THE EU -MEXICO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOC?
by Corina Ciambur
This article represents a summary of the research I have conducted for my MSc thesis, with the
title 'Does the increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements undermine the WTO and the
multilateral trading system? The case of the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement' which I have written under
the supervision of the Dr.Iain Hardie of the University of Edinburgh.
The EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: stepping stone or stumbling block?
By Corina Ciambur
One of the most `alive' academic polemics in the field of international trade is
the so called `stepping stones' versus `stumbling blocks' debate. Amongst the reasons
this subject has attracted so much discussion is the antinomy that it creates and to
quote a connoisseur: `At the heart of the debate over regionalism and multilateralism
lies a paradox. Members of the WTO are busy in both striking bilateral agreements and
seeking to negotiate a multilateral trade deal'. (Baldwin & Thornton; 2007, p.51)
To this paradox, one may add another: the World Trade System has as its main
pillar the principle of non-discrimination or the Most Favored Nation Clause whereas
the `cornerstone' of regionalism is discrimination towards outside or third countries.
(Sampson; 1996, p.81)
Under these circumstances it is legitimate to wonder how this proliferation of
regionalism, which has transformed the global trading system into a `spaghetti bowl' of
regional agreements (RTAs), will impact on multilateralism. Hence, one major question
must be asked: are these two processes complementary or are they mutually exclusive?
(Lamy; 2002, p.1400)
The regionalists consider that RTAs are benefic to the global trading system
because they imply trade liberalization, and any kind of such liberalization is worth
supporting. Therefore, they consider RTAs as `stepping stones' which will eventually
lead to global free trade. (Levy and Srinivasan, 1996, p. 93; Baldwin, 1997, p.866)
On the other side of the barricade, the multilateralists only look at the
discriminatory elements that RTAs imply. The potential effect of such discrimination can
be the diversion in existing trade from efficient outside suppliers towards high-cost
suppliers from within the agreement. Moreover, multilateralists consider that these
agreements pose a threat to the WTO system, because they could lead to a world
fragmented into several trading blocks, a situation that creates the potential for trade
wars and in turn reduce the will of parties to proceed to further multilateral
liberalization. (Levy and Srinivasan, 1996, p.93)This is the `stumbling blocks' approach.
The European Union
In the context of the above debate, the European Union represents a good
study case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the EU is the most advanced form of
regional integration as well as one of the most important members of the WTO.
Secondly, while being a member of the WTO, the EU has also signed a number of
regional agreements outside the WTO's framework. In this respect, the EU's constant
position is `multilateralism first' and its pursuit of RTAs is only motivated by the belief
that regional integration will lead to further liberalization and to `deep integration'.
In more detail, it has been argued on several occasions that the EU's own
experience with the Single Market is used as a model for its external trade policy and for
the global trade agenda in general. (Young and Peterson, 2006, p. 796; Jones, 2006, p.
943) For this reason and many more, the EU has tried to go beyond traditional free
trade agreements and has tried to push for harmonization on different levels of policy
making in order to achieve `deep integration'. Therefore, the EU is promoting RTAs that
are not limited to liberalizing trade in goods, but also incorporate policy reforms in the
following areas: standards and technical regulations, intellectual property rights,
services, investments, competition, government procurement, rules of origin and trade
defence instruments. (Lamy, 2002, p. 1408)
In order to determine if `deep integration' has been achieved and if it
represents a step further in the process of multilateral liberalization or if it is nothing
but a `stumbling block', this article will focus on a particular agreement of the EU, the
one between the European Union and Mexico, the so-called Global Agreement. Both
Mexico and the EU are parts of several other regional agreements, as well as the WTO.
This offers a perfect exemplification of the `spaghetti bowl' phenomenon. Secondly, this
is the first regional agreement signed by the EU with a country in the western
hemisphere, and this fact can be regarded as path-opening for further such agreements.
