The Standard Objection to
the Standard Account
Ryan Wasserman
Western Washington University
Here is an old story, both familiar and puzzling: a sculptor purchases an
ordinary lump of clay – hereby named ‘Lump’ – and later fashions that lump
of clay into the likeness of the biblical king David. A statue – hereby named
‘David’ – is thus created. We are now faced with the following question:
what is the relation between Lump and David?
According to certain theorists,1 Lump and David are distinct enduring
objects that spatially coincide whenever they both exist. Lump and David are
distinct objects since they differ in their de re temporal properties, de re modal
properties, kind properties and so on. Lump and David are enduring objects
in virtue of the fact that they are ‘wholly present’ at each moment of their
respective careers – they do not exist at various times by having distinct
temporal parts at those times.2 And, finally, Lump and David are spatially
coincident objects in virtue of the fact that they occupy the exact same region
of space whenever they both exist.
There was a time not long ago when this view – the view on which there
exists enduring, spatially coincident objects – was correctly called ‘the
standard account’.3 Time changes all things, however, and enduring
coincident objects seem to have fallen out of favor amongst contemporary
philosophers. This is due, in large part, to what I will be calling ‘the standard
objection’ to the standard account. The standard objection has been known,
alternatively, as ‘the supervenience objection’, ‘the problem of grounding’,
Most notably David Wiggins (1968, 1980).
For recent attempts to define ‘wholly present’, see Markosian (1994), Zimmerman (1996)
and Merricks (1999b). For an excellent discussion of enduring objects and related issues, see
Sider (2001).
3 This honorific title was first suggested by Burke (1994), who also provides a helpful list
of the view’s defenders.
1
2
1
and ‘the indiscernibility problem’.4 The various names under which the
standard objection is known hint at the various ways in which that objection
is stated. I prefer to state the problem in terms of explanation, since this seems
to be the most neutral characterization available.5 Here, then, is what I take
the standard objection to amount to: according to the standard account,
Lump and David share the exact same spatial location whenever they both
exist. But it also seems as if they share the exact same parts whenever they
both exist. In particular, they have all of the same microphysical parts in
exactly the same arrangement whenever they both exist – Lump and David
have the exact same microphysical structure at those times. But the standard
account also has it that Lump and David differ in their de re temporal
properties, de re modal properties, kind properties and so on. So the
challenge for the defender of the standard account is to explain how such
differences are possible, given that Lump and David have the exact same
microphysical structure whenever they both exist. The standard objection
has it that no such explanation can be given and that the standard account
must therefore be rejected.
Defenders of the standard account have offered a variety of responses to
the standard objection in recent years, but these proposals have met with
considerable resistance.6 In this paper, I aim to develop a new line of
response to the standard objection on behalf of those who accept the
standard account.7 More specifically, I will be proposing a mereological
response to the standard objection. Roughly, my suggestion will be that
coincident objects like Lump and David differ with respect to their parts and
that this difference explains why they differ with respect to their de re
temporal properties, de re modal properties, kind properties and so on. 8 In
the following sections, I discuss a variety of ways in which this rough idea
can be developed. I also discuss several objections to these proposals. In the
end, I arrive at what I take to be the most plausible response to the standard
objection.
See, respectively, Rea (1997), Zimmerman (1995), and Olson (2001).
This way of characterizing the problem is suggested by Eric Olson, who argues that talk
of supervenience has led to some confusion in this area.
6 For some responses to the standard objection, see Rea (1997), Baker (2000), Sider (1999)
and Shoemaker (1999). See Olson (2001) for a criticism of these and other responses.
7 I should say at the outset that I am not myself a defender of the standard account. I am a
perdurantist and, as such, I reject the coinciding enduring objects posited by that account.
8 For the most part, I will be focusing on the question of how coincident objections could
differ with respect to their de re modal properties. But my comments carry over directly to
the question of how such objects could differ with respect to their de re temporal properties,
kind properties and so on.
4
5
2
1. The No Coincidence Response
Let us begin by noting that the standard objection proceeds on the
assumption that objects like Lump and David share the very same parts
whenever they both exist (or, at least, that such objects share the very same
microphysical parts whenever they both exist). That is, the standard objection
proceeds on the assumption that objects like Lump and David materially
coincide whenever they both exist. This, however, is a far more tendentious
claim than the claim that such objects spatially coincide whenever they both
exist – the later claim is embraced by every defender of the standard account,
while the former is not. Lynne Rudder Baker, for example, writes:
But is it obvious that they share all of the same parts?
