doi:10.1093/bjc/azn058
BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (2008) 48, 798–817
Advance Access publication 13 August 2008
THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP: PROCEDURAL
(IN)JUSTICE AND AUTOMATED SPEED LIMIT ENFORCEMENT
Helen Wells*
While the use of technology to monitor and punish suspected ‘risky’ populations is likely to increase,
the experience of being on the receiving end of such enforcement has received relatively little attention.
This paper presents research that considered one particular criminal justice ‘techno-fix’—the speed
camera—from the perspective of those who encounter the technology as offenders. Such enforcement
is commonly described by drivers as being ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’. Speeding drivers’ experiences of
being ‘techno-fixed’ are considered with reference to the antecedent elements of a procedurally just
experience proposed by Tyler amongst others. Drivers’ preferences for fairer methods of speed limit
enforcement are then analysed, before the potential for reconciling the ‘techno-fix’ with procedurally
just enforcement is considered.
Part 1: Techno-Fixing Crime Risks
A shift toward ‘risk’ as a focus and rationale for enforcement has produced changes in the
way criminal justice systems operate (Sparks 2000; Hudson 2003). This has had consequences
for the processes and methods that underpin criminalization, including an increase in
the use of ‘techno-fixes’ to identify so-defined ‘risky’ behaviour (Haggerty 2004a: 494).
Techno-fixes can be found at the centre of ‘projects that position technology as a key
component in attempts to control, manage or regulate social objects’ (Haggerty 2004a:
492) rather than educate or rehabilitate them. Techno-fixes generally operate within
‘localized strategies to transform the immediate physical environment in order to reduce
or eliminate conditions highly correlated with crime or disorder’ (Haggerty 2004b: 218).
Such interventions have included familiar surveillance devices such as CCTV (Coleman
2004), drug testing (Seddon 2004), the electronic monitoring of offenders (Patterson
2004) and automated probation check-ins (Jacobson 2004), as well as ‘radar detectors,
drug tests, polygraphs, photographic reconstructions, hand-writing analysis, photoradar, criminal profiling, geographic imaging systems and facial recognition software’
(Haggerty 2004b: 224). Such technologies offer the seemingly irresistible potential for
cheaply and reliably identifying instances of risky behaviour (Seddon 2004: 16) and,
given this appeal, we might reasonably expect that more of our behaviours will be
monitored in this way in the future (Patterson 2004; Seddon 2004; Haggerty 2004b).
In each case in which a techno-fix is used, presumed risky behaviours are
re-conceptualized into a format consistent with the use of technology as an enforcement
tool. Establishing a point of differentiation at which behaviour changes from acceptable
and ‘safe’ to unacceptable, ‘risky’ and hence punishable is the first step in this
reconceptualization. For example, the presence or absence of an individual in a defined
*Centre for Criminological Research, Institute for Law, Politics and Justice, Keele University; [email protected].
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (ISTD).
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]
THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
area (Shute 2007) or at a defined time (Jacobson 2004) or with certain blood alcohol
levels (2006 Road Safety Act) are deemed problematic and the techno-fix is triggered.
Such a dichotomization is a simplification of potentially complex events, as in the final
example, above, where ‘risky’ driving behaviour is assumed irrespective of the size,
weight, sex or health of the person being subjected to the techno-fix. The entrusting of
such decisions to automated systems means that behaviours must be, and are,
reconfigured as simple dichotomies of punishable/permissible.
Techno-fixes also, however, make possible the reconfiguration and reinvention of the
associated processes of detection, evidence-gathering, prosecution and punishment.
Given that an act’s ‘riskiness’ is the justification for punishing the behaviour, the legal
framework underpinning enforcement by techno-fix need only be constructed in a way
that determines that this faulty behaviour occurred, not that it was deliberately engaged
in. Strict liability legal principles can and have, therefore, been used in techno-fixed
contexts, dismissing complicating and unnecessary issues such as intent, culpability and
mitigation. The details of the case are thus not to be found in court but in the outputs
of a machine, and it is the techno-fix that provides ‘the facts of the matter’ (Haggerty
2004b: 222). As a result, fixed penalties become a viable punishment and offer an
alternative to lengthy and costly court processes because each behaviour is simplified
into a risky/not risky dichotomy. No other ‘facts of the matter’ are relevant.1
Despite these significant reconceptualizations of what it means to be accused of and
punished for an offence—to experience the criminal justice system as an offender—
debates about the use of techno-fixes in criminal justice have largely been dominated by
narrow ‘effectiveness’ arguments centring on the technology itself. They have maintained
a ‘micro-focus on the comparatively mundane questions of space, place and risk’
(Haggerty 2004b: 219) and have neglected wider social questions, including the
experience of the ‘techno-fixed’ subject (Gilliom 2006; Haggerty 2004a). This is perhaps
because the use of inanimate objects implies that the enforcement experience is similarly
neutral and uncontroversial. This paper explores one techno-fixed context in which
this is certainly not the case, while raising potential issues for the use of the techno-fix
in criminal justice contexts more generally.
Techno-fixing speed
The perceived potential of technology to assist with the management of risk can readily
be detected in a traffic context, where it has been credited with a change in the way that
traffic policing is conducted (PACTS 2005). Recent road safety legislation puts its faith
in a variety of technological interventions designed to impact on a range of problems
and with a view to achieving casualty and crime reduction targets. Interventions have
included Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems that detect the presence
or absence of vehicles on certain key databases, such as insurance, road tax and MOT
databases,2 ‘alcohol interlocks’ that require drivers to provide a sample of breath that
1
The appeal of fixed penalties means that they have increasingly been promoted as the appropriate intervention for a variety of
unacceptable behaviours, including unauthorized parking, littering, smoking in enclosed places, and over-filling dustbins (often
enforced by non-police agencies), as well as criminal activities such as graffiti, criminal damage, and drunk and disorderly behaviour
(Home Office 2000). Fixed penalties have also been promoted as a major tool in the armoury of Community Support Officers
(Home Office 2006).
2
Contained within the 2005 Road Safety Bill but subsequently enacted under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
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contains a legal blood-alcohol limit before the car will start, and the further use of speed
cameras.3 A further four developments in the 2006 Road Safety Act had the aim of
increasing the effectiveness of existing techno-fixes.4 An ‘impairmentometer’ able to
measure ‘reaction times and hand–eye co-ordination’, as well as various types of
impairment through alcohol, drugs or a combination of both, has also been favourably
discussed by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS 2005). In
each case, road user behaviour has to be reconceptualized into a dichotomous variable—
‘risky/not risky’—in order to render it suitable for enforcement by techno-fix.
