Francesca PICCIN & Elia PUSTERLA
Defending eroded states' sovereignty
the European Union humanitarian aid policy
GARNET – April 22nd 2010
"The European Union in International Affairs"
GARNET – April 22nd 2010 – "The European Union in International Affairs"
Introduction
This paper questions sovereignty in the specific context of the European Union humanitarian
aid policy. By adopting a theoretical approach based on the literature on sovereignty, it will be
firstly discussed what the essence of sovereignty is, and who can be considered its
repository 1 . The starting assumption is the traditional role of the state as sovereign. Such role
is put under discussion in the current international relations context where states suffer a loss
of control over their sovereignty. By verifying the process of loss of control, the focus is put
on the impact of phenomena such as interdependence and integration on the redefinition of
sovereignty repositories. In other words, sovereignty is currently facing an evolution in its
conceptualization; states are less and less able to autonomously act without external pressures.
Thus, the traditional nation-state model is de facto challenged. There is a shift of sovereignty
from the national to the international level. In empirical terms, sovereignty evolution from the
traditional Westphalian nation-state system towards a more international one influences the
EU integration process. Nonetheless, the shift of sovereignty is not always sharp-cut. In this
sense, the EU humanitarian aid policy is particularly interesting as competences are shared at
the same time by Member States and the European Union. Accordingly, the Union has
acquired authority in humanitarian aid decisions and actions. On the other hand, European
Member States did not give up their sovereignty, but they maintain their freedom of action.
"The Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy;
however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented
from excursing theirs" 2 . This work questions the implications for sovereignty entailed by such
form of competences sharing. On the one hand, it discusses the EU Member States costs and
opportunities in delegating to the Union. On the other hand, it questions the consequences of
delegation for sovereignty control.
Level and Approach
This paper puts under discussion the traditional assumption of states as repository of
sovereignty. To reach this goal, the role played by states as actors of the international relations
1
In this paper, the term repository is used in the meaning given by Janice Thomson (Thomson 1995).
European Union. Treaty of Lisbon-amending the treaty on the European Union and the treaty establishing the
European Community, Official Journal of the European Union. 2007/C 306/01, 17 December 2007, Article 2C,
4.
2
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is under question. The analysis of sovereignty evolution stresses the challenges states are
called to face to guard their sovereignty.
States’ attitudes in the international context are analysed referring to the rationalistic
tradition 3 . The reason of this choice is inherent to the nature of the analysis itself. It
specifically pertains to the impact of the international context evolution on national
sovereignty and on states’ propensity towards integration. Being the systemic approach
situational, it maintains that states are no more considerable just as impermeable single units;
rather, they shape and are shaped by the international context where they act (Keohane
1983:508; Waltz 1979b:67-73). Keohane, by referring to Waltz's argument 4 , clarifies the
utility of adopting an outside-in approach, instead of an inside-out one. This latter devotes, on
the contrary, much more attention to the unit level of analysis:
“First, causal analysis is difficult at the unit level because of the apparent importance of
idiosyncratic factors, ranging from the personality of a leader to the peculiarities of a given
country’s institutions. […]. Second, analyzing state behaviour from “inside-out” alone leads
observers to ignore the context of action: the pressure exerted on all states by the competition
among them” (Keohane 1984:25).
The rationalistic approach is also able to frame sovereignty evolution in the broader
international institutional context. As already stated, this work questions whether states can
still be considered as the repositories of sovereignty, and whether sovereignty changed
following the recent evolution of the international context. According to rationalism, states
are the principle units of study when analyzing the dynamics characterizing the international
context. The basic statement defines states as unitary, rational, and autonomous (Waltz 1979a;
Keohane 1984). They aim at the attainment of their interest on the base of a rational calculus
of costs/gains. They are supposed to be rational and self-interested, national preferences to be
sovereign, and safeguard of sovereignty traditionally to be their principal concern. Thereafter,
such assumption offers the theoretical framework to go over the concept of sovereignty from
its classical Westphalian conceptualization until a more essential conceptualization. This latter
is more suitable to understand the structural changes occurred to the international context in
the last decades.
3
4
The rationalistic approach is also known as outside-in or systemic.
See also Waltz (1979a; 1979b).
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Definitions
States are traditionally considered as sovereign. In this sense, they:
"are territorial units with juridical independence; they are not formally subject to some
external authority. Sovereign states also have de facto autonomy. Although the power and
preferences of foreign actors will limit the feasible options for any state, sovereign states are
not constrained because external actors have penetrated or controlled their domestic authority
structures" (Krasner 2001:230).
Some clarifications about the origin of Krasner's definition are necessary. According to
Habermas, states are the executive branch able to assure sovereignty both at the internal and
external level (Staatsgewald); they have a geographically delimited territory (Staatsgebiet),
and a specific population (Staatsvolk) (Habermas 1996:126). Such definition refers to the
traditional Westphalian conceptualization of state. Westphalian sovereignty, in some
acceptations also named "domestic sovereignty", has two dimensions. Firstly, according to
Hobbes and Bodin, the internal dimension represents the authority and control of a
government within a state. Such internal dimension has then been completed by an external
one; a government, in exercising its authority, is immune from any external interference
(Philpott 2001:300; Krasner 1999).
