REPORT
Collision between the Tanker
MARTINA - ELNF7
and
the Container Vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
on 28 March 2000
2000-07-10
REPORT
Collision between the Tanker
MARTINA - ELNF7
and
the Container Vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
on 28 March 2000
Our designation
Maritime Casualty
Investigation Staff
080202-0034611/0034610
Sten Anderson, Head of Staff
Telephone: +46-11-191269
This report can also be found
on our Internet Home Page
www.sjofartsverket.se (Webbtjänsten-PressRapporter/remisser
Reprinting is permitted upon disclosure of the orgin of
the text
THE SWEDISH MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
SE - 601 78 NORRKÖPING
Tel:
+46-11-19 10 00
Fax:
+46-11-10 19 49
2000-07-10
Table of Contents
1. Summary .................................................................................. 1
2. The basis of the investigation........................................................ 1
3. Factual account.......................................................................... 3
3.1 The Vessels .............................................................................. 3
3.1.1 The Martina .......................................................................... 3
3.1.2 The Werder Bremen ................................................................ 7
3.1.3 Weather conditions on 28 March 2000 .......................................... 9
4. The rescue operation..................................................................10
5. Course of events accordning to the WB..........................................11
6. The Collision ............................................................................13
7. The Wreck................................................................................13
7.1 The stern part...........................................................................13
7.2 The bow part ............................................................................14
7.3 Planned action..........................................................................14
8. Observations from the VISCARIA .................................................15
9. Observations from the GREEN FLAKE ...........................................15
10. Plotting by means of the ARPA radar............................................16
11. Analysis.................................................................................17
11.1 Plotting on board the WB ............................................................17
11.2 The Ma's radar ........................................................................18
11.3 The Ma's actions......................................................................19
11.4 Propeller position of the wreck .....................................................20
11.5 Rudder position of the wreck .......................................................21
11.6 The collision angle....................................................................21
11.7 Passing distance - CPA .............................................................21
12. Cause of accident ....................................................................22
13. Comments..............................................................................22
14. General recommendations .........................................................23
15. Damages................................................................................24
15.1 Personal injuries ......................................................................24
15.2 Structural damages...................................................................24
15.2.1 The Martina ........................................................................24
15.2.2 The Werder Bremen .............................................................24
15.3 Environmental consequences ......................................................25
15.3.1 The diesel fuel.....................................................................25
15.3.2 The cargo ..........................................................................25
16. Conclusions of the investoigation................................................25
17. Additional information ..............................................................27
Annex 1: Detail of Chart
Annex 2: The Martina
This maritime incident investigation report was compiled jointly by
Söfartsstyrelsens Opklaringsenhed, Köpenhamn (the Investigation Division
of the Danish Maritime Administration) and Sjöfartsverkets
Utredningsstab, Norrköping (the Maritime Casualty Investigation Staff of
the Swedish Maritime Administration)
Sten Anderson
Utredningsstaben
Knud Skaareberg
Opklaringsenheden
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
1. Summary
In the forenoon of Tuesday 28 March 2000, the containership WERDER
BREMEN (WB) was heading north in Öresund and was approaching the
Kullen light. The wind was brisk from the northeast and falling snow had
reduced the visibility to 1-3 cables (185 – 550 metres).
The master, who had the watch, plotted an approaching vessel at a distance
of 2.5 M (nautical miles) on the ARPA radar (Automatic Radar Plotting
Aid).
The approaching ship, which was the tanker MARTINA (MA), was
heading south, on a near counter course and at a close passing distance. On
the Martina as well, it was the ship's master who had the watch, but he had
probably been relieved for a short while by the chief mate.
The two ships collided at 1005 hrs in position N 56° 15'.8 E 12° 25'.0,
which is 208° 2.6 M from the Kullen light. When they collided, at an angle
of 35°- 40°, the MA was cut in two just forward of the bridge. The stern
part sank in a very short time, while the forward part portion kept afloat for
close to four hours and went down
1.9 M north of the stern section. The WB incurred only slight damage
above the waterline and could continue her journey after the rescue
operation.
Two of the seven persons on board the MA were saved by vessels coming
to the rescue, while the remaining five lost their lives.
2. The basis of the investigation
The sequence and analysis of the investigation are based on ROV
(Remotely Operated Vehicle) filming of the wreck, police interrogation of
the officer on watch on board the WB and his statement, police
interrogation of the officer on watch on board the GREEN FLAKE, police
interrogation of the officer on watch on board the VISCARIA, police
interrogation of the two survivors from the MA, the Göteborg MRCC's
(Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre) sound tape of the rescue
operation, and the observations of the divers in their search for the
drowned men. The analysis has also taken into account the examination of
Page 1
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
the salvaged radar units manufactured by Furuno. The examination was
undertaken by Furuno Sverige AB in Gothenburg. The police
interrogations were, for the most part, held by the County Criminal
Investigation Department in Malmö.
Whatever took place on the MA's bridge is shrouded in obscurity since the
OOW (officer of the watch) on the MA did not survive the accident. Thus,
the investigators have only the statement of one of the parties at their
disposal.