(Busse, Huth and Koopman, 2000, p. 7)
The Global Agreement
Overview
In July 2000, the agreement that governs the liberalization of trade in goods
between the EU and Mexico entered into force. It is part of the wider Economic
Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, which includes the
establishment of an EU-Mexico Free Trade Area. (Panagariya, 2002, pp. 1415-1418;
Lamy, 2002,p. 1400). The agreement encompasses three dimensions: political dialogue,
trade liberalization and cooperation. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p. 1) It is quite
ambitious as it is the first comprehensive agreement between the EU and a country in
the western hemisphere that also implies reciprocity. (Busse, Huth and Koopman, 2000,
p.7)
The agreement was designed to be consistent with the WTO and create a free
trade area in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of
GATS. (Busse, Huth and Koopman, 2000, p.7; Bagwell and Staiger, 1998, p. 1176)
Therefore, all in all, the EU-Mexico FTA provides for liberalization in bilateral goods
trade of about 95% between the two parties and a removal of almost all barriers to
trade in services.
But the Global Agreement goes beyond economic issues. More precisely, it tries
to incorporate all aspects of the relations between the European Union and Mexico.
Even if the part of the agreement that relates to trade issues (the FTA) has received
more attention on the international arena, one must not forget that the agreement
includes a political dimension as well as a cooperative one. These are both issues that
require some attention. They are relevant to the present discussion because they have
had impacts on the negotiation process, an element of major interest for the theoretical
debate.
Mexico and the EU have been led by different motivations into entering this
partnership. On the Mexican side, the economic incentives were of significant
importance. The EU represents a large and attractive market and securing
nondiscriminatory access for Mexican exporters in this market, was part of the
economic reform and trade liberalization that the country was already undergoing. Also,
as part of NAFTA, Mexico had become increasingly dependent on the USA an effect it
sought to counterbalance by diversifying its external relations and turning towards the
Europe. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.3)
The completion of NAFTA created an urgent problem for the EU's terms of trade
with Mexico, because of the discriminatory and trade diversion effects. (Santander,
2000, p. 496) The EU's major concern was to obtain `NAFTA-parity' as it had lost nearly
50% of its share in the Mexican market, from a 9% share in 1993 to a 6% share in 2000
with the US's total increasing with 5% over the same period. (Santander, 2000, p. 496;
Dur, 2007, p.838). This has been the `catalyst' in the EU's determination to sign the
agreement with Mexico, but there existed several other concerns.
The EU felt threatened by the possibility of Mexico increasing its protection
level. Another concerning fact was the potential creation of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas, which would have displaced European exporters from the market. (Reveles
and Rocha, 2007, p.5)
With this agreement, the EU also sought to obtain benefits not covered by WTO
legislation. Therefore, it included in the agreement the `Singapore issues' which focused
on the fields of investment, competition, transparency and trade facilitation. (Reveles
and Rocha, 2007, p. 5)
Which side of the debate?
Although the regionalism versus multilateralism debate brings a large number of
arguments on both sides, due to space limit, this article will analyze a reduced number
of issue areas in relation with the EU-Mexico Partnership, namely the role of interest
groups in the signing of the agreement, the impacts on trade and the speed and
efficiency of negotiations between the two parties.
Role of interest groups
In both theory and practice, interest groups play important roles in a nation's decision
to join a regional block. (Baldwin, 2006, p.1467) They also have the power to influence
the outcome of negotiations by lobbying for the exclusion of sensitive sectors. (Frankel,
1997, p. 219-220; Panagariya, 1999, p.494) Once the RTA has been created, they can
also lobby for increased protection towards third countries and not support further
liberalization on the multilateral level. This is what Jagdish Bhagwati names `Our market
is large enough' syndrome meaning that governments do not see the purpose of
including new members as long as they already operate on a large market. (Bhagwati,
1992, p. 549)
The Global Agreement offers an interesting example on how interest groups react to
the perspective of a bilateral trade agreement.
In the case of Mexico, business groups did not receive with great enthusiasm the idea
of an agreement with the EU. This should not come as a surprise for two reasons- the
entry into effect of NAFTA and the late 1994 economic crisis Mexico had undergone.
(Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.9-10) In view of the economic asymmetries between
Mexico, on one side, and USA and Canada on the other, it was expected that NAFTA
would have greater impacts on Mexico than on the other two countries. (LopezCordova, 2001, p.3) These impacts took the form of a powerful competitive pressure
coming from USA and Canada, which is why domestic groups did not embrace the idea
of opening their markets to another agreement that would confront them with the
strong competition coming from the European markets. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005,
p.9-10)
The other side of the coin reflected the economic importance of gaining access to the
large European Internal Market. A partnership with the EU would reduce the Mexican's
economy dependence on the USA. These represented sufficient grounds for the promembership forces to lobby in favor of the agreement. (Baldwin, 2006, p. 1467)
As for the EU, its exporters mobilized in favor of the FTA with Mexico. (Dur, 2007, p.