Pretheoretically, I would have thought that David had a nose as a
part but that [Lump] did not. Part of [Lump] is (i.e., constitutes)
David’s nose; but [Lump] itself does not have a nose. Or so I would
have thought.9
Fred Doepke makes a similar claim:
Consider you and the collection of atoms of which you are now
composed. Appealing to intuition, I suggest that your heart is a part
of you but not a part of this collection of atoms. Similarly, Theseus’
ship, but not the wood of the ship, is composed of boards. 10
As an initial line of inquiry, then, let us pursue the idea that enduring objects
like Lump and David spatially coincide whenever they both exist without
ever sharing any parts.11
It is initially odd to think that Lump and David could occupy the same
region of space at a time without sharing any of the same parts at that time. 12
Following Baker and Doepke, one might try to mitigate the oddity of such a
thesis by claming that David, but not Lump, has objects like arms, legs and
ears as parts. Intuitively, lumps of clay only have things like bits of clay
(and, perhaps, subatomic parts of clay) as parts. Of course, it is also intuitive
Baker (2000: 181).
Doepke (1982: 51).
11 I do not mean to suggest that Baker and Doepke accept this strong claim. Baker and
Doepke instead defend the ‘Weak Coincidence Response’, which I discuss in sections 3 and
4.
12 For expository reasons, I will often be leaving the temporal index implicit when I speak
of Lump or David having certain parts.
9
10
3
to think that clay statues like David have bits of clay as parts, in addition to
arms and legs and ears.
There are two things that the defender of the standard account might say
in response to this last claim. First, such theorists may simply reject the
relevant intuitions and hold fast to the claim that Lump only has things like
clay bits as parts and that David only has things like arms, legs and ears as
parts. Rejecting such intuitions is a cost to the theory but not, I take it, a
prohibitive cost. A second response would be to respect the sorts of
intuitions we are considering and admit that David has things like clay bits,
atoms and subatomic particles as parts. Such an admission does not
immediately commit the defender of the standard account to the claim that
Lump and David share certain parts since it is open for such a theorist to say
that, at the subatomic level for example, Lump and David are composed of
distinct, spatially coincident, microphysical parts. If matter is ultimately
particulate, such a theorist might say that there are two distinct sets of
material simples such that (i) the members of the first set compose Lump, (ii)
the members of the second set compose David, (iii) every member of the first
set is spatially coincident with, but distinct from, a member of the second set,
and (iv) every member of the second set is spatially coincident with, but
distinct from, a member of the first set. The view being gestured at here is a
difficult one to accept. First, given the number of coincident macro-objects,
such an account is committed to there being widespread interpenetration of
matter at the subatomic level. Second, given that coincident objects like
Lump and David cannot (in some sense) be pulled apart, such an account is
committed to there being (in some sense) necessitated interpenetration of
matter at the subatomic level. Third, while it might seem intuitive to think
that altering the shape of a lump of clay is sufficient to bring a new object – a
statue – into existence, it is downright odd to think that rearranging some
fundamental particles could bring a host of new fundamental particles into
existence (each of which coincides with one of the particles with which we
began). The current account would seem to commit one to claims of just this
sort. Since all of these implications are unpalatable, I suggest that the sort of
defender of the standard account that we are considering ought to take the
first line of response indicated above and claim that David, for example,
does not have things like clay bits as parts.
At this point we have developed a version of the standard account on
which enduring objects like Lump and David have no parts in common
(even when they both exist). Lump only has things like clay bits as parts and
David only has things like hands, ears and feet as parts. How might the
advocate of such a view respond to the standard objection? The answer here
is obvious: the standard objection proceeds on the assumption that Lump
4
and David share all of the same parts whenever they both exist (or, at least,
that they share all of the same microphysical parts whenever they both
exist). On the view we have developed, that assumption is simply false. So
the standard objection has no hold against the sort of theorist we are
considering.13 Indeed, the hypothesized difference in parts seems to provide
an obvious explanation of why, for example, Lump, but not David, is such
that it can survive flattening. Lump only has things like clay bits as parts.
Since flattening Lump would not destroy any of these parts, we have no
immediate reason to think that such an act would destroy Lump. On the
other hand, David has things like arms, legs and ears as parts and these parts
would be destroyed if David were flattened. Hence, it is natural to think that
such an act would also destroy David.
