying and Policymaking: The
Public Pursuit of Private Interests. CQ Press (selected chapters).
McKay, Amy Melissa. 2011. “The Decision to Lobby Bureaucrats.” Public Choice 147(1): 123-38.
Recommended:
Ainsworth, Scott, and Itai Sened. 1993. “The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two
Audiences.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 834–66.
Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” American
Journal of Political Science. 38:25-44. Note: You should review the exchange about
counteractive lobbying between Austen-Smith and Wright, and Baumgartner and
Leech in the AJPS 40:521-69.
Bachellor, John. 1977. “Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of
Environmental Constraints.” American Political Science Review. 71:242-63.
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1977. Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest
Groups. Princeton University Press.
Browne, William P. and Won K. Paik. 1993. Beyond the Domain: Recasting Network
Politics in the Postreform Congress. American Journal of Political Science 37:
1054–78.
Browne, William P. 1990. Organized Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for
Pluralism in a Policy Domain. Journal of Politics 52: 477–509.
Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. Organized Interests and Agenda-Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Court. American Political Science Review 82: 1109–27.
Dür, A. and Mateo, G. 2013. Gaining access or going public? ‘Interest group strategies in
five European countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 52: 660–686.
Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hansen, John Mark. 1990. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hall, Richard L., and Kristina C. Miler. 2008. What Happens After the Alarm? Interest
Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers. Journal of Politics 70(4): 990-1005.
Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. The
Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policymaking. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
*Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. “Organized Interests and the Decision of
Whom to Lobby in Congress.” American Political Science Review. 92:775-90.
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La Pira, Timothy. 2009. Is It Who Says It, Or How They Say It? An Experimental Study Of
Lobbying Influence And Agenda Setting In Congress. Unpublished ms.
Leech, Beth L. 2011. “Lobbying and Interest Group Advocacy.” In the Oxford Handbook of
Congress, Frances Lee and Eric Schickler, eds. Oxford University Press.
Lowry, Robert C., and Matthew Potoski. 2004. “Organized Interests and the Politics of
Federal Discretionary Grants.” Journal of Politics. 66:513-533.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. 1983. “More of the Same: Washington
Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change.” Journal of Politics 45: 351–77.
Week 6. Oct. 12. Influence
Collins, Paul M., Jr. 2007. “Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Briefs.” Political Research Quarterly. 60:55-70.
Dür, Andreas, Bernhagen, Patrick, and Marshall, David. 2015. Interest Group Success in the
European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose? Comparative Political Studies 48:
1-33.
Grossmann, Matt, and Kurt Pyle. 2013. “Lobbying and Congressional Bill Advancement.” Interest
Groups & Advocacy 2 (1): 91–111.
Epstein, Lee and C.K. Rowland. 1991. “Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the
Courts.” American Political Science Review. 85:205-217.
McAdam, Doug, and Yang Su. 2002. The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional
Voting, 1965 to 1973. American Sociological Review 67(5): 696-721.
Yackee, Jason Webb and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics. 68:128-139.
Recommended
Burstein, Paul, and April Linton. 2002. The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and
Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and
Theoretical Concerns. Social Forces 81(2): 381-408.
*Drope, Jeffrey M., Wendy L. Hansen. 2009. “Futility and Free-Riding: Corporate Political
Participation and Taxation Rates in the United States.” Business and Politics 10(3):
Klüver, Heike. 2011. “The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in the
European Union.” European Union Politics: 12(4): 483-506.
Kluver, Heike. 2013. Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying
Coalitions, and Policy Change. Oxford.
Leech, Beth L. 2010. Lobbying Influence. In The Oxford Handbook of Political
Organizations, Jeffrey M. Berry and Sandy Maisel, eds. Oxford University Press.
Smith, Richard A.. 1984. “Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress.”
American Political Science Review 78: 44–63.
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Week 7. Oct. 19. Lobbying and Policy Change
Class canceled. We will discuss this book in tandem with the book for next week on Oct. 27.
Baumgartner, Frank, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. 2009.
Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago.