The tugboat VISCARIA, which at the time of the collision was approx. 4
M astern the MA, and the reefer GREEN FLAKE, which was approx. 1.75
M astern the WB, have contributed much valuable information, since these
two ships had observed the two vessels involved in the collision on there
respective radar screens.
Page 2
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
3. Factual account
3.1 The Vessels
3.1.1 The Martina
Name of Ship
MARTINA
Call sign
ELNF7
Port of regsitry
Monrovia
Gross tonnage
696/386/393
Deadweight
815 mts
Length over all
55 m
Breadth
9.3 m
Draught
3.5 m (even keel)
Classification Society
Bureau Veritas
Year built
1968
Year rebuilt
1990
Building materieal
Steel
Propulsion power
515 kW
Crew
6
Passangers
1
The Martina was built in 1968 at Baatservice Verft A/S in Mandal,
Norway and was named Jytte Dania. After delivery she operated as a
general cargo vessel of Danish registry for her first 22 years. After three
different name changes she was bought in 1990 by the same owners to
whom she belonged at the time of the accident.
Page 3
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
The MA was constructed to Bureau Veritas (BV) class designation 1 3/3 E
Special Service/Chemical Carrier Deep Sea ICE III. "1" means that the
ship was constructed according to regulation requirements, "3/3" that the
ship was in satisfactory condition, "E" that the anchor equipment complied
with the requirements, "Special Service" that special features had been
built in, and "ICE III" that the vessel was of a certain ice class. "Chemical
Carrier" denoted her type of usage and "Deep Sea" meant that the vessel
was classed for operation in all waters.
In 1989 the ship was transferred from the Danish to the Liberian register,
and in 1990 she was converted from a general cargo vessel to a chemical
tanker. The flag State determined at that time that the difference in gross
tonnage before and after the rebuilding was not significant enough for the
change-over to be considered a "major conversion". Taking that point of
view, the ship did not need an IOPP certificate, since she was not a tanker
and the gross tonnage did not exceed 400.
According to an entry in the MA's tonnage certificate, her gross tonnage
was 386, but in the chemical certificate it was noted as 393. According to
the new tonnage calculation rules of 1969, which entered into force in
1982 for new ships and in 1994 for all ships, a gross tonnage of 696 had
been assigned to the ship. In order for the larger gross tonnage to be
applicable, a conversion constituting a "substantial variation of gross
tonnage" must have been made. The Liberian Administration was of the
opinion that a change according to that definition had not taken place.
The ship was constructed as a typical 60's general cargo vessel with the
deckhouse, containing the master's cabin, other crew accommodations and
the navigating bridge, placed furthest aft on the main deck. The cabins for
the rest of the crew and the engine room were located below this. The
cargo space was located forward of the engine room and consisted of two
cargo holds, separated by a bulkhead and covered by two cargo hatches of
the same size.
The double bottom below the cargo space was divided into three pairs of
tanks, all of them ballast tanks. In addition, there were three centre tanks,
starting at approx. midships (L/2) and extending aft to the forward
bulkhead of the engine room. Of these the two forward tanks were fuel
tanks, which, at the time of the accident, contained between 10 m3 and 15
m3 of diesel oil, and the third was a ballast tank. Two fuel oil day-tanks,
each with a capacity of 1000 litres, were located in the engine room.
Page 4
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
Forward of the cargo space was a forepeak ballast water tank and above
that a dry-storage compartment. Aft of the engine room was an afterpeak
tank and a tank in the overhang, both for fresh water (see annex 2).
At the time of the accident the most significant aids to navigation were one
daylight radar of the make KODEN MD 3751 F, Display Unit MRD-55,
another FURUNO, type 1832 RDP 18 daylight radar, one differential
operation GPS of the make KODEN KGP-931 D, and a NAVITRON type
NT920G autopilot, which was connected to a magnetic compass of the
make IVER C. WEILBACK, a liquid type compass. According to a
deviation table, prepared in 1998, the deviation was 0º on the course in
question, which was approx. 158º.
The Koden radar unit, manufactured in 1988, had been recently
reconditioned and had a new magnetron and a new cathode-ray tube. The
reconditioning had been done in August/September by Stella Marine
Skibselektronik. The other radar unit, the Furuno radar, was manufactured
in 1998.
The ship's main engine was a B&W ALPHA-DIESEL, type 407-26VO. It
had a power out-put of 551 kW, turned at 400 rpm, and was coupled to a
variable pitch propeller, which was also manufactured by ALPHADIESEL. The operational controls, both revolutions and pitch stood at
slightly short of half astern when the ROV filming was carried out about a
week after the accident. The main engine was controlled from the bridge.
The steering engine was equipped with two hydraulic pumps. During
manoeuvring, when quick rudder action were needed, both pumps were in
operation, but only one pump was in use during normal running. The ROV
filming mentioned earlier could establish that the rudder was in position
hard to port.
As mentioned earlier, the MA was converted from a general cargo vessel
to a chemical tanker in 1990. Three cylindrical steel tanks were installed in
cradles in the cargo holds and bolted to the hull. The insides of two of the
tanks were lined with fibreglass and the third with rubber.