The Westphalian definition presupposes the existence of six structural properties: authority,
state, population, coercion, territoriality, and recognition. Accordingly, sovereignty is not an
attribute of the state, but other states must recognize this attribute to the state. The recognition
of sovereignty needs that a state owns a factual sovereignty in exercising its internal and
external authority (Recognition). Moreover, sovereignty resides in a government/state (State)
able to make and enforce rules (Authority) over its citizens (Population) and over a specific
territory (Territory). Finally, state/government has the monopolistic right of imposing its
sovereignty over this territory even thanks to the exclusive use of violence (Coercion)
(Thomson 1995; James 1999). These properties have to be unitary, legal, and absolute (James
1999). It can thus be concluded that the traditional definition of sovereignty assumes the
"final authority over a given territory" (Krasner 1988: 86), and it "requires independence from
any outside power and final authority over men who live within certain boundaries" (Strayer
1970:58). The above mentioned characteristics structurally determine the conceptualization of
the traditional state sovereignty; any eventual challenge to them can preclude its survival.
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Francesca PICCIN & Elia PUSTERLA
After the traditional Westphalian conceptualization, the distinction between state-sovereign's
existence and sovereignty existence becomes crucial. The essential properties attributed to
state-sovereign conceptualization may result as unessential when focusing on the more
abstract concept of sovereignty. Referring to the social and political sciences traditions
(Sartori 1970; Phillips 1971) and their more recent interpretations about conceptualization
(Collier and Mahon 1993; Mair 2008), this article goes through the definition of other main
concepts like sovereignty (and sovereign) and breaches of sovereignty. These concepts are
related one another, and share a common high level of abstraction. Nevertheless, they differ in
the degree of essential contentedness (Gallie 1955).
Sovereignty is the most complicated concept to clarify as it is the most debated. According to
the classic constructivist interpretation (Bartelson 1995; Weber 1992), sovereignty may be
conceived as the result of a pure human production (Strang 1996; Murphy 1996; Doty 1996).
Firstly, by adopting a historical perspective (Onuf 1991; Barkin and Cronin 1994; 2003;
Prokhovnik 2008), constructivism correctly states that sovereignty has been subject to
time/space (Walker 1991) fluctuations in terms of both abstract conceptualisation and
concrete articulation. As a matter of fact, historical fluctuations of abstract and concrete
sovereignty do not necessarily diverge in all their cuttings, but could even overlap in some
common points. These points may thus be considered as the essential properties of
sovereignty always common to all the conceptualisations of sovereignty in any time and
space.
Secondly, according to Foucault (Foucault 2003, 2007), sovereignty rises from a societal and
dialogical relation between sovereign and subject. Both these entities actively participate in
founding sovereignty. A sovereign cannot exist without his corresponding subject and vice
versa. Foucault adds that the power related to the existence of sovereignty is mutually created
by both these actors. This interpretation is certainly an additional proof of what the
constructivist tradition affirms. The society participates in building sovereignty; sovereignty
does not pre-exist to society.
An important question rises at this stage: is it possible for a society to pre-exist or simply exist
without sovereignty? This article answer is no. By referring to the structural invariant logic
issued by the anthropological tradition (Lévi-Strauss 2001, 2003), sovereignty and sovereign
can adopt many different forms, but remain constantly present in time and space. Similarly,
even the peculiarity of the relation between sovereign and subject can be object of
fluctuations, but remains constant. The birth of a society and the birth of sovereignty are thus
parallel processes. A society cannot articulate itself without founding some even primitive,
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but also peculiar, forms of sovereignty. The dialogical process of mutual definition and
recognition implies the possibility of circumscribing the subject-sovereign relation.
The distinction between internal and external sovereignty requires now attention. It is not by
chance that such distinction concerns many authors interested by sovereignty. Prokhovnik –
by adopting a "conception of sovereignty in relational terms" (2007: 35) – tries to go beyond
the "dominant internal/external dichotomy" (Prokhovnik 2007: 35) of sovereignty. It has
largely influenced the mainstream international relations approach (Prokhovnik 2007: 35):
"The mainstream international relations discourse of states in anarchy is the dominant
discourse. […] Recognition of the historical and cultural specificity of both the modern state
paradigm and the discourses about it opens the way to puncturing the universalist claims of
this model and rethinking sovereignty beyond the modern state form" (Prokhovnik 2007: 36).
The nation-state model does not satisfy the need of circumscribing the societal relation
sovereign-subject. The nation-state model of sovereignty – finding its apex in the Westphalian
model (Krasner 1999) – is a temporary manifestation of sovereignty or a historical event; it
does not represent an essential property of sovereignty. A priori, the external/internal
dichotomy may be considered as still valid to circumscribe the relation sovereign-subject.
Nevertheless, the external/internal wall might difficultly be built in perfect correspondence to
the physical and legal boundaries of a Westphalian nation-state.
The nation-state seems not to be the exclusive repository of sovereignty anymore. Empirical
evidences clearly show the existence of many breaches of sovereignty (Krasner 1999).