837) This strong lobbying was manifested at first by European companies with
investments in Mexico but increasingly the exporters from Europe became actively
involved in arguing in front of their governments for protection against the
discrimination caused by NAFTA. It is actually claimed that the EU mainly pursued the
Global Agreement as protection for its exporters.(Dur, 2007, p.837; Aggarwal and
Fogarty, 2004, p.185)
What is intriguing in this case is the fact that in spite of the trade diversion
effects and discrimination caused by NAFTA, the Mexican market did not account for a
significant percentage amongst the European exporters. For instance, in 1994 the total
of EU-Mexico trade represented only 0.95% of the total extra-EU trade. (Zabludovsky
and Gomez, 2005, p. 7) Even after the entry into effect of the EU-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement (EUMFTA), Mexico only accounted for 1.2 % amongst the EU's major trading
partners. (DG Trade, 2007) Thus, the domestic groups pushed for a wide agreement
(which was time-consuming and engaged serious resources) with a distant partner that
did not bring major contributions to the EU's extra trade.
Considering the facts in both Mexico and the EU's case, we may draw the
following conclusions. The groups that pushed for trade liberalization were able to lobby
harder and tip the balance in favor of the agreement. Furthermore, the reaction of the
European business groups contradicts the argument according to which once
liberalization on a regional level has been achieved, domestic group support for further
liberalization will become eroded because of the `Our market is large enough'
syndrome. The Common Market is in itself a large market, but in spite of this, the
exporters pushed for further expansion of their markets and for liberalizing their trade
relations with Mexico, irrespective of the percentage the latter had in the EU extratrade.
Impacts on trade
The regionalist side claims that RTAs can present an opportunity to their
members to explore trade issues amongst themselves before addressing them at the
multilateral level. In this way, by the time such complex trade issues are approached in
the WTO, the states in a regional block would have already established a policy to deal
with them. (Sager, 1997, p.245)
In the case of the Global Agreement, the opposite has happened. Issues that
were blocked at the WTO level have been incorporated in the agreement. (Reveles and
Rocha, 2007, p. 5) These are the so-called `Singapore issues' and comprise the following
sectors: investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation.
(Khor, 2004, p. 8)
To begin with, in terms of EU Trade Policy, including these sectors in a bilateral
arrangement has been a premiere. The Global Agreement has been the first agreement
in which the EU addressed these matters. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p. 25) Since
they have been rejected on the multilateral arena, the EU found it useful to approach
them on a regional level. Moreover, a wide agreement to include these issuess was in
alignment with the European `deep integration' agenda.
Obviously, the `Singapore issues', as addressed by the WTO members, implied
more ample regulations. More precisely, apart from an attempt to reduce the role of
domestic governments (in terms of regulating foreign investments and supporting local
businesses) in the fields of investment, government procurement and competition (so
as to ensure maximum market access for foreign enterprises) the purpose was to also
apply the WTO principle of national treatment in these sectors. (Khor, 2004, p. 22)
As for the EU-Mexico FTA, in practice, it implies that in the field of government
procurement, the EU suppliers must gain access to the Mexican market in the same
conditions as NAFTA members, just as Mexican firms must benefit from the same
treatment (national treatment) as the EU's partners under the WTO Public Procurement
Agreement. (Busse, Huth, Koopman, 2000, pp. 10-12) Therefore, in relation to
procedures of public procurement, Mexico is following the articles provided by NAFTA
while the EU uses the WTO principles. (Reveles and Rocha, 2007, p.7) In terms of
competition policy, the Global Agreement only provides for compliant domestic
legislations. Moreover, investment will also be gradually liberalized. (Busse, Huth,
Koopman, 2000, p. 10-12) However, the provisions of the investment chapter did not
include the principles discussed at the WTO level in relation to this sector (equitable
treatment, national treatment, expropriation rules as well as a dispute settlement
mechanism). It allowed for individual states to take the responsibility of negotiating a
legal framework with regards to the reciprocal investment. (Zabludovsky and Gomez,
2005, p. 23)
Although it does not go as far in terms of regulating the `Singapore issues', the
Global Agreement has managed to breach the deadlock (at least partially) that these
matters have created in the multilateral arena. Considering that in August 2003 (three
years after the entry into effect of the Global Agreement) at the Cancun Ministerial,
Mexico supported the inclusion of these sectors on the negotiation agenda of the Doha
Development Round, one could find reasons to offer the EUMFTA as a proper example
of the positive implications of regionalism.