One tank of 188 m3 was placed in the forward cargo hold. The other two
were placed in the aft cargo hold; the forward of those tanks had a capacity
of 47 m3 and the aft had a capacity of 282 m3. Fixed ventilation systems
were installed as part of the conversion, as well as a fixed pipe and
Page 5
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
pumping system for cargo handling. The pump was placed in a small
compartment on the weather deck. It was in use only when unloading;
loading was done by means of a dock-side pump. When the tanks were
installed the cargo hatches were permanently welded to their coamings.
When the accident occurred, the MA was on her way from Sarpsborg in
Norway to Copenhagen in Denmark. The cargo consisted of approx. 600
tons of hydrochloric acid, which has IMDG class 8 and UN number 1789.
According to the IMDG Code, the substance poses only insignificant and
short-term hazard to the marine environment
The crew was made up of the master, the chief mate, three able seamen and
one cook-steward, all in compliance with the requirements of the Liberian
Administration. In addition, the master's father was on board as a
passenger. He was listed in the manning document as an electrician and
stayed in the salon, which was located on the starboard side of the main
deck. All persons on board were Polish nationals.
The diver-assisted search for the victims showed the master to be in the
salon and the very lightly clad chief mate on the bridge.
The ship's inflatable life raft of the make VIKING was located on the boat
deck port side and was equipped with a hydrostatic release device of the
make TANNER. A davit-launched lifeboat was located on the starboard
side of the boat deck.
The MA had been the subject of a port State control on 17 September 1999
in Aarhus, Denmark. The survey revealed no deficiencies.
Page 6
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
3.1.2 The Werder Bremen
Name of Ship
WERDER BREMEN
Call sign
9HMW6
Port of regsitry
Valetta
Gross tonnage
6378
Deadweight
7114 mts
Length over all
121 m
Breadth
18.4 m
Draught
6.7 m
Classification Society
Germanischer Lloyd
Year built
1999
Building materieal
Steel
Propulsion power
5300 kW
Crew
13
The WB was built in 1999 at the J.J. Sietas KG Schiffswerft GmbH & Co
in Hamburg as an "open top" container vessel with a cargo capacity of 700
TEU (in 20 foot entities). The WB was delivered just four months before
the accident occurred.
The WB was constructed to the Germanischer Lloyd (GL) class and was
designated +100 A 5 E3 ”Container Ship”, ”open-top”, SOLAS II-2,
Reg.54. "+" means that the construction had been supervised by GL, "100
A 5" means that the ship had been built entirely to GL's requirements, and
"E3" denotes ice class 1A. " Container Ship" denotes that the ship was
intended solely for container cargo, and "open top" that the ship was
allowed to sail, altogether or partially, without weather deck hatches. "
Page 7
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
SOLAS II-2, Reg. 54" specifies that the ship was equipped to carry
dangerous goods.
The deckhouse of the WB, which housed the crew accommodations and
the bridge, was typical for a container vessel, both as to of its height and
because it was extremely narrow, and also because it was located as far aft
as it could possibly be. The visibility from the bridge was excellent. At the
time of the accident the cargo consisted of 119 containers of 40 foot each
and 136 containers of 20 foot. Only a few were loaded on the weather
deck.
The cargo space contained four cargo holds, of which cargo hold number
3, which was the largest, was an open cargo hold. The remaining three
holds were covered by steel patent hatches. All four cargo holds were
provided with guider systems for loading the containers.
The engine room was located below the deckhouse. Forward of the engine
room and below the container cargo space was the double bottom
containing various tanks for bunker fuel and ballast water.
Forward of the cargo space and the double bottom was a forepeak tank.
Above that and below the forecastle was a storage compartment.
The ship was operated by an eight-cylinder main engine of the make MAN
B&W Maker. It had a power out-put of 5300 kW and was coupled via a
reduction gear box to a variable pitch propeller, allowing the ship a
maximum speed of 17 knots. Manoeuvring was done from the bridge and
the system was classed for unmanned machinery space. The WB was
equipped with a 550 kW YASTRAM bow thruster.
The rudder was a so-called flap rudder with a maximum rudder angle of
45º. With two steering engine pumps in operation, as was the case at the
time in question, the rudder could be shifted from the one extreme position
to the other in 18 seconds.
The turn radius of the ship, fully loaded, with the rudder turned to the limit
and the engine at full speed, was 1.2 cables.
The bows of the WB were prominently flared and the topmost portion of
the prow protruded approx. 2.5 metres in front of the very sturdily
constructed bulbous bow.
Page 8
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
A free-fall lifeboat was located aft of the superstructure and a MOB boat
(Man Over Board) was suspended from a davit on the starboard side.
The bridge was of the pilot-copilot type, arranged on the ship's centreline,
where two STN ATLAS 9600 radar units, were located; those aids to
navigation that are the most pertinent to this occurrence. The radar on the
starboard side was an ARPA radar with a wave length of 10 cm. The port
radar was also an ARPA radar, which had a wave length of 3 cm.
A display screen for a STN ATLAS 9300 electronic navigation chart,
which, according to the interrogation held on board, was not in operation at
the time of the accident, was located between the two radar units, and
behind each of these were the seats of the navigators. The steering
apparatus and the manoeuvring controls, located on a control panel
between the navigators' seats were easily accessible from these positions.