Nevertheless, Krasner's interpretation of sovereignty breaches revives the realist centrality of
the nation-state model. Accordingly, he argues that breaches certainly exist, but are
voluntarily due to the nation-state activity. Sometimes the nation-state rationally opts for
breaches, and thus maintains a control on the organisation of breaches 5 . Since they represent a
conscious state's choice, breaches does not decrease the centrality of states' sovereignty in the
international context. On the contrary, they are expression of state's sovereignty. This
argument remains however debated.
Is it possible to consider states as promoters of their own loss of sovereignty? In abstract
terms, it is still necessary to better understand if breaches of state's sovereignty rise a
posteriori justifications. Accordingly, on the one hand, states suffer breaches of sovereignty
due to any kind of external pressure. On the other hand, they pretend being the promoters of
5
States may indeed opt for breaches of their own sovereignty on the basis of a rationalist approach leading them
to give priority to economic (Liftin 1997; Mattli 2000) or even moral aspects (Goldsmith 2000).
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such breaches. External disjunctions (Held 1995: Chapter 5) issued by international dynamics
lead to the decrease of state's sovereignty; but this is not per se an unavoidable scenario.
Referring to Krasner, any state may theoretically opt for the compliance or the resistance
before some potential breaches of sovereignty. Nevertheless, state's active role in the defence
of its own sovereignty is harder to prove empirically. Accordingly, when a breach of
sovereignty occurs, it is easy to affirm that a state expected and even welcomes it. Proving
that the state could have avoided such breach is much more difficult.
Ilgen clarifies this point and suggests a peculiar definition of sovereignty:
"I adopt the following definition of sovereignty because it enables us to apply the concept to
contexts that do not assume the existence of the nation-state. Sovereignty is the capacity to
make binding decisions in political and social contexts and to assure the implementation of
those decisions. […] When sovereignty in practice closely corresponds to formal sovereignty,
one might expect order and legitimacy to prevail. When sovereignty-in-practice departs
significantly from formal sovereignty; one might expect turbulence and change on the
horizon. This definition admits readily that sovereignty is not indivisible but can be and
regularly is divided up, parcelled out. […] The definition is also not inextricably tied to
territoriality. The boundaries of the sovereign's authority and power may coincide with the
borders of states, geographical regions or municipalities but they may have little to do with
territory and stretch across all manner of physical barriers" (Ilgen 2003: 10).
Ilgen's definition seems firstly to satisfy the relational nature of sovereignty based on the
relation sovereign-subject. Secondly, it satisfies Sartori's suggestions on concept formation.
Finally, this conceptualisation allows establishing a criterion able to determine the factual
frontier between internal and external sovereignty. This frontier can be built only whether
sovereign and subject share the same belief on "who governs". Thus, a certain level of
sovereignty exists whether sovereign and subject recognise the same actor as ultimate
authority. Sovereignty is thus defined as the shared recognition by sovereign and subject of
the presence of the ultimate authority of power inside their (exclusive/societal) relation of
power. According to such definition, the societal sovereign-subject relation can still be
circumscribed, but not necessarily at the nation-state level.
Ilgen's contribution raises an important aspect. A sovereign society may not correspond to the
Westphalian nation state. Decision-makers – alias the authority – may belong to higher or
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lower levels bypassing the nation-state dimension 6 . A penetrable nation-state becomes unable
to detain the sovereignty monopole and to establish, once for all, the sovereign itself.
Depending on the issue, the decision-maker may thus belong to a national, but also to a
regional or international decisional level.
Currently, nation-states are exposed to new international phenomena which lay the traditional
nation-state on the line. As already suggested by Ilgen, it becomes essential to understand
what sovereignty is in a context in which nation-state does not exist anymore. In the next
chapter, such phenomena are presented and their implications discussed.
Interdependence and Integration
The sovereign nation-state system in the last decades has been put under an unprecedented
stress as it suffered a lot of breaches. Such violations have been caused by two specific
international phenomena. The first one is the increasing impact of interdependence and
globalization on states' internal and external sovereignty control. The second one is the
growing role of international organizations in ruling interstates interactions7 . Both these
phenomena strongly affected the traditional state-centric sovereignty and challenged states'
authority (Krasner 2001). As already maintained, authority over a given territory and
population is the key feature determining states' sovereignty (Krasner 1999: 86). Such
phenomena thus oblige to reconceptualise sovereignty and the centrality of states.
Seen the impact on the sovereign-state system, globalization/interdependence and integration
requires further clarifications. The aim is to discuss the assumption of states as repository of
sovereignty. A prominence is given to the political aspect of sovereignty evolution, and the
stress is put on the impact of interdependence on the sovereign nation state-system. On the
contrary, globalization and its economic impact are just limitedly tackled. Globalization is
defined in accordance with David Held as:
"a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization
of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity
and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity,
interaction, and the exercise of power" (Held et al. 1999).
6
Sassen explains how nations-states as ultimate authorities tend to be bypassed by both an higher and lower
level respectively represented by international integrative events or regional dynamics (Sassen 1996, 2007).
7
See for example Sassen (1996; 2007).