Trade negotiations
From the perspective of trade negotiations, RTAs are considered to be a much faster
and efficient route towards multilateral liberalization. Firstly, negotiations occurring at a
regional level, as opposed to the multilateral one, are much easier because a large
number of parties in trade negotiations will reduce the costs of non-cooperation and
will create a rather rigid framework for negotiations. (Frankel, 1997, p. 207) On the
other hand, a reduced number of parties taking the form of trade blocks, might
negotiate more efficiently.
The multilateralists are concerned, however, that if negotiators are involved in solving
issues regarding RTAs, clearly there is the danger of attention diversion from the
multilateral level, to the regional one. (Frankel, 1997, p. 214)
In the case of the EU-Mexico Partnership the pre-negotiation talks began in 1995 and
the agreement only entered into force in 2000, which is why it is safe to say that its
completion was a five year process.
But what were the major impediments for a smoother and faster creation of a FTA
between Europe and Mexico? Firstly, the two parties had different scopes for the
agreement and this represented the starting point of differences. While Mexico's
purposes were to secure the free trade agreement, the EU wanted to focus on the other
two pillars of the agreement: the political and cooperation dimensions. Furthermore,
the EU subordinated the start of negotiations on trade to Mexico's acceptance of the
other two dimensions. (Szymanski and Smith, 2005, p. 187)
The political conditionality represented one of the major problem areas,
namely the reasons that made the EU include Article 1- The Democratic Clause and
Article 58-The Suspension Clause and not only make the agreement dependant on it,
but also the start of negotiations on trade.
By introducing the Article 1, Article 58 as well as the Co-operation in Democracy
and Human Rights Chapter, and hence including a degree of conditionality that is
dependent on political factors, the EU is reinforcing its image as a `norm exporter' as
well as a `soft power'. (Bosse, 2007, p. 38-62; Johansson-Nogues, 2007, p. 181-197)
Furthermore, if we are to think that the EU's trade strategy is the result of a wide
combination of instruments from other policy areas, it is understandable why the EU
exerts its `soft power' by linking its trade policy with other political goals, in a rather
persistent way, considering that it was willing to abandon the signing of the treaty with
Mexico, when faced with the latter's resistance. (Szymanski and Smith, 2005, p. 177)
Apart from that, the EU has based its foreign policy on two principles: coherence
and conditionality. In the attempt to offer a clear image to the world of what its policies
are and to ensure that its external actions are coherent, the EU included `coherence' as
a guiding principle in the Maastricht Treaty. (Szymanski and Smith, 2005, p. 177) The
Global Agreement itself provides for closer links between its three main pillars: political
and strategic, the economic one and the co-operation one. As for the conditionality
principle, the EU finds it as an adequate way of ensuring its coherence while promoting
democracy amongst its partners, which is why the principle is institutionalized in the
form of a `standard' formula that is included as Article 1 in each of the EU's co-operation
agreements. It is necessary to stress here the fact that this conditionality is bilateral and
the EU is also engaged in assisting its partners to meet the political conditions.
(Szymanski and Smith, 2005, p. 177)
Although legitimate from the EU's perspective, Mexico found this political
conditionality as interference in its domestic affairs. Not only that, but it regarded this
as a way in which the EU dictates its own conditions and imposes its principles on its
partners. (Sakwa, 2008) And for Mexico, these were sufficient grounds for opposition as
they interfered with the auto-determination and non-intervention principles of its
constitution. At this point, the EU found it necessary to portray this agreement as a
`partnership between equals' and not a means in which the EU will attempt to coerce
Mexico. Moreover, the EU insisted on the bilateral nature of the agreement and offered
a genuine dialogue with Mexico on such issues, taking an opposing position form that of
the USA. (Szymanski and Smith, 2005, p. 187)
Another reason for Mexico's rejection was caused by its failure to understand
the connection between trade liberalization and respect for human rights, and saw the
inclusion of the latter amongst the chapter of the agreement as a pretext to diverge
attention from the signing of the FTA, which soon proved to be warranted. (Zabludovsky
and Gomez, 2005, p. 11) Moreover, the Mexican side was also concerned by the fact
that these political clauses have the potential to become trade barriers or protectionist
devices, which the EU could manipulate in order to achieve its desired outcomes.
