The Metaphysics of Race
1. Carving Nature At Its Joints: Consider the differences between these two
classifications of animals:
 Trained animals
 Animals in this field
 Animals that belong to Chad
 Animals that have just broken this vase
 Etc.
 Ostriches
 Horses
 Sharks
 Bears
 Etc.
What is the difference between these sorts of divisions? It is hard to say exactly, but we
have a strong inclination to think that the categories on the right somehow “carve
nature at its joints” while the divisions on the left do not.
We tend to think of biological taxonomies according to species, genus, phylum, etc. as
being REAL categories. It is more NATURAL to divide up animals into the categories on
the right than the categories on the left. Or consider these categories:
In chemistry, these divisions of the elements seem more natural than dividing them into,
say, elements in this room, elements found in the Sun, and so on.
Question: Are some of the categories that we assign things to somehow “REALLY OUT
THERE (OBJECTIVELY)”? Or, are all categories merely subjective—something that WE
have created? That is, are there really natural kinds, or are all categorizations merely
social constructs?
2. Important Similarities: We might think that kinds like ‘ostrich’ and ‘shark’ are more
natural divisions because all ostriches have certain similarities.
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Suggestion #1: Qualitative vs. Non-Qualitative Similarities: The similarities that
groups all ostriches together seem to be qualitative. That is, all ostriches LOOK similar,
or have a similar morphology.
But, first note: The similarities that carve up species (and genus, phylum, etc.) are NOT
purely morphological (for instance, dolphins were once thought of as “fish”, but they are
now called “mammals”, and considered to be more similar to hippos than any fish).
Furthermore, the divisions on the list on the left above ALSO identify similarities. ‘All of
the animals in this field’, for instance, groups all of the animals that have the property of
‘being in this field’ in common. This is a similarity too!
Question: Why are morphological similarities in some sense superior to, or more
“natural” than, other sorts of similarities (e.g., ‘trained’ animals)? (or are they?)
Suggestion #2: Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Similarities: Perhaps the answer is that
morphology is an intrinsic property of an animal, while ‘being owned by Chad’ is an
extrinsic property. Perhaps it is most natural to “carve nature” based on INTRINSIC
similarities between individuals.
However, note that contemporary biological taxonomies are NOT based on intrinsic,
qualitative similarities. Rather they are based on these two EXTRINSIC properties:
 Ancestry (which other animals/species the animal is descended from)
 Breeding ability (which other animals the animal can successfully breed with)
Any reference to OTHER animals makes these properties extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
Question: Why are ancestry and breeding ability similarities more “natural” than other
sorts of extrinsic similarities? (e.g., ‘being in this field’)
3. Three Views About Race: Perhaps if we focus in on ONE single type of category, we
will better come to understand these issues. We will now examine three views of race.
(1) Realism: To most people, intuitively, races (e.g., black, white, Samoan, American
Indian, etc.) are natural kinds. Though breeding is not relevant (members of various
races can successfully procreate), ancestry is.
(Note: This is not really a break from the normal biological classification. For instance, we
probably consider the various breeds of dogs (e.g., greyhounds, golden retrievers,
dachshunds, etc.) to be REAL categories because of ancestry, even though they can all be
interbred (I am not equating human races with dogs, but you get the point.)
So, the standard view of race among non-philosophers is:
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Biological Realism About Race: Races are natural kinds. Racial categories are
real, biological categories, akin to sub-species or breeds of a single species.
(2) Constructivism: Perhaps surprisingly, biological realism about race is not common
among philosophers. Many philosophers believe that race is socially constructed.
Clearly, at least SOME divisions are merely social constructs, right? Consider some
categories that are (probably) merely social constructs:
 husbands
 professors
 hipsters
Surely these divisions are not “natural” ones which “carve nature at its joints”. Social
kinds seem to be categories that are defined based on social practices, institutions and
conventions. Perhaps race is like that too, as in the following:
Social Constructivism About Race: Races are social kinds. Racial categories are
socially constructed kinds, akin to cool vs. uncool people, or the caste system.
(3) Eliminativism: There is actually a third stance as well. Both realism and constructivism
believe that there ARE racial categories. That is, people really are black, white, etc. They
only disagree about whether or not these categories are objective or subjective. A third
view denies that race exists at all—or rather, if they are real categories, there are no
members of them.
Surely, SOME categories are ones which have no members. We used to think that some
humans fit into the category ‘witch’—but it turned out that no one actually belonged in
this category (not even those who were burnt at the stake). So too for categories like
‘vampire’, ‘werewolf’, etc. Perhaps race is like that. We THINK that these labels really
apply to people, but we are wrong about that, as in the following view:
Eliminativism About Race: There are no races. To assign someone to a racial
category is to make an error, or state a falsehood. In short, stating that someone
is white is akin to stating that someone is a witch, or a werewolf.
4. Against Realism: As intuitive as it may be, there are many problems with realism.
1. Identifiable and/or Genetic Differences: One might think that, if there is a taxonomy of
various races, then there must be some identifiable physical features or genetic markers
that distinguish the various races from one another. But, there are none.
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For instance, what physical features does one race have that another does not? We
might think that skin color plays a significant role. But, why should it? Why is skin color
an identifiable feature that “carves nature at its joints”, when other identifiable features
(presumably) do not, e.g., eye color, height, shoe size, etc.?
And, regarding genetic variation, it turns out that there is actually more genetic variation
WITHIN supposed races, than there is between races. It turns out that there are no
genetic markers possessed by any supposed “race” that are not also found in members
of other supposed “races”. Indeed, the scientific consensus among geneticists is that
there IS NO genetic basis for categories of race! (see here)
Furthermore, while you might THINK that we assign
race based on certain physical features, we really do not
even do so. For instance, what race is the man on the
right (Congressman G.K. Butterfield, of North Carolina)?