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States cannot avoid to face these new challenges and to safeguard their own interest. A
question arises: which is the principal states' interest? Traditionally it was the preservation of
sovereignty. But, is it still the case? Interdependence and globalization brought new economic
and political opportunities and states may be prompted to partially or totally give up their
sovereignty to profit of. This may also entails softer or harder forms of integration. In
accordance, if states aim at fully profiting of economic and political gains, but are unable to do
it alone, they can cooperate and set up organizations to which delegating far-reaching powers
(James 1999). Concerning economics, this process passes through two steps. Firstly,
globalization increases transnational economic flows, and economic gains pass through the
interactions between national economies. States thus lose control over their economic
apparatus. Secondly, the international economic system needs to set up norms to manage such
interactions. Thus, states in exercising their authority over their own economic system are
subjected to external rules. What is more, governments' preferences and consequent decisions
are strongly driven by external mechanisms of adjustment (Kissane 2006). The aim consists in
bridging the gap between their limited national systems and the international system 8 . In the
70s and 80s, the state-centric paradigm has been challenged by globalization and economic
interdependence inhibiting states to guard the exclusive control of their borders (Thomson
1995; Cooper 1972; Keohane and Nye 1977, 1972; Morse 1976).
Literature generally states that interdependence strongly concerns also political relations
among states (Keohane and Martin 1995). As it is the case for economics, even in the political
context states are called to manage new political challenges, and rethink their sovereignty
control. Interdependence is thus defined, according to Keohane and Nye, in terms of mutual
dependence. "Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal
effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye 1977:8).
Accordingly, states lose political autonomy as interstates relations becomes more dependent,
and events and decisions trespass national borders. Interconnectedness drives preferences
formation and decision making. The influence of external events and decisions is cross-border,
exogenous and existent whether the states accept it or not. In other words, external forces
affecting a specific state and its patterns of behaviour necessarily concern other states.
8
According to March and Olsen, states' actions and decisions can be determined by two different logics: logic of
appropriateness and logic of consequences. Logic of consequences argues that states' actions aim at preferences
maximization. On the contrary, in accordance with the logic of appropriateness, actors adapt their behavior to
norms and rules giving them specific indications of behavior (March and Olsen 1998).
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“In a very loose and general sense, one can say that interdependence is a state of affairs
where what one nation does impinge directly upon other nations. […] The more one nation
has to take into account what other states might do in charting its own international and
domestic policy, the higher the interdependence” (Rosecrance et al. 1977:426).
In accordance with the systemic approach, political interdependence is thus measured to “the
extent to which events occurring in any given part or within any given component unit of a
world system affect events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the
system” (Young 1969:726). States become more sensible and vulnerable. Sensitivity concerns
the rapidity and cost of changes in one state caused by events occurred in another state.
Vulnerability questions the possibility for a state to find viable alternatives to impede the
occurring of such changes.
“Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside in a given situation-in
other words, before any policies are devised to try to change the situation. Vulnerability
means continued liability to costly effects imposed from outside, even after efforts have been
made to alter or escape the situation” (Nye 1976:133). “Since it is usually difficult to change
policies quickly, immediate effects of external changes generally reflect sensitivity
dependence. Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making
effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time” (Keohane and Nye
1977:13).
These indicators state precise considerations about the impact of interdependence on
sovereignty conceptualization. Firstly, if states are obliged to face external events, they can no
more guard an absolute control over preferences formation which is externally imposed.
Secondly, states' relative power changes on the base of their ability of profiting of new
interdependence opportunities. Accordingly, states are called to adjust their behaviour to other
states' one, so accepting to be bonded to them (Keohane et al. 2000).
Which are the consequences for states' sovereignty? By referring to the six essential statesovereign's properties, interdependence definitively affects state, territory, and, to some
extent, even coercion. Concerning state, if a state is inevitably affected by external events, and
is called to manage such challenges, it becomes unable to guard a factual control of its
external and internal sovereignty (Morse 1976). As a consequence, there is a shift of authority
from the internal (state) to the external (international context) level (Keohane and Nye 1985).
State suffers a loss of sovereignty control, and is called to submit to the external authority of
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the international context. Considering now the international context as sovereign, territory and
coercion are inevitably under discussion. Firstly, if national boundaries have been trespassed,
the territory over which the authority is exercised cannot be delimitated. Secondly, state is
less and less competent in enforcing rules, and is also called to adjust its behaviour to
externally imposed rules (Krasner 1983).
The passage from interdependence to integration is even more stringent for sovereignty. In an
interdependent context, the shift of sovereignty from the state to the international level is due
to an inevitable development of the international context. On the contrary, in the case of
integration, there is a precise choice of states to transfer autonomy and competences to a
supranational body. Such choice is nevertheless in someway a Hobson's one if states want to
keep up with the new international challenges and opportunities. As a result, state's authority,
already affected by interdependence, is definitively challenged by the entrance to an
international organization. Membership is doubly expensive for states. Firstly, they lose
autonomy when they totally or partially delegate authority and competences on a specific
matter to a supranational actor. Secondly, by signing international organization's treaties, they
legalize such a transfer and impose sanctions enforcing supranational body's coercion power.