Since the current response to the standard objection relies on the claim
that enduring objects like Lump and David do not materially coincide at all
(even when they both exist), I refer to it as the No Coincidence Response.
2. An Objection to the No Coincidence Response
The standard objection is not so easily put to rest. For, while Lump and
David differ in their de re temporal properties, de re modal properties and
kind properties, they are also similar in certain respects. We can suppose, for
example, that Lump and David each weigh 100 pounds. Lump and David
are also distinct and one would think that, if one were to put two 100 pound
objects on an accurate scale, that scale would register 200 pounds. Were
Lump and David placed on such a scale it would register only 100 pounds.
So what is going on? Well, if Lump and David materially coincide, it is not
so surprising that their mereological sum weighs only 100 pounds. After all,
one does not total the weight of an object by individually weighing each of
that object’s parts and then summing those various weights. To illustrate the
point, suppose that we have a wall built out of three blocks – A, B, and C –
each of which weighs a single pound. Given the existence of arbitrary
undetached parts, that wall has seven distinct parts – A, B, C, AB, AC, BC
and ABC. If we weigh each of these parts and then total the respective
weights, we will reach the conclusion that the wall weighs 12 pounds. This is
obviously the wrong result. The explanation here is that, in totaling the
13 It is worth noting that the standard objection might still have some force if, as suggested
earlier, Lump and David are, at bottom, each composed of their own microphysical parts.
These parts would not be numerically identical, of course, but they would be qualitatively
identical. It would thus remain somewhat of a mystery how Lump and David could differ,
for example, with respect to kind.
5
respective weights of the relevant parts, we will have counted the weight of
certain parts more than once. Similarly, if Lump and David materially
coincide, then summing their individual weights will give us the incorrect
weight for the fusion of Lump and David, since that would involve counting
the weight of certain parts more than once. But, according to the No
Coincidence Response, Lump and David do not share any of the same parts
and, thus, we seem to be at a loss when it comes to explaining why their
mereological sum does not, in fact, weigh 200 pounds.14
3. The Weak Coincidence Response
The above line of thought suggests that enduring objects like Lump and
David both spatially coincide and materially coincide whenever they both
exist. But there are several ways in which we may understand the claim that
Lump and David materially coincide at a time. In particular, Lump and
David may strongly materially coincide or weakly materially coincide at a
time, where these notions can be defined as follows:
(D1) x and y strongly materially coincide at t =df every part of x at t
is a part of y at t and every part of y at t is a part of x at t.
(D2) x and y weakly materially coincide at t =df every part of x at t
has a part in common with y at t and every part of y at t has a
part in common with x at t.15
The standard objection is most forceful on the assumption that objects like
Lump and David materially coincide in the strong sense whenever they both
exist. For, if Lump and David share all of the same parts whenever they both
exist, it is difficult to see how they could fail to share all of the same
properties at those times. But, as it stands, there is no theoretical pressure on
the defender of the standard account to say that Lump and David coincide in
Zimmerman (1998: 293-295) also presses this worry.
In distinguishing between strong and weak material coincidence, the proponent of the
standard account must reject classical mereological systems, for strong and weak material
coincidence are equivalent in such systems. But recall that the defender of the standard
account is also an endurantist and, as such, she may be inclined to take the parthood
relation to be a three-place relation that holds between two objects and a time (see Mellor
1981). Since classical mereological systems do not recognize this temporally-relativized
conception of the parthood relation, the proponent of the standard account may already
have sufficient reason to reject those systems (but see fn.22).
14
15
6
such a manner. In other words, it is open for such a theorist to claim that
Lump and David merely coincide in the weak sense. Earlier I said that it was
intuitive to think that statues like David have things like arms, legs and ears
as parts, and that lumps of clay like Lump do not. To be a bit more exact, let
us suppose that everything that is a part of Lump is also a part of David
(whenever they both exist) but that David has parts (like his right arm) that
are not also parts of Lump. It follows from these assumptions that Lump is a
proper part of David. This is consistent with the claim that Lump and David
coincide in the weak sense. All that is required here is that every part of
David has a part in common with Lump and vice versa. Since Lump, we are
supposing, is a proper part of David, it is trivially true that every part of
Lump has a part in common with David. Moreover, it seems plausible to
think that every part of David has a part in common with Lump since, for
example, it seems plausible to think that David’s right arm – hereby named
‘Righty’ – has certain clay bits as parts (bits that are, by hypothesis, parts of
Lump).