A gyrocompass of the make PLATH was also located on the control panel.
The WB sailed on a regular route between Russia and the Continent. All
her courses and waypoints were pre-programmed in a DGPS (Differential
Global Positioning System) of the make STN-ATLAS.
There were twelve Polish nationals and one German in the WB's 13-man
crew. The watches on board were arranged into four-hour passes, and the
master was on duty from 2000 hrs until 2400 hrs and between the hours of
0800 and 1200.
The WB had been the subject of a port State control in Antwerp, Belgium
on 19 January 2000. The survey revealed no deficiencies.
3.1.3 Weather conditions on 28 March 2000
According to the SMHI (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological
Institute) there was a low-pressure area located over Central Europe and a
high-pressure area over mid-Scandinavia. Between these systems was a
northeasterly air current of 8-12 m/sec above the province of Skåne,
Sweden and the surrounding waters.
During the forenoon an area of snow mixed with rain was moving west
over Skåne towards Sjaelland, Denmark and the southern part of Kattegatt.
According to reports from the site of the accident, the visibility was only a
few cables, which is in keeping with such weather conditions.
Page 9
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
For short periods the visibility may have been as low as a few hundred
metres, since heavy snowfall lowers visibility considerably.
According to statements from the rescue units participating in the
operation, the current was set north-northwest at 1-2 knots.
According to the SMHI's calculations, the wave height was only approx.
0.5 metres due to offshore winds.
4. The rescue operation
At 1008 hrs the WB hailed the Coast Guard and reported that she had
collided with an unknown vessel. As soon as the MRCC in Gothenburg
realized that it was a distress call, it took charge of the rescue action and
sent out a " May Day Relay", which was subsequently repeated at regular
intervals during the day.
Within a short time a large number of commercial ships, Navy vessels,
Coast Guard vessels, helicopters, and Coast Guard aircraft responded. The
first military unit, the HMS Östhammar, which arrived at the site of the
collision, rescued two of the MA's crewmembers.
Approx. 20 entities on the water or in the air participated in the search for
survivors throughout the day. Nine MRCC staff members were on duty
together with another five persons, who made up a support group. The
reason for the large number of people manning the MRCC was the very
intensive radio and telephone traffic and the mass media pressure.
The extensive rescue operation, which was carried out most satisfactorily,
was terminated at 2040 hrs.
5. Course of events according to the WB
On 28 March 2000 the master relieved the chief officer on the bridge at
0800 hrs, just as the ship was passing Copenhagen and was proceeding in
the Drogen Channel. He had been off duty for the preceding eight hours
and felt rested.
He sat down in the seat behind the 10-cm radar, which was in the "true
motion" mode, centred and set on the 3-M range. The other radar was also
Page 10
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
operating in the "true motion" mode and centred, but was set on the 6-M
range. The master stated that he had kept these settings during his whole
watch until the moment of collision. The ship was operated by means of
the autopilot, and thus the master was alone on the bridge at the beginning
of his watch.
At the time of the change of watch the wind was northeasterly at approx.
12 m/sec with a visibility of 3 M. At 0900 hrs the visibility deteriorated to
4-5 cables due to snow and the master called up the able seaman of the
watch to serve as look-out. He stationed himself on the port bridge wing.
After having passed the buoy M1 in the northern end of the traffic
separation scheme at Helsingborg, the course was laid at 334º and was
shortly thereafter changed to a course of 332º. According to the police
interrogation, the speed at that time was approx. 15.5-15.7 knots in a
following current of slightly more than one knot. At first the engine power
output was approx. 95%, but it was reduced to 88% because of the
visibility condition.
The master noticed an echo on his radar screen approx. 10º off the
starboard bow at a distance of 2.5 M. He plotted the echo on the ARPA
radar and could determine that the echo was heading 160º-162º at a speed
of 11 knots. CPA (Closest Point of Approach) for the echo showed 0.5 M
off starboard.
He then plotted another echo 20º to port, and then again plotted the first
echo, which still remained off the starboard bow, but now at a distance of
approx. 1.5 M. CPA was still 0.5 M off starboard, which, from a safety
standpoint, the master considered to be an adequate passing distance.
Since the master at this time felt certain that the two ships would meet
starboard to starboard at a safe distance, he no longer paid close attention
to the approaching ship.
Approximately three minutes later both the master and the outlook caught
visual sight through the snow fog of a ship close to starboard at a distance
of roughly 1-1.5 cables. The ship, which later turned out to be the Martina,
was making a starboard turn.
Page 11
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
The MA's turn increased and the master realized that the other ship would
cross the WB's course line. The forward speed was immediately reduced to
zero and the rudder was pat hard to starboard.
The master observed that the aft section sank rapidly and that the forward
section turned over. He also noticed two men in the water, who were
rescued after about 20 minutes by a Swedish naval vessel, which had
hurried to the scene.
The master hailed the Coast Guard on the VHF Channel 16 immediately
after the collision, stated the name of his vessel, what had occurred, and
that assistance was needed. The crew was called up at once, the free-fall
lifeboat was manned and launched, and look-outs were posted on the
bridge.