Even if interdependence and integration put under discussion state-sovereign system, the
essential form of sovereignty does not necessarily lose its validity. As matter of fact, the
conceptualization of an essential definition of sovereignty recognizes the existence of
properties of sovereignty, between the six proposed, being more essential than others. First of
all, as previously explained, sovereignty to exist does not require the historical nation-state
event. State is arbitrarily associated to sovereignty also because of the social path dependent
tendency to consider Westphalia as the essential form of sovereignty (Krasner 1988; Beaulac
2004). Second, coercion belongs to a consolidated tradition of Westphalian sovereign-state 9 ,
and may be excluded from the conceptualisation of an essential and abstract sovereignty.
Peters indeed explains that the respect of a sovereign authority could not necessarily be based
on coercion, but on other motivations such as values shared by both sovereign and subject
(Peters 1967). Finally, even territory can be discarded from the number of essential properties
of sovereignty. It is enough to think about spiritual sovereignty not requiring, by definition,
physical territory to exist.
Sovereignty is thus per se a more abstract and essential concept, and include only three very
essential properties being population, authority and recognition. The Westphalian sovereign-
9
See in particular Hobbes' ontology of sovereignty as explained by Shaw (2008).
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state has thus six properties while sovereignty only requires three of them. In Figure 1, it is
possible to observe the situation as conceived by this work. Two different abstract
conceptualisations of sovereignty currently coexist in the international relations: the essential
one and the Westphalian one. Both of them represent an abstract ideal-type not necessarily
corresponding to their concrete manifestations. The essential sovereignty includes three sine
qua non properties, while the Westphalian one the same three plus other three. How to explain
such differences? The essential conceptualisation of sovereignty is limited to properties
constituting the skinny version of sovereignty. This typology of sovereignty starts to exist at
the same time when the political and the social start to exist. This sovereignty is therefore
directly linked to the birth of any kind of society. In reverse, Westphalian sovereignty
includes more sine qua non properties because of its constructed influence. A state sovereign
is something more than any other form of sovereign polity; it can defend the presence of
authority, recognition and population within a constructed framework enriched by coercion,
territory and state. Westphalia indeed represents a conceptualisation of sovereignty issued by
more complex social and historical events, such as the birth of the state-sovereign model. A
sovereign-state continues to exist until (a) authority, (b) recognition of authority and (c)
population recognising such authority stays at the national level. Once they shift from a
national to an international level, state stops being a state-sovereign.
Both these abstract conceptualisations can suffer breaches. Notwithstanding, breaches in
Westphalian sovereignty – as detected by Krasner (1988) – would lead to its simple
transformation in its more essential version. Differently, breaches of essential sovereignty
would lead to the complete disappearance of sovereignty itself. A polity can thus keep
considering itself as sovereign only until it preserves the three essential properties.
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Figure 1: National and International sovereignties
Nation-states tend to regard themselves as state-sovereigns because, despite breaches, they
consider their factual situation closer to the abstract Westphalian conceptualization of
sovereignty rather than to the essential one. Such perception, even without being surprising,
does not necessarily correspond to reality.
This work – by referring to consolidated literature (Sassen 2007; Baldwin 1980; Held and
McGrew 2007; Alker 1977; Caporaso 1978; Cooper 1972; Sassen 1996; Keohane and Nye
1977) – has shown how interdependence and integration, by shaping the current international
relations, push authority, recognition and population outside the state–sovereign (Figure 2).
Krasner's sight on this trend is optimistic. He affirms that the hypocrisy of sovereignty 10 is
organised by states for pragmatic reasons (Krasner 1999).
10
The hypocrisy of sovereignty refers to the presence of unperceived and non-admitted breaches of sovereignty.
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Figure 2: States loosing essential sovereignty's properties
Society is always evolving. If sovereignty is the quintessential production of a societal
relation between sovereign and subject, then this relation may occurs outside from the state
borders. This phenomenon entails the appearance of a sort of world society (Burton 1972).
The question of this work may thus be formulated in the following way: is the shift of
sovereignty from the national to the international level always sharp-cut? The hypothesis of
this work is no. It hypothesizes (H1) that the more or less strong compliance or resistance to
the international integrative trend leads up to different degrees of integration. Different
degrees of integration entail different degree of sovereignty control for states. Sovereignty is
sometimes sought after between two tendencies. On the one hand, the evolution of the
international context prompts towards integration and loss of national sovereignty. On the
other hand, even if states choose integration, they still try to defend their sovereignty. A
corollary (C1) can be added. The hypocrisy of sovereignty is organised as long as states
rationally choose between costs and opportunities of integration. Nonetheless, states do not
always have the necessary information to make a rational choice.
In the next section, a specific case study is presented. Such case is the European Union
Humanitarian Aid Policy. This is an emblematic case of integration and sovereignty sharing
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as authority and decision making are shared between the Union and the Member States. Both
of them have the possibility to decide and act independently from the other in the
humanitarian aid domain. The aim is to offer an illustrative case of not sharp-cut shift of
sovereignty form the national to the international level. In this case study states have the
possibility to choose rationally between integration and unilateralism, but there are not always
the necessary conditions to make this choice.