In 2000, the government’s road safety strategy, Tomorrow’s Roads Safer for Everyone,
drew particular emphasis to the role of speed in crash causation and credited ‘speed’
with a role in one-third of all crashes (DETR 2000: 39). ‘Speeding’ then became a focus
for enforcement in pursuit of the government’s ambitious road death and injury
reduction targets.
Exceeding the speed limit is deemed punishable, regardless of whether it occurred
intentionally or inadvertently, and regardless of the situational context (weather, time,
day, etc.) and is therefore prosecuted as a strict liability offence. With no perceived need
to engage with complicating contextual factors or issues of intent, the speed camera is
clearly a viable intervention. Such a techno-fix, when applied to speed limit infringements,
need only detect that a limit was breached and provide enough information for the
identification of the individual who committed the breach such that they can be traced
and punished.5 The speed camera can be relied upon to do this without the need for
human corroboration, thereby reducing both costs and labour requirements. This
approach produces a large number of identically perceived infractions for which
identical punishments must be dispensed. The strict liability status of speeding means
that costly and time-consuming court appearances are unnecessary. The fixed penalty
system that underpins enforcement is, therefore, both viable, given the standardized
response that speed limit infringements are deemed to warrant, and necessary, given
the vast numbers of cases that are produced through the use of automated detection
technologies. Such technologies are now entrusted with the majority of speed limit
infringement detection work on the UK’s roads, numbering in excess of 4,000. It is
therefore the speed camera that detects, investigates, captures and processes the
speeding driver—producing ‘the facts of the matter’ (Haggerty 2004b: 222) in respect
of the vast majority of speeding offences.6
While their use has been the subject of continuous debate, both official and unofficial
evaluations of the National Safety Camera Programme (NSCP) have predominantly
concerned themselves with whether or not speed cameras ‘work’ in terms of preventing
speed limit infringements and/or road crashes. The research on which this paper draws,
however, should be viewed as ‘an attempt to push discussions about the appeal and
implications of new technologies beyond narrow evaluative questions’ as endorsed by
Haggerty (2004a: 493) ‘at a time when such tools are positioned to become ever more
Contained within the 2006 Road Safety Act (DfT 2006).
Banning speed camera jammers and detectors, the improved evidential value of roadside breath tests, improved enforcement of
tachograph restrictions and the registration of number plate suppliers (DfT 2006).
5
In this case, the car’s registration number provides this information.
6
The most recent data available (for the year 2006) indicate that 95 per cent of the speeding offences detected that year were
detected by speed cameras. Over 1.7 million of the 2,000,000 speeding cases were dealt with by way of a fixed penalty, while a further
100,000 resulted in prosecutions (Fiti et al. 2008: 14–15).
3
4
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important attributes of criminal justice’ (Haggerty 2004a: 496). After all, in the case of
the speed camera, the use of such inanimate objects has been greeted with a particularly
animated response from many drivers, drivers’ groups and some sections of the media,
despite the existence of numerous reports testifying to their effectiveness (DfT 2003;
Gains et al. 2004; 2005). An exploration of the experience of being on the ‘receiving
end’ of enforcement of this nature therefore forms the subject of the rest of this paper.
Procedural justice and the techno-fix
The perceived ‘procedural justness’ of an experience at the hands of the criminal justice
system does, to some extent, determine the acceptance of policies and compliance with
them. A procedurally just experience reinforces an authority’s ability to punish without
damaging public perceptions of their legitimacy, with adverse outcomes being acceptable
if dispensed in procedurally just ways (Tyler 1990: 107).
Procedurally just experiences are those that demonstrate ‘consistency’ (Lind and
Tyler 1988: 131), ‘neutrality’, ‘lack of bias’ (Tyler 1990: 7) and ‘impartiality’ (Tyler 1990:
117). The kind of consistent and neutral treatment guaranteed by the techno-fix means
that it might be presumed that they will be perceived as offering fair and just treatment—
as being procedurally just. The riskiness or otherwise of an action is the only factor of
interest to automated detection systems. Other factors are not only of no interest, but
are guaranteed not to be taken into account by such technologies that have, as a result,
been identified as offering the potential for guaranteeing entirely non-discriminatory
enforcement:
It is the first time in human history that we have the opportunity to experience forms of control that
do not take into account any category of social division. Age, sex, race, beauty and attire are irrelevant
and, what is equally important, guaranteed to be so. (Lianos and Douglas 2000: 108)
The techno-fix is therefore guaranteed to be ‘fair’ in one sense, given that it cannot
discern any characteristics of its target population other than the risky characteristic
used to justify the control of that population. However, procedurally just experiences
must also be perceived as both ‘respectful’ and ‘polite’ to the individual involved (Tyler
1990: 12). They must, further, contain ‘opportunities to voice’ (Lind and Tyler 1988:
170–2) where individuals can say what is on their mind, make their views known and tell
their ‘side of the story’ (Tyler 1990: 194). Given that a machine is unable to demonstrate
respect, respond politely or provide the ears necessary for an individual to feel that their
voice has been heard, these additional criteria implicitly necessitate the involvement of
human beings in procedurally just encounters. Indeed, within the procedural justice
literature, an assumption always seems to have been made that procedurally just
experiences will be generated within the context of interpersonal encounters (see, e.g.
Sunshine and Tyler 2003: 533; Tyler 1990: 134, 194). The antecedents of consistency,
neutrality and impartiality have, therefore, so far been considered in the context of the
‘respect’, ‘politeness’ (Tyler 1990: 7) and ‘opportunities to voice’ (Lind and Tyler 1988:
170–2) also considered vital to a procedurally just experience and provided by systems
that inevitably centre on scenarios in which humans interact. In the case of the technofix, such interpersonal interaction does not necessarily occur.
