Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW FORUM
VOLUME 41
Fall 2010
NUMBER ONE
RECENT DEVELOPMENT: TALBOT COUNTY V. MILES POINT PROP.
By: Leslee Tingle
Legislative Zoning Decisions by County Council Limit Appellate Jurisdiction
TALBOT CNTY. V. MILES POINT PROP.: WHEN A COUNTY COUNCIL MAKES A
LEGISLATIVE DECISION UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE EXPRESS POWERS ACT
OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION, BOTH THE COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS
AND THE CIRCUIT COURT LACK APPELLATE JURISDICTION, THEREBY MAKING
A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AN INAPPROPRIATE AVENUE OF RELIEF.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Express Powers Act of the Maryland Constitution
denies the Talbot County Board of Appeals (“Board of Appeals”) and the Talbot County Circuit
Court jurisdictional authority over legislative decisions made by the Talbot County Council (“County
Council”). Talbot Cnty. v. Miles Point Prop., 415 Md. 372, 377, 2 A.3d 344, 346-47 (2010).
Specifically, when the County Council is acting within its adjudicatory powers, the Board of Appeals
and the circuit court are inappropriate venues for appellate relief, and both administrative and
common law writs of mandamus are ineffective judicial remedies. Id. at 398, 2 A.3d 344, 359.
This case consolidated two separate disputes, which arose out of the County Council’s concern for
their overburdened wastewater treatment plant. The construction of the Region II Wastewater
Treatment Plant resulted in only 50% of the flow capacity that Talbot County originally anticipated.
As a result, rainstorms caused untreated sewage to overflow from the plant’s collection system. The
first land parcel at issue, the Miles Point Property (“Miles Point”), was zoned as a “S-2” property
under the Talbot County Comprehensive Water and Sewage Plan. Consequently, this property was
ineligible to use the sanitary facilities and did not have immediate sewage allocation. The second
plot of land, the Shore Lands Property (“Shore Lands”), also carried a “S-2” designation. Both
properties applied to the County Council seeking reclassification as a “S-1” property.
“S-1”
properties receive priority standing for sewage allocation, giving them immediate access to water and
sewage services.
The County Council denied both applications, reasoning that the wastewater treatment plant was
overburdened and unable to sustain its current demands. Miles Point appealed the County Council’s
decision to the Board of Appeals, which held that it lacked authority to hear the case under the
Express Powers Act of the Maryland Constitution. Miles Point then sought judicial review in the
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Legislative Zoning Decisions by County Council Limit Appellate Jurisdiction
Circuit Court for Talbot County, which reversed and held that the Board of Appeals did in fact have
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the County Council. The circuit court based its decision on
Section 502 of the Talbot County Charter, which conferred jurisdiction of “executive, administrative,
or adjudicatory” orders onto the county board of appeals.
Shore Lands, however, first appealed its decision to the circuit court, which dismissed the case for
failure to first appeal to the Board of Appeals based on its decision in the Miles Point case. Talbot
County filed appeals in both cases to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. On its own
initiative, the Court of Appeals of Maryland consolidated the matters and granted certiorari to
determine whether the Board of Appeals was correct in deciding the jurisdictional issue over an
appeal from the Council’s action, and whether invoking original jurisdiction of the circuit court was
the proper mechanism for review.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by discussing the authority of the Board of
Appeals over decisions made by the County Council. Talbot Cnty., 415 Md. at 387, 2 A.3d at 351.
The court framed its analysis around the powers conferred upon the counties by the Express Powers
Act of the Maryland Constitution, which granted the county government legislative powers formerly
reserved to the General Assembly. Id. (citing MD. CONST. ART. XI-A, § 2; Montgomery Cnty. v.
Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 418, 312 A.2d 225, 233 (1973)). Under the Act, a charter
county may create a board of appeals and grant it authority to review an adjudicatory order pursuant
to the Limiting Clause of the Express Powers Act. Id. at 386, 2 A.3d at 352.
The critical issue to be resolved by the court was whether the County Council’s decision to rezone
the properties was adjudicatory or legislative in nature, as the Board of Appeals lacked authority to
review the County Council’s legislative decisions. Id. The court first turned to prior case law which
articulated the distinction between the adjudicative and legislative functions of a local zoning
authority. Id. at 387, 2 A.3d at 352 (citing Bucktail, LLC v. Talbot Cnty., 352 Md. 530, 723 A.2d 440
(1999)). The court then explained that adjudicative decisions were those based on the unique
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Legislative Zoning Decisions by County Council Limit Appellate Jurisdiction
characteristics of the property at issue, whereas legislative decisions generally did not concern the
immediate parties, but were more concerned with general facts that decided questions of law, policy,
and discretion. Id. at 387, 2 A.3d at 352 (citing Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 395 Md. 16, 39, 909 A.2d 235, 248-49 (2006)).
Applying this distinction, the Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed how a large portion of the
County Council’s findings addressed broad-based facts relating to Talbot County’s infrastructure, the
capacity and history of the wastewater treatment plant, and specific policy issues surrounding the
reclassification. Talbot Cnty., 415 Md. at 387-91, 2 A.3d at 353-55. Because the County Council
did not base its decision on the unique characteristics of the property itself, the Limiting Clause of
the Express Powers Act prohibited the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Board of Appeals. Id. at
391-92, 2 A.3d at 355.
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction,
and if so, whether an administrative writ of mandamus or a common law writ of mandamus was the
proper mechanism for relief. Talbot Cnty., 415 Md. at 392, 2 A.3d at 356. The court began by
outlining the rules governing administrative mandamus proceedings. Id. at 392-93, 2 A.3d at 356.
Maryland Rules 7-401 through 7-403 require that in order for an administrative writ of mandamus to
apply in a particular case, the underlying action must be quasi-judicial in nature. Id. at 394, 2 A.3d at
357 (citing MD. RULE 7-401). Applying the same judicial-legislative analysis, the court found that
the County Council’s decisions regarding the reclassification of the two properties at issue were
based largely on general facts. Id. at 395-96, 2 A.3d at 357-58. The court therefore held that the
parties were unable to obtain a writ of administrative mandamus from the circuit court, as the County
Council had used its authority to make a legislative decision. Id. at 396, 2 A.3d at 358.
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that a common law writ of mandamus is only a
remedy in cases involving ministerial acts, not discretionary ones. Id. at 396-97, 2 A.3d at 358. The
court explained that an official’s duties are ministerial if they involve the execution of certain non3
Legislative Zoning Decisions by County Council Limit Appellate Jurisdiction
discretionary tasks. Id. at 397, 2 A.3d at 359. The court held that a common law mandamus is
inapplicable when it interferes with the quasi-judicial or legislative functions of the County Council.
Id. at 397, 2 A.3d at 358 (citing Glen Burnie Improvement Ass’n v. State Appeal Bd., 213 Md. 407,
412, 132 A.2d 451, 453 (1957)). Because the County Council used its authority to perform a
legislative function, which required the exercise of discretion to render a decision, the court found
that a common law writ of mandamus did not lie in this case. Id. at 397, 2 A.3d at 359.
In the instant case, the court applied a critical distinction for determining the proper avenue of
relief when appealing a County Council’s zoning decisions. In light of this ruling, attorneys called
upon to challenge the decisions of county municipalities must examine the record of the proceedings
carefully and be aware of the nature of the review process the County Council used to make their
decision. Attorneys must be mindful that zoning decisions that are legislative in nature restrict their
clients to limited avenues of appellate remedies.
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