According to the master, the WB gave the required acoustic signals for
operating in reduced visibility. He heard no signals from the other ship.
The questioning of the look-out did not reveal anything that was at
variance with the master's statement.
The WB participated throughout the day and evening in the continuing
search and rescue action.
6. The collision
The ROV films, which the Coat Guard made, show that the bulb and bow
of the WB struck the port side of the MA approx. three metres forward of
the bridge and that the bow penetrated the ship to approx. two thirds of her
width.
The depth of the penetration together with the MA's speed caused her to be
torn in two, with the stern portion dragging along the starboard side of the
WB, as evidenced by the scratches along the WB's hull.
The WB's bow opened the whole forward part of the deckhouse, both the
bridge and the crew accommodations, on the other ship. The topmost
railing of the flared prow plunged into the bridge approx. half a metre
under the roof of the wheelhouse, wrenching out or forcing aside the
equipment in the front portion of the bridge. A forward window with
windshield wipers, a clear-view pane, and some fragments of wood were
Page 12
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
found on the WB's forecastle after the collision. The forward engine room
bulkhead was also ripped off, which left the engine room entirely open. A
deformed steel plate folded over the liferaft so that the raft remained in
place.
The aft part of the MA was thus laid opened from the roof of the bridge to
the floor of the engine room, causing the ship to flood and sink in a matter
of seconds.
The bow continued moving slightly to port, as viewed from the WB, and
quickly overturned. Air pockets in the forepeak and some of the double
bottom tanks kept it afloat until it went down after almost four hours.
7. The wreck
7.1 The stern part
The aft part sank at the site of the collision at N 56° 15'.76 E 12° 25'.01
approx. 2.6 M bearing 208° from the Kullen light. The water depth at this
location is between 23 and 24 metres.
The ROV film that was made a week after the collision, showed that this
portion of the wreck stood on an almost even keel and that the stern mast
was intact. The mast was only a few metres below the surface of the water.
A new ROV filming a week later showed that the stern had settled into the
bottom sediment up to the loadline, which was 3.5 metres.
Sounding data after yet another week showed the water depth to be 10.7
metres above the funnel and 7.0 metres above the mast. This indicates that
the upper portion of the spliced mast had either broken off or was
overlooked when the sounding was done.
7.2 The bow part
The current brought the forward part of the ship to position N 56° 17'.66 E
12° 24'.29 approx. 1.7 M from the Kullen light, where it sank. The distance
between the two sections of the ship is 1.9 M.
Page 13
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
The forward part lies at a depth of 24-26 metres and has a port list of
approx. 120º. The fore mast is embedded in the bottom sediment. The
cargo tanks proved to be intact.
The water depth above this part of the wreck is 17.7 metres.
7.3 Planned action
The water depth above the wreckage to the north is somewhat more than
17 metres and does not pose any navigational hazard.
Regarding the wreckage to the south, which consists of the engine room,
the crew accommodations and the bridge, the police has determined that,
any bodies which may remain in the ship shall be removed, if possible.
After that, the plan is to cut the wreckage down to the boat deck, so that the
water depth will be at least 15.0 metres at mean low water.
It is further planned to shift the sector boundary line between white and red
sectors at the Svinbådan light by 3º. The wreckage will then lie within the
red sector of the Svinbådan light.
8. Observations from the VISCARIA
The Swedish tugboat Viscaria was heading south and had set a course of
approx. 158º towards the M1 buoy in the traffic separation scheme in
northern Öresund. The visibility was very poor with heavy snow falling.
An echo of a ship heading in the same direction, which subsequently
turned out to be the MA, was observed on the heading marker on the radar
screen. The mate on watch had observed the echo for several hours and
noticed that it held approximately the same course. The distance was
shortening since the Viscaria's speed was about a knot faster than the
MA's.
When the distance was approx. 4 M an approaching echo appeared at a
distance of 6 M, on which the mate put the electronic bearing cursor. The
calculated starboard to starboard passing distance of this echo, which
turned out to be the WB, seemed to the mate to be so close that he was
prepared to turn starboard for passing port to port.
Page 14
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
The mate estimated that the passing distance would be 2-3 cables if each
ship kept its respective course.
The mate was distracted by a mechanical defect of the variable ring of the
radar and he did not notice whether or not the MA made a starboard turn.
The Viscaria participated in the search and rescue efforts throughout the
day and evening.
9. Observations from the GREEN FLAKE
The Maltese registered reefer Green Flake (GF) was heading north in
Öresund with her master on the bridge. The ship was equipped with a 3-cm
ARPA radar, which was set on the 3-M range, and a
10-cm radar which was operating on various ranges between 0.75 M and 3
M. Both radar units were manufactured by KELVIN-HUGHES.
While passing the east shore of the island of Ven, the GF was overtaken on
her port side by the WB which, according the master of the GF, was
proceeding at approx. 17 knots. The echo of the WB was visible on the
GF's radar the whole time until the collision. The master of the GF
estimated that the WB kept her speed constant during her northbound
voyage in Öresund.
Snow caused visibility to deteriorate during the voyage north and when the
ship passed the buoy M1 at 0940 hrs at a distance of 0.4 M it could not be
sighted visually. From the buoy the course was set at 324º and at that time
the WB was approx. 1.5 M ahead of the GF, approx. 20º off the starboard
bow on a slightly more easterly course.