We now have a version of the standard account on which Lump and
David materially coincide in the weak sense and on which David has parts
that Lump lacks. And, just as before, it seems that this difference in parts
can explain the different properties had by Lump and David. Flattening
David would destroy David’s arms, legs and ears, for example, and thus we
appear to have an explanation of why flattening David would result in his
destruction. Since Lump does not have David’s arms, legs and ears as parts
it is no surprise that Lump can survive flattening. So the hypothesized
difference in parts explains why Lump, but not David, has the de re modal
property of possibly being flattened.
Since the current reply to the standard objection relies on the claim that
enduring objects like Lump and David materially coincide in only the weak
sense (whenever they both exist), I refer to it as the Weak Coincidence Response.
4. An Objection to the Weak Coincidence Response
I anticipate the following objection to the Weak Coincidence Response:
The initial challenge for the defender of the standard account was to
explain how enduring objects like Lump and David could differ in
their de re modal properties, for example, given that they have the
exact same microphysical structure whenever they both exist.
According to the weak coincidence response, Lump and David
differ in their parts and this difference in parts explains how they
7
can differ in their de re modal properties. But now we have a new
challenge: how is it that Lump and David can differ in parts, given
that they have the exact same microphysical structure when they
both exist? In particular: why is it that David, but not Lump, has
things like arms as parts? Surely, the explanation here is that David
is a statue, while Lump is a mere lump of clay. But now we’re right
back to where we started: how is that David and Lump differ in
kind, given that they have the exact same microphysical structure?
The dialectic at this point should sound familiar to those who are acquainted
with the literature on the standard objection. The opponent of the standard
account presents a challenge: explain how enduring coincident objects like
Lump and David can differ, for example, with respect to their de re modal
properties. The defender of the standard account answers the challenge by
claiming that Lump and David differ with respect to X and that this
difference with respect to X explains the difference with respect to de re
modal properties. The opponent of the standard account then issues a new
challenge: explain why Lump and David differ with respect to X. Here is an
example of such an exchange, taken from the work of Michael Burke:
Let us suppose that Lump comes into existence at t1, that David
comes into existence at a later time t2, and that both Lump and
David go out of existence at a later time t3. In the present context, to
say that objects x and y differ in their histories is to say that for some
past or future time, x and y differ with respect to the properties (of
certain types) that they exemplify at that time. This, in turn, is to say
that for some past or future time and for some property (of one of
those types), it is true of x or y, but not of both, that it is numerically
identical across time with an object exemplifying that property at
that time. But now what could account for a difference in the crosstime identities of [x] and [y]? The two are composed of just the same
atoms. And since they are coextensive, any object spatiotemporally
continuous with one is spatiotemporally continuous with the
other.16
Here the suggestion is that objects like Lump and David differ with respect
to their de re temporal properties and that this difference explains their
difference with respect to de re modal properties, kind properties and so on.
Burke’s objection is that this simply relocates the burden of explanation
16
Burke (1992: 15).
8
without removing it. This objection would seem to have some force against
the standard account since it is natural to assume that differences in de re
temporal properties require further explanation. If differences in parts are
analogous to differences in de re temporal properties in this respect then my
proposal, like the one entertained by Burke, only serves to relocate the
problem in question.
But I take it that the defender of the standard account can plausibly claim
that the differences are not analogous in this respect. In particular, the
defender of the standard account can say that there is no further explanation of
the fact David and Lump differ with respect to their parts – there is no
explanation, for example, for why David, but not Lump, has Righty as a part.
David and Lump do indeed differ in this respect, but such a difference is
simply a brute fact and does not admit of any further explanation. All
explanation must come to an end at some point, after all, and it seems as if
there is no better place for explanation to come to an end than in facts of the
following sort: x is a part of y (at t). Indeed, I take it that the defender of the
standard account will not be alone in locating brute facts at this exact point.
Everyone,17 after all, admits that Righty is a part of David. But what sort of
explanation could anyone give of this fact? It seems as if there are no
illuminating answers to such questions. I therefore conclude that the
defender of the standard account can explain the relevant differences
between Lump and David by appealing to a difference in (macro) parts and
that this latter sort of difference can plausibly taken to be inexplicable.