The use of a procedural justice framework to explore this specific enforcement
context is considered to be particularly apt for a number of reasons. First, procedural
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justice authors have noted that ‘socially connected’ individuals ‘base their judgments
more strongly on the degree to which they receive procedural justice’ in encounters
with authority (Tyler and Huo 2002: 124). Given that this policy implicates individuals
who consider themselves respectable and socially responsible in unfavourable-outcome
encounters with authority (Wells 2007), the importance of procedural justice issues is
clear in relation to this policy perhaps more than any other that may focus on more
traditional offending groups.7 The methods chosen to detect speed limit infringements
are, furthermore, considered to be particularly significant given that they target a
population with little practical experience of the criminal justice system. Tyler and Huo
suggest that, where this is the case, interactions which do occur are particularly significant
in shaping the individual’s view of the law and legal authority (Tyler and Huo 2002:
131). The procedural justness of the experience is, additionally, found to be of particular
significance when the authorities intervene unsolicited to impose restrictions (Tyler
and Huo 2002: 56). Given that speeding is a seldom-reported, pro-actively policed
offence, it is a particularly important candidate for procedurally just enforcement
processes. Finally, but of crucial importance to this work, this theoretical framework
also identifies the potential consequences of operating procedurally unjust or unfair
policies. These take the form of non-compliance with the law and reduced cooperation
with authority, produced via a decline in levels of their perceived legitimacy (Sunshine
and Tyler 2003: 514). These outcomes are not, furthermore, confined to support for
the policy in question, but can extend beyond this to undermine other encounters
between controllers and controlled (Lind and Tyler 1988: 149). In partnership
arrangements, such as those through which speed limit enforcement is pursued, it
cannot be discounted that such effects could therefore also damage public relationships
with other statutory agencies involved in speed limit enforcement. Given that the
perceived legitimacy of authorities impacts on levels of compliance with their laws
(Sunshine and Tyler 2003: 514), the successful achievement of the road safety targets at
the centre of this policy may also depend on the perceived procedural justness of the
experience of that policy.
To date, empirical research combining the traffic policing context with procedural
justice analysis has assumed that encounters occur between humans in the form of a driver
and a police officer. While the procedural justness of this experience consistently emerges
as significant (Johnson 2004; Shephard Engel 2005), the use of automated detection
devices in this context, removing the interpersonal element, has only been the focus of
positive expectation. Joh, for example, speculates that such developments would ‘render
obsolete the litigation, public criticism, and academic critique’ that has resulted from
human enforcement practice and is thus optimistic about the introduction of automated
enforcement in the United States (Joh 2007: 216). The following analysis, however,
considers the enforcement of speed limits by speed camera: one specific case of automated
detection already in existence. This intervention has met with considerable negative
reaction and this analysis considers whether these can be understood in relation to the
7
Less socially connected individuals are more concerned with distributive justice (outcomes) than with procedural justice
(fairness) (Clayton and Opotow 2003: 303).
8
The procedural justice literature also notes the importance of the perceived motives of enforcers, with ‘a belief that the authority
involved is not behaving in a biased or self-interested manner’ also being of relevance to a procedurally just experience (Tyler 1990:
117). Whilst of potential relevance in this context, this aspect falls beyond the scope of this paper.
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THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
types of enforcement methodologies used. The speed camera’s in/ability to offer procedural
justice to those who fall within their regulatory gaze will frame this discussion.8
Methodology
This research sought to explore the views of drivers about their experience of speed
limit enforcement by speed camera. Although drivers have previously been asked their
views about the NSCP, this has generally been in the form of poll or survey research in
which drivers are asked only to express support or opposition to the scheme (see, e.g.
YouGov 2003; Transport2000 2003; or the survey research conducted as part of DfT
2003). In order to access the more complex and contextualized views that potentially lie
behind these statements of support or opposition, and that remain hidden by the survey
approach, this research adopted three compatible methods that relied on unstructured
and semi-structured approaches. The explicit aim was to explore the concerns that are
not solely concerned with effectiveness criteria, but relate more to drivers’ expectations
in terms of justice and fair treatment.
Initial research involved the analysis of internet-based discussion forums convened
around the issue of speed limit enforcement. These have themselves been viewed as a
kind of ‘marathon focussed discussion group’ (Mann and Sutton 1998: 210) and the ten
discussions analysed generated over 1,000 separate postings. The selected boards represent
the most heavily used national boards during the sample period and local and regional
boards from areas with a distinct enforcement policy.9 Contributors were essentially free
to offer any opinions related to the subject of speed cameras, and rather than being
pigeon-holed into traditional demographic categories, were able to identity themselves in
any way they felt relevant. Four volunteered driver identities were seen to emerge as
particularly significant to contributors on this subject, and these were the identities around
which focus groups were subsequently convened (see below). Of course, such a method
essentially provides a self-referring pool of participants and is subject to biases of usage
and accessibility (Bloor et al. 2001: 74–5), but, in this sense, the gathering of data from this
source was concerned more with representation than it was with representativeness.10
Quotes sourced from these forums are followed by the reference ‘DF’ for ‘discussion
forum’ and a number indicating the discussion from which they are drawn. Full details of
the discussions can be found in Table 1 in the accompanying references.
Further research was conducted via focus groups involving 29 drivers with different
driving biographies (convicted drivers (two groups), new drivers, experienced drivers,
professional drivers (two groups)) as had emerged as significant from the earlier
research. Questions explored the views of the drivers and, where dissatisfaction was
expressed, explored the reasons for this. Where drivers demonstrated opposition to the
current system of speed limit enforcement, their opinions on the form and structure of
a preferred system were sought. As such, both the nature of the objections and the sense
of a more legitimate alternative were established.
These methodologies were supplemented by non-participant overt observation of 20
sessions of a Speed Awareness Course. Such courses are offered by various Casualty
Reduction Partnerships and offer an educational alternative to prosecution for certain
For example, the particularly enthusiastic enforcement approach of the North Wales police service.
For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wells 2007.
9
10
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WELLS
drivers. This was considered a necessary methodological approach, given the hypothesized importance of the interaction between the enforcing authority and the subject of
the techno-fix—an interaction not possible in the standard detection, prosecution and
punishment model of speed enforcement.
Part 2: Being Techno-Fixed
Despite the association of the techno-fix with panoptic power (Haggerty 2004b: 217),
the objections of the surveilled subjects of speed camera enforcement related less to any
kind of ‘big brother’ or civil liberties arguments and more to an inherent sense of the
unfairness and injustice of the experience. Despite the guaranteed consistency,
impartiality and neutrality offered by interactions with speed cameras, that experience
was commonly described in terms of its ‘unfairness’ and ‘injustice’:
I just feel cheated out of my money, I really do. I think the whole thing is just so unfair it makes me very
angry. I am not an angry person, but the injustice of the whole thing really gets me going. (Female
driver, early 40s, experienced driver focus group)
Ray They put a speed camera in on the A34 near Tesco and they put it right in behind the 30mph
speed sign ....
Dennis … and they had to take that one out, yeah you’re right.