When the GF was abeam the buoy Öresund Norra the master saw a new
echo at a distance of 4 M on his 10-cm radar. He did not plot that echo,
which subsequently turned out to be the MA, since the passing distance as
judged from the echo tracks on the screen, was adequate. However, he
estimated the course of the echo to be on a counter course to the WB,
which at that time was 1.75 M distant from the GF.
In the opinion of the GF's master it appeared that the WB and the MA
would meet bow to bow or possibly port to port. He made this judgement
with the aid of the tracks left by each echo on the radar screen. Based on
these tracks he anticipated that, if the two ships kept their respective
Page 15
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
courses, the meeting would occur bow to bow or possibly very close port
to port. At this point the WB was approx. 20º on the GF's port bow.
Shortly thereafter the WB's distress call was heard on the VHF. The GF
headed towards the place of the accident and was the first vessel to arrive
there in 8-9 minutes. The WB was then in the process of launching her
MOB boat.
The GF participated in the search and rescue efforts throughout the day and
evening.
10. Plotting by means of the ARPA radar
As noted earlier, the WB was equipped with a 10-cm ARPA radar. The
master used the radar functions, among other things, to determine the
courses of the target echoes, speed and CPA by plotting specific echoes.
To do so, the radar cross hairs are placed on a selected echo and ”target
acquire” is first activated, whereby an electronic cross marks the echo.
Then the "target select" is activated and after a while, when the radar has
made the necessary calculations, the result is presented on a menu on the
radar screen at the same time as a direction vector and a speed vector are
created by the selected echo. After a short while, when the vector has
become stabilized, it indicates the course of the echo and becomes longer
the faster the echo moves.
When one echo has been plotted it is possible to proceed with the next
echo. In this way a large number of echoes can stay plotted and
subsequently, by using the cross hairs, any echo can be selected and the
result immediately be displayed on the menu.
The vector mentioned above shows simultaneously on the radar screen for
each of the selected echoes. This makes it possible to visually determine
how different echoes move in relation to ones own ship and it allows a
rough estimate of how "dangerous" an echo may be. It is also possible to
detect any changes in the direction of the other echoes. If more precise data
is needed, the procedure described in the paragraph above must be
followed for each individual echo.
Page 16
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
When an echo is no longer of interest and does not need to stay plotted, the
cross hairs are placed on it, the "cancel" key is pressed, and the ARPA
function drops the echo and its up-dating mode.
11. Analysis
11.1 Plotting on board the WB
The master of the WB plotted the echo, which turned out to be the MA, at
a distance of 2.5 M. On the menu he found the information regarding
course, speed and CPA that he needed. This data did not at all trouble him
and he cancelled the plotting in order to start plotting another vessel. A
couple of minutes later he repeated the procedure for the first echo and got
the same data. After yet another few minutes the MA appeared out of the
snow fog under a starboard turn on a crossing course, and directly
thereafter the collision occurred.
By using the ARPA function of his radar in this manner the master
deprived himself of the option of continually following an approaching
echo's course and speed changes by means of watching the vector that a
plotted echo presents. According to the master's statement, the ARPA
function of the radar performed poorly or not at all at distances of less than
1 M.
The master was asked if he realized that it is possible to have maybe as
many as 20 different echoes activated at the same time, and why he had
cancelled the "old" echo before he plotted a new one. He replied that he
"usually always does it that way".
11.2 The MA's radar
Divers brought up the MA's newly renovated Koden radar one week after
the collision. It proved to be set on "stand by" with the brilliance turned
down to zero and the gain set at 25%. This means that the Koden radar was
not in operation around the time when the accident occurred.
The Furuno radar had its place on the port side of the bridge and was torn
off by the WB's bow in the collision. It was salvaged later than the Koden
radar since it had been difficult to find among the debris. It was
subsequently sent to Furuno Sverige AB to be examined.
Page 17
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
Except for water damage, there were no visible external damages.
Verdigris and rust damages were found on mechanical parts when the unit
was dismantled. The power unit contained components that had been
singed when they came into contact with the seawater. The processor also
showed verdigrital damages.
After cleaning and repairs the printed circuit card could be restarted and
the electronic menu selections could be accessed. This type of radar was so
designed that it saved the last settings that had been in use before a power
failure. The examination showed that the Furuno radar was supplied with
electric power when the ship foundered.
It seemed improbable that the control knobs on the face of the panel had
been effected by external forces at the time of the accident. It took a certain
effort to turn the three turn-knobs "gain", "anti-clutter sea", and "anticlutter rain" and they were not mechanically damaged. Other knobs were
set into the panel and did not protrude from the face of the frame. To alter
the menu selection required at least two keystrokes.
The examinations further showed that the "gain" setting was 0%, the "anticlutter sea" setting was 80%, and the "anti-clutter rain" setting was 95%. It
could not be determined whether or not the radar had been in the "standby" or "send" mode at the time of the accident.
The radar picture, which could be displayed in the sending mode by using
the settings that were found, has not, on the whole, shown any echoes
within the set range, which was 2 M.