Recommended:
Godwin, Ken, Scott A. Ainsworth, and Erik Godwin. 2012. Lobbying and Policymaking:
The Public Pursuit of Private Interests. CQ Press.
Week 8. Oct. 26. Compared to What?
Mahoney, Christine. 2008. Brussels vs. the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the
European Union. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Recommended:
Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjar, Simon Kroyer. 2012. “Customizing strategy: Policy goals and
interest group strategies.” Interest Groups and Advocacy 1: 115-38.
Bygnesa, Susanne. 2012. “‘We are in Complete Agreement’: The Diversity Issue,
Disagreement and Change in the European Women's Lobby.” Social Movement
Studies.
Coen, David, and Jeremy Richardson, eds. 2009. Lobbying the European Union:
Institutions, Actors, and Issues. Oxford University Press.
REQUIRED TALK
Thursday, Oct .27, 3:30 a.m.-5 p.m. Professor Tim LaPira of James Madison University, a
Rutgers PhD, will discuss his forthcoming book on revolving door lobbyists.
Week 9. Nov. 2. Interest Groups vs. The Public?
Burstein, Paul. 2014. American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress. Cambridge.
(Selected chapters.)
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics 12(3): 564-81.
Bashir, Omar. 2015. “Testing Inferences about American Politics: A Review of the
“Oligarchy” Result.” Research and Politics: 1-7.
Enns, Peter K. 2015. “Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation.”
Perspectives on Politics 13(4): 1053-64.
Branham, J. Alexander, Stuart N. Soroka, and Christopher Wlezien. n.d. When do the Rich
Win? Unpublished ms.
Recommended:
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Bowler, Shaun and Robert Hanneman. 2006. “Just How Pluralist Is Direct Democracy? The
Structure of Interest Group Participation in Ballot Proposition Elections.” Political
Research Quarterly. 59:557-68.
*Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How
Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” American Political Science Review. 80:89106.
*Schlozman, Kay Lehman. 1984. “What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality
and the American Pressure System.” Journal of Politics 46: 1006–32.
Week 10. Nov. 9. PACs
*Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech 1998. Basic Interests. Ch. 8.
Chin, Michelle L., Jon R. Bond, and Nehemia Geva. 2000. “A foot in the door: An experimental
study of PAC and constituency effects on access.” The Journal of Politics 62: 534-49.
Esterling, Kevin M. 2007. “Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy
Analysis in Congressional Committees.”
Wawro, Gregory. 2001. “A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll Call Votes.”
American Journal of Political Science.” 45:563-79.
Witko, Christopher. 2006. “PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decision Making.” Political
Research Quarterly. 59:283-95.
Wright, John R. 1990. Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of
Representatives. American Political Science Review 84: 417–38.
Recommended:
Fleisher, Richard. 1993. PAC Contributions and Congressional Voting on National Defense.
Legislative Studies Quarterly 18: 391–409.
Grenzke, Janet M. 1989. “PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is
Complex.” American Journal of Political Science 33:1–24.
Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees. American Political Science
Review 84: 797–820.
Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 2001. “PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts
in Congressional Committees.” Political Research Quarterly. 54:161-80.
Langbein, Laura. 1986. "Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence." Journal of
Politics 48(4): 1052-62.
Silberman, Jonathan I., and Garey C. Durden. 1976. Determining Legislative Preferences on
the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 84:
317–29.
Wright, John R. 1985. "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational
Perspective." American Political Science Review 79: 400-14.
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Week 11. Nov. 16. What causes the group system to grow?
Han, Hahrie. 2016. “The Organizational Roots of Political Activism: Field Experiments on Creating
a Relational Context. American Political Science Review 110(2).
Leech, Beth L., Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. La Pira, and Nicholas A. Semanko. 2005.
“Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy.”
Political Research Quarterly. 58:19-30.
Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 1995. “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural
Regulation of Interest Group Numbers.” American Journal of Political Science 39: 1–29.
*Moosbrugger, Lorelei. 2012. The Vulnerability Thesis: Interest Group Influence and Institutional
Design. Yale University Press. (Selected chapters)
Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. “A Nation of Organizers: The
Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States.” American Political
Science Review. 94:527-46.