Ray … they had to take that one out, people said ‘that’s not fair! You’re not being fair!’ and I can certainly see their point. (Male drivers, late 50s, professional driver focus group)
These are meant to be SAFETY cameras sited at black spots but why on earth are they sited on a straight
road that [has] never had an accident? Yes we do speed at times but most of the time we are caught just
over the speed limit. This is unfair. Discretion should be used. (Male driver, UK, DF1)
Additionally, general feelings of underhandedness, of sneakiness and unfairness, can be
detected in the coining of the terms ‘speed trap’ and ‘scamera’, while a poll conducted
in 2003 found that over 80 per cent of motorists questioned felt the government treated
motorists ‘unfairly’ (YouGov 2003).11 Clearly, then, the guaranteed absence of
discrimination is not sufficient to guarantee a procedurally just experience. The
following sections will consider the NSCP in relation to a range of procedural justice
criteria, and suggest that, when techno-fixes are deployed, we must revisit the role of
consistency, neutrality and impartiality to generate a more precise understanding of the
nature of these antecedents and their role in generating procedural justice.
Consistent but unfair enforcement
A common objection to speed camera-based enforcement relates to the centring of the
policy on the speed limit as the point of differentiation between problematic and
unproblematic behaviour. This method of differentiation offers the apparent potential
for entirely consistent, neutral and impartial enforcement, applying the same rules to
11
In response to a question about how the government treats motorists, 84 per cent of respondents selected the option ‘unfairly’
from a list that also included ‘too generously’, ‘about right’ and ‘don’t know’.
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all drivers in all circumstances, but is nonetheless experienced as ‘unfair’. Objections
centre on the idea that limits somehow always represent an accurate judgment of
acceptable speed, regardless of other variables that change constantly and affect the
‘actual’ (if such a status could be known) level of risk posed in a specific context:
Motorists are fed up with inappropriate speed limits. Variable limits based on road conditions, volume
of traffic, time of day would be far more practical, they would keep traffic moving and drivers would
view them as fair. (Male driver, Crewe, DF6)
Pat Eighty [miles per hour] in some situations is safer than thirty in others ….
Dave Y eah, that’s true enough.
Pat … and there’s a well used saying that ‘there’s nothing wrong with speed so long as its used in the
right place and at the right time’, and that’s quite true. (Professional driver focus group)
I know there’s good reason for certain speed limits in certain areas but I mean there is also a good
argument to suggest that speed limits, you know 24/7, is nonsense. Because O.K. outside a school
20mph, got no problem with that, but when its school holidays, why keep it at that level? Why not have
sort of variability to do with time of day and congestion? (Male, mid 40s, convicted speeder focus
group)
Although a vital aspect of this kind of automated road safety intervention, limits are
seen to be inappropriate in many circumstances—circumstances that are not reflected
when strict liability principles are used. The use of speed cameras to consistently enforce
limits in situations and contexts that are anything but consistent is experienced as
unfair.
In addition to the consistent application of limits to inconsistent situations, speed
limit enforcement was viewed as unfair, given that it consistently applied the same limits
to all drivers. Duff notes that, in the context of strict liability laws, there will always be
some people for whom regulation based upon averages is unnecessary, given that a
proportion of the population will be above average, and gives speed limits as an example
of this phenomenon (Duff 2002: 102–3). Strict liability laws based on acceptable-level
principles therefore inevitably restrict some people who perhaps might not be as in
need of regulation (or at least consider themselves to be so) as others. Indeed, many
drivers chose to identify themselves in terms that reflected their belief in the importance
of their prior safety record. They claimed that they had ‘never had points deducted
from my licence not had to make an insurance claim in 22 years of driving’ (Experienced
female driver, Staffordshire, DF1), could boast having ‘never had an accident/points 4
years No Claims Bonus’ (Male driver, 21, Staffordshire, DF1), or had even been ‘Lorry
Driver of the Year three times’ (Professional driver, Speed Awareness Course). There is,
however, no ‘no claims bonus’ when it comes to speeding and each detected offender is
considered to pose the same level of risk, regardless of their past experience. If their
behaviour failed to meet the required standard at the most recently encountered
checkpoint represented by the speed camera they are, as viewed by the techno-fix, as
culpable as any other individual. Given that 80 per cent of drivers do indeed consider
themselves to be better than average (Svenson 1981), 80 per cent of drivers are likely to
consider themselves unnecessarily inconvenienced by laws designed to restrict the
behaviour of average drivers, based on the levels of risk that they would cause in any
specific set of circumstances. Given this statistic, traffic regulations that are based around
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strict liability premises and that use the logic of the acceptable level are therefore
perhaps particularly liable to accusations that they fail to give due ‘respect’ and
consideration to individual drivers’ abilities. Rather than producing a procedurally just
experience, therefore, the antecedent element of ‘consistency’ is interpreted as
providing insufficient ‘respect’ for individual circumstances and the specific context in
which each offender offends. Consistency is therefore unfair when it leads to the
disrespect of differences that are thought to be significant in determining whether or
not risk was ‘really’ caused.
As such, ‘respect’ (Tyler 1990: 7) is seen to be conveyed through discriminatory
experiences: discrimination that is understood in this context to relate to the appropriately
different treatment of qualitatively different circumstances and characteristics, and that is
incompatible with systems based on the techno-fix. The very factors that make the use
of limits attractive from a ‘risk’ and ‘techno-fix’ perspective are, therefore, seen to
damage the perception of the policy as procedurally just.
The denial of ‘voice’
The contextual issues raised in the above analysis suggest that each offence, rather than
being a de-contextualized incident, has a story attached. One aspect of this story
concerns the construction of explanations as to why enforcement is not necessary or
valid in an individual’s case. The formulation and communication of such excuses,
reasons and mitigation for apparent incidents of offending behaviour are essential to
the maintenance of a coherent identity in the face of challenges from authority (Sykes
and Matza 1957/2001: 209).
In the majority of criminal cases, the courtroom provides the venue for excuses, mitigation
and rationalizations to be heard in front of a representative of the criminal justice system
that has sought to criminalize the behaviour. Again, such opportunities for control and
participation have been shown to be vital to procedurally just policies (Lind and Tyler
1988: 106). Such participation was measured by Tyler and Huo in terms of participants’
sense that they were able ‘to say what was on [their] mind’, ‘able to make [their] views
known’ and were given ‘an opportunity to tell their side of the story’ (Tyler and Huo 2002:
194). Procedural justice research has, to date, assumed that such opportunities are going
to be made available as a matter of course within the courtroom and through the interaction
of a judge and a defendant (Tyler 1990: 5–6). They thus assume that the aforementioned
consistency, neutrality and impartiality will be expressed within an interpersonal context.