There is, however, a more serious problem with the current reply to the
standard objection. On the version of the standard account currently on
offer, every part of Lump is a part of David, but David has parts that Lump
lacks. Righty, for example, is a part of David but not a part of Lump. But
now consider the part of Lump – ‘Lump-minus’ – that spatially coincides
with Righty. What is the relation between Lump-minus and Righty? If
Lump-minus is identical to Righty then, since Lump-minus is a part of Lump,
it follows that Righty is a part of Lump. This, however, is inconsistent with
version of the standard account that is currently on offer since, according to
this view, Righty is not a part of Lump. Accordingly, the advocate of the
current account must deny that Lump-minus is identical to Righty. And, in
fact, the defender of the standard account has a more familiar reason to
make this distinction since Lump-minus and Righty differ in their de re
temporal properties, de re modal properties and so on. Lump-minus, like
Lump, could survive being flattened. Righty, like David, could not. We must
17 Here I ignore both the Nihilist and the denier of the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached
Parts. See, respectively, Unger (1979) and van Inwagen (1981).
9
therefore address the standard objection once more. Lump-minus and
Righty materially coincide (in some sense) and yet differ in their properties:
what is the explanation for this difference? Following our earlier discussion,
the defender of the standard account may claim that Lump-minus and
Righty differ in their parts (Lump-minus and Righty materially coincide in
only the weak sense) and that this difference in parts explains their
differences with respect to the relevant properties. It might be claimed, for
example, that Righty has a certain finger – ‘Pinky’ – as a part and that Lumpminus does not have that finger as a part. This response will not satisfy the
opponent of the standard account, however, since it only raises the further
question: what is the relation between Pinky and the part of Lump with
which Pinky spatially coincides? This series of challenges and responses can
be continued for some time. At each stage in the dialectic we will be
confronted with a smaller part of David and a smaller part of Lump that
must be distinguished. At the limit, we will be forced to distinguish between
the atomic parts of Lump and the atomic parts of David. In other words, the
version of the standard account corresponding to the Weak Coincidence
Response is ultimately incoherent for, in the end, it collapses into the earlier
account on which objects like Lump and David spatially coincide without
sharing any parts at all. Since we have already seen that this account is
unacceptable, the current response to the standard objection must be
rejected.
5. The Strong Coincidence Response
The previous response to the standard objection relied on the claim that
objects like Lump and David materially coincide whenever they both exist,
but only in the weak sense. I have argued that this response ultimately
collapses into the No Coincidence Response and must therefore be rejected.
In light of this, let us see what response to the standard objection is available
on the supposition that enduring objects like Lump and David materially
coincide in the strong sense.
To begin with, let us turn out attention to an alternative solution to the
puzzles of material constitution – the doctrine of temporal parts. According
to the proponent of the doctrine of temporal parts, objects like Lump and
David are not coincident enduring objects. Rather, they are overlapping
perduring objects. To say that Lump and David are perduring objects is to say
that they are spread out in time in much the same way that they are spread
out in space. Lump and David are not wholly present at the various times
throughout their careers. Rather, they are partly present at those times –
10
Lump and David exist at various times by having different temporal parts at
those times. The notion of a temporal part can be defined as follows:
(D3) x is a temporal part of y at (or during) t =df (i) x exists only at
(or during) t, (ii) x is a part of y at (or during) t, and (iii) x
overlaps at (or during) t everything that is a part of y at (or
during) t.18
So, according to the proponent of the doctrine of temporal parts, Lump and
David will be temporally overlapping objects in much the same way that I and
my right arm are spatially overlapping objects. Let us suppose that I exactly
occupy the spatial region r1 at the current time and that my right arm exactly
occupies the spatial region r2 at the current time (so that r2 is a sub-region of
r1). In a natural sense, then, there is a single object currently present at r2.
That object is a proper spatial part of me and an improper spatial part of my
arm. Thus, my arm and I spatially overlap at r2 in virtue of sharing a
common spatial part at r2. Nonetheless, my arm and I are distinct since I
currently have spatial parts that my arm lacks. Everything that is currently a
spatial part of my arm, on the other hand, also happens to be a spatial part of
me right now. That is, my arm is currently a proper spatial part of me. Next,
let us suppose that Lump comes into existence at t1, that David comes into
existence at a later time t2, and that both Lump and David go out of existence
at a later time t3. For the temporal parts theorist, there is a natural sense in
which there is a single object present in the immediate vicinity of Lump and
David during the interval from t2 to t3 – that object is a proper temporal part
of Lump and an improper temporal part of David. Lump and David then
temporally overlap during that interval in virtue of the fact that they share a
common temporal part during that interval. Nonetheless, Lump and David
are distinct since Lump has temporal parts that David lacks. On the other
hand, everything that is a temporal part of David is also a temporal part of
Lump. Thus, David is a proper temporal part of Lump.