Recommended:
Ainsworth, Scott H. 1995. “Electoral Strength and the Emergence of Group Influence in the
Late 1800s: The Grand Army of the Republic.” American Politics Quarterly. 23:31938.
Becker, Gary S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371–400.
Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1997. The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of
Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise, and Theda Skocpol. 2001. “The Rush to Organize: Explaining
Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s.” American Journal of
Political Science. 45:813-29.
Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest
Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
*Hansen, John Mark. 1985. “The Political Economy of Group Membership.” American
Political Science Review. 79:79-96.
Naoi, Megumi, and Ellis Krauss. 2009. “Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics
under Alternative Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 53(4):
874-92.
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations.
Posner, Richard A. 1974. “Theories of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science 5: 335–58.
Tichenor, Daniel, and Richard A. Harris. 2002. “Organized Interests and American Political
Development.” Political Research Quarterly 117(4).
*Walker, Jack L. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
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Week 12. Nov. 30. Business and Lobbying
Drutman, Lee. 2015. The business of America is lobbying: How corporations became politicized
and politics became more corporate. Oxford.
Recommended:
Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter. 1963. American Business and
Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press.
Smith, Mark A. 2000. American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections,
and Democracy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Nov. 23 NO CLASS
University re-defined day
Week 13. Dec. 7. Collective Action and Social Movements
Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. Why Movements Succeed or Fail. Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle
for Woman Suffrage. Princeton University Press. Ch. 1-2, 8-9.
Chong, Dennis. 1991. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago. (Selected
chapters)
*McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1
Recommended
Amenta, Edwin. 2006. When Movements Matter. Princeton.
Banaszak, Lee Ann. 2010. The Women’s Movement Inside and Outside the State. Cambridge
University Press.
Biggs, Michael. 2005. Strikes as Forest Fires: Chicago and Paris in the Late Nineteenth
Century. American Journal of Sociology 110(6): 1684-1714.
Chong, Dennis. 2000. Rational Lives. Chicago.
*Gamson, William. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2d ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth
Publishing.
Granovetter, Mark. 1978. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of
Sociology 83(6): 1420-43.
Kubik, Jan. 1994. The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power. Penn State.
Oliver, Pamela E. and Gerald Marwell. 2001. Whatever Happened to Critical Mass Theory?
A Retrospective and Assessment. Sociological Theory 19(3): 292-311.
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Week 14. Dec. 14. When Collective Action Fails
Goss, Kristin A. 2006. Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Recommended:
Goss, Kristen A. 2013. The Paradox of Gender Equality: How American Women’s Groups
Gained and Lost Their Public Voice. University of Michigan Press.
Heaney, Michael T., and Fabio Rojas. 2015. Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and
the Democratic Party after 9/11. Cambridge University Press.
RESEARCH PAPER DUE FRIDAY, DEC. 16
(One-week extensions are available upon request, but you must ask.)
XX HISTORY WEEK – not currently on syllabus
Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1968. American
Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton
Press. pp. 323-357.
Kennedy School of Government, Case C14-83-492. 1983. Prohibition A: Enactment and
Prohibition B: Repeal.
Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. “A Nation of Organizers: The
Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States.” The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 94(3): 527-546.
Tichenor, Daniel, and Richard A. Harris. 2002. “The Lost Years: Taking a Long View of
American Interest Group Politics.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Boston.
Recommended:
Thompson, Margaret Susan. 1985. The “Spider Web”: Congress and Lobbying in
the Age of Grant. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Prologue and Ch. 3 &
6.
Clemens, Elizabeth. 1997. The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the
Rise of Interest Group Politics in America, 1890-1925. University of Chicago
Press.
Hansen, John Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 19191981.
Herring, Pendleton. 1929. Group Representations Before Congress. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Odegard, Peter. 1928. Pressure Politics, the story of the Anti-Saloon League. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff: A study of free private
enterprise in pressure politics, as shown in the 1929-30 revision of the tariff.
New York: Prentice-Hall.
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