Seeing Baghdad,
Thinking Saigon
The Perils of Refighting
Vietnam in Iraq
Stephen Biddle
May 1, 2006
Echoes of Vietnam
Nixon Administration, 1969:
Bush Administration, 2006:
• Hearts and Minds
• Three Tracks
– Economic Development
– Political Reform
• Vietnamization
“As South Vietnamese forces
become stronger, the rate of
American withdrawal can
become greater.”
- Richard M. Nixon,
24 Nov. 1969
– Economic Reconstruction
– Political Reform
– Iraqization
“As the Iraqi security
forces stand up,
coalition forces can stand
down”
- George W. Bush,
30 Nov. 2005
Maoist People’s War vs.
Communal Civil War
Maoist People’s War:
Communal Civil War:
• Class-based insurgency vs.
regime
• Struggle for good governance
• Ethnic group vs. rival ethnic
group(s)
• Struggle for ethnic self-interest
– Competition for allegiance of
common pool of citizens
– Combatants aspire to represent
rights of all citizens
• Importance of ideology
– Underpins insurgents’ claim to
superior governance
– Nationalist component
• Root cause often economic
inequality
– No common pool of uncommitted
citizens
– Combatants aspire to champion
own group’s rights vs. others’
• Ideology unimportant
– Populations know whose side they
are on: manifestoes unnecessary
– Limited national identity
• Root cause often security
dilemma
Iraq is a Communal Civil War
• Violence correlates with ethnicity, sect
Sunni heartland:
• 4 provinces
• 40% of Iraq’s pop.
• 85% of Iraq’s violence
Rest of Iraq:
• 14 provinces
• 60% of Iraq’s pop.
• 15% of Iraq’s violence
– Insurgents overwhelmingly Sunni Iraqi
– Insurgent targets are overwhelmingly Shiite Iraqis
– Attacks on US troops seen by Sunnis as legitimate
strikes on tools of Shiite-dominated regime
• No meaningful class warfare, ideological struggle
Iraq is a Communal Civil War, cont’d
• Nationalism?
– Almost no anti-occupation violence in Shiite or Kurdish
provinces
– Only in Sunni triangle do “nationalists” attack American
occupiers
– Ethnicity, not foreign occupation, accounts for pattern of antiAmerican violence
• Sadr?
–
–
–
–
Shiite attack on Shiite-dominated regime, but ….
Failed to spur general uprising
Fighters decimated by U.S. troops without wider Shiite backlash
Exception that proves the rule: violence in Iraq is overwhelming
inter- not intra- ethnic, sect
People’s War Strategies Can Make
Civil Wars Worse
• Economic reconstruction:
– Critical in People’s War
– Secondary in communal civil war
• Democratization:
– Critical in People’s War
– Counterproductive in communal civil war
• Iraqization:
– Critical in People’s War
– Throws gasoline on fire in communal civil war
Iraqization
• Sunnis see “Iraqi” security forces as a powerful
Shiite/Kurd militia
• Aggravates security dilemma at heart of conflict
• The stronger the security forces, the harder Sunnis fight
back
• Two possibilities, both bad:
1. Government fails to recruit Sunnis
• Sunni resistance grows as security forces improve
• Imbalanced forces undermine constitutional deal
2. Government succeeds in recruiting Sunnis
• Ineffective military incapable of protecting any group if Sunnis
integrated – or:
• De facto but unstable partition if Sunnis segregated
What is to be Done?
1. Slow Iraqization
– Security force buildup must come after constitutional compromise, not before
– US forces must provide bulk of security requirements until then
2. Use Iraq’s military future as tool for settlement, not quick ticket
home for US
– Key to civil war termination is power sharing compromise
– US currently has limited leverage; parties prefer stalemate to risky compromise
– Strongest potential leverage is military: threat to realign, allow violence to
escalate
– Current US policy undermines this leverage, reduces prospects for deal
• Sunnis:
– If security forces include Sunnis, not threatening: why compromise?
– If security forces exclude Sunnis, threatening but not contingent: why compromise?
• Shiites/Kurds: US now promises to stay until/unless they can defend selves,
regardless of negotiating behavior: why compromise?
– US must threaten to realign, allow violence to escalate, or remain as needed as
function of parties’ bargaining behavior
Prognosis
• Case for pessimism:
– US domestic politics may undercut US leverage
– Sustained US presence could break US military
– Security dilemma may reach point of no return before Iraqis can seal
bargain
– Requires emergence of credible Sunni political leadership
– Shiite split could create impossibly complex negotiation
– Requires cool-headed, clear-sighted bargaining behavior on all sides,
deft diplomatic balancing act by US
• Case for optimism:
– All parties underlying interests better served by power sharing
compromise
– US has powerful leverage – if we use it
Success still possible in Iraq – but much likelier if we treat it as the
civil war it is, not the People’s War we imagine it to be