11.3 The MA's actions
Since there were only two officers on board, the watches were most likely
divided into six-hour passes and the master had probably come on duty at
0600. According to the two survivors, the master was on the bridge, which
indicates that the collision occurred on his watch.
In the dives for the drowned men, the master was found in the salon and
the lightly clad chief mate was found on the bridge. It seems probable that
the chief mate had been called to the bridge or come there of his own
accord to relieve the master for one reason or another.
Page 18
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
It seems clear that one of the two officers was on the bridge at the time of
the accident.
Nobody knows what took place on the bridge of the MA. The settings of
the Furuno radar can not be determined with absolute certainty since, after
all, much could have happened to the unit at the time of the collision, when
it was torn off by the prow of the WB and the sea flooded the bridge with
great force as the ship very rapidly foundered.
The fact that the master and the look-out on the WB detected the MA in
the process of making a starboard turn indicates that the OOW on the MA
was aware of the WB, since he had started the turn before the ships were
able to sight each other visually. A starboard turn at this point was
probably not part of the voyage plan. The MA's turn to starboard before the
WB was sighted visually seems to contradict the settings found on the
Furuno radar when it was brought up by the divers, namely that the radar
had been in the "stand by" mode at the time of the collision, with brilliance
and gain set as described in section 11.2 of this report.
Considering the testimony by the mate of the Viscaria (see section 8) it
could be possible that the navigator of the MA also judged the passing
distance starboard to starboard to be too close and therefore altered his
course to starboard so that the ships would meet port to port.
He might have assumed that the WB would also change her course to
starboard. When he realized, too late, that this was not the case he
increased his turn since it was too late to steady the course.
The accident appears to have been a typical radar collision, where one
vessel, in reduced visibility, makes a judgement regarding the collision
threat, that is the entirely contrary to the other's.
11.4 Propeller position of the wreck
The ROV films, taken a week after the accident, showed the propeller
blades at a pitch of approx. zero, although the control lever on the bridge
showed almost half astern.
The main engine powered the hydraulic oil pump, which conveyed
hydraulic pressure to the propeller. When the main engine stopped it
caused the pump to stop and this could very well have caused the pitch of
Page 19
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
the propeller blades to change as the pump pressure ceased. That the
position of the propeller blades did not agree with the position of the
control lever is most likely a result of the collision, when the bow of the
WB tore off the forward bulkhead and dislodged the equipment on the
bridge
11.5 Rudder position of the wreck
The same ROV films showed that the rudder was in position hard to port.
According to the master of the WB, the MA was in the process of making a
starboard turn when she was sighted at 1-1.5 cables. It is possible that the
navigator on board the MA, when the collision was imminent, by altering
the rudder hard to port tried to swing the stern out of the way in a last
desperate attempt to avoid the collision.
11.6 The collision angle
The master of the WB stated that his ship struck the MA frontally at an
angle of 35º-40º, which could very well be the case. Because of the MA's
speed ahead, the bow of the WB was pushed to port, causing the vessels'
relative angle to increase. The starboard bow of the WB was pushed with
tremendous force against the bridge and forward bulkhead of the MA's
deckhouse until that ship was broken in two.
On the ROV films this made it appear as if the collision angle had been
close to 90º.
11.7 Passing distance - CPA
According to the interrogation of the master of the Werder Bremen on the
day of the accident, the ARPA radar showed the CPA of the MA to be 0.5
M to starboard.
The tug Viscaria, which was on approximately the same course as the MA
and had her on its heading on the radar screen, felt that its own passing
distance to the WB starboard to starboard would be uncomfortably close.
The tug was prepared to turn starboard and meet the WB port to port. The
Viscaria judged the CPA to be
0.2-0.3 M if the courses were maintained.
Page 20
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
The GF had been overtaken by the WB and had that ship 20º on her
starboard bow at a distance of approx. 1.75 M. The WB's course was
approx. 8º further east that the GF's. Based on the tracks left by the WB
and the MA on the radar screen, the master of the GF estimated that those
two ships would meet bow to bow or perhaps close port to port.
Taking into account the three different estimates, where two are
presumably entirely objective, it seems clear that the passing distance
between the WB and the MA would have been very close if the two ships
had maintained their courses.
12. Cause of the accident
The cause of the accident was the starboard turn of the MA in front of the
bow of the WB, which was executed without the master of the WB being
aware of the turn until he visually caught sight of the other ship as it
appeared out of the snow fog.
A contributing cause may have been that the master of the WB did not
optimally utilize his radar equipment.
There was no action taken on board the WB, although the passing distance
was close.
Some kind of technical malfunction on board the MA, which caused the
MA to unintentionally make the starboard turn when the two ships were
meeting each other, can not be eliminated.
13. Comments
•
Regulation 7(a) of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREG)
"Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If
there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist."
•
Regulation 7(b) of the COLREG
"Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational,
including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of
collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of
Page 21
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
detected objects."
The master of the WB had seemingly not made optimal use of his radar
equipment, as regulated by Regulation 7(a) and 7(b).
•
Regulation 8(a) of the COLREG
"Any action to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case
admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the
observance of good seamanship."