Given that fixed penalty and strict liability arrangements effectively remove the
prospect of a court appearance for all but a minority of defendants,12 this human
interaction and the sense that the case has been, effectively, ‘heard’ are absent. As the
following drivers suggest, the absence of any opportunity to voice is singled-out as a
significant omission in the current system:
There needs to be some way you can tell them that the signs were bad, or that there was no one else
within ten miles of you. The camera can’t tell that obviously, but there must be some way that you can
tell them things like this. (Male, early 20s, Speed Awareness Course)
12
Accused drivers who plead not guilty may get the opportunity to appear in court as part of their trial. However, the fixed penalty
system is designed to discourage drivers from taking this option, as a higher penalty can result from a conviction following a not
guilty plea.
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I wanted to tell someone! To say ‘look this is ridiculous!’. The camera was right inside the 30 limit, I
mean virtually level with the signs and I just didn’t have the chance to slow down. There must have
been dozens of us done just the same. But who do you tell? Is it the council? (Female driver, 40s, experienced driver focus group)
Such protests are suggestions why the contexts of particular offences make them invalid,
less serious or excusable and, consequently, why punishment is not deserved or fair.
Opportunities to offer these explanations that are offered at other stages in the system
are therefore particularly cherished, as these drivers note:
Lucy You know when you used to get sent the form there was a section that asked for any reasons you
were speeding, but the last one or two that I had didn’t have that, there was nothing to say ‘why’, so
they’d obviously … well you never thought for a moment that they’d take any notice but at least it was
there so you could say.
Sue You feel as though you are doing something if you write in. It said on my form ‘no appeal’!
Lucy But what I mean is that they’ve obviously done away with that as well, which I guess proves they
never read it.
Sue I know what you mean. It was like at least they cared about stuff like that. (Convicted speeder focus
group)
Ann On the form you should at least be able to send in a comment about the stretch you were done in,
if the limit was correct or not.
Rose Then you’ve had your chance to explain, whether or not they take any notice or not.
Terry There are penalties out there for people who drive really dangerously, all we have to do is hand
them out appropriately. And that’s what you have a judge and a jury for, for the particular sentence,
which is based on all the circumstances of that particular case, and you get the chance of an appeal as
well. There are checks and balances in the proper system. (Convicted speeder focus group)
To these drivers, the opportunity to ‘voice’ important aspects of their offence’s context to
the authority that sought to punish them was valued in and of itself, and regardless of its
perceived potential to change the outcome of their case (Tyler 1990: 101). This suggests
that the same outcome (punishment) could be rendered more acceptable if accused
drivers were simply given the opportunity to ‘voice’. Such a view is confirmed by other
research (Johnson 2004: 495; Shephard Engel 2005: 474; Tyler 1990: 5). The authority
that offered opportunities to communicate such comments and concerns was considered
to ‘care’ about context, while the authority that denied such an outlet was viewed less
positively. Furthermore, the idea that the court, rather than the roadside, is the appropriate
venue for guilt to be determined is clearly in evidence in drivers’ criticisms of the remote
fixed penalty system. The absence of such opportunities within the standard fixed penalty
process is viewed as unfair, given that it formalizes that lack of interest in the context of the
offence and the offender that is implied by the use of speed limits and speed cameras.
Disrespect of the respectable
Tyler and Lind (1988) have noted the importance of ‘dignitary processes’ in conveying
signals which are respectful of our social standing, and the ‘respect’ with which
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individuals are treated is generally thought to be of significance (Tyler 1990: 7). The use
of cameras to enforce speed limits is seen by some drivers, however, to convey signals
that are disrespectful of status and social standing:
No one likes to be criticised, but more than that, no one likes to be embroiled in the criminal justice
system, I think. The idea that in one moment, one over-excessive push on the accelerator and, despite
being a respectable, law-abiding bloke, you enter into the criminal justice system and become stigmatised thereafter. I think that’s why it creates such a bone of contention and why people see it is unfair.
(Male, late 40s, experienced driver focus group)
For ‘respectable, upstanding members of the community’ (Female driver, mid 60s,
convicted speeder focus group), encounters with the criminal justice system have
historically been characterized by the ‘niceties’ of due process, justice and, it is suggested,
more sympathetic and respectful treatment by human enforcers (Stenson 2001: 19).
Since the widespread automation of speed limit enforcement, this differential treatment
has been denied to those that previously felt they benefited from it. The respectable are
experiencing disrespect, given that ‘status’ cannot be effectively ‘deployed’ in interactions
with non-human technologies (Lea 2002: 15).
Crucially, claiming to be a law-abiding, respectable or upstanding citizen are all
references to previous behaviour, to worked-at and worked-for status, and to established and
maintained credentials of worthiness that are valued by their owners (Wells 2007). These
identities are found to be of no use in the current context of speed enforcement, relying
as it does on the continued and perpetual proving of worth at proliferating ‘checkpoints’.
Unbiased enforcement can therefore be experienced as too fair, in that it does not
discriminate enough for people who are used to discrimination working in their favour.
Part 3: Respecting Context
The following analysis considers drivers’ suggestions for ‘fairer’ policies that, while
achieving the same ends in terms of enforcement, could cause less damage to the
perceived legitimacy of the enforcing authorities. These kinds of amendment would
potentially allow the authorities to punish instances of behaviour that they believe
contribute to the increased risk of road death and injury, but, by taking a procedural
justice-informed approach, they could minimize the damage to their credibility and
legitimacy that resulted. To use Tyler’s phrase, such fairer procedures could then ‘act as
a cushion of support [for] when authorities are delivering unfavorable outcomes’ (Tyler
1990:107).
It should be noted, however, that previous attempts at altering aspects of the scheme
to increase its legitimacy have not been successful. Alterations to the financial
arrangements that had seen partnerships ‘profit’ from their enforcement activity (Fiti
et al. 2008: 15) have not resulted in an end to accusations of ‘revenue raising’, nor have
attempts to stipulate and publicize the criteria under which a camera can be installed
(DfT 2006) resulted in an end to suggestions that cameras are placed cynically and for
purposes other than road safety. Such attempts at justification remain unconvincing
when drivers continue to feel that they are being punished for behaviour that (for any
one of the various reasons explored above) actually caused no real risk.
The suggestions put forward by drivers here are particularly focused on methods of
altering the process itself to give a more procedurally just experience. This final analysis
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THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
considers the ways in which systems that can guarantee ‘fair’ and non-discriminatory
enforcement are met with calls for discrimination to be re-injected into the system in
order for it to be seen as ‘fair’ and legitimate. Such discrimination is, crucially,
re-conceptualized as the kind of discretion that results from the use of ‘common sense’
and ‘intelligence’—in short, with human qualities. These policy suggestions include the
abandonment of the notion of inherently ‘safe’ versus ‘unsafe’ speeds and its replacement
with the notion of ‘appropriate speeds’; the reflection of context in subsequent
punishments rather than the blanket application of a fixed penalty; and the availability
of opportunities to interact with the authority that has deemed a driver’s behaviour to
be unacceptable. Each of these potentially ‘fairer’ alternatives is considered below.