In the end, the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement began in 1998 and
were completed in November 1999. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p. 16) It is certainly
reassuring to know that the greatest difficulties did not appear during the negotiation of
the trade related matters. Nevertheless, intense efforts, diplomatic resources as well as
a significant period of time were necessary for these problems to be overcome. One can
hardly disagree that with the EU and Mexico being engaged in trying to solve the
differences on their future agreement, a certain degree of attention diversion from the
multilateral arena occurred.
From the perspective of the reduced number of actors argument resulting into a
much faster route towards trade liberalization (Frankel, 1997, p. 207) the Global
Agreement does not come in support of the regionalist case.
Certainly, as a fully implemented Customs Union, with a common external tariff,
the EU can be seen as the perfect example to support the above argument. And, indeed,
Mexico did not negotiate the tariff reductions with each of the (back then) 15 MS of the
EU. However, this did not facilitate the process as the EU's institutional structure and
decision-making procedures are just as complex and the entire negotiation process
required intense efforts for inter-institutional coordination. (Zabludovsky and Gomez,
2005, p. 9)
More specifically, to avoid confusion and for practical reasons, the `voice' of the
EU in international trade negotiations is held by the European Commission. Member
States delegate their authority at the supranational level- to the Council of Ministers,
which in turn gives a negotiation mandate (specific and limited) to the Commission.
(Meunier, 2007, p.907) The European Parliament also has the power to accept or
impede the entry into force of the agreement negotiated. (Szymanski and Smith, 2005,
p. 180) To begin with, the different presidencies of the Council, though attempting to
maintain a coherent position that represents the overall EU stand, do have (to some
extent) a biased attitude towards the domestic policy preferences. (Dur and
Zimmermann, 2007, p. 774) Moreover, just as the Council of Ministers, the Commission
is also far from being a monolithic actor. Within its structures, its position is influenced
on the one hand by the rivalries between the different DGs (Trade, Industry,
Development or Agriculture) and on the other hand, by the doctrine shifts of the
different Trade Commissioners. (Dur and Zimmermann, 2007,p. 774) This description is
only a simplification of the EU's structure and decision-making procedures which were
offered with the purpose of presenting the different influences that affect trade
negotiations.
In the EU-Mexico contex, Mexico had to work with ten European Council
Presidencies and two European Commissions, in the period in which the institutional
crisis between the Commissions occurred. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.10) Each of
these elements brought several changes and influences in the process, making it
increasingly difficult for the Mexican diplomats to `argue for the benefits of the
initiative, keep it alive, complete the negotiations, and secure legislative approval both
at the Community level and in the member states'. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.
10) Moreover, there was a lack of agreement at the European level with respect to the
timeframe and scope of the partnership. Apart from that, there was also lack of
consensus at the Commission level, between the British Commissioner for Trade, who
was supporting an FTA with the USA and thus, pushed for the launching of the
`Millennium Development Round' in the WTO. On the other side, there was the Spanish
Commissioner who gave priority to the relations with Latin America, Africa and the
Middle East. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.10) The same issues were also occurring
at the Member State level, with opinion and support division between Spain and
Portugal on the one side and France on the other. (Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p. 18)
In the end, Mexico did not negotiate with a reduced number of actors per se. In
view of the EU's institutional structure, Mexico was confronted with the different
interests of the Member States, whether it was at the Council level or at the
Commission one. The main idea is that Mexico did not negotiate either pillar of the
Global Agreement with a regional block that was able to `speak with a single voice'. This
contributed to the stalling of negotiations. Taking into account that the EU is the most
advanced form of regional integration in the world, this situation should cause a certain
level of concern amongst the supporters of regionalism.
Do we have deep integration?