The picture presented by the proponent of the doctrine of temporal parts
is, in some ways, quite different from the picture embraced by the proponent
of the standard account. According to the first view, ordinary objects persist
through time by having distinct temporal parts at different times. According
to the second, ordinary objects persist through time by being wholly present
at different times. But there are also some noteworthy similarities between
the two views. The temporal parts theorist and the proponent of the
18
Cf. Sider (1997: 205).
11
standard account will both say that Lump and David are distinct objects.
Moreover, both will say that Lump and David differ in kind (and in their de
re temporal properties, de re modal properties and so on). And, finally, both
will say that, for each time during the interval from t2 to t3, Lump and David
have all of the same spatial parts at those times. So, the temporal parts
theorist will join with the proponent of the standard account in saying that
Lump and David differ in kind, even though there are times at which they
have the exact same microphysical structure. This suggests an interesting
point that has gone unnoticed in the literature: the standard objection to the
standard account can also be directed at the doctrine of temporal parts. If
Lump and David have the exact same microphysical structure at a time, the
temporal parts theorist apparently owes us an explanation of how those two
objects can differ in kind (and in other properties). At this point one might
reasonably begin to worry that there is a fundamental problem with the
standard objection, since that objection was never intended to count against
the doctrine of temporal parts. Such a suspicion can be brought out even
more forcefully by recalling that, according to the temporal parts theorists,
temporally overlapping objects like Lump and David are fundamentally
analogous to spatially overlapping objects like my right arm and I. If the
standard objection counts against the doctrine of temporal parts, then it
should also count against any theory on which my right arm and I spatially
overlap. After all, my right arm and I share all the same parts at r2 – we have
the exact same microphysical structure at that region of space. How then do
we differ in kind? At this point the standard objection looks almost
laughable since there is an obvious explanation of how my right arm and I
differ in kind. I have spatial parts that my right arm lacks – my arm is a
proper spatial part of me – and this difference in spatial parts explains our
difference in kind. By analogy, there is an obvious explanation of how, on
the temporal parts view, Lump and David differ in kind. Lump has temporal
parts that David lacks – David is a proper temporal part of Lump – and it is
this difference that explains their difference in kind.
At this point I have argued that the doctrine of temporal parts and the
standard account are similar in certain important respects. I have also
argued that the defender of the doctrine of temporal parts has an obvious
response available to the standard objection. It therefore seems reasonable to
expect that the defender of the standard account has an obvious solution to
the standard objection, one that will be modeled on the response given by
the temporal parts theorist. And indeed I think that this is the case. To begin
with, let us note a further point of agreement between the defender of the
standard account and the defender of the doctrine of temporal parts: both
parties will agree that David is a temporal part of Lump during the interval
12
from t2 to t3.19 For David exists only during that interval, David is a part of
Lump during that interval and David overlaps during that interval
everything that is a part of Lump during that interval. Moreover, both
parties will agree that David is a proper temporal part of Lump during the
interval in question since David is not identical to Lump. The two parties
will not agree on everything, of course. Most importantly, the temporal parts
theorist will assert, and the proponent of the standard account will deny,
that Lump has temporal parts (during the interval from t1 to t2) that David
lacks. Still, given that David is a proper temporal part of Lump, there must
be some sense in which these two objects differ in parts. Indeed there is:
Lump has spatial parts during the interval from t1 to t2 that David lacks.
And, just as the temporal parts theorist relies on a difference in temporal parts
during that interval to explain how Lump and David can differ in kind, the
defender of the standard account can rely on a difference in spatial parts
during that interval to explain how Lump and David can differ in kind.
Since the current response to the standard objection allows that objects
like Lump and David materially coincide in the strong sense whenever they
both exist, I refer to it as the Strong Coincidence Response.