Appropriate speeds versus acceptable levels
As an alternative to the over-simplification of circumstances that speed limits are often
considered to represent, many drivers suggested the notion of ‘appropriate speeds’,
with the ‘appropriateness’ of any chosen speed dependent on its context. This notion
of a contextualized approach is strongly in evidence in drivers’ criticisms of the
inflexibility of speed limits—inflexibility that they know from experience to be a poor
reflection of ‘real’ levels of risk caused by drivers of different abilities:
There are times when it is safer to exceed the speed limit for a short time than to keep to it. There are
other times when exceeding the speed limit is dangerous …. Let’s have a little common sense applied
rather than the usual ‘one size fits all’ lunacy. (Male driver, UK, DF5)
The limit is arbitrary and the test should be what is a safe speed for the conditions … 60 [mph] is
purely an expedient compromise measure, and should be treated as such. Instead it is managed as an
absolute dictate, for the convenience of the administration of the country. (Male driver, Stevenage,
DF4)
Both ‘inappropriate’ and ‘appropriate’ speeds imply an element of free will and of
interpretation, whereby speed choice reflects on-the-spot, contextualized judgments of
‘actual’ levels of risk, given the ever changing conditions and circumstances in which
any act of driving occurs. By appealing to be allowed to use such interpretative skills,
drivers are asking to be given credit for their driving skills and their human intelligence
(skills that are, in most cases, considered to be above average, of course). It is these
skills, and the desire that they be acknowledged by the enforcing authorities, that
seemingly underpin speeders’ claims that ‘I wouldn’t do it if it were dangerous’ (Male,
late 40s, Speed Awareness Course) and ‘I only speed when it’s safe’ (Male, late 20s,
experienced driver focus group). Stradling et al. (2003), however, note that in their
research the idea that drivers should ‘judge for themselves’ what speed was safe received
little support (Stradling et al. 2003: 110). However, this research suggests that the
question of whether drivers are considering their own driving or that of others in
answering Stradling et al.’s question is relevant here. Given the foregoing analysis, we
might expect some reluctance to support the idea that other (presumably below
average) drivers be allowed to use their discretion, while supporting the idea when
applied to our own driving. Whether or not drivers are making this distinction in
Stradling et al.’s research cannot be determined from the presentation of the data in
that study. The question itself appears to be phrased in such a way that it invites drivers
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to consider other drivers rather than their own case, which supports the suggestion
made here.13
Graduated points
A more procedurally just system of speed limit enforcement would, according to many
drivers, also contain the potential for contextualized punishments. A diverse range of
possible outcomes would, it seems, be viewed as more accurately reflecting the diverse
range of offences that are being punished. Rather than consistently, neutrally and
impartially dispensing the same ‘fixed’ penalty in all circumstances, many drivers’
preferred systems of punishment involved some potential for the circumstances of an
offence to be reflected in the penalty:
Terry If you’re going to be punitive about it then [the penalty] should reflect the severity of the offence,
so yeah. I think it depends on the speed you are going over the limit.
Sue We’re all in favour that for doing thirty-eight [mph] I should only have had one [penalty point]
shouldn’t I? Certainly not three for eight miles an hour! I think a sliding scale of points would be
better.
Terry Well it’s certainly more logical ….
Mark How about one point for maybe just a small infringement, ten points for a bigger infringement?
They need to set up the law round the technology they’ve got rather than just introduce the technology and ‘lets get em’. Then that would be a lot fairer wouldn’t it? (Convicted speeder focus group)
The 2006 Road Safety Act made provision for offering a graduated response to speeding
along these lines,14 with consultation focusing on a new reduced penalty of two points
for minor offences (considered to be those only marginally above the limit). When such
a development was initially suggested, it was noted that these proposals were for ‘a fairer
system of penalties for motorists caught speeding’, conceding that the proposals would
be ‘more effective and appropriate than the current “one-size-fits-all” approach’ (DfT
2004). While going some way to addressing many drivers’ concerns, such an approach
does not, however, appear to offer the potential for ‘softer’ contextual issues such as the
‘respectability’ or ‘skilfulness’ of the accused, the ‘actual’ level of risk, or the intent or
lack of it to be acknowledged. Intent or lack of it is, seemingly, represented by the
assumption that a minor infringement may be accidental but that a major one is
intentional. ‘Time of offence’ and ‘degree of excess’ are therefore potentially new
proxies for ‘level of risk posed’ and ‘driver culpability’. This kind of ‘techno-fixed
proportionality’ would not, therefore, acknowledge the aspects of context demanded by
many drivers. The many and various contextual aspects deemed important by the
accused driver would still fail to be ‘heard’, with the slight increase in flexibility in the
13
Respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘disagreed’ with the statement ‘Speed limits don’t mean much on roads and drivers should judge
whether to drive faster or slower’. The suggestion being made here is that a different answer could potentially have been given if
the statement has been phrased in the first person: ‘Speed limits don’t mean much on roads and I should judge whether to drive
faster or slower.’
14
To date, it is not apparent that any partnership has opted to make use of this provision, which, in any case, seems somewhat
incompatible with a camera-based scheme. A fixed penalty will currently see the driver receive three points if detected by a speed
camera. A court may decide to issue between three and six points.
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THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
system still confined to what drivers do and failing to respect who they are. Without further
developments to the supporting structures that result in any kind of fixed penalty,
graduated or otherwise, such unfavourable outcomes are still unlikely to be accepted.
Many different unfavourable outcomes can be rendered palatable by fair preceding
procedures, but, if those procedures continue to be viewed as unfair, then no punishment
outcome is likely to be deemed acceptable.
The Speed Awareness Course (SAC)
Given that human contact is apparently a significant component of fair treatment, the
popularity of an alternative disposal for speeding drivers, run alongside but in place of
the standard fixed penalty system, is noteworthy. Speed Awareness Courses are
alternatives to prosecution that normally involve education and some on-road tuition.