At this point of the discussion, it is important to establish to what extent the Global
Agreement has resulted into `deep integration' in order to place this particular
agreement in the academic debate. As mentioned previously, the European rationale is
based on the belief that `deep integration' not only facilitates all the interactions
between the members of the partnership but also contributes to the multilateral trading
system.
The latter will happen because the `deep integration' agenda, if handled
successfully implies two potential effects: solving issues regionally which can be
afterwards approached on the multilateral level and improving the market access for
the members of the agreement. Thus, when establishing provisions that improve the
rule-making system in several policy areas, such as investment, services, rules of origin,
technical standards or competition, the parties will obtain better market access. (Lamy,
2002, p. 1408) If they also manage a harmonization of policies and regulations, then the
negative side-effects caused by vague procedures and regulations, which in turn may
become non-tariff barriers and interfere with trade flows, can be avoided.
In the EU-Mexico Partnership, the first effect has occurred with the `Singapore
issues'. There was no coincidence that the EU included these sectors in the agreement,
in a time when they were being rejected on the multilateral arena. In this situation, one
must also note that the European Union with its `deep integration' agenda is aligned
with the WTO tendencies, by liking together issues that are not directly related to trade.
From this perspective, it can be concluded that the EU's approach towards regionalism
is compatible with multilateral liberalization.
It is now essential to regard the achievements of the EUMFTA in terms of
market access. Improved market access relates to the level of liberalization achieved
and to the degree of openness of the market. In practice, EUMFTA liberalizes 95% of all
trade in goods and services between the two partners (over a period of ten years). As a
direct result of this, in the first three years after the entry into effect of the FTA, bilateral
trade between the EU and Mexico has increased with 27%. (Reveles and Rocha, 2007, p.
10)
The degree of market openness is reflected by the rules of origin. They provide
the requirements for a product to benefit from tariff reductions. (Zabludovsky and
Gomez, 2005, p. 21) In the case of the EUMFTA, agreement was reached that the `single
European list of rules of origin' would prevail for the majority of industrial goods and
also for all agricultural products. Mexico was given an exemption so as to allow it to
adapt to the EU's standards. (IRELA, 2000) This would serve as a way of avoiding the socalled `criss-crossing' effects that are caused by different types of rules. (Panagariya,
2002, p. 1415-1418)
As the agreement is a comprehensive one, this `deep integration' also goes
beyond the economic dimension.
The political clause in the arrangement, even if it relates to different aspects of
the EU-Mexico relations, might have repercussions on the economic relations between
the two partners. From the European perspective, a stable social environment based on
shared democratic values, will contribute to the trade relations and facilitate the market
access. The Mexican concern on this issue, as reflected by its initial refusal to accept the
latter's inclusion in the Global Agreement, rests on the idea that this clause might
become a protectionist device and hinder the entire process of market opening.
(Zabludovsky and Gomez, 2005, p.21)
In practice, however, there are those who argue that instead of the EU being
very insistent on the political clauses of the agreement, the opposite has happened. The
Democratic Clause has been neglected by the European Commission even if there have
been some serious cases of human rights violations in Mexico, which were signaled to
European authorities. (Reveles and Rocha, 2007, pp. 21-24)
As for the co-operation aspect, it did not bring the expected results. This is not a
surprising fact because there are thirty chapters included in the agreement, which
makes it too ambitious and it becomes practically impossible to go into more depth will
all the matters. (Reveles and Rocha, 2007, pp. 21-24)
Concluding remarks
Overall, this agreement has had more positive than negative implications not
only because it was a path-finder for further such partnerships, but also because it has
given Mexico a different place as an actor on the world stage. In spite of the fact that
there are diverging opinions concerning its success, one cannot deny its beneficial
contribution to the relations between its partners and to the global trading system in
general. Moreover, it proved that the `deep integration' policy of the EU is a plausible
stand that is aligned with WTO rules.
In the context of the academic debate, it represents a good example to support
the regionalism cause, especially if one considers the roles interest groups played in the
signing of the agreement as well as the successful inclusion of the `Singapore issues'.
Even if the `reduced number of actors' argument is not supported as we have concluded
previously, the overall image is a positive one.
Moreover, judging by the fact that `deep integration' has been achieved to a
certain extent, it can be affirmed that the Global Agreement is a step further in the
direction of multilateral trade liberalization.
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