6. An Objection to the Strong Coincidence Response
I expect protest once again. To paraphrase the earlier quotation from Burke:
In the present context, to say that objects x and y differ in their
spatial parts is to say that for some past or future time, x and y differ
with respect to their spatial parts at that time. This, in turn, is to say
that for some past time and for some objects that exist at that time, it
is true of x or y, but not of both, that it is numerically identical
across time with an object that has those objects as parts at that time.
But now what could account for a difference in the cross-time
19 This does not, of course, mean that the standard account is a perdurantist theory, for the
proponent of the standard account will deny that Lump, for example, has temporal parts at
every time throughout its career. Thus, the proponent of the standard account will deny the
following principle, taken by many to be the central thesis of the perdurance account:
Thesis of Temporal Non-Locality: Necessarily, for any object x, and for any nonempty, non-overlapping sets of times T1 and T2 whose union is the time span of
x, there are two objects x1 and x2, such that (i) x1 and x have the same parts at
every time in T1, (ii) x2 and x have the same parts at every time in T2, and (iii) the
time span of x1 = T1, while the time span of x2 = T2. (Sider 1997: 204)
13
identities of x and y? The two are composed of just the same atoms
(at those times when they both exist). And since they are
coextensive (at those times), any object spatiotemporally continuous
with one is spatiotemporally continuous with the other.
Objections of this sort should now seem less than compelling since
analogous objections can be raised against the temporal parts theorist and,
perhaps even more strikingly, against any theorist who holds that my right
arm is currently a part of me. Presumably, the challenge to the temporal
parts theorist will go something like this:
In the present context, to say that objects x and y differ in their
temporal parts is to say that for some past or future time, x and y
differ with respect to their temporal parts at that time. This, in turn,
is to say that for some past or future time and for some temporal
parts that exist at those times, it is true of x or y, but not of both, that
it has those temporal parts as parts at that time. But now what could
account for a difference in the temporal parts of x and y? The two
are composed of just the same atoms (at those times when they both
exist). And since they are coextensive (at those times), any object
spatiotemporally continuous with one is spatiotemporally
continuous with the other.
The temporal parts theorist does admit that Lump and David differ in their
temporal parts (and that this difference explains their difference in kind), so
we may legitimately ask them to explain this difference. But, of course, it
does not follow that we can expect an answer to such a question. For it would
seem plausible for the temporal parts theorist to deny that there is any
interesting explanation to be given here: the difference in temporal parts
between Lump and David is simply a brute fact, not admitting of further
analysis or explanation.
In the same way, I suggest once again that the defender of the standard
account ought to say that the difference in spatial parts (at certain times)
between Lump and David is a brute fact and that this difference explains
their difference in kind. Burke, of course, is correct in pointing out that this is
equivalent to saying that there is some time and some object such that Lump
or David, but not both, has that object as a part at that time. Burke is also
correct to point out that this entails that Lump or David, but not both, is
identical to something that has that object as a part at that time. But by now
it should be clear that the defender of the standard account has an
explanation for this last fact. Lump or David, but not both, is identical to
14
something that has the relevant object as a part at the time in question in
virtue of the fact that Lump or David, but not both, has that object as a part
at that time. Since this latter fact is taken to be a brute fact, there is no further
explanation to be given. If the defender of the standard account is pressed to
answer the question of why Lump or David, but not both, has the relevant
object as a part at some time, that theorist ought to shrug her shoulders. 20
Moreover, the defender of the standard account can take comfort in her
silence since, as we have seen, the temporal parts theorist (and, by analogy,
the theorist who takes my right arm to be a part of me right now) must also
take facts of this sort to be brute. Since almost all of us accept the standard
account or accept the doctrine of temporal parts or, at the very least, accept
the claim that my right arm is currently a part of me, we will all have to fall
silent in response to questions of this sort. Univocal silence is golden.
There is, however, a more serious worry facing the Strong Coincidence
Response. According to the current line of thought, one uses the fact that
Lump and David differ in their spatial parts at some time (or times) to
explain the fact that Lump and David differ in kind. But what if there is no
time at which Lump and David differ in their spatial parts? That is, what if
Lump and David coincide throughout their respective careers? 21 In cases like
this, the Strong Coincidence Response does not seem to be of any help. But,
once again, the connection between the doctrine of temporal parts and the
standard account is instructive. For the defender of the standard account can
join with the defender of the doctrine of temporal parts in embracing a
counterpart-theoretic analysis of de re modality. The suggestion is that, in
cases where a lump of clay and a statue coincide throughout their respective
careers, the defender of the standard account ought to claim that there is a
single object present. That object is both a lump of clay and a statue. We then
use the machinery of counterpart theory to explain the fact that all of the
following claims are true:
(1) Lump is such that it could survive flattening.