The OOW of the MA does not appear to have executed his change of
course in a manner that was "positive and in ample time".
•
The requirement in Regulation 5 of the COLREG regarding a lookout was not satisfied on board the MA.
•
Regulation 6 of the COLREG
"Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can
take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped
within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and
conditions."
Both ships were proceeding at full speed or nearly full speed, which
was not in compliance with Regulation 6.
•
The master of the WB very promptly hailed the Coast Guard. He ought
to have contacted the MRCC directly. However, this did not delay the
rescue action since the MRCC was listening in.
14. General recommendations
If any one of the regulations 7a, 7b, 8a and 6 of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which are the bases for the
comments above, had been complied with more strictly, the accident might
possibly have been avoided. Thus, it is important to give proper attention
to these regulations at all times and in all situations.
Radar collisions have been a matter of reality ever since radar was first
installed on board ships, no matter how sophisticated the systems have
become. Therefore, it is imperative to remember that a navigator on
another bridge may come to a totally different conclusion than one's own,
especially when passing at a short CPA.
Page 22
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
15. Damages
15.1 Personal injuries
Two crewmembers managed to leave the MA and were rescued, much
chilled, by a Swedish naval vessel. The two survivors had served as cooksteward and able seaman. They recovered quickly.
The remaining five men on board the MA lost their lives. All who drowned
were found in the living quarters and were brought up in a diving
operation, which was undertaken at the request of the police and the
Swedish Maritime Administration.
There were no reports of personal injuries on board the WB.
15.2 Structural damages
15.2.1 The Martina
The MA was broken in two and the ship with its cargo was lost.
15.2.2 The Werder Bremen
Two holes of 300 and 50 mm in diameter and surrounding indentations
were caused approx. 2.5 metres above the waterline in the hull plating on
the port side in the storage space near the first and the second frame from
the bow. The frames were also damaged.
There were also indentations in the plating of the storage compartment
immediately above the forepeak tank and the two forward frames were
damaged as well.
The third area of indentations was in the hull plating on the port side of the
upper portion of the forepeak tank and the adjoining frame.
The bulbous bow suffered some slight indentations.
The damages, which were examined by a surveyor of the Swedish
Maritime Safety Inspectorate, were considered of an art to allow the ship to
continue her voyage. However, the classification society was to make an
inspection in the next port of arrival.
Page 23
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
15.3 Environmental consequences
15.3.1 The diesel fuel
The oil in the two day-tanks in the engine room has most probably seeped
out. The Coast Guard, which has kept the area under observation, has not
been able to detect any damage to the environment.
The two double-bottom tanks, which together contained 10-15m3 of diesel
oil at the time of the accident, are believed to still hold most of the original
diesel oil. The Swedish Maritime Administration has requested the
shipowner to retrieve the oil.
15.3.2 The cargo
The ROV films show the three cargo tanks to be intact. The Swedish
Maritime Administration has requested the shipowner to remove the cargo,
which consists of 600 ton of hydrochloric acid.
Permission has been granted to discharge the hydrochloric acid into the sea
under controlled conditions. By so doing, the damage to the environment is
considered to be short-term and of a temporary nature.
16. Conclusions of the investigation
•
The weather conditions at the time of the accident were northeasterly
winds at 8-12 m/sec. with snow and visibility of 0.1-0.3 M.
•
The master of the WB was on her bridge, and the chief mate was on the
bridge of the MA.
•
A look-out was on duty on the WB, but the officer of the watch was
probably alone on the bridge of the MA.
•
After having plotted the MA at a distance of approx. 1.5 M, the master
of the WB cancelled the data, and the echo vector disappeared from the
radar screen.
•
The MA's oldest but newly renovated radar, the Koden radar, was not
in operation at the time of the accident.
Page 24
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
•
The settings on the MA's newest radar, the Furuno radar, can not be
determined.
•
If each ship had maintained her course the result would have been a
very short CPA distance.
•
The MA turned starboard in front of the WB's prow, and the WB tried
to avoid the collision by stopping the engine and make a starboard turn.
•
The bow of the WB struck the MA just forward of the deckhouse at an
angle of 35º-40º.
•
When they collided, the speed of the WB was approx. 15 knots and the
speed of the MA was approx. 11 knots.
•
The MA was cut in two and the two sections went down 1.9 M from
each other.
•
Two of the seven persons on board the MA were rescued and five lost
their lives.
•
An extensive search and rescue operation was initiated.
•
Soundings revealed that the aft section of the wreck, in contrast to the
forward section, constituted a hazard to shipping and certain measures
were taken.
17. Additional information
At the end of May the MA's bunker tanks were emptied of oil, which was
removed.
The valves of the tanks containing the acid were located and opened.
Seawater was pumped in by means of the existing pipe system and the
hydrochloric acid was forced out into the sea.
One empty drum of lubricating grease was found beyond the stern portion.
At the beginning of June the bodies of four of the victims were brought up.
Three of them were found in the salon and one in a toilet on the deck
below. According to the police, one of the persons found in the salon was
Page 25
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
28 March 2000
identified as the master. The chief mate had been found on the bridge
during a previous dive.
The stern of the wreck was cut down so that the water depth above that
section now is 16.5 metres.
Page 26