Such courses offer the opportunity for drivers to avoid paying the usual fine of £60 and
incurring the usual three penalty points, with drivers paying approximately £90 to attend
the course instead. On being offered a place on a course by a local Casualty Reduction
or Safety Camera Partnership, a driver can accept the offer, or decline it and accept
prosecution under the usual fixed penalty system. Courses of this nature have been well
received by drivers (personal observation, Dorn, n.d.) and enthusiastically reviewed by
academics, with positive changes in self-reported driving behaviour subsequent to
attendance of the course noted (Stradling 2003; Meadows, n.d.). Although such courses
are primarily conceived by those who operate them as opportunities for educating
drivers about the dangers of speed (ACPO 2006: 2), it is apparent from drivers’ feedback
that one of the most important issues to be addressed by such courses is the provision of
the opportunity for drivers to have ‘voice’ and to appear as a fully contextualized human
being within the system.
SACs allow drivers to discuss the individual circumstances of their offence in a situation
presided over by a representative of the prosecuting authority, with some even inviting
attendees to discuss their individual excuses for their offence.15 Although attending the
course secures a change in the penalty, this is dependent on successful completion of
the course, not on the communication of mitigation or excuses that lead to the dismissal
of the case. As such, the sharing of excuses cannot ultimately lead to the exoneration of
the driver but, as Tyler again notes, this is not a necessary feature of the opportunity to
voice (Tyler 1990: 127). Although ‘pre-decision voice’ is the most effective way of
securing outcome acceptance, in the absence of this (as in cases enforced by automated
technologies and strict liability principles), ‘post-decision voice’ is still valuable in
securing satisfaction based upon fairness criteria (MacCoun 2005: 192). Voice, according
to this finding, has beneficial qualities in and of itself and is not solely associated with
the potential to ‘get away with it’, as these attendees suggest:
It was nice to talk to the man from the Partnership. I really don’t feel that I should have been charged
given the circumstances and I felt that he had some sympathy with my case. Of course it cost me ninety
pounds to find that out. (Female detected speeder, mid 50s, Speed Awareness Course)
15
The Staffordshire course, for example, began with an ‘Excuses’ exercise in which drivers give their own and other excuses that
they have heard and have them challenged by the course leader.
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The woman [course leader] said that if I had complained at the time they might’ve let me off it, I
mean, it’s obviously too late now but it was good to actually explain that the signs were just too close to
the roundabout. (Male detected speeder, mid/late 30s, Speed Awareness Course)
A significant component of a more procedurally just system as conceived by speeding
drivers is, therefore, that it contains opportunities for communicating aspects of
context that are seen to determine a driver’s culpability for the risk they are accused
of causing. It should be noted, however, that ‘voicing’ opportunities should be used to
supplement otherwise procedurally just policies and not as a substitute for fair and just
treatment elsewhere in the process. Where ‘voice’ is offered in isolation, it can be seen
instead as a method of ‘manipulation and exploitation’ by the authorities to encourage
recipients to accept otherwise unjust policies (MacCoun 2005: 193). Furthermore, it
is unlikely that the opportunities offered by the Speed Awareness Course could be
made available to any more than a small minority of drivers, with the majority still
liable to experiencing ‘voiceless’ prosecution via the techno-fix and fixed penalty
route.
The techno-fix versus the fair cop
The change in the experience of criminalization brought about by an enthusiasm for
techno-fixes has, it seems, produced nostalgia for the days of the human traffic police
officer. The perceived disappearance of the police officer from public view has been
met with criticism in many circles (Loader and Mulcahy 2003: 28–9) and the roads
policing context is seemingly no exception. Research confirms that the use of human
traffic officers offers no guarantee of procedurally just, legitimizing experiences
(Johnson 2004; Shephard Engel 2005), but drivers in this research nonetheless expressed
a preference for the ‘excellent traffic officers we once had’ as an alternative to being
‘policed by robots’ (Male driver, London, DF3) or, more generally, for ‘[m]ore traffic
police, less trial by camera’ (Male driver, UK, DF5). But it is necessary to ask what it is
that human interaction supposedly offers and why motorists are remembering with
nostalgia the days when they would be pulled over by a traffic police officer. Why are
such encounters now remembered as fair and as just, particularly given that, historically,
the traffic officer has been a particularly unpopular figure (Emsley 1993)? It is clear
from the majority of calls for re-humanized enforcement that it is only certain elements
of this interaction that are fondly remembered, and these are precisely those elements
of enforcement that the techno-fix promised to eliminate. In this context, however,
discrimination has been re-conceptualized as ‘common sense’, ‘discretion’, ‘intelligence’
and ‘judgment’:
Limits are needed as a guide but drivers need to be taught that, on some occasions, slower is essential
and on others, faster is ok. Police officers have the discretion to take all factors into account, but
cameras result in prosecutions of drivers who are acting in a perfectly reasonable way. (Male driver,
Biggin Hill, DF3)
You just wouldn’t ever get a policeman [sic] who’d bother with you for doing 45 [mph] in a 40 [mph
limit] in the middle of the night on an empty road! It’s just common sense! They’d maybe tell you off
and send you on your way, but they would never think of booking you and that’s the way it should
be—sensible like. Them using their brains. (Male driver, late 50s, professional driver focus group)
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THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
Years ago if you were stopped by the police, it was down to common sense. If the driver was dangerous
or had a problem with complying with the law, and in some cases a ticking off, and a tail between your
legs would suffice, but now you are a criminal in the blink of an eye. (Male driver, Staffordshire, DF1)
The assumption is made here that, if detections were made by police officers instead of
machines, some assessment of dangerousness would take place. As a result, only ‘really’
dangerous speeding drivers would be stopped by the police and ‘reasonable’ speeders
would escape problematization. In the following examples, the ‘easy target’ of speed is
contrasted with ‘dangerous’ practices, and ‘poor driving standards’—subjective labels that
require interpretation by a human being and are, as such, less amenable to large-scale
automated enforcement campaigns. They are, most importantly, judgments that have to
be made on the basis of an assessment of the context of the offence and the offender:
I have been stopped and given a ‘ticking off’ in the past and the officer stated that he thought the
standard of my driving was good, but that I was exceeding the speed limit and he was obliged to inform
me of this fact. He then sent me on my way, impressed with his use of discretion …. These automated
camera systems make no distinction between poor driving standards and those driving well. (Driver,
Greenhithe, DF 3)
Speed doesn’t cause accidents but inappropriate use of speed certainly can be a cause. A camera cannot analyse subjectively. More traffic police would provide an effective deterrent to erring motorists. It
would also mean that motorists needing further education could be identified and circumstances