Answer: He is black (for instance, see here). In reality,
“looking a certain way” is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for being a member of any race.
2. The Cladistic Approach: Perhaps the division of race has little to do with genetic
variation or appearance. The popular trend among biologists these days is to divide
human beings into races based on lineage. For instance, when one group splits off from
its main group to go live in another region, it becomes isolated and stops interbreeding with the main group. Over time, this can result in variation and perhaps new
human sub-species (i.e., races). On this view, in the same way that evolutionary branches
are seen as breaking away from the main group at various points in history, so too are
races seen in terms of a branching tree:
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Since the cladistic approach relies on historical lineage rather than genetics, the
similarity or dissimilarity of appearance and/or genes between members of different
races is irrelevant to the taxonomy of race. But, now, look at these races. Do they fit our
“folk” conception of racial categories? Sometimes. But, often not. For instance, “Asian”
turns out not to identify a race at all. For, Thai and Koreans are as remote of cousins as
Iranian and English. Similarly, “black” actually applies to several races; and, if (aboriginal)
Australians are “black” then that label applies to some VERY distant cousins (it turns out
that, cladistically, Aborigines are more closely related to Koreans than Nigerians. Note
also that other supposed races (e.g., Hispanic/Latino, Jew, etc.) are entirely absent here.
Reply: Might it just be that, rather than give up the notion of race, the cladistic approach
merely shows that we should REVISE it? After all, we once thought dolphins were FISH
until biologists told us that we were mistaken. What do you think?
3. Relativism: If racial categories are really “out there” in the world to be discovered,
rather than invented or constructed by societies, then we would expect there to be ONE,
correct list of races. However, the racial divisions vary wildly around the world. Here are
some recent census categories from various countries:
United States
England
South Africa
Brazil
Bulgaria
White
Black
American Indian
White
Mixed
Asian/Asian British
Black African
Colored (mixed race)
Indian or Asian
White
Black
Brown
Bulgarian
Turkish
Gypsy
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Asian Indian
Black/Black British
White
Yellow
Chinese
Chinese
Aboriginal
Filipino
Other
Japanese
Korean
Question: Just as a list of atomic elements can be
Vietnamese
right or wrong (or one list can be closer to the right
Other Asian
list than another), is one of these lists right (or more
Native Hawaiian
right) than the others? If not, then racial categories
Guamanian/Chamorro
cannot be absolute, objective categories.
Samoan
Other Pacific Islander
4. The Social Aspect of Race: Consider a case like that in Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead
Wilson, where a slave has a child who is 1/32 black (and therefore will grow up as a
slave), and then switches her child with that of her white master. This white child is then
brought up as a slave, treated as a slave, believes himself to be black, and is perceived
as black by everyone around him. The “black” child meanwhile believes himself to be
white, grows up free, is treated as white, etc. What are we to make of this story? We
might think that this story supports the position that race is—at least in part—a social
construct, based primarily on how one perceives one’s self, and also on how one is
perceived by others.
5. Racism: Based on the reasons we have just examined, there seems to be a case for
giving up the conception of race as a real category in nature. But, many philosophers
propose that there is an additional type of reason to give up this notion: Many
philosophers oppose realism about race because it seems to be inseparably coupled
with racism. When a racial category is assigned to someone, along with it come many
racialized stereotypes, pre-suppositions, and so on—most of them negative. For
instance, when the categories ‘white’ and ‘black’ were first used (in the 18th century), the
writers of the Constitution noted that each black person would be counted as 3/5 of a
person for the purposes of determining how many members of the House of
Representatives would be assigned to each district. In effect, the distinction served the
conclusion that a black person was inferior, a mere 60% as valuable as a white person
(and this, in turn, served to justify slavery). However, such racialization of others is
undermined because (i) it leads to unjust discrimination, racism, and oppression, and (ii)
because none of these racialized stereotypes seem to ACTUALLY be linked with race,
genetics, etc.
Reply: The realist would reply that, even if racial terms (e.g., white, black, etc.) are
charged with potentially dangerous racialized assumptions, this has no bearing upon
whether or not those categories EXIST.
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5. Against Eliminativism: If one rejects realism, then one is faced with two options:
Constructivism or Eliminativism. Here is an objection to Eliminativism.
Here is a plausible principle: If something has causal powers—that is, if it enters into
a causal explanation of some effect or phenomenon—then it must exist.
But, races seem to have causal powers. For instance, they seem to be the cause of:
 discrimination (race causes people to treat some people differently than others)
 self-image (viewing one’s self in certain ways; as a member of a group, etc.)
 and so on
Reply: But, a similar argument could have been made about witches. “Witch” must be a
real category, because it CAUSED people to burn others at the stake, and so on. What
the eliminativist will say here is that the cause of these effects is not the existence of
RACE but rather the (erroneous) BELIEFS about the existence of race.
6. Further Speculation: A Lesson From the Sex/Gender Distinction?: We seem to be
left with no identifiable criteria for racial divisions Could it be, perhaps, that the
confusion here is due to the fact that we are in fact operating simultaneously with
multiple, distinct interpretations or definitions of race?
Consider, for instance, the distinction between sex (based on a biological distinction, of
having XX or XY chromosomes; e.g., male vs. female), gender (based on certain social
roles and pressures; e.g., femininity vs. masculinity), and gender identity (based on one’s
own subjective experience and identification; e.g., one’s private sense of being a man or
a woman). Could race be like this? That is, perhaps there are:
 Natural, biological divisions (e.g., the cladistic divisions)
 Social or cultural affiliations (e.g., Jewish, Hispanic, etc.)
 Personal identifications with a particular race (e.g., in Pudd’nhead Wilson)
What do you think?
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