(2) David is such that it could not survive flattening.
(3) Lump is identical to David.
20 Yet another response here is to reverse this order of explanation and claim that facts
about the identity of enduring objects over time are brute. One could then, in turn, give an
explanation of why Lump and David differ in their (spatial) parts at certain times by
reference to these brute facts about identity. Indeed, this may be the more natural of the
two moves since, as Merricks (1999a) has argued, the endurantist might have independent
reasons to take facts about diachronic identity to be brute.
21 Cases of this sort are discussed in Gibbard (1975) and Lewis (1986).
.
15
(1) is true since, qua lump-of-clay, Lump/David is such that it could survive
flattening. Likewise, (2) is true since, qua statue, Lump/David is such that it
could not survive flattening. (3) is true since, by hypothesis, Lump coincides
with David at every time it exists (and vice versa). 22 23
Historically, one of the major motivations for accepting the standard
account has been a desire to avoid a counterpart-theoretic analysis of de re
modal claims. To my mind, however, there are powerful reasons –
independent of the puzzles of material constitution – to accept counterpart
theory. I am therefore happy to recommend the Strong Coincidence
Response to those who accept the standard account. 24 This is not to say that
22 For a more detailed discussion of counterpart theory and its relevance to cases of this
sort, see Lewis (1968, 1986).
23 There is one further connection between the doctrine of temporal parts and the standard
account that is worth mentioning. One way of developing the standard objection to the
standard account (due to Rea 1997) goes as follows: Joe and his body have the exact same
microphysical structure whenever they both exist. Macroscopic properties like being a
thinker supervene on microphysical structure. Since Joe is a thinker, so is his body. But it is
wildly counterintuitive to claim that there are two thinkers located in Joe’s immediate
vicinity. Most defenders of the standard account respond to this sort of objection in the
same way that they respond to the objection concerning de re modal properties – the
defenders of the standard account grant that Joe and his body differ with respect to mental
properties and then try to provide an explanation of this difference. But, in fact, there is
another option for such theorists. One could deny that Joe and his body differ in mental
properties, claiming instead that there are, in fact, two thinkers in Joe’s immediate vicinity.
One could then mitigate the oddity of this claim by telling a story modeled on the
perdurantist’s account of fission. The basic claim made by the perdurantist is that, in cases
of fission, there are two (temporally overlapping) persons present prior to fission. Both
persons are thinkers, but they share a single thought – that thought is a plural thought. The
perdurantist then claims that the presence of a single thought goes some way toward
mitigating the counterintuitiveness of the claim that there are two thinkers present. I
suggest that an analogous story could be told by the defender of the standard account in
connection with the current objection. For the full story on perdurance and fission, see
Lewis (1977).
24 Note that, on the current proposal, the defender of the standard account can also accept
the following (temporally-relativized) version of the identity axiom:
Identity Axiom: x = y if and only if for every time t, if x exists at t or y exists at t,
then x is a part of y at t and y is a part of x at t.
(For more on temporally-relativized mereology, see Thomson 1983.) In addition, the
defender of the standard account who accepts the current proposal can also accept
supervenience principles like the following:
Microphysical Supervenience: For any objects x and y, if x and y are microphysical
duplicates at every time at which (at least) one of them exists, then x and y are
duplicates simpliciter.
(For more on supervenience principles of this sort, see Rea 1997.) If the defender of the
standard account finds principles like this plausible, I suggest that they ought to take the
Strong Coincidence Response seriously.
16
the Strong Coincidence Response is the only response available to the
defender of the standard account. But it does strike me as obvious that if
such a theorist rejects counterpart theory and holds that Lump and David
are distinct even in cases where they materially coincide (in the strong sense)
throughout their careers, then radical claims must be made. In particular, it
seems to me that such a theorist must claim that facts about de re modality
(or facts about kind membership) are simply brute facts. In short, I believe
that the advocate of the standard account must either embrace a counterpart
theoretic analysis of de re modality or else claim that there is no analysis of de
re modality at all. I leave it to the advocate of the standard account to weigh
the relative costs of these positions. 25
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