could be considered rationally. A grey box can’t do this. (Male driver, Barton, DF4)
I applaud the work of Traffic Officers. I think they are there to help motorists but their reasoned judgement on whether you’re driving dangerously is being replaced [by] mechanistic speed traps that are
there to rack up the fine revenue. (Male convicted driver, Cannock, DF2)
‘Common sense’ in these examples is clearly associated with the police officer’s power
to dismiss a driver with a warning if the circumstances are right. Such circumstances
relate to the contexts of time, place and individual character. As the following drivers
explain, being stopped by a police officer offers the opportunity for a rational discussion
about the issue, the outcome of which may potentially be the avoidance of a fine and
penalty points, as the first driver suspects and the second confirms:
I think people who say they think they would rather have another human being to talk to, I think
its because they think if they had a person, they might be in some position to bargain away from the
punishment they are going to get. (Male driver, late 20s, experienced driver focus group)
I remember once being stopped by this young chap. He was looking at my car, which was one of those
big new Rovers and he was obviously interested. So I said to him ‘look son, I’ve only just picked her up
and I was just seeing what she could do’. And he asked me how fast I’d managed to go! He could see I
wasn’t going to cause any trouble, you know? That I was just a bloke having a bit of fun. (Male driver,
early 60s, experienced driver focus group)
An interaction with another human being is, crucially, understood as containing within it
the potential for certain people to be filtered out of the system and for the effective
de-criminalization of people who, for reasons of respectability or context, do not deserve to
be there. Discrimination is, in this interpretation, a positive capability that allows people who
deserve it to escape criminalization.16 ‘Desert’ can, as this analysis has shown, be determined
only through an appreciation of context. The police officer acts as a gatekeeper to the
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criminal justice system that, it is assumed, will function as a commonsense filter. He [sic.] will
(it is assumed) ignore marginal offences, meaning that only ‘dangerous’ speeding is
punished. He can also listen to excuses as a similarly fallible human and acknowledge the
good intent and genuine mistakes of the good driver, the respectable, and the up-standing
citizen. The legitimacy of a system is, according to this analysis, determined not on the basis
of its ability to enforce without discrimination or bias, but on the basis of the type of people
it criminalizes and, consequently, its ability to demonstrate discrimination when appropriate.
The system is judged not on the accuracy with which it detects offences, but on the accuracy
with which it seems to criminalize the ‘right’ people.
Conclusion
Haggerty notes that ‘empirical studies of technology-in-use are essential in order to
appreciate their true influence’ (Haggerty 2004a: 493). This is one such empirical study
that side-steps the debate about effectiveness and, through focusing on one specific
techno-fix, introduces a theoretical framework that attempts to identify some potential
unintended consequences of the use of automated enforcement technologies. This is,
it is suggested, of particular importance given the appeal of techno-fixes and the likely
reliance on them in the future.
A pre-occupation with risk, whether intentionally or unintentionally caused, has led
to the re-conceptualization of some behaviours into dichotomies of ‘safe’ and
‘dangerous’. This, in turn, has made viable the use of technologies to detect, prosecute
and deter instances of so-defined risky criminal behaviour. Such technologies appear to
offer the potential for consistent and therefore (in some senses) procedurally just and
fair enforcement. As important points of contact between individuals and authority,
however, they have also changed these interactions in ways that have de-prioritized other
antecedent elements of procedurally just practices. This research has sought to explore
the objections of one ‘techno-fixed’ population from a procedural justice perspective
and has shown that, in short, the demand from many drivers is that all kinds of biases
and discrimination be put back into the system, which is experienced as too impartial,
neutral and consistent. This analysis suggests that, rather than operating on simplistic
notions of fairness in terms of consistency and impartiality, drivers are demonstrating
that they require more contextualized and inconsistent treatment when it comes to
systems that acknowledge their own individuality and the contexts in which they offend.
Technologies that operate on a dichotomized interpretation of good and bad, risky and
non-risky behaviour are seen as inadequate for the task of judging real-world, qualitative,
contextualized events. Procedurally just enforcement practices can be seen to depend
upon a differently conceived notion of accuracy dependent not on the reliable
measurement of acceptable levels of speed, but on the reliable identification of people
and actions that should and should not be criminally problematized. Legitimating
inconsistency is achieved through the reintroduction of opportunities for interpersonal
contact and commonsense judgments once the initial detection has occurred.
16
It might be suggested that the positive reception of CCTV, and the apparent absence of significant opposition to ANPR, stems
from the involvement of the human being in the process of deployment. This permits ‘discretion’ to be used in determining
who does, and who does not, fall within the camera’s lens, reinforcing the sense that the technology is there to protect ‘us’ from
‘them’.
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THE TECHNO-FIX VERSUS THE FAIR COP
Table 1 Sources of Discussion Forum Data. DF 1
‘Speed cameras’
Host
BBC Stoke and Staffordshire
Date
URL
Throughout 2003
www.bbc.co.uk/stoke/have_your_say/archive/2004/
speed_camera/1.shtml
BBC Wales
Throughout 2003
www.bbc.co.uk/wales/northeast/yoursay/topics/
cameras.shtml
BBC Kent
13.12.2002—13.01.2003
www.bbc.co.uk/kent/have_your_say/commuters/
cameras/shtml
BBC Three Counties
12.11.2003—11.01.2004
www.bbc.co.uk/threecounties/have_your_say/speed_
cameras_5_shtml (click on ‘more comments’)
BBC News (national)
19.12.2003
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/3306405.stm
BBC News (national)
28.01.2004
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/3423425.stm
DF 2
‘Speed cameras’
Host
Date
URL
DF 3
‘Kent’s speed cameras’
Host
Date
URL
DF 4
‘Speed cameras’
Host
Date
URL
DF 5
‘Should speed cameras be
used on all roads?’
DF 6
‘Do the speeding laws
need changing?’
Host
Date
URL
Host
Date
URL
Previous research has not considered the antecedents of procedural justice in anything
other than interpersonal encounters between controllers and the controlled. As such, the
consistency that advocates of this approach claim is required is always going to be
mediated through those interpersonal encounters. It is not pure consistency and nondiscriminatory enforcement, but a kind that is produced in traditional, non-automated
and hence human enforcement scenarios. As such, the notions of ‘common sense’,
‘discretion’ and ‘respect’ are considered vital to a ‘just’ experience. The fact that these
are conditions of human enforcement and of interpersonal encounters, and are therefore
inapplicable to human–machine interactions, represents a challenge for future
enforcement based around infrastructure of this nature. The techno-fix—potentially
the fairest form of enforcement to date—can therefore be experienced as one of the
most unfair forms, given that it throws out the baby of respect for relevant difference
with the bath water of prejudice.
Funding
This paper arises from doctoral research funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council (Award No. PTA 030-2002-01469).
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