Case Study: the EU Humanitarian Aid Policy
The European Union is a specific case of international integration. It is deepened and
strengthened through the delegation of competences by the Member States to the Union. The
delegation entails the shift of authority from the states to the Union. The degree of Member
States and Union’s authority depends on the delegated competences. Thus, delegation strictly
concerns sovereignty, its national control and its international transfer. The question is: which
forms delegation can take? Why states decide for a form rather than another one? Is their
choice rational? (Pollack 2003).
The process of delegation refers to the institutional design states decide to give to integration.
Accordingly, through delegation a state partially or totally transfers its authority and
sovereignty on a specific issue-area to a supranational actor. It aims at reducing the
transaction costs 11 which derive from the decision making and the implementation of policies
(Pollack 2003). In other words, delegation is defined "as a grant of authority by two or more
states to an international body to make decisions or take actions"(Bradley and Kelley
2008:3). The delegation of authority entails a shift of sovereignty from the national to the
international level. States lose sovereignty as the supranational body gains authority
(Hawkins et al. 2006).
Delegation does not always take the same form and the sovereignty shift the same extent.
Indeed, states decide to what extent and how transferring their sovereignty to the
supranational body. According to the rationalist approach, such decision requires an attentive
calculus of costs and opportunities of delegation. To enter the case study represented by the
humanitarian aid policy, two clarifications need to be stated. The first one questions the
process of delegation and its consequences for states. The second one analyses costs and
opportunities of delegation with the aim of understanding states' choice.
11
The transactional costs of international cooperation have been developed in details by Robert Keohane in the
functional theory of regimes (Keohane 1984).
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The principal-agent model illustrates the process of delegation; it "explain[s] organizational
autonomy as well as responsiveness to the demands of member governments" (Nielson and
Tierney 2003:242). The states delegating authority are called principals, the supranational
actor gaining authority is called agent 12 . The process of delegation follows four steps. Firstly,
states delegate authority to a supranational actor. Secondly, they take control mechanisms to
monitor agent decisions and actions. Thirdly, they estimate the consequences of delegation.
Fourthly, following such evaluation, they decide for or against a successive delegation
(Tallberg 2002). The chain of delegation can involve a huge number of actors so becoming
longer and longer (Lake 2007).
States can thus decide rationally if delegating or not, to which and to what extent. Following
Krasner (1999), such rationality presupposes an organised hypocrisy of sovereignty.
Accordingly, delegation undermines national sovereignty, but states keep free to decide
whether delegating. They are called to value costs and opportunities before deciding in which
cases and to what extent delegating. If such costs are too high, then delegation is
unrealisable. In revenge, if the expected outcomes are relevant, then states can not renounce
to delegation. Moreover, seen the uncertainty characterising delegation outcomes, states put
in place mechanisms of control over agent's actions and decisions. The evaluation of
delegation costs and benefits must take into consideration also the forms of control at states'
disposal.
“The delegation of power from one actor to another is explained by reference to the functions
performed by the latter, and the value of these actions for the delegating party. Expressed in
P-A [principal-agent theory] terms, a principal delegates functions to an agent in the
expectation that the agent will act in ways which produce outcomes desired by the principal.
In the political domain, common functions which principals may wish to delegate include
monitoring of compliance, solving incomplete contracting problems, independent regulation,
and formal agenda-setting. 13 P-A theory posits that the scope for agent autonomy in such a
relationship varies with the control mechanisms operated by the principal. The starting point
of this argument is the recognition that relationships of delegation are inherently problematic,
because of the simultaneous presence of conflicting interests and asymmetry information”
(Tallberg 2000:845).
12
The theory of principal-agent is the dominant approach to explain delegation in the framework of the
European Union. The most interesting contribution in this sense has been proposed by Giandomenico Majone
and Andrew Moravcsik (Majone 2001; Moravcsik 1998).
13
See Pollack (1997a).
16
Francesca PICCIN & Elia PUSTERLA
In order to maximise opportunities of delegation, states have to find the most suitable form of
delegation to attain their policy desires 14 . At the European Union level, states can decide
between three alternatives: full delegation, non-delegation, and partial delegation. In general
terms, delegation opportunities concern the reduction of transaction costs, the enhancement
of credibility and commitment, the warrantee of the efficiency of decisions and actions, and
the reduction of information asymmetries (Tallberg 2002:26; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999)
and divergent preferences. Other than opportunities, also costs have to be considered. The
principal is the loss of sovereignty control suffered by states. If such loss was organised, as
hypothesized by Krasner, it would not be so problematic. Unfortunately, it is not always the
case. Accordingly, states face the risk that, once delegated, the conditions for delegation
change. In particular, principals’ preferences and interests can diverge from agent’s ones.
In the specific context of humanitarian aid, other than asymmetry of information, preferences
divergence and commitment credibility, delegation helps to solve also the problems of
specialization and politicization. Information asymmetries, preferences divergence and
uncertainty are transaction costs or, in other words, costs pertaining to any transaction. In the
case of humanitarian aid, it is usually the case of a transaction between a donor and a
recipient (Coase 1960; North 1990). According to Martens, there are two types of transaction
costs: "The ex-ante transaction costs for the donor to obtain information about the deprived
[…] and effectively carry out the transfer […]; The ex post uncertainty about the recipient's
intentions concerning the use he is going to make of the transfer […]" (Martens 2005:648).
In general, supranational bodies can reduce transaction costs since "they can coordinate
solutions and make running policy decisions so that states do not have to continually
renegotiate" (Bradley and Kelley 2008:26). Information collection is the first and foremost
transaction cost for states (Pollack 2002). In the humanitarian aid context, it is even more
important (Milner 2006). Accordingly, unilateral actions face obstacles in the phase of
information collection and monitoring. On the contrary, supranational bodies are better
providers of information especially concerning the monitoring of recipients (Milner 2006;
Rodrik 1995).
"Since information on the quality of investment environments in different countries is in
many ways a collective good, multilateral agencies are in a better position to internalize the
externalities that may arise. This creates a rationale for multilateral lending in terms of
14
For a good review of literature about the kind of institutions able to reduce costs and enhance cooperation see:
(Martin and Simmons 2001).
17
GARNET – April 22nd 2010 – "The European Union in International Affairs"
information provision, and particularly in terms of monitoring of government policies in
recipient countries" (Rodrik 1995:2)
Supranational bodies are also essential as knowledge producers (Martens 2005). If donors act
unilaterally, the same projects and programmes are multiplied, and the action is inefficient. A
multilateral action is more effective and less expensive for donors (Martens 2005; Rodrik
1995) as supranational bodies gains in specialization. In repetitive and frequent tasks, once
the information collected by the supranational body, any donor can repeatedly benefit of it
without wasting time and resources (Hawkins et al. 2006; Bradley and Kelley 2008).
Second, delegation helps enhancing the credibility of donors' commitment (Lake and
McCubbins 2006) and of their policies (Pollack 2002). Supranational bodies put in place
mechanisms of enforcement and monitoring to guarantee commitment compliance (Bradley
and Kelley 2008). Moreover, in the context of humanitarian aid, the relationship donorrecipient is based upon political considerations. The intervention of multilateral agencies
with recipient countries "can remain less politicized than intergovernmental links. This in
turn endows multilateral agencies with an advantage in the exercise of conditionality, that is
in lending that is conditional on changes in government policies" (Rodrik 1995:2).
Third, supranational bodies play a role of dispute resolution if donors' preferences diverge by
acting as agenda-setting. It helps to reach agreements, and to solve disputes (Hawkins et al.
2006). As humanitarian aid is a collective good, heterogeneity of preferences is even more
problematic since that collective good presupposes collective action. Martens by referring to
Rodrik (1995) states that "delegation to a multilateral agency avoids spillover of this conflict
[conflict of preferences] to donors (who may prefer to maintain a privileged relationship with
the recipient) and prevents blame falling on the donor if a risky programme goes wrong"
(Martens 2005:656-657).
Delegation advantages suggest that multilateral aid is preferable to bilateral aid, and the shift
of sovereignty to the international level seems profitable. Notwithstanding, states sometimes
decide in favour of non-delegation or just partial delegation. Despite the undeniable
advantages of multilateralism, bilateral aid is still a widespread reality because delegation
also hides costs for donors. Delegation costs can be summarised in the sovereignty loss
suffered by states (Hart 1961). Such loss affects the states' authority to govern, their
supremacy, territoriality and independence (Hathaway 2008). States depend on an external
authority which imposes norms and obligations. As already mentioned, since states are
18
Francesca PICCIN & Elia PUSTERLA
supposed to be rational, sovereignty loss should be organised by states. But, is it always the
case? Have states the perfect control on their sovereignty loss?
The principal risk for states' control on loss of sovereignty is preferences divergence 15 . The
divergence can occur between principal and agent or even between principals (in the case of
collective or multiple principals). In the first case, divergence is dangerous if states, once
authority delegated, lose control on principal's decisions and actions. The risk can be
worsened by an imperfect knowledge of such decisions and actions (Lupia and McCubbins
2000b:292). Referring to Lyne, Nielson and Tierney (Lyne et al. 2006), Helen Milner states
that: "if collective principals have different preferences and coordination is costly, the best
they can do often is to agree to limit the agency's discretion so that it cannot adopt a policy
that is worse for any principal than the initial status quo" (Milner 2006:113). In the specific
case of humanitarian aid, by referring to Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), Siqueira
asserts:
"Given that a common agency can distort incentives and weaken them and lower agent effort
due to the competition and lack of coordination among principals, one would like to know if
principals are better off with their own exclusive agency. With regard for dispensing foreign
assistance, one motive for choosing a bilateral agency over a multilateral one is that it may
reduce the number of principals influencing the aid process" (Siqueira 2007:147).
When does preferences divergence affect the organised hypocrisy of sovereignty? Firstly, in
the case of asymmetric information principals ignore agent's decisions and actions, and agent
lacks of accountability. Indeed, agent gains an incredible independence and, principals lose
their sanctioning power (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lupia and McCubbins 2000a). Secondly,
in the case of Madison's Dilemma, principals suffer the risk of slippage. They delegate to
agent powers that can be used against the principals themselves (Nielson and Tierney 2003).
If states do not know the scenario in which delegation takes place because of lack of
accountability and asymmetric information, they are not always able to put in place
15
According to Brehm and Gates, there are three forms of preferences divergence: leisure-shirking, dissentshirking, and sabotage. In the first case, a supranational actor fails to achieve the outcome expected by principals
due to an insufficient effort. In dissent-shirking an agent decides not to act in conformity with principals
preferences as it does not agree with them. In sabotage, a supranational actor acts in opposition to the principals’
policy desires (Brehm and Gates 1997).
19
GARNET – April 22nd 2010 – "The European Union in International Affairs"
monitoring mechanisms 16 to control agent's discretion. They accept to lose sovereignty
without owning all the necessary information to take a rational informed choice.
To conclude, the decision about delegation requires an attentive valuation of costs and
opportunities. Sometimes, states can rationally decide in favour of delegation as they suppose
to make their action more efficient. They consider the loss of sovereignty acceptable in the
domain of humanitarian aid if compared to the expected advantages. Nevertheless, states are
also conscious that the rationality of such choice presupposes a perfect knowledge of agent's
actions and decisions. Moreover, once delegated, the conditions should not change.
Nonetheless, this is not always the case. Sometimes, states decide to delegate, but, as the time
goes by, they suffer an always more important loss of sovereignty. Such loss is unavoidable
despite the monitoring mechanisms. For this reason, principals’ attitude towards delegation
depends on the degree of trust they put in the agent, on the uncertainty and complexity of the
issue-area, and on the final aim of delegation. As a matter of fact, even if states are disposed
to lose sovereignty, they aim at keeping a control on the sovereignty loss. In Krasner's terms,
they aim at keeping sovereignty loss organised.
Conclusion
This theoretical paper has questioned the shift of sovereignty from the national to the
international level due to the new trends characterising the international context, such as
interdependence and integration. First, it puts under discussion the traditional Westphalian
definition of sovereignty as the most adequate to define sovereignty in a given polity. Second,
a more essential definition of sovereignty has been conceptualised. Third, the detection of
breaches
of
sovereignty
questions
the
shift
of
authority
following
the
integrative/interdependent process at the international level.
This theoretical discussion assumes the shift of sovereignty from the national to the
international level, and the loss of sovereignty unessential properties. The unessential
properties derive from a construed Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty. The
essential international sovereignty refers to a conceptualization based on three sine qua non
16
There are three forms of monitoring mechanisms. Firstly, there is a direct mechanism of monitoring. It is
extremely precise, but also expensive. Secondly, a mechanism is trusting in agent’s self-reporting. The risk is
the agent's omission of important information. Finally, a third mechanism is a third part's monitoring.
Nevertheless, its independence is difficult to warrantee (Lupia and McCubbins 2000b). These are ex-post
monitoring mechanisms, but it is also possible to rely on ex-ante administrative procedures. They can limit
agent’s competences, clarify legal instruments and procedures. Such mechanisms cost because they are strict,
and they can affect policy flexibility and efficiency. Thus, the reduction of agency losses caused by shirking and
sabotage entails agency costs (Pollack 2003).
20
Francesca PICCIN & Elia PUSTERLA
properties. The article has thus hypothesized that the shift of sovereignty form the national to
the international level is not always sharp-cut (H1). States are not only called to rationally
decide between giving up their sovereignty, or defending it. They sometimes have a third
alternative: a partial transfer of sovereignty. If states decide in favour of total delegation, as
long as the choice is rational, the hypocrisy of sovereignty is organised. Nonetheless, this
paper corollary hypothesizes that sometimes states do not dispose of the necessary
information to rationally decide.
This hypothesis seems to have good chances of being verified by analysing the specific case
of the European Union humanitarian aid policy. Accordingly, the European Union
humanitarian aid policy is a potential case of divergent preferences. The European Union
Member States not always share the same interests. Taking into consideration the interests of
all Member States would lead up to a policy vague and difficult to implement. Such
disagreement among principals can be very costly and prompting states to choose unilateral
instead of multilateral action (Martens 2000). For these reasons, the EU provides three
alternatives. States are called to decide whether delegating or not, but also to decide between
full and partial delegation. Firstly, they can decide to act just through the European Union.
Secondly, Member States can opt for acting unilaterally, and to simply coordinate their
policies with the Union. Thirdly, Member States can choose case by case to delegate or to act
multilaterally. In institutional terms, the humanitarian aid policy is conceived to allow a
transfer of sovereignty at variable geometry, and Member States can decide for or against
delegation case by case.
Concerning the corollary, a more detailed empirical analysis is required to reach a definitive
conclusion. For the moment, this paper suggests some factors susceptible of affecting the
organised hypocrisy of sovereignty. Such factors can be summarised in the changes occurred
before and after delegation. First of all, principals and agent can share the same preferences
before delegation, but preferences can change after delegation. The choice for delegation was
rational in a first moment, but is not more rational afterwards. Second, sometimes European
institutions lack of accountability. States do not succeed in putting in place efficient
monitoring mechanisms. In any case, as suggested, any conclusion on the impact of such
explicative factor on sovereignty loss requires a more detailed empirical analysis.
21
GARNET – April 22nd 2010 – "The European Union in International Affairs"
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